SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST

G.R. No. 166715

August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST petitioners, vs.

HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). 3 It covers all officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. 4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the
targeted amount of tax revenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization. 6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the
Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection
falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a
system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6)
submit an annual report to Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials
may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the

enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being premature
as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the
exercise of this Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution
of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed
mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared
objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct
from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard
that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the
legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the
implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And
a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal
stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere
enactment of the law even without any further overt act, 13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete
legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake
in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The
grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And
where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the
public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs
of the people they are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily
obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection. 15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere
conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an
underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.

Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty
hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To invalidate RA 9335 based
on petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional
performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the
concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty
to public service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the customs as
well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws
against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in
detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of
their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335
establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or
mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary measures
is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. The officials, examiners,
and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts
of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties
shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of
such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. 19When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. InVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,20 this Court
declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has

held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary
that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.21 (emphasis
supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the subject of the law is the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law
should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they
have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and
subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by
the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the
management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the
following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports
of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;

(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 27 To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" 29 the delegated power to the President to fix revenue
targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund,
is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective
revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the Excess

the Revenue Targets

Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to

the Fund

30% or below

15%

More than 30%

15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining

excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF)
submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of

the agencies revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the
collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the
scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority and identifies the conditions under which
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration
of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated
under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation,
as has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the
period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or
potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of
responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic
difficulties brought about by natural calamities orforce majeure or economic causes as may be
determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the
Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That
such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the
separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the
application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other
than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. 31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays
down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with
due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 32 The
action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity,"
"public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation Of Powers

Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two
senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by
the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have
approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore
cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved
the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c)
to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20 th century, Congress
has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform
their functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative
operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of
government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and
report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.
xxx
b. Congressional investigation

xxx

xxx

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of
Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI,
xxx
xxx
xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative
supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny
and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive
branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the
force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to
Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such
legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of
a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime.
Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively
approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the
legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to
the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of
such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this
arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected
administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our
law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led
Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and
general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive
officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of
parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could
be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative
power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post
enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its
policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative
intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive
prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an
impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive
or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers
as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They
submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize
only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive
proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions
of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the
approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a
delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by
Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority,
they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over
the evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the validity of
legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the
deportation of Chadha pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States
House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to 244(c)(2) authorizing
either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings
to implement the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals
dismissed the aliens appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress. The
United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without constitutional authority to
order the aliens deportation and that 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from
the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and
bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is
subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower court decisions
invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes
containing legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of both Houses
of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions
were not even exercised.35(emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the nature
and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189
(The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked
not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the
IRR promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections.36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.
It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive
branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members
with either executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution, 39 including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation 40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
"right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the

form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitutions diagram of power
as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. 44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative
competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. 46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in
all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. 47 Thus, what is left for the executive
branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill
up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent
rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. 49 Such rules and regulations partake of the
nature of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the
force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in
an appropriate case by a competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass
upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is vested in Congress which consists of
two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of
both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either
or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a
congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the
Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative
act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of
Congress.

In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President. 55 As summarized by Justice Isagani
Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for some measures
that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature
or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its
entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important
stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least
three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes and explain
them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three
readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the
House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers 59
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient
standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective
because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by
the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the
determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. 62 As such, it is only upon its
effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said
law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing
the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing
rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the
implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be similar
provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating
them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought
before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other
provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.

Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the
remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and
effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than
complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it
could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the
parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute
to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision
from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand
independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete,
intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is shown,
the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of
RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.]

LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14
November 1990.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated
14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court
of Appeals.
It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving
as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974. 1
On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate
Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." 2 Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First
Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted
an appointment to be ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. 3
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire
government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court
and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice, now
Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the
United Nations Sedfrey Ordoez as Vice Chairman. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative
powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned
reorganization of the Judiciary. 4
The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court
of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices.
When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioners seniority
ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26). 5
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence
for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33, which
reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"SECTION 2. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended to read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding
Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The
Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment and the Associate Justice shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two
or more shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by
the President. Any Member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other
position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original
appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purpose be considered as continuous
and uninterrupted." 6
Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her own
Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction of the inadvertent error would only implement
the intent of the President as well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind
of constitutional confrontation (between the President and the Supreme Court). 7
Petitioner points to the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano, former Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals who, according to petitioner, was transferred from his position as Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the Ministry of Justice as Commissioner of Land Registration and in 1986 was reappointed
to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner states that his (Victorianos) stint in the Commission of Land
Registration did not adversely affect his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals, for, in his case,
Executive Order No. 33 was correctly applied. 8

In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Justice Punos
request. 9 It will be noted that before the issuance of said resolution, there was no written opposition
to, or comment on petitioners aforesaid request. The dispositive portion of the resolution
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno for correction of his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals is granted. The presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable
Rodolfo A. Nocon, is hereby directed to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from number twelve
(12) to number five (5). Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator and the
Judicial and Bar Council for their guidance and information." 10
A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later
filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices
affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with
fifty one (51) members and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither
can he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been
appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. 11
The Court en banc in a resolution dated 17 January 1992 required the petitioner to file his comment on
the motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated 29 November 1990.
In his Comment, petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg.
129, his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino
rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3
(otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution) that "no right provided under the unratified 1973
Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution." 12
Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last
sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and
re-enactment mandate, according to petitioner, the preservation and enforcement of all rights and
liabilities which had accrued under the original statute. 13 Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although
the power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the
Government, such power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this
case, by the limits set by Executive Order NO. 33 14 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded
in violation of law. 15
Justices Javellana and Campos were required by the Court to file their reply to Justice Punos comment
on their motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 24 January
1991.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, Associate Justices Javellana and Campos submit that the
appeal or request for correction filed by the petitioner was addressed to the wrong party. They aver
that as petitioner himself had alleged the mistake to be an "inadvertent error" of the Office of the
President, ergo, he should have filed his request for correction also with said Office of the President
and not directly with the Supreme Court. 16 Furthermore, they point out that petitioner had indeed
filed with the Office of the President a request or petition for correction of his ranking, (seniority) but
the same was not approved such that his recourse should have been an appropriate action before the
proper court and impleading all parties concerned. The aforesaid non-approval by the Office of the
President they argue, should be respected by the Supreme Court "not only on the basis of the doctrine
of separation of powers but also their presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they
are entrusted to enforce" 17 for it (the non-approval) is a confirmation that petitioners seniority
ranking at the time of his appointment by President Aquino was, in fact, deliberate and not an
"inadvertent error" as petitioner would have the Court believe. 18
The resolution of this controversy is not a pleasant task for the Court since it involves not only
members of the next highest court of the land but persons who are close to members of this Court.
But the controversy has to be resolved. The core issue in this case is whether the present Court of
Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly

enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33 or whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the Court
of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said Executive Order No. 33.
It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct
from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33,
for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government
of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986.
A resolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it" 19 or as "a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least
some acts of violence." 20 In Kelsens book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that
which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a
way not prescribed by the first order itself." 21
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as
the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime.
This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of
making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." 22 It has
been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from
there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution." 23
The three (3) clauses that precede the text of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, 24
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon C. Aquino was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines;
"WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended;
"WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the sovereign mandate of the people, do hereby promulgate the following Provisional
Constitution."25cralaw:red
These summarize the Aquino governments position that its mandate is taken from "a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people." 26
Discussions and opinions of legal experts also proclaim that the Aquino government was "revolutionary
in the sense that it came into existence in defiance of the existing legal processes" 27 and that it was a
revolutionary government "instituted by the direct action of the people and in opposition to the
authoritarian values and practices of the overthrown government." 28
A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was overthrown by
the Aquino government. "A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all
the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state operates under a written
constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs
are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments,
along with those in the constitution, comprise the legal order of that constitutional state." 29 It is
assumed that the legal order remains as a "culture system" of the polity as long as the latter endures
30 and that a point may be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a

whole for it is no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials. 31
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in
fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986 presidential election. 32 Thus it
can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and
her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the
administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revampt of the Judiciary and the Military
signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive
Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of
Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointments
thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to
precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive
Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.
But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive Order No. 33 did not abolish the precedence or seniority
ranking resulting from previous appointment to the Court of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court
existing prior to the 1986 revolution, it is believed that President Aquino as head of then revolutionary
government, could disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her
appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.
It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 33, President Aquino was still
exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and legislative
powers, such that she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her
own Executive Order No. 33. It should also be remembered that the same situation was still in force
when she issued the 1986 appointments to the Court of Appeals. In other words, President Aquino, at
the time of the issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified or disregarded the rule embodied in B.P.
Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33, on precedence or seniority in the case of the
petitioner, for reasons known only to her. Since the appointment extended by the President to the
petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in the roster of
justices, was a valid appointment anchored on the Presidents exercise of her then revolutionary
powers, it is not for the Court at this time to question or correct that exercise.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of
members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were
made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME
AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 146738

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the
President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities
are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While
the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a
democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he
would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing
on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit"
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused
the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to
August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes
intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue
Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by
Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral
statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the
presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. 3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17,
former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of
resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo
resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services 6 and later asked for petitioner's
resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic
Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator
Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department
of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together
with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino. 10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon
was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative

Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21)
senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. 13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started. 14 The battle
royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House
Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul
Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura.
They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now
Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former
Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day
trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the
constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings was the
testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away
from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million
investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000. 15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on
January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who
served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW
Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading. 16 Then came the fateful day of
January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose
Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned
as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets
of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation.
They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. 19Senator Raul Roco
quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives
shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion. 20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people
holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to
the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers
walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA
Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people. 21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando
Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. 22 In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General
Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to
announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government." 23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. 24Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. 25 Rallies for the
resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he
was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope. 26 There was no turning
back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power started at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara,
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying
Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner.
Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto
Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. 27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola
between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations

consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent
Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.29 He issued the following press
statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor
that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges
that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: 31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20. 23 Another copy was
transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m. 33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of
the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC,
to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed
to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated
as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12)
members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20,
2001.1wphi1.nt

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys. 34Recognition of
respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d'
honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred
foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo. 35 US President George W. Bush gave the
respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government. 36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives. 37The
House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the
administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines." 38 It also approved
Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the
Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. 40 A few days later, she also signed
into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act. 41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President. 42 The next day,
February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr. 43Senators
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason
therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court.
Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent. 44 The House of Representatives also approved
Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178. 45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2)
days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has
been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the
impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the
resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post. 48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on
January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February
2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner
Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the
balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is
accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class,
and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously
filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed
by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed
by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption,
bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft
and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on
November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco,
Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges
against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel
Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against
him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any
other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if
legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed
for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on
GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a
non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR
Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February
15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice
Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former
Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves
by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the
parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous
replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag
Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of
the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for
contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they
are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may
immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic." 53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV

Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond
the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the
"legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people
power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14 th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of
the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground
constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political
question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the
political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations,
continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v.
Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these
formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the
ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions', not of
'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the
inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court,
through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to whichfull discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. 59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused
on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. 60 With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the
new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are
other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is
section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve
the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral
reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of
former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one.

No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered
contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the
EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. 64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and
defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under
the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise
ofpeople power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons
of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of
freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 TheMalolos
Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall
not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press
or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public
means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights
were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the
Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble
and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966. 66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights are
now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The
reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to
provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more
adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and
necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the
"conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society." 70 In Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus
curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the
right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this
means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar
stressed that " it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to
petition for redress of grievances, all should listen.For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are
deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, 74 and section
875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call
for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid
down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus,
respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.

II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it
involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to
judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he
submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in
case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20,
2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation
is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of
events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed
revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The
Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of
succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the
House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as
Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in
tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a
new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It
sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming
with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly
spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The
window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal
advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to
handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the
presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo
has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and
stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would
not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At

3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and
dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent
Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked
Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not
disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to
the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that
petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the
petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never
leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I
would have five days to a week in the palace." 85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality
that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the
palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested,
"Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of
power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this
stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the
petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20,
that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the
petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open
the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was
not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact.According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30
a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of
the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of
the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x
x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.

2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the President
and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the
request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the
opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition
Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
"Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement." 89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this
second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled
points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was
further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to
await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted
by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx

11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the
background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of
the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police
authority Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore
attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the
agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot
and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been
signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as
it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.

The President is too stunned for words:

Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members
who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is
there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal
possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have
strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not
wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges
that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang.
In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he
was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the
petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration
that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did
not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner
reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter,
despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not
the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino
people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government
to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If,
however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation
from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is
the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance
to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a
matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019
originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain
a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo
Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to
the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative
investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire." 92 During the period of amendments, the following
provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act
for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the
provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above
became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the
immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate
on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative
cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or
retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery
under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation
of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless,
if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He
cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that
when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case
Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent
Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting
President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the
Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the
petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA
3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But
even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time
petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the
opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and
duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the
January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of article VII." 95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For
that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:

1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and
majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria MacapagalArroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition
to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the
people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to
eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nation's
goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines
qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and
challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose
and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served
the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman
of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities
merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus
officioand has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16
and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be transferred
to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the
Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate
and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular
election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 th) highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of
government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the
petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
president of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power
or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of
the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of
inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman
should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; andsecond,
he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening.
The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes,
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret
Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a
writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch
the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and
unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could
walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable
under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governorsgeneral, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in

civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary
has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it,
declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any
person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person,
however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General
personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member
of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy
between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining
whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for
damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually
used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or
not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position,
might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could
not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private
individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in
wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office
he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself." 105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the
tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In
1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official
acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The
Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP
College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the
existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute
immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also from criminal
cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President
outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the
President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of
the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity
defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in
the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo,
who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office
is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong." 107 The effort
failed.

The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution
in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the
1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for
the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second
sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But
would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall
be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he
might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigation's
almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during
his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was
to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will
place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings
and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper
criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz: 110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would
render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the
presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed
against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the

President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v.
Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and
documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were
facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the
Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President
Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached
and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the
US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only
"official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts
is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our
jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. 118 It declared as a
state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. 122 It created the office of
the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from
suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the
cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained
publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. 125 The British approach the problem with the
presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right
of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical
approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong
likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga
vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:

"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It
is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and
high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible
to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed
out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of
appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds
of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of
the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to
our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our
idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially.
xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se
fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we
rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the
trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc. 130 and its
companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial
risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure,
few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation
of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today.
Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even
the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have
participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding,
criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or
decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of
public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work

effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v.
United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people
to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid
today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362
US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share
a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit
guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of
trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily
closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was
adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an
independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment
rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the
people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their
presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
c.

Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the
right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be
eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing
in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of
petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown
and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and
Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no
indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except
evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its
summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners
speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of
the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis
supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the
petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members
of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.
Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.1wphi1.nt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's
submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has
buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs." 132 News reports have also been quoted to establish
that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner 133 and it is postulated that the
prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports
referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the
respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of
petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. 134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled
cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner
and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of
assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and
then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice
will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the
respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair
investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms." 135To be sure, the duty of
a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord
Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose
judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a
democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has
proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the
majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's
progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, ET AL.
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972,
People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor
Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It
is claimed that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated
below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew
the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal
is functus oficio.

The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so
that it is not merely a de factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.-----------------------------------------DIGEST
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of
power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

[G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001]

HON.

JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.

CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.

CALIXTO

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision[1] dated February 10, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan
Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order[2] dated April 21, 1997 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for
a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for
said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which
was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG
LAGUNA
SAPAGKAT, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKAT, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalot higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYAT DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni
Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna
lalot higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP) Col.
[illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na
ang Jueteng.[3]
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering
the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal
Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as
invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby enjoined from implementing or
enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of
the lotto in the province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997, which reads:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru
counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiffs counsel and the comment thereto filed by counsel for the defendants which were
duly noted, the Court hereby denies the motion for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by the respondent trial
court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T.
1995 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN
THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS THAT BEFORE ANY
GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES,
PRIOR CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER
CONCERNED SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its
vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial
governments police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991.[6] They also maintain that respondents lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the
local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A.
7160.[7]
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the state
since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations around the country.
[8]
As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna,
respondent Calvento contends this is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a
self-executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991. [9] He also states that his operation of the lotto system is legal
because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress. [10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna has no power
to prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national government. [11] He argues that this is based on the
principle that ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national
government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. This
being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to determine, taking into
account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in
Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the provinces Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said
authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior consultations and
approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayors permit for the operation of a lotto
outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the objection of the council to the said
game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid

ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much when they stated in
their petition that:
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration of the
Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling
including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna.[12]
As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the
local governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by
Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act
1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the
lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:
Section 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.- The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the
Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and
services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act
Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be
determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper
to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance
that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a
provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,[13]ordinances should not contravene an existing
statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.[14]
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from
which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them
the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and
control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it
capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By

and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it.[15]
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments
will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the
state or an imperium in imperio.[16]
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon
1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an
expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Boards enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of
power, the national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the
country. These provisions state:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. x x x
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and peoples organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate
relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be
implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a
charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the
contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof.[17] Section 26 reads:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every
national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of
any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or
minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects
are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic
change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover;
(5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for
the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these
effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part. There is
no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was
predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna.

In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing
the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a policy
statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides
no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayors refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a
legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution orKapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of
Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND
GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines
Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that
the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative
to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District
1st District

2nd District

Municipalities/Cities
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando

Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo

Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

Population
417,304

474,899

3rd District

4th District

Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

372,548

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured
in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor
and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table 3 illustrates the reapportionment made by
Republic Act No. 9716:
District
1st District

2nd District

Municipalities/Cities
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

Population
176,383

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao

San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor

3rd District (formerly 2nd District)

Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman

Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

439,043

4th District (formerly 3rd District)

Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

5th District (formerly 4th District)

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

276,777

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that
became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen
(13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments
and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as
argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a
population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district. 4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His copetitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined
the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of
a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second

districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less
than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population
standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created
province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form
new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the
reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000
inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population
requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats. 9 The petitioners argue that when
the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two
hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year
1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly
250,000 people for every one (1) representative. 11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission
in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of a province,
Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional
Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to
meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI,
Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5
paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present
petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first,
petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn
by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population
condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no
application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. 13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population
is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in
provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of
Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the
petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing
Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the
performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a petition for
declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents,
therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of
constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules, 14 as well as
relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to
society.15

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) 16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17this
Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of
cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 18 Tatad v.
Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to
name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the
latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v.
Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path must
be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.24Before
a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the
fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the
Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and
the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of
250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation
by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted
the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional
legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation
of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would
be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000.
The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining
the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.28(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial
legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000
to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not
be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an
additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of
and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the words and
meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be
gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article
VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for
the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply
put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should
have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to
the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the

population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it
was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two
hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were
distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three
(73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000; 30 second, the remaining seats were then
redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and
then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the
1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned
among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the
1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our
population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants
and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and
each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan,
Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase
whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination of the
districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records show,
dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more affinity with
the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District
has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by
the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of the
Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces
and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern towns.
He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its
inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the
south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was
the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential
candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together,
there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then
suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that the
COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO

On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I has a
total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of
186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the
contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the
Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the
Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have
262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and
districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of the towns
and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for the
possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He
stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer
capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency
and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the
population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but the
transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and
professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of
the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be
isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the
Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a
say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that
Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of
the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With
14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The
First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok,
Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.

There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I. 35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the distribution of its
three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit
area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the
standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability
and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the
"accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders." 37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the
highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that
they should "balance the area and population." 38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however,
does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x.
To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional
provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the
formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative
district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the
formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning
legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it
was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point. 40 In other words,
Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against
strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and
second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative
district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the
petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured
District One; and

(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and
Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the erstwhile
Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that
would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts
of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is
that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district.
Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form
in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretarygeneral, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE,
ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS &
HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW);
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA
PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP;
and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who
have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate
directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream
of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district
elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1issued by
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity
of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With
the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions
as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions
and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of
the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December
22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list
elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations,
but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme
will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly
participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the
number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who
substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or
evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some
of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly
amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed,
and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within
three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9before
this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.

3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a
non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added
that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred
the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument
was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus
Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration,
pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001.
Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a
verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion
for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that

Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was
no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this
date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because
the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects
to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the
participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka,
or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo
and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal
at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order
to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there
were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group
of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system.
We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in
the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or
any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must
be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence,
when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully,
usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective
of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipinostyle party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack ofwelldefined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section
5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who
have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent,
the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in
Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent
of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does
not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In
fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the
elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes
Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that
the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion
of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could
not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized
nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than
their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope,
but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest
sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites
those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in
the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during
the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of

Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled
80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG
and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list
elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance
of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it
-- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do
so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open
house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the
same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system
would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not
have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored
mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in
order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of
the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions
ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The
criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to
the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are,
at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they
remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the
law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above.
The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented,
could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution
or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the
function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or secondguess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political
parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No.
4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001
elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the
party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties
would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein
and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the
party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a
government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51It is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify
under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be
elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and

underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other
similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly
a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented
in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters,
in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not
fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can
pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their
group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered." 56 The
prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with
election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks
to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to
become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with
this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but also
deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of
RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be
fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able
to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who

could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should
have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the
great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and
even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and
seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the partylist system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the
marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system.
Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken
them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing
more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA
7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered
such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to
submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during
the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its
compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905

August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said
letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the
present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2)
whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in
any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview
of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either
in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an
open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was
not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence,
contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication began
with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in
intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public
attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our
people to expose.1wph1.t
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by
some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said
to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961".
To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public
Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the
Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are "available to
adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA,
(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt.
Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public
information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of
MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent
Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while
Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col.
Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the

intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan
of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational technique
the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism"
and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2) typewriters only" to
Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953,
1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in
several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the
feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning
stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a
loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of
Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be
divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military
man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that
the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and
other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked
by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that
all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of
law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the
various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify
themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter
says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having
been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it
should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the
plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs'
action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that
they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs,
to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such
they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in
question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is
false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and
ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent
with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too,
when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they

were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the
aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of
said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821

March 4, 1949

JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Taada for respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and Vicente del
Rosario as amici curiae.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain the principal
grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taadare quested that his right to speak on
the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be
reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator Taada and Senator
Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate
President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the appointed time
(10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall
until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead
requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the
presence of the public he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his
colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order. Except
Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senator were
present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona
opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use of
dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this motion
was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned
conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada repeatedly stood up to
claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and
when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by
him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator
Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Taada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same
time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for
adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was seconded by
herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the
adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed
by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained.
Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair
and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of
the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session
which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary, because the
Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the
session.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter
Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval
thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him,
Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of
the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the
said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines
Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the
Philippines senate and oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial points:

a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1)
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors
of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the
majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme
Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead
into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people
as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action
inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not where two sets
of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said Werts case), there
being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and
his partisans have not erected themselves into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has
not been duly elected in his place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes it advisable,
more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a
continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was
there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to
pass on these questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is
the opinion of the other four on those four on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a
continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other
twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different
had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was
there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria,
Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such
session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of
the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of
twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the
House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one
(23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes
furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of
the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would
have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three
senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators
will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to
declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively
upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to
avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here aboutquorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.
EN BANC

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,

G.R. No. 196271

in his personal capacity, and in representation of

MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF

Present:

AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,

INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN

CORONA, C.J.,

ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN

CARPIO,

TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH

VELASCO, JR.,

AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI,

BRION,

Petitioners,

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,

- versus -

ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its

MENDOZA,

President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF

SERENO,

REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO

REYES, and

BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,

PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President

Promulgated:

Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.,

Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer
of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
Petitioner,

October 18, 2011

- versus -

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman

G.R. No. 196305

of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO

ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management,
PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the

Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU
CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO
DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN
(PDP-LABAN),
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 197221

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its

Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as

G.R. No. 197280

Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,

JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B.
TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE

OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 197282

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,

JR., and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

G.R. No. 197392

Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.

G.R. No. 197454

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3)
years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the
power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity;
House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after
RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to
concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall
be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA)
No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held
on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No.
6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than
90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in
the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140 [1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular
elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, toNovember 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to
not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to
join ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August
2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a
plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the
ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one
hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6,
2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the
Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No.
[3]

196271 - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as
well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No.
196305 filed another petition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The
law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:
a)

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives
against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197221;

b)

Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c)

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction [7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the
COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and

d)

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against
Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido

Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8,
2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus [9] against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed
their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26,
2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and
ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by
the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have
to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No.
9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of
suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have
assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues

From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9
and 16, 2011:
I.
II.

Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on
irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under
paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV.

Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI.

Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of
this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous
with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve
for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, [10] which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the
shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future
elections whether national or local to once every three years. [12] This intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution,
all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a constitutional
mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on Elections,[14]we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been
synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term
of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in
terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p.
605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under
Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec.
5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it
is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district,
often a community or minor political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor
and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will
serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as
evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under
Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form
of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional
elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this concept
permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete
resolution.

II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution [18]which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the
following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become
a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For
example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate
version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify
the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.

[20]

Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply

with the three separate readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no
public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the
Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action. Hence, while the
judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the
matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process. [23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed
measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited
ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1
and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by
the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives
and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a
majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60)
days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will
show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by
enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot
be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law ; they merely filled in
a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No.
6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections,
[24]

leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, [25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,

[27]

RA No. 8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws

did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would
be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to reset the date of the ARMM
elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No.
9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the
plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, [31] which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these
bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient
to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3

voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers
of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this
subject best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the
ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal
footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of
its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or
things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly
or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish
the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the
original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature
cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of
subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires
on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action
and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite
requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of
absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions
and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled
rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,
[35]

questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of

the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With these
wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution
which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic
Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e.,
the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers
constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. [36]

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated
Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements
are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would
require compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must
provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already exists RA
No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections
with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the
exception ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a
reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express
constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which
should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by
RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem.
These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section
7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; [38](2) to hold special elections in
the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to
authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint
OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V.

The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A.

Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood. The first is the
extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; thesecond is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and
the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. [39] The legislative body possesses
plenary power for all purposes of civil government. [40]Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. [41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly
or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. [42]

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally
provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights
(Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the
autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose
which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of
organic law.[43]

The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute
express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is
otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of
government i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be
elective and representative of the constituent political units; national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers
granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and functions not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing
with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the
Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social,
economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the permeating principles of national
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15. [44] In other
words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the
relationship between the national and the regional governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized
and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the
difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term
suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To
succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the
national, congressional and all other local elections (save for barangay and sangguniang kabataanelections) left it with the
problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and
its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not

a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide
measures for transition from the old constitution to the new [46] and for the introduction of new concepts. [47] As previously
mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that
synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In the creation of
Quezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim governor, vicegovernor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are essentially elective in character; the
appointive officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified. [50] A similar
authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local government from a sub-province to a province. [51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were
adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to
reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional
discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of
the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly
understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures
assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e ., given the
constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate
the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections
necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
[emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by
the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication
prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within
the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the
election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term
of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where the
Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should be
respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A
necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as
the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the
constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only
interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.[54]
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court.
Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended
by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to
create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively
extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would
be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of
the President.[56] Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v. Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v. Comelec,[59]where the Court ruled that the
elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials the ARMM Governor, the
ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit
set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an
extension beyond the term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,
Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
[61]

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that
prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the
discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately
conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the
following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of
the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and VicePresident shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President,
Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of
a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By
so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom thatit shall not call special
elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. [64] But our power rests on very narrow ground

and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282
urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of
Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election. [65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a
specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone
elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due
notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the
election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result
of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension
of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have already been
scheduled to take place but have to be postponedbecause of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term analogous
causes will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These
analogous causes are further defined by the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled but do not
take place because of (a) force majeure, (b)violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections
do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpectedand unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant
to the constitutional mandate of synchronizationof national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these

reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to
extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of
interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. [66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP
881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal
basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the
synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the
power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is specifically
given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of
twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President [69] in order to
synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot
be changed by mere statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms
of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years [71] as this tinkering
would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot
be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is
what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is
achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of
acting on their term (where the term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while the tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis
to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if
they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the
President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the
only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. [74]
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials
that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is
the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of
the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves
the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes
very real only if RA No. 10153 were to bemistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is
that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for
the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.[75] Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt,
given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on the above
considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to
appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of appointment would
extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic and republican.
For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to besystemically withdrawn to the point of fostering
an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and representative governance requirement of
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the
period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No.
9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern
unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary
measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the
ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim
measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units [76] and the
adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces. [77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for
the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other
words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is
the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of
OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted by the
appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of
Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative of
the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus
allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.

This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for
the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even
Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose the
synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and
the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other
cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in
accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of
their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the
dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years
intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective
officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history past and current teach us, many developments, some of
them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past.
[78]

Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully

functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under
the present circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v.
Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy
that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in
the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public
service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power.
This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided
by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor
of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the
constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people
of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to
the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical developments that

may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment
power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede
the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict
between two recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one
over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat
quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, [81] and one mandate should not be given importance over the
other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear. [82] We refer to the Courts declaration inAng-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,
[83]

thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this Court should
reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit to synchronized
regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be respected.Particularly, regional autonomy will be
respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a
very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local elections in
order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide
and local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the
Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the
larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only for those
specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather
an efficient working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an
effective partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of
the nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the
express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be
unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the
limits of the powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national
government[.][85] Of note is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers
over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at
the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable
the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since
the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy
mandated by no less than the Constitution.

Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local
elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task; the
Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. [87] As judges, we can only
interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative
problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive
prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of
authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most
basic principles of a republican and democratic government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No.
10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of
choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that

synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its
duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every statute
is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the
validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. [92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of
the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt
is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must
support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153
for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in
our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081

July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance
of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of
the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO
SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said
position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid
protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution
No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the
accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer
to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election
contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National
Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters
involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National
Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of
article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under
section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral
Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9,
1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it
by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred
upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality
of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial
cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members
of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the
electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might
be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution
as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or
person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition
would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting
forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was
no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National
Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly
conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and
over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not
reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be
filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasijudicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united
States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied
"without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question
of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it
would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it
undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the
question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under
our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws.
This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President
to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President
has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void
if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off
and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are
apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of
their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions
of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more
than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to
mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis,
then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds
and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the
herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National
Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of
cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly,

then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable
and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the
framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by
the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been
inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is
taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to
assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts
shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained
a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This
is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of
ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and
undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that
upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and
determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution
of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able
counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative,
therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its
framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule
that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from
clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18,
par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of

Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the
legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the
Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation
of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive
officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings
against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be
composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to
which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside.
The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on
September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four
members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two
representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in
awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the
President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on
September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election
of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three
members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by
the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of
the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative
Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a
Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with
respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of
adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October
26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting
the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members
elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike
out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall
be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following
illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of
the said draft:
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Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the

National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of
the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is
why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member,
there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election
of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not
constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens
with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been
elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the
Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected.
From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the
citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers
upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral
Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of
the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the
sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included
in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted
merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm
the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of
its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of
the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for
that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of
its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make
the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority
to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not
been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment
introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference
between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
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Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar
tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la
enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases
contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos
en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon
the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a
la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del
Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la
cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
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The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National
Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as
to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six
(76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the
largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President
Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to"
between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature long
lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere
experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid
account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the
House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of
March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the
determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees appointed
at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose
functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to
report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and
made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were
considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the
bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in
substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is
called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was
required to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if
they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had
been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks
upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election.
Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were
insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in
questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the
house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the
unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of
members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective
causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously
notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly
self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own
inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are
ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the
contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they should
determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the
approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated
law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles
works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever devised by
any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the
remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement, which
was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by
subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the
common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on
the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of
parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of
commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of
the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High
Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32
Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911
[1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests

which were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise,
in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922
tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the
Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37,
par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May
13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme
Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31),
the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian
Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is
by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number
of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision
for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap.
37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five
members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be
selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the
two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of
America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of
the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the
Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at
least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in
years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other
countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove
stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of
the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the
people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and
execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our
tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of
the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express

prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B,
1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings
of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case
would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only
would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever
the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to
the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the
entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance
and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the
government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited
power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have
pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol.
I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace
of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession
of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been
committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial,
and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not
intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission
reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they
have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government
were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own
particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in
accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these
constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of
its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in
appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable
character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The
Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to
the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved
by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National

Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the
National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the
Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively
designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested
elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of
protests, the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power
of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had
had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive
jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no
protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the
time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no
protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said
body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States,
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election
officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the
time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2,
secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the
claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker
of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is
required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for
the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require
(31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is
generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the
time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after
the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or
approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time.
This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore
contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89;
Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature,
Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act
No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to
determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3,

1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not
do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete,
and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the
time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional
organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its
elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution
the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying
the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental

power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of
the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in
any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional
creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person
within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 123037. March 21, 1997]
TEODORO Q. PEA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND ALFREDO E.
ABUEG, JR., respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution [1] of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Pea in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner
questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of Representatives
representing the Second District of the province of Palawan.
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995
elections. On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan
proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.
On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that:
7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying,
intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting
of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the
fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioners known
supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote in excess of the number of
registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of protestants ballots and other irregularities.
8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly obtained 52,967 votes, while the
protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of said document is attached hereto as Annex B.
9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities not been committed, the result of
the elections for Member of the House of Representatives would have been different and the protestant would have garnered the
highest number of votes for the Office Member of the House of Representatives in the Second District of Palawan, which was the
true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.
10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the protestee was allegedly the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Second District of Palawan is contrary to law and to the true expression
of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.[2]

Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and CounterProtest[3] on June 5, 1995, to which Pea filed a Reply on June 23, 1995. Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg
filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] the Petition on June 22, 1995, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the
petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on
the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of voters
occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [5] on July 10, 1995, attaching thereto a Summary of
Contested Precincts, naming 700 precincts where election irregularities allegedly occurred.
In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction over the
petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in
form and substance, meriting its dismissal.
The HRET states pertinently:
There are 743 precincts in the second congressional district of Palawan which is comprised of Puerto Princesa City and the
municipalities of Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon, and Marcos (Ordinance appended to the 1973
Constitution). The Protestant failed to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are included in his
protest; he even failed to allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are located. Worse, the body of the Petition does
not even mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made only in the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being
apprised of the issues which he has to meet and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have
to be collected.
The Supreme Court, in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, et. al. (No. 46099, 66 Phil 148, 150,
August 30, 1938) observed that, [w]hile the election law does not say so directly, it is clearly inferred from its relevant provisions
that where the grounds of contest are that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes received, the motion of protest should state in
what precincts such irregularities occurred. xxx The specification in the motion of protest of the election precinct or precincts
where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required in order to apprise the contestee of the issues which he has to meet. xxx
In its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150
SCRA 665), the Supreme Court held that the petition therein could have been dismissed outright as deficient in form and
substance, being couched in general terms only, without precise indication of the time, place and manner of the commission of the
alleged irregularities. xxx
Similarly, this Tribunal, in dismissing an election protest, observed that the protest, in general language, impugns, contests and
protests the illegal, improper and fraudulent electoral practices, acts and deeds of the protestee and impugns and contests all the
election returns in the lone district of Catanduanes. The tribunal held that this scattershot allegation is not allowed in election
contests and that it is necessary to make a precise indication of the precincts protested and a specification of the claimed offenses
to have been committed by the parties. (Alberto vs. Tapia, HRET Case No. 37, January 23, 1989)
While Protestant has attached as Annex A to his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, filed on 10 July 1995, a Summary of
contested Precincts, the defects in his Protest were not cured thereby as the Summary was submitted only after the Motion to
Dismiss had been filed. The Opposition and the attached Summary do not amend the original Petition. There is not even a prayer
in the Opposition suggesting such amendment.
Moreover, in a Resolution promulgated on 17 June 1995, the Commission on Elections en banc (COMELEC) dismissed herein
Petitioners Petition (SPA Case No. 95-258) to declare a failure of elections in the second district of Palawan. Copy of said
Resolution was sent to Petitioner Peas Petition Ad Cautelam was thus converted into a regular protest (not Ad Cautelam) effective
upon the finality of the official COMELEC resolution, thereby providing him an opportunity to amend it to cure the defects cited
above, Protestant took no positive and affirmative steps for that purpose.
Protestant alleges in his Opposition that Protestee has likewise failed to specify the 47 precincts he contests in his CounterProtest. This omission merely renders Protestees Counter-Protest defective for insufficiency in form and substance and for failure
to state a cause of action. It does not cure the fatal defects in Protestants Petition.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the petition (Protest) to state a cause of action because it is fatally insufficient in form and
substance, the Tribunal Resolved to GRANT Protestees Motion to Dismiss and to DISMISS, as it hereby DISMISSES, the instant
Petition of Protest. As a logical consequence thereof and also for the same reason, Protestees Counter-Protest is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the respondent tribunal on November
14, 1995.
In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995, petitioner argues that the respondent HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election
protest of petitioner considering that:
I
THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM
AND SUBSTANCE.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY THE
CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF THE
CONTESTED PRECINCTS WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT HRET.
It is the Petitioners view that the instant election protest is sufficient in form and substance even while failing to
specify the precincts where irregularities allegedly occurred. Nowhere is it provided that the specification of the
precincts is a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order that an election protest can be entertained
by the HRET. To support his submission, petitioner cites the cases of Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Arao vs.
COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790 and Gallares vs. Casenas, 48 Phil 362, the latter stating that:
From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that frauds, irregularities and violations of the law are alleged
therein, which, if true, would undoubtedly change the result of the elections.
The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor of the protestant after the judicial counting is not
specified, does not affect the right of the protestant, for it being known that said omission is a defect of the protest, the same may
be cured by a specification of the votes mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest, without thereby adding new grounds for
those already alleged by the protestant.
Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in the instant case, the defect in the petition should
have been cured by the opposition to the private respondents Motion to Dismiss.
Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss the Petition Ad Cautelam, and instead, required the
private respondent Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has thus made a prior determination that the petition is
sufficient in form and substance.
We do not agree.
In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition, the HRET was not ruling on the
formal and substantive sufficiency of the petition. The order to require an answer is but a matter of course, as under
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided that:

RULE 22. Summons. - Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons
to the protestee or respondent together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file
his answer.
As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the insufficiency of the same.
A perusal of the petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where
widespread election, fraud and irregularities occured. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the
protest. Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and substance of the
petition constitutes a ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must be more
than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in
fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumptions of an elected
public official may, and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.
Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more serious inadequacy than a mere failure to specify the
number of votes which would inure to the protestant, as was the case in Gallares vs. Casenas, or the failure to
impugn the validity of some of the ballots cast, as in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of which cases were decided in
the 1920s. The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare
allegation of massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities, without
specification, and substantiation, of where and how these occurences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot
allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will
deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the water.
On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The Court has already ruled in Joker P.
Arroyo vs. HRET,[7] that substantial amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing
the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after proclamation of the
winner.
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise
stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or
amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest. [8]
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest
care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under
circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections
are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other step. [9] xxx This is as it should be, for the
democratic system is good for the many although abhorred by a few.
In sum, this Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only upon a showing
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such a grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the electoral tribunals judgment. There is such showing in the present petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the present petition for lack of merit. The
resolution of the respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal dated October 12, 1995 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

G.R. Nos. 178831-32

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
NAPOLEON N. CAMERO andRENALD F.
VILLANDO,
Respondents.
x -------------------------------------------- x
LOUIS C. BIRAOGO,

G.R. No. 179120

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of

the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines, and
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
OLIVIA P. PARAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -

HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his

capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives;
HON.
ROBERTO
NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary
General
of
the
House
of
Representatives;
HON.
RHODORA
SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy
Secretary General for Finance of the
House
of
Representatives;
THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
and
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,
Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 179132-33

x ------------------------------------------- x
RENALD F. VILLANDO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

and

Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 179240-41

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
April 1, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal begins

over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to
the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.

At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint Resolution[1] of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifying Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong
(Limkaichong) from running as a congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental; (2)
the COMELEC En BancResolution[2] dated June 29, 2007, affirming her disqualification; and (3) the
COMELEC En Banc Resolution[3] dated August 16, 2007, resolving that all pending incidents relating to
her qualifications should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her Certificate
of Candidacy[4] (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification were instituted before the COMELEC by
concerned citizens coming from her locality. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a registered voter of
La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the
citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of Representatives. The petition, which was
docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006, [5] alleged that she is not a natural-born Filipino because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a
registered voter of the same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship,
docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-007. [6] He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were
still Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained
finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the cancellation of
Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of qualified candidates for
the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In her separate Answers[7] to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born
Filipino since she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino
mother, who had reacquired her status as such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time
of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father took his Oath
of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the same
day. She contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of
action. Citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[8] she averred that a petition filed before an
election, questioning the qualification of a candidate, should be based on Section 78, [9] in relation to
Section 74[10] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),[11] and not under Sections 68[12] and 74 thereof in

relation to Section 1,[13] Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure[14] and Section 5,[15] paragraph C
(3.a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800.[16] She also contended that the petitions were dismissible on the
ground that they were in the nature of a collateral attack on her and her fathers citizenships, in
contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a
direct action for its nullity.

The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) petitions and re-docketed them as SPA Nos. 07-247 [17] and 07248,[18] entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG FROM HER
CANDIDACY AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL (herein referred to as the
disqualification cases), which remained pending on May 14, 2007, when the National and Local
Elections were conducted.

After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged as
the winner with 65,708 votes[19] or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressional candidate,
Olivia Paras[20] (Paras), who obtained 57,962.

On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First
District of Negros Oriental.[21]

In a Joint Resolution[22] dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petitions in the
disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the First District of
Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list
of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her
proclamation. In disposing the cases, the COMELEC Second Division made the following ratiocination:
On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to
run for the congressional seat of the First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that
she is not a natural-born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.

Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and has convincingly
shown with pieces of documentary evidence that Julio Ong Sy, father of herein
respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong, failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in the
naturalization proceedings which he underwent for the said purpose.

An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would reveal that the Office of
the Solicitor General was deprived of its participation in all the stages of the
proceedings therein, as required under Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised

Naturalization Law and Republic Act No. 530, An Act Making Additional Provisions for
Naturalization.

xxx

The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished
copies of two material orders of the trial court in the said proceedings. One was
the July 9, 1957 Ordergranting his petition for naturalization and the other was
the September 21, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG logbook, we have determined
that the OSG did not receive a notice for the hearing conducted by the trial
court on July 9, 1959, prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order declaring
Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, this was fatal to the naturalization

proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, and prevented the same from gaining finality. The
leading case in the matter isRepublic v. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, 136 SCRA 617 (May 31,
1985), wherein the Supreme Court declared:

And as though that was not enough, the hearing prior to the oathtaking of
respondent Tan was conducted without the required notice to the Solicitor
General. It is true, as it appeared later, that Fiscal Veluz, Jr. was authorized
by the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the hearing of the
application for naturalization. That authority, however, does not extend to
Fiscal [Veluzs] right to appear for the State in the hearing preparatory to
the oathtaking. Private respondent Tan was therefore under legal
obligation to serve copy of his motion to be allowed to take his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen upon the Solicitor General which was not
done.

Respondent argues that upon his taking of the Oath of Allegiance, Julio Ong Sy became a
Filipino citizen for all intents and purposes, with all the rights appurtenant thereto.

This argument does not hold water, as was held by the Supreme Court in the same case
of Republic v. Valero, supra:

That private respondent Tan had already taken his oath of allegiance does
not in any way legalize the proceedings relative thereto which is pregnant
with legal infirmities.Compounding these irregularities is the fact that Tan
was allowed to take his oath even before the expiration of the thirty (30)day period within which an appeal may be made thus making the said
oath not only highly improper but also illegal.

In the same case, the Supreme Court added:

To sustain the same would be to sanction a monstrosity known as

citizenship by estoppel. The grant of naturalization under such
circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may be had at any
time. Neither estoppel nor res judicata may be set up as a bar from
instituting the necessary proceedings to nullify the certificate of
naturalization so issued.

Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his
Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days
after his declaration as a naturalized Filipino.

Even granting that the OSG was notified of the September 21, 1959 Order, this was still
one day short of the reglementary period required under Sections 11 and 12 of C.A. No.
473, above-cited.

The thirty-day reglementary period is so required under the law so that the OSG could
make known his objections and to appeal from the order of the trial court declaring the
petitioner a naturalized Filipino citizen. This is also the reason why a copy of the
petitioners motion to take his oath of allegiance has to be furnished to the OSG.

The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are binding on the
whole world.

She would have been correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of
the same. The OSG, being the counsel for the government, has to participate in all the
proceedings so that it could be bound by what has transpired therein. Lacking the
participation of this indispensable party to the same, the proceedings are null and void
and, hence, no rights could arise therefrom.

From all the foregoing, therefore, it could be seen that Julio Ong Sy did not acquire
Filipino citizenship through the naturalization proceedings in Special Case No.
1043. Thus, he was only able to transmit to his offspring, Chinese citizenship.

Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong being the daughter of Julio Ong Sy, and
having been born on November 9, 1959, under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, is
a Chinese national, and is disqualified to run as First District Representative of Negros
Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is

declared as DISQUALIFIED from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of
Negros Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is

hereby directed to strike out the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible
candidates for the said position, and the concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby
directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as
winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division on the evening of May 17,
2007, and accordingly suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong. [24]

The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No.
8062

[25]

adopting

the

policy-guidelines

of not

suspending

the

proclamation

of

winning

candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.

On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Joint Resolution of May 17, 2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order Suspending
Proclamation.[26]
On May 22, 2007, Limkaichong filed another motion for the lifting of the directive suspending
her proclamation, insisting that she should be proclaimed as the winner in the congressional race
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8062.[27] On same date, Villando, one of the petitioners in the
disqualification cases, filed an Urgent Manifestation Clarifying COMELEC Resolution No. 8062
with Motion,[28] praying that the COMELEC should not lift the suspension of Limkaichongs
proclamation.

On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and
proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First
District of Negros Oriental.[29]

Thereafter, or on May 30, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or
Annul the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative of
Negros Oriental in relation to the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division,[30] stating, among others, that Limkaichong's proclamation violated the earlier order of the

COMELEC Second Division suspending her proclamation. The petition, docketed as SPC No. 07-211, was
dismissed by the COMELEC First Division, [31] ratiocinating that the disqualification cases were not yet
final when Limkaichong was proclaimed. Accordingly, her proclamation which was valid or legal,
effectively divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over the cases. The COMELEC First Division
explained its ruling in this wise:

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very
clear in that there shall be no suspension of proclamation of winning candidates
with pending disqualification cases involving, among others, issues of
citizenship. As the disqualification cases involving Limkaichong were still pending
reconsideration by the en banc, the underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of
the Resolution: to respect the will of the Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of
proclamation of the winning congressional candidate for the First District of Negros
Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

Dissatisfied, Paras moved for the reconsideration of the above Resolution. [32]
Meanwhile, in a Resolution[33] dated June 29, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc, in an equally divided
vote of 3:3, denied Limkaichongs motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division in the disqualification cases. The pertinent portions of the Resolution denying her
motion reads:

Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the Commission has jurisdiction to rule on
Respondent Limkaichongs Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding her proclamation
as it is only this Commission, and not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which has jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC,
whether issued by a division or en banc. As stated by the Supreme Court in the leading
case of Codilla v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, respondent herself
seasonably challenged the validity of the resolution of the Second Division in her motion
for reconsideration. Hence, the issue of respondents disqualification was still
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc to resolve, and HRET
cannot assume jurisdiction on the matter, to wit:

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the

validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably
challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue
was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc to
resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon v. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it

is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving

members of the House of Representatives, could not have been
immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very
COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the HRET has no
jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether
issued by a division oren banc.

Finally, in disposing the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion
for Reconsideration filed by intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as
the winning candidate for First District Representative, suffice it to say that in the same
case of Codilla v. De Venecia, supra, the Supreme Court held, thus:

More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the

settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be
given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate
by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the
office, no one can be declared elected in his place. In Domino v. COMELEC,
this Court ruled, viz.:

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed
winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received that (sic) other votes would
be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He
could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed.

xxx

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an

office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a
declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case,
the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a
nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take
over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate
is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part
and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy
and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice.

All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of this Commission
(Second Division) in its Joint Resolution promulgated on May 17, 2007.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration of

Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is hereby DENIED.

The Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the
winning candidate for the First District Representative of Negros Oriental is hereby
denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[34]

On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases against her a Manifestation
and Motion for Clarification and/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance with
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.[35] She contended that, with her
proclamation, her having taken her oath of office and her assumption of the position, the COMELEC was
divested of jurisdiction to hear the disqualification cases. She further contended that, following Section
6,[36] Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the disqualification cases would have to be reheard,
and if on rehearing, no decision would be reached, the action or proceedings should be dismissed,
because the COMELEC En Banc was equally divided in opinion when it resolved her motion for
reconsideration.

On an even date, Paras wrote the House of Representatives informing it of the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated June 29, 2007 upholding the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
dated May 17, 2007, which disqualified Limkaichong as a congressional candidate. [37]

In the interim, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Jose de Venecia, Jr. (De Venecia) allowed
Limkaichong to officially assume the office as a Member of the House of Representatives on July 23,
2007, as shown in the Journal of the House of Representatives.[38]

Despite Limkaichongs repeated pleas for the resolution of her manifestation and motion for
clarification,[39] the COMELEC did not resolve the same. Hence, on August 1, 2007, she filed with this
Court a Petition for Certiorari[40] under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32 praying for the annulment of the May 17, 2007 Joint
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc in the disqualification cases for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. She averred that since she was already proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had
started to perform her duties and functions as such, the COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now
the HRET which has jurisdiction over any issue involving her qualifications for the said office.

On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichongs manifestation and motion for
clarification,[41] with the following disquisition:
In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of
office on June 30, 2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating
to the qualifications of Limkaichong should now be determined by the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision
of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves,

that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as
Member of the House of Representatives should now be determined by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

On August 24, 2007, Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), as a citizen and a taxpayer, filed with the Court
a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order[42] under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R.
No. 179120, seeking to enjoin and permanently prohibit: (a) De Venecia from allowing Limkaichong to
sit in the House of Representatives and participate in all its official activities; and (b) Limkaichong from
holding office as its Member.[43]

Meanwhile, on August 28, 2007, Paras has instituted before the Court a Petition for Quo Warranto,
Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[44] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 179132-33, seeking, among others, the ouster of Limkaichong from the House
of Representatives on account of her disqualification and for the holding of special elections to fill the
vacancy created by such.[45]

On even date, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution [46] denying Villando's motion to
suspend the proclamation of Limkaichong, which denial was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a
Resolution[47] dated February 1, 2008.

On September 5, 2008, Villando also filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction
with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [48]under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 179240-41, contending, among others, that the
COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in issuing the August 16, 2007 Resolution [49] because it
still acted on Limchaikongs manifestation and motion for clarification, notwithstanding that the same
was not set for hearing and considering that its June 29, 2007 Resolution had already become final and
executory.
As the four (4) petitions are interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them in its Resolutions
dated September 4 and 11, 2007.

The Court heard the parties in oral argument on August 26, 2008, during which the following issues
were tackled:

1.

Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Negros

Oriental is valid;

2.

Whether said proclamation divested the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;

3.

Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal shall assume jurisdiction, in lieu of
the COMELEC, over the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;

4. Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that
Limkaichong is disqualified from running as a Member of the House of Representatives on the
ground that she is not a natural-born citizen;

5. Whether the COMELEC disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory; and,

6. Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit Limkaichong
from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

On same day, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file within twenty (20) days their
respective memoranda, after which the petitions shall be deemed submitted for resolution, with or
without the memoranda.

Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the qualification of a
Member of the House of Representatives, thus:

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless

he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election.

When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. It was not
true, according to the petitioners in the disqualification cases, because her father remained a Chinese
citizen at the time of her birth. The COMELEC Second Division has sided with Camero and Villando, and
disqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental for
having failed to comply with the citizenship requirement. Accordingly, her proclamation was ordered
suspended

notwithstanding

that

she

obtained

the

highest

number

of

votes

during

the

elections. Nonetheless, she was proclaimed by the PBOC pursuant to the policy guidelines of
COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 8062, and she has since assumed her position and performed her
functions as a Member of the House of Representatives.

I
Whether Limkaichongs proclamation was valid.

The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution
dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion
for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution.[50] Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint
Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the
winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or
ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro
forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

In G.R. Nos. 179132-33, Paras, however, maintained that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen
who was disqualified to run as a congressional candidate by way of a final judgment of the
COMELEC. With that, her proclamation was questionable and the same was done in open defiance of
the Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. She also stressed that
Limkaichong's proclamation was procedurally defective, it appearing that one of the PBOC members
was not present on May 25, 2007, and that it took place in a restaurant and not at the provincial
capitol. Finally, she argued that Limkaichongs proclamation was void in accordance with the Court's
pronouncement in the case of Codilla v. De Venecia.[51]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment on the petition of Paras, expressing its
support for the position taken by the latter.

A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras and the OSG does not sway the Court to rule
against the validity of Limkaichongs proclamation. No less than the COMELEC First Division has
sustained the validity of her proclamation when it dismissed, by way of a Resolution dated June 29,
2007, the petition filed by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not only that. The COMELEC First Division
has also adopted Limkaichongs argument that following her valid proclamation, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over the disqualification cases has ceased and that the same should be threshed out in the
proper proceedings filed before the HRET. Notably, the dismissal of Paras petition was affirmed by the
COMELEC in its Omnibus Order dated January 28, 2008.
In addition, the validity of Limkaichong's proclamation is in accordance with COMELEC En
Banc Resolution No. 8062. The disqualification cases filed against her remained pending as a result of
her timely motion for reconsideration. Villando (in G.R. Nos. 179240-41), however, maintained that
Resolution No. 8062 is invalid; hence, it could not be used as basis to validate Limkaichong's
proclamation. He argued that it must be published since it is a policy-guideline in the exercise of the
COMELECs rule-making power. As such, it cannot supersede the Joint Resolution of the Second Division
which was rendered pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial power.
His argument is specious. Resolution No. 8062 is not only a policy- guideline. It is also an administrative
interpretation of the two (2) provisions of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (i) Section 17, [52] Article VI (ii);
Section 2(2),[53] Article IX-C; Section 6[54] of R.A. 6646; and Sections 241 [55] and 243,[56] Article XX of the

OEC. As such, it does not have to comply with the due process requirement. The term administrative
connotes or pertains to administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting,
directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not
entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or
resolution thereon.[57] This is to be distinguished from quasi-judicial function, a term which applies,
among others, to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. [58]

Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally mandated power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the elections. [59] In adopting such
policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the
objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and fair
play. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the
elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but
that their proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of
the involved cases. Whereas, in this case, the COMELEC Second Division having failed to act on the
disqualification cases against Limkaichong until after the conduct of the elections, with her obtaining
the highest number of votes from the electorate, her proclamation was properly effected by the PBOC
pursuant to Resolution No. 8062.

The Court has held in the case of Planas v. COMELEC,[60] that at the time of the proclamation of
Defensor, the respondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution
invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final. As such, his proclamation was valid or legal,
as he had at that point in time remained qualified. Limkaichongs situation is no different from that of
Defensor, the former having been disqualified by a Division Resolution on the basis of her not being a
natural-born Filipino citizen. When she was proclaimed by the PBOC, she was the winner during the
elections for obtaining the highest number of votes, and at that time, the Division Resolution
disqualifying her has not yet became final as a result of the motion for reconsideration.

II

Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, should
assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Limkaichong argued that her proclamation on May 25,
2007 by the PBOC divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her qualifications,
and that jurisdiction now lies with the HRET.

Biraogo, on the other hand, believed otherwise. He argued (in G.R. No. 179120) that the issue
concerning Limkaichongs disqualification is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC En
Banc to resolve because when Limkaichong was proclaimed on May 25, 2007, the matter was still
pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.

We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.[61] It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his
case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide
a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns
and qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section
250[62] of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.[63]
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, as amended, which states:

RULE 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.

The COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, had given paramount
consideration to the two (2) aforementioned provisions when it stated that:
In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of
office on June 30, 2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating
to the qualifications of Limkaichong should now be determined by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision of
the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves,
that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as
Member of the House of Representatives should now be determined by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Worth citing also is the ratiocination of the COMELEC First Division when it dismissed the petition of
Paras seeking the nullity of Limkaichong's proclamation, thus:

The present situation is similar not to the factual circumstances of Codilla, which Paras
invokes, but rather to that in Planas which adheres to the general rule giving jurisdiction
to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. As at the time of Limkaichong's
proclamation, her disqualification was not yet final, her proclamation was valid or
legal. This Commission no longer has jurisdiction over the case. This, notwithstanding the
Second Division's directive suspending Limkaichong's proclamation.

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that
there shall be no suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases, involving, among others, issues of citizenship. As the
disqualification cases involving Limkaichong were still pending reconsideration by the En
Banc, the underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of the resolution: to respect
the will of the Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of proclamation of the winning
Congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichongs
proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring
jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been
tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. [64] The Court has shed light on this
in the case of Vinzons-Chato,[65] to the effect that:
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been
proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives
(Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost
jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato
essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent
Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment
and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's
proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a

winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post
as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings
and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard
to the people's mandate.
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against
respondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming
jurisdiction over all matters essential to a members qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
Rule 16. Election protest. -- A verified petition contesting the election of any Member of
the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten (10) days
after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as
the protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.

xxx

Rule 17. Quo Warranto. -- A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a
Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the
petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.

xxx

Rule 19. Periods Non-Extendible. -- The ten-day period mentioned in Rules 16 and 17 is
jurisdictional and cannot be extended.

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections, the remedy
of those who may assail ones eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file before the
HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the
HRET Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections,[66] we ruled that where the candidate has already
been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral
protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.

The PBOC proclaimed Limkaichong as the winner on May 25, 2007. Thus, petitioners (in G.R. Nos.
179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) should have filed either an election protest or petition for quo
warranto within ten days from May 25, 2007. But they did not. In fact, to date, no petition of protest or
petition for quo warranto has been filed with the HRET. Verily, the ten-day prescriptive period for
initiating a contest against Limkaichong has long expired.
However, the said ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification cases
based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not
only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's
citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[67] the Court held that:

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not
well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his
office as governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her
term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have the right to remain in office
simply because the challenge to her title may not longer be made within ten days from her proclamation ?
xxx
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does
not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
thePhilippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country alone, abjuring and renouncing all fealty to any
other state.

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued: - Upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the
competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1.
2.

3.

If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent
residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his
native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall
be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the
same:
If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4.

If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high schools recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of
the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring
them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate
shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President]
and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5.

If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of
the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use
or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,[68] where the Court of First Instance judge motu proprio and not in the proper
denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of
allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were
tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of
the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must

be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of
the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the
Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal. In other words, the initiative must
come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the
illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a
matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

III
Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly disqualified
Limkaichong on the ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In resolving the disqualification cases, the COMELEC Second Division relied on the entries in the docket
book of the OSG,[69] the only remaining record of the naturalization proceedings, [70] and ruled on the
basis thereof that the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, Limkaichongs father, in Special Case
No. 1043, were null and void. The COMELEC Second Division adopted Villando and Cameros arguments
that the OSG was deprived of its participation in the said case for it was not furnished copies of the
following: (a) the July 9, 1957 Order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) granting the petition for
naturalization; and (b) the September 21, 1959 Order of the CFI declaring Julio Ong Sy a Filipino
citizen. Thus, when the latter took his oath of allegiance on October 21, 1959, it was exactly 30 days
after his declaration as a naturalized Filipino, or one day short of the reglementary period required
under Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. Such defects were fatal to the naturalization
proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented the same from gaining finality. The COMELEC Second
Division concluded that since Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Philippine citizenship through the said
naturalization proceedings, it follows that Limkaichong remains a Chinese national and is disqualified to
run as candidate and be elected as a Member of the House of Representatives.

We cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichongs citizenship as the same should have been challenged in
appropriate proceedings as earlier stated.

IV

Whether the COMELEC's disqualification of Limkaichong

is final and executory.

In resolving this issue, pertinent is the provision of Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure:

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. x x x

(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

In his Memorandum dated June 27, 2008, Biraogo stated that the Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc in the disqualification cases became final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
and that the same was not restrained by this Court pursuant to Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He averred that since Limkaichong received a copy of the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated June 29, 2007 on July 3, 2007, she had until July 8, 2007 within which to obtain a
restraining order from the Court to prevent the same from becoming final and executory. However, she
did not do anything to that effect. Biraogo also averred that Limkaichong is guilty of forum shopping;
hence, her petition must be dismissed by the Court.

Instead of asking the Court for what Biraogo opined as a restraining order, Limkaichong filed with this
Court, on August 1, 2007, her petition for certiorari assailing the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution
pursuant to Section 2,[71] Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, postulating that
she had thirty (30) days from July 4, 2007 within which to file the petition, or until August 3, 2007. She
cited Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which prescribes the power of this Court to review
decisions of the COMELEC,[72] thus:
SEC. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

In his Comment on the petition, Villando prayed for the outright dismissal of Limkaichongs petition as
(a) it was filed beyond the reglementary period; (b) Limkaichong engaged in prohibited forum

shopping; and (c) Limkaichong admitted that the issues raised have become moot and academic. He
also sought to declare Limkaichong in contempt of court for forum shopping.

The COMELEC, through the OSG, also filed its Comment, praying for the denial of Limkaichong's
petition and its dismissal for being moot, contending that: (a) the COMELECEn Banc Resolution dated
August 16, 2007 has rendered the instant petition moot and academic; and (b) Limkaichong knowingly
and intentionally engaged in forum shopping.The OSG argued that, without waiting for the resolution of
her Motion for Clarification and two (2) successive motions to resolve said motions which are pending
before the COMELEC En Banc, Limkaichong filed the present petition to question the Joint Resolution
dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, which issues were pending before the
COMELEC En Banc. Her act of seeking relief from this Court while there were several other incidents
pending before the COMELEC, the final resolution in either one of which will amount to res judicata in
the other, clearly showed forum shopping on her part.

In her Reply to the above Comments, Limkaichong countered that she did not engage in forum
shopping, for had she waited for the COMELEC to rule on her manifestation and other motions, it would
have resulted in the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari before the
Court.

The May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying Limkaichong and
suspending her proclamation cannot yet be implemented considering that she timely filed a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, the Joint Resolution has not yet attained finality for it to be implemented.

Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated June 29, 2007 has
since been remedied by the promulgation of its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, recognizing that it
no longer has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases following the valid proclamation of
Limkaichong and her assumption of office as a Member of the House of Representatives.
V
Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit
Limkaichong from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Biraogo's contention was that De Venecia [73] should be stopped from entering Limkaichong's name in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives because he has no power to allow an alien to sit
and continue to sit therein as it would amount to an unlawful exercise of his legal authority. Moreover,

Biraogo opposes Limkaichongs assumption of office in the House of Representatives since she is not
qualified to sit therein, being a Chinese citizen and, thus, disqualified by virtue of a final and executory
judgment of the COMELEC En Banc. He relied on the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated June 29, 2007,
which affirmed the COMELEC Second Division Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying
Limkaichong from holding public office. He contended that the said Resolution dated June 29, 2007 is
already final and executory; hence, it should be respected pursuant to the principle of res judicata.

De Venecia, on the other hand, argued that he should not be faulted for honoring the proclamation of
Limkaichong, because it had the hallmarks of regularity, and he had no power to exclude any Member
of the House of Representatives motu proprio. In their Comment on the petition, respondents De
Venecia, et al., contended that the enrollment of a Member in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives and his/her recognition as such becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary
General and the House of Representatives upon presentation by such Member of a valid
Certificate of Proclamation and Oath of Office.

Respondent Nograles, as De Venecia's, substitute, filed a Memorandum dated July 16, 2008 stating that
under the circumstances, the House of Representatives, and its officials, are without recourse except to
honor the validity of the proclamation of Limkaichong until the same is
canceled, revoked or nullified, and to continue to recognize her as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Negros Oriental until it is ordered by this Court, as it was in Codilla, to recognize
somebody else. He went on to state that after assumption by the Member-elect, or having acquired a
presumptively valid title to the office, the House of Representatives cannot, motu proprio, cancel,
revoke, withdraw any recognition given to a sitting Member or to remove his name from its roll, as such
would amount to a removal of such Member from his office without due process of law. Verily, it is only
after a determination by the appropriate tribunal (as in this case, the HRET), pursuant to a final and
executory order, that the Member does not have a right to the office (i.e., not being a duly elected
Member), that the House of Representatives is directed to exclude the said Member.

Their contentions are meritorious. The unseating of a Member of the House of Representatives should
be exercised with great caution and after the proper proceedings for the ouster has been validly
completed. For to arbitrarily unseat someone, who obtained the highest number of votes in the
elections,

and

during

the

pendency

of

the

proceedings

determining

ones

qualification

disqualification, would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.

or

[74]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32 is GRANTED and the Joint
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. All the other petitions (G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, 179240-41)
are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, G.R. No. 189466
Petitioner,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,
JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ
and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------- x

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. G.R. No. 189506

PALPARAN, JR.,
Petitioner,
- versus -

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,
CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN,
ANTONIO FLORES and Promulgated:
JOSELITO USTAREZ,
Respondents. February 11, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower
house of Congress.

The Facts and the Case

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo partylist organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered
voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET againstAangat Tayo and its nominee,
petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list
seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself
was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the

marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization
called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the
status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers,
women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also
claimed that although she was the second nominee ofAn Waray party-list organization during the 2004
elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition
for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the
registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon
who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were
internal concerns ofAangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but
upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. [1]The latter moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009, [2] prompting Abayon to file the
present petition for special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list
group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda
Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a
petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives
as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan
committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern ofBantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the
reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over
the question of petitioner Palparans qualifications. [3] Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET
denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009, [4] hence, the recourse to this Court through this
petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.

Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations,
respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the
2007 elections.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List
System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the
qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the
HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications
of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but
were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to
inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld
her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays personality is
so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss
the quo warranto action against Bantaywithout dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution,[5] identifies who the members of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party -list
system
of
registered
national,
regional,
and
sectoral
parties
or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members x x x who
shall be elected from legislative districts and those who x x x shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This
means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are elected into
office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that
peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where
the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives
belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in
like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments.They can participate in
the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to
the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list
nominees as members of the House of Representatives, thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring
supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,[6] a
party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the

end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be

nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five

(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they
ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent. [7]

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need
for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context
of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the
qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is
true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from
among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. [8] But where an
allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to
become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the
position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to
believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an
incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not
resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution [9] provides that the HRET shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected
members of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins.[10]

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantayparty-list but upheld its jurisdiction
over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated
July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated
September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKASNUCD),petitioners,
vs.
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, respondents.
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.
Ricardo G. Nepomuceno for petitioners.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondents.
RESOLUTION

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27, 1992 and respondents Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992, said respondents moved for a
reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following grounds:
Senator Taada alleges that:
1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents;
2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the 1935 and
1987 Constitutions;
3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;
4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Taada to the Commission on
Appointments.
In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:
1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng vs. Mitra,
Jr. 1and Daza vs. Singson. 2
2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to function as a
constitutional body.
3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political parties and must
govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.
4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which contemplates a
realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the Commission.
On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed its separate
Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7, 1993 their separate
Comments on the Motion of the respondents.
Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the reasons/arguments
submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the following grounds:
1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
and We quote pertinent portions thereof.
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of
the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN .5
NPC 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal
interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application
than as above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so
doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's

representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in

the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its
mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the
political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
xxx xxx xxx
We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination
and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a
breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the
Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of
half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not
leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the
House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By
requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect
works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No
party can claim more than what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its
proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in
the Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same
token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission. 3
The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada in the Commission on Appointments for the year alluded to by
respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the former Senator's Membership in the
Commission during his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. 4 In the following years the composition of the
Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not
discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within their own ranks. During this period, his membership in the
Commission was acquiesced to by the other members of the Senate, including the Nationalista Party which had a
fractional vote. His membership in the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the
Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not
never reached the Court. The older Taada's membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be
considered by respondent Senator Taada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI,
Section 18 of the Constitution.
It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada, he had his Citizens Party
coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the banner of the latter party. His
election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the Nationalista Party and not
because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone representative of the Citizens' Party. 5Senator
Taada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in 1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the
end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again got
re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The Nationalista-Citizens Party coalition of 12
Senators in the Senate from
1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late Senator Lorenzo
Taada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional representation in the Commission by
resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional membership in the Commission. This
practice was repeated in
1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the Commission on
Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional representation to the Commission, with
the late Senator Taada becoming the 16th Senator of the Coalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission.

Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator Taada filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member
representing the Coalition in the Commission.
The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect any practice or
tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of the constitutional provision on
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No practice or tradition, established by a mere
tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In
the absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated
erroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature. 6
2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of the Senators based on
the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and including Senator Teofisto Guingona
as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the
proportional representatives of each political party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual
number of members of each political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments
in the Senate. 7 In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld
the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, 8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the Commission
based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on Appointments. The issue
therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision.
3) Senator Taada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the party must make the
nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDP-LABAN. It was the Majority Leader, an LDP
Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to elect respondent Senator Taada (along with the Senators
belonging to the other Minority parties NPC and LAKAS-NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for
election and votation those previously nominated by the various political parties. In nominating the twelve (12)
Senators to the membership in the Commission on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved:
Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for election to the
Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its membership : Senators Angara,
Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and
Osmea for NPC; Senator Rasul, for Lakas-NUCD; and Senator Taada for LP-PDP, Mr. President. 9
4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-party system,
entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership in
each house. 10 The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the effect that "under the Constitutional provision
on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and
minority parties therein but extends to all the political parties represented in each house of Congress", does not and
should not be construed to mean that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in the Senate, are
entitled by Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the subsequent
case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where it ruled that proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each house. The mere presence of one Senator
belonging to a political party does notipso facto entitle such a party to membership in the Commission on
Appointments.
5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected to the
membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to
elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a
proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the
specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement
allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of
proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the case
at bar.
Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as exofficioChairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation . . . .
The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the composition of the
Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of Section 18 which
provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation. This interpretation
finds support in the case of Taada vs. Cuenco, 13 where this Court held that the constitutional provision makes
mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that
they should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in
interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail. Such interpretation is the only
correct and rational interpretation which the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the
Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers to every clause and word thereof.
The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve Representatives in order
that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the Commission on Appointments, provides
that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is
provided that the Commission "shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of
all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In implementing these
provisions, the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members
is necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum
should come from either house". 14 Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can
perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full
complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its business
even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Taada is excluded from the
Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has
representation in the Commission in the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman
Juan Ponce Enrile.
Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the impasse in the
membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote:
. . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition with
another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision. 15
The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the case. It does
not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have explicitly said so. What we
intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may join their half-memberships to form a full
membership and together nominate one from their coalition to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the
NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the
Commission. In the same way the LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Taada to fill up the
other slot to complete the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator
Taada and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional
representation.
Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as members of the
Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed by the Constitution to twelve,
but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on proportional representation. The question of
who interprets what is meant by proportional representation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court.
The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse concerning the
membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the Supreme Court is a Senate
recognition that the determination of proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a
function of this Court.

Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The framers of our Constitution,
in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in the Supreme Court the role in final arbiter in
cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the
unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction
tyranny by force of numbers.
The election of respondents Senators Taada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional provision and
when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. We quote
from our decision:
. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on
Appointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in
numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of
discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution,
and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts
to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. 16
For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.