D

Journal of Shipping and Ocean Engineering 2 (2012) 45-54

DAVID

PUBLISHING

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and

Security in Ports: Empirical Evidence from Container
Terminals in Greece
Constantinos I. Chlomoudis1, Petros A. Kostagiolas2 and Petros L. Pallis1
1. Department of Maritime Studies, University of Piraeus, Piraeus 18532, Greece
2. Department of Archive & Library Science, Ionian University, Corfu 49100, Greece
Abstract: Nowadays, the most prominent risk assessment techniques are founded on the values of measuring and controlling the
frequency and the consequences of risks in order to assure an acceptable level of safeness mainly in the lines of environmental,
health and hygiene and port product issues. This paper initially introduces risk assessment approaches within the emerging role of ports.
Thereafter, it qualitatively assesses their potential for ports by discussing issues challenging every safety and security approach within
the maritime industry such as proactiveness, organization, transparency, cost-effectiveness and, when possible, calibration to specific
experiences. Moreover, an empirical study was conducted in order to provide evidence for formal risk assessment for safety and
security in the main Greek port container terminals of Piraeus and Thessaloniki. The empirical research is based on in-depth
semi-structured interviews with the administrations of container terminals. The results include important findings, regarding the
likelihood of appearance of certain risks and their perceived severity in Greek container terminals. The collected answers and their
analysis are also important for confirming the suggested theoretical formal risk assessment framework for ports.
Key words: Greek ports, risk assessment, safety, security, container terminals, empirical evidence.

1. Introduction

A great variety of activities are performed in port

terminals: passenger transport, cargo transport, oil and
chemicals storage, vehicle storage and transport, ship,
lorry and train circulation and so on. Due to this
intense activity, ports are very important facilities for
the economy of a country [1, 2] but also a place of
risk, where harm can be directed to persons
(crew/passengers/port
labor/other),
environment
(nature) and/or property (ships/port facilities/port
labor/other). On the other hand, in a global perspective,
there are different viewpoints for risk preparedness.
Thus, prevention of risk is diachronically a focal matter
for maritime transportation. The current approaches
however have focused on specific perspectives (i.e.,
human error, mechanical failure, etc.). It is well known
Corresponding author: Petros L. Pallis, Drs., research
fields: port plan and management, risk and safety assessments.
E-mail: ppallis@unipi.gr.

that by using an estimation of the frequency of

occurrence and the severity of these events, it is
possible to create an effective risk assessment
framework [3].
Considering the interest for risk prevention in port
container terminals, especially in a view of the fact that
additional potential problems are continually added
through new and upcoming risks, and the fact that ports
are at the very beginning of implementing modern risk
approaches, already developed in other industries, this
paper proposes an approach for risk assessment,
categorization and prioritization in port container
terminals. The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides an overview of risks in port
container terminals and in Section 3 the
methodological framework is adopted. In Section 4
two case studies based on interviews are presented;
while Section 5 presents the conclusions of this paper.

46

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and Security in Ports:

Empirical Evidence from Container Terminals in Greece

2. An Overview of Risks in Port Container

Terminals
Human, material, economic, and environmental
losses generally exceed the ability of the affected
organization to resolve all hazardous situations using
only its own resources. Risk is a combination of the
frequency (likelihood or probability) of a risk and the
consequence (severity or impact) of the risk reaching
its potential [4].
2.1 Risk Prevention Plan
While it is generally accepted that the overall level
of maritime safety and security has improved over the
years, further improvements are still desirable.
Evidently much of maritime safety and security
policies have been developed after serious accidents.
Why should the maritime industry and, in general,
society, have to wait for an accident to occur in order to
modify existing rules or propose new ones? [5].
Promoting risk awareness rather than waiting for
accidents to reveal them is a widely employed
approach, especially in other industries such as the
nuclear and the aerospace industries [5]. In addition,
the port industry has begun to move from a reactive to a
proactive approach and therefore towards more
complex risk prevention plans and tools.
2.2 Risks in Port Container Terminals
The literature on port risks is extensive [6-25] and
formulates several categories of port risks. Chlomoudis
et al. [26] have provided a methodology based on five
risk categories for the port industry. Bing et al. [27]
presented a risk categorization methodology approach
regarding risks at the macro and micro level. Moreover,
Shaluf [28] provided an overview of natural,
man-made and hybrid risks in addition to subsequent
risks. Shalufs paper [28] also proposed a risk tree
depicting the various risk types. Moreover, the port
sector has its own set of risk factors, a typology of
risks regarding business and operational conditions in
ports, terminals and shipping [29]. Although, risk

categories can be generalized, different ports are

mostly affected by distinct risk categories due to the
uniqueness of the port operational environment, as well
as the variability of the impact associated to each risk
for each port. Hence, although risk categories are
applicable to all ports around the world, not all risk
categories are of the same importance for individual
ports [26].
All safety and security approaches based on
standards

are

proactive

in

nature.

However,

distinctions among ports are important and the possible

scenarios for assuring or enhancing safety and security
are certainly quite a few. In the analysis of Chlomoudis
et al. [26], 12 distinct safety principles and/or
standards have been introduced and interrelated to
distinct risk categories. These include the PERS
standard which is a process-based standard leading to
certification for addressing environmental risks.
Similarly, OHSAS 18001 is a process-based standard
that may lead to certification and deals on personnel
health and hygiene.
2.3 Risks Stages in a Risk Prevention Plan
The most general form of a risk management cycle
and therefore the main stages in a risk prevention plan
are:
(a) risk identification;
(b) risk mitigation;
(c) risk preparedness;
(d) risk response;
(e) risk recovery.
However, many alternative forms of risk
management processes and phases are presented in the
literature. The first objective can be satisfied with a
combination of creative and analytical exercises that
aim to identify all relevant risks. The creative part
(mainly brainstorming) is to ensure that the process is
proactive and not confined only to risks that have
materialized in the past. In cases where a risk cannot
be prevented, the literature emphasizes on mitigating
the risk impacts to the minimum; while risk

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and Security in Ports:

Empirical Evidence from Container Terminals in Greece

preparedness acknowledges that whilst it is impossible

to completely prevent a risk or mitigate its effects, it
necessitates adequate preparedness to respond to a risk
and a quick recovery process from the risk impacts.
Risk identification, risk prevention or mitigation and
risk preparedness include measures implemented in
anticipation of a risk and thus are proactive in nature.
On the contrary, risk response and risk recovery
measures are mainly reactive in nature.
The conventional approach of risk prevention
measures defines them as the opportunity of
preventing an accident or adverse occurrence. It
therefore combines a probabilistic measure of the
occurrence of an event with a measure of the
consequence, or impact, of that event. The process of
risk prevention is generally based on three sets of
sequenced and inter-related activities as follows:
(a) the prevention of risk in terms of what can go
wrong, the probability of it going wrong, and the
possible consequences;
(b) the prevention of risk in terms of what can be
done, the options and trade-offs available between the
costs and the benefits;
(c) the impact of risk prevention measures,
decisions and policies on future options and
undertakings.

3. Methodological Framework
In the context of risk preparedness in ports and of the
clearly distinguished need for realistic proactive
measures, safety and security approaches are founded
on the values of measuring and controlling the
frequency and the consequences of risks in order to
assure an acceptable level of safeness. Indeed, the
empirical research conducted and presented here
addresses the following issue: The likelihood of
appearance of certain risks and their perceived severity,
in the two major container terminals in Greece,
confirms the theoretical background for the
indispensable role of a formal risk assessment
framework. In order to proceed with the empirical

47

research a combined two stage methodology has been

developed:
1st Stage: literature review and development of an
initial taxonomy of risks;
2nd Stage: semi-structured interviews conducted
with container terminal directors in two Greek ports,
the OLP operated container terminal and the container
terminal in the port of Thessaloniki. The main aims of
the interviews were (a) to collect data and information
regarding past risks and the level of preparedness and
(b) to modify the initial taxonomy based on the
quantification of port risks.
At Stage 1, the initial taxonomy that will be
developed is based on the review of Section 2 and
includes the main risk categories for port container
terminals at the international level. It should be noted
that the term taxonomy is used to refer to a
polyhierarchical classification in which individual
components may appear more than once [28].
Risks have a common denominator: the severe
impact they have on peoples lives, properties and the
environment. To formulate all potential risks into the
following categories is possible when the risks pose a
definite threat to the lives and safety of people and
property [26, 28]. The methodology proposed here is
similar to the one proposed for developing an initial
taxonomy of risk parameters in Ref. [28] and includes
all the risks reviewed in Section 2. Hence, risks have
been classified as falling into one of five categories
[28], i.e. human (i.e., accidents, health and hygiene
issues etc.), machinery (e.g., ship collisions,
mechanical failures, etc.), the environment (e.g., water,
air and noise pollution etc.), security (e.g., terrorism
etc.) and natural risks (e.g. act of God, weather etc.).
Risk types can be arranged in the form of a risk tree, as
shown in Table 1. The risk tree categories do not
include subsequent or secondary risks.
The initial taxonomy of Table 1 has been
incorporated into the interview forms of the second
stage. The main aim of the interviews is to identify
which are the most significant safety and security risks

48

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and Security in Ports:

Empirical Evidence from Container Terminals in Greece

Table 1 Initial taxonomy of risks in port container

terminals.
Risk categories

Human

Machinery

Environment

Security

Natural

Risks subcategories
Ship collisions
Grounding
Sinking
Navigation error
Pilotage error
Poor maintenance
Falling of a crane
Falling of a container
Error in cargo handling and storage
Damage to equipment
Fire/explosion
Machinery failure
System failure
Ships emissions
Dredging
Oil spills
Chemical contaminants
Ballast waters
Ship breaking/salvage activities
Air toxics
Noise pollution
Alien species
War/political instability
Terrorist
heft
Smuggling
Illegal trade
Vandalism
Illegal immigration
Blockade
Earthquakes
Volcanic eruptions
Hurricane
Strong winds
Heavy swell and sea
Floods
High temperature during working hours
Heavy rain

in terms of their frequency and their severity of

appearance. For example, Bichou [30] described the
process of risk assessment as the assessment of risk
in terms of what can go wrong, the probability of it
going wrong and the possible consequences; while he
further states that the empiricist approach is to regard
accidents as random events whose frequency and
severity is influenced by certain factors. In our
methodology we assumed risk events to range in
frequency and severity from high frequency low

consequence events (e.g. road accident or machine

failure), which tend to be routine and well reported, to
low frequency high consequence events (e.g.
earthquake or terrorist attack), which tend to be rare
but more complex and severe.
In support of the interviews, an initial consultation
with port container personnel took place and the
container terminal directors of the ports of Piraeus
(OLP operated container terminal) and Thessaloniki
agreed to participate in the research, by completing a
specially designed interview form. The interview form
is pilot-tested with a group of experts in the field of port
management and its final structure included four
sections:
Section A includes information regarding the
respondent and the port container terminal;
Section B comprises three sets of questions, the
first concerns the definition of risks, the second
concerns information regarding the frequency of
risk-related damages, and the third includes
information on the implementation and certification of
various quality and safety and security systems;
The third section (Section C) contains a total of
twenty three questions or groups of questions,
examining many aspects of the level of container
terminal risk prevention;
The final section of the interview form, Section D,
regards the quantification of the frequency and the
severity of the risks identified in the initial taxonomy
for the port container terminal, through a 5-point scale.
The last question of Section D is an open-ended
question giving the opportunity to provide additional
information concerning risk prevention in the port
terminal.

4. Empirical Evidence for the Two Container

Terminals in Greece
4.1 Profiles of Piraeus & Thessaloniki Container
Terminals
This paper focuses on the two major Greek ports in
order to provide empirical evidence from Greece. The

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and Security in Ports:

Empirical Evidence from Container Terminals in Greece

Piraeus Port Authority is the largest port in Greece and

one of the largest in the Mediterranean. It is a centre of
development for international trade and the local and
national economy. The port of Piraeus is the hub that
connects the islands with mainland Greece, an
international cruise centre and a commercial hub for the
Mediterranean, providing services to ships and Cargoes
of all types and sizes. The PPA in the context of its
environmental policy has implemented since 2004 the
Environmental Management System PERS (Port
Environmental Review System), which has been
shaped by the European Agency ECOPORTS
Foundation supported by the European Sea Ports
Organization
(European
Sea
Ports
OrganizationESPO), exclusively for port activities,
services and products. The PERS system is applied in
several European ports, while the certification process
is checked and validated by the prestigious independent
body of Lloyds Register (Netherlands BV). The PPA
in December 2008 completed the review process of
environmental certification PERS (Port Environmental
Review SystemVersion 3) and obtained a certificate in
accordance with the upgraded version of PERS. At June
28, 2011, the PPA has been certified with the upgraded
version of PERS (Version 4).
On the other hand, the port of Thessaloniki is one of
the largest and busiest ports of Southeastern Europe.
The Thessaloniki port is an important sea hub for the
European Union since it is close to the countries of
Southeast Europe and the Black Sea. The Thessaloniki
Port Authority S.A. implements a port facilities
security plan and is fully complied with the ISPS Code
requirements. The ThPA S.A. is strongly committed to
security and closely observes and follows any new
security initiative/rule/regulation implemented at the
international, European and national level. The
companys sensitivity to personnel and passenger
safety as well as its respect for environmental
protection plays an important role in the companys
operation. Thanks to regular measuring of radiation,
noise, chemical factors and other elements, the

49

Environment, Health and Safety Department has

contributed to the improvement of occupational safety
and health conditions. The results of the above
systematic efforts are reflected in the significant
reduction of the frequency of labour accidents and
severity indicators in the recent years. Within the
framework of environmental protection and
sustainable development, ThPA S.A. was the first port
of the Mediterranean to receive the Port
Environmental Review System certification for
environmental issues by the European Sea Ports
Organization (ESPO) and the ECOPORTS Foundation.
Moreover, in harmonization with the community
directive 2000/59/CE and the MARPOL 73/78
Convention, ThPA S.A. implements a ships waste
reception and management plan.
Moreover, Piraeus is the dominant container port in
Greece handling 73.4% of all of the 1.86 m TEU
container traffic in Greece in 2007. This included the
majority share of the total 1.26 m TEU container traffic
in Greek ports, which was destined for the Greek
consumer market. For a study conducted for the winner
of the concession, Drewry estimated the Piraeus
container traffic split in 2007 at 848,694 TEUs (62%) in
Greek gateway (import-export), while 511.391 TEUs
(37%) transhipment is en route to/from other ports in
the region, which is unrelated to the Greek market and
transit (to foreign countries by road through Piraeus)
8.573 TEUs (1%). Piraeus transhipment traffic is about
98% of transhipment containers handled through Greek
ports. Transit traffic, mainly for destinations in
Romania and Hungary, is estimated to account for 1%
of Piraeus total gateway traffic. This represents
approximately 10% of the transit traffic handled
through Greek ports in 2007 (Thessaloniki handles the
remaining 90%). Container terminal contributes almost
75% of OLPs revenues and 50% of its earnings before
taxes and amortization (EBTDA) [31].
The findings of the interviews for the risk
identification are presented in the following section,
separately for each port container terminal.

50

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and Security in Ports:

Empirical Evidence from Container Terminals in Greece

4.2 Findings and Implications

4.2.1 Container Terminal Operated by OLP at the
Port of Piraeus
In the second section of the interview form in
Question B1, the director of the container terminal at
the port of Piraeus, provided with a number of damage
categories (injury or death of employee, injury or death
of user, system damage, container damage, building
damage, environmental damage, equipment damage,
ship damage and freight loss), identified the three main
damage categories as: (a) injury of employees, (b)
system damage, (c) container damage. Moreover,
the director identified in Question B2 (When was the
last time that your container terminal suffered a
risk-related damage?), system damages, equipment
damages and container damages as occurring often,
environmental damage and freight loss as rarely
occurring; while the rest of the damage categories
never occurred. In the third section (Question C1: Does
your port have a Risk Prevention plan?), it was
indicated that there is no formal risk prevention plan
implemented at the moment, however, later in the same
section (Question C9: In case you do not have an
overall risk prevention plan or distinctive risk
prevention plans, do you intend to create one or many
in the future?) it was noted that they are planning to
develop an overall risk prevention plan as well as
specific plans for employee and user injuries and plans
for system and container damages prevention. In the
next question (Question C10: Why havent you created
such an overall plan or distinctive risk prevention
plans), the reasons identified as the most significant for
not preparing overall or specific plans are other
priorities; while no need was identified for building
damage and equipment damage, and ship damage
was considered to be outside of the authority of the port
container. In particular, for environmental damage
the main reason identified for not preparing such a plan
was the cost of the investment. Moreover, the director
gave a very high priority to prevention preparedness
and reaction and a medium significance to recovery.

Finally, very high importance was given to preventive

maintenance and employee training, to ship/cargo
monitoring and quality/safety assurance, while low
importance was given to security measures and guards.
In this context, in the following questions adequate
training was noted for employees, lack of training for
the users, no drills took place, although it was
mentioned that the port container terminal has an
anti-theft system, emergency equipment, and is
insured.
The results for the final section of the interview
identify, assess and thus prioritize the most important
risks for the port container terminal of Piraeus. As can
be seen in Table 2, 24 risk factors have been identified
as relevant for the container terminal, operated by OLP
in the port of Piraeus. The priorities are presented in the
first column of Table 2. The second column contains
the relevant risk factor, while the remaining three
columns present the frequency, the severity and the
overall assessment. Indeed, the first two risks, failing
of a container and system failure have been assessed
as the most important; while the next four are also quite
significant high Temperature during working hours,
machinery failure, noise pollution, and poor
maintenance. From those, most of the risks relate to
the container operations, systems and equipment, while
the high temperature during working hours relates to
employee health and hygiene and noise pollution
relates to environmental damages. The overall
prioritization of risks for this particular port is
exhibited in Table 2.
4.2.2 Container Terminal at the Port of Thessaloniki
In a similar manner to the results obtained from the
port of Piraeus, in Question B1 (What is the first thing
that comes to your mind when you hear the term Risk
in Ports ?), the director of the container terminal at the
port of Thessaloniki identified the three main damage
categories as (a) injury of employees, (b)
equipment damage and (c) container damage.
Moreover, container damages have been identified
(Question B2: When was the last time that your container

51

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and Security in Ports:

Empirical Evidence from Container Terminals in Greece
Table 2 The container terminal of Piraeus.
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Risk
Risks
Frequency Severity
assessment
Falling of a container 3
4
12
System failure
4
3
12
High temperature
3
3
9
during working hours
Machinery failure
3
3
9
Noise pollution
3
3
9
Poor maintenance
3
3
9
Alien species
2
3
6
Ballast waters
2
3
6
Damage to equipment 3
2
6
Earthquakes
2
3
6
Error in cargo
3
2
6
handling and storage
Oil spills
2
3
6
Pilotage error
2
3
6
Blockade
2
2
4
Falling of a crane
2
2
4
Heavy rain
2
2
4
Heavy swell and sea 2
2
4
Illegal immigration 2
2
4
Illegal trade
2
2
4
Ships emissions
2
2
4
Strong winds
2
2
4
Vandalism
2
2
4
heft
2
2
4
Ship collisions
2
1
2

environmental damage prevention plan. All these

prevention plans have been initially developed within
the past five years (Question C3: How long ago did
your container terminal develop this risk prevention
plan or distinctive risk prevention plans for each of the
following risk categories?), and are updated annually
(Question C4: How often is the current/last overall risk
prevention plan or distinctive risk prevention plans
updated?), while no other plans are planned to be
developed (Question C5: Did the container terminal
perform a pilot test for this overall plan or distinctive
risk prevention plans?). These risk prevention plans
have been developed without any external cooperation
with other authorities (Question C6: Your container
terminals overall risk prevention plan or distinctive
risk prevention plans has been created following
discussions with: (a) Local Administration/Authority,
(b)

Port

Authority,

(c)

Public

Transportation

Representative, (d) Coast Guard Authority, (e) Army,

(f) No one, (g) Other institutions (which ones?)), while
as shown in Questions C7 (Is any member of the
container terminal staff responsible for the overall risk
prevention plan or distinctive risk prevention plans and

Source: Authors.

its implementation?) and C8 (Please name the post

terminal suffered a risk-related damage?) to occur often,

while employee injuries, equipment damage, ship
damage and freight loss are noted to occur rarely.
Furthermore, as show in Question B3 (Which quality and
safety systems does your container terminal follow?), the
container terminal has been certified with a quality
management system according to ISO 9001:2008.

occupied by the person responsible for the overall risk

In the next section of the interview form it was

havent you created such an overall plan or distinctive

specified that no overall risk prevention plan has

risk prevention plans?) has been identified as a main

been developed (Question C1: Does your port have a

issue for not developing an overall risk prevention

Risk Prevention plan?), although a number of

plan, a system damage prevention plan, a container

particular risk prevention plans have been developed

damage prevention plan, an environmental damage

(Question C2: Does your port have an overall Risk

prevention plan, an equipment damage prevention

Prevention plan or distinctive risk prevention plans

plan, a ship damage prevention plan, a freight loss

for each of the following risk categories?), including an

prevention plan, while it was indicated that a building

injury (-death) of employee prevention plan, an

damage prevention plan was not actually required.

injury (-death) of user prevention plan, and an

Once again in Question C11 (Evaluate the importance

prevention plan or distinctive risk prevention plans in

your container terminal) the safety technician of the
container terminal is the person responsible for
employee

injuries,

while

for

other plans

the

responsibility belongs to the port container director. In

this case, the factor of cost (Question C10: Why

52

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and Security in Ports:

Empirical Evidence from Container Terminals in Greece

of each of the following stages included in a risk

Table 3 The container terminal of Thessaloniki.

prevention plan), the highest significance was given to

No.

Risks

Frequency Severity

prevention while high significance was also given to

Illegal trade

Risk
assessment
12

preparedness, reaction and recovery. The most

Earthquakes

10

important risk prevention measures were considered to

Smuggling

be preventive maintenance and guards following

Strong winds

by employee training, security alarms and quality

Damage to equipment 2

Machinery failure

assurance procedures. Finally, it was indicated that

Table 3 displays the risk assessment for the container

15

System failure
War/political
instability
Floods
Error
in
cargo
handling and storage
Oil spills
Chemical
contaminants
Hurricane
High
temperature
during working hours
Heavy rain

terminal in the port of Thessaloniki. In this case the risk

16

Ship collisions

factors relevant to this container terminal were 32

17

Sinking

18

Falling of a crane

19

Fire/explosion

20

Terrorist

the container terminal employees are adequately

trained in order to deal with an upcoming risk. Drills
for fire protection/fire extinguishing have taken place,

8
9

while emergency equipment has been installed in

10

important parts of the container terminal area that can

11

be easily accessed by all staff. Container terminal

12

equipment is covered by insurance and a civil

13

protection program is implemented.

14

instead of 24 that were identified for the container

terminal in Piraeus. Indeed, illegal trade was
indicated as the most important risk issue, followed by

21

Navigation error

earthquakes, smuggling and strong winds.

22

Pilotage error

Thereafter, risk factors related to container terminal

23

Falling of a container 2

operations follow, i.e. damage to equipment,

24

Ships emissions

25

Dredging

26

Heavy swell and sea 1

27

Grounding

issue war/political instability. Other risk factors

28

Poor maintenance

belonging to all different risk categories follow for the

29

Noise pollution

container terminal of Thessaloniki as shown in Table 3.

30

Alien species

31

Ballast waters

32

heft

machinery failure, system failure, together with

one environmental related factor floods and a security

4.2.3 Refinement of the Taxonomy and Limitations

In an effort to provide an overview of the common
and/or the most prominent risks appear in both major
container terminals in Greece, an indicative refined risk
taxonomy is presented in Table 4. The indicative
taxonomy of Table 4 may indeed serve as a vehicle for
further risk assessment analysis and further research in
port container terminals in the eastern Mediterranean
area, in the environment of which, the container
terminals operation is affected by similar risk factors,
while each of the risk categories has been examined.

Source: Authors.

Bearing in mind, however, that each port is unique in

a number of ways, for the results presented here and for
that matter the risks presented in Table 4. Only if they
are supported by further empirical evidence based on
the methodological framework of Section 3, they can
be generalized with caution. Moreover, different risk
prevention strategies should prevail in distinct ports as
the most effective and efficient approaches when trying

An Analysis of Formal Risk Assessments for Safety and Security in Ports:

Empirical Evidence from Container Terminals in Greece
Table 4 Taxonomy based on risk assessment for port
container terminals.
Risk category

Human

Machinery

Environment

Security

Natural

Risk factors
Falling of a container
Error in cargo handling and storage
Poor maintenance
Pilotage error
Falling of a crane
Ship collisions
Sinking
Navigation error
Grounding
System failure
Machinery failure
Damage to equipment
Fire/explosion
Noise pollution
Oil spills
Alien species
Ships emissions
Ballast waters
Chemical contaminants
Dredging
Illegal trade
Smuggling
War/political instability
Terrorist
heft
Vandalism
Illegal immigration
Blockade
Earthquakes
High temperature during working hours
Strong winds
Heavy rain
Floods
Heavy swell and sea
Hurricane

Source: Authors.

to reduce either the frequency or the severity for each

of the risk factors could significantly differ among
different ports.

possibility of risks and the potential occurrence of fatal

injuries or accidents. It is nearly impossible, however,
to implement a unique method or a general
prevention plan for all ports.
The above-mentioned taxonomy could be employed
as a vehicle of risk assessment in other container ports.
Indeed, this study could be extended with more case
studies, in a number of ways, especially at the
geographical region of the Southeastern Europe due to
the similar characteristics and culture of the region. As
we can see from the findings, there were four similar
answers in the first ten, for the two container terminals,
presenting in that way, a common ground in risk
preparedness.
Finally, further areas of application should be
explored considering the proposed model as a support
tool for risk prevention and decision-making at different
levels (policy, design or operating procedures, etc.) and
for different stakeholders of the container terminals. As
a matter of fact, while for policy makers and regulators
the objective is providing safety and security with
affordability as a prerequisite, for the industry (e.g.,
ship operators, shipyards, port) the objective is
achieving affordability with safety and security as an
indispensable condition. The proposed approach is
suitable for further extensions on the side of economic
and societal impact, as well as for cost benefit
approaches in order to help the administrations or the
authorities achieve the most profitable improvements
and implications.

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5. Conclusions
Container terminals in Greek ports face significant
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The aim of a prevention plan should be to provide
equipment and procedures able to minimize the

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