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Copyright 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd.

Women's Studies Int. Forum, Vol. 16, No.6, pp. 605-613, 1993
Printed in the USA.

STRUCTURING FEMINIST SCIENCE

MURIEL LEDERMAN
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Biology,
Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA

Synopsis - Many calls for a feminist science have ended with the disclaimer that there is no way to
imagine such a science from within an androcentric society. Making the attempt requires dealing
with two broad questions: "Is all or some of science socially constructed?" and "By what features
is science recognized?" The strategy used here involves defining the components as we know them,
asking if they are socially constructed, and, if they are, how they could be changed to be less androcentric. The conclusion is that all of science may be androcentric, and the approach to attaining
feminist science may need to be radical, a total replacement of the scientific enterprise with one not
based on the scientific method. Alternatively, we may accept a modification of current science, a
"feminized" science (defined as doing the same science differently), as consistent with the political
goal for feminist scientists.

Recently, there have been many calls for a

feminist science. Most have ended with a
statement reflecting the difficulty of envisioning a feminist science, saying that there is
no way, -from our current perspective, to
imagine the form a feminist science might
take. For example, Elizabeth Fee has stated
that "For us to imagine a feminist science in
a feminist society is rather like asking a medieval peasant to imagine the theory of genetics
or the production of a space capsule" (Fee,
1982, p. 31). Sue Rosser has said "I do not
think that we can further imagine how a feminist sciencemight differ from traditional science until we have many feminists in top-level
research and decision-making positions in
science for a considerable period of time"
(Rosser, 1988, p. 18). However, we should
think about what may comprise such a science. If we fail even to try, we may be perceived as less than serious about our femi-

The author thanks all the participants in the Women

in Science Discussion Group of the Department of Biology at VPI&SU, especially Robin Andrews and Carol
Burger, the "WASPS" (Women and Science Publication
Support group, Peggy DeWolf, Joy Harvey, Ann LaBerge, and Doris Teichler Zallen), as well as Bonnie
Spanier and David Bleich for their encouragement and
constructive criticism of these ideas. A version of this article was presented at the meeting of the International
Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies
of Biology in 1989.

nism and less than serious about the science

that we conduct.
There is considerable agreement in feminist critiques of science that both the practice
of science and the applications of that science
reflect domination in subtle and overt fashions. Maria Mies has said:
There is no abstract gain of knowledge
which justifies the drastic destruction of
vital links between self-sustaining living
systems on earth, of the inherent worth of
plants, animals, and humans in their living environment. The marriage between
knowledge and force must be dissolved. It
is imperative to alter this science. Another
paradigm of science cannot start, however, with the famous male urge for limitless knowledge, omniscience and omnipotency (Mies, 1990, p. 439).
However, this ideology of domination is
deeply ingrained in the current practice of science, an ideology that entered, according to
some, at the time of the Scientific Revolution.
... The new epistemological principle
upon which, since Bacon, the new scientific method is based is violence and
power. Without violently disrupting the
organic whole called Mother Nature, without separating the research objects by

605

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MURIEL LEDERMAN

force from the symbiotic context and isolating them in the laboratory . . . the new
scientists cannot gain knowledge. Violence and force are therefore intrinsic
methodological principles of the modern
concept of science and knowledge . They
are not, as is often assumed, ethical questions which arise only on the application
of the results of this science. They belong
to the epistemological foundations of
modern science (Mies, 1990, p. 437).
As Susan Bordo says in her analysis of "The
Cartesian Masculinization of Thought,"
"The otherness of nature is now what allows
it to be known" (Bordo, 1986, p. 261).
One consequence of statements such as
Mies' may be that current science will have to
be replaced to attain feminist goals. However, these statements do not give much
guidance about what might take its place. I
explore another path to investigate the relationship of science as it is practiced now to
a science that includes feminist viewpoints of
many origins in the practices of biology. I realize that my analysis may be suspect to
some, because I am a practicing scientist and
therefore subject to the charge that I have
been socialized during my training to accept
androcentric science. I maintain that concerned, sensitized scientists may have the best
perspective for a realistic assessment of science, because they might have two lenses with
which to view science, the lens of feminism
overlaid on the lens of their own research.
Science as we know it functions in an androcentric society. The first question to be
asked is "By what features do we recognize
science?". We need to be able to state clearly
what is meant by "science" in order to define
what counts as something to be changed.
Then we need to ask "Is science socially constructed? - Is it defined by its practitioners
and the society within which it thrives?". A
positive answer to these last two questions,
taken together with an androcentric society,
means that if all facets of contemporary science are socially constructed, all of science if
androcentric, and the call for a feminist science will necessitate the total replacement of
the scientific enterprise. If only some aspects
of science are socially constructed, then they
alone have to be replaced or changed to develop or reveal a feminist science.

It is important to keep in mind that the

search for a feminist model of inquiry is not
separable from feminism as a political movement. Seeking to replace androcentric science
with an alternative of any form is as much of
a political act as entrenched androcentrism is
a political reality. Implicit in the search for a
feminist science is the assumption that once
such a science can be characterized, it will be
practiced. But can a feminist science be practiced in an androcentric society? Some feminists have said that this is not possible. The
answer may depend upon what "feminist"
science turns out to be. Conversely, attaining
a gender-neutral or gynocentric society logically should insure that the science practiced
in that society would be a "feminist" science.
However, the legacy of androcentric science
must be overcome and the implementation of
feminist science may have to be won politically as part of feminism's use of politics to
cause changes in the society as a whole after
a clear definition of feminist science emerges.
Is it possible, even with these constraints,
to begin the process of inventing a feminist
science? In the analysis to follow, I describe
science as it is practiced today and attempt to
identify which of its aspects are socially constructed and therefore androcentric. I attempt to show that it is necessary to be as rigorous in our critiques of the current versions
of feminist science as we are of science within
society. I hope to convince the reader in this
exercise that at least some of the current analyses may not alter androcentric science in any
fundamental fashion. I believe that what has
emerged from the feminist critiques of science are versions of something that can be
called "feminized" science (to be defined
later). Any real change, to attain a truly feminist science, may require a much more radical
approach.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE

PRACTICE OF SCIENCE
When analyzing the practice of science, we
need to ask if science, in all or some of
its components, is socially constructed and
therefore androcentric. First, we must identify those components which exemplify science. If we can agree that these parameters
are socially constructed, then the possibility
emerges that they can be eliminated or re-

Structuring Feminist Science

placed, thereby opening the way for a feminist science. I will take the scientific method
as the current methodology of science. It is
characterized by observation, description,
the development of hypotheses, and the testing of these hypotheses by experimentation.
To what extent is each of these components
socially constructed? It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss each of these categories
separately, because the scientist comingles
them in the process of carrying out an investigation. Observations are usually made within
the context of experiments. Even if the science is not experimentally based, an hypothesis is still present and the interpretation of the
data is a description which may confirm or
refute the hypothesis.
Is the process of making an observation
socially constructed? The process of observation has three components, the physiological
act of observation, the instantaneous processing of information that produces an observation, and the description of that observation. I believe that the first component, the
physiology of observation, is not socially
constructed. If the difference between androcentric science and feminist science were
grounded in differential perception, it would
follow that men as opposed to women or individuals with diverse sexual orientation, or
persons of different social classes or political
persuasion would see, hear, or touch nature
differently. Making the suggestion that individuals sense the physical world differently
depending on a social or biological grouping
would lead to the most dangerous, counterproductive kind of determinism. However,
the second and third components, the "observation" and its description, may vary among
members of different groups, based upon
their different experiences in different social
contexts. These alternatives could lead to a
richness in interpretation that could benefit
future experimentation, but more commonly
the descriptions serve only to simultaneously
reflect and reinforce prevailing social structures (Martin, 1991).)
Within my own scientific field, molecular
biology, the by now classic example of a description that is biased in a way which reflects
the androcentrism of society is the naming of
DNA as the "master molecule." The implication behind this naming is that DNA controls
totally the metabolism of the cell, the overall

607

metabolism of the organism, and the entire

process of heredity. The implicit assumption
of this term is that the DNA works in isolation, that it is preprogrammed for all these
tasks. In this model, DNA functions solely to
"read out" the program contained in its sequence of nucleotides, with no chance for
any interaction with the cytoplasm or the
environment (Biology and Gender Study
Group, 1988). Is the process of generating
hypotheses socially constructed? Very likely
it is, because the already existing descriptors
influence the way scientists pose new questions and the way they view the data they
obtain.
Is experimentation socially constructed?
By experimentation, I do not mean the nature
of the questions asked in the experiment or
the interpretation of the result, but rather the
overall concept of experimental design. Experimentation itself can be subdivided into
what I will call passive and active experimentation. One example of passive experimentation is the discovery of the periodicity in
planetary movement. This involved observation, the generation of hypotheses, and the
confirmation of hypotheses at a later time,
again by observation. Passive experimentation can also be found in the field of ecology.
Here, the investigator observes a natural situation, makes a hypothesis about the types of
interactions occurring among the living entities in a region, and searches for confirmation of the hypothesis in other naturally occurring situations. A second situation may
be, for example, a study of biological succession in an area which has suffered a forest
fire. In neurobiology, hypotheses about the
location in the human brain of areas which
control different functions initially took advantage of individuals who had lost portions
of their brains to accident or disease.
This is in contrast to what I call active experimentation, in which the investigator sets
up a situation to test the hypothesis rather
than patiently waiting for Nature to deliver
the situation. A criticism of androcentric science which has been voiced persistently is
that it is not "at one" with Nature. Active experimentation is the part of contemporary
science which feminist critiques have singled
out as exemplifying androcentric science, because this type of experimentation can be
seen as an intrusion into Nature. For the ex-

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MURIEL LEDERMAN

amples given above of passive experimentation, the parallel active experiments might be
burning an area to investigate ecological succession or surgically severing the corpus callosum in an animal, an early experiment in
the development of the left brain-right brain
distinction.
Let us instead entertain the idea that active
science is female in origin by devising a hypothetical scenario. Imagine an individual in a
pre-Scientific Revolution society posing herself the following questions: "Does the extract of the purple-leaved plant which grows
on the hill a morning's walk toward the sun
reduce the redness when applied to the
wound caused by the bite of the spider? Does
the liquid made by boiling this leaf stop the
shivering of the fever which comes every year
when the sun is low in the sky? If it stops the
shivering, could the boiled leaves of the plant
which grows by the river stop the shivering as
well? The leaves of the plant by the river are
green, but they are the same shape as the
leaves of the purple plant."
For all we know, a train of thoughts similar to this may have been one of the starts of
science. It contains all the components of science as we know it today; actually, it combines aspects of both experimental medicine
(not altogether different from early searches
for antibiotics or cancer chemotherapies) and
biological classification. It is plausible that
experiments similar to those described were
first carried out by women. (A similar point
has been made by Ruth Ginzberg, 1987, in relation to midwifery.) As Sandra Harding has
said:
It is unclear how one would define this
term (scientific method) in such a way that
highly trained scientists and junior members of research teams in physics counted
as scientists, but farmers in simple societies (or mothers!) did not (Harding, 1987,
p.28).

Radical feminism as described by Rosser

(1992) is "based on the women's experience
... reject(ing) most scientific theories, data,
and experiments because they not only exclude women but also because they are not
women-centered" (p. 545). If there is any
truth in the scenario I suggested for women's

discovery of therapeutic botanicals, we are

faced with a paradox. In the radical critique,
active science would have to be valued because of its female origin. On the other hand,
this woman-based effort might have given
rise to one of the most androcentric parts of
current science, after the co-optation and alteration of the contributions of women.
RECONSTRUCTING SCIENCE
I have given examples which show that much
of the practice of science is socially constructed and has been perceived to have an
androcentric bias. How can we make the
practice of science less androcentric? Let us
begin with observation and description.
There have been excellent examples of cases
in science in which observations of the same
systems resulted in alternative descriptions,
one set of which was androcentric and the
other set was gynocentric. Sue Rosser (1988,
1992)reports that the field of primatology altered drastically after the participation of
women as researchers; the analyses of the organization of the animal families changed
from an interpretation that was almost totally androcentric to one that recognized the
contributions of the women.
Another instance is the description of
DNA as the "master molecule." The concept
of a nucleic acid (or whatever sort) as a
reservoir of genetic information which is
read out to determine genetic specificity has
been challenged as a hierarchical construct
which should be abolished. At some point,
biologists must consider how an organism
or a cell interacts with its environment.
Strangely enough, one system which was very
important in the early stages of attempts to
understand the mechanism of gene expression was one in which expression was altered
in response to changes in the environment
which affected the growth of bacteria. The
studies of Jacob and Monod (1961)on the lac
operon of the bacterium Escherichia coli,
was one of the first in which messenger RNA
was demonstrated. The messenger RNA for
the enzymes which allowed this bacterium to
metabolize lactose appeared within the bacterial cell in response to the presence of lactose in the external growth medium. However, at the time, the environmental aspect

Structuring Feminist Science

609

II

REGULATIO

Fig. I. Diagram of possible regulatory signals for cell-cell interaction. Cell Regulation 1989. The American Society for Cell Biology. Reprinted by permission.

was downplayed, and the utility of the system was the ability to detect and characterize the production of this newly made messenger RNA.
Indeed, 30 years after the experiments of
Jacob and Monod, scientists are beginning
formally to recognize the importance of a
more interactive biology. The cover art on
the Instructions to Authors for the first issue
of a journal, The Journal of Cell Regulation,
published by the American Society for Cell
Biology, (now called Molecular Biology of
the Cell) showed a drawing of two adjacent

cells (Fig. 1). Superimposed on these cells was

an arrow beginning in the cytoplasm of one
cell, going to a box in the space between the
cells. There is another arrow from the box to
the cytoplasm of the second cell and a third
arrow pointing from this cytoplasm to the
nucleus. This diagram reflects both the sites
of potential regulatory molecules and the directionality of the pathways thought to be
operating in the regulation of gene expression. I wish to emphasize that there is an
arrow from the cytoplasm to the nucleus; this
implies that the cytoplasm has an influential

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MURIEL LEDERMAN

role in affecting nuclear events. This in itself

is a major shift from earlier paradigms, as
there is no arrow from the nucleus to the cytoplasm; the major "controlling" role of the
DNA in the nucleus is downplayed.
The term "master" has also been used to
refer to genes, perhaps not surprisingly, to
the putative genes for sex determination. The
report of the human testis determining factor
by Page and co-workers (1987) explicitly uses
the term "master." The view put forth by
these workers (and five of the nine authors
are women) is that the determination of
"maleness" is the active process, with the expression of a gene(s) resulting in a phenotype.
An alternative view (Eichner & Washburn,
1986), is that there are ovary-determining
genes and testis-determining genes. The time
at which these genes are expressed determines
sex, with the "male" gene being expressed before the "female" gene. This perspective suggests that the default condition determines
the phenotype. If the "maleness" gene is not
expressed, the individual will be female. I
leave it to the reader to decide for herself
which hypothesis gives the most power to
which sex. It must be noted that the hierarchical viewpoint is not absolutely correct: Indirect effects come into playas well, both in
mammals (Patek et al., 1991) and in the
worm Caenorhabditis (Hunter & Woods,
1992). Both points of view ignore other invertebrates (Drosophila) which have yet another
mechanism of sex determination, and hermaphrodites. Unfortunately, the glib terminology of "master" was quickly picked up
and disseminated to undergraduates. The genetics textbook, The Science of Genetics by
George W. Burns and Paul J. Bottino (1989),
refers to the testis determining factor as the
"master switch that . . . activates an entire
series of genes whose function is sex differentiation" (p. 136).
Unfortunately, the term "master" is becoming ever more widely applied. The journal Cell recently had a review article titled
"Translocations, Master Genes and Differences between the Origins of Acute and
Chronic Leukemias," (Rabbitts, 1991) that
analyzed the genes on either side of sites
where chromosomes break. These breaks
correlate with recombination between individual chromosomes and with malignancy.

Another review article covering essentially

the same data was published in Science, without the sexist bias. It was "Chromosome
Aberrations and Cancer" by Ellen Solomon,
Julian Borrow, and Audrey D. Goddard
(Solomon, Borrow, & Goddard, 1991). Cell,
because of its reputation as perhaps the most
prestigious cell and molecular biology journal currently published, allows a certain
amount of "glitz," but this should not be tolerated at the expense of the sensibilities of its
readers.
Is there a term that can substitute for
"master gene"? Does "switch" (without the
"master") serve the purpose? "Switch," as in
a commonly used light switch, does convey
the distinction between two alternative states
without the overt sexism of "master," but still
contains a subtle hierarchical message: that
flipping the switch correlates with the change
from passivity to activity, that flipping the
switch "turns something on," paralleling
Page's description of sex determination.
However, "switch" as used to describe the device that alters the path of a railroad train
from one track to another, has precisely the
desired meaning.
As mentioned above, descriptions generally influence the generation of new hypotheses. The conception of DNA as the "master
molecule" and the implication of unidirectionality inherent in it was a hypothesis, the
Central Dogma; DNA makes RNA makes
protein. Focusing on this hypothesis led to a
series of experiments that were very productive. Scientists concentrated on those aspects
of gene expression that were unidirectional.
This led to the understanding of the mechanism of the synthesis of messenger RNA and
the synthesis of protein based upon the nucleotide sequence of messenger RNA. It could
be argued that this basic information was
needed before studies on how gene expression is regulated in response to changing intracellular signals or altered environmental
stimuli could be carried out. One potential
problem with a conceptual framework that
requires each component of a biological system to be accorded equal importance is that,
under these circumstances, it is difficult to
obtain information about the parts. It is not
possible to know everything at once. Useful
information is most often obtained by divid-

Structuring Feminist Science

611

ing biological systems into smaller packages; ning to be practiced points up how political
this information can then be reintegrated to the process of attaining even this first level of
give a complete picture.
feminist science is. It is only through the agiOne may wish to attribute equal standing tation by the public and in the elected and exto, for example, DNA, the magnesium ion, ecutive branches of government that even
and water. However, one cannot study the modest progress has been made.
role of these three components simultaneIn all our analyses, we must remember
ously. The relationship of water to DNA was that science eventually is constrained by the
crucial in discovering the structure of DNA, physical world. For there to be science at all,
because X-ray diffraction studies were car- there must be something approaching a physried out on the molecular in different states ical reality. Nucleic acid may be a "master
of hydration. The role of magnesium in DNA molecule" in some sense. However, it is not
replication was studied by enzymologists. the ultimate determinant. There are many
When scientists came to study the role of genes which are subject to what is called "auDNA in gene expression, experiments had al- togenous regulation," in which the amount of
ready been carried out and the results could the protein produced from the genes regube incorporated into the new studies. Al- lates the production of messenger RNA for
though focusing on the role of DNA in gene the protein which in turn redefines the
expression could be seen as an example of hi- amount of protein. As well, there are proerarchical science, anyone investigator picks cesses such as cortical contraction in ova that
out the things that are most interesting to her continue in the absence of a nucleus with its
for her research program. She takes advan- associated nucleic acid. We must be as aware
tage of the research programs of other inves- as possible of the characteristics of many biotigators, hoping someone else chooses a com- logical systems in our critiques of biology beplementary area and that, in the long run, cause many are not open to androcentric inenough information is obtained so that a co- terpretations.
herent view appears.
Evelyn Fox Keller (1988) has said" ... a
How do wedeal with active and passive ex- view of science as a pure social product, owperimentation? At first glance, one solution ing obedience to moral and political presmight be to eliminate active experimentation sures from without . . . (leads to) extreme
from the practice of science. There would be relativism, (in which) science dissolves into
immense resistance to this proposal, as it ideology" (p. 178). I would put a different
would require the dismantling of almost all slant on it. Without a physical reality, social
of the scientific establishment. Even passive construction of science could result in fraud.
experimentation may have to be discarded, at If absolutely everything were socially conleast in the extreme vision of feminist science structed, then anything goes. Any individual or social group could concoct a reality
that I suggest later.
If we cannot eliminate experimentation, which could be explicated in a fashion totalhow can we make it less androcentric? The ly consistent with the rules for carrying out
liberal feminist critique believes that science science.
is value-neutral and that androcentrism reCONSTRUCTING
sults from misapplication of the scientific
FEMINIST SCIENCE
method and is "bad science" (Rosser, 1992).
Proper application of the scientific method
could overcome this bias and result in "good The examples given in the previous section
science," with experiments properly con- are representative of attempts to find alternatrolled, for example, for effects of drugs on tive ways of doing science. How far have
both sexesand with equal emphasis placed on these changes, along with some institutional
diseases that affect both sexes, for example, changes that have resulted in greater participrostate cancer and breast cancer. In my pation of women in science, gotten us? I
opinion, "good science" should be business as think not very far. Although these changes
usual and not a goal to be attained in the fu- are revisionist, they are still bound within the
ture. That "good science" is just now begin- canons of androcentric science. I describe

612

MURIEL LEDERMAN

them as "feminized science," as "doing the

same science differently."
Even if all the changes suggested in the section entitled "Reconstructing Science" were
made, the "feminist" science which would result would still be based on the scientific
method. I suggest that the ultimate change
leading to a feminist science might require the
development of a science which is not based
on the scientific method, especially if androcentrism is as deeply imbedded in science as
some have suggested. Indeed, the scientific
method is so ingrained that it remains even in
some of the feminist critiques. According to
Rosser (1992), the liberal-feminist position
explicitly accepts the scientific method. The
Marxist-feminist viewpoint, along with believing in the social construction of science,
rejects distancing the observer from the observed (Rosser, 1992). The examples given
above of "passive" experimentation are consistent with this latter viewpoint but nevertheless share some features of the prevailing
androcentric methodology, the generation of
hypotheses and their testing . Even the hypothetical scenario of a woman searching for biologicals as therapies, which could be seen as
an example of "woman-centered science"
from the radical feminist perspective, also
follows the scientific method. I point this out
not to suggest that these critiques are not
valuable but only to demonstrate how difficult is the task of freeing ourselves from androcentrism and attaining a truly feminist
science.
Imagining a science not based on the scientific method is as difficult for me as Elizabeth
Fee suggests imagining genetics would be for
a medieval peasant. I believe that we should
try to envision such a science. By going to the
edge and looking over the precipice, we
would be engaged in an extraordinarily exciting and strenuous intellectual activity that at
least may bring back to current science new
insights that will make it more accessible and
relevant to all. Even if we can imagine this
science, further difficulties may arise. How
would we be sure this feminist science was a
science when the only science we have now is
by definition androcentric? We can get no
guidance from philosophy of science in this
matter. Philosophers relate different sciences, for example, transmission genetics
and molecular biology, both of which are

based on the scientific method. If there were

two sciences, one based on the scientific
method but not the other, they might truly be
unrelatable by the current philosophical
strategies . How would this science be distinctively feminist? What does feminist mean in
this context? Would a science not based on
the scientific method be a science accessible
to all standpoint epistemologies? If it is not,
we run the risk of both internal squabbles in
the feminist community and further alienation of feminists from other oppressed peoples. Would a feminist science affect all sciences equally? Perhaps the most significant
changes would be in areas such as ethology
which can be interpreted in the mirror of
human society. Would physics, chemistry,
and molecular biology be as drastically affected?
There may be no real purpose in developing a truly feminist science. If we can make
all the changes suggested above, resulting in
a truly "feminized" science, would we, as
feminists, still be unhappy with the scientific
enterprise? Here we must return to the realization that feminism is a political movement. Is there a political advantage for
women scientists, for the society at large and
for science, in eliminating the scientific
method? I believe this is the hard question we
must ask. If we choose not to, we should direct our energies otherwise. We could continue our struggle to gain influence in the scientific establishment, attempt to alter both
the practice of science at all levels and the
technologies that result from the applications
of the scientific method, in ways that are in
line with our feminism.

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