Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
JD 2
NatRes
October 2016
Case Digests
The assailed Decision DID NOT overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia. It must be pointed out that what Apex Mining
Co., Inc. v. Garcia resolved was the issue of which, between Apex and MMC,
availed itself of the proper procedure in acquiring the right to prospect and to
explore in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. Apex registered its
Declarations of Location (DOL) with the then BMGS, while MMC was granted
a permit to prospect by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) and was
subsequently granted an exploration permit by the BMGS. Taking into
consideration Presidential Decree No. 463, which provides that mining rights
within forest reservation can be acquired by initially applying for a permit to
prospect with the BFD and subsequently for a permit to explore with the
BMGS, the Court therein ruled that MMC availed itself of the proper
procedure to validly operate within the forest reserve or reservation.
While it is true that Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia settled the issue of
which between Apex and MMC was legally entitled to explore in the disputed
area, such rights, though, were extinguished by subsequent events that
transpired after the decision was promulgated.
2. BENGUET CORPORATION v. DENR GR No. 163101
FACTS:
On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a RAWOP,
wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims
respectively named as Bonito-I, Bonito-II, Bonito-III, and Bonito-IV, with a
total area of 288.8656 hectares, situated in Camarines Norte. The parties
also executed a Supplemental Agreement dated June 1, 1987. The mining
claims were covered by MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by
J.G. Realty as claim owner and Benguet as operator.
In the RAWOP, Benguet obligated itself to perfect the rights to the
mining claims and/or otherwise acquire the mining rights to the mineral
claims. Within 24 months from the execution of the RAWOP, Benguet should
also cause the examination of the mining claims for the purpose of
determining whether or not they are worth developing with reasonable
probability of profitable production. Benguet undertook also to furnish J.G.
Realty with a report on the examination, within a reasonable time after the
completion of the examination. Moreover, also within the examination
period, Benguet shall conduct all necessary exploration in accordance with a
prepared exploration program. If it chooses to do so and before the
expiration of the examination period, Benguet may undertake to develop the
mining claims upon written notice to J.G. Realty. Benguet must then place the
mining claims into commercial productive stage within 24 months from the
written notice. It is also provided in the RAWOP that if the mining claims were
placed in commercial production by Benguet, J.G. Realty should be entitled to
a royalty of five percent (5%) of net realizable value, and to royalty for any
production done by Benguet whether during the examination or development
periods.
Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet issued a
letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims.
However, on February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty then sent a letter to the President
of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP.
In response, Benguets Manager for Legal Services, Reynaldo P.
Mendoza, wrote J.G. Realty a letter dated March 8, 1999, therein alleging that
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Benguet complied with its obligations under the RAWOP, and that the
commercial operation was hampered by the non-issuance of a Mines
Temporary Permit by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) which must
be considered as force majeure, entitling Benguet to an extension of time to
prosecute such permit. Benguet further claimed that the high graders
mentioned by J.G. Realty was already operating prior to Benguet's taking
over of the premises, and that J.G. Realty had the obligation of ejecting such
small scale miners. Benguet also alleged that the nature of the mining
business made it difficult to specify a time limit for the RAWOP. Benguet then
argued that the royalties due to J.G. Realty were in fact in its office and ready
to be picked up at any time. It appeared that, previously, the practice by J.G.
Realty was to pick-up checks from Benguet representing such royalties.
However, starting August 1994, J.G. Realty allegedly refused to collect such
checks from Benguet. Thus, Benguet posited that there was no valid ground
for the termination of the RAWOP. It also reminded J.G. Realty that it should
submit the disagreement to arbitration rather than unilaterally terminating
the RAWOP.
ISSUE:
(1) Should the controversy have first been submitted to arbitration before
the POA took cognizance of the case?
(2) Was the cancellation of the RAWOP supported by evidence?
(3) Did the cancellation of the RAWOP amount to unjust enrichment of J.G.
Realty at the expense of Benguet?
RULING:
1) The case should have first been brought to voluntary arbitration before
the POA.
In RA 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the
Congress reiterated the efficacy of arbitration as an alternative mode of
dispute resolution by stating in Sec. 32 thereof that domestic arbitration shall
still be governed by RA 876. Clearly, a contractual stipulation that requires
prior resort to voluntary arbitration before the parties can go directly to court
is not illegal and is in fact promoted by the State. Thus, petitioner correctly
cites several cases whereby arbitration clauses have been upheld by this
Court.
Moreover, the contention that RA 7942 prevails over RA 876
presupposes a conflict between the two laws. Such is not the case here. To
reiterate, availment of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the
courts or quasi-judicial agencies of the government is a valid contractual
stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties.
2) The cancellation of the RAWOP was supported by evidence.
The cancellation of the RAWOP by the POA was based on two grounds: (1)
Benguets failure to pay J.G. Realtys royalties for the mining claims; and (2)
Benguets failure to seriously pursue MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 over
the mining claims.
3) There is no unjust enrichment in the instant case
Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the
cancellation of the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to
participate in further developing the mining claims, was brought about by its
violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its
predicament.
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the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning
can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be
otherwise satisfied.
6. JOHN ERIC LONEY et al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 152644
FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez
are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident
Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a
concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of
or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged
petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with
violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976
(PD 984), Section 108 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
In its Resolution of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public
respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the
Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD
1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated.
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Branch 94s ruling.
ISSUE: (1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should
be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.
RULING: Petition has no merit.
1) The contention has no merit. As early as the start of the last century, this
Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or
more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.[24] The only limit to
this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
2) This contention is also without merit.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
charging one Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power
under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City
Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring,
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violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not
because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but
because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and
a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple
prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against
multiple prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of
double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of
Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national
statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section
21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and
not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
7. PICOP RESOURCES INC v. BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES
CORPORATION AND MAB GR No. 163509
FACTS:
In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation
(CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement
for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation (Banahaw
Mining for brevity) whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the
exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs
eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed
applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the
Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines
Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals
found within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit was
subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June
28, 1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in
petitioner PICOPs logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and
petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in
mutual recognition of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner
PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. In
1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18,
1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37)
mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources
Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims
held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those
covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner,
immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of
private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent
Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. On March 10, 1997, private
respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Minings pending MPSA
applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to
submit additional documents in support of the application. Area clearances
from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh
and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required.
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FACTS:
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in Palo,
Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) from 2 February 1982 to 12 October 1982. Private
respondents Alberto G. Bumolo, Benito Cachili, Conchita Bumolo, Patricio
Dumlao, Jacinto Aliguyon, Alfonso Maddawat, Toledo Gillao, Jose Tigo and
Peter Cabiggat Bumolo and others, namely, Rosario Camma, Mariano
Maddela, Victor Guiaoan and Catalino Randa, registered their mining claims
in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims
were subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA).
On 12 March 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the
mining claims with respondent Alberto G. Bumolo, for himself and as
attorney-in-fact of the other respondents on one hand; and with Rosario
Camma on the other, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of the rest. Under the
Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to
explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for extension.
On 23 December 1982 and 26 March 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting
Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on
the alleged ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims
was within the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of 26 June
1969 and with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on account of
alleged coverage of the other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil
Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.
On 11 February 1991 and 12 March 1991 petitioner informed
respondent Alberto G. Bumolo and Rosario Camma that it was terminating
the Agreements since its conduct of a systematic exploration program
disclosed that the area was relatively weak and of limited tonnage which did
not justify further drilling for big tonnage of low grade gold exploration
target.
On 15 July 1991 DENR Regional Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat
rejected petitioners Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that
the Memorandum of 8 July 1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director
for Mines revealed that the area covered was outside government
reservation; that the prospect claim was in conflict with existing claims; and,
that the area had been extensively explored in the early 1980's.
ISSUE: Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the
PPA was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.
RULING: Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional
Executive Director Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.
The circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside
the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the
following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest
Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991
Memorandum Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c)
plotting provided by the National Mapping and Resources Information
Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps to the office of the
Regional Executive Director. Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area
subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on
the alleged "typographical error committed by somebody in the Engineering
Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does not have
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Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act
No. 7076, or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of
the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under
the DENR Secretarys direct supervision and control. The statute also
authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale mining areas
subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to
small-scale miners under certain conditions.
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of
the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. The
issuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by
Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve.
Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the
admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal
over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director,
docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94 entitled, Rosendo Villaflor, et al. v.
Marcopper Mining Corporation.
On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending,
Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over
the land covered by the permit.
In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI
in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA
application of petitioner.
In the meantime, on March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the
Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the aboveenumerated MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA)
tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA
subsequently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was
consolidated with the MAC cases.
On April 1, 1997, Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed
Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997, authorizing the issuance of ore transport
permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines.
Thus, on May 30, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the DENR
Secretary and PMRB-Davao. SEM alleged that the illegal issuance of the OTPs
allowed the extraction and hauling of P60,000.00 worth of gold ore per
truckload from SEMs mining claim. The petitions were dismissed by both the
POA and the CA.
ISSUE:1) Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the complaint
2) Whether the validity of ore transport permit is vested in the POA.
RULING:
1) We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged MO 97-03
did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the
Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what
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was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else.
Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or
to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials
concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. Consequently, the
petition was premature. The said memorandum order did not impose any
obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and
among the parties to the dispute. At this stage, petitioner can show no more
than a mere apprehension that the State, through the DENR, would directly
take over the mines after studies point to its viability. But until the DENR
actually does so and petitioners fears turn into reality, no valid objection can
be entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative
and anticipatory.
2) We see no need to rule on the matter of the OTPs, considering that the
grounds invoked by petitioner for invalidating the same are inextricably
linked to the issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases.
11. UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES INC., v. IAC GR No. 69997
FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted the following
mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu
Albay.
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos
assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The
assignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of
Albay on December 2, 1959.
The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were
all recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962
and transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the
Registry of Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay
issued the respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of
Act No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the
petitioner.
Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the following free patents were granted
by the respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original
certificates of titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay.
All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patents
belonging to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents
against the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles
issued in their favor for properties over which original certificates of title had
already been issued in its favor be declared null and void.
The Director of Lands, who was impleaded as a formal defendant, filed his
answer alleging, among others, that the petitioner has no personality to
institute the cancellation proceedings inasmuch as the government is the
grantor and not the petitioner, and it should be the grantor who should
institute the cancellation proceedings.
On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint. It ruled that since the disputed properties form part of disposable
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land of the public domain, the action for reversion should be instituted by the
Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and that,
therefore, the petitioner lacks personality to institute the annulment
proceedings.
The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
It ruled that the titles issued to the petitioner cover mineral lands which
belong to the public domain and that these cannot be the subject of private
ownership. According to the Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land Law,
only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead has the authority
to institute an action on behalf of the Republic for the cancellation of the
respondents' titles and for reversion of their homesteads to the Government.
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when
it ruled that the lands in question belong to the public domain;
2) whether or not the appellate court erred in discussing the complaint on
the ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same.
RULING:
1) We rule for the private respondents.
The petitioner has been beguiling, less than candid, and inexplicably silent as
to material dates in the presentation of its case. Nowhere in the records of
this petition is there any mention of a date before November 15, 1935 as to
when essential acts regarding its mining claims were executed. It is silent as
to when the land was entered, measured, and plotted; when the legal posts
and notices were put up; when the claim was registered with the mining
recorder; whether or not the annual amount of labor or development, and
other requirements under the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed. These
may have been complied with but not necessarily before 1935.
A mere mention in the Torrens title that the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902 were followed is not sufficient. The Philippine Bill provides the
procedures for the perfection of mining claims but not the dates when such
procedures were undertaken by any prospector or claimant. The same
procedures would have to be followed even after the Jones Law of 1916 and
the Constitution of 1935 were promulgated, but subject to the restrictions of
the fundamental law. The petitioner has failed to state if and when new
procedures, different from the 1902 procedures, were provided by law to give
a little substance to its case. The petitioner is completely and strangely silent
about these vital aspects of its petition.
Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the
locations of its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15,1935
when the Government of Commonwealth was inaugurated. In fact neither the
original complaint nor the amended one alleged the perfection of petitioner's
mining rights prior to November 15, 1935. All that petitioner offers as
evidence of its claims were the original certificates of titles covering mining
patents which embodied a uniform "WHEREAS" clause stating that the
petitioner "has fully complied with all the conditions, requirements, and
provisions of the Act of the United States of Congress of July 1, 1902, as
amended, ..." In the absence of proof that the petitioner's claims were
perfected prior to the 1935 Constitution, the provision of the latter with
regard to inalienable lands of the public domain will apply.
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2) The appellate court did not likewise err in concluding that the petitioner
has no personality to institute the action below for annulment and
cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract
minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public domain and
thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring an
action for reversion.
12. PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION v. MAB et al. GR No. 179674
FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws
engaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioners
Application for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), identified as
APSA-SF-000089, with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the
DENR, Regional Office No. 1, San Fernando City in La Union, for the
exploration, development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and
other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was
approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.
Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. On 12
September 2003, private respondent filed an Application for Exploration
Permit with MGB covering the same properties covered by and during the
subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In
turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for
Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It was allegedly filed with the
Panel of Arbitrators on 30 August 2005 and was received by the latter on 5
September 2005.
On 1 September 2005,[13] the MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private
respondent.
In an Order dated 14 September 2005, the Panel of Arbitrators
dismissed motu proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner for the
following reasons: (1) the instant pleading was filed out of time; (2) in view of
the issuance of EP No. 05-001 to private respondent, the Verified
Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of
private respondent was rendered moot and academic; (3) the Panel of
Arbitrators had no authority/jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No.
05-001 of private respondent, the same being lodged with the MGB, the
issuing authority; and (4) petitioner failed to include a certification against
forum shopping.
Subsequently, in a Decision dated 28 December 2006 in MAB Case No.
0147-06, the MAB dismissed the appeal of petitioner.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the
Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was filed out of time.
2) Whether the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner filed before the MAB
needs to be accompanied by a Certification against Forum Shopping.
3) Whether the issuance by the DENR Secretary of DMO No. 2005-03 on 1
February 2005 which cancelled MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner and the
issuance by MGB of EP No. 05-001 in favor of private respondent on 1
September 2005 rendered the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner moot
and academic.
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1. Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The President is
assigned the task of seeing to it that all laws are faithfully executed. Control,
in administrative law, means the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
2. Under Sec. 2 of MO 415, the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM
chaired by the NCR-CORD to oversee the implementation of the Project. The
EXECOM was the one which recommended approval of the project plan and
the joint venture agreements. Clearly, the DENR retained its power of
supervision and control over the laws affected by the Project since it was
tasked to facilitate the titling of the Smokey Mountain and of the area to be
reclaimed, which shows that it had tacitly given its authority to the NHA to
undertake the reclamation.
3. Former DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala issued Special Patents Nos. 3591
and 3592 while then Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued Special Patent No.
3598 that embraced the areas covered by the reclamation. These patents
conveyed the lands to be reclaimed to the NHA and granted to said agency
the administration and disposition of said lands for subdivision and
disposition to qualified beneficiaries and for development for mix land use
(commercial/industrial) to provide employment opportunities to on-site
families and additional areas for port related activities. Such grant of
authority to administer and dispose of lands of public domain under the
SMDRP is of course subject to the powers of the EXECOM of SMDRP, of which
the DENR is a member.
4. The issuance of ECCs by the DENR for SMDRP is but an exercise of its
power of supervision and control over the lands of public domain covered by
the Project.
Based on these reasons, it is clear that the DENR, through its acts and
issuances, has ratified and confirmed the reclamation of the subject lands for
the purposes laid down in Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465.
4) We are not convinced of petitioners postulation.
The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable
lands of public domain of the State for the following reasons, viz:
First, there were three (3) presidential proclamations classifying the
reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to
disposition or concession, to wit:
(1) MO 415 issued by President Aquino, of which Sec. 4 states that [t]he land
covered by the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite is hereby conveyed to the
National Housing Authority as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10.
The directive to transfer the lands once reclaimed to the NHA implicitly
carries with it the declaration that said lands are alienable and disposable.
Otherwise, the NHA cannot effectively use them in its housing and
resettlement project.
(2) Proclamation No. 39 issued by then President Ramos by which the
reclaimed lands were conveyed to NHA for subdivision and disposition to
qualified beneficiaries and for development into a mixed land use
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water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate,
and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA,
as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and
sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection,
treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.
The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative
Code of 1987 (EO 292), is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate
and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper
utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local
government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of
establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that
fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized
and managed on a sustainable basis.
The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national
government, is tasked under EO 292 to provide integrated planning, design,
and construction services for, among others, flood control and water
resource development systems in accordance with national development
objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast
Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979, or the Marine Pollution Decree of
1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines.
When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP
Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine
territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of
the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the
capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not
yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of
PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate
with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing
marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was
made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in
which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said
law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.
In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish,
develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in
support of trade and national development.
The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain
adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well
as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for
the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which
would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.
The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the
Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the
establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water
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effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the
water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation,
monitoring and test sampling of the leachate that seeps from said dumpsite
to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal
and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA,
acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the
water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could
considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it
indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have
contaminated the sample during collection or handling. On December 5,
1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City
Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors,
and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any
form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government
of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was
resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at
the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes
failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on
August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5,
1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine
National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the
entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on
September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of
injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City
Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the
people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction.
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA
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from enforcing its cease and desist order. The LLDA motioned to dismiss the
case, but was denied. The LLDA petitioned for certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to
entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open
dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of
Caloocan?
2. Whether the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order?
RULING:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and
the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of
the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a
broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it
by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press
powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its
charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a
"cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of
mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.
20. HIZON v. CA GR No. 119619
FACTS:
In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime
Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing
operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to these reports, the
city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the
detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force
Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and
several small crafts were fishing by muro ami within the shoreline of
Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo
Enriquez, and members of the Task Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito
Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found several men
fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B
Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the
F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the boat
captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two
foreigners in the captains deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their passports
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and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large
aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one
ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the boat and its
fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez
brought the boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for
further investigation.
At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command were ordered
by SPO3 Enriquez to guard the F/B Robinson. The boat captain and the two
foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command office.
Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat,
its crew and fishermen were charged with the following violations:
1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters
without mayors permit;
2. Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized--26; On board--36);
3. Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original passports.
The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat
captain to get random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for
laboratory examination. As instructed, the boat engineer, petitioner Ernesto
Andaya, delivered to the Maritime Office four (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a
plastic shopping bag filled with water. SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and in
the presence of the boat engineer and captain, placed them inside a large
transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the plastic with heat from a
lighter.
The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) sub-office in the city for examination to determine the method of
catching the same for record or evidentiary purposes. They were received at
the NBI office at 8:00 in the evening of the same day. The receiving clerk,
Edna Capicio, noted that the fish were dead and she placed the plastic bag
with the fish inside the office freezer to preserve them. Two days later, on
October 3, 1992, the chief of the NBI sub-office, Onos Mangotara, certified
the specimens for laboratory examination at the NBI Head Office in Manila.
The fish samples were to be personally transported by Edna Capicio who was
then scheduled to leave for Manila for her board examination in Criminology.
[6] On October 4, 1992, Ms. Capicio, in the presence of her chief, took the
plastic with the specimens from the freezer and placed them inside two
shopping bags and sealed them with masking tape. She proceeded to her
ship where she placed the specimens in the ships freezer.
Capicio arrived in Manila the following day, October 5, 1992 and immediately
brought the specimens to the NBI Head Office. On October 7, 1992, NBI
Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples
and found that they contained sodium cyanide.
ISSUE:
1) Whether the fish specimen, who yielded a positive result to the test of the
presence of sodium cyanide, are admissible being illegally seized on the
occasion of warrantless search and arrest.
2) Whether the statutory presumption of guilt under Sec. 33 of PD 704
prevails over the constitutional presumption of innocence.
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RULING:
1) On the first issue, the court sustained the warrantless arrest and therefore
the evidence obtained was admissible.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of
persons without a judicial warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained
without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a
search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs
laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for
violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition
that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and
secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a
search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be
constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats
breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by highspeed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine
Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our
fishery laws.
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing
boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other
evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the
trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and
hence, waived
their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said
search and seizure.
2) On the second issue. Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt
under the Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Constitution. The validity of laws establishing
presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded
that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can
constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then shift the
burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any
constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not
be arbitrary and unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on
facts and these facts must be part of the crime when committed.
The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of
guilt based on facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It
makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or
devices for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of
obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing
boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and
operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in
catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of
the boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this
presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the substances and the
contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The
fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved.
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as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion
thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant
Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor
his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property,
the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to
the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the
Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason
as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of
Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole
oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default
excepting the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry.
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general
default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon filed an
opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to
be registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of
the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part
of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of
Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he had
already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on
November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against
Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to
have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy,
a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The
defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon:
thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be
registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate
the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual
appealed to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga,
Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of
the similarity of the parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for
ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case and was jointly
tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano
Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the
herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted
by his heirs, the herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the
subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain,
it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered
the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in the name of
private respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the
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the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where
the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457
is misplaced. If theres any land to be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to
the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land
along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of
land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore
land and the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore
cannot be registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by
government for public use and declared as private property capable of
alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside.
Registration cannot be allowed.
22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VERGARA GR No. 110286
FACTS:
It would appear that at about 7:30 in the morning of 04 July 1992, a
team composed of deputized Fish Warden and President of the Leyte Fish
Warden Association Jesus P. Bindoy, Police Officers Casimiro Villas and
Diosdado Moron of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, Fish Wardens Mario Castillote
and Estanislao Cabreros and Fish Examiner Nestor Aldas of the Department
of Agriculture were on board, "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat, on "preventive
patrol" along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and Candahug
of Palo, Leyte, when they chanced upon a blue-colored fishing boat at a
distance of approximately 200 meters away. The boat, 30 feet long, had on
board appellant Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused Bernardo Cuesta,
Pedro Dagao and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr., and was on parallel course toward the
general direction of Samar. Momentarily, the team saw appellant throw into
the sea a bottle known in the locality as "badil" containing ammonium nitrate
and having a blasting cap on top which, when ignited and thrown into the
water, could explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and
various species of fish within a certain radius. Approximately three seconds
after appellant had thrown the "badil" into the sea, the explosion occurred.
Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with their gear while Dagao and
Cuesta, Jr., stayed on board to tend to the air hose for the divers.
The team approached the fishing boat. SPO2 Casimiro Villas boarded
the fishing boat while Fish Warden Jesus Bindoy held on to one end of the
boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or
"sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped from under the water.
Having been caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended and
taken by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to
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the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as
well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were impounded. The accused,
however, refused to sign and acknowledge the corresponding receipts
therefor.
On 10 February 1993, following the submission of the evidence, the trial
court rendered judgment convicting Vergara.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime
charged.
RULING:
The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted correctly in finding
accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, read:
"Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal
fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall be
unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken
or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use
of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity
as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof:
Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the
same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter
provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the
Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary,
allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or
gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified area: Provided, further,
That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance
with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects
in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally,
That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or
other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the
Secretary.
"Section 38. (1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12)
years to twenty-five (25) years in the case of mere possession of explosives
intended for illegal fishing; by imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years
to life imprisonment, if the explosive is actually used: Provided, That if the
use of the explosive results in 1) physical injury to any person, the penalty
shall be imprisonment ranging from twenty-five (25) years to life
imprisonment, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be life
imprisonment to death."
23. La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association et al. v. Victor Ramos et al. GR No.
127882, January 27, 2004
Facts:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995),
its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with
Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
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