Artigos Sobre Antropologia e Religiao

Thailand
Authors(s): David Morell

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Feb., 1973), pp. 162-178
Published by: University of California Press
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THAILAND:
"... If you would know how the villagers really feel,
abandon intimidation."
/ David Morell
tIn December 15, King Phumipol Adulyadet promulgated his nation's
ninth constitution in 40 years, ending the longest period of modern Thai his-
tory-13 months-when the country operated without a constitution or
legitimate government. During this period the military group which seized
power in a bloodless coup on November 17, 1971 had an opportunity to im-
plement its policies of paternalistic, autocratic rule. The power of the ruling
faction was consolidated and rivals eliminated, but basic decisions on politi-
cal succession, social and economic development, and political participation
were deferred. What did the National Executive Council accomplish? And
where is Thailand now headed?
PERSONALITIES AND POLITICAL POWER
Development of patron-client links and factional competition were particu-
larly intense in the fluid power environment of 1972. In the absence of a
Cabinet, constitution, and National Assembly, the NEC assumed an active
executive, legislative and judicial role, and both the wielders of power and the
ambitious aspirants could wheel and deal at will.
As noted a year ago,' the principal issue driving factional competition
concerns political succession and the relative positions of Field Marshal
Thanom Kittikachorn and General Praphat Charusathien-and their fac-
tional supporters. The coup, although ostensibly led by Thanom, was in effect
a power consolidation by the Praphat faction. Clearly, Praphat was next in
line to succeed Thanom, 'who has said repeatedly over the past several years
that he wants to retire. But Praphat's image is quite poor with intellectuals,
news media, many civilian bureaucrats (outside the Ministry of Interior),
some Army officers, foreigners, and, most important perhaps, the King.
These are the areas in which Thanom is strongest, and thus they form an
excellent team. Together, they can easily control the Thai political system;
divided, alone, each is definitely vulnerable.
The reason why it took 13 months for the military regime to produce even
an "interim"' constitution undoubtedly relates to the succession issue, not, as
'See the author's "Thailand: Military Checkmate," Asian Survey, February 1972, pp.
156-167.
162
DAVID MORELL 163
was claimed, to "the many important tasks remaining which require the
NEC's absolute powers." The King clearly wanted a constitution, for how
can one be a constitutional monarch without a constitution? At the same
time, he clearly did not want Praphat to rise to the position of Prime Minis-
ter. So the eventual trade-off, not formalized until December, was for Thanom
and Praphat to retain their relative positions in the hierarchy under a new
interim constitution. The succession dilemma, like so many other difficult
issues in Thai politics, was simply deferred; for how long?
By late 1972, Thanom's personal power position was quite a bit stronger
than it had been a year earlier. At first, he was only a pawn of the Praphat
faction, a smiling front man; but as the months went by he consolidated his
position as the indispensable leader, energizing new allies in the military to
replace the old Government House combination of the 1969-71 period.
Four men now reside at the top ranks of political power: Thanom, Praphat,
the enigmatic General Krit Sivara (Deputy Commander of the Army and
NEC Secretary-General) 2 and Colonel Narong, Kittikachorn, Thanom's son,
Praphat's son-in-law, and, as discussed below, a new aspirant to national
power in 1972. Others-Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulasap, Pote Sarasin,
Thanat Khoman, and Police General Prasert Ruchirawongse-are of far less
importance in the power equation.
One of the major trends since the coup has been the greater "militariza-
tion" of the ruling clique. This is not simply a measure of the ratio of men in
uniform to civilians in a Cabinet or ruling council, but of the behavior pat-
terns and functional roles of leading political figures. "Civilianized" military
and police officers, concerned about institution building, political develop-
ment, the rural/urban gap and popular participation-like Lt. Gen. Sa-
waeng Senanarong, Police Maj. Gen. Sanga Kittikachorn, and others in the
Government House faction-are now out of power. During the parliamen-
tary period, these men were performing essential functions for the ruling
clique as brokers between the core military establishment and elected poli-
ticians or party functionaries. Because of their influence, the ruling clique
was becoming more attuned to civilian interests and political development
issues. Leaders were made aware of villager grievances, demands for partici-
pation, and decisions on institutional development of the government party.
Iii the post-coup era, of course, none of this is necessary, and the traditional
generals now provide dominant support to both the Thanom and Praphat
factions: men like Krit, Narong, Lt. Gen. Prasert Thammasiri3 and Lt. Gen.
Chalard Hiranyasiri.
Control Over the Police: Factional competition became particularly in-
tense over the political power and personal role of Police General Prasert
2See "General Krit: Thailand's Man of the Moment," Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 25, 1971, pp. 12-13.
'Formerly the 1st Division Commander, he was promoted during 1972 to 1st Army
Commander, the most powerful position in the Armv; the new commander of the Ist
Division is Maj. G(en. Uam Chirapong, a son-in-law of Thanom.
164 THAI LAN D
Ruchirawongse, Chief of Police since 1963 and Minister of Public Health in
the pre-coup Cabinet. Prasert and Praphat have been at odds for some years,
a battle emanating from traditional Army-Police animosity,4 their struggle
for control of the Ministry of Interior, competition for control of village
security forces, and competitive commercial interests. Prasert's power em-
anates from within the 75,000-man police force, from his close connections
with the commercial and banking community and the palace, and from his
former associates in the Army (he is a former Army Major General and 'Com-
mander of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division in Bangkok). Prasert was due
to reach the mandatory civil service retirement age of 605 during 1972. He
and his supporters wanted the NEC to waive the requirement, as had been
done a year earlier for Thanom in his military position as Supreme Com-
rnander of the Armed Forces. Prasert formally requested the NEC to extend
his tenure, and even apparently tried to pressure his NEC colleagues by in-
dicating that the King supported his request. When Thanom asked the King
whether it was true that he personally wanted Prasert to stay on, the King
repudiated Prasert.
The Praphat faction resisted Prasert's move and won.6 It is reliably re-
ported that one major reason for Prasert's departure was opposition to him
by Narong and his mother, Thanphuying Chongkol Kittikachorn.7 Their
animosity dates from an incident two years ago when Army troops under
Narong's command, apparently drunk, attacked and demolished a police in-
stallation in Bangkok. Prasert publicly criticized Narong for this incident,
and Narong never forgot the insult. Prasert was forced to retire as Chief of
Police on October 1, the beginning of the new fiscal year; he was replaced
by Praphat himself.A There were strong rumors of a police coup in the first
week of October. For three days Army garrisons in Bangkok were on full
alert, but no troops moved, and the coup was either nipped in the bud or
(some believe) was a trick by Narong to further discredit the Prasert faction.
On December 1, the NEC appointed Army Lt. Gen. Prachuab Soontharan-
gura, Director of the Port Authority, as Deputy Chief of Police. Prachuab,
'This animosity goes back to the early 1950s, when the police under Gen. Phao
Sriyanon were a heavily-armed competitor to the Army; following Sarit's coup of 1957
they were placed under Army leadership and control. It is commonly felt that the Army
views the police as "too fat and too rich," and see Prasert as the fattest and richest.
'This requirement applies only to civil service (or military) positions, not to Cabinet-
level roles. But traditionally in Thai politics, power has emanated from the former,
not the latter. Praphat reaches retirement as Army Commander in 1973, posing the
next extension crisis.
'There was a good deal of play-acting by Praphat, who publicly sided with Prasert
in a couple of news conferences. But when it appeared at one point that the NEC, in
Praphat's absence abroad, was going to approve Prasert's extension, Praphat hurriedly
flew home to deal with the situation.
7Narong is apparently the favorite son of Chongkol, who in turn has enormous in-
fluence over Thanom, and independent power of her own from her extensive commercial
interests.
8There is a precedent for this in Sarit's assumption of the Police Chief position in
1958. Sarit groomed an Army General, Prasert, as his successor, and Prasert held this
position from Sarit's death in 1963 to 1972.
DAVID MORELL 165
only 52, is an NEC member; many observers felt that he was being groomed
as Praphat's successor in the police role whenever Praphat decides to leave it.
But most believe Praphat will remain Police Chief for some time.
Narong's Power Play: Perhaps the most interesting single development in
Thai politics during 1972 was the astonishing rise to fame and power of
Colonel Narong. A young officer with excellent political/family connections,
Narong managed to accrue a good deal of power within the NEC structure
and mounted a splendid public relations campaign to convince the Bangkok
populace that he was "the man of the hour," the power-to-be in the Thai
hierarchy.
It was a rare day in 1972 when one would open a Bangkok newspaper and
not see stories and photographs depicting Narong's activities. He headed a
widely-reported campaign to suppress corruption in the Army conscription
system; he directed a program to suppress heroin smuggling; he sponsored
a land reform program later vetoed by the NEC ;9 he responded to cries for
help from girls kidnapped into brothels; he met with students from Prasarn-
mit College of Education protesting their lack of university status; he claimed
to have been the driving force behind the 1971 coup; and he gave a multi-
tude of public speeches on topics ranging from national ideology to pollution.
Perhaps the height of his speech-making activity came in late August, when
he appeared on a panel discussing national ideology along with leading in-
tellectuals M. R. Kukrit Pramoj and Professor Boonlua Thepsuwan, with the
King in the audience. Narong on this occasion chose to speak out on the role
of the military in protecting the nation and the throne; Kukrit amused him-
self rhetorically at Narong's expense. For the common citizen of Bangkok
not privy to the widespread assumption among the elite of Narong's own high
levels of illegal activity, corruption, greed, and ruthlessness,10 he easily ap-
peared as the epitome of the Thai military leader-powerful, compassionate,
willing to sacrifice and concerned above all with the national interest. Even
in being intellectually demolished by the urbane Kukrit, he achieved a small
victory.
Away from the light of publicity, Narong's power play centered on the
NEC and the 1st Army. His official positions were Assistant to the NEC's
Director of National Security (Praphat) and Chairman of the Committee to
Suppress Those Dangerous to Society. Narong utilizes five sources of politi-
cal power: (1) his father; (2) his father-in-law; (3) the senior associates
and clients of both; (4) his personal clique of young military men; and (5)
certain intellectuals and academicians. Most key battalions in the 1st Army
'Narong later claimed that his plan was so comprehensive that a copy was requested
by President Marcos for possible use in the Philippines. It was Praphat who obliterated
Narong's proposal.
10Many members of the Thai elite with whom the author has discussed Narong believe
that he is significantly different from any of the other powerful military figures of the
present or recent past. They actually fear physical harm from Narong, where they do
not from Thanom, Praphat, Prasert or the others. He is most often compared to Police
General Phao Sriyanon.
166 T H A I L A N D
in Bangkok are now commanded by his classmates from the Chulachomklao
Royal Military Academy, with whom he is now forging patron-client links.
During the year he gathered around him a group of ambitious western-
trained bureaucrats and professors who carry out studies, write speeches,
and devise plans." Several of these men, not members of the 1968-71 ap-
pointed Senate, were appointed to the National Assembly in December, as was
Narong himself. Potential power from the Bangkok populace emerging from
his calculated public relations campaign is a still untested source of addi-
tional strength.
In sum, the Narong story is representative of the failure to develop repre-
sentative, participant political institutions in Thailand. Instead, one sees
again the emergence of personalism, centered around the "strong man." He
is the obvious patron for those aspiring to greater power and wealth in the
years ahead. Some feel that he over-played his hand during 1972, and that
powerful generals will deflect his rise; 12 others feel that in another five or
six years, Narong will be prepared to make his move-some of these have
indicated their willingness to move with him.
POLITICAL OPPOSITION: THE PAINFUL CHOICE
The Army coup of November 1971 brought forth a new response for the
Thai political system: overt opposition from a group of sincere, dedicated
intellectuals who were convinced that the coup decision was wrong, that
constitutional rule and representative government could and must work in
Thailand, and that repressive military rule had to come to an end. They had
little to work with besides their pens and their reputations, but several chose
to run a risk and speak out. Most were not harmed in any way by the regime
for their opposition, partly because they were exceedingly polite. Many were
warned, called in for questioning, harassed in subtle ways. Phones were
tapped, mail was opened, reputations were smeared. There were mutterings
from high places about "communists, radicals, agitators." Bribes were of-
fered, ranging from cash to scholarships to advisory posts. Some men were
threatened with retribution ranging from lack of promotion to confiscation
of property to jail sentences if the criticism did not stop. As for the docu-
ments prepared by certain intellectuals in opposition to renewed Army use
of martial law, nothing in fact has resulted to prove that they were worth the
anguish they caused their authors. The populace did not rise up to smite the
generals, and even the students-the intellectuals' major base of support-
were afraid to demonstrate against the military. The opposition intellectuals
were themselves disorganized, fragmented, nervous, and prone to co-opta-
tion 'by Army leaders. Nevertheless, the writings and actions of this small
group did tell the world that not everyone in Thailand went along with the
"1Establishment of such a "brain trust" is typical of powerful Thai military/political
figures. Thanom, Praphat and Krit each have their intellectual advisors; during 1972
Narong and Chalard emerged with such groups as well.
"2Usually identified in this regard are Krit, Chalard, and Prasert (Thammasiri).
DAVID MORELL 167
coup and the end of constitutional government, although "the world" by and
large accepted the Thai leadership's statements suggesting that the coup was
a relief to the nation.
This "loyal opposition," to be differentiated completely from the armed
insurgents in the hills and villages of the hinterland, took three courses of
action: publication and dissemination of protest documents; overt demon-
strations against the military; and legal action against coup leaders. The
most important documents were written by Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, the na-
tion's senior economist, whose impeccable reputation has earned him the
respect of students, intellectuals, government officials and the Thai elite at
large. Dr. Puey, former Governor of the Bank of Thailand (a position from
which he resigned in August 1971) and Dean of Economics at Thammasat
(from which he resigned in August 1972) was a Visiting Professor of Eco-
nomics at Cambridge University in England when the coup took place. His
first article was written in the form of an analogy, a letter from a villager to
his village chief; it was signed "Mr. Khem Yenying," Puey's code name
during the World War II Free Thai resistance movement. The letter notes
the many important changes which had been instituted since 1968: the new
constitution, elected legislature, and freedom of speech and assembly for the
people. Puey admits that perfection had not been attained but emphasizes
that this was only a beginning, based on the principle of popular sovereignty
which he holds paramount. Puey openly disagreed with the military leaders'
contention that all Thais sincerely supported and favored the coup; rather,
he attributes the lack of overt opposition to the military's apparatus of in-
timidation: "Fear works as magic to weaken the cries of the opposition. If
you would know how the villagers really feel, abandon intimidation." In this
letter, Puey urged that the constitution be brought back and the people again
be allowed basic freedoms, civil rights, and the ability to participate in elect-
ing a national assembly.13
Others took a more active stance, or at least attempted to do so. Several
student leaders from Thammasat University laid a funeral wreath on the
Democracy Monument shortly after the coup; they were called in by the
police for questioning and were dissuaded from repetition of such "subver-
sive" actions. A group of university professors attempted to organize them-
selves to present a protest petition to the NEC; their attempt collapsed in the
face of their own fragmentation and threats from the authorities, but was
documented by one of the group in an article published in one of the leading
academic journals.14 As Dr. Warin describes it, one by one the potential
"3This letter was originally written and distributed by hand in Bangkok in February
1972. It was published in Chao Ban magazine in April 1972, and a translation appeared
in the Far Eastern Economic Review, September 16, 1972, pp. 14-15.
14Warin Wonghanchao, "A Dream in Which I Satisfied My Own Desires in the King-
dom of Fear," Social Science Review, March 1972 (in Thai) ; a translated version of
this article will appear under the title "Political Masturbation" in David Morell and
Suchit Bunbongkarn (eds.), The Voice of the Domino: Thai Views on Development,
Alliance, and Sovereignty, forthcoming from the University of California Press.
168 THA I LA N D
signers decided that it would be more prudent to withdraw. Some claimed
that the effort was "pointless . . . it won't change anything"; others backed
out because of suspicions of "politics within our group." Some were directly
co-opted by the Revolutionary Party and within days were occupying "con-
sultant" positions. Finally, the original group was down from fifty to only
two. Informed specifically that they would be arrested if they went ahead
with the protest, the "movement" collapsed.
This is the typical story of protest in Thailand. Undercut, spied on, threat-
ened and co-opted by the power elite; desirous of influence and access; con-
vinced that one must work from the inside; disdainful (almost ashamed) of
the vulgarity of open, public protest; and unable to agree among themselves
-those who would represent "political opposition" are unable to develop
sufficient power with which to compete with the Army leaders and their
bureaucritc allies.
Following President Nixon's decision to mine North Vietnam's ports and
escalate the air war, many of these same Thai intellectuals brought down
upon themselves the wrath of the regime by sending an open letter of protest
to the President via the American Embassy in Bangkok. Those who signed
the letter were called in by the police for "questioning" or slandered as
"communists" or "subversives."
The most serious legal challenge to the assumption of power by the military
came from three former elected MPs,'5 who in February brought suit against
the NEC on charges of "treason, illegal usurpation of power, and actions
contrary to the constitution." They were immediately arrested and held with-
out bail, while all publication of their charges was suppressed." About two
weeks later, the court announced that it would be unable to hear their case
"because the plaintiffs had not been personally affected by the change in
government." In June, the -NEC summarily announced that the three men
had been convicted of "subversive activities inimical to the state" and were
being sentenced to jail terms ranging from 7 to 10 years; there was no trial,
no right of appeal, no bail-just the announcement of their conviction and
sentence.
What made their charges particularly potent was that the King never offi-
cially pardoned the coup group for its actions of November 17. After pre-
vious Thai coups, the King has issued a Royal Pardon declaring the seizure
of power legal; and in 1948 the Supreme Court declared the 1947 coup a
"One of these MPs, Uthai Pimchaichon, was the youngest man ever elected to
parliament in Thailand, just 30. He was an accomplished public speaker, apparently
quite popular in his Chonburi constituency. Another in the group was a former school
teacher from Chaiyaphum. In his mid-30's, he had spent a great deal of time while an
elected MP visiting the villages of his province and speaking with the villagers.
1"All Bangkok newspapers with the exception of one were informed by the police
that it was forbidden to publish information on the three MP's court case. Khao Panich
(The Commercial Trade News), published by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ap-
Iparently did not get the word, for it published a headlined account of the court action.
Shortly thereafter Khao Panich was closed by the government; it emerged about two
months later with a new editor-in-chief.
DAVID MORELL 169
"constitutional, legal" act. But no such pardon was forthcoming in 1972,
rendering the coup group's legal position rather tenuous. Therefore, rather
than permit the court to hear the three MPs' case, they chose blunt suppres-
sion as the preferable alternative.
Political opposition in Thailand is perhaps 'best exemplified by the case of
Praphansak Kamolpetch, a young Chulalongkorn University political sci-
ence graduate and one of the most outspoken advocates of democracy and
political participation during the parliamentary period. He contested several
elections, none successfully, and formed both the People's Council and a
student Political Development Group to encourage active study of and par-
ticipation in politics. Two days after the coup, Praphansak met with his
followers and distributed a document critical of the seizure of power; he was
immediately called in for police interrogation and warned to refrain from
further "subversive actions." Praphansak is the paramount example of what
happens to the opposition man in Thailand, to anyone who consistently takes
stands which cannot enhance his career and which prevent him from occu-
pying a dignified social position among the leaders of Thai society. He is not
in jail, he is not cruelly persecuted. He is watched, of course, but for the
most part-he is ignored. He cannot hold a respectable government position,
rise through the system, and hope eventually to guide the affairs of his nation,
in league with other men of consequence. These things may not matter very
much to Praphansak, but they do to most of the would-be opposition. It may
be fear of ignominy, of de facto exile, which influences these men more than
any other factor. Political opposition depends upon the safety of numbers;
the opposition man alone is nothing more than an eccentric in the eyes of
Thai society and government.
About three months after initial circulation of "Mr. Khem's letter" in
Bangkok, Dr. Puey prepared a second statement for open distribution: "A
Call for Non-Violent Resistance." This document sets out Puey's program
for organized opposition to the coup group and his conception of an alter-
native political structure for Thailand. He emphasizes repeatedly that he is
calling for a completely peaceful, non-violent strategy of opposition. Re-
flecting his own pacifist point view, he is convinced that violence is not the
answer, that it cannot produce enduring results.
Little if anything happened in the months following Puey's cry for non-
violent active resistance to the military and other opposition activities. Stu-
dents remained passive; there was no opposition to the arrest and lengthy
sentences handed the three ex-MPs, and few were willing even to visit them
in jail for fear of being remembered later by guards. There was no meaning-
ful protest when the police closed Chao Ban, the most outspoken of the "oppo-
sition press." Puey's appeals did not'fall on deaf ears, for there are many in
Thailand who agree with him and would follow him if they knew how and if
they were organized to do so. But a few scattered intellectuals do not consti-
tute an organized movement. Meanwhile, far more visible opposition to the
military regime continues to emanate from the hills, from the armed revolu-
170 THAI LAN D
tionaries who have their own conception of Thailand's political future.
Unless and until "the loyal opposition" can organize into an active, discip-
lined, coherent political force, the Army will 'be able to continue to do what-
ever it likes to suppress them, on an individual basis. And the Army's ability
to suppress the loyal opposition will inexorably render the armed guerrillas,
far better protected against government suppression, the only remaining
opposition.
INSURGENCY: CONTINUAL, GRADUAL, WORSENING
Despite the hopes of the NEC, Thailand's insurgency situation worsened
again in 1972. The threat is still not an imminent one for Bangkok's leaders,
but in long-term perspective the expansion and intensification of insurgent
power in various regions of the kingdom bodes ill indeed.
Available information, admittedly inadequate, indicates that the insur-
gents' governing structure in Northeast villages was further strengthened
during 1972.17 Insurgent village infrastructure and the capabilities of their
leadership elements were improved through intensified training and continu-
ing attention to organizational details and political grievances. Primary con-
centration remains in the original areas of insurgency in the Northeast and
on village-level organization and "political development"; it is in this regard
that the government's response is most inadequate. There was no new upsurge
of violence in the Northeast, but this ought not to be taken as an indication
that the political threat has diminished.
Areas of the North remained under the complete military/political hege-
inony of the tribal insurgents. Seven districts of Nan and Chiang Rai
provinces near the Laos border were declared "special insurgency zones,"
writing them off from permanent government presence and permitting freer
use of military firepower. Government forces penetrate these hill regions
only in large-size units, and the often suffer casualties far out of proportion
to the value of the 'operation.
The NEC's major counterinsurgency extravaganza came in February in
the North-Central area (Phitsanulok, Petchabun, Loei). The entire 1st Divi-
sion, some 10,000 strong, was moved out of Bangkok garrisons to surround
and then attack the insurgent hilltop stronghold known as Phu Khwang (or
Phn Hin Long Kha). Airpower (including napalm and AC-47 miniguns)
and artillery were employed liberally, followed by battalion-sized infantry
assaults. Despite claims at the time of an overwhelming Army victory, in
private conversations with both Thai and American observers the author
was told repeatedly that this operation was an abject failure---c--haracterized
by poor leadership, faulty organization, and inadequate coordination 'be-
tween the Army, police and civil government officials in the area. These
remain the typical problems of suppression operations in Thailand, as they
"Communist organizational control over 150 or more Northeast villages and a total
population of perhaps 100,000 was described in "Thailand: Military Checkmate," op.
cit., p. 159.
DAVID MORELL 171
have been since the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC)
was first created in 1965. Army planners had no clear idea of the insurgents'
strengths and weaknesses, and as a result played into their hands by attacking
in conventional formations. The 1st Division units suffered large casualties
in this month-long operation, variously estimated at from 300 to 600 killed
and wounded, most by snipers, anti-personnel mines and booby-traps. Not a
single insurgent body was found when the Army finally captured its hilltop
objective. By the end of 1972 the estimated number of armed insurgents in
this "tri-province" area had increased, despite-or perhaps because of-the
Phu Khwang operation.
One of the most important stories in Thailand's insurgency this year was
the great intensification of violence in the mid-South: Trang, Phattalung,
Surat Thani and Nakhon Sri Thammarat. Aggressive insurgent units at-
tacked and overran a sizeable number of isolated tambon police stations (a
US-sponsored and financed program, many of these stations remain under-
manned and vulnerable -to attack) and village defense units. Police and Vol-
unteer Defense Corps (VDC) units suffered serious casualties and loss of
weapons, radios and ancillary equipment. By mid-year it had become appar-
ent to the Bangkok elite that the situation in the peninsular region could no
longer be ignored. As so often happens in Thailand, a serious challenge
produced an impressive government response. A coordinated counterinsur-
gency program implemented by a single strong leader, Major General Sant
Chitpatima,18 by late in the year appeared to be seriously hurting the in-
surgents, both in their village infrastructure and in their armed guerrilla
units. Knowledgeable observers report that if it weren't for the inordinately
sophisticated and hard-hitting government response, the security situation
in the South would be extremely serious.
CSOC seems to be doing somewhat more in the way of integrated planning
for combined utilization of military, police and civilian assets; and this or-
nganization may be receiving a bit more support from top echelons of the
government (though not when it comes to conflict between CSOC and the
Army). The Ministry of Interior's program to arm and train villagers to
defend their own communities (VSDiU-Village Security and Development
Units), another US-sponsored program, was slowly upgraded and improved
during the year, though its performance remained far below original aspira-
tions. The Police Special Branch carried out a maj or operation in August,
arresting some 300 "communists," reportedly including several senior offi-
cials of the Communist Party of Thailand. Newspaper reports of the police
raid indicated that an inordinately high percentage of those arrested were of
Chinese or Vietnamese descent.
"8General Sant is Commander of the Army's Fifth Military Circle, headquartered in
Nakhon Sri Thammarat, and Regional Commander for CSOC in the South. He has close
connections with local police commanders and civilian governors, who support his
requests for men and equipment and follow his lead in designing and implementing
counterinsurgency operations.
172 THAI LAN D
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
The Thai economy presented a mixed picture in 1972. GNP growth is ex-
pected to be just over 5%, a slight decline from the 6% rate of 1970-71.
Rice exports were up to a record high of some two million tons, although
stocks at the end of the year were abnormally low. Performance in other
export commodities was also quite good, especially sugar, tapioca and kenaf,
but the sizeable rise in imports led to a slight rise in the balance of trade
deficit. Due to accelerating capital inflows associated with the large expan-
sion in the U.S. military presence at the air bases and an increased number
of tourists, Thailand's international reserves increased slightly. There was not
much 'improvement in the agricultural diversification area, one of the major
goals of the third five-year plan.
The investment side witnessed problems associated with some new laws
concerning commercial activities of foreigners. The new Alien Business Law
decreed by the NEC on November 26 will force aliens out of 12 categories
of business operations within two years, unless control of at least 50% is
turned over to Thais. Firms in this category include law, architecture, ad-
vertising, brokerage, real estate, accountancy, and trade in native agricul-
tural products. Firms in another 37 categories can remain in existence, but
no new foreign firms in these categories may be established. Another law
specifying occupations from which aliens are to be excluded was anticipated
at the end of the year. These regulations appeared to be having a distinct
dampening effect on the investment climate.
FOREIGN POLICY: THE INTENSIFIED AMERICAN ALLIANCE
The two principal issues in Thai foreign policy during 1972 dealt with
relationships with the United States on the one hand and China on the other.
Throughout the year, the choice was one of intensifying the American alli-
ance, trying simultaneously to open channels of communication with Peking.
The major expansion of America's air war in Southeast Asia following the
communist Easter Offensive led to massive additions to the capabilities of
U.S. air bases in Thailand, from which most of the air war continues to be
fought. Hundreds of new war planes arrived; Takhli Air Base, closed in
1969, was re-opened; and the base at Nam Phong near Khon Kaen in the
Northeast achieved operational status for the first time in the war."' All this
activity required new inputs of American troops, so that by mid-year troop
levels were well in excess of 50,000, more than at any previous time and
significantly greater than the number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. The
intimidation bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in December led to further
expansion of the huge B-52 base at U-Tapao, southeast of Bangkok. Through-
out the year there was intensified Thai participation in the U.S.-funded war
19This base had been built as a contingency measure in the mid-1960s, but has never
before been operational. Its use brings to seven the number of major American air
bases in Thailand. At least initially, Nam Phong was the site for U.S. Marine Corps
air units transferred from Danang, South Vietnam, casting doubt on the meaning of
publicized U.S. troop reductions in that country.
DAVID MORELL 173
in Laos, as thousands of Thai "volunteers" staffed Special Guerrilla Units
and other groups. It seems clear that Thai leaders made a conscious decision
to endorse all American air activity, presumably in the belief that it will en-
hance Thailand's security; it also seems clear that Hanoi and Peking will not
forget the source of these massive air raids.
Contacts with Peking, following the American precedent, began with the
visit of a Thai ping pong team in August. "Political advisor" to the sports
group was Prasit Kanchanawat, former Deputy Minister of Economic Af-
fairs, a leading banker, and a close associate of General Praphat. Prasit
met with Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders, but apparently little was
achieved. No trade announcements were forthcoming, although this was one
of the stated purposes of the meeting. Chinese support for insurgency in
Thailand was discussed, with Chou reportedly stating that China would con-
tinue to support revolutionary elements in Thailand in their struggle for
national liberation.
The ping pong visit was followed later in the year by a trade mission, again
headed by Prasit. Negotiations concerned the possibility of government-to-
government trade, excluding private individuals and firms from the opera-
tion; but again there were no apparent results. It does not appear that Bang-
kok's leaders are prepared, as yet, to offer China anything substantial, either
in the trade arena or in political/military alignments. The air bases remain,
Thailand remains the pillar of the crumbling SEATO edifice, and U.S. aid
and western investments continue to pour in. Short-term security consider-
ations and fear about the effect of Sino-Thai trade and eventual diplomatic
recognition on the overseas Chinese community in Thailand are cited as
reasons for delaying tactics; long-term vulnerability is apparently not wor-
ried about. As long as U.S. air bases in Thailand remain the principal source
of the American air war, it seems unlikely that any significant Sino-Thai
agreements will 'be forthcoming.
Administratively, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was shunted to a minor
position by the coup group. Thanat Khoman's personal role as initiator and
spokesman for Thai foreign policy ended with the coup, with the NEC itself
and Army headquarters assuming responsibility 'for foreign policy decisions.
Many fundamental questions remain unanswered. What will Thai-U.S. rela-
tions be in the post-war environment? How will Chinese and North Viet-
namese animosity after eight years of air warfare based in Thailand be ex-
pressed? Will the U.S. air bases in Thailand be dismantled, or will they
remain in operation? What will happen to the extensive joint U.S./Thai
operations in Laos? Will Thailand finally come to terms with its giant
neighbor?
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE NATIONAL
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
In their 13 months of absolute rule, Thailand's military leaders acted ag-
gressively-at least on the surface-to cope with a number of pressing prob-
174 THAILAND
lems. There was a heavy urban and bureaucratic aura to their actions, not
surprising given their bases of power and personal predilections. But one
needs to ask two questions about all this urban activity: (1) what was its
long-term socio-economic impact, as opposed to the obvious short-term politi-
cal image of a regime of strength and activity, and (2) was any of this
activity precluded by the previous governmental structure, including a con-
stitution and an elected legislature? The answers to these questions, despite
Bangkok's propaganda barrage, are clearly: (1) the only impact was to
widen the gap between rich and poor, between elite and mass; and (2) al-
though much would have had to be justified to the parliament with Com-
promises effected, the balance of power between executive and legislative
branches and the provisions of the 1968 constitution ensured that the Cab-
inet could have undertaken any reforms it pleased-but from 1969 through
November 1971 they did not choose to lead a government with an aura of
activity. In terms of development of political institutions and attitudes, the
military regime's actions have pushed Thailand back at least two decades;
while in terms of economic development, internal security and defense no
significant improvements have been added.
Government Re-organization: One of the NEC's primary objectives, an-
nounced at the time of the coup and repeated thereafter, was to implement a
major re-organization of the government's administrative structure. Finally
decreed in December 1972 were the most important changes in bureaucratic
organization in over a decade. The Ministry of National Development was
dissolved,20 with its functions transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture
(now including the title "and Cooperatives"), Ministry of Communications,
Ministry of Industry and the Prime Minister's Office. The changes certainly
do not eliminate all the overlap and ministerial duplication of functions in
Thailand's development bureaucracy, but they do simplify the situation. In
particular, they greatly strengthen the Agriculture Ministry, traditionally the
weak sister of the Thai bureaucracy despite its obvious intrinsic importance
for this agricultural nation. The Ministry of Interior's powerful position was
enhanced by addition of the Accelerated Rural Development Office, though
ARD's relationship with the Departments of Local Administration and iCom-
munity Development in the same ministry have not been clarified. The name
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs was changed to Commerce, reportedly
to punish former MOEA head, Bunchana Attakorn, for publishing his con-
troversial memoirs just before the coup. The NEiC also revised judicial pro-
cedures, reducing the independence of the courts and giving greater control
to the Minister of Justice. This proposal had been vetoed by the elected
parliament in 1971; its announcement in 1972 led to a student protest dem-
onstration.
20MOND had been created in the Sarit re-organization of 1959. Pote Sarasin, Min-
ister of National Development and civilian Deputy Prime Minister in the pre-coup
government (and a full member elf the NEC) held no position in the new Cabinet
announced in December 1972.
DAVID MORELL 175
Urban Development: Though the NEC did almost nothing to cope with
the growing social and economic problems of Thailand's rural areas, many
actions were taken in the metropolis. Early in 1972 the NEC amalgamated
the two provinces of Bangkok and Thonburi (the metropolitan region) into
a single administrative unit. This was a logical step from the public admin-
istration perspective, but appointment of new municipal councilors to imple-
ment urban reforms led some in Bangkok to question the NEC's intent. The
group included one of the most notorious of the government party's MPs
and a Dean of Chulalongkorn University implicated in the Siam Square land
scandal-both closely identified with the Praphat faction. The new urban
government proceeded rapidly to act on Bangkok's many ills. Houseboat resi-
dents were forcibly evicted so that canals could be dredged and cleaned;
hawkers were removed from the sidewalks; working groups on low-cost hous-
ing were convened; buses were checked for air pollution; residents of squat-
ter slums were forced out of their homes to make way for a new municipal
stadium. It was evident to even the most apolitical urban resident that Thai-
land's military leaders were concerned about Bangkok's problems-though
the end result of all this activity led one to question whether anything sub-
stantial was really being accomplished, or whether all this had purely political
content; acting against the poor, for example, while ignoring the obvious
requirement for urban land taxes, educational reforms, health improvements,
and so on.
Crime and Capital Punishment: Following the Sarit model, the NEC lead-
ers immediately after seizing power announced their intention to squelch
Thailand's rising crime problems through harsh measures. The first public
execution was convened within days of the coup, when thousands of residents
of Chonburi province trooped out to see the execution of a man convicted
of killing an American military officer (this display was broadcast on nation-
wide television). By the end of 1972 a total of 37 men had been executed,
some behind prison walls and others in public extravaganzas. These men
were not tried by a court of law, nor even a military court martial; they were
summarily accused, tried and ordered executed by the NEC itself, often
within days of their arrest.21 All were from poor backgrounds and many
were of Chinese ancestry. Neutral observers believe that crime remains at
previous levels, although much of the urban population certainly feels more
secure under strong military leadership.
National Defense and Coiunterinsurgency: Much of the rationale for the
Army's seizure of power in 1971 was the perceived necessity to take steps to
21In contrast to this is the three-month delay in arresting a Thai police lieutenant
who is charged with planting a bomb in a CPA plane in order to collect $300,000 in
life insurance on his girlfriend and daughter. Despite the hard evidence collected by
crash investigators, the police and Army stalled on the basis of "circumstantial evi-
dence" and the stated belief that "this (allegation) is an attempt to blacken the repu-
tation on Don Muang Airport." As of this writing the lieutenant has been arrested but
the NEC has not brought his case up for a hearing; 82 people died in this crash.
176 T H A I L A N D
meet the worsening situation. During 1972, not surprisingly, the military's
budget expanded considerably, receiving most of the 8%o boost in the na-
tional budget, to a record high of 31 billion baht (about $1.5 billion). The
elected parliament had been vociferously resisting increased defense oxpendi-
tures. The NEC leaders also claimed that they would solve Thailand's in-
creasingly serious internal security/insurgency problem; this issue was
discussed above.
The 1972 "Interim" Constitution: The typical pattern following each
Army coup in Thailand is to dissolve the constitution then in effect, promul-
gate an "interim" constitution, and "lay the groundwork" for a new "per-
manent" constitution and a return to "democracy." Thus it was expected
that the latest Revolutionary Party would, after a few months of absolute
power unconstrained by any constitutional document, announce a new con-
stitution, undoubtedly accompanied by an all-appointed assembly. This did
happen, but it took a good deal longer than initially expected; not until De-
cember 15 was the nation's ninth constitution promulgated and the new
Cabinet formed, barely in time to meet the auspicious date set by court
astrologers for the investiture of the Crown Prince on his reaching the age
of 20. The leaders apparently felt that a "legitimate" Cabinet ought to be
in effect at the time of this ceremony.
Given the prevailing political culture, it does not seem to matter to most
Thai citizens-or to the monarch-what actual provisions are contained in
the constitution; just so long as there is a document of some kind, this is
sufficient to meet the perceived requirements of "Thai-style democracy."
The principal provisions of this latest constitution, containing 23 articles
and closely resembling Sarit's 1959 documents are as follows:22
1. in a near duplicate of Sarit's Article 17, the Prime Minister is given
absolute power to take any steps "appropriate for the purpose of preventing,
repressing or suppressing actions which jeopardize the national security, or
the Throne, or the economy of the country, or the national administration, or
which subvert or threaten law and order or the good public morals or which
damage the health of the people";
2. an all-appointed 299-member National Assembly is to act as a legisla-
tive body; assembly members have limited power to interpellate Cabinet
ministers appointed by the King; all legislation dealing with financial mat-
ters must be introduced by the Cabinet;
3. the Cabinet is empowered to draft the kingdom's next "permanent"
constitution; 23
4. all decrees issued by the NEC during its 13 months in existence are to
22Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, December 15, 1972, Article 17, as trans-
lated in the Bangkok Post, December 17, 1972; these powers have been used in the
past to order summary executions of criminals.
2"In the Sarit era, this was the second responsibility of the 240-member appointed
assembly. By now retaining this power within the Cabinet, the military elite can ensure
that no pressure will emerge from the appointed assembly for promulgation of a "per-
manent" constitution and new elections (as happened in 1968).
DAVID MORELL 177
remain in force, and are declared legal by the new constitution.
The New Assembly: The new appointed legislature contains 200 military
officers (134 Army, 30 Navy, 23 Air Force and 13 police) and 99 civilians,
all trusted members of the Bangkok governing elite. By constitutional pro-
vision, Cabinet members are excluded from the assembly. Prominent Minis-
ters from the 1969-71 Cabinet not included in the new executive body but
appointed to the assembly include Thanat Khoman (ex-Minister of Foreign
Affairs), 'Bunchana Attakorn (ex-Minister of Economic Affairs), M. R.
Chaktong Tongyai (ex-Minister oif Agriculture), Sukich Nimanhaeman
(exMinister of Education) and Police Maj. Gen. Sanga Kittikachorn24 (the
Prime Minister's brother and ex-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs). Only
one member of the assembly elected in February 1969 was appointed to the
assembly, Maj. Gen. Siri Siriyothin, President of the previous House of
Representatives and active in NEC councils since the coup. M. R. Kukrit
Pramoj, publisher of Siam Rath, is the only representative from the press.
Colonel Narong's enhanced position was evidenced by his appointment; he
was not in the appointed Senate dissolved in November 1971.
The New Cabinet: The departures of Thanat and Pote were the most sig-
nificant changes in the new Cabinet, as compared with the executive body
in effect from 1969-71. Thanom retained his position as Prime Minister and
Minister of Defense, adding Thanat's portfolio as Foreign Affairs Minister.
Praphat remains Deputy Prime Minister25 and Minister of Interior, as well
as Army Commander, CSOC Commander and now Chief of Police. Air Chief
Marshal Dawee Chulasap shifts from Communications to the newly-power-
ful Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives; General Pong Punnakan be-
comes new Minister of Communications. Police General Prasert remains
Minister of Public Health (though no longer Police Chief) and Serm Vichai-
kul returns as Minister of Finance. Two interesting appointments to the
rank of full minister are those of General Krit Sivara (Minister of Industry)
and Prasit Kanchanawat (Minister of Commerce). In the earlier Cabinet,
Krit had been Deputy Minister of Education and later Deputy Minister of
Defense; Prasit had been Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs (renamed
Commerce). Krit, also Deputy Commander of the Army and the NEC's
Secretary-General, remains one of the most enigmatic figures in the Thai
power hierarchy; his new appointment, while at the rank of full minister,
is in one of the weakest ministries. Prasit led the country's contacts with
China and represents the Praphat faction in the counsels of industry and
commerce. Boonrod Binson, formerly Deputy Minister of National Develop-
ment, was appointed Minister in charge of University Affairs in the Prime
Minister's Office, and Lt. Gen. Sawaeng returned as Minister in charge of
"4Sanga holds no other top government position; his activities in 1971, as aggressive
leader of the Government House faction within the government's political party, had
a great deal to do with precipitating the coup.
"With Pote's retirement (reportedly at the request of his family), Praphat is the
only Deputy Prime Minister.
178 T H A I L A N D
the Prime Minister's Office, his earlier position, after having been eclipsed
during the post-coup maneuvering. Sawaeng's close relationship with
Thanom apparently ensured his retention in the Cabinet, at least as long as
Thanom remains Prime Minister.
ASSESSMENT AND PROGNOSIS
Little of substance was accomplished under the military junta which could
not have 'been achieved under the legitimate parliamentary system, with the
possible exception of factional consolidation in the struggle for eventual
political succession. Despite all the bold talk, crime remains at the same level,
the insurgent threat is growing, corruption remains rampant, Thai vulner-
ability in Southeast Asia remains acute, Bangkok's problems remain over-
whelming and the reorganized bureaucracy seems hardly a paragon of ad-
ministrative virtue. At the same time, the limited channels for villager
grievances and the gradual steps toward creation of political institutions
and growing political consciousness have been wiped away.
It seems likely that participant political institutions, even those operating
under the constraints of the 1969-71 period, will not recover for at least a
decade. Absolute military rule is in ascendancy throughout much of the de-
veloping world, and Thailand's four decades of practice make her a leading
exponent. Limited political opposition will continue; students may become
somewhat more articulate; the King may play a greater role-but the pri-
mary focus of Thai politics will continue to be the personalistic factions com-
peting for bureaucratic power and personal wealth. The system shows no
evidence of having solved the succession dilemma, and in all likelihood both
Thanom and Praphat will remain in office until both "retire" together. Mean-,
while, the insurgents in the hills continue to offer their own version of the
succession alternative.
DAVID MORELL is a Research Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University; during 1971-72 he taught in the Faculty of
Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.
The McCormick Family Planning Program in Chiang Mai, Thailand

Authors(s): George B. Baldwin
Source: Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 9, No. 12 (Dec., 1978), pp. 300-313
Published by: Population Council
Accessed: 29-03-2016 03:49 UTC
Population Council, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Studies
in Family Planning
The McCormick Family Planning Program
in Chiang Mai, Thailand
GEORGE B. BALDWIN
author's conviction that injectables could provide an im-
Thailand's family planning program is one of the more
portant expansion of contraceptive options in several coun-
active and successful programs in the developing world. Ac-
tries if authorities were more familiar with its client accept-
cording to recent figures, 32 percent of married women aged
ability, contraceptive effectiveness, ease of administration,
15-44 were using contraception in 1977 (Nortman and Hof-
and excellent safety record to date.
statter, 1978, Table 23). The government health-delivery
system accounts for over 85 percent of all acceptors, through
the National Family Planning Program (NFPP), launched
The Setting
in 1970. Private sources, with which the NFPP has devel-
Chiang Mai's 1977 population of 1.3 million is highly con-
oped cooperative relationships, account for most of the
remainder. Overall population growth in Thailand has slowed
centrated in the lowland areas of the agricultural Chiang Mai
from more than 3.0 percent ten years ago to 2.5 percent or
valley, where Chiang Mai city is located (see Figure 1). About
less today, and the crude birth rate (CBR) has fallen from
1 million people live in this valley, with about 170,000 in the
about 42-43 per 1,000 in the mid-1960s to about 34 at the
city and another 130,000 in the province's highlands and
end of 1977.
mountains. About half the highland population belongs to five
tribal groups (known as the "hill tribes") who are closely re-
One of the most effective private-sector contributions, the
lated to the Shan peoples of northern Burma. The province's
McCormick Family Planning Program, has occurred in
population consists overwhelmingly of ethnic Thais, with
Chiang Mai province, located about 700 km. (435 miles)
10-15 percent ethnic Chinese, mostly in the towns, plus the
north of Bangkok on the Burmese border. Until the govern-
hill tribes people.
ment program began in 1970 the McCormick program was
the only family planning program in Chiang Mai, and until
Eighty-five percent of the population is rural, and over
1974 it accounted for more than one-half of acceptors in the
half the households are engaged in rice farming, primarily
province. Fertility in northern Thailand has fallen more
for their own use. Major extensions of the road network dur-
rapidly than in the country as a whole, and the decline has
ing the past decade or so have greatly expanded the rural
been greatest in Chiang Mai and neighboring Lamphun prov-
sector's contact with the market economy, but rural-urban
inces: an estimated 50 percent over a 20-year period, from a
migration has remained very light. Recent rapid growth in
CBR of about 40 in 1954 to less than 20 in 1973 (Pardthai-
multiple cropping (rice, tobacco, groundnuts, onions, garlic)
song, 1978). Most of the drop occurred in the 1960s. Although

has provided a major new source of cash income. Landhold-
the role of family planning in bringing about this fall in fertilings are typically small, the average paddy farm having 3.5
ity is not at all clear, it is clear that contraceptive use in Chiang

acres (27 percent of the farms have less than 2 and 33 per-
Mai has increased dramatically within the past decade. The

cent have more than 4 acres). Population pressure has al-
contraceptive prevalence rate is estimated at 56 percent

ready led to a decline in average farm size in recent years
(Shevasunt, 1978), at least equal to that of metropolitan

and to progressive settlement on upland and mountain slopes.
Bangkok.
About one-third of all farmers work their land as tenants,
This account provides a description of the evolution and
but most land is owned locally, not by absentee landlords.
present organization of the McCormick program, contracepAverage per capita income in 1972 was about US$85,
tive methods used, administrative and staffing structure, costs,

equivalent to $155 in late 1977 prices. These Chiang Mai
funding, and results. These details command interest because

per capita farm incomes compare with a nationwide per
of the program's widely recognized success, making it a

capita income of US $350 in 1975 (IBRD, 1977.) Net crop
potential model for others to follow, suitably adapted. Two

income is proportional to both farm size and cropping in-
aspects of the McCormick program may be of particular

tensity (see Tongsiri, Lerttamrab, and Thodey, 1975, p. 54),
interest to programs elsewhere and will be discussed in some

but a substantial amount of farm income comes from on-
detail: the mobile family planning service and the dominant
farm activities other than raising crops (e.g., from livestock,
role played by an injectable contraceptive, depo medroxypro-
poultry, and handicrafts). On the smallest farms, more than
gesterone acetate (DMPA), a drug that has been well re-
half of total household income comes from off-farm activities
ceived by Thai women, and which the Thai government has
(mainly laboring); although the province is very lightly in-
recently incorporated into the national program. It is the
dustrialized, there are relatively good off-farm employment
300
FIGURE 1 Population density of and number of service points

The McCormick Family Planning Program
in Chiang Mai province, by district
Family planning services were initiated in Chiang Mai by

Chga, Ma
the McCormick Christian Hospital, established in 1920 by
US missionaries with funds donated by the McCormick

THAIANf
angkok BURMA family of Chicago and now run by the Church of Christ in
Thailand, a wholly Thai institution. The McCormick Family
W \ ---------___~ ~--=-= -_ i-
Planning Program (MFPP) was formally organized in 1963
as an offshoot of the obstetrical-gynecological services pro-
- = --= -------A -
vided by the hospital. Today, McCormick's fertility control
program consists of four parts: a five-day-a-week clinic in
CHIANG RAI
Chiang Mai city; a Saturday morning clinic at McCormick
MAEHONG SON 1
Hospital; a mobile unit that visits service points throughout
&i IAY ii' M S m

the province; and a project to reach the hill tribes.
DEVELOPMENT OF SERVICES
|_ * ,,LAMPANG
McCormick's services have expanded over the years to
meet a growing demand for family planning in Chiang Mai.
The hospital's lying-in section offered female sterilization
operations beginning in 1948. By the early 1960s the head of
4/'',,''I// ',,,,/!/x- LAMPHUN
obstetrics and gynecology, Edwin B. McDaniel, had become
concerned with the number of unwanted repeat pregnancies
among women who came to the hospital for delivery, and in
t / // ///,r//////.
September 1963 the hospital began offering IUDs. It was at
f :- , ////------v///
this time that the McCormick Family Planning Program was
Population density per sq. km.
formally established with the opening of a family planning

( ////A?//o/// //Under 5
clinic, which offered services five days a week, within the
hospital. In 1965 the clinic began offering the injectable
TAK - 200
DMPA, which soon became the primary method of the
program.'
By 1967 the number of women seeking family planning
*Over 4,00
services at the hospital's part-time clinic began to outrun the
0 Location of district capital
20 40 so so too ?2 Number of mobile service points

clinic's capacity. The program therefore opened a satellite
Kilometers -.- Amehoe boundaries
clinic in a municipal health center close to the city's main
Cbangwat boundaries
_International boundaries
bus depot, convenient to the program's many clients from
SOURCE ThismpwaprerparedbytheoWrld8ank'csstaf Thedenorriratironsusdandtheboundariesshownontismarrp
villages in the heavily populated agricultural area surrounddcotiml any juvidgmenrior ithe legl status or any territory orary erdorsemenrsor acceptanceofisuch boundaries
ing Chiang Mai city.2 All but IUD clients were moved to this
opportunities, including employment on other people's farms.
new site, which was in operation all day, five days a week.
The hospital clinic continued on a Saturday morning basis
Education has spread rapidly during the past generation.
In 1972-73, 75 percent of the population over age 50 had
only. After five and a half years at the municipal health
never attended school, but 89 percent of those aged 20-49
center, the program's satellite clinic, known as the Chiang
Mai Christian Clinic, in early 1973 moved to a new facility
and 92.5 percent of those aged 10-19 had had some school-
with better accommodations.3
ing. Relatively few had gone beyond the four-year primary
school. Of the 20-49 age group, only 5.6 percent had gone
In 1967 the program decided to try offering pills and in-
beyond the compulsory four-year level.
jectables in a village setting. It chose a village about 50 kms.
The area is undergoing rapid modernization, as evidenced
north of Chiang Mai, where hospital staff made once-a-
by high and rising literacy; still high but falling infant mor-
month visits. The success of that experiment convinced the
tality (estimated at 80-85 versus more than 120 fifteen to
program's leaders that many village women were ready to
twenty years ago); rapidly changing cropping patterns and
accept family planning and that an attempt should be made
agricultural technology, including increasing mechanization
to bring services to them through a mobile service. This
and fertilizer use; expansion of the road network and the
service began in May 1969. Within a year it was visiting
number of buses and motorcycles; rising newspaper circula-
about 20 service points, initially offering mainly pills and
tion and mass communication via the transistor radio; im-
condoms, but adding DMPA in 1970. Today, the mobile unit
proving standards of rural housing; near-universal primary
has 39 service points, served by one team operating on a
school attendance at village schools for both boys and girls;
once-every-three-months schedule.
and a network of 9 hospitals and around 160 health posts,
In 1975 the fourth branch of the MFPP was introduced
about double the facilities of ten years ago. Still, few villages
to bring family planning to selected hill tribe areas in the
have electricity or protected water-supply systems.
low mountains that lie beyond the program's traditional
301
TABLE I New acceptors recruited by McCormick Family
service area. A small cadre of health workers sets out on
Planning Program and National Family Planning Program:

foot from the end of the bus line, taking pills and injectables
Chiang Mai, Thailand 1970-77

to selected villages and arranging appointments for women
who want sterilizations, which are performed at a govern-
Number of new acceptors McCormick
ment hospital in a town where a McCormick physician has

as percent of
Year McCormick National Total total

been given facilities. The hill tribe program is still in its
formative stages.4
1970 10,017 4,424 14,441 69
1971 8,392 9,674 18,066 46
1972 8,769 10,261 19,030 46
1973 12,862 15,337 28,199 46
1974 14,892 10,660 25,552 58

STAFFING
1975 13,676 16,973 30.649 45
1976 14,461 19,561 34,022 43
The McCormick Family Planning Program has a central

1977 13,891 25,901 39,792 35
office staff of 8; 25 persons assigned to the daily Chiang Mai
SOURCE: Compiled from figures supplied by the Ministry of Public

Christian Clinic, including a physician, 6 nurses, and 6
Health and the McCormick Family Planning Program.
nurse's aides; 10 with the mobile service; and a hill tribe staff
of 3 that is scheduled to total 17 by early 1979. All but one
of the Saturday morning clinic staff are drawn from the regu-
in attendance. About 8 percent of government acceptors re-
lar McCormick Hospital staff, which numbers around 400.
ceived the injectable in 1977.
MFPP staff are paid somewhat more than McCormick Hos-
The availability and relative prices of contraceptives great-
pital regular employees, who, in turn, are paid more than
ly influenced the original family planning methods offered by
comparable government employees in the higher grades (e.g.
the McCormick program. The McCormick program relies
physicians, nurses, and senior administrators).5
almost entirely on external donations for its contraceptives,
which it offers to clients at a low, subsidized price. A small
supply of DMPA first became available to the hospital (and
ultimately to the program) in May 1965, from another mis-
COVERAGE AND METHODS
sion hospital in the region. In October of that year it became
In 1976 the McCormick program was providing protection
the most common method in the program, after many accep-
to an estimated 25-30,000 women, or 20-25 percent of the
tors indicated a preference for it. For the next five years,
married women of reproductive age (MWRA) in Chiang
sporadic supply difficulties prevented the program from offer-
Mai province, according to the program's service statistics.
ing injectables to all those who requested them, although
The government program was providing protection to 25-30
none who started with the method had to discontinue use.
percent of the MWRA. Thus, the two programs together
Oral contraceptives came on the market in northern Thailand
were serving 45-55 percent of the MWRA, with a small
in 1965, but McCormick had no access to free supplies, and
additional contribution from the commercial sector.
few clients of the program could afford the j?40-50 (US$2-
The relative shares of the McCormick and government
2.50) market price of a cycle.
programs are shown in Table 1. Expansion of the govern-
For many women, therefore, the program could offer only
ment program since the mid-1970s has not been matched by
the IUD (the condom was not offered until 1975, a reflection
the McCormick program, where new recruitment has re-
of its general unpopularity in Thailand for contraceptive
mained relatively stable since 1974. While McCormick was
use). In 1970 assured supplies of both DMPA and the pill
the innovator in the province, it became a "junior partner"
became available to McCormick from the International
after the introduction of government services in 1970. The
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF); since that time over
government program now operates through a far larger serv-
three times as many women enrolling in the program have
ice network; in 1975 it had 9 hospitals plus about 160 health
selected the injection as have selected the pill. Only a small
centers and midwifery stations compared with McCormick's
proportion of clients have received the IUD in recent years.
one hospital, one city clinic, and one mobile team.
Although the proportion who have accepted sterilization is
small, the number has recently increased markedly (see
The McCormick program currently offers four main con-
traceptive methods: an injectable; oral contraceptives; sterili-
below). Of the 118,000 new acceptors the program has
served since 1965, 63 percent used DMPA. Acceptors of the
zation; and the IUD. The proportion of new acceptors ob-
taining each method is shown in Table 2. As the table indi-
pill, offered since 1967, make up 24 percent of all acceptors,
IUD acceptors 5 percent and female sterilization acceptors 8
cates, DMPA is the major method, with 71 percent of
percent, with other methods making up less than 1 percent.
acceptors in 1977 receiving the injectable; the pill is second,
with 14 percent. Female sterilizations were 12 percent, male
The MFPP does not provide general maternal and child
sterilizations almost zero, and IUDs acceptances were under 2
health services (an initial experiment was found both costly
percent. Other methods made up less than 2 percent of the
and unnecessary as government services expanded), but it
total. The government program, by contrast, has developed
does supply about a dozen different medications at no charge
primarily as a pill program; 69 percent of its acceptors re-
to family planning clients who need them. This practice,
ceived this method in 1977. Although the government pro-
which costs the program about -$2,000 per year, is believed
to make an important contribution to program acceptance
gram began offering DMPA in 1975, it is available only at the
and credibility.6
relatively few service points in its network that have a doctor
302
TABLE 2 Contraceptive methods received by new acceptors, McCormick Family Planning
Program and National Family Planning Program, by method: Chiang Mai, Thailand 1974-77
Percent by method
Female Male
New sterili- sterili-
Year acceptors IUD Pill zation zation DMPA Other Total
McCormick program
1974 14,892 1.8 17.0 5.8 0.1 75.3 0 100
1975 13,676 1.4 15.6 8.3 0.2 52.4 22.1 100
1976 14,461 1.6 13.9 10.7 0.2 73.7 0 100
1977 13,891 1.7 13.7 11.7 0.2 71.3 1.4 100
1974-77 56,920 1.6 15.0 9.1 0.2 68.4 5.6 100
National program
1974 10,660 5.9 81.2 6.4 0.8 0 5.6 100
1975 16,973 4.1 81.4 10.6 0.2 3.1 5.6 100
1976 19,561 6.3 74.2 7.1 0.2 8.6 3.6 100
1977 25,901 4.9 68.8 7.2 0.4 7.8 10.8 100
1974-77 73,095 5.2 75.0 7.8 0.4 5.8 6.9 100
(Rinehart and Winter, 1975, p. K-13). Some doctors orig-
The Role of Injectables
inally worried that the bleeding and spotting symptoms were
One of the distinctive features of the McCormick Family
pathological and not merely the (irregular) occurrence of
Planning Program is its long and successful experience with
normal menstrual discharge; however, concerns on this score
the injectable contraceptive, DMPA. The program has pro-
have diminished with the accumulation of experience.
vided this method to more women than any other program
It was originally believed possible to overcome some of
in the world-almost 74,000 women by December 1977-
these menstrual disruptions by administering estrogen supple-
during its 13 years of experience with the drug.7
ments (either orally or by intramuscular injection), and in its
early years, the McCormick program gave such supplements
to almost all clients.9 But subsequent analysis showed this
CHARACTERISTICS AND SIDE EFFECTS
procedure to be of no real use in regulating menstruation in
DMPA is a steroid hormone that is administered to
DMPA acceptors, according to McDaniel. Careful counsel-
women, usually by injection in the upper arm muscle. The
ing of acceptors has allowed the program to omit the estro-
standard injection given in the McCormick program lasts
gen supplement for all but the 1 percent of clients who
three months and costs clients about the same as three cycles
request it. Since one of the advantages of DMPA is its absence
of pills: ,f15 ($.75). The relative ease of administration and
of estrogen, skillful and periodic counseling is needed to help
the long-lasting effects are DMPA's main advantages. In cul-
clients accept whatever degree of menstrual disruption they
tures (such as the Thai) where injections are a preferred
may experience.
form of medication, the nature of administration may have
The McCormick program considers the following to be
appeal as well (see Clark, 1970; and Riley and Sermsri, 1974).
contraindications for DMPA:
Both the pill and the injection are very effective, but both
1. Known or suspected pregnancy. Injection of DMPA
produce side effects in some users, effects that are rather
does not involve known risks to the fetus or mother but is of
different with each method. Some of the differences are re-
course unnecessary.
lated to the fact that DMPA contains only progestogen, while
2. History of irregular vaginal bleeding or spotting. In
the pill contains two hormones, progestogen and estrogen.8
these cases a thorough pelvic exam, including Pap smear, is
Both methods also involve questions of long-run safety for
performed to rule out existing cancer or other pathology.
which conclusive answers do not now exist and cannot be
3. Nulligravidity. This is not an absolute contraindication,
expected for many years.
but if DMPA (or other contraceptive medication) is given to
By far the greatest difference in side effects between the
a woman who may be part of a naturally sterile couple, and
pill and DMPA is the strong impact of the latter on menstua-
that woman is unable to become pregnant after discontinuing
tion. In a large majority of women DMPA disrupts the
medication, it is possible that the medication, the doctor
normal cycle and produces unpredictable spotting or bleed-
prescribing it, and the method itself will be blamed. To a
ing during the early months of use (Rosenfield, 1974; Nash,
lesser extent, this is true of a couple who has had only one
1975; McDaniel and Pardthaisong, 1971a). After six months
pregnancy. Current practice is not to give DMPA to nulli-
or so, about two-thirds of all DMPA users become amenor-
parous women (McDaniel, 1974).
rheic, with those continuing to experience abnormal spotting
or bleeding reporting less serious problems. This effect has
CONTINUATION OF USE OF DMPA
not only been troublesome to many users, but has also been
a reason for caution by many doctors in recommending the
The McCormick program has conducted several followup
method in the 70 or so countries where it is legal to do so
surveys to assess continuation of injectable acceptors. Using
303
TABLE 3 Continuation rates in McCormick Family Planning Program studies: Chiang Mai, Thailand
Continuation rate
Number of Date of 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 60
Method women survey months months months months months months months months months
Pillsa 671 1970 76.6 66.7 60.7 52.7
DMPA 1,694 1970 82.7 76.0 71.6 67.8 62.4 54.0 49.8 48.0
(3-month
injection)
DMPA 1,148 1970 85.9 80.6 77.1 71.5 64.0
(6-month
injection)
DMPA 1,152 1973 86.4 78.2 67.1 55.0 45.6
(6-month
injection)
DMPA 9,284 1974 84.2 72.9 64.6 57.3 51.0 43.6
(3-month
injection)
a Sample from followup study of 2,015 McCormick acceptors.
NOTES: The 1970 study covered women who first received injections between April 1965 and April 1967. For 72 percent of these women, DMPA
was the first contraceptive ever used. The 1972 study analyzed rates for new acceptors between May 1967 and 31 December 1972 (most were
enrolled in April and May 1967); 75 percent of these women had never used a method. The 1974 study included women who started receiving
DMPA between March 1970 and June 1973 and covered only clients at the clinics, not the mobile service.
All studies used the statistical method described in Tietze and Lewit (1969).
available information from these and other surveys, it is
ity of service (and/or surveys) at least as much as acceptor
possible to make some tentative comparisons of continuation
satisfaction with the method adopted. It seems safe to say,
rates for acceptors of DMPA and of other highly effective
however, that DMPA continuation rates in Thailand are at
methods (keeping in mind that the studies are not identical).
least comparable to those for the two other leading methods.
Reasons for discontinuation are available from three studies
Data from which to analyze continuation are presented in
of MFPP clients: a 1974 study of 9,284 clients at the Chiang
Tables 3 and 4. Table 3, reporting results of the McCormick
studies, shows higher continuation rates for DMPA users
Mai clinic; a 1973 study of 1,132 DMPA users on 6-month
than for pill users; somewhat higher rates for acceptors of
doses; and a 1970 study of 1,694 users on 3-month doses. The
the experimental 6-month injection as compared with those
results of the 1974 study are presented in Table 5. These
who received the 3-month injection; and somewhat lower
figures show the largest category of dropouts in the "other
rates in the large 1974 study of 3-month users than was
reasons" row. The extent to which these other reasons included
found in the 1970 study, particularly after 12 months of use.
medical side effects associated with the method is not apparent
A follow-up study is under way to update the experience of
from the 1974 study summary figures. Information on this
3-month users at the Christian Clinic. When the McCormick
point is provided, however, by the 1970 and 1973 studies.
rates are compared with other continuation-rate studies done
Both of those studies showed that about 15 percent of all
acceptors discontinued for medical reasons, with bleeding
in Thailand (Table 4), no clear pattern emerges as to which
problems accounting for 65-70 percent of the medical prob-
method has the highest rate. Differences may reflect the qual-
TABLE 4 Comparison of continuation rates reported by various studies for the pill, IUD, and DMPA: Thailand
Cumulative continuation rate Total starting
Method first
and year Organization 6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months ordintal month Coverage
Pill
1971 NFPP 79 69 - 55 1,495 16 districts, all regions
1974 NFPP 68 54 43 35 1,506 26 districts, all regions
1975 IPSR 77 66 54 48 720 Bangkok metropolis
IUD
1970 Potharam 70 - 56 902 1 district
1971 NFPP 85 76 65 1,087 16 districts, all regions
1972 NFPP 77 - - 1,180 4 Bangkok hospitals
1975 IPSR 75 62 48 36 277 Bangkok metropolis
DMPA
1975 NFPPa 75 50 - 550 15 provinces
1975 NFPPb 86 69 - - 555 15 provinces
1974 McCormick 84 73 65 57 9,284 1 province
- - Not available. Potharam Potharam Project, Ministry of Public Health.
NFPP = National Family Planning Program. a Injections given by midwives.
IPSR = Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University. b Injections given by physicians.
304
TABLE 5 Reasons for discontinuation of DMPA: Chiang Mal, Thailand, 1974
1974 termination rates
6 12 18 24 30 36
Reason for discontinuation months months months months months months
Method failure (accidental
pregnancy) 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.5
Planned pregnancy 1.1 2.6 4.3 5.4 6.4 7.6
Protection not needed
(includes sterilization) 1.7 3.0 3.7 4.3 4.5 4.5
Transfer to mobile unit 1 6 2.6 3.5 4.3 5.4 6.1
Other reasons 10.9 18.0 22.7 27.4 31.2 34.7
Cumulative termination rate 15.9 27.2 35.3 42.8 49.0 54.4
NOTE: These rates are for a total of 9,284 clients.
lems. Details on discontinuations from the 1970 study are
use, a continuation rate of approximately 70 percent at the
shown in Table 6.
end of 2 years,* a normal pattern of menstruation of ap-
proximately 93 percent six months after discontinuation
Of the five bleeding problems that led most women to dis-
continue, amenorrhea and irregular bleeding were the most
of the method, and a return of fertility of about 82 per-
important. Since DMPA causes all bleeding to stop after
cent at the end of 14 months after discontinuation of the
three or four injections in about 70 percent of all women,
method, in women who discontinue with the specific pur-
the 5 percent who discontinued because of amenorrhea may
pose of becoming pregnant. (In the definition of DMPA
not be considered a high rate; less than 10 percent of the
rates, the date of "discontinuation" is reckoned as being 3
women who became amenorrheic said they discontinued for
weeks following the due date of the missed injection.)
that reason (not shown). McCormick staff report that some

* This will depend on the easy availability of other methods, educa-
tion and motivation, cultural factors, etc.

women who became amenorrheic worry that they are preg-
nant, others that amenorrhea is retaining "bad blood" in their
The relatively high continuation rates reported in the
bodies; only a minority of women welcome amenorrhea. But
McCormick program cannot be overcredited to DMPA as a
the majority apparently tolerate it in exchange for the pro-
tection offered by the method. A normal pattern of menstru-
method until considerably more data from other programs
become available. The use-effectiveness of DMPA in other
ation occurs in 93 percent of women by six months after
discontinuation.
settings will depend, as McDaniel points out, on such factors
as availability of other methods and the cultural context. The
The McCormick experience with DMPA was summarized
high premium that Thai culture puts on injection medicine
by Edwin McDaniel (1974) as follows:
has undoubtedly helped give the method acceptability. But
Based on our own experience with 3-month injections
two features of the McCormick program must also be borne
of DMPA, with routine oral estrogen supplement [since
in mind, namely, the high reputation of McCormick Hospital
discontinued], you can expect a method-failure pregnancy
throughout the Northern Region, and the program's heavy
rate of approximately 0.7 per hundred women years of
emphasis on personal consultation with patients every three
months. McCormick's ability to provide personal consultation
for all clinic visitors is believed by program staff to be an

TABLE 6 Reasons for discontinuation of DMPA: Chiang Mai,
important reason why large numbers of McCormick clients

Thailand, 1970
have not transferred to the government program since the
Reason for discontinuation Number Percent

latter dropped its client charges in October 1976.
Total acceptors 1,694 100.0
Bleeding problems 169 10.0
Amenorrhea 82 4.8
THE FUTURE OF DMPA
Heavy bleeding 16 0.9
Moderate bleeding 3 0.2
There are unanswered questions about DMPA's long-run

Irregular bleeding 62 3.6
safety, just as there are for the pill. These questions mainly
Spotting 6 0.4
Other medical problems 61 3.6

concern the drug's possible role in causing cancer. Although
Nausea, dizziness, weakness,
some tests of DMPA have produced breast nodules in

headaches, palpitation, or
blurred vision 35 2.1
beagle dogs, there is no evidence yet that it causes cancer in
Lower abdominal discomfort 7 0.4
human beings. Neither can it be proved conclusively, how-
Allergic skin rash 5 0.3
ever, that it will not do so in a certain percentage of users.
Back pain 2 0.1
Subjective weight loss 5 0.3

In the absence of conclusive evidence, experts are divided
Subjective weight gain 3 0.2
on whether the degree of risk involved in using DMPA

Pregnant before start of injections 3 0.2
Acute or chronic illness,
should outweigh the benefits of its use.
not related to method 31 1.8
Independent committees of experts appointed to advise
Car accident 1 0.1
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on whether
305
or not to approve DMPA for use in the United States have
Thailand generally: from about 30,000 in 1972 to 107,000
four times recommended, apparently unanimously in all
in 1977 (Nortman and Hofstatter, 1978, p. 56; Varakamin,
cases, that approval be granted on a limited basis. The -FDA
Kolasartseni, and Narkavanakit, 1978).
has not accepted these recommendations, however. In March
More than 50 percent of the program's sterilization ac-
1978 it notified the manufacturer that it would not approve
ceptors are now coming from the ranks of DMPA users,
DMPA for contraceptive use in the United States. The manu-
a trend that has softened criticism of McCormick's long-
facturer is appealing that ruling, but no final resolution is
term use of DMPA on the ground that women should not
expected for several months. Without domestic approval, the
use hormonal contraception indefinitely. In its counseling,
US Agency for International Development (AID) is not
the McCormick staff encourages DMPA acceptors to make
allowed to supply the drug to other countries. The Select
this change. McCormick's rules for accepting a woman who
Committee on Population of the US House of Representatives
desires sterilization are that she have a minimum of two
held hearings in August 1978 to explore, among other things,
living children, with the youngest at least one year old (i.e.,
the impact on DMPA use in developing countries of the
past the vulnerable first year). This one-year rule for the
FDA's adverse ruling on DMPA use in the United States.
second child is sometimes relaxed for women who deliver in
the hospital and request postpartum sterilization. If the latest
Some medical organizations outside the United States have
birth is a second child who survives birth normally, the re-
approved DMPA. The Central Medical Committee of IPPF
quest is granted. In addition to the woman's request, her
approved the drug for IPPF use in 1975, calling it "a most
husband must also sign a consent form-unless a woman has
dependable and useful method of family planning" and stat-
four living children, in which case no spouse consent is
ing that "the alleged increased risk of carcinoma is not
required.
proven in the light of all the available evidence (IPPF, 1975).
Acceptors are charged g50 ($2.50) for sterilization. The
Today IPPF is the major supplier to private agencies around
procedure was done without charge for a while, but rumors
the world. The World Bank, in conjunction with the Canadian
government, has recently financed 3 million doses as part of a
spread that the program was "conducting experiments" and
loan to Thailand approved in February 1978. And the World
wanted to attract acceptors by making the operation free.
Health Organization (WHO), while not a drug-approving
When the charge was reimposed, the rumor died out and
body, has supported United Nations agencies (mainly the
demand increased. In addition to the client charge, which
United Nations Fund for Population Activities and the United
goes into the program's general revenues, the Association for
Nations Childrens Fund) supplying DMPA to governments
Voluntary Sterilization pays the program g300 ($15) for
that request it.
each sterilization to help cover costs.10
Male sterilizations are not yet popular in northern Thai-
On 12 July 1977, following a meeting of its Task Force
land, although increasing attempts are being made to en-
on Long-Acting Systemic Agents for the Regulation of Fer-
tility, WHO issued a press release generally supportive of the
courage them (the government hospital in Chiang Mai has
use of Depo-Provera on the basis of scientific evidence then
recently started a mobile vasectomy service). One reason for
available. A year later, WHO's Toxicology Review Panel
male hesitation to accept vasectomy is that Thai farmers
specifically rejected the applicability to human beings of the
often confuse male sterilization and castration. If demand
Depo-Provera trials on beagle dogs, and said it could find no
should increase (as many expect on the basis of scattered
toxicological evidence against using Depo-Provera for human
local experience and broader understanding of the proce-
contraception (Personal communication, 1978).
dure), the MFPP can easily handle a much higher volume
than the 28 performed in 1977.
The Role of Sterilization
The Mobile Service
Female sterilization was the first fertility regulation method
offered by McCormick Hospital. Until 1974, all sterilizations
The mobile service constitutes a major arm of the McCor-
were performed at the hospital, where they were done on an
mick program. Mobile services have not been undertaken by
inpatient basis either postpartum or, infrequently, on an
many family planning programs, and the literature on them
"interval" basis. The inpatient "interval" procedure presents
is relatively small.1" The experience in Chiang Mai suggests,
a hurdle for many women considering sterilization because it
however, that such services may have considerable potential
requires an absence from home, which many cannot afford.
for reaching rural populations.
Consequently in 1974 the hospital introduced sterilization on
an outpatient basis and began performing outpatient pro-
LOCATIONS, SCHEDULE, AND FACILITIES
cedures at the Chiang Mai Christian Clinic as well (the added
service was made possible by the availability of another full-
The mobile service's 39 service points cover most of the
time physician).
province, reaching 13 of its 18 districts; these 13 districts
The addition of outpatient sterilization has led to a marked
contain almost 90 percent of the province's population out-
increase in sterilizations and has helped provide a new termi-
side the Chiang Mai municipal area.12 Decisions on where to
nal option for acceptors of temporary methods. By 1977, the
locate service points begin with identification of villages with
program was providing over 2,000 a year (up from 250-300
substantial populations that are not being served by a gov-
in 1970-71). The increase in female sterilizations in the
ernment health center that offers the injection. Program
McCormick program parallels its growth as a method in
officials visit the headman ( puyaiban ) of such villages in
306
headman's house.) Headmen are paid a modest rental fee
order to get his judgment on the feasibility of establishing a
for the use of their house, plus 1-5 percent of the day's
service point, to enlist his interest, and to identify a suitable
income as an "incentive" to promote the program. According
building. If the headman welcomes the idea, a visit is made
to McCormick personnel, however, the incentive payment
to the district and provincial health authorities to see if they
has not had much, if any, incentive impact (word-of-mouth
have any objections. This approach has been adequate to
"advertising" by clients has been much the most effective
"test the market" and to ensure good relations between the
source of recruitment). Staff would prefer that these pay-
McCormick program and government authorities.
ments be terminated and the headmen remunerated on a
The proportion of eligible women served by the program
time basis, but they feel it impossible to change a long-
varies greatly among the 13 districts of the province in which
standing arrangement. No information or education activities
it operates. Thus the three highest-ratio districts show an
are conducted by the program.
average service level more than five times that of the average
for the three lowest-ratio districts. The high-ratio districts
are those farthest from Chiang Mai city, in districts where
STAFFING AND PROCEDURES

the government facilities are least developed. The lowest
response is in districts closest to the city, where both gov-
The mobile team consists of nine members: one physician;
ernment and other McCormick service points can be easily
three nurses (who have three years' nursing training plus six
reached. The future of the mobile service will probably be
months' midwifery training); two midwives (with two years'
influenced substantially by the spread of the government's
midwifery training); two nurses' aides (with three months'
rural health network, which will determine where existing
post-secondary training); and a driver.
service points may need to be dropped and new ones added
Upon arrival at each service point, all workers help unload
in districts now thinly served, where many clients have to
the vehicles, set up furniture, equipment, client records, and
travel long distances. (McCormick officials believe that its
supplies. The specific functions of the staff members are
clients almost never make use of government health stations
shown below:
when they feel the need for consultations but either wait for
the next visit of the mobile team or make their way into
Staff member Functions

Chiang Mai city).
Each service point is visited once every 84 days throughout
Physician Supervises team, satisfying legal requirements
for medical supervision; sees clients referred

the year. The schedule of visits is fixed at the start of each
by nurses; is available to answer difficult ques-
year and is strictly followed. Adherence to schedule is contions or handle medical emergencies (none has
occurred thus far).
sidered essential to the credibility of the system, since many
of the 200-1,800 clients who attend each session must travel
Nurses 1 Receives new acceptors, gives group
considerable distances to keep appointments, which have

talks describing contraceptive methods; takes
case histories, writing prescriptions for those

been stamped on their client cards on their previous visit.13
without contraindications and referring other
The schedule for each week is also broadcast as a public

clients to doctor. (When there are more than
service by the local radio.
100 new acceptors, this nurse needs an as-
sistant).
All but two of the service points can be served on single-
1 Helps doctor interview returning accepday trips, that is, without having to spend a night away from
tors.
Chiang Mai city. The farthest point can be reached in 31/2
1 Works at injection table, dispensing pills

hours, but the great majority can be reached within 11/2 to 2
and giving injections; supervises midwife who
hours. The team generally leaves Chiang Mai at about eight

works with her.
A.M. and returns at about five P.M. The team normally goes
Midwives 1 Works with nurse giving injections and

into the field on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, and on
dispensing pills.
about half the Tuesdays. Nontraveling days are used for
I Works with doctor, helping write pre-
record-keeping, preparation of the week's supplies, steriscriptions and calling in new acceptors.
lizing syringes and needles, vehicle maintenance, and so on.
Nurses' aides 1 Takes care of client identity and record
The mobile service has three vehicles: two Land Rovers
cards.
and a 21-passenger bus. Only one vehicle is used when the
1 Takes clients' weight and blood pressure.
team goes into the field, however. A Land Rover (with spe-
Driver Drives; loads and unloads vehicle; serves as
cially fitted seats and roof-carrying capacity) is able to take
cashier.
the nine-person team, plus all necessary equipment and sup-
plies, when visiting about two-thirds of all service points. For
the larger service points, when extra staff and equipment

The following procedures are followed at each clinic ses-
must be taken, the bus is necessary (the bus is cheaper to

sion:
run than two Land Rovers). The second Land Rover is used
mainly for research work.
1. Upon reporting to the reception desk, all clients are
given a numbered waiting card in order of their arrival. Two
The mobile service relies heavily on the village headman
series of numbers are used, one for new clients, one for return-
for providing services. The puyaiban normally turns over his
whole house to the McCormick team one day every 12
ing clients, with the latters' cards color-coded to permit staff
weeks. (In 5-6 villages the team uses a local church, not the
to identify them easily as pill, DMPA, or "other" acceptors.
307
In 1976 the mobile service served about 38,700 acceptors
2. At the time returning clients are given their waiting
and generated almost $1 million ($50,000), sufficient to
numbers, they hand in their personal identification cards,
cover all cash operating costs (mainly personnel plus vehicle

which the staff use to locate their case-history cards from the
operating costs). This revenue is equivalent to $200-400 per

clinic's record files. (Clinic records are filed by these num-
day in the field.

bers, not by name-a simpler, more foolproof system than
alphabetical filing. A client who has lost her identification
card is charged $5 for a new one.) The case-history card is
Finances and Cost-Effectiveness
put on the desk of a nurse, with whom all clients must talk.
The McCormick Family Planning Program has always
3. New clients are given a group talk by a nurse or mid-
been intended to be independent, administratively and finan-
wife, who explains the various family planning methods and
cially, of McCormick Hospital. The program has its own
their respective advantages and disadvantages and answers
headquarters in a rented house, its own staff, accounts,
general questions.
sources of funding, property, bank accounts, and audits.
4. New clients have their weight and blood pressure
Because the MFPP is a single-purpose program, it is pos-
taken and then proceed to individual consultations with a
sible to measure the costs of providing nonintegrated family
nurse, who takes the initial case history-looking especially
for any contraindications for women who select either
planning services, to look at their trend over the past eight
DMPA or the pill-and helps the client decide which method
years, and to compare costs with revenues generated. Over
seems best for her. Returning clients have their weight and
this period, the cost-of-living index for the Northern region
blood pressure taken only on every other visit.
has increased by almost exactly 100 percent.
The program generates revenues that cover most of its
5. Both new and returning acceptors who want to be steri-
costs, with the exception of contraceptive supplies and some
lized are given an appointment at McCormick Hospital or
Chiang Mai Christian Clinic. (Even those who show up at
capital costs (mainly vehicles, but also some office and medi-
the hospital or clinic requesting sterilization are given a later
cal equipment), by charging clients for most of its services.
appointment, partly to test the firmness of the patient's deci-
The charges for pills and DMPA have remained unchanged
sion and partly to maintain orderly clinic schedules.)
for over a decade, during which they were the same as the
government's charges. When the government abolished all
6. Clients who want an IUD are usually told to go to the
client charges for contraceptives in October 1976, the
Saturday morning clinic at McCormick Hospital (no appoint-
ment is required). The mobile unit does no IUD insertions
McCormick program left its charges unchanged (at F5 per
or sterilizations.
pill cycle, $15 for a three-month injection, $25 for a six-
7. Clients who obtain DMPA or the pill are issued new
month injection, and $50 for female sterilization).14
prescriptions at each visit (this is required by law). These
In 1977, client charges generated revenue of approxi-
are brief standard printed forms with serialized numbers,
mately p2.3 million ($115,000) a year, sufficient to cover
one color for pills, another color for DMPA; the doctor, or
80-85 percent of the program's cash expenditures. The re-
nurse acting as the doctor's agent, need only initial the form.
mainder of program funds have come from an annual cash
The prescription is presented by the client to the cashier for
grant from IPPF and miscellaneous minor items (such as
stamping "paid" before the patient goes to the injection/
bank interest and occasional local donations). The IPPF
dispensing table. Clients who have been certified by the local
regular budgetary support, which has varied between $5,000-
headman as unable to pay have "free" stamped on their
27,000 ended in 1977. IPPF continues to make grants for
identification cards, and on their prescriptions. Others pay
capital equipment, however, and pays for certain exceptional
the )d15 fee for 3 cycles of pills or one injection.
nonprogram costs (for example, one-time purchases and ex-
8. The receipted prescription serves as authorization for
penses for visitors). Two program activities are handled
the nurse or midwife to dispense pills or give the injection,
outside the regular budget: research on the program and
after which the patient departs.
its experience with DMPA, funded with special overseas
grants, and the experimental hill tribes project, which is
A daily ledger allows a quick tally of how many scheduled
funded by Family Planning International Assistance (FPIA).
women appear and provides a summary record of the types
In 1977, the total cost of the program's special research ac-
of prescriptions issued and the number of clients certified as
tivities amounted to 54 percent of the regular budget.
unable to pay. This tally sheet is important in conducting the
The uncovered costs (contraceptives and about half the
end-of-day reconciliation of supplies issued and cash re-
capital costs) account for roughly half of total program
ceived and, later, for identifying and following up missed
costs. If the program tried to become fully self-financing,
appointments.
therefore, it would have to double its client charges, some-
Cash is counted in the field before the team departs from
thing the market would probably not accept without a sub-
a service point. Strict controls are exercised to prevent "leak-
stantial loss of clients. In the 20 months since the govern-
age" of cash: careful cross-checking at the end of each day
ment abolished its charges, there has been a moderate but
between (1) cash receipts, (2) contraceptives dispensed, and
unmistakable shift of McCormick pill clients to the govern-
(3) adjustment for the 5 percent or so of free distribution.
ment program. Although the shift has not yet become large
This inventory/cash reconciliation task takes 20-30 minutes.
enough to create financial problems for the program, it is
The physician takes charge of the cash at that point (during
difficult to predict what the future will bring.
The program's budget has grown from about $30,000 in
the day, the driver serves as cashier).
308
1970 to about $130,000 in 1977. When adjusted for inflation
ing only consultations. The average client makes 4.3 service
of just over 100 percent, the increase in real terms is about
visits per year. Since the McCormick cash budget does not
two times, reflecting a doubling in program activities between
include the cost of contraceptives, the figures in Table 5
need to be increased by adding in the value of contracep-
1970 and 1978. Administrative costs have normally been
16-17 percent of total cash expenditures (excluding contra-
tives used (plus an allowance for vehicle and equipment
depreciation). These noncash costs come to about $17 or
ceptives). Not surprisingly, the direct cost of providing
$.85 per service visit. Total costs per visit thus come to
family planning services (i.e., the costs of the mobile service
about ,33 ($1.65). Since each client averages 4.33 visits
and of the Chiang Mai Christian Clinic) is the largest item in
per year, the total cost per woman-year of protection works
the budget. If the cost of contraceptive supplies was in-
out to $143 ($7.15) in 1977 prices.15 This larger measure
cluded, direct costs would be a substantially larger propor-
of total costs represents the full cost of providing program
tion of total costs, and the share of administrative costs
services and thus is a better measure of the extent to which
would be around 8-9 percent. The program has spent very
similar programs can expect to become fully self-financing.
little ($500-1,000 a year) on information and education
For the last three years the mobile service's unit costs have
activities, which have not been considered necessary to
been consistently lower than those of the Chiang Mai
recruit acceptors, and even less on staff training, which is
Christian Clinic, by roughly 02-3 (15-20 percent) per client
done at McCormick Hospital. A major item is that for
"medical" expenses, which total $24,000 and cover two main
visit. While the clinic consistently sees 10-15 percent more
costs: (1) medical supplies, such as vitamins and post-steri-
clients at its single service point than the mobile service sees
lization antibiotics, used at the Christian Clinic and (2) pay-
at its 39 points, the clinic's staff is more than three times as
ments to McCormick Hospital to cover hospital costs in-
large as that of the mobile service, and it has higher costs
curred when there is a family planning failure (for example,
for capital items (building rent and automobile deprecia-
when a pregnancy occurs and the woman delivers at the
tion), utilities, vehicle operation, and stationery. The mobile
hospital), for inpatient sterilization cases, for removal of
service is today able to cover fully its direct cash costs and
IUDs for medical reasons, and in the rare cases when exces-
to contribute something toward the other costs of the pro-
sive bleeding requires a dilatation and curettage. The McCor-
gram.
mick program has a long-standing policy of paying virtually
all such hospital costs for its family planning clients, a policy
Conclusions
that is considered by the program to be worthwhile in terms
of program credibility, research, and good will.
Although expansion of the McCormick family planning
The necessary data for analyzing revenues and costs are
program coincided to some extent with reported declines in
presented in Table 7. The calculation is as follows: total
fertility in Chiang Mai, the program's contribution to fertility
program cash costs and total revenues generated by fees
decline was probably relatively small. Most of the drop oc-
charged to clients are divided by the total number of service
curred between 1960-70, and the program did not really
visits to obtain cost per service visit and revenue per service
"take off" until 1970 (the date the government program
visit. "Service visits" consist of visits by new and returning
also got under way), when early supply difficulties were
clients for whom family planning services are provided; they
overcome. The McCormick program could not have had more
exclude the relatively small number of visits by clients want-
than 8,000 continuing acceptors in 1966, or about 6 percent of
TABLE 7 Costs and revenues, McCormick Family Planning Program (in baht):
Chiang Mai, Thailand, 1970-77
Total service
Total costs Unit costs Unit costs income Revenue per
Total service (thousands (unadjusted, (adjusted, (thousands service visit
Year visits' of baht)b in baht) in baht)d of baht) (in baht)
1970 60,606 584 9.64 9.64 397 6.55
1971 70,189 653 9.32 9.32 341 4.86
1972 79,874 1,199 15.01 13.96 462 5.78
1973 99,138 - - - -
1974 126,793 2,558 20.17 15.73 1,866 14.72
1975 145,937 3,092 21.19 12.50 2,079 14.25
1976 161,326 2,752 17.06 9.21 2,252 13.96
1977 163,356 2,584 15.81 7.91 2,315 14.17
NOTE: )41 $US.05.
- = Not available.
a Includes Chiang Mai Christian Clinic, mobile unit, and hospital. The hospital accounts for about 10
percent of total visits. Hospital costs and revenues are not carried on MFPP budget, but on the hospital's
budget. It is assumed that inclusion of hospital costs and revenues would not significantly change unit
costs and revenues.
b Includes direct cash costs, plus sharing of indirect costs in proportion to the branch's share in total
service visits (including MCH visits). Excludes cost of contraceptives and vehicle depreciation. Includes
building rents and minor capital expenditures.
c Total costs divided by relevant service visits, unadjusted for inflation.
d Same as above but adjusted for inflation, using the government's Consumer Price Index for Urban Areas
(North region).
309
the 130,000-140,000 married women of reproductive age
allowed to do so. Whether or not they are introduced will
in the province; the prevalence rate would have been con-
depend primarily on judgments by national health authorities
siderably lower in the years between 1963-69. These rates
on the safety issues involved. This clinical experience with
are far too low to account for a fertility drop of the magni-
Depo-Provera (the most widely used injectable throughout
tude that occurred between 1963-70, nor can it account for
the world) -over more than a decade-of the McCormick
the substantial drop that had occurred before the introduc-
program has produced only two known cases of serious
tion of modern contraception in 1963. At most, the McCor-
medical complications: two cases of very heavy bleeding
mick program might have accounted for 15-20 percent of
seen in 1965, during the first six months after the drug's
the drop in the 1960s.
introduction. There is still a chance that long-run studies
Most of the fertility decline must therefore be attributed
(which are not yet being done on a large scale) might prove
to factors other than the introduction of modern family plan-
the drug unsafe. The FDA does not want to expose US
ning;16 these factors have yet to be analyzed. Quite clearly,
women to that chance in view of the availability of alterna-
a strong demand for fertility limitation developed in this
tive means of contraception (it is interesting to speculate
population in the early 1950s, well before vigorous develop-
whether the pill would be approved today by the FDA if
ment efforts-or family planning programs-took hold.
DMPA has been approved earlier and were in widespread
use). The issue is one of conflicting expert judgments on
Analyses done to date provide no evidence of strong changes
the risk-to-benefit tradeoffs. Where authorities are persuaded
in age distribution, nuptiality, age at marriage, or the abor-
tion rate that singly or in combination, might explain the
that DMPA is safe enough to use, the drug seems capable of
sharp fall in fertility. How (and why) large numbers of
making major contributions to many family planning pro-
married couples avoided having as many children as before
grams, private or public.
Whether DMPA is offered or not, governments may wish
-which seems to have been the case-is a mystery that re-
mains unsolved. In any event, when family planning services
to consider the encouragement of mobile services run by
did become easily available, women turned to them in num-
approved private groups in a country. Most governments
bers surprisingly large for a low-income, rural population.
have slowly expanding networks of static service points but
Many couples who had formerly used other methods (as yet
very few have mobile services. If governments can provide
unidentified) must have switched to the modern methods
agencies with free contraceptives and vehicles, good private
provided by McCormick and the National Family Planning
mobile services may be capable of covering their other
Program; and many who had not practiced any form of
operating costs without cash subsidies after a service becomes
fertility control must have become acceptors. However one
well established. But financial viability will depend partly on
explains the strong response of this agricultural population
what particular populations can afford to pay. Key factors
to the provision of family planning after 1969, the Chiang
in a successful mobile service would seem to be (a) basing
Mai experience appears to be another example of the widely
the service on a strong center of administrative responsibility
held thesis that family planning programs are more effective
(e.g., a provincial hospital or a provincial medical office)
in societies where fertility has already started to decline, and
and not on hard-to-supervise peripheral units; (b) careful
where latent demand for improved methods of fertility con-
selection of staff, with heavy emphasis on sensitive counsel-
trol therefore already exists, than they are in triggering
ing; (c) rigorous adherence to itinerary schedules; (d)
fertility declines.
maintenance of continuous supplies; and (e) maintenance
of an orderly administrative office at each team's base, for
Demographic objectives, however, have not been the
controlling supplies and client record-books for each service
primary concern of the McCormick program, and its impact
and lessons may be viewed in other terms, especially its use
point. Moreover, according to McCormick staff members, a
of DMPA and the mobile service.
mobile service that begins by offering family planning serv-
ices exclusively and deliberately tries to gain experience
The program's use of DMPA seems replicable, at least on
an experimental basis, in other countries with a cultural pre-
before rapidly expanding its services or service area, has a
disposition in favor of injectable medications. McCormick's
better chance of avoiding administrative breakdowns, with
favorable experience with injections was a key factor in
the attendant dangers of discrediting the service, than a
persuading the Thai Ministry of Public Health to introduce
service that tries to offer a complete maternal and child
injectables into the National Family Planning Program in
health service.
A private, single-purpose static clinic offering a full "cafe-
1975. "Replicability" could mean simply introducing DMPA
teria" approach, supplemented by a rural mobile service that
into existing private or public delivery systems. Important
conditions for success seem to be the careful planning of
offers mainly pills and injections, has proven financially self-
service procedures, counseling of new clients about possible
supporting in Chiang Mai, except for the cost of contracep-
side effects to be expected and about possible delays in the
tives and some capital costs. In a government program, con-
return of fertility after stopping use, and limiting service to
trol of cash revenue might be more difficult, since the pro-
gram's salaries and operating funds would not be dependent
(a) women of proven fertility, to avoid accusations of induc-
on revenues generated.
ing sterility, and (b) women who have not yet completed
The McCormick experience suggests that a well-run family
their families (i.e., not using DMPA as a terminal method).
planning service need not be integrated into a general
There is a major gap in contraceptive options in many
maternal and child health delivery system in order to attract
countries, which injectables could in many cases fill if
310
7The McCormick program has conducted and published a considerpatients or to get costs down to acceptable levels. It also in-
able amount of clinical research on the use of the drug; see publications
dicates that private family planning services can successfully

by McDaniel and Pardthaisong, various dates. For a useful general dis-
serve rural areas even where no backup network of govern-
cussion and good bibliography on DMPA, see Rinehart and Winter,
1975.
ment medical services exists. And, in Chiang Mai, family
planning services have not needed to undertake any special

8 DMPA's absence of estrogen is a presumed advantage, in that side
effects associated with the pill's estrogen content (for example, throm-
information or education activities; word-of-mouth "adver-
boembolic complications and reduced milk production in lactating
tising" has been enough.
mothers) seem to be avoided with the injection. For discussion of
The success of the McCormick program does appear to
issues involved in DMPA's use as a contraceptive method-including
effectiveness, side effects, discontinuation, influence on lactation, and

depend, however, on the favorable demand situation within
return of fertility-see Rinehart and Winter, 1975; Nash, 1974; Rosen-
which it operates and on the high general reputation of the

field, 1974; and WHO, 1977. See Hertz, 1977 and 1968, for criticism of
all hormonal methods.
McCormick Hospital in the province independent of its
work in family planning. The program has had very strong
9 Both oral and injectable estrogen has been given. The oral that is
leadership from its founder and director, Edwin McDaniel,

the program's regular birth-control pill (Norinyl) contains estrogen.
Women desiring to menstruate, or who complain of spotting, are given

since its start. Other experienced staff members have helped
three packages, each containing 10 pills. Their oral instruction, and
build public confidence in the program, and the lack of

the Thai-language package insert, is to take one pill a day for 10 days
turnover in staff over many years has given the program
(for each of the three months between injections). For women who
complain of irregular spotting, the instruction is to take one pill every

stability. Interestingly, McCormick's success may not depend
evening until the spotting stops. If the pills prove ineffective, the
greatly on the contraceptive method for which it has become

woman may be given an estrogen injection on her next visit or switched
to pills only, or be persuaded to accept an interval sterilization.

so well known, since the government program has been able
to recruit even larger numbers of clients who have accepted
10 The choice between doing a minilaparotomy or a laparoscopic
pills as readily as McCormick clients have accepted injec-
sterilization is made primarily on the basis of how many sterilizations
are scheduled for a given day. Many minilaps are done by highly
tions. Perhaps method options do not strongly influence
trained surgical nurses under a doctor's supervision, and at the clinic's
acceptance rates where the underlying desire for fertility

two operating rooms it is possible to do 10-15 minilaps in a normal
working day. Laparoscopic sterilizations are faster (since the incision is
control is strong.
smaller and fewer closing stitches are required) but must be done by the
single doctor who works at both the clinic and the hospital. It is pos-
sible for one doctor to do 20-25 laparoscopic sterilizations on a "peak"
Notes
day. The average load at the clinic is currently about 4-5 per day. At
that level, economic considerations play an important role in the
clinic's choice of procedure. Laparoscopic sterilization requires the
' The McCormick program has used Depo Provera, manufactured by
The Upjohn Company.
sterilizing of the laparoscope in a very expensive solution before each
operation. It is not economical to use a unit of this solution unless it
can be used for several operations, so if only 4-5 clients are scheduled,
2 In 1970, 432,000 of the province's 864,000 total population (exclud-
ing the 140,000 living in the capital city itself) lived in the seven amphoes
it is more economical to do a minilap. Both procedures are done with a
(districts) surrounding Chiang Mai city (see Figure 1); year-round access
local anesthetic, after administration of a preoperative sedative.
to the city, by small buses, became progressively easier during the 1950s
and 1960s.
11 One early source, based on an IPPF survey of the field, is provided
in Working Paper No. 1-Mobile Units (IPPF, 1968, 34 pp.). An un-
published study of a mobile unit in Turkey, done by the Johns Hopkins
3 The new facility was a general health clinic owned and run by a
University for USAID in the early 1970s, came out with largely negative
sister church-related institution, the McKean Leprosy Hospital (the
findings on the usefulness of that experiment.
leprosy hospital itself was located outside the city). The MFPP initially
occupied the top floor of the Chiang Mai Christian Clinic. The MFPP
12 The five unserved districts are thinly populated and very difficult to
quickly outgrew these accommodations, helped the McKean Hospital
reach by vehicle. Attempts were made to establish service points in a
raise money to expand the clinic, and now uses over three-quarter of
few of these districts: in one (hill tribe) area the response was poor; in
the expanded clinic's total space.
another, the roads proved impassable.
4The McCormick program also sponsors and supports an isolated
13 The mobile unit has a contingency plan in case it misses an ap-
small five-day family planning clinic operated in a church building in
pointment: to schedule a revisit on the earliest feasible date and broad-
the town of Nan, over 300 km. distant from Chiang Mai in a neighbor-
cast this fact intensively on the local radio. However, up to this time
ing province. This is run by one nurse, working under the supervision
the unit has never missed an appointment. Clients are advised that if
of a doctor who is "on call." The Nan clinic has offered pills only,
they miss an appointment, they should try to get to the clinic in Chiang
because its small remote staff was not sufficiently familiar with DP ad-
Mai to receive the injection or visit the nearest government health post,
ministration and monitoring to offer that method. Nan's service-statistics
where they can secure pills to maintain protection until the next
are not included in the MFPP figures but are reported directly to the
Government. In 1975, there were about 10,000 active acceptors at the
scheduled visit of the mobile team. DMPA effectiveness continues at
Nan clinic.
least three weeks beyond the 84 days).
14 The government hospitals charge clients $150 (US$7.50) for a
5 In the lower grades, McCormick Hospital staff are paid at substan-
tubectomy. The substantially cheaper MFPP charge may help explain
tially the same levels as governrnent employees. MFPP staff are all on
why the MFPP has done almost as many female sterilizations as the
two-year contracts, reflecting the more uncertain status of MFPP fund-
government's nine hospitals in Chiang Mai province over the past four
ing and program as compared with the government program. Many
years.
McCormick Hospital staff are given free housing and subsidized food;
part of the difference between the remuneration of hospital and MFPP
15 In 1975, Edwin McDaniel calculated the cost of providing one
staff represents a conversion of these benefits, which MFPP staff do not
woman-year of protection in the mobile service, 1970-74. His estimate
receive, into salary terms.
varied from US$6.71 in 1971 to a high of $8.01 in 1970. The two meth-
ods of calculation appear substantially the same, although the later one
6 The medications offered are vitamins (for iron); aspirin, tranquil-
was made before seeing the earlier one. The substantial inflation in
izers; digestion tablets; antidiarrheal pills; antibiotics (both pills and
Thailand since 1970 means that the 1977 cost of $7.15 represents a
injectables); urological pills; skin disease ointments and pills; predni-
substantially lower real cost than the costs required in the early years
sone; and anti-histamines. Estrogen is also available to treat the symptoms
of the decade.
of menstrual disruption often associated with DMPA (see below).
311
No firm figures exist that would permit a close comparison of the cost
. 1972b. "Changes in breast size during prolonged use of
of family planning in the McCormick and government programs. A
contraceptive injections." Journal of the Medical Association
crude comparison (probably the most that can be expected even if good
of Thailand 55, no. 5 (May): 294-297.

data had been collected on the government program) suggests that the
. 1973a. "Incidence of breast nodules in women receiving
costs in the two programs are not very different. The government pro-
gram has around 60,000 acceptors in Chiang Mai province, of whom

multiple doses of medroxyprogesterone acetate." Journal of
three-quarters are using the pill. At a cost of US $.25 per cycle, the
Biosocial Science 5, no. 1 (January): 83-88.
contraceptive cost alone for each acceptor is around US$3.25 per year
* 1973b. "Use of long-acting injectable contraceptive in
(this assumes that the average cost of other methods is about the same-
IUDs and condoms cheaper, sterilizations much more expensive). The
post partum family planning programme." Asian Journal of
big variables are the number of government health staff who may be
Medicine 9 (April): 133-135.
classed as working on family planning, the proportion of their time
* 1973c. "Depot-medroxyprogesterone acetate as a contraspent on family planning, their average salary, and an appropriate allo-
ceptive agent: Return of fertility after discontinuation of use."
cation of transport and overhead costs. Based on some fairly arbitrary
assumptions (e.g. a total staff of around 450 spending 10-20 percent of
Contraception 8, no. 5 (November): 407-415.
its time on family planning, and paid at an average annual rate of
. 1974. "Use-effectiveness of six-month injections of DMPA
US$1,500), one arrives at a range of US$6-9 per couple year of protec-
as a contraceptive." American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynetion in the government program. A cautious conclusion would be that
cology 119, no. 2 (15 May): 175-180.
the unit costs of these two programs-one an integrated government
program, the other a single-purpose private program-are the same order

McDaniel, E. B., and J. S. Zelenik. 1970. "Field trial results of
of magnitude.
long-acting injectable medroxyprogesterone acetate as an injec-
table contraceptive in 1,730 patients." In Selected Papers on
16 If we apply estimated 1964 and 1970 CBRs (30 and 20) to the 1970
provincial population of approximately 1 million, we get a rough figure
Anttifertility Agents, reprinted from Proceedings of the Sixth
of 10,000 additional births averted in 1969 as compared with the number

World Congress on Fertility and Sterility, Tel Aviv, 1968. Jeru-
that the 1964 CBR would have produced. If the MFPP was covering
salem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.

around 8,000 women in 1969 (a high estimate), this implies coverage of
around 45,000 population. If we assume that in 1969 these 45,000-if
McDaniel, E. B., T. Pardthaisong, and R. Gray. 1974. "The
not covered by the MFPP-would have experienced the CBR of 30

epidemiology of the acceptance and use of Depo-Provera in
estimated in 1964 for the rest of the province, then MFPP protection
Chiang Mai, northern Thailand." Paper presented at conference

accounted for about 1,350 births averted, that is, the difference between
of the International Epidemiologic Association, Brighton,
30 and the zero births per 1,000 of complete protection. This equals
13.5 percent of the estimated births averted. A generous allowance for
United Kingdom, August.
error in these crude estimates would be unlikely to push the MFPP con-
Nash, Harold A. 1975. "Depo Provera: A review." Contraception
tribution above 15-20 percent.
12, no. 4 (October): 377-393.
Nortman, Dorothy A., and Ellen Hofstatter. 1978. Population and
Family Planninzg Programs, 9th ed. A Population Council Fact
References
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McDaniel, E. B. 1973. "'Mini-manual' for use of DMPA as an
1978. "Fertility and family planning in rural northern Thailand."

injectable contraceptive." 2nd ed. Chiang Mai, unpublished
Studies in Family Planning 9, no. 8 (August): 212-221.

paper.
Tietze, Christopher, and Sarah Lewit. 1968. "Statistical evaluation
. 1974. "1973 annual family planning report: Combined
of contraceptive methods: Effectiveness and extended use-
family planning clinics in or under the auspices of McCormick
effectiveness." Demographly 5, no. 2: 931-940.

Hospital, Chiang Mai, Thailand." Chiang Mai, unpublished
paper.
Tongsiri, Benchavan, Pichit Lerttamrab, and Alan R. Thodey.
1975. Agro-Economic Characteristics of the Chianig Mai Valley,
McDaniel, E. B., and T. Pardthaisong. 1971a. "Return of men-
1972-73. Agricultural Economics Report No. 5. Chiang Mai:
struation and fertility in Thai women after contraceptive injec-
Chiang Mai University, January.
tions." Journal of Biosocial Science 3, no. 2 (April): 209-222.
. 1971b. "Incidence of breast nodules and changes in breast
Varakamin, Somsak, Wanee Kolasartseni, and Tongplaew Narka-
size during prolonged use of DMPA injections for contracep-
vanakit. 1978. "Thailand." In "East Asia review." Studies in
tion." Paper presented at the 1971 annual meeting of the Medical
Family Planzning 9, no. 10 (September): 25 1-252.
Association of Thailand, Khon Kaen, 2-4 December.

World Health Organization Expanded Programme of Research,
. 1972a. "Acceptability of an injectable contraceptive in a
Development, and Research Training in Human Reproduction.
rural population of Thailand." In Clinical Proceedings of Inter-
Task Force on Long-Acting Systemic Agents for the Regula-
national Planned Parenthood Federation of South-East Asia &
tion of Fertility. 1977. "Multinational comparative clinical
Oceania Regional Medical and Scientific Congress, Sydney,
evaluation of two long-acting injectable contraceptive steroids:
August 14-18, 1972. Sydney: Australian and New Zealand
Norethisterone oenanthate and medroxyprogesterone acetate."
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, pp. 80-83.
Contraception 15, no. 5 ( May ): 5 13-53 3.
312
Department, who encouraged and supported the writing of
ABOUT THE AUTHOR George B. Baldwin was deputy director
the study. This account could not have been produced without
of the Population Projects Department of the World Bank,
the help of several of the senior members of the McCormick
1971-78, and was leader of the Bank's sector review mission
Family Planning Program. The following officials deserve
to Thailand in 1975. He is currently on a one-year sabbatical
special recognition and thanks for their assistance: Boon
leave.
Chom Ariwongse, doctor in charge of the mobile unit; Anong-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to express his
pan Charnsungnern, executive secretary; Ruchira Chitprarop,
special thanks to the following individuals for their generous
treasurer; Arunee Fongsri, doctor in charge of the Chiang Mai
assistance in preparing this study: to Edwin B. McDaniel,
Christian Clinic; Sant Khankeaw, administrative manager;
director of the McCormick Family Planning Program, who
Paul Lewis, advisor on the hill tribes program; Tieng Pard-
reviewed two versions of the manuscript, and to K. Kana-
thaisong, chief statistician and research officer; and Paipunee
garatnam, director of the World Bank's Population Projects
Suwanprathet, head nurse at the Chiang Mai Christian Clinic.
313
Review
Authors(s): Adele G. Epstein
Review by: Adele G. Epstein
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Feb., 1973), pp. 374-376
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Asian Studies
BOOK REVIEWS 375
ranked, taking into account such factors as
during the reign of King Chulalongkorn him-
birth rank, relationship to the reigning king,
self.
Jones' translation of this essay is excellent.
and position within the government. Even
though by the end of King Chulalongkorn's
reign, in 19I0, the actual position of an in-
dividual prince was no longer dependent
solely on such traditional criteria, bureau-
cratic effectiveness now being another factor,
royal rank and titles were by no means for-
gotten and maintained an important role in
determining prestige.
Professor Jones deals with three important
aspects of this changing hierarchical pyramid:
the traditional ranking of royalty; the titles of
nobility, which were gradually losing pres-
tige; and the ministerial ranks, which were the
sources of increasing power. By presenting an
annotated translation of King Chulalong-
korn's essay, "Traditions of Royal Lineage in
Siam," written in I878, Professor Jones has
provided the English speaking reader with the
most exhaustive and comprehensive informa-
tion available concerning Thai royal titles and
ranks. In any polygamous society such as
Thailand, there are an overwhelming num-
ber of princes. To gain order in this extensive
He successfully resists the temptation to re-
write the King's often obtuse prose, and con-
vincingly conveys the feeling and mood of the
original. Confusing points are cleared up in
the notes, rather than by alteration of the text.
By placing the original Thai opposite the
English translation, Professor Jones enables
his audience to compare the two easily. The
use of the Haas phonemic transcription is to
be commended. Although those unfamiliar
with the system may find it confusing at first,
this transcription is widely known and enables
the reader not only to pronounce any given
word correctly, but also to determine what was
written in the original Thai. Due to the vari-
ety of translations used by Professor Jones
for certain hierarchical-related terms, this re-
viewer feels that he should have maintained
the Haas transcription for these words as
well, and placed the best English translation
in brackets. This would allow the reader to
grasp the nuances of such words as jot and
sagd'naa.
The change in governmental perogatives
royal family, some sort of personal ranking had
to be developed. Since many of the princes had
the same father, position of the mother became
of paramount importance. King Chulalong-
at the turn of the century, and the importance
of the new ministerial undertakings, helps to
explain why the student of Thai society, and
korn's essay provides a detailed explanation
in fact, of much of Southeast Asian society,
of the Thai royal hierarchy as it was evolving
will find the second part of Jones' book, a
over several centuries.
compendium of his own essays, of more use-
The King begins by discussing the grada-
tions in the cawfaca rank, and explains the var-
fulness than the King's essay. Jones' notices
are concerned primarily with the situation in
ious ceremonies, names and titles associated
the government during the reign of King
with each. He proceeds to discuss the other
Wachirawut (1910-1925). Much of the infor-
birth titles for princes, and the ranks and
titles appropriate for them. He includes the
krom ranks, and concludes with a valuable
explanation of the titles for women in the
royal household.
mation is, in fact, supplied by the King's own
writings.
Jones begins by sketching the development
of royal titles, and then presents the available
evidence on the history of the titles of nobil-
While enabling the reader to come to grips
with the royal ranking system, perhaps the
ity. In the next few pages he outlines, in rank
order, the titles for the Corps of Royal Pages,
most important contribution of King Chula-
the ministries, the army, and the police, as
longkorn's essay is to stress the dynamism and
they stood during the reign of King Wachira-
adaptability of the Thai hierarchy. Ranks
wut. By this time, the Thai government had
changed meaning over periods of time, as did
undergone a considerable amount of func-
Cawfda, and new ranks were added as the
tionalization and formalization. Ranks were
need arose, e.g. mom lu/ayj and mom raad-
established in the various branches of govern-
chawoij became "transitionary" royal titles
ment, and bureaucrats tended to rise in an
376 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES
Thai Rural Families: A Sociologic and Eco-
orderly progression. One of the greatest prob-
nomic Survey. BY HAROLD E. SMITH,
lems facing Thai scholars has been to deter-
CHALERMARI DHAMABBUTRA, CHAMRIENG
mine this new hierarchical progression. Often
it was possible to determine the various ranks
BHARICHITRA AND PAUL D. RICHARDSON.
and titles held by a lone individual, but im-
NCR Microcard Editions: Washington,
possible to determine the precise position of
D.C. I97I. 5I pp. Tables, Appendices.
the individual within the overall structure.
$I.20. (microfiche).
Jones provides clear, readable lists cataloguDevelopment and Conflict in Thailand. BY
ing the hierarchy of ranks and titles in the

JOYCE NAKAHARA AND RONALD A. WITTON
various branches of government, and the acIthaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell
companying notes explain the operational

University, I97I. Xvi, 8o pp. Map, Illustra-
methods of the relevant ministries. Moreover,

tions, References. $2.50.
by correlating the ranks among the various
The two studies here reviewed both exam-
branches of government, and then correlating
ine aspects of Thai society through sociologi-
the titles of nobility with the ministerial of-
cal lenses, although lenses of quite different
fices, Jones provides an even clearer picture
powers. Thai Rural Families analyzes the re-
of Thai government at that time. Beyond
this, Jones also provides a refreshing antidote
sults of scheduled interviews with 875 heads
to the often rather fancifully explained posi-
of households or spouses of households heads
tion of women in the royal system, describing
carried out in I963-I964 in selected villages in
several parts of the kingdom. Development
in straight-forward terms the workings of the
and Conflict in Thailand subjects Thai census
Inner Palace.
data to a rather novel theoretical approach in
The essays, however, all suffer from one flaw
-that of brevity. While providing the reader
order to obtain an assessment of the relative
with an accurate list of titles and ranks, un-
"development" of Thai provinces and then
available elsewhere, Professor Jones presents a
explores the thesis that it is those provinces
static system, as it appeared under King Wach-
which have experienced the greatest develop-
irawut. His work makes us competent in de-
ment in the two decades between 1947 and
I966 which have also experienced the most
lineating the rank and titles of anyone in the
serious challenges to central Thai control.
Thai government service at that time, but
Thai Rural Families must be viewed basi-
leaves us with no feeling of change and
development. We have little sense of the tre-
cally as a sociological exercise-an exercise
mendous upheaveal which took place during
which undoubtedly served a useful purpose
in providing first hand research experience
the reign of King Chulalongkorn.
for students at Prasamit, the College of
But a data paper is by nature tentative,
Education, in Bangkok. However, the authors
something which merits immediate publica-
themselves recognize that because the sample
tion. Thai Titles and Ranks will unquestiona-
selected was not a random one, "the findings,
bly be put to immediate use by all interested
while quite useful, cannot be generalized to
in modern Thai history. Robert B. Jones pro-
any particular population. They may be, howvides a solid core of fact, which has taken
ever, suggestive of what a truly representative

him years to collect and refine. No one in-
sample would provide" (p. 7). Even this sort

volved in Thai studies can fail to appreciate
of pretest usefulness is doubtful given the exhis precise work. This book may easily be-
tensive literature on rural Thai society which

come the most referred to volume on any
has been generated in the past decade (a liter-
Thai scholar's shelf, and the scholarly com-
ature which is scarcely referred to in the
munity looks forward in anticipation to future
study). At best, the study does provide some
data papers on other aspects of Thai rank from
corroborating evidence for results which have
Professor Jones.
been established elsewhere-eg., the greater
ADELE G. EPSTEIN
University of Michigan
communal solidarity of northeastern villages
as compared with villages elsewhere in the
Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand

Authors(s): Charles F. Keyes
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (May, 1971), pp. 551-567
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
Accessed: 29-03-2016 03:35 UTC
Cambridge University Press, Association for Asian Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Asian Studies
Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand
CHARLES F. KEYES
I N I965, the Thai government, through the Department of Public Welfare,
launched a program of Buddhist missions to the hill tribes of North Thailand
that was to be carried out by members of the Thai Buddhist clergy, the Sangha. The
purpose of the program was
to strengthen sentimental ties [of Thai] with the tribal people and to create loyal-
ties [of the tribal people] to the nation through development of strong beliefs in
Buddhism.'
This policy that aims at the bringing of marginal people into the national fold of
Thailand through conversion to Buddhism would seem to have its origins in poli-
cies concerning the relationship between Buddhism and national integration that
were first formulated in the reign of King Culalongkorn at the end of the last century.
Among Culalongkorn's attempts to weld the territories under his rule into a
unitary nation was the institution of laws designed to create a national Buddhist
church. Present-day statistics on religion in Thailand suggest that these efforts were
highly successful. In the I960 census, 93.4 percent of the population of the kingdom
are said to be Buddhists.2 While this classification is somewhat misleading since it
subsumes adherents of different forms of Buddhism, the distortion is not very
significant. Less than i percent of the Buddhist monasteries and Buddhist clergy
of the kingdom are not part of the Thai church.3 In such a context, it would appear
that a policy of integrating marginal peoples into Thai national life through con-
version to Buddhism would be a reasonable one.
However, despite the apparent connection between recent policies toward tribal
peoples and the integrative policies of King Culalongkorn, these two are actually
based on quite different assumptions. King Culalongkorn sought to negate the im-
portance of "primordial attachments"4 by creating national social structures. The
present policies reflect quite a different tendency, namely, the appeal to Buddhist
ideology as a basis for mobilizing the populace to attain national ends. To Culalong-
' Thailand. Department of Public Welfare, Min-
Charles F. Keyes is Associate Professor of An-
istry of Interior, Raingan kanphoeiphrae phraphut-
thropology at the University of Washington.
thasaisana kac chaokhao thang phak nya pi 2510
A preliminary version of this paper was read at
['Report concerning the Buddhist Mission to the
the annual meeting of the Association for Asian
Tribal People in the North in I967'] (Bangkok,
Studies in San Francisco, April 3, I970. The au-
February 2, I968), p. 28.
thor would like to acknowledge the assistance of
2 Thailand Official Yearbook 1964 (Bangkok:
Miss Amara Bhumiratana in researching some of
Government House Printing Office, I965), p. 498.
the background to this paper and of Mrs. Diane
3 Ibid., pp. 504-05.
Eddy who typed the manuscript. He would also
4 In the use of this concept I follow Clifford
like to acknowledge his indebtedness to Phra Khru
Geertz ("Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics
Anusonsatsanakiat, District Abbot of Mae Sariang
District, northwestern Thailand, who made possi-
in the New States," in Old Societies and New
ble the researches into the Buddhist missionary pro-
States, ed. by Clifford Geertz [New York: The
gram among the tribal peoples and who interpreted
Free Press, I963], pp. I05-I57) and Edward Shils
many aspects of Buddhist tradition as it is found in
("Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties,"
northern Thailand.
British journal of Sociology [I957]).
551
552 CHARLES F. KEYES
korn, Buddhism as traditionally practiced outside of the core area of traditional
Siam represented a potential threat to national integration because its local manifes-
tations were articulated with autonomous polities. For the modern rulers, those who
are not adherents of Buddhism or whose attachment to the faith is weak pose the
potential threat to national unity. This shift of assumptions concerning the relation-
ship between Buddhism and national integration can be clearly shown with refer-
ence to the recent history of North Thailand.
Northern Thai Society in the igth Century
Until the end of the igth century, that part of present-day Thailand which is
usually referred to as the North" was divided between the semiautonomous princi-
palities of Chiangmai and Nan. Although these principalities had become vassals
of Siam at the end of the i8th century, they experienced little direct influence from
the Siamese court of Bangkok until nearly the end of the igth century. Such au-
tonomy was particularly marked in the religious sphere for the vast majority of
the population were adherents of a variant of Therevada Buddhism which Dodd"
termed the "Yuan cult." This local version of Therevada Buddhism differs from
the variant found in Siam proper' in the script used for the sacred literature, in the
structure and content of rituals, and in the organization of the Buddhist clergy, or
Sangha. While the Yuan cult is not restricted to northern Thailand, being found
also among Tai-speaking8 peoples in the Burmese Shan State of Kengtung, in parts
of northern Laos, and in southern China, it is most closely identified with North
Thailand where it probably originated and where it achieved its most elaborate de-
velopment in the i6th centuryY
The Yuan church in the igth century was relatively unstructured. Each temple
(wat) had autonomy, and its clergy was only minimally tied to clergy elsewhere.
Powers to ordain monks and novices belonged to the senior monk in each temple
and he in turn could pass this power on to one of his followers when he was near
death.10 A distinction existed between those wat which were supported by local
congregations and those supported by the royalty and nobility. The latter usually
had important relics which also made them important as pilgrimage sites. In addi-
tion to the senior clergy of these wat, who were universally held in higher esteem
than were the clergy of ordinary wat, there was another group of clergy who had
of Ayutthaya and igth century Siam.
5This designation should not be confused with
8 Following conventional usage, the term "Tai"
the official grouping of provinces into what is
will be here used to refer to any group belonging
known today as the "northern region" (phak
to the Tai (or Daic) language family, while the
nya). This official region includes both provinces
term "Thai" will be reserved for reference only to
which were formerly in the semiautonomous prin-
citizens of the modern nation of Thailand.
cipalities of the North and those which formed the
9 Cf. G. Coedes, "Documents sur i'histoire poli-
northern provinces of the traditional Siamese king-
tique du Laos occidental," Bull. de l'Ecole Fran-
doms of Ayutthaya and then Bangkok. In this
raise Extreme Orient, 25 (I925), pp. I-202 and
paper, the term "the north" will be used to refer
Phraya Prachakit Koncak, Phongsawadan Yonok
to an area today mainly confined to the provinces
['Yonok Chronicle'] (Bangkok, National Library
of Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Lampang, Lamphun,
Edition, I964).
Mae Hong Son, Nan, and Phrae.
10 Sanguan Chotisukkharat, Prawat Khruba
6 William C. Dodd, The Tai Race (Cedar Rap-
Siwichai: Nakbun haeng Lannathai ['Biography

ids: Torch Press, I923), p. 75.
T By "Siam proper" I am here referring to cen-
tral and north central Thailand which had com-
of Khruba Siwichai: Lannathai Saint'] (Chiang-
mai: Sanguan Kanphim, I963), p. 28.
prised the "inner provinces" of the Siamese states
BUDDHISM & NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THAILAND 553
more than a local reputation. These were the khu ba ("esteemed teachers"), monks
whose reputation, often for presumed magical powers, attracted large followings.
Beyond these distinctions, however, the Sangha of the Yuan tradition appears to
have had little hierarchical organization.
Yuan cult Buddhism was not the only religion found in igth-century North
Thailand, and not even the only form of Buddhism. Migrants from Burma, includ-
ing Burmese, Mon, and Shan, had brought their religious traditions with them.
In such towns as Lampang, which were centers of the Burmese-dominated teak
trade, Burmese and/or Mon Buddhist temples could be found. In areas of Shan
settlement such as Mae Hong Son, Fang, and Phrae, Shan Buddhism also existed.
The largest non-Buddhist element in the igth-century population of northern
Thailand was accounted for by those people who are usually referred to as "hill
tribes." The tribal population was made up primarily of Karen and such Mon-
Khmer speaking peoples as the Lua' (Lawa), T'in, and Khamu. Only a few repre-
sentatives of Miao, Yao, and such Tibeto-Burman groups as the Lahu, Akha, and
Lisu had moved into Thailand by this period. All of the tribal peoples followed
religious traditions which are usually subsumed under the vague term "animism,"
a term which disguises some important differences in tribal religions. The Mon-
Khmer groups had developed symbiotic relationships with both the Yuan, who had
dominated the region since the end of the I3th century, and the Buddhist Mon, who
had preceded the Yuan as the rulers of what is today North Thailand. Over this
long period of time, these Mon-Khmer groups had absorbed a number of Buddhist
elements and ideas into their own religions. Some, and probably many, had assimilated
to Yuan culture, becoming Yuan Buddhists in the process."
In contrast to the Mon-Khmer tribals, most of the Karen in North Thailand
had developed only minimal ties with the Yuan with whom they had had contact
for only about I50 to 200 years.'2 What they knew of Buddhism had come from the
Shan, Mon, or Burmese who live in present-day Burma13 rather than from the Yuan
or other Tai-speaking peoples living in present-day Thailand.
Around the turn of the century, other tribal peoples began migrating into North
Thailand. The Miao and Yao brought with them religious traditions which had
been formed in their homelands in South China. While they too might be termed
animists, their religions display marked Chinese influences.14 Some of the Tibeto-
Burman groups, and particularly the Lahu, had assimilated elements of Shan Bud-
dhism into their traditions while still in Burma. However, the religious traditions
11 Cf. Peter Kunstadter, The Lua' (Lawa) of
Northern Thailand (Princeton University, Center
tionships: the Case of the S'kaw Karen of Central
Upland Western Chiengmai," in Tribesmen and
Peasants in Northern Thailand, ed. by Peter Hinton
of International Studies Research Monograph No.
2I, I965) and Peter Kunstadter, "The Lua' and
Skaw Karen of Maehongson Province, Northwest-
ern Thailand," in Southeast Asian Tribes, Minori-
ties and Nations, ed. by Peter Kunstadter (Prince-
ton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, I967), vol.
(Chiang Mai: Tribal Research Center, I969).
13 Cf. F. K. Lehman, "Kayah Society as a
Function of the Shan-Burma-Karen Context," in
Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies, ed.
by Julian Steward (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, I967), vol. II, pp. I-I04.

II, pp. 639-674.
14 Cf. P. Kandre, "Autonomy and Integration of
12 Cf. P. Kunstadter, "The Lua' and Skaw Karen
of Maehongson Province, Northwestern Thailand,"
C. F. Keyes, "New Evidence on Northern Thai
Frontier History" in In Memoriam Phya Anuman
Rajadhon (Bangkok: The Siam Society, I970),
and David H. Marlowe, "Upland-Lowland Rela-
Social Systems: The Iu Mien ("Yao" or "Man")
Mountain Population and Their Neighbors," in
Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations,
ed. by P. Kunstadter (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, I967), vol. II, pp. 583-638.
of these people show today little that would suggest any influence from Yuan Bud-
dhism. Rather, such changes as have occurred in their traditions in recent years
seem to have resulted primarily from Christian missionization.
A third religious element was introduced into the north in I867 with the estab-
lishment of a Presbyterian mission in Chiangmai by Dr. Daniel McGilvary. By I903,
the Lao Mission had a total of 2738 members, 97 of whom were Khamu (a Mon-
Khmer tribal people), and the great majority, apparently, Yuan.15 Some Christian
influence had also been felt among the Karens through contact with Karens who had
become Christians in Burma where the American Baptist Mission was working.
However, the number of Christian Karen in Thailand seems to have been insignifi-
cant.16
While tribal and Christian traditions did exist in North Thailand in the igth
century, Yuan cult Buddhist was obviously the most important tradition. In the eyes
of the Siamese rulers in Bangkok, this tradition distinguished the north from other
areas within their sphere of influence. When the attempt was first made to integrate
the north into the emerging nation of Thailand, it became obvious to King Culalong-
korn and his advisers that the perpetuation of Yuan Buddhism as a distinctive
religious structure could not be permitted.
Incorporation of the Yuan Sect into the Thai Church
The political autonomy of North Thailand began to disappear in consequence of
the actions of the Thai court during the last quarter of the igth century. During
this period, when the Siamese court was feeling intense pressure from British and
French imperialism, King Culalongkorn formulated and implemented a program of
reforms which can only be termed revolutionary.'7 One prime aim of Culalongkorn
was to construct a national state out of the fragmented domain which he had
inherited as his realm. His first move in this connection was the appointment of a
Siamese High Commissioner to the court of Chiangmai in I874, resulting in what
LeMay had termed a "silent revolution."'18 This move was but a prelude to the major
provincial reorganization act of I892 in which the administration of all parts of the
kingdom were placed under direct jurisdiction of the Thai government. While the
replacement of the local aristocracy by Thai government officials did not take place
immediately after the promulgation of this act, owing partially to the lack of sufficient
corps of trained officials, this act marks the beginning of the end of fragmented
authority in the areas under Siamese domination.
The implementation of the Provincial Reorganization Act in the north was
spurred by an uprising of Shan in the northern province of Phrae in igoi. This re-
bellion revealed to the Siamese court, as Graham has stated, "the weakness of their
hold on the Lao states, the poverty of their rural administration and the inadequacy
15 K. E. Wells, History of Protestant Work in
The Politics of Reform in Thailand (New Haven:
Yale University Press, I969), and Tej Bunnag,
Thailand, 1828-1958 (Bangkok: Church of Christ
The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892

in Thailand, I958), p. 89.
16 Thra Loo Shwe, "The Karen People of Thai-
to 1915 (Unpubl. D. Phil. thesis, Oxford Univer-
sity, I968).
land and Christianity," (typescript, n.p., I962).
18 Reginald LeMay, An Asian Arcady (Cam-
17For excellent analyses of the impact of the
Culalongkorn "Revolution" in the educational and
bridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1936), p. 54.
provincial administrative systems see David Wyatt,
of their military arrangements."'9 By the end of the first decade of the 20th century,
the Thai government had succeeded in replacing the local aristocracy by Thai
officials.20 The construction of a rail line to the north which reached Chiangmai in
I92I further helped to tie the region more closely to the center of centralized au-
thority.
Concomitant with implementation of reforms designed to integrate outlying re-
gions politically into the emergent nation-state of Thailand, King Culalongkorn also
initiated policies which aimed at the incorporation of all Therevada Buddhists within
the kingdom into a single national church. While previous Kings of the Cakkri
dynasty, notably Rama I (I782-i809) and Rama IV or King Mongkut (I85I-I868),
had established many of the principles which were to form the important bases of the
national religion.21 However, none of Culalongkorn's predecessors had concerned
themselves with the religion as it existed in the "Lao" tributaries, i.e., in the areas
which are today North Thailand, Northeast Thailand, and Laos proper.
Culalongkorn codified the principles which had been developed as the bases of the
Siamese church and decreed that these should be implemented throughout the king-
dom. The crucial promulgation was his Sangha Administration Act of I902.22
Among the most important features of this act are those which provide for (i) the
incorporation of all monks into a national structure, (2) the establishment of the
principle of hierarchal authority whereby monks higher in the structure could
inflict punishments upon or countermand decisions of those lower in the hierarchy
and (3) the establishment of a national system of clerical education. The implications
of this act were clearly pointed out by Prince Wachirayan, the supreme patriarch at
the time of the proclamation, in his remarks prefacing the proclamation:
Although monks are already subject to the law contained in the Vinaya, they must
also subject themselves to the authority which derives from the specific and gen-
eral laws of the State. In addition, they should also follow local customs which are
not contrary to these other two sets of laws.
19 Walter A. Graham, Siam (London: Alexander
Moring, I924), vol. II, p. I72. Also cf. Tej Bun-
nag, "Khabot ngiao myang Phrae" ['Shan Rebel-
mayutnikai which followed stricter interpretations
of clerical behavior than did the dominant Ma-
hanikai Order. During his reign, he promoted the
lion in Myang Phrae'], Sangkhomsat Porithat
strengthening and systematizing of Buddhist edu-
['Social Science Review'] (Bangkok), 6 (I968),
cation, an effort which was even further advanced
by the work of Mongkut's son, Prince Wachirayan
pp. 67-82.
20 The local aristocracy was retained in symbolic
who was to become Prince Patriach. On Mongkut's
positions. In I924 Graham reported that the in-
relationship with the Sangha, see Prince Dhaninivat,
digenous northern chiefs "still hold their titles with
op. cit., pp. 32-39, R. Lingat, "La vie religieuse du
the purely nominal status of President of Council,
Roi Mongkut," journal of Siam Society, 20 (I926),
a body of officials appointed for each state, under
pp. I29-I48, Abbot Low Moffat, Mongkut: The
the control and at the dictation of a Siamese Vice-
King of Siam (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University
roy located in the neighbourhood with a strong
Press, I96I), and A. B. Griswold, "Asian Religious
staff of assistants" (Graham, vol. II, p. i68).
21 For example, among the laws concerning the
Sangha (kotmai phra song) promulgated by Rama
I was the extremely important one requiring that
Buddhist clergy be registered and carry identifica-
Reformer: King Mongkut of Thailand," journal of
the Vietnamese-American Association, I (1956),
pp. I3-I9.
22 The act appears in Chot Thongprayun, comp.,
Khambanyai phraratchabanyat khana song, Ph.S.
tion papers. See Prince Dhaninivat, A History of
2505 ['Explanation of the Proclamation Concerning
Buddhism (Bangkok: Asia Foundation, I960), p.
the Sangha, I962'] (Bangkok: Hatthasin Press,
26. Mongkut had been a monk for 27 years before
I966), no pagination. Also cf., Graham, vol. II,
ascending to the throne. During his sojourn in the
pp. 230-I and Yoneo Ishii, "Church and State in
monkhood, he established a new Order, the Tham-
Thailand," Asian Survey, 8 (I968), pp. 865-6.
In sum, monks must obey three types of laws: the law of the land, the Vinaya
and custom.
This Act is the law of the land; thus, it should be known, understood, and fol-
lowed correctly.23
The Sangha Administration Act of I902 was not applied to the north until i9i0
when the king issued a separate promulgation specifying that the act be applied in
certain outlying circles, the north among them.24 The implementation of the law pro-
ceeded immediately afterward, with Prince Patriarch Wachirayan taking a personal
interest. He himself made a trip to the north central provinces in I9I2 and in 19I3
he traveled as far as Phrae in the north itself.25 His intent in all of his journeys was to
make certain that the local monks were correctly following the Vinaya and to bring
the local orders into the emergent Thai Sangha hierarchy. He established the practice
of having local monks come to Bangkok to improve their studies of the Dharma.26 He
also appointed monks to local positions in the hierarchy. For example, in Tak he
appointed as the senior members of local hierarchy three respected monks with the
most seniority. The monk chosen to be the chief abbot of the province belonged to
the Yuan tradition, while the two chosen as his assistants were followers of the
Siamese tradition. This mixture of Yuan and Siamese monks appealed to the patriarch
since it provided for the integration of the two traditions in one order.27
The mixing of Yuan and Siamese monks in the hierarchy of the northern
church was later extended to those areas where there was no indigenous Siamese
tradition. An interesting example of this is to be found in the story of Phra Ratch-
awirakorn (Bunma Yankhuttathera). This monk was born in the northeastern
province of Ubon28 where he also studied in a local temple school. At the age of i8, he
entered the Sangha as a novice in an Ubon temple and, after continuing his studies
in the same temple, he entered the monkhood at the age of 21 in 1922. His biographer
states that
the studies of the Vinaya and Pali language were not very well-developed up-
country and finding a teacher was difficult. Thus, he gained permission by his
preceptor and [took leave] of his parents and moved [to a wat in Bangkok].29
In Bangkok he came under the influence of a Siamese monk who, although a Siamese
monk and abbot of the Bangkok temple of Wat Bencamophit, was also abbot of the
Northern Circle. This same monk later became supreme patriarch. This abbot sent
Phra Ratchawirakorn first to the northern province of Phrae to supervise the
Dharmic studies in a district in that province. In i936 he was sent to Mae Sariang
district in Mae Hong Son Province to take up the same responsibilities. His bi-
ographer says of this experience:
In Mae Sariang district, he undertook to perform well the duties connected with
23 Quoted in Chot Thongprayun; my translation.
which like the north had enjoyed relative auton-
24 Ibid.
omy prior to the reforms of Culalongkorn.
25 Somdet Phramaha Somana Cao Khrom Phraya
Wachirayan Wororot ['(Collected Writings of)
Prince Patriarch Wachirayan Wororot'] (Bangkok:
Department of Religion, i967), vol. I, pp. 343-557.
26 Ibid., vol. I, p. 222.
29Phra Wimon Yanamuni, "Prawat Phra Rat-
chawirakorn (Bunma Yankhuttathera)" ['Biography
of Phra Ratchawirakorn (Bunma Yanakhuttathera)']
in Ubbai Banthao Khwamkrot ['Means for Alle-
viating Anger'], by Atsapha Thera (Mae Hong
27 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 243-5.

Son: Volume distributed on the occasion of the
28 It is worthy of note that this monk came
from another area of Thailand, i.e., the northeast,
cremation of Phra Ratchawirakorn, I968), p. viii;
my translation.
Sangha administration and assisted the District Abbot in education, propagation
and public service. If he had lacked perserverance, he would not have been able
to make the sacrifice to live in such a remote land as that.30
In I942, he was raised to the status of provincial abbot of Mae Hong Son. The seat
of this province is quite unique since most of the local population is Shan, rather
than Yuan. In this setting, Phra Ratchawirakorn "undertook to improve and correct
the different customs and mores and he gradually introduced the more popular
universal standards of the central region.' In personal interviews with monks in
Mae Hong Son, I discovered that the provincial abbot strictly forbade the following
of Shan traditions in the local temples of the provincial town and to a lesser extent
in the temples in the Shan villages around the town. Instead, the local monks were
required to learn and to follow the Siamese form of Buddhism.
Phra Ratchawirakorn was particularly zealous in attempting to supplant local
Buddhist traditions and replace them by the tradition which had become dominant
in the Thai church. Elsewhere, in the north, however, something of a compromise
was attained. This compromise arose in great part out of the resolution of a conflict
between the Thai Sangha and Khru Ba Siwichai, probably the most famous monk
in northern Thailand in the first decades of this century.
Born in Lamphun in I878, Khru Ba Siwichai also had his first religious training
in that province. However, he soon moved beyond being a local monk in conse-
quence of his reputation for being endowed with supernatural powers.32 Shortly after
the extension of the provisions of the Sanga Administration Act to the north, Khru
Ba Siwichai ran into problems with the Thai Sangha owing to the fact that he had
ordained monks and novices without having been officially recognized as a "pre-
ceptor" by the Thai hierarchy. The right to determine whom should be permitted
to ordain monks was a particularly significant issue to the leadership of the Thai
Sangha since exercise of this right by monks not sanctioned by the Sangha could
lead to the development or perpetuation of sects whose existence would pose a direct
threat to the unity of the Thai church. For his contravention of Sangha regula-
tions, Khru Ba Siwichai was confined to a temple in Lamphun in about I9I5 or I9I6
by the viceroy of the north.33
During his confinement, large numbers of people came to "make merit" with
Khru Ba Siwichai since it was believed that his reputed holiness would enhance the
merit of such acts. His popularity greatly troubled Thai officials in the north for
it was feared that Khru Ba Siwichai was potentially a leader of a millenarian move-
ment with revolutionary implications.84 Having only recently put down a millenar-
ian revolution in northeastern Thailand in I902,35 the Thai government was not
about to allow a similar movement to develop in the north. In I9I9 Khru Ba Siwichai
was ordered to report to Bangkok to answer charges of clerical disobedience and
sedition.36 However, a number of high Thai officials, including the viceroy of the
north, Prince Boworadet, became concerned that the prosecution of Khru Ba Siwichai
would have as serious repercussions as permitting him to remain free. In the end, a
30 Ibid., p. x.
'1 Ibid., p. xii.
isan R.S. I2I" ['Millenarian Revolt in Northeast-
ern Thailand, I902'], Sangkhomsat Porithat ['So-
cial Science Review'] (Bangkok), 5 (I967), pp.
32Sanguan Chotisukkharat, op. cit.
83 Ibid., pp. I 6, 2-3-4-
78-86.
36 Sanguan Chotisukkharat, op. cit., pp. i6 et
84 Ibid., p. i6.
85 Cf. Tej Bunnag, "Khabot phu mi bun phak
passim.
committee of high ecclesiastical officials appointed by the patriarch decided that the
only fault Khru Ba Siwichai had committed was the ordaining of clergy without
official permission.37 Since he had already been punished for this wrong in his con-
finement in Lamphun, he was released. Recognizing his popularity, the ecclesiasti-
cal officials even "defrayed the expenses of his return journey, bidding the monks of
Lampoon to look after his personal comfort on his return."38
However, he still remained a thorn in the side of the Thai Sangha and in I935
he was again in Bangkok to answer charges levelled by the ecclesiastical authorities.
The charges against him were virtually the same, but this time the independent
monks of the north had openly severed connections with their ecclesiastical supe-
riors and declared Phra Sri Vijaya to be their leader. It was said that Phra Sri
Vijaya had dispensed them from the need of additional learning, contrary to the
church's usual requirements. After they had refused to allow church officials to
inspect their monasteries, some of these leaders were arrested.39
This was the crisis point in the relationship between the Yuan sect and the Thai
Sangha. In the end, Khru Ba Siwichai "signed an agreement to abide by the laws of
the church, and returned home, to be welcomed back by more than eight thousand
people."40 On the Thai side, however, a tacit agreement to permit the northern clergy
to follow Yuan customs also was apparent, for there have been no efforts since that
time to suppress Yuan practices.4'
Today, the education of the monks in the north includes both formal training
in the Thai prescribed curriculum and informal training in the traditional Yuan
literature and liturgy. Local custom determines the structure of most of the rituals
performed in northern temples while Thai government and Sangha law structure
the realm lying beyond the local temple. What Moerman has reported for the Thai-
Lue42 village of Ban Ping in Chienkham district, Chiengmai Province, is character-
istic of most local temples in the north:
Ban Ping's temple serves the local community which provides all its support, all
its congregation, and all its clergy. But the village priest is also at the bottom of
an ecclesiastical hierarchy that begins in Bangkok . . . Before Chiengkham came
under the district administration of Bangkok, there were, in widely scattered tem-
ples, a few aged priests (xu ba [i.e., khu ba]) to whom a young cleric might
apprentice himself to learn some special religious skill. There are still such saintly
men whom the villagers revere, but now there are also certified stages of theolog-
ical excellence and a national hierarchy of ecclesiastical power. These are the Bud-
dhist aspect of the increasing centralization of Thailand.43
In the temples which traditionally were, and today still are, centers of Buddhism in
the north, the Yuan tradition is also taught. However, in such temples the tradition
is increasingly assuming an antiquarian character as most young monks prefer to
37Ibid., p.28.
42 While the Thai-Lue are ethnically different
38 Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam
(New York: Macmillan, I94I), p. 642.
39 Ibid., pp. 642-3. Sanguan does not discuss
this incident, saying only that the details of the
second incident were the same as the first (San-
guan Chotisukkharat, op. cit., p. 32).
from the Yuan or Northern Thai, their traditional
religion is of the Yuan variety.
43 Michael Moerman, "Ban Ping's Temple: The
Center of a 'Loosely Structured' Society," in An-
thropological Studies of Therevada Buddhism, by
Manning Nash et al. (New Haven: Yale Univer-
40 Thompson, op. cit., p. 643.
sity Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series
41 Khru Ba Siwichai died in I939.
No. I3, I966), pp. I65-6.
study in the Thai language which they have learned in schools rather than in Yuan
to which they have never been exposed before entering the clergy. In short, the
implementation of the religious laws formulated as part of Culalongkorn's "integra-
tive revolution"" did not lead to the death of the Yuan tradition. However, the im-
press of Thai structures upon the northern Sangha did succeed in reducing the
potential of the Yuan tradition as a rallying point for communal or regional dissent.
At the time of Culalongkorn's accession to the throne, the tributary "Lao" states,
including the Yuan north, were tied to the Siamese throne along only one axis,
i.e., through the tributary relationships between their rulers and the king of Siam.
The aim of the Culalongkorn revolution was to introduce a number of new axes
which would link the people of these areas and the central Siamese government. To
do so, however, necessitated the breaking down of "primordial attachments" such
as those focused upon the Yuan Buddhist tradition, and to substitute attachments to
the nation in their stead. Insofar as Yuan Buddhism was concerned, the actions of
the Thai government working through the Thai Sangha did not lead to the replace-
ment of Yuan customs by Siamese customs even though such an intent seemed to
be present in the minds of some Sangha officials as the case of Phra Ratchawirakorn
in Mae Hong Son suggests. Rather, the essential element of the integration of the
Yuan sect into the Thai church lay in the incorporation of all members of the
northern clergy into a single national Sangha structure and the establishment of
hierarchical authority whereby Yuan clergy would be responsive to decisions made
at the higher levels of the Thai Sangha. With the final submission of Khru Ba
Siwichai in I935, this end had been achieved. While the Yuan tradition has certainly
been undermined by this integration of the northern clergy into the Thai Sangha
and by the introduction of a national educational scheme in which the teaching of
the Yuan script and literature has no place, the tradition still remains. In short, the
case of the integration of the Yuan sect into the Thai church reveals that some de-
gree of cultural pluralism can be tolerated provided that structural integration has
been achieved.
Buddhism as an Instrument of National Policy
The Sangha reforms of King Culalongkorn were designed primarily as a means
for undermining primordial sentiments rather than making the religious structure
an instrument for the promotion of national ends. However, the very success of
the integrative revolution of Culalongkorn made the Thai Sangha a national structure
of such significance that the temptation to use it for such purposes has in recent
years become irresistible. While not denying that some attempts were made during
the period between 1902 and the early I960's to use the Sangha in the promotion of
national policies, it would appear that no concerted effort to do so seems to have
occurred until the regime of Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat (I957-I963).
Sarit was almost single-mindedly concerned with the promotion of national
development as a means of strengthening the country. The existence of a strong
national church recommended itself to him as an excellent tool for effecting his pur-
poses. As Ishii has noted:
Sarit thought that national integration must be strengthened to realize national
44 This term is borrowed from Geertz, op cit.
development. To attain this goal he planned to start with fostering the people's
sentiment for national integration through the enhancement of traditional values
as represented by the monarchy and Buddhism.45
For the Sangha to be a tool of national integration, it must itself be strong. While
Culalongkorn's revolution had brought a strongly hierarchical national Sangha into
being, a subsequent law in I94I had somewhat diffused power among several in-
stitutions at the top-but not, significantly, at the bottom. The separation of powers
established in the Sangha Administration Act of I94146 had permitted the emergence
of disputes between the two orders, the numerically predominant Mahanikai and
the prestigious Thammayutnikai that, owing to royal favor, had long controlled a
significant proportion of the powerful positions at the upper levels of the Sangha.47
These disputes, together with the separation of powers at the upper level of the
Sangha, troubled Sarit and he moved in I960 to impress his own will upon the
church.48 In I962, a new Sangha Administration Act was promulgated which
created (or recreated) a highly centralized Sangha with power concentrated in the
role of the supreme patriarch.49 Among the most important elements of the law were
the provisions for the disrobing of monks who had either broken Sangha (Vinaya)
rules or laws of the state.50
The Sangha as restructured by the I962 law had much greater potential for
being used by the government for the promotion of national goals. Sarit himself did
not make much use of the Sangha, perhaps because of his death in late I963, but
his successors have done so. In the mid I960's two important programs sponsored
by the government were initiated which made possible Sangha assistance to the gov-
ernment in strengthening of the loyalties of the populace to the nation.
The first of these programs, called thammathut (Dhammadiita, lit. "Dharmic
Ambassador"), was established by the Department of Religious Affairs, Ministry
of Education, in I965. Under this program, and the closely related community de-
velopment program sponsored by Mahaculalongkorn (Buddhist) University, Bud-
dhist monks travel out to the outlying areas during the dry season in order to
strengthen the people's attachments to Buddhism and to provide some aid to people
in need. The Sangha fully cooperated in the establishment of the thammathut pro-
gram and took over the administration of the program from the Department of
Religious Affairs in i966.51
The underlying suppositions on which this program was built include the be-
lief held by government officials that attachments to Buddhism provide a safeguard
against the incursions of alien ideologies and that these attachments can be capi-
talized on in the promotion of national development. As regards the political
motive, some officials believe that the peoples of the northern and northeastern re-
45 Ishii, op. cit., p. 869.
46 Chot Thongprayun, op. cit.
47 I follow Kirsch in referring to the Tham-
divisions between Protestant sects.
48 Ishii, op cit., p. 869.
49 A text and explanation of the Sangha Adminis-
mayutnikai and Mahanikai as "orders" rather than
tration Act of i962 is given in Chot Thongprayun,
the more common "sects." See A. Thomas Kirsch,
op. cit. For a discussion of the significance of the
Phti Thai Religiotis Syncretism (Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University, I967), p. I3. The choice
of terms here is predicated upon the observation
that the divisions in the Thai Sangha appear to be
more similar to the divisions between religious or-
ders in the Catholic Church than they are to the
act, see Ishii, op. cit., pp. 869-870.
50 See articles 24-30 and 42-44 of the act as
given in Chot Thongprayun, op. cit.
51 Mahaculalongkorn Rajavidyalaya, Buddhist
University under Royal Patronage, Catalogue, B.E.
2510-1i/i967-68 A.D. (Bangkok, i967), p. 92.
gions of the country are particularly vulnerable to the propaganda of subversive
elements. "To counter this threat," Mulder has stated, "specially trained monks are
flow sent on a kind of moral rearmament mission in those areas which are threa-
tened by subversion."52 In the description of the community development program
of Mahaculalongkorn University given in the catalogue of the university, the reasons
for clerical involvement in rural development programs are explicitly stated:
Upcountry, the people put their trust and confidence in the monks; obedience and
cooperation in any activity becomes automatic if the request comes from the monks.
In an age of accelerated development, community development programs are sure
to be effectively accomplished with monastic help and cooperation.53
Monks from both Bangkok (including students from Mahaculalongkorn Uni-
versity) and from upcountry centers are involved in this program. It was headed, in
I967, by a member of the Council of Elders who resides at Wat Chetuphon in Bang-
kok. In the north, the local head was a former provincial abbot who had subse-
quently become abbot of Wat Phra Sing in Chiangmai.
The Thammathut monks, according to a handbook distributed to them in I967,54
are supposed to teach villagers with whom they work about the basic tenets of
Buddhism. For those villagers who have never made a commitment to the religion
the Thammathut monks perform a ceremony roughly equivalent to confirmation in
the Christian religion. For those who are already confirmed Buddhists, the monks
are to encourage them to become lay disciples. More significantly for our pur-
poses, the monks also teach the applications of Buddhism to everyday life, including
the relevance of religious practices to the development goals of the nation. Finally,
they aid local people by distributing medicines and, in the case of the clerical com-
munity development workers from Mahaculalongkorn University at least, encourage
local monks to support development programs.55
As a result of inquiries made into the functioning of the Thammathut program
in both the north and the northeast,56 the two main areas covered by Thammathut
monks, I would conclude that the main impact of the program has been to provide
villagers in these areas with clear evidence that the Sangha approves and supports
the economic development efforts of the government. Both ordinary and Tham-
mathut monks have cooperated successfully with government officials in spurring
villagers to undertake such secular projects as building schools, improving roads,
and constructing bridges. Such projects are defined by the clergy as merit-making
endeavors so that those who contribute labor or money toward their realization
obtain merit.
Since the villagers of the north and the northeast are, overwhelmingly, practicing
Buddhists who already belong to the Thai church, the goal of strengthening
Buddhism in these areas would seem to be spurious. However, there is no question
52 J. A. Niels Mulder, Monks, Merit, and Moti-
i967'] (Bangkok, n.d.).
vation (DeKalb, Illinois: Center for Southeast As55 Ibid. and Mahaculalongkorn, op. cit., pp. 89-
ian Studies, Northern Illinois University, Special
9I.
Report Series, No. i, I969), p. i6.

56 Research on the social action programs of the
53 Mahaculalongkorn, op. cit., p. 89.

Sangha was carried out in I967 and I968. I grate-
54 Lakpathibat nai phraphutthasatsana samrap

fully acknowledge the support of the National Sci-
pen khumy phra thammathut nai prathet Ph.S.

ence Foundation and the University of Washington
25IO ['Principles of Buddhist Conduct for Use as
which made this research possible.
a Guide for Thamnnathut Monks in the Country,
but that appeals to the religious sentiments of villagers has been an effective way to
mobilize the populace to work toward secular ends of community development.
Whether the Sangha, through the Thammathut or other similar programs, will
play an even bigger role in promoting the development of Thailand is still uncer-
tain. The Thammathut program does suggest, however, that the Sangha is willing
to accept such a role.
The second program of social action in which the Sangha is currently engaged,
known as thammacarik (Dhammacarika, lit., "wandering Dharma"), is directed
specifically toward the tribal people of the country.57 It was initiated in I964-I965 by
Mr. Pradit Disawat, the head of the Tribal Welfare Division of the Department of
Public Welfare, in consultations with a monk who is both abbot of Wat Bencamophit
in Bangkok and abbot of a region which comprises four northern provinces. The
purpose of the program is to convert the tribal peoples of the country to Buddhism.
According to Mr. Pradit,
the propagation of Buddhism among the different tribal groups would be likely
to advance administrative and development goals among the tribal people because
the integration of our people into a large community depends upon the ties of
custom and religion.58
The program was approved by the Council of Elders of the Sangha and has been
run since I965 as a joint endeavor of the Department of Public Welfare and the
Sangha.
Each dry season, monks recruited from Bangkok (including from Mahacula
University) and from northern provinces have been sent in groups of 3 to 5 mem-
bers to live in centers established in areas where the tribal people have already
experienced some contact with Department of Public Welfare workers. The Bang-
kok monks spend two months in the mission stations, while the local monks spend
four. In i968., I4 novices and one monk of tribal background were also added to the
mission group, ostensibly to act as interpreters. However, the effect of the addition
of these clerics is somewhat doubtful owing to the fact that only 5 were posted to
stations in which the tribal group being served was the same as that from which the
cleric had come.59 Thammacarik monks have worked among Meo, Yao, Lisu, Lahu,
Akha, Karen, and T'in peoples, although the heaviest emphasis has been on the
Meo and the Karen (including both P'wo and S'kaw Karen). (See Table I.)
The methods utilized by the Thammacarik monks include the exposing of
tribal peoples to clerical behavior, teaching them how to pay respect to the Triple
Gems, teaching them to make merit by giving alms to the monks, encouraging them
57 The following discussion of the Thammacarik
program is based in part upon the reports of the
program for I966 and I967. See Thailand. De-
partment of Public Welfare, Ministry of Interior,
Raingan kanphoeiphrae phraphutthasatsana kae
chaokhao thang phak nya pi 2509 ['Report Con-
phraphutthasatsana kae chaokhao cangwat tangtang
nai khet patthibatkan thang phak nya pracam pi
2511 ['Program Presented for the Convenience of
Thammacarik Monks Going as Buddhist Mission-
aries to the Tribal People in Selected Provinces of
the North, I968'] (Bangkok, February 2, I968).
cerning the Buddhist Mission to the Tribal People
in the North in I966'] (Bangkok, March 20, I967)
and Thailand, Department of Public Welfare, Min-
58 Thailand. Department of Public Welfare, Min-
istry of Interior (I967), Op. cit., p. 45; my trans-
lation.
istry of Interior, (I968), op. cit. In addition, I
have also made use of the schedule for the I968
program-Thailand. Department of Public Welfare,
Ministry of Interior, Phaenkan thawai khwamsaduak
59 This information is based on a mimeographed
listing of the composition of each mission group
which was distributed to the Thammacarik monks
in I968.
kae khana phrathammacarik khyn pai phoeiphrae
TABLE I-BUDDHIST MISSIONS TO TRIBAL PEOPLES
(Thammacarik Program)
Estimated
population ot
Tribal group to tribal groups Number of missionary stationsb
whom missionaries (Total in
were sent Thailand)a 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Karen 123,000 + 3 3 4 5 9
Meo 53,000 + 6 13 8 5 4
Akha 25,000 + 2 1 3 2 0
T'in 19,000 0 0 1 0 1 0
Lisu 17,000 + 1 2 2 1 4
Yao 16,000 + 3 0 2 2 1
Lahu 16,000 + 1 0 0 2 1
Yao/Akhao 0 0 1 0 1 1
Yao/Lisuo 0 0 0 1 0 0
Yao/Meoo 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total [ca. 300,000d] 10 16 21 20 20 21
Notes:
a No adequate census data for tribal populations in Thailand exist. The figures here are based on estimates
given by Gordon Young in his monograph, The Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand, 2nd ed. (Bangkok:
The Siam Society, 1962) and in the Report of the United Nations Survey Team on the Economic and
Social Needs of the Opium-Producing Areas in Thailand (Bangkok: Government House Printing Office,
1967), p. 8. The latter estimates are based on official Thai estimates made in 1965/66. The highest
figures given by these sources, rounded to the nearest thousand, have been used for the reason that
most students of tribal society in Thailand believe published estimates of tribal populations to be
understated. The figures for Karen, Meo, Yao, and Lahu are based on the U.N. estimates, while the
figures for Akha, T'in, and Lisu are based on Young.
b Data for 1965, 1966, and 1967 were drawn from Thailand. Department of Public Welfare, Ministry
of Interior (1967), op. cit. and from Thailand. Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Interior
(1968), op. cit. Those for 1968, 1969, and 1970 were taken from mimeographed materials distributed
to missionary monks. Detailed breakdown of the figures for 1965 was unavailable. However, the data
does permit indication (noted with +) of tribal groups to whom missionaries were sent.
Three mission stations were at centers where more than one tribal group was represented.
d The estimate of 300,000, or about 1% of the total population in Thailand in the mid-1960's, subsumes
all tribal groups including several to whom Buddhist missionaries have not yet been sent.
to be confirmed as Buddhists and, for a few men and boys, encouraging them to be
ordained as novices or monks. In I965, I2 tribal people were ordained as novices.
In I966, a major ordination ceremony of i8 tribals was held at Wat Bencamophit in
Bangkok which was attended by officials and members of the families of those
ordained. Also in I966, permanent monks were assigned to two tribal villages. In
I967, another 46 were ordained, four of whom were monks and the rest novices.
About half of these were ordained in Bangkok and the rest were ordained in local
temples in the North. However, of those ordained, few remained for even a whole
lenten period. As the abbot of Wat Bencamophit told me in an interview, the high
"drop-out" rate was a consequence of the fact that the adult men involved had to
return to support their families and that many were illiterate and thus could not
participate fully in all activities of clerical life.60 In I967, only two novices remained
60 Interview with Phra Thammakittisophon, Ab-
I968.
bot of Wat Bencamophit, Bangkok, February 12,
of the group ordained in I965, while 25 novices and one monk ordained in I966 still
remained. Nineteen of those who remained were Meo, with the remaining nine
being distributed among Lisu (3), T'in (3), Yao (2) and Ho Chinese (i)4
The concentration on the Meo is obviously a consequence of the great concern
which developed in government circles in the past few years regarding this group.
Nearly half the mission stations in the three years of the program and over half of
the missionaries have been in Meo areas. This concentration on the Meo is out of
proportion to the relative size of the Meo population among the tribal peoples, since
the Meo comprise only about ii percent of the total tribal population.61 In the last
two years of the program, there has been a decline in the number of missionary sta-
tions among the Meo, a reflection, perhaps, of recent fears regarding security in
Meo areas. There has also been a marked increase in the number of stations among
the Karen, bringing the amount of attention given this group more in accord with
the relative size of the Karen population in Thailand.
The Thammacarik program is intended to accomplish quite a different pur-
pose than simply loosening of primordial attachments of the tribal people and
drawing these people into greater involvement in national life. The overall aim of the
government's tribal policy is the assimilation of the tribal people into Thai culture.
This policy was clearly enunciated in a speech by the director-general of the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare:
In promoting the development and welfare of the hill people, the Government's
main objectives may be summarized as follows:
i. To prevent the destruction of forest and sources of natural streams, by encour-
aging stabilized agriculture to replace the destructive shifting cultivation prac-
tised by the hill tribes.
2. To end poppy growing, by promoting other means of livelihood.
3. To develop the economic and social conditions of hill tribes so that they may
contribute to the national development, by promoting community development
among the hill tribes grouped in settlements.
4. To induce the hill tribes to accept the important role of helping to maintain
the security of national frontiers, by instilling in them a sense of belonging and
national loyalty to the nation.62
To effect the latter end, it is obvious that the government looks primarily to the
Buddhist missionaries.63
The degree to which Thai Buddhism can play the new role which the govern-
ment has cast for it is still open to question. The actual impact of the Buddhist
missions upon tribal cultures has not been the success that the official reports would
seem to suggest.
In a first-hand study of the Thammacarik program which I made in the Karen
stations of Mae Sariang District, Mae Hong Son Province, I found that the monks
were unable to communicate with the tribal peoples owing to an absence of a com-
mon language. The monks (with one exception) could not speak Karen and few of
61 Report of the United Nations Survey Team

fare Scheme for the Hill Tribes in Thailand,"
on the Economic and Social Needs of the Opium(Chiengmai, Thailand: Tribal Research Centre,
producing Areas in Thailand. January/February

First Symposium on Hill Tribes in Thailand, Au-
I967 (Bangkok: Government House Printing Of-
fice, I967), p. 8.
gust 29, I967), pp. I8-I9.
63 Ibid., p. 23.
62 Suwa Ruenyote, "The Development and Wel-
the Karen could speak even Northern Thai (Yuan), much less the Thai spoken by
Bangkok monks. What was transmitted then was exposure to certain pieces of overt
behavior (eg., how to give alms to the monks) without any of the ideological
basis upon which the behavior was predicated. With the departure of the monks,
nothing appears to have changed in the beliefs of the Karens.
Even the official reports give indication that the mission program has made only
a superficial impression upon the tribal peoples. For example, in the assessment of
the first year of the program, it was stated that the incorporation of Buddhism into
tribal culture was not at the expense of tribal beliefs since Buddhism "is not at
variance with the animism of the tribal peoples" (Thailand. Department of Public
Welfare, Ministry of Interior, I967:48).
A superficial understanding of Buddhism is potentially more threatening to the
aims of the government as regards the tribal peoples than no understanding at all.
Recent Buddhist millenarianism among P'wo Karen in Kanchanaburi province in
western Thailand64 and the attraction of tribal peoples to a charismatic defrocked
follower of Khru Ba Siwichai known as the Khu Ba Khao (or Pha Khao Pi) in
North Thailand65 have provided the basis for the creation of movements among tri-
bal peoples which could possibly be turned against the government.
The superficial character of Buddhist mission efforts is a consequence also of the
lack of attention given to the differences in cultures of tribal peoples by those who
have constructed and administered the Thammacarik program. The program is
uniform despite the fact that such groups as the T'in (and other Mon-Khmer groups
such as the Lua' and Khamu which have not yet been missionized) have had long
contacts with Tai-speaking lowlanders (i.e., the Yuan) while other groups such as
the Meo and Yao have been amongst Tai-speaking Buddhists for only a short
time. The fact that a majority of tribal clergy were sent in I968 to groups other
than those to which they themselves belonged suggests that those who control the
program tend to see all tribals as basically the same.
With continued experience, the Thammacarik missionaries may become more
sophisticated in their techniques, thus overcoming some of these problems. Even if
this happens a more significant problem will yet remain, namely, the tying of the
program to political ends. On the tribal side, resistance could appear to the pro-
gram if the tribals perceive that the missionaries are working along with other
governmental officials to undermine completely their traditional cultures. Tribal
opposition to Buddhist missionaries could also have a detrimental effect on the good
relations which many monks in the north have developed with tribals outside of the
mission program.
64 Theodore Stern, "Aryiya and the Golden
Yuan character inherent in the movement led by
Book: A Millenarian Buddhist Sect among the

the Khu Ba Khao, my own investigations into this
Karen," Journal of Asian Studies, 27 (I968), pp.
297-328.
movement, primarily in Mae Hong Son and Tak
provinces, have revealed the facts that the move-
65 Marlowe, op. cit. In another paper, Marlowe

ment spurns any connection with the established
has suggested that Karen followers of the Khu Ba
Khao have become assimilated to Northern Thai
(Yuan) ceremonials and institutions (David Mar-
lowe, "The S'kaw Karen of Chiang Mai" [Un-
published paper read at the annual meeting of the
Association for Asian Studies, San Francisco, April
Sangha (except on a purely local and personalistic
basis) and, in turn, is looked on with grave sus-
picion by members of the Sangha hierarchy. Far
more investigation on this movement and upon
Buddhist millenariasm in general as has appeared
in Thailand still needs to be done.
3, 1970], p. io). While I would not dispute the
The use of Buddhism to serve political ends as in such programs as Thamma-
carik and Thammathut could also have unfortunate consequences for the Sangha
itself. In modern Thai history, the Sangha has maintained a significant degree of
freedom of action within the religious sphere. The freedom has not been threatened
by the restrictions imposed by the government on the Sangha nor by the frequent
involvement of monks in ceremonial activities sponsored by the state. The implicit
premise underlying church-state relations during most of the 20th century seems to
have been that since most Thai are Buddhists, Buddhism could provide an aura of
sanctity for secular activities rather than that Buddhism should be a mechanism
which could be manipulated by the State in achieving secular goals. Insofar as
Buddhism becomes an instrument of national policy, freedom of action by mem-
bers of the Sangha could become severely limited even in the realm of religious af-
fairs.
Conclusions
The effect of the policies instituted under King Culalongkorn was the creation of
a national church in Thailand which today numbers as adherents the overwhelming
majority of the citizenry. The implementation of these policies was faciliated by the
fact that while the Yuan and Lao traditions were distinctive from that of the Siamese,
all three still belonged to a greater tradition, that of Therevada Buddhism. All three
shared a common set of symbols which could be appealed to by the national leaders
in their efforts to construct a national church. This is not to say, however, that the
undermining of primordial attachments to the separate Buddhist traditions of Thai-
land was somehow an inevitable consequence of the creation of a national polity.
The sectarian clevages still to be found among Therevada Buddhists in Burma and
Ceylon demonstrate that quite the opposite could have occurred. The ultimate
success of Culalongkorn's policies is to found in the recognition that a national
church depended more upon establishment of a hierarchical structure in which all
members of the clergy were brought under the authority of the Thai Sangha than it
did upon the impression of cultural uniformity on all of the adherents of Buddhism
within the kingdom. This guiding principle was specifically recognized by Prince
Wachirayan, the supreme patriarch of the Sangha at the time of the promulgation of
the Sangha Administration Act of I902, when he stated that the clergy in Thailand
were bound by local custom as well as by the regulations of the great tradition (the
Vinaya) and the laws of Thailand.
The emergence of a strong national church with an elaborate structure seems to
have been faciliated also by the societal context in which it developed. Evers has
suggested that the greater formalization of the Thai Sangha, as compared with the
Singhalese Sangha, is associated with the fact that Thailand, unlike Ceylon, is "a
society in which relatively few ascriptive criteria are available for the formation of
social groups, and where basic rules are vaguely defined."66 It is certainly true that
in Thailand, the Sangha is one of the few highly formalized structures which exists.
This characteristic of the Thai Sangha, together with the fact that the great pro-
portion of Thai are Buddhists, underlie the recent government efforts to utilize the
Thai church as a instrument for achieving politically defined national ends. How-
66 Hans-Dieter Evers, "The Buddhist Sangha in
p. 24.
Ceylon and Thailand," Sociologus, n.s., i8 (I968),
ever, the efforts to manipulate Buddhism for political ends which are evident in the
Thammathut and particularly in the Thammacarik program could prove to be de-
leterious rather than advantageous to the attainment of national goals.
Insofar as equation of being Thai with being Buddhist is a cornerstone of Thai
official thinking, non-Buddhists could be denied access to participation in the na-
tional community. It could be predicted that such a policy would lead to increasing
alienation on the part of such minorities as the Thai-Islam who show no signs of
becoming Buddhists. A similar case could be made for the tribal peoples unless the
assimilationist programs become far more successful than they have to date.
Given the essentially other-worldly and nonmaterialist character of the Buddhist
religious life, one is also led to wonder how far the Thai Sangha could be pushed to
promote economic development without seriously undermining the credibility of
clerical roles in the eyes of both the Sangha and laity alike. This is not to argue that
Buddhism is somehow incompatible with economic development. However, the
character of the role of Buddhist monk'67 suggests that the contribution of monks to
development lies more in the providing of spiritual advice and solace to those who
labor to bring about the transformation of Thai society than in being toilers in that
field themselves.
While the Thammathut and Thammacarik program do represent moves in the
direction of making Buddhism an instrument of national policy, that die has not
yet been irrevocably cast. These programs are too recent to be able to assess fully
their future course. The question of the role which Buddhism is to play in Thai-
land's search for modernity is still undecided. However that question is resolved,
Thailand is fortunate in being able to face the future knowing that it does not have
to overcome marked communal dissent which is rooted in local and regional Bud-
dhist traditions or in sectarianism. Such threats to national unity which might have
appeared in these guises were successfully countered nearly 70 years ago as part of the
integrative revolution wrought by King Culalongkorn.
67 Cf., Jasper Ingersoll, "The Priest Role in Cen-
(New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Stud-
tral Village Thailand," in Anthropological Studies
ies, Cultural Report Series No. I3, I966), pp. 51-
in Therevada Buddhism, by Manning Nash, et al.
76.
Urban Ties of Rural Thais

Authors(s): Theodore D. Fuller, Peerasit Kamnuansilpa and Paul Lightfoot
Source: The International Migration Review, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 534-562
Published by: Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.
Accessed: 29-03-2016 03:33 UTC
Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to The International Migration Review
Urban Ties of Rural Thais1
Theodore D. Fuller
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Peerasit Kamnuansilpa
National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok
Paul Lightfoot
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, Bangkok
Sponsorship plays an important role in influencing migration deci?
sions and shaping migration streams. Therefore, it is important to
document the nature and extent of interpersonal linkages between
villagers and urban dwellers. This article presents such an analysis for
Thailand, in a context dominated by circular mobility. Using data from
Northeast Thailand, it examines the prevalence of urban social con?
tacts, selectivities involved in such linkages, the characteristics of the
urban contacts themselves, the salience of the interpersonal relation?
ships, and the potential for the urban contact to act as a sponsor for
the villagers. Furthermore, using a prospective research design, the
impact of social contacts on subsequent rural-urban mobility of villag?
ers is examined. Given the dominance of Bangkok in the Thai urban
hierarchy and given the interest of decentralized urbanization ex?
pressed by Thai policymakers, it is important to distinguish between
Bangkok and regional centers. Therefore, the article systematically
distinguishes between Bangkok and Northeast Thai centers. By so
doing, the study clarifies some of the obstacles hindering the decen?
tralized urbanization program in Thailand.
Migration plays a profoundly important role in shaping the development
of many less developed countries, including Thailand. Not only does migra?
tion influence the demographic development of less developed countries, it
also contributes to their social and economic development. It is becoming
increasingly clear that there is a great ebb and flow between rural and urban
1 This paper was previously presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological
Society, Atlanta, April 9-12, 1987. The research reported here was funded by the Rockefeller
and Ford Foundations' Research Program on Population and Development Policy (RF 77065;
Allocation 164). We are grateful to Joel Smith and to several anonymous reviewers for their
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
534 IMR Volume xxiv, No. 3
URBAN TIES OF RURAL THAIS 535
areas of developing countries. Circular mobility is an important part of this
ebb and flow in Thailand (Lauro, 1979; Singhanetra-Renard, 1981; Light-
foot, et al, 1983), as elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Goldstein, 1978; Hugo,
1982).
Contacts between villagers and urban dwellers play an important role in
influencing migration decisions and shaping migration streams. The migra?
tion literature demonstrates that potential migrants typically consider few
alternative destinations before moving. Their decisions concerning where
and even whether to move are heavily influenced by the social networks
linking them to other places. The important function of providing informa?
tion about urban opportunities is often performed by the villager's kinfolk,
but can be performed by close friends, co-workers or employers as well. In
addition to providing information about opportunities, urban social contacts
also provide a variety of sponsorship functions once the migration has
actually moved. Whenever a migrant arrives in a new community, he needs
a place to stay, a job and information about the community. He needs
someone to "show him the ropes" and someone who will help "bail him out"
if he gets into trouble. Having a social contact at the destination can ease the
adjustment process and can spell the difference between migrating or not.
Conceptualization of the forms and function of sponsorship has evolved
over the past quarter century. In their seminal article, MacDonald and
MacDonald (1964) emphasized the role of previous migrants in the recruit?
ment and assimilation of later migrants. A few years later, Tilly and Brown
(1967) pointed out that various social structures (kinship, friendship, work)
link migrants to the receiving community, and these "auspices of migration"
can have a significant impact on the subsequent involvement and adjust?
ment of migrants. The adaptive strategies of migrants are further
elaborated and systematized by Graves and Graves (1980), with their dis?
cussion of Kin-Reliance, Peer-Reliance and Self-Reliance.
Most studies of sponsorship have been conducted in the context of
"permanent" migration. While migration is usually broadly defined as any
"permanent or semipermanent change in residence" (Lee, 1966:49), the
term circulation encompasses "a great variety of movements, usually short-
term, repetitive, or cyclic in nature, but all having in common the lack of
any declared intention of a permanent or long-lasting change in residence"
(Zelinsky, 1971:255-6). As Chapman notes, depending on the discipline of
the researcher and the context of the mobility, "circulation is designated by
a confusing variety of terms: return migration, circular migration, wage-
labour migration, seasonal mobility, sojourner movement, transhumance,
commuting" (1982:1-2; see, also, Prothero and Chapman, 1985).
Circular mobility is one species of circulation. Specifically, circular mo?
bility refers to back and forth movement between two locations. Circular
536 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW
rural-urban mobility?i.e., the back and forth movement of the population
between rural and urban areas?has become an important part of the
economic strategy of a large proportion of rural households in many
developing countries. Diversification of the rural economy has meant not
only the introduction of new crops, but also greater involvement in the
urban labor force. As a result of this diversification, it is not uncommon for
the largest share of cash income to be derived from off-farm labor, usually
urban labor. Many rural households, then, maintain their niche in their
villages by using urban opportunities to supplement their incomes.
Circular mobility is quantitatively far more significant than the types of
permanent migration recorded by national censuses or traditional surveys
and is potentially consequential for the social and economic development
of both urban and rural areas. Furthermore, the circular movement of
individuals between the village and the city stimulates a constant flow of
information about jobs, economic conditions, new technology and changing
values and mores (Goldstein, et al., 1977).
Social contacts are equally, if not more, important in the context of
circular mobility. The pattern of repeated, relatively short duration moves
that is so typical in Thailand depends for its success on, and contributes to,
the availability of reliable village-based information about current job and
housing opportunities. Therefore, it is important to document the nature
and extent of interpersonal linkages between villagers and urban dwellers.
Others have examined the ties that urban migrants maintain with their rural
origins (Goldstein, et al., 1977; see, also, Papanek, 1975). This article exam?
ines the social contacts that link Northeast Thai villagers with urban areas.
Specifically, the study addresses a number of questions. First, how prev?
alent are urban contacts among Thai villagers? Second, are specific groups
of villagers more likely to have such urban contacts than are other villagers?
Third, what are the characteristics of the urban contacts, and how strong is
the bond between the villagers and their urban social contacts? Finally, what
are the implications of having urban contacts, in terms of the potential for
the urban contacts to serve as sponsors for villagers and the subsequent
rural-urban mobility of the villagers.
THE SETTING
Thailand displays a highly centralized pattern of urbanization. Bangkok,
with approximately half of the national urban population, is over 50 times
as large as Thailand's second largest city and appears to be increasing its
urban primacy (Sternstein, 1984). Policymakers in a number of less devel?
oped countries?including Thailand?are concerned that a highly
centralized pattern of urbanization may be undesirable in that it may create
a barrier to national social and economic development. In light of these
concerns, it is interesting to examine similarities and differences in patterns
of social contacts with Bangkok versus provincial capitals.2
As implied by the high degree of urban primacy, the provincial capitals
throughout the country are small compared to Bangkok. According to the 1980
census (National Statistical Office, 1983b), the 16 provincial capitals in the
Northeast region ranged in size from 15,000 to 100,000. Twelve of the 16,
including Roi-et (population: 29,295), had populations of less than 32,000.
This research is based on a household survey conducted in several villages
in Northeast Thailand. Northeast Thailand is an impoverished region that
has been characterized by substantial out-migration for decades, much of it
directed toward Bangkok (Goldstein and Goldstein, 1986; Fuller, 1990).
Within the Northeast, Roi-et Province was selected because of its high rate
of migration to Bangkok and its low income. Within Roi-et, Atsamat District
was selected because its population growth rate during the 1970s was similar
to that for the entire province and because its level of accessibility and level
of development were typical of much of the province. Map 1 shows the
location of Roi-et Province within the Northeast region; the inset shows the
location of the Northeast relative to Bangkok and the rest of Thailand.
Within Roi-et, and indeed throughout much of the Northeast, circular
mobility is an extremely common economic strategy (Lightfoot, et al., 1983).
The prevalence of circular mobility has no doubt affected the development
of urban contacts.
THE SAMPLE
Villages in Thailand are organized administratively into tambon (communes)
consisting of about ten villages. The data analyzed in this research were
collected in the six study villages over a five year period. The six villages
were selected from two communes which appeared to be similar in terms of
size, accessibility and basic social and economic characteristics. The six
villages?which range in population from just under 500 persons to just
over 1,000?are relatively poor, they are neither immediately adjacent to
an urban area nor excessively remote, and they are representative of many
areas supplying migrants to Bangkok and other urban centers (See, Fuller,
et al., 1983, for details about the study area).
Approximately 50 percent of the households in each village were selected,
for a total of 356 households. A simple random sample was obtained, with
the proviso that selected households should have in residence at least one
2 As Goldstein and Goldstein (1978) note, there is no official Thai definition of "urban." Most
analyses equate "urban" with administrative "municipal areas." Normally, a municipal area must
have a population of at least 10,000 or be a provincial capital. Goldstein and Goldstein argue that
"sanitary districts" should also be included in the urban population (1978:257). "Sanitary
districts" are frequently district capitals and vice versa (a district is a subdivision of a province).
538
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW
MAPI
Northeastern Thailand and Roi-Et Province
) /m i ? /?" ^ r* ?
' . ' ? MohasoroKhom ^Ro>-Et / , -^
\ChQiyophum m) \ ? - . Jvosothon
f Y-^ ? -^ m . ? J
^ ? ^-T"* ? ? / ' V. -\Ubon rate ho thorn ?C
? ? * ) ( i s'soket ^ ^ * ?
f Bur.rom \ ' \ ? ? ? / V.
' /OSur.n /.
?\
./?
/
;
I
i
^-*S ^ -^J, ^-? *^ KAMPUCHEA
?? ??? ??? Notional boundary ______ Provincial boundary
Provincial tov?
Dii*' ' t town
person within the demographic groups from which the great majority of
Thai rural-urban migrants are drawn: males 15-39 and never married
females 15-39. Three waves of interviews were conducted in each sample
household. These interviews occurred during July-September 1978, July-
September 1979 and April-August 1983. During each wave, two interviews
were conducted with persons from each household: the household head (or
representative) and one young adult (a male 15-39 or a never married
female 15-39). The household head interview provided information about
the household as a whole. The second interview provided more detailed
information about one member of the household. If the household head was
a member of the aforementioned demographic groups, he or she was
eligible to be interviewed with the second questionnaire; where more than
one eligible person was available for the second interview, random methods
were used to select one respondent. Both questionnaires were administered
in each household in each year. Some of the data discussed in this study
derive from the household head interviews, but most of the data are from
the special interviews with younger members of the sample households. The
same young adult was interviewed during each wave. If a young adult was
absent at the time of the second or third wave, another household member
was asked to provide information about the original respondent's where?
abouts and recent mobility.
PREVALENCE OF URBAN CONTACTS
Urban social contact means simply anyone that a villager happens to know
in an urban place. Various name generators can be used in research on social
networks (Burt, 1984). This study used a fairly broad name generator: "Do
you have any friends or relatives in any provincial capitals or district towns
anywhere?" Following this general question, in an effort to improve recall,
there were probes for Bangkok and several Northeast provincial capitals.
After these urban social contacts were identified, questions were asked to
identify several characteristics of the social contacts. Specifically, for each
named urban social contact, their sex, age, migrant status, occupation,
household size, relationship with the respondent, the frequency of recent
contact with the respondent and the respondent's perception of the contact's
willingness to provide sponsorship were ascertained.
Many villagers from Roi-et have a personal contact in some Northeast
town (i.e., provincial capital or district town), but they are much more likely
to know someone in Bangkok. Of the 356 villagers, 179 (50.3%) have a
contact only in Bangkok; 62 (17.4%) report having an urban social contact
both in Bangkok and in at least one Northeast town; 43 (12.1%) have a
contact only in a Northeast town; and 72 (20.2%) do not have an urban social
contact in Bangkok or in any Northeast town. In all, nearly 30 percent of
villagers report that they know someone in a Northeast town, while fully
two-thirds of these villagers know someone in Bangkok (Table 1). Given the
fact that Roi-et is some 700 kilometers from Bangkok, it is somewhat
remarkable that these villagers?all living in Northeast villages?are more
than twice as likely to know someone in Bangkok as they are to know
someone in any of the 16 provincial capitals in the Northeast region. This
TABLE 1
Prevalence of Contacts in Bangkok and Northeast Towns
Bangkok Northeast Towns
Percent of villagers with urban contacts (n=356) 67.5 29.5
Total number of urban contacts 400 134
Average number of urban contacts
All villagers 1.13 0.38
Villagers with at least one contact 1.67 1.30
Number of urban contacts (%)
1 62.8 73.8
2 17.2 22.3
3 12.6 3.9
4 7.4 0.0
is a reflection of the urban primacy of Bangkok and the fact that villagers
from Roi-et have a strong history of movement to Bangkok.
In all, the 356 villagers mentioned some 400 social contacts in Bangkok,
versus 134 in Northeast towns.3 Most of the villagers who reported knowing
someone in Bangkok mentioned only one such social contact; the same can
be said for Northeast towns. However, a considerable number of villagers
reported multiple contacts in Northeast towns or in Bangkok.
SELECTIVITY OF URBAN CONTACTS
Not all villagers are equally likely to have urban social contacts. Villagers in
their 20s are somewhat more likely to have contacts in Bangkok than are
younger or older villagers (Table 2) (chi-squared = 11.5, df = 4, p < .05).
On the other hand, there is no significant relationship between age and the
likelihood of having contacts in Northeast Thai towns. Also, there is no
significant relationship between sex and the likelihood of having contacts
in either Bangkok or Northeast Thai towns. Thus, young women are no less
likely to have such contacts than are village men.
Heads of household are less likely to have urban social contacts?at least
to have contacts in Bangkok. While 58 percent of the heads of household
report social contacts in Bangkok, 68 percent of the sons and 75 percent of
the sons-in-law and (single) daughters mention social contacts in Bangkok
(with the "other" group omitted, chi-squared = 7.31, df = 3, p < .07). The
pattern for Northeast towns is rather different. Although the differences
3 It is entirely possible that two or more villagers could have mentioned the same urban social
contact. For current purposes, it is not necessary to know whether such sharing exists.
541
URBAN TIES OF RURAL THAIS
TABLE 2
percent of villagers having urban contacts by selected
Villager Characteristics
Northeast
Bangkok
Towns
Age (n = 356)
69.0%
30.1%
75.8
24.2
15-19 (n= 113)
20-24 (n=62)
77.1
27.1
50.0
36.5
65.4
29.6
25-29 (n = 48)
30-34 (n = 52)
35-39 (n= 81)
Sex (n= 355)
65.6
28.9
75.6
30.5
57.7
34.0
Male (n= 273)
Female (n = 82)
Relationship to household head (n = 356)
Head (n = 97)
67.7
22.6
74.7
31.6
75.0
35.4
75.0
25.0
72.9
29.3
61.7
29.9
Son (n= 124)
Daughter (n = 79)
Son-in-law (n = 48)
Other (n = 8)
Marital status (n = 356)
Single (n= 188)
Married (n= 167)
Household size (n = 354)
66.0
28.0
65.3
32.3
1-4 persons (n= 50)
5 or 6 persons (n= 124)
70.0
28.3
7 or more persons (n = 180)
Education (n = 338)
67.4
23.0
Four years (n = 98)
66.3
43.7
More than 4 years (n = 258)
Occupation (n = 354)
67.3
26.2
91.7
58.3
Farmer (n = 294)
Teacher (n= 12)
56.4
43.6
88.9
44.4
63.6
31.6
Student (n = 39)
Other (n = 9)
Mobility to Bangkok in last 3 years (n = 356)
None (n = 297)
84.8
19.6
One trip (n = 46)
100.0
15.4
Two or more trips (n= 13)
Mobility to Northeast towns in last 3 years (n = 356)
69.1
28.2
None (n = 333)
47.8
One trip (n = 23)_
47.8
are not statistically significant, heads of household are more likely than their
sons to mention social contacts in Northeast towns (34% versus 23%).
Daughters and sons-in-law resemble household heads in this respect (32%
of the daughters and 35% of the sons-in-law mention social contacts in
Northeast towns).
Single villagers are more likely to mention social contacts in Bangkok
than are married villagers: 73 percent versus 62 percent (chi-squared =
5.06, df = 1, p < .05). Marital status seems irrelevant, however, to the
likelihood that a villager has a social contact in a Northeast town.
The number of persons in the household seems to have no influence on
the likelihood that a villager mentions an urban social contact in either
Bangkok or Northeast towns. Similarly, education has no impact on whether
a villager has a social contact in Bangkok. However, education is strongly
related to whether or not a villager has a social contact in Northeast towns:
only 23 percent of villagers with four years of education mention a social
contact in Northeast towns, but 44 percent of villagers with more than four
years of education mention such contacts (chi-squared = 17.5, df = 1, p <
.001). This is no doubt related to the fact that village children who wish to
obtain more than a basic education must go to school in one of the urban
centers, usually in Roi-et, the capital of Roi-et Province.
Village teachers are the occupational group most likely to have social
contacts in Bangkok and in Northeast towns. Virtually all village teachers
(92%) have contacts in Bangkok. Furthermore, teachers are twice as likely
as other villagers to have a social contact in a Northeast town (58% versus
29%). Some of these teachers may have actually gone to school in Bangkok;
at any rate, teachers no doubt have a more mobile circle of friends than do
other villagers.
Students are less likely to have social contacts in Bangkok than are
villagers who have already begun their working career?they are too young
to have had many opportunities to visit Bangkok and make friends there.
Still, over half of the students do mention friends they have in Bangkok. In
fact, students are more likely to have social contacts in Bangkok?even
though they may have little first hand experience with it?than in Northeast
towns, although they in all likelihood are going to school in a Northeast
provincial capital (56% versus 44%).4
Not surprisingly, having urban social contacts is also influenced by recent
circular mobility. Villagers who had gone to Bangkok within the three years
4 The relationship between occupation and having urban social contacts reaches borderline
significance for Bangkok (chi-squared = 7.26, df = 3, p < .07) and reaches significance at the
.02 level for Northeast towns (chi-squared = 10.9, df = 3). With "other" occupations deleted,
the results are similar; for Bangkok, chi-squared = 5.25, p < .08; for Northeast towns,
chi-squared = 10.6, p < .01.
prior to the survey were more likely to have social contacts there. Specific?
ally, 64, 85 and 100 percent respectively of villagers who had been to
Bangkok never, once or more than once in the least three years knew
someone in Bangkok (chi-squared = 14.5, df = 2, p < .001). Similarly,
villagers who had been to a Northeast town within the last three years were
more likely to have a social contact in some Northeast town (chi-squared =
3.97, df = 1, p < .05). Interestingly, those who went to Bangkok are
significantly less likely to know someone in any Northeast town, and those
who went to a Northeast town are significantly less likely to know someone
in Bangkok (p < .05 for both).
CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN CONTACTS
The urban contacts mentioned by the villagers are not a representative
cross-section of the residents of Bangkok and Northeast towns. The most
notable difference pertains to the migration status of the urban contacts in
Bangkok. While 67 percent of Bangkok residents (age 5 or more) were
natives of Bangkok (National Statistical Office, 1983a), only 8 percent of
the villagers' social contacts were natives of Bangkok (Table 3). The vast
majority of the villagers' Bangkok contacts were from Roi-et: nearly half
(46%) are from the respondent's home village; another 41% are from
elsewhere in Roi-et. By contrast, migrants from Roi-et represent only 2.2
percent of the lifetime migrants to Bangkok and 2.2 percent of the five year
(1975-80) migrants to Bangkok (National Statistical Office, 1983a).
While very few of the social contacts in Bangkok were natives of Bangkok,
a larger proportion of social contacts in Northeast towns are natives of those
towns: 31 percent.5 A majority of the contacts come from Roi-et Province:
37 percent are from the respondents home village, while 25 percent are
from elsewhere in Roi-et. These migrant status distributions for urban social
contacts in Bangkok versus Northeast towns are significantly different
(chi-squared = 51.6, df = 5, p < .001).
The contacts in Bangkok are slightly older than the villagers (median age
= 25.2 versus 24.2), while those in Northeast towns are substantially older
(31.4). About one quarter of the contacts are within one year of the age of
the villager who mentioned them. Frequently, however, villagers mentioned
contacts who are older than themselves. In roughly half the cases, and
especially for Northeast towns, villagers mentioned contacts who are older.
Also, both male and female villagers tend to mention contacts of the same
sex as themselves, particularly in Bangkok where 80 percent of the time
male villagers mention male contacts and 75 percent of the time female
5 The 1980 Census does not report what proportion of Northeast townspeople are natives.
It does report that 80% of the population of Northeast municipal areas (age 5 or more) were
five-year nonmigrants (1975-80).
544
TABLE 3
Characteristics of Urban Contacts in Bangkok and Northeast Towns
Northeast
Bangkok
Towns
Migrant status of urban contact (n = 370; 126)a
Native of place of residence 8.1% 31.0
From respondent's village 46.5 37.3
From nearby village 3.0 6.3
From Roi-et 38.1 19.0
From another rural area 2.2 1.6
From another urban area 2.2 4.8
Median Age (n= 384; 128) 25.2 31.4
Percent same age (? 1 year) 26.0 28.5
Percent older than villager 47.9 57.7
Percent male (n= 385; 131) 65.6 64.2
Percent same sex as villager (M/F) 80.1/74.5 69.7/54.1
Number in household of urban contact (n=376; 120) 2.58 3.92
Occupation of urban contact (n = 376; 127)
Factory laborer 16.8 1.6
Wage laborer (nonfactory) 19.9 6.3
Taxi/pedicab driver 12.8 4.7
Shopkeeper 7.7 16.5
Tailor/dressmaker 7.2 3.1
House servant 5.3 0.0
Teacher 1.1 11.8
Student 2.1 7.9
Other 23.4 41.7
None_3/7_6.3
Note: a Number for Bangkok; number for Northeast Towns.
villagers mention female contacts. In Northeast towns, the corresponding
percentages are 70 percent and 54 percent.
The urban contacts in both Bangkok and Northeast towns have relatively
small households. In Bangkok, the average household size for the contacts is
only 2.6 persons, compared to an average of 5.1 for all households in Bangkok.
In Northeast towns, the average household size for contacts is somewhat larger,
but is still only 3.9 compared to 5.1 for municipal areas and urban sanitary
districts in the Northeast. As noted above, the contacts are disproportionately
likely to be migrants, especially migrants from Roi-et. Although there are no
specific data to confirm our suspicions, it is quite possible that migrant house?
holds are generally smaller than nonmigrant households.
The occupations of the social contacts in Bangkok are rather different
from the occupations of contacts in Northeast towns (chi-squared = 100.6,
df = 9, p < .001 ).6 To some extent, the differences in the occupations of
urban contacts in Bangkok versus Northeast towns reflects differences in
the occupational and industrial structures of the respective urban areas, and
to some extent the differences reflect the opportunities for villagers to
establish contacts with persons living in those places. Roi-et is famous for
providing taxi drivers to Bangkok. Indeed, 13 percent of the contacts in
Bangkok are taxi drivers. In Northeast towns, a maximum of 4.7 percent
of the contacts are taxi drivers.
An even larger proportion of Bangkok contacts are laborers. Over one
third of the contacts in Bangkok are laborers: 17 percent are factory laborers
and 20 percent are nonfactory wage laborers. Consistent with the paucity
of factories in Northeast Thailand, very few of the social contacts in North?
east Thai towns are factory laborers: less than 2 percent. And only 6 percent
are nonfactory wage laborers. Compared to contacts in Northeast towns,
contacts in Bangkok are more likely to be house servants (5.3% versus 0.0%)
or tailors or dressmakers (7.2% versus 3.1%). On the other hand, compared
to contacts in Bangkok, contacts in Northeast towns are more likely to be
shopkeepers (16.5% versus 7.7%), teachers (11.8% versus 1.1%) or students
(7.9% versus 2.1%). The relatively large number of contacts in Northeast
towns who are teachers or students no doubt stems from the fact that many
village youths go to school in Roi-et.
SALIENCE OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH URBAN CONTACTS
How strong is the bond between the villager and each urban social contact?
There are several ways to assess the salience of the relationship. First, the
type of social relationship is examined. Second, the number of times the
villager and the social contact have met or communicated in the recent past
is considered.
Most of the social contacts that villagers mention are relatives. This is
true for both Bangkok and Northeast towns, but is especially characteristic
of contacts in Northeast towns. Specifically, 55 percent of the social contacts
in Bangkok are relatives and 74 percent of the social contacts in Northeast
towns are relatives (Table 4). In Bangkok, the social contacts are almost as
likely to be siblings as they are to be other relatives (25% versus 30%); in
Northeast towns, there are far fewer siblings than other relatives (19%
versus 54%). Other social contacts are friends from the villagers' home
village. Villagers report more friends from their home village now living in
6 The expected frequency is less than five for two cells, teachers and students in Northeast
towns. If teachers and students are included in the "other" category, chi-squared = 84.0, df = 7,
p < .001.
TABLE 4
Salience of Relationship with Contact in Bangkok or Northeast Towns
Northeast
Bangkok
Towns
Relationship with urban contact (n= 384; 129)
Brother or sister 25.5% 19.4%
Other relative 29.9 54.3
Friend from village 16.4 7.0
Former co-worker 1.6 2.3
Former roommate 1.0 0.0
Other friend 21.4 16.3
Employer 4.2 0.8
Number of times villager met urban contact in last
12 months (n=37l;126)(%)
Never 15.9 7.9
Once 29.4 21.4
Twice 17.8 21.4
Three times 7.0 8.7
Four times 3.8 4.8
Five times 3.8 7.1
Six times 1.6 2.4
Seven, eight, or nine times 0.8 3.2
Ten times or more 20.0 23.0
Median number of times 1.3 2.0
Last time villager met contact (n = 334; 100)
This year 70.7 77.0
Last year 17.1 11.0
Before last year 12.3 12.0
Number of times villager heard from contact in last
12 months (n=359; 120)
Never 21.7 15.8
Once 22.0 16.7
Twice 18.1 23.3
Three times 7.2 8.3
Four times 4.2 7.5
Five times 6.4 5.8
Six or seven times 1.9 1.7
Eight or more 18.4 20.8
Median number of times 1.3 1.7
Bangkok than in Northeast towns (16% versus 7%). Villagers also mention
other friends in urban destinations, presumably people they met while
sojourning in Bangkok or Northeast towns. Such friends were former
co-workers, former roommates and other people they happened to meet.
Finally, villagers sometimes mentioned former employers as urban social
contacts. The mixture of social relationships between villagers and social
contacts in Bangkok is significantly different from the mixture of social
relationships with contacts in Northeast towns.7
Compared to villagers who have not recently gone to Bangkok (i.e.,
within the last three years), villagers who have recently gone to Bangkok
are significantly more likely to have a contact who is an "other" friend. The
villagers who are recent noncirculators to Bangkok, by contrast, are more
likely to have contacts who are siblings, other relatives or friends from the
village.8 Similarly, recent circulators to Northeast towns are more likely to
have contacts in those towns who are "other" friends, while recent non-
circulators to Northeast towns are more likely to have contacts who are
siblings, other relatives or friends from the village.9
In addition to the nature of the social relationship between villager and
urban contact, an important indicator of the salience of die relationship is the
frequency with which the villager and the social contact have communicated.
In most cases, villagers reported that they had physically met with the named
social contact at some time during the past year. This was true both for contacts
in Bangkok and for contacts in Northeast towns; 71 percent and 77 percent,
respectively, of villagers had met social contacts in Bangkok and in Northeast
towns during the past year. The median number of times villagers had met with
named social contacts in the past year was 1.3 for Bangkok and 2.0 for
Northeast towns. In about one fifth of the cases, the villager had met with the
urban contact ten or more times in the past year. Finally, in addition to meeting
the social contacts, the villagers occasionally received messages from these
contacts. The median number of messages received from the contacts in the
past year was 1.3 for social contacts in Bangkok and 1.7 for social contacts in
Northeast towns. It appears that villagers communicate less frequently with
social contacts in Bangkok than with those in Northeast towns. However, these
differences are not statistically significant.10
7 With a 2 x 4 table (including siblings, other relatives, friends from the village, and "other"
friends, but excluding former co-workers, former roommates, and employers because of the small
number of cases), chi-squared = 24.1, p < .0001.
8 For this 4 x 2 table, chi-squared = 37.6, df = 3, p < .001.
9 Chi-squared = 8.2, p < .05. However, due to the relatively small number of recent
circulators to Northeast towns, the expected frequency is less than five for three of the eight cells
in this 4x2 table.
10 The tests were done using analysis of variance. For recency of meeting the social contact
(with 1 = this year, 2 = last year, 3 = year before last, and 4 = before year before last), F = 0.93,
548
TABLE 5
Frequency of Contact Between Villager and Urban Social Contact by
Social Relationship Between Villager and Urban Social Contact
Number of
Number of
Last Time Meta
Times Met
Communications
Relationship
in 12 Months
in 12 Months
BANGKOK
4.1 1.2 2.8
Brother or sister (n=92)
2.7 1.6 2.6
Other relative (n= 107)
2.6 1.4 2.6

Friend from village (n=61)
4.7 1.5 3.4

Other friend (n=89)
NORTHEAST TOWNS
4.2
Brother or sister (n=22)
1.4
3.7
1.3
5.0
1.1
4.9
1.5
Other relative (n=66)
3.3
3.2
2.8
Friend from village (n=8)
3.3
Other friend (n=21)_
Note: a l=this year; 2=last year; 3= year before last; 4=before year before last.
The frequency of contact between villager and social contact is related to
the social relationship between them. As might be expected, the frequency
of contact with siblings is relatively high, compared to frequency of contact
with other social contacts (Table 5). It is interesting to note that villagers
seem to maintain a fairly high level of contact with "other" friends in urban
areas (i.e., friends not from their home village). The villagers report that
they met their "other" friends in the past 12 months even more often than
they met their siblings (4.7 versus 4.1) and they received more messages
from these friends than they did from their own siblings (3.4 versus 2.8). It
appears that many villagers have been able to forge relatively strong bonds
with acquaintances in Bangkok. The frequency of contact between villagers
and social contacts in Bangkok is significantly related to the social relation?
ship between them.11
Similar results are found with respect to social contacts in Northeast
towns (See, Table 5). Again, villagers have met their siblings more frequently
than other relatives (4.2 versus 3.7), and again they have met "other" friends
more often than they have met their siblings (4.9 versus 4.2). The number
df = 1,432, p < .30. For number of times the villager met the social contact in the last 12 months,
F = 2.63, df = 1, 495, p < .10. For number of times the villager heard from contact in the last
12 months, F = 1.42, df = 1, 477, p < .20.
11 For the number of times the villager met the social contact in the last 12 months, analysis
of variance shows that F = 4.52, df = 3, 366, p < .01; for the last time met, F = 3.88, df = 3,
329, p < .01. However, for the number of communications from the social contact in the last 12
months, F= 2.09, df = 3, 354, p < .10.
of messages villagers have received from siblings, other relatives and other
friends in the past 12 months, however, is about the same for all three
groups. While villagers have not made nearly as many friends in Northeast
towns as in Bangkok, they have been able to form a number of very strong
friendships with people from Northeast towns, as well as from Bangkok.
However, in part because of the smaller number of social contacts with
Northeast towns, these differences are not statistically significant.12
PERCEIVED SPONSORSHIP OPPORTUNITIES
One important consequence of having social contacts in Bangkok is the
potential for these social contacts to provide sponsorship. A number of
questions in the survey explored the perceived sponsorship opportunities.
One important sponsorship function is providing a new migrant a place
to stay during the initial period after a move to a city. If the villager were
required to secure lodging in the open market, the sheer cost of lodging alone
might be enough to deter some potential migrants from attempting to move
to the city. Virtually all of the villagers, however, indicated that their social
contacts would be willing to provide them with a place to stay for at least one
week (95% of the Bangkok contacts and 99% of the Northeast contacts).
A second extremely important obstacle for a villager contemplating a
move to an urban area is finding a job. While the villagers were not quite
so confident that their urban social contacts would help them find work, in
a large majority of cases they did believe that the people they knew in
Bangkok and in Northeast towns would help them find work: specifically,
villagers indicated that 77 percent of the contacts in Bangkok and 73 percent
of the contacts in Northeast towns would indeed help them find jobs. Perhaps
more significantly, in a small number of cases (2.7 and 4.9% respectively),
villagers felt that the social contact would not just help them find jobs, but
would actually give them jobs.
Villagers indicated that their friends and relatives in Bangkok and in
Northeast towns would be prepared to help them in other ways, if necessary.
For example, villagers indicated that over one third of their social contacts
would be willing to provide financial help (36% for Bangkok, 40% for
Northeast towns). In numerous other cases, villagers anticipated that their
urban social contacts would provide help in time of trouble (16% for Bang?
kok, 9% for Northeast towns) or nonmonetary gifts or loans (9% and 12%).
Another aspect of sponsorship is whether the perceived sponsorship can
be transferred from one person to another. That is, will an urban social
12 For the number of times the villager met the social contact in the last 12 months, analysis
of variance shows that F = 1.46, df = 2, 112, p < .20; for the last time met, F = 0.31, df = 2, 86,
p < .70; and for the number of communications from the contact in the last 12 months, F =
0.009, df= 2, 107, p< .99.
contact provide sponsorship functions not only to a rural acquaintance, but
also to a friend of a friend? Two questions tapped this additional dimension
of sponsorship. First, would the social contact help other villagers? Second,
would the villager be willing to tell other villagers about his friend or relative
in Bangkok or a Northeast town? In a large majority of cases, villagers
indicated that their social contact would indeed be willing to assist other
villagers and that they would be willing to inform other villagers of this
potential source of assistance. Specifically, villagers reported that 86 percent
of their contacts in Bangkok and 74 percent of their contacts in Northeast
towns would be willing to assist other villagers. Furthermore, the villagers
indicated they would be willing to tell others in the village about 81 percent
of their Bangkok contacts and 73 percent of their contacts in Northeast
towns. Even when villagers failed to give positive responses to these ques?
tions, their responses were often qualified, rather than negative responses.
That is, the perceived willingness of the urban social contacts to assist other
villagers and the willingness of the respondents to inform their fellow
villagers of these potential sources of assistance sometimes depended on
various unspecified factors.
The extent to which villagers perceive that their urban social contacts would
be willing to provide sponsorship functions depends in part on the social
relationship between the villager and the social contact. With respect to
Bangkok, villagers appear to be more confident that siblings would help them
find jobs than they are that either other relatives or friends from their village
would (Table 6). We noted above that villagers seemed to be able to develop
very strong relationships with friends they made in Bangkok. The strength of
these relationships is confirmed by the strong expectation the villagers have
that their "other" friends in Bangkok would help them find jobs if they returned
to Bangkok. The villagers are every bit as confident that they can expect help
from their nonvillage friends as they are that they can expect help from their
siblings. For example, while 82 percent of the siblings in Bangkok are expected
to help the villagers find jobs, 85 percent of the "other" friends in Bangkok are
expected to provide the same kind of assistance. It is also clear that a majority
of villagers who mentioned former employers as social contacts in Bangkok
expect that the former employers would offer them jobs if they return to
Bangkok. Indeed, former employers seem to be die major source of anticipated
jobs, as opposed to anticipated help in finding jobs.
Interestingly, the patterns are rather different for Northeast towns. Although
the number of cases is smaller, the villagers appear much less confident that
their siblings in Northeast towns would even help them find jobs: only 59
percent of the siblings are expected to provide help in finding jobs. Also, while
villagers perceive that their siblings in Northeast towns are more likely than
their siblings in Bangkok to give them jobs (9.1% versus 1.1%), the villagers
TABLE 6
Perceived Sponsorship Opportunities by Social Relationship Between Villager and Urban Social Contact
Friend
Brother Other from Other
Brother Other from Other
or Sister Relative Village Friend Employer
or Sister Relative Village Friend Employer
BANGKOK
(n=88) (n=81) (n=62) (n=91) (n=14)
NORTHEAST TOWNS
(n=22) (n=66) (n=8) (n=23) (n=l)
Percent who would:
59.1
72.7
Help find a job 81.8 74.1 62.9 84.6 35.7
9.1
4.5
Giveajob 11 1.2 0.0 0.0 57.1
19.7
27.3
Not help find job 12.5 19.8 29.0 12.1 7.1
Percent who would provide:
40.0
40.0
Financial help 42.9 40.0 22.2 43.5 12.5
5.7
12.0
Help in time of trouble 12.2 18.3 31.7 9.8 6.2
11.4
12.0
Nonmonetary gift or loan 13.3 5.2 11.1 10.9 0.0
Would contact help other villagers?
75.0
73.9
Yes 92.5 88.5 87.1 78.0 57.1
11.6
20.8
No 3.2 8.8 11.3 9.9 35.7
4.2
Don't know, depends 4.3 2.7 1.6 12.1 7.1
Tell other villagers?
83.3 68.1 100.0 63.6

Yes 86.0 86.6 80.0 74.2 46.2
12.5 14.5 0.0 22.7

No 11.8 10.7 16.7 15.7 53.8
4.2 17.4 0.0 13.6
Don't know, depends_2.2 2.7 3.3 10.1 0.0
14.5
anticipate that a sizeable minority of siblings would not even help the
villagers find jobs in a Northeast town (27%). Another contrast with the
results for Bangkok is that other relatives in Northeast towns are expected
to be more helpful than siblings. "Other" friends in Northeast towns are
expected to be more helpful than siblings, and about as helpful as other
relatives.
As mentioned above, other aspects of potential sponsorship functions
include financial assistance, nonmonetary gifts or loans, and general help
in time of trouble. For both Bangkok and Northeast towns, siblings, other
relatives and "other" friends are perceived to be about equally likely to
provide financial assistance when needed. Friends from the village are
perceived to be somewhat less likely to provide financial assistance.
A final aspect of perceived sponsorship opportunities is whether or not
the villager perceives that his urban social contact would be willing to help
other villagers. For both Bangkok and Northeast towns, villagers report that
their siblings, other relatives and friends from the village would be willing
to help other villagers. Furthermore, they are generally willing to inform
other villagers of this contact in Bangkok or Northeast towns. Villagers are
not quite as willing to inform other villagers about relatives other than
siblings in Northeast towns. With respect to "other" friends, however, while
villagers anticipate these friends would be willing to help them, they appear
less confident that their friends would be willing to help other villagers, and
are sometimes hesitant to tell other villagers about these friends in Bangkok
and Northeast towns. However, this is true only in a relative sense. Villagers
believe that over 60 percent of their "other" friends in Northeast towns and
over 70 percent of their "other" friends in Bangkok would be willing to help
other villagers, and in most of these cases our respondents would be willing
to tell other villagers about the urban contacts. These results suggest a high
degree of transferability of sponsorship.
THE IMPACT OF CONTACTS ON SUBSEQUENT MOBILITY
Does it matter whether a villager has urban social contacts? What are the
consequences of having such contacts? There are several ways of examining
these questions. One is to examine the mobility plans of villagers who have
contacts versus those who do not. As shown in Table 7, compared to villagers
who have no social contacts in Bangkok, villagers who do have social
contacts in Bangkok are significantly more likely to be planning a move to
Bangkok in the foreseeable future. Specifically, the mean score for mobility
plans for those with contacts in Bangkok is 2.9, versus 2.2 for those without
social contacts in Bangkok.13 Similarly, compared to villagers who have no
13 Mobility plans were scored on a seven-point scale, as follows: 0 = definitely will not move
within five years; 1 = probably will not move within five years; 2 = definitely will not move
TABLE 7
Plans for Moves to Bangkok and Northeast Towns, by Urban Contacts in
Bangkok and Northeast Towns, after Adjusting for CoNTROLSa
Plans to Move to Plans to Move to
Bangkok Northeast Towns
Urban contacts in Bangkok
Yes (n=234) 2.9 2.1
No(n=112) 2.2 1.9
F 7.16 .724
Significance .01 ns
Urban contacts in Northeast towns
Yes (n= 102) 2.7 2.7
No (n=244) 2.7 1.8
F .003 13.10
Significance ns .001
Note: a Multiple Classification Analysis was used to control for age, education, occupation,
relationship to household head, recent mobility to Bangkok and to Northeast towns, and
social contacts in Bangkok or Northeast towns. See footnote 14.
social contacts in any Northeast town, villagers who do have social contacts
in a Northeast town are significantly more likely to be planning a move to
a Northeast town in the foreseeable future. Specifically, the mean mobility
score for those with contacts in a Northeast town is 2.7, versus 1.8 for those
without social contacts in any Northeast town. These comparisons are based
on a multivariate analysis in which the villager's age, education, relationship
to the household head, recent mobility to Bangkok and to Northeast towns,
and social contacts in either Bangkok or Northeast towns have been con?
trolled.14 Thus, having social contacts in either Bangkok or a Northeast
town apparently results in a significant increment in mobility plans.
Interestingly, having a social contact at one destination does not seem to
significantly detract from the possibility of moving to another destination.
That is, having a social contact in Bangkok has no significant effect on plans
within one year, but may move in five years; 3 = probably will not move within one year, but
may move in five years; 4 = not sure about moving in one year; 5 = probably will move within
one year; 6 = definitely will move within one year.
14 When the focus is on the impact of contacts in Bangkok, we control for the presence of
contacts in Northeast towns; and vice versa. Also, note that relationship to household head has
the following categories: Head, Single Son, Married Son, Single Daughter, Son-in-law and Other.
Inasmuch as Heads are almost always married males and there are few "Other" household
members, the control for relationship to household head implicitly introduces controls for sex
and marital status.
to move to Northeast towns, and having a social contact in a Northeast town
has no significant effect on plans to move to Bangkok. Having a social
contact at one destination enhanced the likelihood of having plans to move
to that destination, but did not detract from plans to move to the other
destination.
Although villagers who have social contacts in Bangkok (or Northeast
towns) report that they are more likely to move to Bangkok (or Northeast
towns) in the foreseeable future, these reports are not only subjective, they
are also possibly flawed predictions about future behavior. Were the villagers
who had contacts actually more likely to circulate in subsequent years? As
noted above, in addition to the original interview in 1978, additional
interviews were conducted in 1979 and in 1983. These interviews provide
data on circular rural-urban mobility in 1979 and in 1983. In the 1983
survey, we also obtained retrospective reports on the mobility of villagers
during 1980,1981 and 1982. Inasmuch as these retrospective reports make
substantial demands on the memory of the respondents, it is likely that the
data for 1980, 1981 and 1982 are affected by progressively larger amounts
of underreporting of mobility. Nevertheless, these data present an unusual
opportunity to prospectively evaluate the impact of social contacts on
circular mobility over a five year period.
Recall from Table 2 that among the villagers who had recently (i.e., within
the past three years) gone to Bangkok, the vast majority had social contacts
in Bangkok. Similarly, nearly half of those who had recently gone to a
Northeast town had a social contact in a Northeast town. There are many
reasons to expect that those who have recently gone to Bangkok (or a
Northeast town) will again go to Bangkok (or a Northeast town) in the near
future. Therefore, to control for this, the analysis is restricted to those
villagers who had not recently gone to Bangkok (or a Northeast town).
How many of the recent noncirculators subsequently are engaged in
circular mobility to Bangkok or to Northeast towns? Analysis of the data
from the second and third waves shows that among those who had not gone
to Bangkok in the three years prior to the 1978 interview, 17.5 percent went
to Bangkok for at least one week in 1979 and 17.8 percent did so in 1983.
The corresponding percents for 1980,1981 and 1982 are somewhat smaller,
perhaps because of underreporting. Similar analyses show that among those
who had not gone to any Northeast town in the three years prior to the 1978
interview, 11.1 percent went to a Northeast town for at least one week in
1979 and 1982, while 10.8 percent did so in 1983. Again, the corresponding
percents for 1980 and 1981 are somewhat smaller.
Restricting the analysis to recent noncirculators, villagers who in 1978
reported having contacts in Northeast towns were significantly more likely
to engage in circular mobility to a Northeast town in 1979 and in 1983 than
were villagers who did not have such contacts (Table 8). For example,
villagers who in 1978 reported having a social contact in a Northeast town
spent an average of .19 agricultural season in a Northeast town in 1979,
compared to .06 season for villagers who had no social contact in a Northeast
town. For 1983, the comparison is .46 versus .21. Villagers who in 1978 had
a social contact in a Northeast town spent more time in Northeast towns in
1980, 1981 and 1982 than did villagers who in 1978 had no social contacts
in Northeast towns, but these differences are not significant. When we sum
across all five years to find the number of agricultural seasons that villagers
spent in Northeast towns, we find a significant difference between villagers
who had social contacts in a Northeast town and those who had no such
contacts. In fact, compared to villagers who in 1978 reported no social
contacts in Northeast towns, villagers who did have such contacts spent an
average of nearly twice as much time in Northeast towns over the subse?
quent five years (1.58 seasons versus .84). These comparisons are based on
multivariate analyses in which a villager's age, education, occupation, rela?
tionship to the household head and contacts in Bangkok are controlled.
Thus, having social contacts in a Northeast town is a significant predictor of
subsequent movement to Northeast towns.
Similar analyses of mobility of recent nonmigrants to Bangkok reveals
no significant differences for any of the five time periods between villagers
who have versus do not have contacts in Bangkok, nor is there any signifi?
cant difference for mobility summed over the five year period. For the sake
of brevity, the statistical results are not presented here, but it can be noted
that in each case p < .50.
TABLE 8
Subsequent Mobility to Northeast Towns, by Prior Contacts in
Northeast Towns, after Adjusting for Controls*: Recent Nonmigrants13
1979-
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
1983
Contacts in Northeast
Towns in 1978
Yes(n=94) .19 .27 .32 .34 .46 1.58
No(n=236) .06 .14 .21 .21 .21 .84
F 5.30 2.93 1.67 2.09 6.18 5.80
Significance .03 .09 ns ns .02 .02
Notes: a Multiple Classification Analysis was used to control for age, education, occupation,
relationship to household head, and social contacts in Bangkok or Northeast towns. See
footnote 14.
b N=330.
Thus, having social contacts in a Northeast town enhances the probability
that a villager will circulate to a Northeast town, but having a social contact
in Bangkok has no effect on subsequent movement to Bangkok. This
difference may perhaps be accounted for by the rather different context of
migration to the two destinations. Recall that there is a much higher level
of mobility to Bangkok than to Northeast towns, that there is a steady stream
of villagers going to and arriving from Bangkok, and that more of the
villagers have contacts?and have a larger number of contacts?in Bangkok
than in Northeast towns. It may well be that having a personal contact with
someone in a Northeast town can make a decisive difference in future
mobility, whereas having a personal contact with someone in Bangkok is
less important because there is more information flowing into the villages
about Bangkok and in general there are strong interpersonal linkages
between the villages and Bangkok. An arbitrarily selected villager is more
likely to have his or her interest piqued by Bangkok and, once having his
interest piqued, can easily find someone who knows someone in Bangkok.
Thus, it is much less important whether the villager has a personal contact
in Bangkok, but it is important whether he has a personal contact in a
Northeast town.
A further question is whether certain types of urban social contacts are
more likely to stimulate subsequent mobility. That is, does it matter whether
the contact is a relative or a friend; does it matter whether the contact is
from Roi-et or elsewhere; does it matter whether the villager frequently or
rarely has communications from the urban contact? In short, is it the
presence or absence of a social contact that matters, or are the specific
characteristics of the contacts important?
A series of multivariate analyses were conducted to answer this question.
The following characteristics of contacts were examined: whether the con?
tact was a relative, a friend from the village or another friend; whether the
contact could give the villager a job or help the villager find a job; whether
the contact was from Roi-et or a native of the city where he or she lives; the
number of times the villager met the contact in 12 months; the last time the
villager met the contact; and the number of communications from the
contact in 12 months. The multivariate analyses included controls for the
villager's age, education and relationship with the household head. Note
that the contact characteristics could not all be entered simultaneously
because of the high degree of multicollinearity among them. In order to
determine whether contacts in Bangkok had an effect on mobility to
Northeast towns and vice versa, contact characteristics for both Bangkok
and Northeast towns were entered into the analyses simultaneously. For
example, dummy variables for having a relative in Bangkok and Northeast
towns were entered along with the villager's age, education and relationship
to the household head. As was done in the analyses presented in Table 8,
these analyses were restricted to recent nonmigrants. That is, analyses of
mobility to Northeast towns included only villagers who had not gone to
Northeast towns within the three years prior to the 1978 interview, while
analyses of mobility to Bangkok were restricted to villagers who had not
gone to Bangkok within the three years prior to the 1978 interview.
Several characteristics of contacts in Northeast towns turned out to be
significant, while no specific characteristics of contacts in Bangkok were
significant. Results of the analyses of mobility to Northeast towns in 1979
are presented in Table 9. Of the nine contact characteristics analyzed, six
were significantly related to mobility to Northeast towns in 1979. Villagers
who in 1978 reported having a relative in a Northeast town spent signifi?
cantly more time in a Northeast town in 1979, compared to villagers who
had no relative in a Northeast town (.18 season versus .06). Villagers who
in 1978 reported having a contact in a Northeast town who could give them
a job or help them find a job spent significantly more time in a Northeast
town in 1979, compared to villagers who had no contact who could help
them with a job (.36 versus .07). Villagers in 1978 who knew someone in a
Northeast town who was from Roi-et Province spent significantly more time
in a Northeast town in 1979, compared to villagers who knew no one in a
Northeast town who was from Roi-et (.25 versus .07). The frequency of
contact between a villager and the social contact in a Northeast town was
also significantly associated with amount of time spent in a Northeast town.
This is true with respect to the number of times the villager met the contact
in the past 12 months, the time when the villager last met the contact and
the number of communications the villager received from the contact in the
past 12 months. More specifically, villagers who met the contact ten or more
times in the 12 months prior to the 1978 interview spent an average of .73
seasons in a Northeast town in 1979, compared to only .05 for villagers who
never met the contact in the 12 months prior to the 1978 interview; villagers
who met their contact in the year prior to the 1978 interview spent an
average of .22 seasons in a Northeast town in 1979, compared to only .07
for villagers who had no contact in a Northeast town; villagers who had four
or more communications from their contact in the 12 months prior to the
1978 interview spent an average of .37 seasons in a Northeast town in 1979,
compared to only .05 for those who received no communications from their
contact. As noted above, all of these differences are significant. On the other
hand, there was no significant difference in mobility to Northeast towns in
1979 comparing villagers who had versus did not have a contact who was a
native of a Northeast town, a friend from the village or an "other" friend.
(This statement refers to three separate tests.) Furthermore, none of the
characteristics of contacts in Bangkok significantly affected mobility to
558
Northeast towns. Thus, the most important characteristics of contacts in
Northeast towns, in terms of the impact on subsequent mobility, are the
frequency of the contact between the villager and the urban social contact
and whether the contact is a relative, another migrant from Roi-et or able
to help the villager obtain a job in the Northeast.
TABLE 9
Mobility to Northeast Towns in 1979, by Nature of Link Between
Villager and Contacts in Northeast Towns, after Adjusting
for controls:a recent nonmigrantsb
Nature of Link
Yes
Noc
Significance
Relative
.18
4.61
.06
Yes
.04
Noc
Significance
Will help find or
.36
.07
.001
12.33
give job
Yes
Noc
Significance
From Roi-et Province
Times met in
8.97
.07
.25
1-9
Nonec
.003
10 or more
Significance
.10
.05
.73
.001
23.72
past 12 months
Met more
Met in
No friendc
than
Significance
Last time met
past year
.07
.06
2.84
1 year ago
.22
.15
Number of
1-3
None
4 or more
Significance
communications in past
.05
.15
.37
8.82
12 months
Notes: a Multiple Classification analysis was used to control for age, education, occupation,
relationship to household head, and the corresponding social contact variable for
Bangkok. See footnote 14.
b N=330.
c Includes villagers with no contact in any Northeast town.
Additional analyses, omitted for reasons of brevity, indicate that very few
of the specific characteristics of contacts are significantly related to mobility
of recent noncirculators to Northeast towns in 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 or
for the sum of all seasons in 1979-1983. Thus, in spite of the fact that
presence or absence of a contact in a Northeast town is a significant predictor
of mobility to Northeast towns in 1979, 1983 and the sum of all seasons in
1979-1983, we are not able to isolate specific contact characteristics that
consistently predict mobility to Northeast towns after 1979. There are at
least two potential explanations for this failure. One, the effects may be
shortlived, becoming statistically insignificant after a year or so. If the effects
.001
are shortlived, this could be either because the specific characteristics of the
contacts?or even the existence of a contact?are in flux (e.g., a relative in
Bangkok returns to the village) or because other causal factors tend to
intervene over time, reducing the impact of prior contacts. A second possible
explanation for the failure to identify specific characteristics of contacts that
predict mobility for 1980 and later is measurement error. As noted above,
the mobility data for 1980, 1981 and 1982 are likely subject to increasing
levels of underreporting of mobility. This perhaps accounts for the inability
of contact characteristics to predict mobility in these years.
While several characteristics of social contacts in Northeast towns signif?
icantly predict subsequent mobility, none of the characteristics of contact in
Bangkok are significantly related to mobility in 1979.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Villagers in Roi-et are extremely likely to have social contacts in Bangkok.
In fact, villagers are twice as likely to know someone in Bangkok as they are
to know anyone in any of the 16 provincial capitals in the Northeast region.
Villagers in their 20s are more likely to have contacts in Bangkok than
are younger or older villagers. Interestingly, female villagers are just as
likely to report having urban social contacts as are male villagers. Single
villagers are far more likely to mention social contacts in Bangkok than are
married villagers.
The vast majority of contacts in Bangkok are from Roi-et Province. Many,
in fact, are family or friends from the villager's home village. Very few are
natives of Bangkok.
Most of the social contacts are relatives, often brothers or sisters. As one
would expect, siblings are regarded as a highly reliable source of assistance;
that is, the villagers anticipate that if they went to a place where their sibling
lived, the sibling would give them a place to stay, would help them find jobs
and would assist them in other ways, including giving them money if
necessary. It is interesting to note that many villagers have also developed
friendships with individuals they also regard as highly reliable sources of
assistance. These are friends who are neither related nor from their home
village, but who can be counted on in time of need. The bond between the
villagers and these friends has a high degree of transferability; that is, most
villagers are confident that they could ask them to assist other villagers going
to Bangkok or Northeast towns. Interestingly, while villagers often do feel
that they can count on friends from their home village to help in various
ways, they appear to be less confident that these friends will help.
Villagers who have social contacts in Northeast towns are more likely to
engage in circular mobility to Northeast towns, especially if they have
frequent communication with their urban contact or if the contact is a
relative, another migrant from Roi-et or is able to help the villager obtain
a job in the Northeast.
Given the large amount of literature on the role of sponsorship in migration,
these results are not particularly surprising. The results take on added signifi?
cance, however, for two reasons. First, this study examines sponsorship in the
context of circular rural-urban mobility, rather than "permanent" migration.
Second, and more significantly, it is based on a prospective research design,
rather than a retrospective design. The results reported by MacDonald and
MacDonald (1964), Tilly and Brown (1967) and Graves and Graves (1980) are
typical in that, like most migration researchers, they utilize the strategy of
contacting migrants at their destination and learning about the migrants* urban
contacts retrospectively. Our prospective design avoids some of the obvious
selection biases involved in retrospective designs.
The large number of villagers who have social contacts in Bangkok no
doubt helps to sustain the flow of migrants from Roi-et to Bangkok. We argue
this in spite of the fact that villagers who have social contacts in Bangkok are
not more likely to go to Bangkok. To conclude that the large number of
Bangkok contacts plays no role in the continued high level of mobility from
Northeast villages to Bangkok would, we argue, ignore the impact of these
strong interpersonal linkages. Not only are villagers attracted to Bangkok
because of the economic opportunities found in that city, but they are also
attracted to Bangkok because they are more likely to have information about
that city and they possess social contacts who can serve as a social "safety net."
Furthermore, after they work in Bangkok, villagers often forge strong
friendship bonds with other migrants who have settled in Bangkok. Because
of the assistance these new friends can provide to villagers, these friendships
no doubt help to stimulate additional movement. In some cases, villagers who
initially go to Bangkok only to work during agricultural slack seasons may
eventually spend more time in Bangkok. Indeed, it is not uncommon for
villagers from Roi-et to spend parts of farming seasons in Bangkok
(Lightfoot, et al, 1983). The social contacts that so many villagers in Roi-et
have with individuals in Bangkok and the social contacts that many villagers
forge as a result of work experiences in Bangkok are part of the inertia that
will make it difficult for Thai policymakers to promote a more decentralized
pattern of urbanization in Thailand.
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Thailand

Authors(s): David Morell

"... If you would know how the villagers really feel,

tIn December 15, King Phumipol Adulyadet promulgated his nation's

tory-13 months-when the country operated without a constitution or

power in a bloodless coup on November 17, 1971 had an opportunity to im-

cal succession, social and economic development, and political participation

where is Thailand now headed?

PERSONALITIES AND POLITICAL POWER

Development of patron-client links and factional competition were particu-

larly intense in the fluid power environment of 1972. In the absence of a

Cabinet, constitution, and National Assembly, the NEC assumed an active

ambitious aspirants could wheel and deal at will.

As noted a year ago,' the principal issue driving factional competition

concerns political succession and the relative positions of Field Marshal

Thanom Kittikachorn and General Praphat Charusathien-and their fac-

a power consolidation by the Praphat faction. Clearly, Praphat was next in

news media, many civilian bureaucrats (outside the Ministry of Interior),

divided, alone, each is definitely vulnerable.

an "interim"' constitution undoubtedly relates to the succession issue, not, as

DAVID MORELL 163

can one be a constitutional monarch without a constitution? At the same

interim constitution. The succession dilemma, like so many other difficult

issues in Thai politics, was simply deferred; for how long?

position as the indispensable leader, energizing new allies in the military to

replace the old Government House combination of the 1969-71 period.

NEC Secretary-General) 2 and Colonel Narong, Kittikachorn, Thanom's son,

Praphat's son-in-law, and, as discussed below, a new aspirant to national

power in 1972. Others-Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulasap, Pote Sarasin,

Thanat Khoman, and Police General Prasert Ruchirawongse-are of far less

importance in the power equation.

uniform to civilians in a Cabinet or ruling council, but of the behavior pat-

terns and functional roles of leading political figures. "Civilianized" military

and police officers, concerned about institution building, political develop-

Government House faction-are now out of power. During the parliamen-

ticians or party functionaries. Because of their influence, the ruling clique

was becoming more attuned to civilian interests and political development

pation, and decisions on institutional development of the government party.

Control Over the Police: Factional competition became particularly in-

December 25, 1971, pp. 12-13.

Division is Maj. G(en. Uam Chirapong, a son-in-law of Thanom.

164 THAI LAN D

Ruchirawongse, Chief of Police since 1963 and Minister of Public Health in

a battle emanating from traditional Army-Police animosity,4 their struggle

for control of the Ministry of Interior, competition for control of village

security forces, and competitive commercial interests. Prasert's power em-

mander of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division in Bangkok). Prasert was due

by Narong and his mother, Thanphuying Chongkol Kittikachorn.7 Their

Narong's command, apparently drunk, attacked and demolished a police in-

stallation in Bangkok. Prasert publicly criticized Narong for this incident,

On December 1, the NEC appointed Army Lt. Gen. Prachuab Soontharan-

gura, Director of the Port Authority, as Deputy Chief of Police. Prachuab,

next extension crisis.

flew home to deal with the situation.

position from Sarit's death in 1963 to 1972.

DAVID MORELL 165

Narong's Power Play: Perhaps the most interesting single development in

Colonel Narong. A young officer with excellent political/family connections,

and mounted a splendid public relations campaign to convince the Bangkok

not see stories and photographs depicting Narong's activities. He headed a

widely-reported campaign to suppress corruption in the Army conscription

system; he directed a program to suppress heroin smuggling; he sponsored

mit College of Education protesting their lack of university status; he claimed