People vs Valdez (2015)

Facts:
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both
State Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the
disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects thereof were the
reimbursements of expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod
City.
Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime
of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and
171, in relation to Article 487 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Issue:
How should we construe the term "punishable" under the provisions of Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?
Petitioner contention: that the imposable penalty is the one provided by the RPC before conviction to
determine whether the charge is bailable or not, while the penalty actually imposed pertains to the prison
sentence upon conviction. Hence, it is maintained that the penalty imposable for the offense charged against
private respondent is reclusion perpetua, which makes Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324
non-bailable.
Held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be imposed in its maximum period, there is no doubt
that, in case of conviction, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The cases, however, are still at their
inception. Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue. This is not the proper time, therefore, to call for the
application of the penalty contemplated under Article 48 by imposing the same in its maximum period.
For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter of right, it is the imposable
penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which should be considered and, not the penalty to be
actually imposed.
In the case at bar, the offenses charged are the complex crimes of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents. In determining the penalty imposable, it is the penalty for the most
serious crime which is considered. Between Malversation and Falsification, it is Malversation which provides
the graver penalty. As thus provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, "[i]f the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua."
The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied in its maximum period, or reclusion perpetua, since this
will already consider the application of the penalty in the event of a conviction.
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in charging a complex crime, the information should allege
each element of the complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the
subject of separate prosecutions.31 Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the
charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.32
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an
aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it
would be premature to rule that the supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the
trial has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of committing malversation. Further, it

is possible that only the elements of one of the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or
worse, none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice v. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, Jr. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUOZ
G.R. No. 153675, 19 April 2007, EN BANC DIVISION (Sandoval Guitierrez, J.)
Juan Antonio Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong (HK) Court of three (3) counts of
accepting advantage as an agent and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrests
were issued against him [by the HK Court, not a court in the Philippines] which when convicted; he
would face 7 to 14 years of jail for each charge.
The DOJ received a request for the provisional arrest of Muoz from the HK DOJ. The DOJ
forwarded the request to the NBI, which in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila an application to
effect such request. Thus, an Order of Arrest was issued against Muoz and he was arrested and
detained thereafter. [Note: the Philippines and HK signed an agreement for the surrender of accused and
convicted persons or an extradition treaty in 1995 that is why, the HK was represented by the DOJ]

Government of HK filed a petition for extradition of Muoz with the RTC. Muoz for his part
filed a petition for bail. The said bail petition was initially denied by then Judge Bernardo holding
that there is no Philippine law granting bail on extradition cases and Muoz is a high flight risk.
On motion for reconsideration, a different judge (Judge Olalia, herein respondent) took cognizance
with the case and granted the motion of Muoz to bail. Hence, this petition reached the SC.
[Note: Sec. 2(a) of PD 1069 (Philippine Extradition Law) defines extradition as the removal of an accused from
the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state
or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of
a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government]

ISSUE: Is the right to bail impermissible on the grounds that: an extradition case is not a criminal
proceeding; and there is no law allowing an extraditee to do so?
RULING: No, bail can be granted to subjects of extradition proceedings. Bail is generally availed in
criminal cases; however, an extradition proceeding -- although ostensibly administrative -- bears all
the earmarks of criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
Since jurisprudence on extradition is but an infancy in this jurisdiction, the SC decided to
overturn its previous rulings of not granting bail in extradition cases. They held that it is a modern
trend in public international law that primacy is placed on the worth of individual person and
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a
subject of international law is now taking root. The Philippines as a signatory to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
as value the worth and dignity of every person. This is enshrined in Sec. II, Art. II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, is under the obligation to make available
to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.

Indeed, there is no law allowing the right to bail on extradition cases, but the Constitution is
silent as to deprive subject offenders for the same. Moreover, it is important to note that on several
occasions, the SC granted bail in deportation cases as this was sanctioned the UDHR as well as our
obligation to comply with other international conventions to uphold human rights. Thus, the SC
said that there is no justification why it should not be allowed in extradition cases.
Note: Since extradition is a sui generis (a kind of its own) that is merely administrative in character, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail is based on CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. This
is neither a criminal, civil, and administrative case. Thus such quantum of evidence is somewhere between proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases and preponderance of evidence in civil cases.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015, Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on
the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam.
Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On
July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of
his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty
would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age
and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong: a.) Whether or not prosecution failed to
show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua; b.)
Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.
HELD:

1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of
the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from nonbailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall
be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua
subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion may
be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is
indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community
arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and
for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting
from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in
the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted
to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused
during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to
Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
-o0oLEONEN DISSENT
Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal basis the grant of bail over mere
humanitarian grounds. He also claims that the court has no authority to use humanitarian
grounds. Leonen argues that [Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian reasons was not the
basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan, nor were these grounds
raised in the petition in the Supreme Court.
Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found
in any statute or provision of the Constitution.
Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a special accomodation for the
petitioner and he goes on to criticize the decision to wit:
[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal provisions, but
one that is unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human
compassion.
xxx
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged
with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have to
decide, without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension,
pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to
Senators and former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking,
multiple incestuous rape, and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment...
Procedure for granting bail
Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure outlined for the lower courts in bail cases in order to
demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes
vs. Catral the Supreme Court held:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its
Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars
conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined
to study them as well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for
an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if
not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects
judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants
are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles.
Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his bail without any hearing for the
purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the
prosecution had no opportunity to present any evidence because of the prematurity of Petitioner's
Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the
Motion based on prematurity.
Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate
Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan.
Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able to develop their arguments as to this point to
establish legal and factual basis for this kind of bail.
The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court to grant bail merely on the basis of the
certification of the attending physician, Dr. Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering from
numerous debilitating conditions. The dissent states that:
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor's
certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with crossexamination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a hearing whose
main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.

xxx
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and
canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after petition for
bail is filed by accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.
Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the version deliberated upon

This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted to grant bail based on a substantially
different version of the opinion, one which did not use humanitarian considerations as a ground for
the granting of bail. The dissent explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the issue of whether
or not bail is a matter of right and reveals that the copy offered for signature was substantially
similar to an earlier draft which used humanitarian considerations as the basis for the granting of
bail. The dissent makes it clear that this was an irregularity.
The majority opinion offers no guidance
The dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the privilege (humanitarian
considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply to those who have similar conditions. Whether or not
this privilege will only apply to those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this privilege
can be granted to those of advanced age only. The majority has perilously set an unstated if not
ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.
There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if, when and how bail can then be canceled.
Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced
The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is misplaced
because this case referred to extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis on international law.
As applied to crimes charged under Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights must be qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding bail.
Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding the case back to the lower court
for factual determination of whether or not the accused was a flight risk.

*Note: This digest is retrieved from http://the-exiled-prince.blogspot.com/2015/08/enrile-vssandiganbayan.html. Credits to the blogger

Trillanes vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817)

FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup detat in relation to the Oakwood Incident. In the 2007
elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution
whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points
out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was
pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he
(petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political
rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e.,
two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for
coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
xxx
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
(Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by
reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless
of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale
of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisonersappellants like Jalosjos.
xxx
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk
since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous
times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on
November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the
courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the
"Manila Pen Incident," proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he would
escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving nonbailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.

Dela Rama vs The Peoples Court

1946; Feria, J.:
Nature of Action: Petition for Certiorari (2nd Petition)
Facts: The first petition for certiorari on the decision of the Peoples Court denying the petition for
bail was remanded to the said court because of a supplemental motion raising new facts, supported
by medical certificates, which arise only during its pendency before the SC.
SC held in the first petition: Unless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the
illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage
of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail.
Before hearing by the Peoples Court, Motion asking Dela Rama to be confined and treated in a
hospital outside the Bilibid Prison. Special Prosecutor opposed on the ground is in effect an attempt
to obtain by indirection what the accused has failed to obtain directly, i. e., his provisional release.
Peoples Court ordered Dela Ramas confinement in Quezon Institute with an order that the Medical
Director submit a report every 15 days. He was found actually suffering tuberculosis and
pharyngitis, they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the
treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" and recommended to continue his stay in
the institute.
Petition for bail was filed that he may be confined in his own house and treated by a specialist, since
he could not afford to pay the expenses which he stay in the Quezon Institute would entail. Petition
was denied and the court ordered his continued confinement.
Issue: Whether the People's Court has acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner's petition for bail.
Held: Yes, considering the report of the Medical Director; also the previous petition for bail which
was denied because Dela Rama was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis and the
implied purpose of sending him to the Institute was to verify whether it is an active tuberculosis to
decide on his petition for bail; and the application of cases against Pio Duran and Benigno Aquino,
in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their
continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their
life.
The order of the People's Court denying the petition for bail is set aside, and said court is
ordered to render within a reasonable time a new decision in conformity with the said
doctrine applied by the same court in the cases above mentioned.

Comendador v De Villa G.R. No. 93177 (1991)

GR No. 95020 August 2, 1991 (Right to Bail)
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO
ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners, vs.HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of
Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW
94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction.
After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM
No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobeying the said order. He
later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons
with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial
proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men
facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and
declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct
proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include
other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court
reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as
intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
Issue: Whether or not military men are not cognizable from the Constitutional guarantee on the
right to bail?
Held: YES. The Supreme Court finds that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula,
where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the
discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people.
All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political
system.
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National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on
bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained,
on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same
with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from
others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military
are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the
same right that is extended to civilians.