six Colonial Korea in Japan's Imperial Telecommunications Network Daging Yang Siam arway day in 190,» group of prominent goverment, ‘lary, and business figures gathered in the Goverment rn leaders in the SIRARS took tims exchanging getngs arse ey vated tne Te mary historian hs was probably nothing more than one of ‘ies, routine and inconsequential ceemonge inthe te Jenial Kore, Indeed, telecoms12 AGING YANG ‘The equation of telecommanictions with medemity and prog: ress in colonial Kore has dominated the numerous publications c= lated by the Japanese goverment. According to this view, Japan rapidly expanded and moderizd the “primitive” commarications Tactics i Korea afer the laksover in 105 tothe great benefit of ‘conomic and cultural lie in the pennwula. A massive historical ‘Survey on prewar Japanese actives in Asia, compiled by Japan's Ministry of Finance shorty alter Word Wat I eset eterted this evuntion? To be sre, Japan's ae of progress did not go une ‘halenge ni pioneering 194 work on clonal Keres, Anew J. Grnjdanzev pointed out that tlecommunications almost exci- sively benefited the Japanese population Given that tlecmmni- ‘ations in colonial Kotea has not Been considered to meri serious ‘dy, it not suprising no agreement exists on this issue? Inthis chapter, I conidertelocommunicatons development a an ssc part of Japan's overall empir-buling effort not oly the colonization of Korea but also in the establishment of an autre sphere of influence in Northeast Asa. Although the moder tee- tsumuniatons network emerged in Kore large extent as one ‘racial element in Japan apparatus for penetration and domination, it effect on economic and Serial development should not be mii- ‘ized, | argue, nor was impact lie to the Japanese popula- don. Moreover, ae Japan embarked on building « new East Asian felecmmmuniatone network in the 153De to eng imperial bonds, Korea's poston inthe new empue also became ineasinghy contested, as manifested ina prolonged power struggle betveon To- Jo and Ke over conto ofthe network: By examining Korea's = crporation Into Japan’ imperial telecommunications network { hoe fo shed light on te nature of clonal modemity im Kore a ‘wel a colonial Koreas evolving plac inthe Japanese empie Incorporation and Consolidation (ten characterized asthe “nerve of government” telecommunia tions networks have sways been an important component of mod ‘erm imperialist, As Duet Hendrick eloquently proses it in ‘sady of Buope's overseas expansion, “[lhe] web of power that the colonial empires together wat mud of dectecty as well sam and ion Although it was not unl the early 19805 tha Coli Kore ond Teecommsctions 1a Japan became connected to Keres by telephone, tlgraphi links eee the two date from telat nineteenth entry Tn fact autonomy in overseas telaconsmunicatons became a ss tegic objective for Japan aftr a Danish frm, the Great Norther Telegraph Company, Hnked Nagasaki with Shanghai and Viad- vost with submarine cables in early 1871. tn exchange for tans- imiting romanized telegrams overseas, the Japanese government granted the company 20-year monopolistic rights? During the nego- ‘Stor with Kore that led to the Treaty of Kangyeha in 1875, Eno. ‘moto Takeak, Japan's minister in Russa, proposed to his govern ‘ment that Japan secure the vghts to land submarine ele neat Pusan as well sat encter alt n the west cost of Koren near the (Chinese border. These would allow fetare linkage vith Chinese telegraph lines as an alternative to the Danish cable® The telegraph was stil anew technology then, Atebuting the absence of war bee tween Britain and the United States to the telegraph a Jspanese Inagazioe optimally predicted inthe tame year tha were Japan ad Korea linked by telegraph, the to would become good neigh- bors? Sach utopian visions soon evaporated, however, as Japan sought to extend and contral telecomms to Korea. in 15, ‘be Great Norther laid the fist submarine telegraph cable across the Korean Stat Japan's request, while Japan suceeded in etab- lishing a telegraph ofc in Pusan and secured a 25-year monopaly lover Korea's extra telegraph tafe. Thus, although lacking the ‘ocesary technology, Japan made innovative aie ofthe “advanced “West” i facitating is own expansion in Asis. Forth fst ime, Japanese language telegrams could be received and sent outside the Japanese islands afc of coneldersble importance t te growing Japanese community in Koren Ts the next two deades tlacommunicatins in Korea increas ingly became a focus of interationa rivalry among Japon. China, tnd later Russia, each bent on establishing predominance on the ‘erinsla In 885 a year forthe construction ofthe Japa-Korea link, China extended is oven telegraph line fom the order city of ‘ij to the Korean capital of Seoul thus setting up the Wester Route in Koren.» Protesting that this new route violated its monop- ly, Japan demanded the right fo construct telegraph lies inside oes nan effort to increase is own autonomy, the Korean gov= erment conetrucied «Southern Route with asisance from feign164 AGING YANG technicians linking Seoul to Pusan in 1888. As Korea setup it ow {elegraph lice ear the Japanese one in Pusan and connected them with couriers, forthe fist Hime japan acquired analterative route of telegraph linkage troogh Korea ‘aarig the SinoJopanese War of 189495, advancing Japanese ‘woops nt only took overall major telegraph Lines in Korea bt also onatruced tary telegraph nes in the south following desroc- tion of existing lines inthe peasant uprising. After the wa, Japan ‘etaned contol over is ality Ties between Pusan and Sel, ‘which proved to be an important asset in the wa with Russia de ‘de later Even Belore formal dedaration ofthat war Japan wa able to outmancuver the Russians by cutting off communication between Korea and Russ's stronghold of Port Arthur. Once war brake out, Japanese ops again quickly seized contol of Kore's ‘clegraph ines The Rusian defeat inthe war signaled th end of 3 period of relative Korean autonomy, and Japan became the dor- ‘ant powerin the peninsula Forte Japanese, contol ofthe information networkin Kone as a precondition for establishment of politcal and mltary domina- ‘Son Te Bseprint or postwar Koren adopted by the Japanese cable retin May 1904 stipulated permanent Japanese nlitary and naval [ses onthe peninsula and Japanese supervision of Koran foreign affairs, government finances andthe alway system Japan Was also to contol Kore’ telegraph telephone, and postal systems Japan could not incorporate Keres’ commnuniations stems ino sown sd standardize facies in both countries, it was prepared t ake ‘ver important ines and ran them independ fom the Korean goverment” This plan wae duly exceed after the was, when Ko- Fea became a Japanese protectorate, Theda Josaburo, a veteran bu reaucrat in charge of Ue Tokyo Post and Telegraph Oi led team of Japanese technicians and oficial in taking over Kore's communications faites. The Koreans fiercely rested, but Theda ‘acceded after applying considerable coorion” "As Japan gradually assumed consol of Korea's tlecommunic- ons sjstemy implemented several reductions in telegraph ates tween Japan and Korea to facia te expanding scope of ct ‘es on the peninsula. These efforts Brought dramatic results: trate Increasad Hom a wichle of 3400 telegrams in 1894 to some 100000 per year a decade later By 1905, some 40,00 telegrams 98 percent ‘of which were in Japanese, traveled tteen the two counties * Colonia Kore end Tecommicatons 16 Although the Japanese made mach oftheir mission of developing the Korean econ, the infomation infastructure i coloial Kor rea was nt bull primarily for busines active. The felecommn ‘tions network in Kore, expecially long-distance telephones, de ‘eloped largly to meet Japan's urgent pela and miliary dese to consolidate contol over the Korean population. ‘The frst major challenge to Japan came in July 1907, when its {orceful dissolution of what remained ofthe Korean army igated large-scale “politcal disturbance” across the peninsula. Telegraph and telephone lines under Japanese contol were heavily damaged by Korean guerillas, known asthe “righteous woldirs” Although Japan quickly repaired them at a cost of ¥130,00, he general ack of sificent means of communication severely handicapped is response uring the na tage ofthe uprising, One oficial Japanese scsount ‘esa campaign in Kangwn province in hich poor tlcommiini= Cations caused a fequent lack of coordination among Japanese ‘coops and generated considerable confusion Swift ornnunsation betven all locales in Korea was considered cuca aston for suppressing the Korean resistance but slo for fature policing and Secu, Vie Resident General Sone Arak proposed» peninstla- wide pie telephone network, hich would link allplize stations, ‘miliary tamacks, postal branches, and olher government offices, them 10 be reached by telegraph or telephone within 24 Ihours and thas great strengthening contol of Rore's extensive rural arena ‘Given the urgent need this police telephone network ha to be constructed as qu as posse In May 1906, Japan setup aPotice ‘Telephone Construction Department in Korea, adding telephone lines to some exiting postal elegraph nes and ullng new routes ‘dsewhere. Between Jane 1908 and September 1910, over 4000 lo- Imoters of new lines spanning some 3000 hlomcters were com ‘Sructed. A tll of 45,00 new telephone poles were erected, sgrfi- ‘any altering the landscape of much ofthe peninsula. By the end of 1810, over 800 police telephone sats ad been instal insccuriy posts and pos ofces at a cost of 197600. Although this police eee ‘etvark was far from sophistentd, the significance of #5 Exmpltin by 1910 cannot be overestimated” That very Year Japan forced treaty of annexation upon Kors, rendering it Japanese ony. Contr and subsequent expansion of Kore tlecommni- ‘tions network had paved the way for arsexaton.6 AGING YANG To complete its contol of Kors telcommunications syste Ja pn purchased the submarine cable inthe Korean Strat from it Banish owner for ¥6 milion that sine year. By installing new tele ‘raph equipment, Japan dastilly redaced transmission Ue. On verage, the Hine i took a telegraph to get fom Seoul (now nae ke) fo Tokyo dropped from 4 hous 42 minutes 92 Shours® Tapa’ control o elacomsmunictions in Kore, however, didnot cradcate resistance. The March Fret movement in 191, when Kore fans staged. pennsulasrde demonstrations demanding independ. nce, took Japan by sich surprise tat i led to another wave of r= ‘ent expansion of ts police comamunicaons network. In addin Ssuipping local Japanese authorities with automobiles, the new Superintendent general (ima stan), Mizuno Renan stressed the ‘eed to intl lephone connections In every lca district Av Mi hae! Robinson reminds us, the colonial government increased the ‘ficiency and sophistication of i contro system even ast spoke of | moderate “Cultural Rae” Within two yeu’ ae over lon Was spent to extend the network in 35 dst between Pasa and Si: The thre years ater March 1919 wimesed the greet ex pansion of new telephone routes in Kore, ar nearly 200 komt ‘were added «40 percent increase. Ax a rect the police telecon Imunation network was geal strengthened. “Enhanced fleconumunicatons soon proved to be valuable for surveillance and contol purposes In ltr 1919, Prine Yi Kang tempted to join the independence movement in hangs. When the (GG found out that the prince was mising rom hi Kio residence, itimmedintaly cabled the police thoughout Koren and also notified Japanese authorises in Japan, Manchuria, Sibers, ad even Shang a After eetving orders by telegraph Japanese plicermen arrived 2 the Andong Ratway Station actos the border in Manchuria ust, 8 the Korean prince was disembarking fom the train. The price was taken tock to Keo under heavy security. Speedy comune tion thas spared Japanase authorises major plies ebarast ‘ment not lng afer the March First movement Tn this fashion elacommunicatons in soln Keres developed ‘on the back of police communication facilites. Herein es an apps fet paradox that may be sid to characterize Japan's clonal re in ‘genera. What started a a poice network was later opened to cv fn use afer the colonial government restored control. Although Coli Kors ond Telecomms ro ‘South Seas verting To Tenton cS 2% Souther g Korea sainain om eToys vl ne pce mp 1 Gr Tet Dome ilocos dae Bh 00 controlled by the clos government and despite ts original inten- om, this information network also served economic and cultural purposes The nox of Japanese busines as well as agricaltral im Tigrants together with gradual economic developzent and urban ition in Korea, inreased use of electronic communications. The Sleady advancement in tecommuncations technology in the fst ‘decades ofthe went conary farther contributed to this proces. ‘To give jst a few example, in 195, the army transfered it wire les fats tothe GG, aid the renamed Ke Wiens added a few dimension to telegraphic service. The raid development of ‘viele technology were inthe age of ado, when sation JODK tegan broadcasting in both Japaneae ane Kerean in early 1927, and crjyed eracediary growth in eubeequent Years Automatic ex: ‘ange telephones west adopted during the 1920, grea enhanc lng communkationcapaiises, and longistance telephone service wth Manchuria began in 1924 Inthe sane year, estaBishent of Tedoced rate for press telegrams consibuted to the owishing of rewspapers: Thughout te colonial period Korea was the argest ‘ecient ane originator of elegraphic traffic with Japan in the em pie eeoFig. 61)18 AGING YANG Telecommunications and Colonial Modernity Ins study of clonal Korea, Andrew Grajdanzev made an inter: esting cbservaton about what may be termed the information Intensive behavior ofthe colonial bureaucracy in Kove The Jap ‘eve goverment in Korea e poate out, “isa bureaucracy which {fond of mulling circulars and sending clgrama’ since “in 1938, 2206779 telegrams out ofa total of 1,710.75 were Sent mary without charge, because they were offical telegrams, one Bh of the tofa” In other words he abverved, “a handfal of bareaacrats succeded in sending as many telegrams ax 430.00 ofthe pops ton" This preoccupation with communications on the pst of the ‘colonial government is also reflected in the numerous sats and other publications on postal and electronic communications it com piled and issued. Table 61, taken from a statis! yearbook com pled by the GGK, was intended to demonstrate colonial Kore’ fa ‘orable “communication capability” (sishinryotn) in comparison with other parts ofthe Japanese empire. ‘A considerable gap appears 10 have exited in the availabilty of communications falites between metopole and peripheral areas in ‘de empire. Generally speaking, greater ubanizton and & larger Japanese population explained the highly developed inrastroctare of Japan proper and the Kivantung Testor. Souther Saal and the South Sea lands, thily popalted and lacking aneporaion but of szatgic importance, relied heavily on telesoamurieatons Although Korea rivaled Tawan in the category ofthe telegraph it lagged in telephone service and usage In fact once the pice net work was completed in Ker, expansion of eecommaicatione i= feastructure lowed considerably, due less to a ack of tteret than to lick of funds. The colonial govemmant had to abandon i plan © ‘rise publi lors for tlecommunicatons after just one Year, and ‘iter 1923 elephone users had to shoulder al natalltion cots. Asin Japan proper telephone subscriptions in Korea became 9 snc ‘commodity and therefore a stata symbol" "How did telocommnicationsalfect the Korean population? In ‘comparing statistis on the Japanese and Korean popltone of co. Tow Korea, Andrew Grajdanev noted that eof 158 only one ot of every 306 Korean fames had a teephone, compared to one out ‘of every four Japanese families. Therefore, be coneluded, “sle- Colm Korea and Telecoms Py hones in Kore ae wed almost echsvely by the Jpanese”= Epona was cersiny comet hatte Japenese population in Ko te enoye te beet of telecommute droportonte ter t woud be mieaing to Tump all Koreans togetarA cose ‘amination of tephone tbsp during the ele ena Prod auggnss» soe ferent concn ae Fig 62) KO ‘Ran sutsrbrs fo lepone servic increase tnd fe sh fer 5 percen (48 persons) of al subcribers in 1910 to macy 2 Fercenover 17000— arty years aes, espe the high cont of tephoneinstaltion. many considered it indpensble tote tonnes na ined ray, hose Korean sures wera pi lege athe other 70 percent some 40,000 Jpn compare to {ieovereeining msn oft flow Koran “The ato Korean langage lego ay slo ied cues at to how Koran etd to iecanmuncatons (xe Ri 62), When Japan ook over Kors laseaniation aniston 2505, {immediately abla Chine anguge ler servic nd ie Sse Japanese lngsage serie fra Kors Bath a an Furopeamlanguage serves continued, but the former was arly Confted to dan service. The shah tlegame inthe Snell nmaber of telegrams sent sd senved in Koren beeen {9s and 1940 revels an interesting pater Te perenne eel 2 the numberof ru iegrae need seal for te fst fee years after 105 probaly due fo inroved conaunsaons faces an servic tthe stds of hal eepan ‘The vol year of 919 rte a alle high ha le {pas tan recived in Koen. Whether oro his phenemenon seer coneced tothe outa of Independence emanations sree probably related tothe growing atv of the educated Ko- Tan ei. Thesubequent deine o Boer hand efecto feet plc of catalase, peal the reed eo ‘Be agar anguge The perertge worms in fag ver ‘covered and abot number stayed larg unchanged de Spite a steady roe ne of telegraph by Keene Fallowing be {ered adoption of Japanese names and the sing of the Keren language prs he gl lege were fly iectrined in 190, ‘ero Sonar hap educlon in Wester ngunge ere Re "In jusiying the pending aboton of hal telegram service, theig 62 Tenge at Kr 904 Ste Sre Tn a pk ei SS Gitte apy tmyar Be 0) pp 5 ses 8 ge a gene doco nme re mS Sreammevem paper paneea om caoeaPL “Goal ar meticm agmicvANG (GGK concluded from a survey that “although there are many rea- ‘ons forthe eclne nage of Koren eegrams, the popularization ‘of Jepanese and increasingly close tes in busines transactions are ‘nowt important"® Assnulton often isan uneven phenomenon, Japanese was the language of modern busin, and an increasing ‘number of Koreans used it Ths, ssdation induced by modernity precede the coreve measures and used them inthe ees ofthe Japanese administrator. Increased Korean tac as even more semurlable given Japan's firm contol ofthe communications networkin Koren thoughout the colonial period. Although in the 192s the administration of Governor-General Sato Makoto adopted legisation to “equal” Korean and Japanese opportunies in publ service, tats fr those holding offices in the communion bureaucracy indicate & continued preponderance of the Japanese, who occupied over 70 ‘ereet of al pouton inthe Corxmunatons Buren, Te Bias was feven more pronounced in the category of permanent employees articular among higher ranking cil servants, with the exception flea appointments. When increasing nambers of Japanese em ployecs inthe communication services were tanefered eleewhere ‘or moved to beter paying indus inthe late 1930s, demand for ‘wireless operators surged and the GCK belatedly undertook var- ‘us programs to taln Koreans Sil, highranking. postions re ‘sine largely closed to Koreans and only in 1585 did the fist Ko- ‘ean rite above the rank of han compared to 63 Japanese above this ank) As late as 198, ony sx Koreans had progressed beyond this vank compared to $3 Japanese, and no Korean reached the higher duu rank” Ths proce seems to deviate somevhat from the general recruitment utters in late colonial Korea” One pausibe reason for the exclusion of Koreans is thatthe secrecy of ‘Sommunieations a Communsations Barea Director Yamada em Dhaslzed, was especially eritcal for counterntligence purposes, {nd all employees equied appropriate espervsion™ Tn shor, telcommaratons in colonial Korea was simultane. ‘ously 2 tol of ruppresion and of development, since bot were ‘based on eahunced conol.® Although more research is needed to ‘understand is impact on Korean sol, Ii possible to conlude thatthe gradual expansion of tlecommunicaton services in Korea, fapant from the immensely pope radio broadcasting after 1927, Served aba pew channel of public and private interaction primarily Colonia Kor ondTetcommaitions ro forthe Japanese population and th wan Korean elt. Eventhough such Koreans were only smal faction ofthe entize Korean popu Int, their incorporation ino a Japanese-dominated modern inr- ‘mation network could not but affect the development of Korean ‘opitlsm and culture during the eolonial period and thereafter. ‘Telecommunications and Imperial Integration 1 ineral polis control served as the main engine for telecom munitions expansion in colonial Koren dung the fist two de- ‘des of Japanese ocupation imperil integration assumed that ole ‘daring the 1950s, As the world economy formed ito ineresingly Suteki trading bles fllowing the Great Depression, Japan’ Iead- rs not oly ft the wrgent nen to strengthen imperial bonds with {he colonies but also considered Japan amply justified in veeking a self-sufficient exon sphere in greater ASA ™ By “collapeing space and tine” tlecomimunicatons promised to expedite the proven of economic integration. The Kors Japan tee- ‘phone connection achieved in 1853, described atthe beginning of {his chapter, was a major step in ths direction and also marked the increased eiphasis on Japs own technologies, Preparation forthe ‘connection was aleady underway in 198, but techacaldificulties ‘Ss wells Junding problems in Japan and Kores slowed progress ‘When the German fim Siemens und Haleke suceeded in ong submarine telegraph cable for telephone Wansmisson, Japan showed articular interest and requested echnical sstance Pally turned ‘Sou, Japan's Ministry of Commanications (MOC) mobilized its ‘own technical stength ant enlisted the cooperation ofthe private finn Nippon Hlcre Company (NEC), in an al-ot effort to develop long distance telephone warsmussion technology on is own In May 1581, a group of MOC technicians arcived in Pusan for an extended “experiment to render the exsting telegraph ables capaleof speech transnlssion tetween Japan and Kore, The Manchurian Incident that took plac inthe mide of the experiment aed new gency 8 well ar eifclty to the project Sance all cable ccs were fll Utlied during the day fr telegram warsmissions, those technicians had to conduct their experiments a ight A year elapsed before they succeeded in ‘car telephone system on existing telegraph cables. In exrly 153, telephone communication va sub ‘marie cables between Japan and continental Asia became posse forthe st timem4 agiNG YANG Events on the continent soon necessitated an expanded telecon ‘munication network for mary, pole and economic purposes, ‘After the establishment of Manchikuo in 1952 Japan's line of na tonal defense was extended tothe Manchukao Soviet borer, and the army was eager to strengthen military facies inthe noth “Meanwhile, with efforts under way to integeate Japan and Manche ‘a ino a “Japan Manchuluo economie Be,” commonication links ‘between Japan and the continent became atop prion for cian leaders as well Having achieved the sucess of cost telephone connection, MOC emerged asa chief agent of technological devel. ‘pment in Japan an telecommuncation expansion throughout the tpi. In 1934, MOC dealted plas fr a new long-distance cable that would extend from Tokyo though Korea to reach Mukde Manchukue. Sine the cable wae considered a miliary link and ‘mate of national poy, there would be no lack of ands in ace dion to cementing the specal relationship between Japan and Manchukue, a a Tending MOC engineer explained. anew fp Manchuria cable would fcitate further continental expansion, It would be less conly Yo connect with the prosperoas regions along ‘the Yangtze River in central China over lane lnk though Mate ‘hurl tant lay anew submarine able from Japan to Shanghai. In ‘addition, the land cable would help conpect Japan with Esrope, sine the Soviet Union was completing a tans Siberian cable net work. In short the Jpan-Kotet-Manchukuo cable would Fe both a highway anda byway “The emphasis on cable network in Fast Asa, based on Japan's “indigenous technology” represented a major shit in Japan’ inte. ‘ational tlecommunseatons policy. During the previous decades, Japan had placed its hopes for grester autonomy in international (elecommunicaton in the emerging, witless tshnology,, which Promised o reduce both constuction cost and theeforts need 1 cuir landing rights in foreign countries Development of Ue loaded cable camer system for long-distance telephone ttn ston, by Matsumoe Shigeyeri and other MOC tecalan in Japa In he easly 198, ited the balance favor of able ver wiles st as important were Japan's ew empirebulding repulse rents. As Japan gradually conslidted ty politcal and miltary presence onthe Asian continent sharp increase in elec Hon traffic was anticipated (see Fig. 64). AS the director of MOC's oli Kr ond Telecomms ws 64 inter of i wn Ri do enc ‘Sieh pour Tenn Deals Dm an ebys I) ‘elosommaniction Bureas pointed out due othe Limited number of radio frequencies, wireless communication could no longer meet the requirements of a gentrcommuricationsnetwprk in ast Asi In view of it strategic importance, the JapanManchukuo route sone, he tld the Dit, could conceivably require over hundreds of ‘Gunnels. Thus, the Hinited wirelee frequencies svaale #0 Japan would be inadequate and had tobe reserved mainly for commen ‘ation with more distant foreign countries in Europe or the Amer- ‘at Moreover the need fr secrecy ad become particularly acute, Sr ltr, polit, and diplomatic communications among Japan, ‘Manchskaoy and China, now Bound in a special relationship re quired tightened ant-espionage measures. Here cable enjoyed de- ‘ded advantage over wireless, whose messages could easly be in- tercepte and deciphered: Finally, despite improvements in wireless technology, the problem of atmospheric isference with Wiest ‘ommuniations persisted. A cable communications network pro ‘ide not only tighter security ut also the capacity Yo handle the ‘oluminous wae beeen Japan and its sphere of influence in a Jscent areas. Although constuction cots were higher, an under [ground cable would be more permanent and therefore more appro ate, fr Japan’ Ising imperal enterprise”76 AQING YANG A telephone cable linking Japan and the continent proved not ‘only strategically indispensable bat sls highly popular. After ele ‘hone service begin in 1953 between Japan and Kore, demand soon utstipped expect. Dring the fet tn dae afte sevice began on January 15, an average of love ta hundred telephone calls per day was place between Korea and Japan, nel reaching the single ce ‘cuits maximum daly eapacty of 120™ Late, some 3 telephone calls per day were exchanged between Japan and Manchakuo in ally. bu the number soared to about 13 i les than fro Jars Here, the poitealmuliary concer of empire-bullding and bus- es’ interest in what wer called “nutrition lines” ~ pri generat Ingroutes~ coincided ‘Construction of the Japar-Kores-Manchukuo cable began in the ‘sry winter of 938 in Manchulo and in November 1936 in Kore. MOC provided not caly mach ofthe technical expertise but also ‘over milion ofthe total ¥I millon requled in Korea alone, More ‘han half malin men, the majority Kotean, were mobilized: Ahead schedule in September 138, constructon ofthe 90 Kilometers of ‘able in Kore, buried one meter underground along the main ‘orth-south highway, with twenty relay stations en route, was comm pleted. © The cable fom Tokyo to Malden via Keo wat some 200 Icloetesin length, the longest underground telephone cable in the word at that time (ee Map 61). The some ¥40 milion poured into the project sgniicamly strengthened communications mong the three areas. Japan- Manchukuo telephone expacty incensed Py 24 ‘hunnels and Japan-Korea by 10, with telex snd facsimile services as ‘wel using equipment developed enrely by Japan” ‘With another ecological victory insight confident technocrats Inthe MOC in Tokyo drew up plan for uned contra ofthe sone {o-becompleed long-distance flemummuniations network in Eat ‘Asia, Not surprisingly, they sought ofsify such an unprecedenied ‘etension of authonty largely by emphasizing the tecnclogi a perative.® In contrast the open wir line of the Met period, 2 MOC report declared, nomlonded cables were 2 uniquely Tapancse technology. sep ahead ofthe advance courries nthe West this requiring maintenance by knowledgeable technicians to previ terrupions. The fequency of such accident on long-dstnce cables, sccoding lo MOCs own tests, ineresed in proportion othe sae ofthe distance. MOC considered cument maintenance levee fa rom MANCHUKUO ‘ap 6 The ipa Ker cn ng tae ae Su: Tee ‘Rabo No Mo ada est ie abo =8 AGING YANG sulcon for a cable stretching rom Tokyo to Malden (and sn to the Manchko capital, Shinkya) and it was necessary that all maintenance tecicans fellow a single chan of command under MOC supervision. Also, farther savings could be expected by ade ing use by malar, alway, news broadcast relay and acronis fates to that bythe put. The MOC report argued that for the higher purpose of future East Asian telecommmuniatons,” tec ‘contol and maintenance ofthe Jpan-Kores-Manchuko cable ci cuits shouldbe entrusted directly to the MOC. Only unde it un- fied contro, according to MOC, could the long-distance ccs “satisfactorily fall the function af oar important national policy of [creating] 2 communications artery” and forcefully advance Japan's ‘ews and infomation policy in att Asia Colonial Autonomy and Imperial Integration Arguing thatthe history of telecommaniatons not slply #nar- ‘ative of the evolution of technical effsences, commankations Scholar Carolyn Marvin suggests shifting the fous from the nar: tment fo the drama in which exing groupe perpetialy nepotiste power, author, representation, and knowledge with whatever Fesources are avalable® This perspective Muminats the history of the Japan-Korea-Manchukuo long-distance cable. Japan's newt limperial telecommanications network was not simply an epoch ‘making technological achievement, i also exacertted politcal problems ducughout the empire As Japanese technocrats x MOC Prsued their design of und conta, the impact ofthe techno logical innovation, mediated bythe new imperial agenda, affected burenucacies ouside the home islands a wel, “Timing was important extension ofthe Japan-Korea-Manchuria cable network nt the prin coincded wit th vision of Kor teas place inthe empire. The new overall plans Japan envisioned for East Asia begining inthe early 1950s necessarily meant redeliang the status of colonial Korea. After Minami Jr ave in Korea 8 governor general in 1936 and particularly folowing the outbreak of the Sinojspanese War in 1997, the idea of Koren a8 the “forward military depot onthe continent” iri sencinhton Wc) gained wide cureny. As Suzuki Takeo, a Japanese professor a Ke impe- "al University and major exponent ofthe idea, explained oven its colt Kort ond Telemann cy ee Egat ata tate eteiee rience anaes Sore ie ee oom iene ete oe eae ease Secret hearing Seeictneaeetoenaatiad Sekirei eee SERVE eeaeronetionag Se eas aoe Seoeege nett ae cnr Spe mecutennrnesmes Si anesgegimaeanete tee scmeg eee ciety coger Siete ace geeranmese fourteen tac ies bcoteemncmrsontaee ioeegeetamicn ete eegteeninse avert eee Ecce ieee caesar Soci emer omemans Soto peeyeecreopes Shotneeeuaee ts She Copy bine irae eho ein coe Shei terete Pee eee wma wien seo ti saeco fetches nie cateanoes Senne Sate cena iS hice cnyeare aor Sogo ate ahen nese sare Eee oi te Soe as Seige aia mae perro Ee ae ee 5 t0 AQING YANG Initiative” in the North China trade, despite posible competition from goods produced in Japan and Manchakwo. Diet set routes ‘tom Korean ert to Nocth China were establshed, and the inpact of Kora’s growing tade with North Chin on lelacrnmanications was noted in Kore, A KTA journal emphasized thatthe “capitalist, word economy” was characterized by the intemational actuation ‘of commodity prices exchange rates, andthe stock market, which ‘made elicient communication essential for market expansion, The association sree the urgent need for direct commutation is [etween North China and Korea a wells lw ats” ‘elecommunicatlons Became an incessingy inporant priority for the colonial government du to indusalizain at home and trade activity abroad. At the 1936 Conference on Korean indus and Economic Policy, business leaders from Koret and Japa le rented high telegram rates and scarce telephone service Expany ‘Son of telecommanications in Koren became & mj agenda atthe ‘conference convened by the CCK in September 1938 to cope with the ‘new conditions in East Asa after outbreak of the Sino japanese Wa ‘The colonial goverment admit tht inadequate elecommuica- tion faces in Koren were causing numerous delays and poor service. Te conference recommended a wide range of expansions of telecomauniation faces: extension of telegraph end tleptione lines, conversion of are wires t© more secre cables, adoption of high-speed telegraphic equipment and improvement of pedal ‘communication evies for aviation, weather forecasting, and sip- ping In the meantime, contol overall forms of communication by ‘ean of censrchp and radio intligence gathering was to be strengthened. Given radio's great role in educating the people en fying opinion and staaising te public order the GCK pointed out, broadest faces mast be greatly expanded, and publi radio te ‘eivers and highpower radio stations to broadcatt tothe Soviet Union an to interfere with Soviet broadcast o Ala must be eta lished Tn response tothe growing busines concer voiced a the ‘conference, the GGK soon erable radotlephon inks beeen Prybngyang, Pusan and Kei in Korea and Befing, Tanja, and Shang in China in 1508 “Although the “second nai” proposition, cling for industrial zation of Korea a5 well at imperial expansion beyond is or ‘ward base,” generated much enthasiastn among the Japanese in Ko- ‘ea, it met wth skepicim ouside the perinls, For insance, (Colonist Koa nd Teesommuictons a questions arose in the Japanese Dieta to the disruptive conse: quences of an aggresively expanding Korea on isting national boundaries The Kwantn Anny, onthe oer hand averred that the primary purpose of a "forward bas on the continent” Wes fo strengthen mulitary preparation in Manchukuo® Even thse in Ko. ‘ea realized that Korea might acum role other than saiply beng & “forward base Given its unique geographic lctin, as Proessot Suzuki pointed out, Korea itself could also serve asa ital strategie link between inslarJapan"the contr of leadership" —and the ‘ast continent of Asia~the subregions inthe Greter East Asian economic zone. By the late 1930, the perineal stpported the {important Pusn-Kejo-Uiju-Mukden railway tru line The eats ‘on bth sides ofthe pennsul fentured ee-lanes inking Japen with Manchakwo and Chl, efectively turing both the Japan Sen anc the Yellow Seu into “Japanese lakes." In short, Koes amas ao be- come the “route fo the continent” (ira rat) The “route” theory scemed fo coincide with the role of “organ isk” assigned to Korea In MOC’ discussion about the new able network Therefore, considerable ambiguity, not disagreement, emerged ‘ver the primary role of colonial Kore in the new empire. By cl ing the phrase "Kora asthe haan and Manchin asthe tage" thus comparing Kores to the runway in the kabul! theater that serves asa secondary but independent tage, Governor Generel Mir ‘ml didnot clarify the mater As we salle, how to make Ko. rea function smowthly a6 “route to the cnkineat” was no snp question In fact Japan's attempt to esash an empire-wide eee omumniations networkin the ate 1990 made cle that imperial {ntegration would not be ataned at easly as tecnica expert it Tokyo had hoped ‘Telecommunications and Colonial Autonomy During the moths before constrain of he Jopan-Korea-Manchi- uo able began, MOC office nupointed temporary under standing with GGK tht allowed MOC engineers nto Ko fo ea struction work and the use of MOC equips Soon afteandh -MOC bepan making rangement for longi intenance othe cable network and proposed stoning MOC engncurs ons perme ‘ent tai inside Koren. In euly Onber 1508 shy aftr con struction began, MOC engine Matsmoe Shigeo companied1, DDagING YANG the chief the newly crested Japan-Manchukuo Telephone Can- traction Seton ona visit to Kei to discuss the matter with CCK ‘fins. Interestingly, Matsomoes repetedalusone to unied onto of lngdistace networks in advanced countries inthe West Tolitred hi cal for unified system of contol and maintenance of the highly technical nomdoaded cable network. Technology came an uniting aly of MOC hegemony ‘The MOC plan for unified (ead: centralized) control over this tslaconamunictons system aight have made perfect sense from ‘Tokyo's perspective, bat proved unaceepabe tothe GOK Arguably the mos important colony in the Japanese empire, Korea had legally enjoyed virtual autonomy, since its governor general In theory re potted dicey tothe emperor ® Previous elecommunications ees Involving the home island andthe colony teen resolved by bie Tntrl agreements beeen govemunent agencies, This proved in possible withthe MOC proposal although the colonial administra Son in Keres welcomed the new network in Korea, sinc it would brood its own tlecomenunicatons infeadrocire, it nade 1 secret of ie diapproval of MOC contro. Not persuaded by MOC asi ‘ations, GGK proposed that uid manenance mast fist bei plemented inthe home islands and Manchakuo before being & fended to Korea. This was a stumbling block for MOC, since the Krantung Ary hed ever reed MOC’ pan of ured control and proposed the new MT be made responsible fr maintenance. ‘Thus during thelr mecings with CCK officals, MOC bureaucrats ‘had to dowaplay the siguiance ofthe portion of the cable in Mase chulo, since Kwantung Army opposition made i impostibe to ‘amy out thse plan in Manche In response # OGK insistence that Korea be allowed to attempt its own maintenance, Matsumae ‘torte that this would be like two good neighbors erecting high ‘walls Tension consequently mounted between the MOC, which, rand that noted dhe new cable was just “passing through Kore fd would in no way aft the urediction ofthe GGK To make the deal more palatable, MOC promised to lace surplus circuits to (GGK at favorable ates—a major enticement, given the colonial g0¢- femment's lied funds, The GGK Bureau of Communications Coli Kore nd Teecommaicatons ry relented, with the proviso tht maintenance work inside Kores be entrusted toa private company. "The conflict between MOC andthe clonal administration in Ko- zea involved more than quibling among pty bureaucrats In 3 pr ‘ate meeting, Ono Rokuichi, superintendent general in Koren, ox reseduneasnes atthe prospect hat if allowed ino Koren, MOC Employees would be in det contact with local adaunistratios at ‘wal ab ordinary people’ Dsagrocment over the communications retwork even affected the governorgeneral imlf. Ona nee: ton tour nae Kaesing, Minami fro was apparently disturbed soe Ministry of Commurications(Teishinsha) on signs forthe Japan Korea-Manchukuo cable then under contruction, Yamada Tada tsuga, chef of the CGK Communications Barat, proposed simply changing “ministry” to “bureau.” When a MOC engineerin the ‘entourage objected, assorting that the cable belonged tothe Minty ‘of Communications in Tokyo, Misa was eneaped. “Kore is under "he juradicion ofthe governor general drely appointed bythe em peror. What authority on earth does the Minister of Communications Rave to bul facies here” Inthe end. a compromise, the word ‘minsey” was dropped fom all signs, and construction proceeded (Only the agus term “communications” remained Why sas GGK so realtranton sacha seemingly trivial matter? ‘As one MOC bureaucrat blur stated to hs colleagues in Tokyo, “exenson of MOC euthority to Korea isa problem of invasion of their administrative juradicton, which has always been feed there“ The colonial bureaucracy suspected that i It gave in on telecommunications, oer areas under thelr riadiction, such as Aviation and insurance, Would be nest As a short-term soon, [MOC had to secure an imperial ordinance in 1538 to make limited |MOC operations in Korea legal As a more fundamental soon, however, the ministry had to modify ts strategy by using a Semipe vate company, the Intemational Telecommunscatons Corporation, forconeicion and maintenance oasie Japan prope. "The problem of conflicting interests could not be resolved simply by removing a character on sign however. The taper over the stats of Korea within the empire continued tl the eve ofthe Pace ‘War and moved toa diferent area, By the end ofthe 1930 Japan had acquired the technological ca pacity 0 lnk ll elecommanicntions faites into one single net ‘work in East Asia, promising imperial integration under Tokyo. In188 AQING YANG realty, however, the sparse operation of elacomaiction sery- fees in Japa’s home island, ts colonies of Kore and Taian, Man. cSuukuo, and China threatened to undenine the efestvenes ofthe retwork. In addition, faites for the public malta, police, rae ‘way, and other purposes were often managed by seperate agencies Such a situation was anathema from MOC’ standpoint. Bepnning ln 193, series of annual Bast Asian tecommonkationsconer: ences were convened to develop the necessary coordination ofall operations. Although almost all the delegates representing Japan's ‘colonies as well a “Sino Japanese jpint venture” teecommunis ns compris in Chin and Manchakwo were Japanese, consenais ‘bid not come eaily- Only aftr mach deliberation was an East Asan “elocommunication Pact drafted in late 1940 to erauresmoath com ‘munication within japan’s newly expanded sphere of influence "A new problem aro gain with Kore ited ag the MOC In previous intemational testis on telcontmunation sates ir volving Japan and its colonies, Korea a6 well as oer colonial ac. Iministratone bad signed under the usbrlla category of “Japanese agencies in charge of telecomemunications,” essentially delegating Authority fo the MOC. At the Second East Asian Telcom tions Conference in October 190, Koreas eolnial buresucrats x pressed thei dissatisfaction with thi practice and nite om being treated ab an independent signatory’ in the proposed Eat Alan ‘Telesommnications Pack. Although Kore had been represented by .MOC in previous interatonal testes, explained an official om Korea, it wanted a more prominent role in the East Asan telecom ‘murications network now that the pact inladed China and Man uo. Korea was ot going to lone elative utonoany in dealing ‘wih such areas in the neve imperium. ‘MOC viewed the matter diferent. Ina memo sent to Korea be- fore the January 191 conference for signing the pact it described “harmonious unlon between Japan ane Korea” a the "ore of East Asia” destined to be the ais of a broader East Asia in cooperation With Manchalo and China. UNimately thie ace would include Southeast Asa to form the Greater East Aslan Co-prosperty Sphere MOC assured the GGK that under the ew pact Korea's authony in dealings with Mancharia and China would not diminish Hom ver Kores’s independence from the central goverment in external felecommunications matters, MOC implied, would not only abro- gate decades old precedent but alter the “hndamentas of national Colonial Kore nd Teesommunictions us policy," with grave consequences. AS a practical mater, none of he Insitunal adjustments required could be acomplished within the shot time avalabe before the new Telecommanications Pact tock let on April Despite thes ffs to persuade the GGK, MOC wore ight: smare came te atthe general conference in january 194, Koreas representative, ater conraltng with Ke ese o sign the pat MOC official esponded by calling Kors telus to partpate as 8 member ofthe imperial government “suspicious” It was 4 major ‘embarrassment fo MOC tat the primary absace to nity in Enat [Asan teleconumunicaione shold be Japan's ov cola ment in Kore. To rescue the pact, MOC had to accede to the GGK's demand by entering into separate agreement with Koren that promised 1 teat Kors a an independent entity in East Asan tle ‘Cealy the GGK's obstinacy was not just for theta effect. Shorty alter this episode, a Japanese offical from the CGK Bares of Conumunicatins jase ta action to hi counterparts from othet sree inthe empire 1 Keren, we must pay ate atlenon 10 goveming an alien pope ‘maa in move wags an can be agin in Jpn pope. We mast ‘Mop paca mesures sppropste forth siutonThngr nti sce ance withthe pip even hy eee ene and pc, epnate,are comidered inappropriate and een ep tn Kors, We abl servant in Kowa ant forget een fora mint hs prince of (ovemingan alin people” Statements lke this semed incongruous with if not contradic tory to the oficial ply af “pan and Korea a 2 single body” (eae ta) i fore since the Inte 120 That resistance to the toa eradication ofa separate Korean identity would come from the clo- ‘ial bureaucracy ielf maybe ironic but not inconceivable Cony plete obliteration of the difeences between Korea an Japan would Inevitably jeopardize the separate sphere of authoty the Japanese ‘bureaucracy in Kors enjoyed. This tendency toward autonomy had ‘bea leat in part reinforced by the relative stably in personnel in the GGK burenucracy. Although occasional Iter transfers to ‘ther colnis or even Japan proper were possible -OGK Commi ‘ations Bureau Director Yamada Tadatsagu himself had served in the Kovantung Tenniteristhove serving in the GGK tended to have ‘gown up and slaved in Korea The lack of personnel transfers186 AGING YANG ‘could only reinforce the growth of separate entity for the Jepe ‘ese serving in Korea vies Japanese in Japan In thls context ven relatively mundane isues such as diferent pay scales might become source of friction. Referring tothe prospect of MOC oper= ating rside Korea, a GGK ofl hinted tht its own employees would be displeased to work side by side with MOC people since the laters chanoes for promotion were beter. As a bureaucrat he as voicing «rea abut linited concem. Despite highsounding "hetorc, the governments in both Tokyo and in Kejo were oft dominated by bureaucratic self-interest. Conclusion sent, this chapter has explored wo paradones. The ist re fects the charac fps coal poly in Korea node ane expanded primary te modern say f clonic the ‘logph and Wepbone under Japanese rl nt only served 10 senglen the cla ent bu alo provided ew Of orate however ted and unevenly ded to he native FPostaon Few wos deny ot tw underfopnse ue ate fegraph and tlephone ft gale wideepend use in Keres The Incrperation of Koes into Jopan-dominnted leerrencaens ‘network htped cate apes hd of moder ta ct Bot bevaled “ese” Atoagh Keren in neasng number could andi send legrams, for evap the bie dale of Korea Itnguagtegamo reveals ta clonal ausaaton unde te ape ‘se wes suceeding eat Deca tiled et econ bet The son paradox arises pry fom the rate of a naan ‘ations network el pas new Est Asian tecomamnictons ‘ewok was s doubleaged sword. Promising fo colle spce hime wihn de npr sa tresened ope te unasy Telane beeen the taper cir andthe clonal perpen ‘Alhough in Uanportaon and oer areas coordination Beer Tokyo andthe colori govemments was by ro mens smoot fe confit between OGK atl MOC over the new ast Asan com ‘Buniationnetrrk was prtiary serio in par uf he Stantaneous nature of telommancabons ae he issue of cotel nd govemance iene. This phenomenon was not eel new ine amas of impel istry. Writing stout the le of tee Cota Koren Telecomms 17 ply in generating the ground conditions for urban imperialism in the ate nineteenth century, James Carey has note tha the cable ae telegraph in aditon to sea power, tamed Weer clos nto imperialism, a system in which the center ofan empite could dca, rather than respond othe margin” The redefinition of colonel Ko. Fea isan example of sacha transition: colonials, in which power fd authority rested with the donsestic governor, became leperal lm in which power and authority were abrorbed by the imperial capita. Essentially, the contest over tlecommunications, the ule ‘mate medium of cont iusrates the Gray politcal problem of ‘imperial integration versus colonial autonomy snd in turn Belped ‘edefine the ature role of colonial Korea nthe new eae Bureaucratic infighting notwithstanding, Korea's mportance ia Japan's imperial telesoomenicatons network woned during the Pa ‘lfc War. As increned communications between Japan and North China occupied more and mee crits on the Jap Manchakuo ‘able, construction of second cable inking Kai with northern Manchuria began eventually reaching Wnsan by the nd of the war. Domestic service in Korea had o be reduced to meet the need ‘of trough ti and alr defense. The Korean Strait inthe south be ‘ame the biggest botleneck fr teecommunlcatione tafe, pe lly because a planned eabe linking Japan and ental China realy failed to materialize. Although a second nonsladed suber. rine cable across the stat was ad n December 1943, it son cased functioning due to technical problems, To ensure the vital ink be= tween Japan and the continent an uli-sort wave (VHF) connee= tion was established, but the zlay station in Teshima alo ceased ‘operation, due toa fire In a astm put, the Japanese under took contruction of new diet, ros-chanoel facies that need to relay points onlay the work was completed on August 15, 1805, the day of Japan’ surrender ‘The clonal elecommurications infrastructre continued to play 8 roe in postcolonial Korea, however. An American survey in the late 19408 desribed the tlecommanicatonsnebwotk in southern Korea as “small and in many respects obsolete by American ta dards” afer years of poor maintenance, bu conereditgenerally ‘adequate to inet the existing needs” To supplement these rplly eteriocating line, the Repulie of Koren goverment purchased ‘wieess eqlpment fom the American electrics giant REA Tn june 1950, five years after japan’ empiehad disintegrated the18 DaaINe van ‘Korean peninsula was engulfed ina new confit. Badly i need of communication fcites, US. forces found the underground "Mike sen cable” running through the peninsula a crucial asset. Trough- ‘out the war, American engineers repre Japanese eles nde eater statins o munis the cable's ue at trunk ine for troop {In Korea and asthe vital ink between General MacArthur’ head «qearters in Tokyo and US. forces inthe peninsula As the greta tery of communication, a US. Army offcer recalled, the Mukden (Cable was a“ God-sent pt interentingly, American were not the cay ones taking advantage of Japan's imperil legacies. The same tle alo serve asa major conumunications link for Nowh Korea tnd China, which ined the war in October 150. Lacking spre prs to repair damages tothe cable between Sindjia and Pyeng? Jang, Chinese engineers resorted o removing portions ofthe nom loaded cable the Japanese had laid along the former Manchukuo- ‘USSR fronter”” Thus in a manner tht no one would have pre Aicted, what remained of Japan's imperil tlocommunictons et ‘work contrite to postcolonial Koreas transition othe new Cold ‘War world order™ PART Colonial Modernity and Identity