*E.

.0.

Society of Petroleum Engineere

lADC/SPE 39354
Trends extracted from 800 Gulf Coast blowouts during 1960-1996

Pal Skalle/NTNU, Trondheim-Norway; Augusto L. Podio/University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX-USA

Copyr~t 199S,lAOC/SPE DrllllrrgCwferenca

break down while the secondary barrier after a kick has

occurred which most often failed were either failure to close
BOP, failure to stab string valve or BOP failed after closure,

This peper was prepared for presentation at Iho 19SSlAOO/SPE Drilling Conference held in
Dallas, Texas H March 1S98.
This paper MS wlected for presantatl~ by an lAOC/SPE Program Conunittee following
ravlew of informalhm Mtalnti
In an abstract autitfad by tha author(s). Wtents of the
paper, aa prasentad, have not bean retibward by the Intamatiaal Aaaoclallon of Orilling
Contractors or the SooIaty of Petroleum Engineers nd ra sub@ to oorrnotiur by the
author(s). The material, aa presented, ha not n-aaarily rafld anYPosition Ofthe l=
or
SPE, their officers, or mambara. Papera prsaenled t the IANSPE -Iings
are subjeef to
publi~tiw review by Editorial Cmltteas
of the IAOC and SPE. Electronic rapreduotim,
distributi~, or storage of any part of thla papar for an?arcial purposes withouf tha writt~
wsent of the Sooiety of Patroleum Engln-ra is prehlbited. Permlaa[onto r~oduee in pdnt
is re8triofW 10 n abatrscf of not mere than 303 ~;
illustrations may not ba copied. The
abatraof must wntain maplououa aolmoWedgrnent ef *are and by *em tho paper was
presented Write Librarian, SPE, P.O. Box 8338W, Rtiardaon, TX 7S033-3e36, U.S.A, fu
01-972-952-W35

Introduction

Control of the formation pressure is an important concerr

both in the planning phase and during execution of the drilling
operations. Improper procedures with respect to detection and
handling of kicks may result in loss of control.
The cost of blowouts and the loss of lives incurred from
blowouts warrent the study of past occurrences in order tc
reduce the possibilities of titure blowouts.

Abstract

The cost of blowouts and the loss of life incurred from

blowouts warrant the study of past occurrences in order to
reduce number of future blowouts.

We are hoping to see that operating experience in general

and experience through required blowout schools especially is
slowly paying off. Technology changes may however
override these effects in both directions.
Examples 01
technology changes are diverterless drilling combined with
drilling in deeper water and pushing the surface casing deepel
and deeper/fewer casing strings, thus causing a changing risk
and not necessarily accompanied by a corresponding
reassessment of the kick detection/killing procedures. Since
the shallow gas hazard and consequences are above normal,
large improvements have been noted the last decade or twc
with respect to shallow seismic and kick detection systems for
floaters.

Even though we continuously learn more about how to

handle an unstable well, it seems that the problems of
detection, handling kicks and loosing control do not change
much with time in the real world - out on the rig, The small
changes and improvements that do occur are first of all seen
thorough statistical data. A new data base resently compiled
will soon contain extensive data on more than 800 blowouts
from the Gulf Coast area and adjoining states duting the
period 1960 through 1996. At the moment the compiling
work has not been completed.
However, at the 1998
[ADC/SPE Drilling Conference an updated version of this
paper will be available.
Five agencies contributed blowout report information. The
State Oil and Gas Boards/Conservation Office of Alabama,
Mississippi and Louisiana, The Railroad Commission of
Texas and the Mineral Management Service (MMS) of the
Dept, of Interior.

Method of Analysis

On basis of data from five data sources

State Oil and Gas Board of Alabama
Louisiana OffIce of Conservation

At the moment the Texas blowouts makeup approximately

50V0of the blowouts in the data base but range below the
average blowout frequency of 0.15 blowouts pr. 100 well-ft.
drilled. The three major operations in progress when blowouts
occurred were exploratory drilling, workover and development
drilling. Most frequently blowouts occurred during the activity
of actual drilling, tripping out and circulating/killing. The
analysis indicated also that the major causes were related to
swabbing, drilling into a high pressure zone or formation

Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board

Texas Railroad Commission (RRC)
Minerals Management Service (MMS) (Outer Continental
Shelf)

539

PAL SKALLE, AUGUSTO

we have created a new data base in Excel spread sheet for the
period of 1960 to date, and plan to update it every 5th year in
order to watch over new trends within blowouts. The database was initiated by Hughes, Podio and Sepehrnooril. It was
not until 1973 that mandatory reports were instituted in all the
US states. Before that time no systematic method of record
keeping existed, From the investigated records, both before
and after 1973, we have seen that sometimes kicks are
reported together with blowouts. Kicks which have simply
been circulated out in ordin~ manners have been excluded
from the data. Those kicks that have caused extraordinary
problems during shut in or killing, like loss of circulation,
stuck pipe/underground communication etc. are included in
the RRC data base, and it has been somewhat difficult to
determine if it was a blowout or not. When in doubt we have
included such occurances and denoted them with very short
blowout duration. In addition to drilling operations (sulphur
drilling is not included), blowouts that occurred during
completion, workover and production are included. Therefore
our data show higher frequent ~ than drilling operation
blowouts published by Daneberger .

Ycnr
Blowouts
pr. 1S0
wells
Year
Blowouts
Dr, loo

Area

No of

Alabama

blowouts
9

**

No of wells
drilled
**

Footage

Blowoutspr.
100well

**

74

7S

76

77

,07

,11

,M

,03

,05

78
09

79
08

$
i

81
,09

82
,07

83
,05

84
.08

85
,07

86
,M

!37
0.05

88
,10

89
,08

90
008

5
01

in progress

Operation in progress have been devided into two groups,

first the operation have been subdivided into phase of
operation (drilling, completion, production, workover and wire
line), secondly the major phases of operation have been
further split into operation/activi~ in which a blowout has
occurred. The analysis is presented in Figure 5 and Tables 3,
4 and 5. Most risky operational phase is exploratory drilling
where the blowout frequency is 3 times higher than for
development drilling34. During the drilling phase it is mainly
in the drilling operation the blowouts occur, more precisely
activities like; drilling into unknown geology, tripping /axial
movement of the string and being out of the hole.
The high percentage of blowouts during drilling and
tripping indicates that operatorslcontractors are not taking
enough precautions to compensate for the decreased
overbalance margin. 3 The industry must walk a fine line ir
choosing a fluid that will optimize both kick control and
drilling rate efficiency.

100oft

73

,M

Operation

between

drilled
**

72

,03

It is obvious that most kicks occur at shallower depth since

most wells are drilled here, It isalmost even as obvious thal
blowout frequency is much higher in deeper wells since the
&llling length/exposure time is higher and formation pressure
is higher. When compared by drilled length within the depth
categories this evens out, but as expected, the frequency is
highest in the deepest depth categories due to higher pore
pressure gradients and difficulties in handling highl
compressed gas. In addition, as stated by Wylie and Visram K,
increased exposure time, longer open hole sections, more
tripping time and increased risk of lost circulation problem:
increase the blowout probability.

To date ( 1997) some 800 blowouts have been implemented

in the data base, split on areas as shown in Table 1.
and no. of blowouts

71

0,10

Number of blowouts were compared to actual depth the

kick ocurred at and the last casing set in Figure 3 and 4.

Drilling Activity vs Blowouts

Table 1. Overall activiy

1960 and 1996

70

in Texas (incomplete data)

Blowout depth

The data base contains too much data for one paper; In
order to avoid a voluminous paper we decided to publish
statistics dealing with what happened after the blowout
(blowing fluid type, mode of control, duration, consequences
etc) in a later paper,

SPE 39354

Table 2. Blowout frequency

Wells drilled before 1960 were also excluded from our

data base due to lack of accuracy and consistency, Reports on
wells drilled after 1960 show a gradual increase in both
consistency and detail level, although some of the parameters
had to be interpreted, even after 1973.

~..

L. PODIO

**

Estimated value before all data have been com~iled

Still missing data

Blowout causes

Activity distributed into different categories are seen in

Figures 1 through 5. Figure 1 and 2 show that the drilling
activity had a peak in US early in the 80s, corresponding to a
high level of blowouts. Table 2 indicates that the overall
blowout frequency is rather stable, and independent on the
activity level.

Blowout are failure to control a kick and are caused either

by equipment failure or human error. A blowout occttt
approximately for every 110 kicks that occur3, both fo~
development/explora~o~ wells. ~n--TabIei 6 throug~ 9 the
causes of blowouts have been systematised, and we will let the
540

SPE 39354

TRENDS EXTRACTED

~
.

FROM 800 GULF COAST BOWOUTS DURING 1960-1996

data speak for themselves.

References

/1/ Hughes, V.M.P., Podio, A.L. and Sepehmoori, K.:

A Computer Assisted Analysis of Trends among Gulf Coast
Blowouts, In situ, 14(2) (1990) 201-228.

Reducing number of blowouts

In spite of improved regulation and inspection of BOP

equipmentirigs and improved blowout prevention training for
drillers and wellsite supervisors no improvement in blowout
frequency in Texas was seen during the years 1978-1991, in
Table 2, This can be explained by the fact that the prevailing
contracts were of the footage or turnkey type. Improved rig
equipment and crew ability to detect and control kicks were
lost in contractors effort to maximize revenue through
increasing the drilling rate (minimum overbalance) and/or
decrease the non-productive rig time (ignore or missing
drilling breaks, tripping too fast, not stopping to circulate
bottoms up to remove trip gas or to check for any minor
influxes or more frequently fill the hole).

/2/ Daneberger, E.P.: Outer Continental Shelf Drilling

Blowouts 1971-1991, OTC paper 7248, Proc.: 25th Annu.
OTC, Houston (May 3-6, 1993) 415-425.
/3/ Wylie, W.W. and Visram, A. S.: Drilling Kick
Statistics, IADC/SPE pa~er 1994, Proc. at the IAI)C/SPEDrilling Conf., Houston (F~b. 27-Mar.02, 1990) 77-86.
/4/ Hohmd, P.: Offshore blowouts, causes and trends,
PhD-thesis, 96002, NTNU, Trondhehn (Feb 1996).

Wylie & Visram3 suggested to combat such trends through

Eliminate footage contracts in favor of day work contracts.
Alternatively operators should take a more proactive role in
specifying minimum mud density and offer a bonus program
for minimizing kicks.
Take the same approach
to kicks as for rig/equipment
Each kick should be submitted to the
inspections.
Conservation Board and made part of the public record for
review, analysis and continuos improvements.

Table 3. No of blowouts (BOJ vs o~eration/activi@

in
progress during the drilling phase ~x + OCS, 1960-96)

Operation
Drilling

BO
269

Conclusions

Circulation

42

A reasonable extensive data base containing blowout data

from Texas, OCS and US Gulf of Mexico States are about to
form, containing data from 1960 to date. The data quality is
improving, especially after 1973 when mandato~ blowout
reports were instituted in all US States.

Technical problem

16

Like before blowouts are occurring for two main reasons;

1) Drilling into a formation we thought we knew, but the
fomlation pressure was higher than expected, combined with
the effect of low mud weight amplified by means of gas cut or
water cut mud and axial movement of the string causing
swabbing. 2) Too high mud weight/high ECD during
circulation or downward movement of the string leading to
fractures, loss of circulation and kic~lowout.
Although the .-.
first hurrier is lost in such nlanners the situation co!ld haYe
been controlled if the BOP had been closed, would have
worked or was installed. It sounds simple, but the real world
is more complex than these simple rules.
The problem of detection, handling kicks, loosing control
does not seem to changemuch Over!he years. The improved
technology and improvements in procedural abilities is lost in
the strive to maximize efficiency and revenue, thereby
overlooking vital pieces from the fine set of small indicators,
especially if the casing program is challenging the geological
nature. The answer to this complex problem may be found in
enhanced motivation and knowledge. Who knows.
541

ActiviQ
Actual drilling
Tripping outicnxfwiper
Out of hole
Tripping in
Coring
Install BOP
Nipple down BOP
Circulatingikilling
Test BOP
Wait on order
Fishing
Stuck pipe
Killing
Snubbing out

BO
95
82
13
5
3
1
1
26
3
2
6
5
2
1

>,

PAL SKALLE, AUGUSTO

Table 4. No of blowouts (BO) vs operatiotiactivi~

in
~rogress during the completion phase (T.x + OCS 1960-1996)

Operation
Installing equipment

BO Activity
25 Nipple down BOP
Woc

Casing running
Cementing casing
Fishing
Stuck pipe
LOT
Set well plugs
Well testing incl.
preparations

Circulation

10 Woc
Cementing casing
Tripping in
Tripping out
Squeeze cementing
10 Killing
Perforating
Cleaning well
Gas Iifiing

L. PODIO

SPE 39354

Table 6. Most frequent prima~ and secondary barriers

that failed in allphases (Louisiana + Tx + OCS; 1960-1996)
Primary barrier
Swabbing
Too low mud weight
Drilling bretiunexp, high pressure
Formation breakdotiost circd,
Wellhead failure
Trapped/exparrdinggas
Gas cut mud
x-mas tree failure
While cement setting
Urdmom why
Poor cement
Tubing leak
Impro~r fill up
Tubing burst
Tubing plug faihue
Packer leakage
Amndsr losses
Uncertain reservoir depth/pressure

BO
5
5
3
2
1
1
1
1

5
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1

Table 7. Distribution
PA) of most frequent
phase failures (Tx + OCS; 1960-96).
m
.

Table 5. No of blowouts (BO) vs operatiodactivity

in
Drogress during th~ work over phase {Tx +- OCS; 1960- 19b6)

primary barrier
Tx

Operation
Pulling well equipment

Installing equipment

Abandon well

BO Activity
37 Pull tubing
Stuck pipe
Pull/drill out well plugs
Pull WL
Logging
Perforating
Cleaning well
Snubbing out
17 Run tubing
Install BOP
Run WL
Nipple down BOP
Set well plugs
Acidizing
16 Pull tubing
Set well plugs
Killing
Nipple down x-mas tree
Pull/drill out well plugs

BO 1 Secondary barrier
158 I Failed to close BOP
Rmrrsnot seated
50
14
Unloaded too quickly
13
45
DCKeIlyiTJ/WL in BOP 5
43
BOP failed after closure
40
40
BOP not in place
33
Fracture at casing shoe
23
Failed to stab valve/Kelly~IW
Casing leakage
20
19 Diverter - no problem
16
String safety valve failed
15 Diverter failed after closure
13 Form, break downilost cirmd,
String failure
10
9
Casing valve failed
6
WeOheadseal failed
Failed to operate diverter
6
6
x-mas tree-failed

BO
15
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
5
3
2
1
1
1
8
4
2
1
1

Swabbing
To low mud weight
Drilling break
Formation break down
Wellhead failure
Trapped/expaudirrggas
Gas cut mud
x-mas tree failure
While cement sets
Secondary barrier
Failure to close BOP
BOP failed after closure
BOP not in place
Fracture at casing shoe
Failed to stab string valve
Casing leakage

542

E
20
28
32
21
34
20
15
9

z
45
26
26
28
14

BO
78

66
43
38
34
23
21
19
17
15
13
II
10
7
7

operation

)Uts

Ocs
T

&

12
14
6
6
6
6
4
10

254040223
3030102184
62310020
42420580
128345180
1828130353
4023130203
00071290
161079050

7
12
9
3
4
1

34
44
342713
1813300430
15658480
26
24
421743\40

24

47

;103
3

SPE 39354

TRENDS EXTRACTED

FROM 800 GULF COAST BOWOUTS

Table 8. No. of blowouts (BO) vs primary/secondary

barriers dz[ring the ~rillingphase (T.x + OCS; 1960-1996)
Prim@ cause
Swabbing

BO
140

Unexpect well press/drlg break

41

rrappetiexpanding gas

39

Fomration breck down

36

Sas cut mud

27

While cement setting

Unknownwhy
Poor cement
[mpropertill np
Uncertainresemoir depth
4nnular losses

19
16
16
7
5
5

Water cut mud

Drilling

into rreighbourwell

Most frequent secondmy cauaea

Failed to close BOP
Rams not seated properly (4)
Unloaded too quickly (10)
DC, TJ etc. inside BOP (3)
Failed to stab atring valve
BOP failed afier closure
Fracture at casing shoe
String safety valve failed
BOP not in place
Diverted no-problens
String failure
Annular valve failed
BOP failed after closure
Failed to close BOP
Diverted - no problem
Fracture at casing shoe
Casing leakage
Formation bresk down
BOP failed afier closure
Fractnre at casirra shoe
String safety val;e failed
BOP failed afier closure
Failed to close BOP
Fracture at casing shoe
BOP failed after closure
Failed to close BOP
BOP not in place
BOP not in crlace
BOP failed ~fter closure
Diverted - no problem
Diverted - no problem
Failed to stab string valve
Fracture at casing shoe
String failure
Diverter failed

BO
52

19
11
11
8
5
4
4
3
9
4
4
3
3
3
10
5
3
7
6
5
6
6
3
11
5
4
3
2
2
2
2

Table 9, No. of blowouts (BO) vs. primary/secondary

barriers during cornp[etion and workover-phase (Tx + OCS;
1960-1996).
Prima~cmme
Wellhead failure
X-mas tree failure
rubing to anmdus leakage
rubirlg pl~tgfailure
rubing to cnmdus burst
Casing plug failure
WL lubricator faihlre
SCSSV/Storrrlckoke failure
Snubb,eqtlipment failure
Casing collapse

BO
27
19
13
7
7
5
3
2
2
2

Most frequent secondcry cause

Casing valve failed
Wellbead seal failed
Casing leakage

BO
2
3
5

543

DURING 1960-1996

SPE 39354

PAL SKALLE, AUGUSTO L. PODlO

80000
v
o
~ 60000

I-R---USA
;

/\

40000

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

-.

Year

~igure I We[[s dri[[ed in Texas, offshore (Texas and Louisiana) and US by nuntber CIfwells.

..

0
o
0

E
~lo-

.. .

20- -

w
%
0
g15-

.. .
-.

25

..

X.
x

2
5- -

Oxxxo xx
OXXX05

x=

x ox

x x , ~~
1970

OTX

oxxxoo

0 Ax?:.,
1960

1980

1990

--,

2000

Year

uimre 2 NO of. blowouts in Texas and OCS bv,. vear.

TRENDS EXTRACTED

3PE 39364

FROM 800 GULF COAST BOWOUTS

DURING 1960-1996

=-

45
40

20
%
. 15
2 10

5
0
o

10
Depth

(1000

25

20

15
ft)

.-

~i~r= 3 NunzbCrof b[~wouts in Texas and OCS by well depth during 1960-1996.
..

120

rl

TX

HOGS

100

20

-.
-:
h..-.
Casing
..

size

(in)
..,..,..

~iWre 4 N~nlber of b[owouts in Texas and OCS b-v cming size categories during 1960-1996.

..,,,..

PAL SKALLE, AUGUSTO L. PODlO

SPE 39354

140 I
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

.----...
-.-.,
-----...,
-.-.----J. L

~igure 5 Blowot~ts vs phase in progress flti

OCS).