Prosperity and Stability:

A Global Analysis on The Role Economics has on Regime Change

by
Cameron J. Kaiser

Introduction to Political Analysis

POLS 290
Dr. Geoff Peterson

05/13/2016

Abstract
Economical struggles have incited revolutions and contributed to philosophical discourse on
better models of government. In this paper I examined the role economics has had on regime
change globally by analyzing the World Banks 1961-2014 global GDP dataset, in conjunction
with the Polity IV dataset on global trends in regime change from 1800-2014. I first reviewed
some of the scholarly material available on this subject which suggested that drastic positive or
negative influxes in a nations economy provide instances which lead to regime change. The
data I analyzed shows that instances of regime change show a lower average in GDP growth than
in instances when regime change did not occur. I also found that the global average of change in
GDP from the year before regime change occurred in a country, to the year regime change
occurred in that country, is a significant number. However, I argue that this change is due to
anomalies in the dataset which skew the average.

Introduction
Ask anyone about the role of economics in their lives and they will likely give you an answer
which is all inclusive. From the time we wake up, to the time we go to sleep, money is involved
in virtually every aspect of our lives. Money provides the means to cover our basic needs and
comforts, as well as the means to buy power, influence, freedom and luxuries for a privileged
minority. For many people in the world, money is a huge issue as they struggle to have enough
to cover the basic needs of themselves and their families. Economic disparity has incited
revolutions and sparked philosophical discourse on better models of government.

In this paper I will be examining the role economics has played in regime change globally by
analyzing the World Banks 1961-2014 global GDP dataset, in conjunction with the Polity IV
dataset on global trends in regime change from 1800-2014 provided by Monty G. Marshall, Ted
Gurr and Keith Jaggers. The purpose of this project is to offer insight on the role economics has
on regional stability, with the hopes that a predictive model for future stability can be produced.
I will first provide a summary of the literature produced by scholars related to this topic to
provide a framework for the hypotheses I will purpose. Following my hypotheses I will outline
my approach to this project in the Methods section of this paper. Next I will provide the
results of my analysis followed by a conclusion of this project and the implications it produced.

Literature Review
Policy Regimes and Policy Change
When examining the phenomenon of policy regime change in states, many theories have arose in
attempts to explain it. Some of these theories include: political process and decision making
theories, elitist and neo-Marxist theories, postmodern and culture theories, and state-centered
theories (Wilson 2000, 248). In this article Wilson presents how these theories use stressors such
as catastrophic events, economic crises, demographic changes, shifts in modes of production, and
others as frameworks to create the necessary conditions for policy regime changes to occur
(Wilson 2000, 247). For the purpose of this paper I will focus primarily on the section which
most duly covers the economic stressors, labeled Elitists and Neo-Marxists.

Neo-Marxist theory approaches the issue of policy regime change from an economic lens. The
neo-Marxists focus on class conflict, economic arrangements and the dominant class, primarily
in capitalist societies, as a means to explain policy regime change (Wilson 2000, 251). For the
neo-Marxists, the role of the state in a capitalist society is to promote modes of production and
capital gains as well as to address the problems which arise from a privatized and unregulated
economy such as pollution, urban decay and poverty (Wilson 2000, 252). For neo-Marxists, this
type of society is inherently prone to conflict and class divide. This type of society works
towards the benefit of a minute class of social elites which use ideology to quell the public and
legitimize the state (Wilson 2000, 251-252).

Societies like these are usually marked with long periods of stability, followed by short bursts of
social change (Wilson 2000, 253). People tend to conform to the institutional arrangements the
state has provided for them which dictate their everyday lives. People tend to accept these
conditions as inevitable and unchanging for long periods of time until events of extraordinary
significant take place which can inspire social movements (Wilson 2000, 253). Such events
might include, sudden increases in mass hardship, rapid institutional changes, breakdowns in
daily routines or regulatory institutions, calamitous unemployment rates, rapid urbanization and
others (Wilson 2000, 253). Not only would events like these have to occur, but the people must
also be able to shift their belief in systemic legitimacy in order for social movements which
inspire new social orders to occur (Wilson 2000, 253).

Do Coup Leaders Matter? Leadership Change and Economic Growth in

Politically Unstable Countries
In this study Caroline Freund and Melise Jaud seek to find the answer to whether democracies
experience more rapid economic growth rates than other countries. They start this paper off by
stating that the data on this subject is mixed. Some studies claim democracies grow faster than
other regimes, while other studies claim that this notion is untrue (Freund 2012, 2-5). To get to
the bottom of this issue, this study uses the Polity IV dataset to track democratic transitions and
economic growth statistics. The study found that positive effects in economic growth were the,
result of swift regime change and not democratization (Freund 2012, 1).

Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis

There is a widely accepted belief that economic crises can trigger regime changes. Some
scholars argue that economic crises trigger breakdowns in democracy, while others argue that it
can trigger democratic transition. This belief is largely supported by a limited number of case
studies done on a few Latin American countries (Gasiorowski 1995, 882). This study sought to
uncover the truth of these claims by using event history analysis to examine all instances of
regime change in the largest 97 Third World countries (Gasiorowski 1995, 882) from the period
of 1980 to 1992 (Gasiorowski 1995, 885).

This study found that during the period from 1950 to the mid-1970s, but not after, high inflation
increased the likelihood of democracies breaking down (Gasiorowski 1995, 892). However,
through the entire length of the study slow or negative economic growth increased the likelihood
of democracies breaking down (Gasiorowski 1995, 892). For these countries non-democratic
counterparts, the results were much different. High inflation during the period of study actually
reduced, although not always significantly, the likelihood of transition towards democracy,
except in the late 1980s when the data shows a marginal increase in this effect (Gasiorowski
1995, 892). Throughout the period of the study slow or negative economic growth showed to not
significantly affect the likelihood of transition towards democracy (Gasiorowski 1995, 892).
Gasiorowski concludes his findings by stating, Economic crises do not simply undermine the
legitimacy of whatever type of regime currently exists in a country, thus triggering regime
change in either direction, as argued by several authors (Gasiorowski 1995, 892).

Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

The theory of modernization, which was a widely accepted paradigm in the 1960s, holds the
basic notion that the wealthier and more modernized a nation becomes, the greater chance that
nation will develop into a democracy. In this book, Guillerma A. ODonnell disputes this theory
and uses examples of modern industrialization in Brazil and Argentina in the 1930s to support a
counter argument (ODonnell 1973). He argues that the unique conditions which lead to lateindustrialization in these countries lead to the development of non-democratic regimes
(ODonnell 1973).

Before the shift to industrialization in these countries, the world economy was in shambles. The
populist leaders of Brazil and Argentina, Vargas in Brazil and Peron in Argentina, used this
rhetoric to gain support for domestic industrialization under the premise that it would provide
national economic and political independence, an idea which was becoming much more popular
at this time (ODonnell 1973, 57). During this time of economic and state expansionism, the
middle class became stable and support for nationalism rose. As a result, Both leaders used
their control of governmental resources for gaining power over existing labor unions and for
creating new ones. This policy deprived the popular sector of the opportunity to develop more
autonomous organizations and ideologies... But it also had the effect of giving urban workers an
organizational basis... that was stronger than anything they had before (ODonnell 1973, 58-59).

Industrial Modernization and Political Change

Guillerma A. ODonnell disputed the claim that modernization leads to democracy in his book
Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American
Politics, which found that, Higher levels of industrial modernization in Latin America coincide

with new and in some cases exceptionally harsh forms of authoritarian rule (Collier 1978, 594).
ODonnell argues that industrialization triggered socioeconomic and political tensions in both the
elite class and social class in Latin America which provided the necessary framework for regime
change to occur (Collier 1978, 597). In this paper David Collier examines ODonnells argument
and expands upon, as well as critiques his argument.

Although Collier does not discount ODonnells claim that industrialization lead to bureaucraticauthoritarianism in some Latin American countries, he disputes that these transitions are over
exaggerated in ODonnells work (Collier 1978, 603). Collier claims that many of these socalled transitions just reinstated previous political regimes and points to Brazil in 1964 and
Argentina in 1966 as an example (Collier 1978, 603). He also points out that Mexico underwent
drastic economic changes without undergoing a regime change in 1976 (Collier 1978, 603).
Collier concludes his argument by stating, There is (however) no systematic demonstration of
the degree to which these changes in industry and social structure constitute a sufficient, or even
necessary, condition for the political transformations (Collier 1978, 606).

Do Coup Leaders Matter? Leadership Change and Economic Growth in

Politically Unstable Countries
In this paper Richard Jong-A-Pin and Shu Yu examine the impact of leadership change on
economic growth after a coup detat. To do this they examined and applied data from successful
coup detats, and used failed ones as a control to mark political instability (Jong-A-Pin 2010, 1).
However, in the paper the authors state that, A coup detat is not equivalent to political
instability. Political instability is a latent concept that cannot be directly measured... variables

like coup detat are used to proxy for political instability (Jong-A-Pin 2010, 2). With this
disclaimer in mind, the authors found that leadership changes after a successful coup detat have
an impact on economic growth. They state, The poorest countries have higher growth rates in
the decade after the leadership change caused by coups, while richer countries have lower
growth rates in the decade after a successful coup than after a failed one (Jong-A-Pin 2010, 20).

Political Regime Change, Economic Liberalization and Growth Accelerations

In this study Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jakob De Haan were interested to see what factors caused
economic growth accelerations to happen in a country. In the first portion of this article the
authors provide the framework that other scholars had laid out on this subject. Various
explanations for this phenomena had been published by the community ranging from economic
liberalization to political regime change (Jong-A-Pin 2010, 95). Regime stability was another
important variable which some scholars, including Jon-A-Pin in some of his previous work,
found contributed to economic growth accelerations. Jong-A-Pin and Hann write, Jong-A-Pin
(2009) shows that countries with a stable political regime grow on average faster than countries
without a stable political regime. On the other hand, Jong-A-Pin and Yu (2010) find that within
politically unstable countries a leadership change accelerates economic growthespecially in
the poorest countries (Jong-A-Pin 2010, 96)

However, in this study Jong-A-Pins and Jakob De Haans finding are in contrast with much of
the data put forth by earlier works from themselves and other scholars. In this study they used
data on regime change from the Polity IV dataset and data on economic growth accelerations
from 106 countries over the period 1957-1993 (Jong-A-Pin 2010, 100-101). They found that,

Economic growth accelerations are preceded by economic liberalization... That regime changes
in general do no precede accelerations... (and that) Growth accelerations are less likely to happen
the longer a political regime has been in place (Jong-A-Pin 2010, 111).

Summary and Conclusion of Literature Review

Many scholars have used both theory and data in attempts to explain the role economics has on
regime change. Out of all of the literature I reviewed on this subject, there is an unanimous
understanding amongst these scholars that economics plays a critical role in regime change.
However, there is disagreement as to what this role, and the impact of it, actually is. Most
scholars took a more focused approach to examining this phenomenon and were interested in the
type of regime which resulted from either a positive or negative economic change. The primary
theme of these scholars findings were that drastic positive or negative influxes in a nations
economy provide instances which lead to regime change.

Hypotheses
I.

Global GDP data correlates with global trends in a polity regime.

II.

Regime change occurs when a countrys GDP experiences negative growth.

III.

Regime change can be explained by drastic positive or negative changes in annual GDP.

Methods
Brief on Source Material

The material for this project came from two different independent sources. The global GDP data
comes from the World Bank and gives, Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices
based on constant local currency (GDP growth (annual %) n.d.). Further information provides,
Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (GDP growth (annual %)
n.d.). I believe GDP is a good measurement for the strength of a nations economy because, on
the most basic level, it tracks how much the people in that nation are spending or earning
annually. This number is multiplied by a fixed value which accounts for changes in inflation and
deflation, giving a more accurate value of the strength of a nations economy.

The Polity IV dataset is the continuation of the Polity project started by the conjoined efforts of
Ted Robert Gurr and Harry Eckstein (Marshall 2002, 1). The Polity project seeks to provide,
Coding [of] authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative,
quantitative analysis (Marshall 2002, 1). The Polity project has became the most widely used
dataset by researchers for studying the effects of regime authority and monitoring regime change
(Marshall 2002, 1). It should be noted that the Polity IV project distinguishes the differences of
the institutionalized authority patterns of states operating in the worlds state system, and the
authority patterns that operate outside of a legally recognized state, which may be operating
within a legally recognized state as well (Marshall 2002, 1).

Methods for Testing the Hypotheses

To test my hypotheses I used the statistical analysis program SPSS in conjunction with the
datasets. To test hypothesis I. I used the polity2 score variable from the Polity IV dataset and the
GDP variable from the World Banks GDP dataset with the Kendalls Tau B test in SPSS under
the subset Correlate and Bivariate. The Kendalls Tau B test is used to measure the
significance, strength and direction of a relationship between one ratio/interval level variable
(GDP) and one ordinal level variable (polity2). To test hypothesis II. I used the regtrans variable
from the Polity IV dataset and the GDP variable from the World Banks GDP dataset with the TTest in SPSS. The T-Test shows the difference in means across two categories, in this case
regime change and no regime change, and shows the strength and significance of this
relationship. To test hypothesis III. I took the absolute value of the difference between the GDP
from the year before regime change occurred in a country, to the year regime change occurred in
that country for each instance of regime change globally during the period of this study. I then
took the mean of all these values to come up with a global average for this change in GDP.

Primary Variables Used

The World Banks GDP dataset provides the GDP variable which I will use to measure the
strength of a nations economy at a given time. The Polity IV dataset provides a wide range of
variables which provide cross-data analysis within the Polity IV dataset. For the purpose of this
project I have isolated a few of these variables which are the most useful for measuring the role
economics has on regime change. The variables used in the Polity IV dataset are as follows:

Polity2: The polity2 score measures transitions in state polity based off of how autocratic or
how democratic a nation is on a scale of -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic)

(Marshall 2002, 17). Although this project is more concerned with regime change and not the
type of regime present within a country, the polity2 score provides a variable that tracks the
shifts in a countrys polity beyond simply regime change. However, regime change can be
tracked within this variable as a three point shift (either positive or negative) in the polity2 score
over a three year period (Marshall 2002, 17). The polity2 score is different from the polity score
in that it provides a fixed scale of -10 to +10, where as the polity score also includes numeric
variables outside of the fixed scale which denote things like foreign interruption, state collapse
and regime change (Marshall 2002, 16-36). This variable was a new addition to the Polity
project in Polity IV and was added, In order to facilitate the use of the polity regime measure in
time-series analysis (Marshall 2002, 17). This is precisely what I will be using the polity2 score
for to test Hypothesis I.

Regtrans: The regtrans variable shows when and to what degree regime change occurs in a
country. regtrans is based off of the polity score and is denoted a regime change when a threepoint change, either positive or negative, occurs in the polity score (Marshall 2002, 35). This is
the variable I will use in conjunction with GDP to test Hypothesis II.

Eyear: The eyear variable provides the year which marks the end of a previous regime and the
beginning of a regime change (Marshall 2002, 31). This was primarily used as a reference in
testing Hypothesis III.

Year: The year variable indicates what year it was in a country for the additional corresponding
variables (Marshall 2002, 12). This was primarily used as a reference in testing Hypothesis III.

Ccode: The ccode attaches a numeric code to each country in the study (Marshall 2002, 11).
This was primarily used as a reference in testing Hypothesis III.

Changes Made in the Datasets

In order to compare and analyze the two sets of data I needed to make a few changes in the
datasets. Since the World Banks GDP data only goes as far back as 1961, I first removed all
data from the Polity IV dataset from before 1961. Next, I removed the countries from the Polity
IV dataset which had no corresponding GDP data in the World Bank GDP dataset. I then
extracted the GDP data from the World Bank GDP dataset and added it to the Polity IV dataset
matching it with the corresponding years and countries. Finally, I removed all instances from the
combined dataset where GDP data was not present. This left me with a set of data in which all
the remaining values from the previous Polity IV dataset had a corresponding annual GDP
percentages.

To test hypothesis II. I had to modify the regtrans scores so that this variable could be used for
statistical analysis. The regtrans score in the Polity IV dataset provides the direction in polity of
that change in regime as well as scores which provide auxiliary factors such as state interruption,
state creation and state collapse. Since I am only concerned with regime change, and not the
direction in polity of that regime change in this hypothesis, I replaced all instances of regime
change in the dataset with the numerical value 1. I removed all instances of state interruption,
state creation and state collapse from the regtrans variable as they do not qualify as regime
change per se. All instances where regime change did not occur, I replaced with the numerical

value 0. These changes allowed me to produce a variable which could be used to compare to
GDP in SPSS.

To test hypothesis III. I rounded all the GDP percentages to whole numbers (for this test only).
The reason I did this was to simplify the process of finding the change in absolute value of GDP
from the year before regime change occurred in a country, to the value of GDP in the year regime
change occurred in that country. This was necessary to prevent errors in calculations since this
process was done entirely by hand for the 702 instances of regime change during the period of
this study.

Results
Hypothesis I.
Correlations
GDP
Kendall's tau_b

GDP

1.000

-.090**

.000

6622

6566

-.090**

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

6566

6566

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

polity2

polity2

Correlation Coefficient

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 1 - Kendalls Tau B test of variables GDP and polity 2

Table 1 above shows the results of the Kendalls Tau B test used to test Hypothesis I. The table
shows us that the relationship between a countrys GDP and the type of regime present in that
country is significant and shows a weak correlation between the two variables. The significance
of the relationship is denoted by Sig. (2-tailed) in the table and shows a .000 (which I will
round to .001) percent possibility of the relationship correlating by random chance. The strength

of the relationship is denoted by Correlation Coefficient in the table and shows a score of
-.090. -.090 is a very weak relationship and would suggest that as GDP rises, a countrys polity2
score suffers a slight decline. A decline in polity2 score means that a country is becoming less
democratic and more autocratic (Marshall 2002, 17), however the table shows that this
relationship is too weak to provide any meaningful context.

On the following page, Figure 1 gives a visual of how this relationship manifests. As shown in
the figure, GDP is not a good predictor of the type of regime present in a country. From the most
autocratic regimes (polity2 score -10) to the most democratic regimes (polity2 score 10), GDP
remains largely clustered within the range of about -40 to 40.
Figure 1 - polity2 score in relation to GDP

Hypothesis II.
Group Statistics
regtrans
GDP

No Regime Change

Regime Change

Table 2 - T-Test of regtans and GDP

N
5920

702

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

4.1421864644973

6.9738668792829

.090638518795930

46

2.9847557758594

7.5907587206698

76

.286494725704910

The results for running the T-Test for Hypothesis II. produced two tables of statistics . In the first
table (Table 2 above), the results show that the average GDP at the time a country underwent
regime change was about 2.98 compared to the average GDP at the time a country did not
undergo regime change which was about 4.14. The standard deviation away from the mean for
both results was quite high, indicating a wide range of GDPs for both instances. However, the
means suggest that regime change is more likely to occur when a countrys GDP is lower. This
suggestion is backed by the results of Table 3 below.

Independent Samples Test

Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means

95% Confidence

Std.
Mean
Sig. (2F
GD Equal variances
P

6.021

Sig.

.014 4.118

df
6620

tailed)

not assumed

Differenc Differenc
e

Difference
Lower

Upper

.000 1.157430

. 1.708458

6886379

2810902

6064032 13230287

88

1465245

4497309

assumed

Equal variances

Interval of the

Error

3.852 847.3

.000 1.157430

. 1.747223

44

6886379

3004905

5676375 79127849

88

4718285

8599748

Table 3 - T-Test of regtrans and GDP

Table 3 shows, albeit a bit chaotically due to the size of the table, that the difference between the
means of GDP in no regime change and regime change is statistically significant. The
significance of the relationship is denoted by Sig. (2-tailed) in the table and shows a .000
(which I will round to .001) percent possibility of the relationship correlating by random chance.
Since I am not assuming equal variances in standard deviation for this project, the strength of
this relationship will be denoted by the t value under Equal variances not assumed. This
t-score of 3.852 shows that there is moderate strength for the notion that these two groups
show statistically significant differences from one another.

Hypothesis III.
Although the data above is able to show the relationship between GDP and regime type/regime
change, it fails to show the impact of economics leading up to regime change. The scholars

works reviewed in this study suggested that large shifts in economics, in either a positive or
negative direction, were a factor contributing to regime change. In testing Hypothesis III. I
found that a countrys GDP shifted an average of 4.74 in either direction from the year before
regime change occurred to the year regime change occurred.

Conclusions
Given all of the data gathered, a few conclusions can be made in relation to the hypotheses
purposed. Hypothesis I. stated that global GDP data correlates with global trends in a polity
regime. The data shows that this hypothesis holds true given the statistical significance between
the polity2 score and GDP. However, it should be noted that the strength of this relationship
provides no meaningful context to variables correlating significance.

Hypothesis II. stated that regime change occurs when a countrys GDP experiences negative
growth. The data shows that this hypothesis is wrong given the positive mean of GDP for
instances when regime change occurred. However, the difference in means of when regime
change occurred and when it did not, provides interesting information within itself. State
stability, or instances of no regime change, showed an average growth in GDP at nearly twice the
rate of instances where regime change did occur. This would suggest that role economics has in
regime change is significant, but just not as drastic as I originally hypothesized.
Hypothesis III. stated that regime change can be explained by drastic positive or negative
changes in annual GDP. Given the average change in GDP from the year before regime change
occurred to the year regime change occurred of 4.74 percent, this hypothesis would appear to
have some truth to it. A healthy economy experiences a rate of growth of GDP around 2 to 3

percent. A growth rate above 4 percent can be problematic in that there is too much money and
not enough investment opportunities, leading to poor investments and economic instability
(Amadeo). The opposite would hold true too since the 4.74 percent change in GDP can indicate
either positive or negative growth. However, I believe this average provides poor support for
this hypothesis given the plethora of instances where the GDP experienced little to no change at
all. Im positive that certain spikes in GDP change, like Liberia from 1996 to 1997 which
experienced a 94 point change in GDP, have skewed the average to make it seem more
significant than it actually is. Given these instances, I suggest that the scholars notion, and mine,
that regime change occurs under circumstances of large changes in GDP is inconclusive.

Studying the effects of economics on regime change is problematic. Economics are but one
factor that can contribute to regime change in an ocean of possibilities. The analytical mind
wishes to assign value and order to these circumstances, making studying regime change through
the lens of economics attractive and parsimonious, but incomplete none the less. If I were to
repeat this study again I would isolate each instance of regime change and study the history and
politics unfolding in this region during that time, beyond just economics. This would hopefully
provide me with other variables to work with which could be used in conjunction with
economics to paint a better picture as to why regime change occurred.
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