International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 123-124 (2014) 46e59

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International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijpvp

Review

Integrity assessment for safety relevant nuclear piping

E. Roos a, K.-H. Herter a, *, X. Schuler a, J. Chattopadhyay b, H.S. Kushwaha b
a
b

t Stuttgart, Pfaffenwaldring 32, D-70569 Stuttgart, Germany

Materialprfungsanstalt (MPA), Universita
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), RSD, Hall-7, Mumbai, 400085, India

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 22 June 2010
Received in revised form
6 August 2013
Accepted 31 July 2014
Available online 19 August 2014

The failure behavior of pipes and piping components (e.g. straight pipe, pipe bend, T-joint) with and
without cracks under different loading conditions has been investigated in numerous experimental and
analytical/numerical research projects. The results of these projects were used to adjust and to verify
different methodologies and procedures to calculate the failure loads, the respective critical crack sizes as
well as the leak area and the leak rates. On the basis of the actual material characteristics, the actual asbuilt congurations and design of the piping systems, the knowledge of possible failure mechanism,
concepts for the assessment of the integrity of the systems could be developed for the different actual as
well as for postulated loading conditions. Based on the integrity assessment the leak before break
behavior and break preclusion of safety relevant nuclear piping can be demonstrated. Examples are
presented of the German assessment procedure for a main feed water line of a PWR as well as for the
Indian assessment procedure for the primary heat transport system piping of a PHWR.
2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Integrity
Fracture mechanics
Nuclear piping
Leak before break
Break preclusion concept

1. Introduction
The approach of conventional engineering of high-performance
steam generating plants and chemical plants towards design and
construction, selection of material, manufacture and quality
assurance of ductile steel structures, systems and components
(SSC) has evolved over decades. For pressurized components and
piping systems of nuclear power plants (NPP) the reaction and jet
forces acting from a postulated double ended guillotine breaks
(DEGB), i.e. catastrophic failure by pipe rupture, was originally a
design criteria. Later on, the ongoing advances in technology have
increased the standards for the construction and operation of the
plants especially as concerns the safety against catastrophic failure
of pressurized SSC. As a result the dynamic effects, i.e. reaction and
jet forces acting on SSC, due to the postulated DEGB were excluded
from the design basis of the pressurized SSC [1e3]. However, the
postulated pipe rupture was still kept the design criteria for the
emergency core cooling system (ECCS), the containment and its
internals as well as the supports of the reactor coolant system
components.
Within this context, worldwide efforts were made in the last 35
years or so to develop concepts to prove the integrity of pressurized
SSC of NPP, e.g. Ref. [4]. This includes the verication of methods of
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Karl-Heinz.Herter@mpa.uni-stuttgart.de (K.-H. Herter).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpvp.2014.07.004
0308-0161/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

what has become known as the leak-before-break (LBB) or the

break exclusion (BE) concept or the proof of integrity. These
concepts are associated with the NPP design principles as regards
pipe failure and their safety implications. In the different countries,
however, for NPP pressurized components and piping systems
there are various safety principles and approaches available which
result in different national regulations, guidelines and concepts
allowing the possibility of catastrophic failure to be completely
excluded for pressure vessels and piping design [5]. As a result it
allows the use of analysis to eliminate from the design basis the
dynamic effects of the pipe ruptures postulated or at least to use the
dynamic effects of reduced leakage crack, e.g. Refs. [6e11] This is
accepted by applying a LBB or BE concept to show the likelihood of
detecting a crack, which allow countermeasures to prevent a large
(catastrophic) break from the growth of the small detected crack.
The main topics were to verify and to demonstrate the load
bearing capacity, the fracture mechanics behavior and the failure
behavior of ferritic and austenitic piping and piping components
(e.g. straight pipes, elbows, T-joints) with and without cracks under
different loading and boundary conditions. This has been investigated in numerous experimental and analytical/numerical research
projects. The results of these projects were used to adjust and to
verify the methodologies to prove the integrity of pressurized
components and piping systems, e.g. to calculate the failure loads,
the respective critical crack sizes as well as the leakage crack and
the leakage.

E. Roos et al. / International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 123-124 (2014) 46e59

Because of the different national concepts there must be

a distinction between the terms used. In the following the denitions are mentioned, e.g. some of them are according to EUR
Report [12].

47

required quality during operation. This includes veried and

advanced design and fabrication as well as adequate on-line
monitoring and in-service inspection programs.
Typical issues to be addressed for the application of the integrity
assessment are:

Leak-before-break (LBB)
Design and operation principle according to which available ISI,
maintenance and monitoring systems including leak detection, give
early and reliable warning of a defect in piping components, so that
necessary actions may be timely undertaken to avoid its failure as a
consequence of any design basis conditions.

Basis safety (BS)
Basis safety is provided by optimisation of design, material and
manufacturing to secure the required initial quality. If the requirements are fullled, the pressurized components and piping
systems will attain a basis safety level that will exclude any disastrous failure resulting from defects caused by manufacture.

Break exclusion (BE) or basis safety concept (BSC)
Realization of the BS the BSC requires the existence of redundancies to ensure that any possible deviation from optimisation
is sufciently unimportant and unlikely for catastrophic failure.
Advanced construction and operation practices, assured by measures to limit the bounding conditions and recurrent in-service
inspections and monitoring, enable the local protection against
pipe failures to be designed on LBB behavior (use of a reduced
leakage crack 0.1A instead of DEGB, i.e. 2A) [13].

Proof of integrity
Realization of the BSC having regard to the specic operational
conditions and the component quality during operation including
on-line monitoring of the causes of possible operational damage
mechanisms as a central element [14,15].
In India LBB concepts are now being used for the design of the
primary heat transport (PHT) piping of all the newly built Indian
pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) [16].
In Germany the BSC respectively the proof of integrity are
applied to safety relevant high energy piping of pressurized water
reactor (PWR) as well of boiling water reactor (BWR) plants, e.g.
reactor coolant piping, surge lines, main steam line piping and feed
water piping [17]. The general application is included in the nuclear
safety standard Ageing management of NPP (draft version of KTA
1403) [18]. A draft version for a nuclear safety standard with title
Break exclusion for pressurized components of NPP (KTA 3206) is
under preparation.
2. Technical basis for the integrity assessment
2.1. General remarks
The integrity assessment can be applied to high-energy nuclear
piping and should demonstrate in a mechanistic/deterministic way
that the probability of pipe rupture is extremely low as meaningless. The deterministic evaluation should demonstrate sufcient
margins against failure. An indispensable requirement is to ensure
that adequate consideration has been given to direct or indirect
damage mechanisms and other degradation sources which could
challenge the integrity. It is important to review factors, which
inuence or contribute to the initial quality developed during
manufacture and fabrication and the provision to maintain this

Constructional details and material characterization.

Loads and stresses to be considered.
Consideration and control of damage mechanisms.
Location and type of postulated cracks (fracture mechanics
analysis).

In-service inspections and recurrent testing (NDE; nondestructive examinations).

On-line monitoring (pressure, temperature, leakage, etc.).

Safety factors.

All the requirements mentioned below and to be met in this

context shall be those contained in the appropriate nuclear code or
standard to be applied.
2.2. Initial quality of the piping
2.2.1. Material and manufacturing
The choice of material and adequate structural design, welding
and heat treatment shall assure a sufciently ductile state of the
material over the full range of piping operating temperatures
throughout the lifetime under all plant conditions, which may
occur during normal operation and incidents. Only such materials
shall be used as have been certied with regard to manufacturer,
product form and manufacturing process. The material characteristic which is of major importance for the assessment shall be
established according to the requirements in nuclear codes and
standards, e.g. strength and minimum toughness values for base
and weld materials or minimum value of the energy absorbed in an
impact test as well as fracture mechanics values. The material shall
be not susceptible to corrosion and PWSCC is not a potential source
of pipe rupture. Moreover the operational and industrial experience plays an important role in the evaluation of the material
damage mechanisms.
Only qualied manufacturer with reliable quality assurance
programs shall be accepted for the manufacture of the components
and piping, which comply with LBB or BS. Manufacturer qualication must consider the manufacturer's staff, fabrication facilities,
testing equipment and quality assurance. All product forms intended shall be subjected to non-destructive examinations involving a
sufcient detectability of degradations.
2.2.2. Signicance of design
The design of the piping shall be in conformity with the suitability for the intended function, with the suitability for the applied
strength, with the suitability for the intended material, with the
suitability for the intended manufacture (suitability for testing and
fabrication) and with the suitability for an easy maintenance. It
must be demonstrated by means of stress and fatigue analysis, that
the stress limits included and admissible will be obligatory for all
stress categories and loads.
2.2.3. Applied loadings
The stress and fracture mechanics analysis uses design basis
loads and is based on the as-built piping conguration. It shall be
determined in each individual case whether and if so in which
combination the static loads, the transient operating loads, the
vibratory and dynamic loads as well as the loads from emergency
and faulted conditions will be applicable.

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2.2.4. Size of postulated aws and analysis

A part-through wall aw shall be located at the highest stresses
coincident with the poorest material properties which may go
undetected by NDE or which would be permitted by the acceptance
criteria. Demonstrate by fatigue crack growth analysis that the
postulated part-through wall aw will not grow signicantly by
operational loads.
A through wall aw, i.e. leakage aw size, shall be located at the
same location(s) and determine the aw size margin by comparing
with the critical aw size using normal and accidental loading
conditions. Demonstrate that the leakage size aw will not experience unstable crack growth even if larger loads are applied such
that a DEGB will not occur. Acceptable margins can be demonstrated by limit-load analysis veried by experimental results.
2.2.5. Stability of piping system and system evaluation
For the components and piping under evaluation it shall be
demonstrated by review of operating procedures and conditions
that the potential for water hammer in the piping system is very
low and that the piping does not have a history of fatigue crack, i.e.
thermal and mechanical induced fatigue is unlikely and no potential for vibration-induced fatigue cracking or failure.
Correct locations of supports and the reliability of snubbers are
of particular importance because this could invalidate the stresses
used in fracture mechanics evaluations. The potential for degradation by erosion, erosion/corrosion and cavitation due to unfavorable ow conditions/piping congurations shall be evaluated
and demonstrated that these damage mechanisms can be excluded.
2.3. Maintain the quality during operation
2.3.1. As-built piping construction and layout
The proven quality of a piping after the manufacture is to be
maintained in the succeeding operation. The in-service monitoring
of the plant is of highest importance with the rst priority of
monitoring the causes (inuencing parameters) of possible operational damage mechanisms. The assessment is based on the
recording of the mechanical and thermal loads. Monitoring of the
mode of operation (corresponds to the specied values or not;
pressure, temperature, displacements etc.) or are there any

leakages, e.g. occurring on valves. The mechanical, thermal and

corrosive loads have to be kept on specied limits. Knowledge
about the actual operational loads is of decisive importance
because they are the basis for the quality during operation
demonstrated by stress analysis, by fatigue analysis and by fracture
mechanics analyses.
2.3.2. In-service monitoring, recurrent inspections and testing
The extent of the in-service monitoring of the inuencing parameters (causes, such as loads, medium and materials modications) of the possible operational damage mechanisms is to be
dened on the basis of the actual state of the art. The purpose of the
operational in-service monitoring and the recurrent testing is to
guarantee that the assumptions the component design is based on,
especially for the loads (mechanical, thermal, corrosive), remain
constant during the operating time respectively to record possibly
occurring changes. Furthermore, the in-service monitoring shall
demonstrate that dynamic loads can be excluded and quasi-static
global and local loads, which are relevant to the integrity of the
piping, can be completely recorded by the in-service on-line
monitoring.
3. Proof of integrity based on the German basis safety
concept
3.1. General remarks
The proof of integrity for SSC act according to the fundamentals
of the German BSC [1,2], Fig. 1, adopted to German light water
reactor (LWR) systems and components for the application of break
exclusion (BE, exclusion of large respectively double ended breaks
or concept of break exclusion), e.g. Ref. [11].
Within the proof of integrity it has to be demonstrated that the
bearing capacity is given for all relevant operational loads as well as
accidental loads for the lifetime taking into account the specied or
monitored number of load cycles. As a premise the following aspects have to be treated:

Knowledge about the actual status of quality of the SSC.

Fig. 1. German basis safety concept (BSC) schematically.

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49

Fig. 2. Concept to proof the integrity of components.

Sufcient knowledge about the operation performed up to now

including the loads applied during the commissioning phase.

Sufcient knowledge about possible in-service damage
mechanisms.

Appropriate proof to deal with the possible in-service damage
mechanisms (design, operation up to now).

Operational in-service monitoring for the succeeding operation
to ensure against the damage mechanisms.

Consideration of the latest operational experience and state-ofthe-art of science and technology.
The proof of integrity shall be performed for SSC for which failure
is to be excluded to avoid subsequent damage, e.g. reactor pressure
vessel (RPV) and reactor coolant lines (RCL) or other safety relevant
piping. The required quality shall be guaranteed for the succeeding
operations. The causes of possible in-service damage mechanisms

shall be monitored and controlled [15], [17]. Implementing this

proactive approach prevents damage. A systematic procedure
which orients itself on the BSC, requires the following points to be
considered to guarantee the integrity of components such as.

The actual state of quality (material, manufacture, design) shall
be in accordance with the particular requirements (guidelines,
codes and standards). There shall sufcient knowledge about
the possible in-service damage mechanisms in the SSC (experience, research projects).

This state of quality shall be guaranteed for the succeeding
operation by
- in-service monitoring of the causes of possible in-service
damage mechanisms and assessment of the data recorded,
- in-service monitoring of the consequences of possible inservice damage mechanisms as a redundant measure and

Fig. 3. Procedure (schematically) to proof the integrity of SSC.

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E. Roos et al. / International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 123-124 (2014) 46e59

- follow-up of the state of present knowledge (reviewing the

state of knowledge, consideration of research results and
follow-up investigations of failure cases).
In doing so, especially the following points are of importance,
Figs. 2 and 3:

The quality of the component or the system (adhering to the
requirements on manufacture, material and design result in the
basis safety).

The control of the causes of possible damage mechanisms (by
inspection, by monitoring of the methods and mode of operation, of the loading and of the water chemistry, the mechanical
and thermal as well as corrosive and erosive load shall keep
within the limits. It must be shown that unallowable dynamic
loads will not occur).

The in-service monitoring of the consequences of possible
damage mechanisms due to recurrent testing (dening of the
detectable aws sizes, test intervals and test areas) and the
leakage monitoring system (detectable leakage ow rate and
the pertaining leakage area).

The fracture-mechanics assessment of postulated aw sizes.
Determination of crack growth and critical aws sizes and load
parameters, Figs. 4e6.

Follow-up investigations of failure cases and up-dating of the
state of knowledge.

3.2. Proof of integrity

To proof the integrity of SSCs in detail the following aspects have
to be treated:

Fig. 5. Denition of ow stress for limit load calculations.

3.2.1. Documentation and assessment of the actual state of quality

according to the respective requirements
3.2.1.1. Documentation and assessment of the actual design.
According to requirements on the material and the construction
(design and calculation) including the manufacture. These requirements are lay down in Germany in the KTA safety standards
and the RSK-guidelines including the general specication basis
safety and specications to be considered.

Fig. 4. Fracture mechanics procedure (schematically) to proof the LBB behavior of components.

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51

Fig. 6. Fracture mechanics methodology.

Concerning the as-built status of quality documents must be

checked with respect to design, material and fabrication (it is a
prerequisite that the requirements of the RSK-guidelines, of the BS
and of the KTA safety standards are fullled) and possible damage
mechanism must be well known. Based on the (operational)
experience and the state-of-the-art of science and technology the
damage mechanism shall be identied and their causes monitored.
The relevant loads have to be determined. They are to be
checked within the scope of.
- Stress analysis
- Fatigue analysis
- Fracture-mechanics analyses, Figs. 4e6.
It is assumed that the operation is effectively recorded by
operational in-service monitoring (e.g. according to KTA safety
standard 3201.4). Relevant operational loads, such as e.g. transient
loads, can be found and assessed in the data recorded. For the
accidental loads the data of the specications are relevant. The

relevant loadings (normal and upset conditions, reaction forces

resulting from a 0.1A leak) are included in the load specications of
the design.
3.2.1.2. Determination of possible operational damage mechanisms.
The fact has to be claried whether operational related damage
mechanisms may occur taking account of process engineering
related boundary conditions and possible operating conditions.
Therefore, possible damage mechanisms have to be excluded or
have to be identied in view of the operational experience and the
NDT results within the scope of manufacture as well as the present
state of knowledge. The parameters to cause damage as well as the
state after manufacture are to be compiled according to the present
state of knowledge for austenitic and ferritic materials.
3.2.2. Identication, monitoring and controlling of the causes of
possible operational damage mechanisms
The proven quality of a component or system after the manufacture is to be maintained in the succeeding operation. The in-

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service monitoring and inspection of the plant is of highest

importance with the rst priority of identifying the causes (inuencing parameters) of possible operational damage mechanisms.
The assessment is based on the recording of the mechanical and
thermal loads. Monitoring of the mode of operation (corresponds to
the specied values or not; pressure, temperature, displacements
etc.) or are there any leakages, e.g. occurring on valves. The mechanical, thermal and corrosive loads have to be kept on specied
limits. Knowledge about the actual loads is of decisive importance
because they are the basis for the stress analysis, the fatigue analysis and of fracture mechanics analyses.
3.2.2.1. Dening the inuencing parameters for the causes of the
damage mechanisms and their recording. The extent of the inservice monitoring of the inuencing parameters (causes, such as
loads, medium and materials modications) of the possible operational damage mechanisms is to be dened on the basis of the
assessment of the actual state of quality. The purpose of the operational in-service monitoring and the recurrent inspection is to
guarantee that the assumptions the component design is based on,
especially for the load (mechanical, thermal, corrosive) remain

constant during the operating time respectively to record possibly

occurring changes. Furthermore, the in-service monitoring shall
demonstrate that dynamic loads can be excluded and quasi-static
global and local loads which are relevant to the integrity of the
components and systems can be completely recorded by the inservice online-monitoring.
3.2.3. Assessment of the data recorded during the operation and of
the relevant strength
Basis of the assessment for the relevant strength are the specied accidental loads of the component design and the actual
operational loads considering the relevant constructional situation
within the scope of the stress analysis, fatigue analysis and fracture
mechanics analysis. The guarantee of the relevant stresses resulting
from loads takes place within the scope of the stress analysis, fatigue analysis and fracture mechanics analyses.
3.2.3.1. Assessment within the scope of the stress analysis.
Determination of relevant stresses on the basis of recorded data for
operational loads and specied loads for accidental conditions

Fig. 7. Methodology (schematically) to prove the integrity of SSC.

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53

taking account of the actual design. Limitation of the stress categories (equivalent stresses) with the allowable values.

When selecting the test method, the areas monitored, and the
test intervals the following aspects have to be considered:

3.2.3.2. Assessment within the scope of the fatigue analysis.

Determination of the equivalent stress range resulting from the
relevant loads in consideration of the actual design. Limitation of
the usage factor based on the number of load cycles and the
allowable values determined in the KTA safety standards. An
analysis procedure is to be chosen so that a sufcient realistic
determination of the usage factor can be guaranteed for the high
loaded areas. This is of importance to the recurrent non-destructive
testing (NDT).

- Knowledge about the causes of operational-related damage

mechanisms.
- Actual knowledge about the state of the plant and operational
loads.
- Knowledge gained from failure analyses respectively destructive
investigations performed on removed parts.
- Knowledge gained from fracture mechanics assessment of
minimum detectable aw sizes or postulated aw sizes.

3.2.3.3. Assessment within the scope of fracture mechanics analyses.

A fracture-mechanics assessment (load level, crack size, crack
growth) is to be performed for the proof of the criticality of.
- the minimum aw sizes detectable by recurrent nondestructive testing (postulated aw sizes) and
- operational aws because of possible damage mechanisms.
3.2.4. Monitoring/controlling of the consequences of operational
damage mechanisms
The procedure is based on the requirements of the safety standard KTA 3201.4, Fig. 7. The extent of the operational in-service
monitoring is to be dened in dependence on the possible operational damage mechanisms. This concerns the parameters important to the integrity and data to guarantee the succeeding operation
(global and local measuring points) as well as the extent of the
recurrent testing (non-destructive and destructive testing). To
guarantee the integrity of the components and systems for subsequent operation it is indispensable necessary to monitor the causes
of possible operational damage (e.g. mechanical loads, thermal
loads, etc.) as well as their consequences (by NDT, etc.). The
recurrent tests are to be performed in representative areas as a
result from the assessment of the occurring loads.

3.3. Example for practical application

In the following the application of the proof of integrity is
demonstrated on a three-loop PWR plant for the main feed water
lines (MFL) within the valve compartment (between xed point
outside containment and xed point entering the turbine hall, main
feed water line RL21), Fig. 8, as stated in Refs. [19,20]. The pipe
dimensions are outer diameter do 445 mm with wall thickness
s 40 mm and pipe material 15NiCuMoNb5 (WB36).
The fulllment of the requirements in the relevant guidelines,
codes and standards is exposed in the reports dealing with:
3.3.1. Documentation and assessment of the actual design and
determination of possible operational damage mechanisms
The actual pipe layout (design, construction, material,
manufacturing) is according to the requirements lay down in the
KTA safety standards and the RSK-guidelines including the General Specication Basis Safety [13]. The choice of material and the
adequate structural design, welding and heat treatment assure a
sufciently ductile state of the material throughout the lifetime of
the plant under all plant conditions, which may occur during
normal operation, and incidents conditions. The seamless pipes and
the hot-worked pipe bends are fabricated with qualied material
15NiCuMoNb5 (manufacturers designation WB36, material designation 1.6368). The material tensile properties at room

Fig. 8. Main feed water line (loop 1 e RL21) within valve compartment.

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E. Roos et al. / International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 123-124 (2014) 46e59

temperature are yield strength sy 440 MPA and ultimate tensile

strength sUT 610 MPA, at temperature of 220  C sy 398 MPA and
sUT 520 MPA.
3.3.2. Relevant loading conditions (mechanical, thermal, corrosive)
The maximum operating pressure and temperature on a design
basis are 79 bar and 214  C. The maximum section moment for
normal operating conditions is 214 kNm (near xed point close to
the containment). For faulted conditions (normal operating plus
earthquake plus water hammer) the maximum section moment is
606 kNm (time independent superposed values of the maximum
values in every direction).
Relevant cyclic pressure and temperature loads are only during
start-up and shutdown phase, which result in 180 events (3 times
in 60 years). As a conservative assumption the feed in with closed
valves in the valve compartment is supposed to be 14400 (80
events times 180).
No dynamic loading occurs during normal operation, the dynamic events from leakage are considered with the fracture mechanics analysis.
3.3.3. Stresses caused by the relevant loading conditions evaluated
by stress analysis, fatigue analysis and fracture mechanics analyses
The stresses of the different stress categories resulting from the
relevant loading conditions are within the allowable stress limits
according to the nuclear safety standard. It is shown that the fatigue
usage factor is on a low level (<1).
For the fracture mechanics analysis the initial crack size is
supposed to be 8 mm in depth (20% of wall thickness) and 96 mm in
length (30% in circumference) which shall be safely detected by
none destructive examinations. Based on the relevant cyclic loads
the initial crack size exhibit neglecting crack growth based on Paris
law. For the initial crack size it is shown that the critical load is 10times the load at normal operating conditions, whereas the critical
crack length for normal operating conditions is >180 and for
faulted conditions approximately 135 , Fig. 9.

(global and local measuring points) as well as the extent of the

recurrent testing (non destructive and destructive testing). To
guarantee the integrity of the MFL for subsequent operation it is
indispensable necessary to monitor the causes of possible operational damage (e.g. mechanical loads, thermal loads, etc.) as well as
their consequences (by NDT, etc.). The recurrent tests are to be
performed in representative areas as a result from the assessment
of the occurring loads.
4. Leak-before-break qualication of nuclear power plants in
India
4.1. Background
One of the hypothetical design basis events traditionally
considered in the design of the primary heat transport (PHT) system piping of a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) (also
called CANDU reactor), Fig. 10, is an instantaneous double-ended
guillotine break (DEGB) of the largest heat transport pipe. This
concept was originally initiated for sizing of the containment and
emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). Regulatory philosophy for
the design of piping systems, however, tended to shift the postulate
of DEGB to a design basis for making provisions of protection
against DEGB. A natural consequence of an accepted pipe break
postulate would require provision of massive pipe whip restraints
to minimize pipe deection. However, it is now almost universally
accepted that the DEGB of the primary loop piping is unlikely to
occur, provided it can be demonstrated by conservative deterministic fracture mechanics analyses that postulated small through
wall aws in plant-specic piping would be detected by non
destructive tests or by the plants leakage monitoring systems long
before the aws can grow to unstable sizes. Consequently, LBB
concept was accepted in India as a design basis of the PHT piping of
all newly built PHWRs.
4.2. LBB methodology

3.3.4. In-service monitoring, recurrent inspections and testing to

identify, to monitor and to control the causes and the consequences
of possible operational damage mechanisms
The procedure is based on the requirements of the nuclear
safety standard KTA 3201.4. The extent of the operational in-service
monitoring is dened in dependence on the possible operational
damage mechanisms. This concerns the parameters important to
the integrity and data to guarantee the succeeding operation

The LBB concept aims at the application of fracture mechanics

principles to demonstrate that piping is very unlikely to experience
DEGB without giving prior indication of leakage. In India, USNRC [3]
method is mainly followed to demonstrate LBB behavior of PHT
piping of PHWR. The LBB methodology consists of demonstrating
three levels of safety against DEGB. These three levels may be
viewed as defense in depth strategy. Level 1 safety assessment is

Fig. 9. Main feed water line e bending moment vs. circumferential crack length [19,20].

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55

Fig. 10. Schematic layout of PHT piping of a PHWR.

performed by designing the piping as per an established design

code, for example, ASME Sec. III [21] with a well-dened factor of
safety. It does not, however, consider the presence of any aw other
than what is permitted in the non-destructive examination (NDE).
Level 2 safety assessment consists of postulating a part-through
crack at the inside surface of piping components, that may go undetected during NDE and then demonstrate through fatigue (or any
other growth mechanism that may be operative in service) crack
growth study that it will not grow to critical size between two
successive in-service inspection/repair interval or, possibly, during
the entire life period of the reactor. In one such study [9], it was
shown that the amount of fatigue crack growth over the entire life
period of reactor was insignicant (less than 3% of pipe wall
thickness). Level 3 safety assessment consists of postulating a
through wall crack that will ensure detectable leakage in the nuclear power plant (NPP) and then demonstrate that it will remain
stable under the maximum credible loading condition that may be
encountered during an accident e.g. safe shutdown earthquake
(SSE). Factors of safety of 1.4 and 2 are recommended by USNRC [3]
on critical load and crack sizes respectively. A leakage size crack
(LSC) is dened as the crack that leads to the leakage rate, which is
easily detectable, by the leak measuring instruments. A factor of
safety of 10 is recommended by USNRC [3] on leak detection
capability of the instruments. The instruments normally employed
in NPP usually detect a leak rate of 0.05 kg/s easily. Therefore, with a
factor of safety of 10, LSC is dened as a crack that leads to leakage
rate of 0.5 kg/s. The entire process of demonstrating LBB behavior is
to be performed for the complete PHT piping system. The PHT
piping system of a PHWR consists of ve pipelines, namely, steam
generator inlet (SGI), steam generator outlet (SGO), pump
discharge line (PDL), reactor inlet header (RIH) and reactor outlet
header (ROH). The entire layout comprises different piping components e.g. straight pipes, elbows and branch tees. Fig. 8 shows the

PHT pipe layout of a typical Indian PHWR. The present work describes briey the level 3 LBB safety assessment of the straight
pipes and elbows of PHT piping of one 540 MWe Indian PHWR.
Branch tees are not analyzed as they are not so susceptible to failure
due to increased moment in an accidental condition. There are four
distinct steps in this work, namely, (1) Generation of material
properties relevant to actual service condition, (2) Evaluation of
design loads on the pipes, (3) Determination of leakage size crack
(LSC) that ensures detectable leakage and (4) Fracture mechanics
analysis of the piping components to determine the critical load/
crack size.
4.3. Generation of material properties
The 540 MWe PHT piping material is SA333 Gr6. Evaluation of
material properties at service onditions is one of the important
steps in the LBB studies. Material properties in the form of stressstrain diagram and J-resistance curve at operating temperature
are important inputs to all the analytical studies. Due to variation in
chemical composition, grain size and inclusion rating, material
properties will differ from one heat to another. Therefore, it is always advisable to generate one's own material data. Towards this
goal, a comprehensive material test program was undertaken
where tensile and compact tension specimens were machined from
base as well as weld material from actual PHT piping. For base
metal, notches in the compact tension specimens have been
fabricated both in L-C and C-L orientations. The L-C and C-L orientations mean that the notches in CT specimens are along the
circumferential and axial direction of the pipe respectively. The
reason for fabricating specimens in both the directions is the signicant difference in J-resistance value as observed [22] and elsewhere [23]. Subsequently, tensile and fracture properties of these
materials have been evaluated at RT, 200  C, 250  C and 300  C.

56

E. Roos et al. / International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 123-124 (2014) 46e59

When weld is present in a straight pipe, the bulk of the stress-strain

is best represented by the base metal properties while the weld
material J-R curve is more appropriate to use for fracture mechanics
analysis [7]. In case of straight pipe, crack is postulated at the
circumferential weld location and in case of elbow it is postulated
at its mid-length. Consequently, during analysis of straight pipe,
stress-strain diagram of base metal and J-R curve of weld material
have been used. In the analysis of elbow with through wall
circumferential and axial crack, the base metal stress-strain diagram and the base metal J-R curve in L-C and C-L orientations
respectively are used. In the 540 MWe PHWR PHT piping, the
temperature varied from 260  C to 304  C. For both base and weld
material, the lowest J-Resistance values are evaluated at 250  C.
Consequently, the material properties at 250  C are used
throughout the analysis. Table 1 shows the tensile and fracture
properties of SA333 Gr6 base and weld material as reported [22].

Table 2
Geometric details of PHT pipes.

4.4. Geometry and loading on PHT piping

Fig. 11. Location of postulated through wall circumferential crack in weld metal of a
straight pipe.

The geometric dimensions of the straight pipes and elbows in

the PHT piping system of 540 MWe Indian PHWR are shown in
Table 2. There are the connecting straight pipes at both ends of the
elbows. The length of the straight pipes has been taken as
approximately six times the mean bore radius of the elbow. A
through wall circumferential crack is postulated at the weld location of the straight pipe as shown in Fig. 11. Through wall circumferential and axial cracks are postulated at the extrados and crown
of the elbow as shown in Figs. 12 and 13 respectively. Separate
analyses have been carried out for different crack congurations.
The rationale for these crack congurations is as follows. As per the
conventional fracture mechanics procedure, a crack should be
postulated normal to the maximum stress plane for mode I loading.
A straight pipe under pre-dominantly bending load will have
maximum stress along the axis of the pipe and hence, postulation
of a circumferential crack is rational. In case of an elbow subjected
to bending moment, the peak bending stress is in the circumferential direction, which necessitates the postulation of an axial aw.
However, a circumferential crack opens the maximum under
bending moment [24]. Consequently, both axial and circumferential crack congurations are postulated in case of elbow. For elbow,

Pipe line

R (mm)

T (mm)

Rb (mm)

Elbow angle

SGI
SGO
PDL

234
280
211

40
50
35

762
915
686

90
45
90

one additional complexity arises in terms of mode of applied

bending moment. The deformation characteristics of an elbow
under closing and opening bending moments are completely
different [25]. It has also been shown in Ref. [24] that elbow under
closing bending moment has less load carrying capacity. Accordingly, in all the analyses of elbow, only closing bending moment is
considered conservatively. PHT pipes are subjected to internal
pressure and bending moment during normal operating condition
(NOC). Bending moment is introduced due to thermal expansion
and dead weight of the pipe during normal reactor operating
condition. Additional bending moment acts due to a postulated safe
shutdown earthquake (SSE) loading during accident condition. In
the analysis, internal pressure is kept constant while the bending
moment is increased gradually to evaluate the critical moment.
Constant crack face pressure equal to half the internal pressure is
also applied in all the cases. Table 3 shows the emergency loading
on different pipelines of the PHT piping system. Emergency load
includes NOC plus SSE loads.
4.5. Evaluation of leakage size crack

Table 1
Tensile and fracture properties of base and weld metal at 250  C.
Yield stress of SA333 Gr6 base metal: 240 MPa
Yield stress of weld metal: 240 MPa
UTS of SA333 Gr6 base metal: 458 MPa
UTS of weld metal: 449 MPa

Leakage size crack (LSC) is dened as the crack that leads to the
leakage of 0.5 kg/s under the given thermodynamic condition of the
uid inside the pipe, the mechanical properties of the pipe material
and the external loading on the pipe at normal operating condition.

Ramberg-Osgood parameters
Ramberg-Osgood equation: /o s/so a (s/so)n
where
true strain
s true stress
so reference stress (here it is ow stress, taken as the average of yield and
UTS)
o so/E
E Young's modulus 179 GPa
a 19.09 and n 3.273 for SA333 Gr6 base metal
a 7.97 and n 4.898 for weld metal
J-R curve parameters
The J-R curve equation, Jmat B1 (Da)B2
where
Jmat material J-resistance in kJ/m2
Da crack extension in mm
B1 889.2 and B2 0.533 for base metal in LC direction
B1 713.7 and B2 0.487 for base metal in CL direction
B1 587.3 and B2 0.4325 for weld metal in LC direction

Fig. 12. Location of postulated through wall circumferential crack at extrados of an

elbow.

E. Roos et al. / International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 123-124 (2014) 46e59

57

Table 4
Leakage size cracks for various PHT pipelines.

Fig. 13. Location of postulated through wall axial crack at crown of an elbow.

Table 4 shows the thermodynamic condition of the uid inside the

pipes/elbows. Computer program LEAK is used to determine the
LSC. The details of the program are described in Ref. [9]. The evaluation of LSC requires crack opening area (COA) vs. crack length
data as input. In case of straight pipes, the Paris-Tada formula [26]
with plastic zone correction is used. However, in case of elbows,
elasticeplastic nite element analysis is carried out to obtain the
variation of crack opening area with crack length. The crack
openings at inside and outside surfaces are signicantly different.
Hence, out of these two, whichever is less is considered conservatively for evaluating the LSC. Finally the variations of leak rate with
various sizes of crack are plotted and LSC is determined corresponding to the leak rate of 0.5 kg/s. Table 4 shows the LSCs obtained for various pipelines in the PHT system.
4.6. Crack stability analysis
In this step, the critical load (i.e. the load above which the crack
will extend in an unstable manner) is determined. This is done
using the J-integral-Tearing Modulus approach [27]. According to
this theory, the condition for unstable crack propagation is:

Japp > Ji 0necessary condition for crack initiation

(1)

Tapp > Tmat 0sufficient condition for crack instability

(2)

.
.
Tapp E s2f dJapp dajP

(3)

.
Tmat E s2f dJmat =da

(4)

where, Tapp applied tearing modulus assuming load controlled

condition, Tmat material tearing modulus, Japp applied J-integral, Jmat material J-resistance, Ji initiation toughness,
E Young's Modulus, sf material ow stress which is dened as
the average of yield and ultimate strength, a semi crack length

SGI straight pipe

SGO straight pipe
PDL straight pipe
SGI elbow
SGO elbow
PDL elbow

SGI

SGO

PDL

Internal pressure (MPa)


Fluid temp.( C)
LSC
St. pipe
Circumferential crack (2q)
Elbow
Circumferential crack (2q)
Axial crack (2a)

9.81
304
34.6
52.5
14.4

9.51
260
32.4
45
13

11.4
260
34
50
13

and P applied load. While using this concept to determine the

unstable ductile tearing load, one should be cautious about the
transferability of specimen fracture properties to component level.
It is well known that constraint (or stress triaxiality) ahead of crack
tip affects the fracture properties and triaxiality ahead of specimen
and component crack tip may not be identical. In the present
analysis, a high constraint compact tension (CT) specimen J-R curve
has been used as material property to determine the unstable
ductile tearing loads of piping components in a conservative
manner [28,29].
The critical load thus calculated is compared to the limit load
obtained from the momenterotation curve by twice elastic slope
method. If the limit moment is less than the critical moment obtained using J-T approach, the limit moment is considered the
critical moment. Critical moments have been calculated for two
sets of crack size: One for LSC and another for twice the LSC. This is
to demonstrate minimum factor of safety of 2 on the critical crack
length with respect to the LSC for Leak-Before-Break qualications.
4.6.1. Applied J-integrals
In case of straight pipe with a circumferential crack, the
analytical solutions for applied J-integrals are available for combined axial tension and bending moment. Presently, there are ve
such J-estimation schemes, namely, GE/EPRI [30,31], Paris-Tada
[26], LBB.NRC [32], LBB.BCL1 and LBB.BCL2 method [33]. These
are basic papers which rst proposed the pipe J-estimation
schemes and we used them in our analysis.
However, these schemes do not take care of crack face pressure.
Similarly, for elbow with through wall circumferential or axial
crack, the applied J-integrals solutions are not available for combined internal pressure and bending moment. Consequently, nite
element technique has been adopted to evaluate the applied J-integral for both straight pipes and elbows with through wall cracks.
The J-integral varies through the thickness of the component.
While the analytical estimation schemes give an average J-integral
value over the entire thickness, the nite element analysis gives
separate J-integral values across the crack front through the
thickness. Hence an average J-integral is evaluated as:

Javg

Jin 4Jmid Jo
6

(5)

where, Jin, Jmid and Jo are the J-integral at inside, mid and outside
surface respectively. The crack is assumed to be stationary. In other

Table 3
Emergency loading on PHT pipes.
Pipe line

Pipe line 0

Emergency load
Int. pressure
(MPa)

Bending moment
(kNm)

Axial force
(kN)

9.81
9.51
11.4
9.81
9.51
11.4

730
968
327.6
423
738
168

202
665
153.5
e
e
e

Table 5
Material J-T values for base & weld metals.
Base metal (LC direction)
Base metal (CL direction)
Weld metal (LC direction)

Jmat (kJ/m2)
Tmat
Jmat (kJ/m2)
Tmat
Jmat (kJ/m2)
Tmat

400
1378
400
988
587
402

2500
313
1800
203
1563
111

5000
58
3400
9.86
2505
24

58

E. Roos et al. / International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 123-124 (2014) 46e59

Table 6
LBB qualication of straight pipe in SGI line.
Margin type
USNRC, 1984 requirement
GE/EPRI
LBB.NRC
LBB.BCL1
LBB.BCL2
FEM
Limit theory

Table 9
LBB qualication of SGI elbow.

Mc/Memergency
at LSC

Mc/Memergency
at 2  LSC

1.4
2.60
2.98
3.95
4.05
2.87
2.35

1.0
1.81
2.15
2.43
2.33
2.20
2.32

Mc is the minimum of Mcr from J-T approach

Memergency Emergency bending moment at SSE event.

and

limit

moment

Table 7
LBB qualication of straight pipe in SGO line.
Margin type

Mc/Memergency
at LSC

Mc/Memergency
at 2  LSC

USNRC, 1984 requirement

GE/EPRI
LBB.NRC
LBB.BCL1
LBB.BCL2
FEM
Limit theory

1.4
3.47
3.99
5.37
5.51
4.00
3.63

1.0
2.44
2.92
3.34
3.22
3.12
3.26

4.6.2. Material J-resistance

The material J-integral - Tearing Modulus (J-T) relationships are
derived as follows. The applicable J-resistance is expressed in curve
tted power law as follows:

Tmat D1 Jmat D2

(6)

where Jmat is in kJ/m2 and Da is the crack extension in mm.

"
#
B2 $E$106
1=B2
D1
;
$B1
s2f

D2

B2  1
B2

Circumferential

Crack size

LSC

2  LSC

Axial
LSC

2  LSC

Mcr from J-T approach (kNm)

Limit moment (kNm)
FOS Mc/Memergency
USNRC, 1984 requirement of FOS

1720
1533
3.62
1.4

1204
1152
2.72
1.0

1678
1100
2.60
1.4

1237
974
2.30
1.0

Table 10
LBB qualication of SGO elbow.
Crack conguration

Circumferential

Crack size

LSC

2  LSC

Axial
LSC

2  LSC

Mcr from J-T approach (kNm)

Limit moment (kNm)
FOS Mc/Memergency
USNRC, 1984 requirement of FOS

3807
3179
4.31
1.4

2731
2577
3.49
1.0

4034
2947
4.00
1.4

3415
2762
3.74
1.0

4.7. Analysis results

words, the possibility of crack extension during loading is not

accounted for.

Jmat B1 DaB2 ;

Crack conguration

(7)

This form of relationship between the material tearing modulus

and J-resistance is used in the assessment over the range of material J-resistance test data. However, in the assessment, it has been
necessary to extrapolate these relationships beyond the maximum
J-resistance levels from material tests. The extrapolation has been
based on [3]: tangentially in a linear manner from the measured
maximum J-resistance value up to a maximum of twice the
measured J-resistance value on J-T plane. Table 5 shows the material J-T values of base and weld metals for LC and CL orientations
of the notch.

Table 8
LBB qualication of straight pipe
in PDL.
Margin type

Mc/Memergency
at LSC

Mc/Memergency
at 2  LSC

USNRC, 1984 requirement

GE/EPRI
LBB.NRC
LBB.BCL1
LBB.BCL2
FEM
Limit theory

1.4
4.13
4.68
6.37
6.55
4.57
4.15

1.0
2.88
3.34
3.89
3.74
3.54
3.65

For analytical J-estimations of straight pipes with through wall

circumferential cracks, four methods, namely, GE/EPRI, LBB.NRC,
LBB.BCL1 and LBB.BCL2 are employed. Tada-Paris method is not
used because it cannot take care of material strain hardening. For
the nite element analysis of the straight pipes and elbows with
postulated cracks, the ABAQUS (Hibbit et al., 1995) code was used.
Elastic-plastic analysis has been carried out for all the pipelines. The
critical J-integral and bending moment which are calculated by J-T
approach and the limit moments are shown in Tables 6e11 for
straight pipes with circumferential cracks and elbows with
circumferential and axial crack congurations respectively.
Tables also show the leak-before-break qualication as per USNRC,
1984 for all the piping components of the PHT system. It may be
observed that in case of straight pipes, GE/EPRI method gives the
lowest critical moments whereas in all other cases limit moments
are less than the critical moment obtained from J-T analysis. This
indicates the high toughness of the material .
5. Conclusions
Based on the German Basis Safety Concept a general concept to
ensure the integrity of pressurized components and systems is
developed. The concept can be applied to components and systems
under construction (new design) as well as to components and
systems already in operation for their remaining lifetime. The
calculation methods and fracture mechanics approaches are veried by numerous experimental data. The main points are on the
one hand to demonstrate the actual as-built status of quality and on
the other hand in-service monitoring and recurrent nondestructive examinations to guarantee the ongoing operation of
the plants.

Table 11
LBB qualication of PDL elbow.
Crack conguration

Circumferential

Crack size

LSC

2  LSC

Axial
LSC

2  LSC

Mcr from J-T approach (kNm)

Limit moment (kNm)
FOS Mc/Memergency
USNRC, 1984 requirement of FOS

1224
1069
6.36
1.4

877
874
5.20
1.0

1050
544
3.24
1.4

630
484
2.88
1.0

E. Roos et al. / International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 123-124 (2014) 46e59

Application of leak-before-break concept to design the primary

heat transport piping of Indian PHWR is shown here. The basic
background, LBB methodology followed, generation of relevant
material properties for LBB analyses, determination of leakage size
crack and crack stability analysis under the emergency loading
during a safe shutdown earthquake is described.

[14]
[15]
[16]

[17]

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