PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

RUFINO MALLARI
G.R. No. 145993, June 17, 2003
Facts:
On 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m., Joseph admonished Rufino
and his brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while passing by
Josephs house. Rufino and his brothers, who were then hot-tempered,
challenged Joseph to a fight. The latter just ignored the challenge; and,
instead he and his own brothers Radi and Manny asked apology from
Rufino.
Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a
basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and his
brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons, arrived and
attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they
were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck
parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until
the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death.
An information for Murder was filed and Mallari was convicted.
Issue:
Whether or not, use of motor vehicle should be considered as
qualifying circumstance.
Held:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in
pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the
truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear
that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing
of Joseph. The truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over
him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills
another by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use
of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STEPHEN MARK

WHISENHUNT
G.R. No. 123819, November 14, 2001
Facts:
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, driver of Whisenhunt,
reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latters condominium unit at San
Juan. He brought Elsa to accused-appellants condominium unit.
After a few days, while Demetrio was in the servants quarters
watching television, accused Whisenhunt came in. He asked Demetrio
how long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was
willing to work for him forever, and expressed his full trust in him.
Upon hearing this, accused-appellant shed tears and embraced
Demetrio and told him that Elsa was dead.
The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping
Center and bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers, colored black
and gray. When they returned to the condominium, accused asked
Demetrio to help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Then,
they brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of accusedappellants car. After that, they boarded the car. Demetrio took the
wheel and accused-appellant sat beside him in front.
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant
left the condominium.
Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive
around Batangas and Tagaytay City where they disposed the victims
body parts and belongings.
Issue:
Whether or not, Whisenhunt is guilty of Murder.
Held:
The qualifying circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the
corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The
mere decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or
scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to
murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He
further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the
dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside,
leaving them to rot on the ground.
Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant
of the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and scoffing at the

victims person or corpse. This circumstance was both alleged in the

information and proved during the trial.

PEOPLE vs. DONATO CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS,

JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL DOE, and
several other DOES
G.R. No. 100801-02, August 25, 2000
Facts:
On April 21, 1989 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, the car
of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG for brevity), was ambushed at the corner of
Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City.
Initial
investigation by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS for brevity),
National Capital District Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City which
was led by Capt. Gil Meneses, Assistant Chief of the Special
Investigation Branch, CIS, shows that on the date and time of the
ambush, Col. James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car
which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya; and that they were at the
corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City on
their way to the JUSMAG Compound along Tomas Morato Street when
gunmen who were on board an old model Toyota Corolla car suddenly
fired at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and seriously wounding his
driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by the gunmen was
followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it sped away from the site of
the ambush.
Issue:
Whether or not, accused are guilty of the crime of Murder and
Attempted Murder.
Held:
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya,
was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make. The evidence clearly shows that
the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to
ensure the commission of the crime without the least danger unto
themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims.
Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful
firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by
Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street
in Quezon City.
Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his
companions suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said
place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe
during the said ambush is murder.

With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of

Joaquin Vinuya, it appears that the said victim sustained injuries on his
scalp, on the left shoulder and on the back portion of the left hand from
the ambush. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a
felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator. The evidence adduced by the prosecutio is not
sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This Court notes
that the wounds sustained by the victim are not fatal wounds but
merely superficial wounds. The records disclose that Joaquin Vinuya
managed to drive the car of Col. Rowe toward the JUSMAG Compound
which is 200 meters away from the site of the ambush.[76] It also
appears that Vinuya was treated for his wounds for only four (4) days
at the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga after which he was brought
back to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate. Hence,
the crime committed as against him is only attempted murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO S. ANTONIO,

SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA,
JR.
G.R. No. 128900, July 14, 2000
Facts:
On November 1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny
Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for
another poker session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the
club first, followed by Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however,
failed to appear, so after waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles
decided to play pusoy dos, a game for two (2) players only. They
continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had
to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 oclock in
the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings
from the loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the
prosecution and the defense presented two very different scenarios.
The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an
argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from
behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing
treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal
evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose
Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of
Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments
on the testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their
argument was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios winnings. In
the middle of a heated altercation where they traded expletives,
Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a sidetable.
Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand
and they grappled for possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single
shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was left
too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the trigger. In fine,
Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only
motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted the testimony of the
prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have seen
the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito
Nieto, who were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the scene when
Tuadles had already been shot and was lying on the floor.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio
for the crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto
and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.

Issue:
Whether or not, treachery is employed by Antonio which qualifies
the killing to Murder.
Held:
There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused
Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to
insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to
himself.[34] It ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The
trial court did not explain the basis for the qualification except for a
terse citation that there was a sudden attack and the victim had no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. There was no treachery in
this case.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into
murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the
mode of attack for a specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing.
It was a spur of the moment crime.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill
Tuadles in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their
argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no
treachery because treachery requires that the mode of attack must
have been thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an
unforeseen occurrence.
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove
him to pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot
co-exist with treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and
control. In treachery, on the other hand, the means employed is
adopted consciously and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion,
loses his reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a
particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the
crime. Thus, the killing of Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not
attended by treachery. Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser
crime of Homicide under Art. 249 of RPC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.

G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
Facts:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her
home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John
Chapman went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen
asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted
to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know
that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while
Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi
box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came
up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused
alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you?
(Show me your) I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed
and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk
and asked accused: Why are you bothering us? Accused pushed
Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him.
Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked:
Why did you shoot me? Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino
knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up
and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He
pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a trouble? Leino said
no and took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her
senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She
repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun. Hes gonna kill us.
Will somebody help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to
and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused
ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no
attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She
strayed to the side of accuseds car. Accused tried but failed to grab
her. Maureen circled around accuseds car, trying to put some distance
between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually,
accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and
sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the
sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He
faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell

backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino

heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head
to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and
drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He
noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.
As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed
against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with:
MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED
MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN
HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of
confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the
Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.
Issue:
Whether or not, Teehankee is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder.
Held:
According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not holding
that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his
involvement in previous shooting incidents. Second, the NBI failed to
conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at
the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of
Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunmans
car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver metalic gray.
Fourth, the accused could not have been the gunman, for Mangubat
said that he overheard the victim Hultman plead to the gunman, thus:
Please, dont shoot me and dont kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy.
The accused also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of
the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen
say: Daddy dont shoot. Dont. Fifth, the NBI towed accuseds car
from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same
was not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test
conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS
HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the
newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman:
Huwag, Daddy.; and, (b) JOSE MONTAO, another resident of
Dasmarias Village, who had a white Lancer car, also bearing license
plate number 566.
The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply
because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he

considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This rule

has long been laid to rest. The harmless error rule is also followed in
our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial,
the court examines its damaging quality and its impact to the
substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the
weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party.
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports
about the troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The
reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by
the trial judge in convicting the accused. As aforestated, the accused
was convicted mainly because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses
with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from
the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The
omission, however, cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted
comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive
identification of the accused.
There is also little to the contention of the accused that his
Lancer car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously
proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it
was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the
records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could not
get its ignition key which was then in the possession of the accused.
Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running condition.
Even the accuseds evidence show that said car could run. After its
repairs, the accuseds son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from the
repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati,
where it was parked.
Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the
eyewitnesses description of the color of the gunmans car. Leino
described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat
white (medyo puti); Mangubat declared the car was white; and
Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. These alleged
discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are
not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white
and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature of
the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution
eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.

The accuseds attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders

Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant
consideration. The accused cites a newspaper item where Maureen
was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy.
Huwag, Daddy. The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that
Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly
established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for
two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed
Anders Hultman as Papa, not Daddy. Moreover, Leino outrightly
dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed
that the Makati police were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly
stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. Leino is a reliable
witness.
The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing
he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that
the paraffin test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of
nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test
alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of
substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses
tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since
these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors
which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the
hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after
firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the
direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In
the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and
confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use
of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the
skin. She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after
more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may
not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have
already been removed by washing or perspiration. In the Report on the
paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth
Ayonon noted that when the accused was tested for the presence of
nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the
alleged shooting.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORBERTO MANERO, JR.,

EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO,
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO,
ROGER BEDAO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR,
JR.,
JOHN DOE and PETER DOE
G.R. Nos. 86883-85, January 29, 1993
Facts:
11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero
brothers, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren
Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo
Diocades. They were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private
secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2)
unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a number of suspected
communist sympathizers were discussed. On the same occasion, the
conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail
to kill Fr. Peter Geremias.
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia
and the four (4) others, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the
house of "Bantil", which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia
and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at
the forehead of "Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his
right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were hit. Then they
grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife
from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was again fired upon by
Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however managed to seek
refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr.,
ordered his men to surround the house and not to allow anyone to get
out so that "Bantil" would die of hemorrhage.
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his
motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr.,
and his co-accused Pleago towed the motorcycle outside to the center
of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some
fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze,
the felons raved and rejoiced.
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto,
Jr. In a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali
dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto,
Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest.
Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body
three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire
virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on

the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers,
his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of
their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the
victim from possible assistance.
Issue:
Whether or not, accused are guilty of Murder and Attempted
Murder by conspiracy.
Held:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. 22 It is not
essential that all the accused commit together each and every act
constitutive of the offense. 23 It is enough that an accused participates
in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its
execution is present. 24
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was
indeed a community of design as evidenced by the concerted acts of
all the accused. Thus
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms,
were positively identified with Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto
Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades in La Esperanza,
Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985
morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the window near
the table where Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor,
Elpidio Manero and unidentified members of the airborne from
Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning, they all went to
the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and drink tuba. They were
seen again with Edilberto Manero and Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of that day near the house of Rufino Robles
(Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the
house of Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left
when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as Robles would die of
hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to Domingo Gomez' house,
witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the motorcycle of Fr. Favali and
later stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when Edilberto
Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr.
and Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the death
of the priest.
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that
appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital
cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted
murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen.

Accused all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any

attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the
house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from
leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage.
Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the
commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the
conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali
and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accusedappellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their
collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANECITO UNLAGADA

G.R. No. 141080, September 17, 2002
Facts:
On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo
Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod
City, to attend a public dance. At around 11:00, Danilo asked Edwin to
take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities
outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and
bought two (2) bottles of beer.
Not long after, Danilo left to look for a place to relieve himself.
According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters from Danilo
who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past
him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated
by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost
simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up
on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons. Danilo fell to the ground
and died before he could be given any medical assistance.
Trial court convicted the accused for the crime of Murder.
Issue:
Whether or not, the lower court erred in convicting the accused
of Murder instead of Death in Tumultuous Affray.
Held:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while
several persons, not composing groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel
and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in
the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by prision mayor.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between
several persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in
the course of which a person is killed or wounded and the author
thereof cannot be ascertained.[5] The quarrel in the instant case is
between a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently
identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common,
particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a "tumultuous
affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that
is, a melee or free-for-all, where several persons not comprising
definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and

disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of

them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was
relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when
suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached
the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at
all to accused-appellant; the attack was completely without warning,
the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any
defense.