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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46306
MORAN, J.:
On February 9-4, 1938, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which substantially recites the following facts:
On March 10, 1937, plaintiff Levy Hermanos, Inc., sold to defendant Lazaro
Blas Gervacio, a Packard car. Defendant, after making the initial payment,
executed a promissory note for the balance of P2,400, payable on or before
June 15, 1937, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, to secure the
payment of the note, he mortgaged the car to the plaintiff. Defendant failed
to pay the note it its maturity. Wherefore, plaintiff foreclosed the mortgage
and the car was sold at public auction, at which plaintiff was the highest
bidder for P1,800. The present action is for the collection of the balance of
P1,600 and interest.
Defendant admitted the allegations of the complaint, and with this admission,
the parties submitted the case for decision. The lower court applied, the
provisions of Act No. 4122, inserted as articles 1454-A of the Civil Code, and
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 61043. September 2, 1992.]
DELTA MOTOR SALES CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
NIU KIM DUAN and CHAN FUE ENG,Defendants-Appellants.
Francisco C. Bonoan for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Agapito M. Joaquin, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
"7. Should SELLER rescind this contract for any of the reasons
stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the BUYER, by these
presents obligates himself to peacefully deliver the PROPERTY to
the SELLER in case of rescission, and should a suit be brought in
court by the SELLER to seek judicial declaration of rescission and
take possession of the PROPERTY, the BUYER hereby obligates
himself to pay all the expenses to be incurred by reason of such
suit and in addition to pay the sum equivalent to 25% of the
remaining unpaid obligation as damages, penalty and attorneys
fees;" 3
Defendants-appellants claim that for the use of the plaintiffappellees three air-conditioners, from July 5, 1975 4 to April 11,
1977, 5 or for a period of about 22 months, they, in effect, paid
rentals in the amount of P6,429,92, 6 or roughly one-third (1/3) of
the entire price of said air-conditioners which was P19,350.00.
They also complain that for the said period the trial court is
ordering them to pay P6,188.29 as the balance due for the three
air-conditioners repossessed. Defendants-appellants were likewise
ordered to pay P1,000.00 as attorneys fees when plaintiff-appellee
never sought for attorneys fees in its complaint. They satirically
pointed out that by putting "a few touches here and there, the
same units can be sold again to the next imprudent customer" 7
by plaintiff-appellee. Thus, enforcement of the Deed of Conditional
Sale will unjustly enrich plaintiff-appellee at the expense of
defendants-appellants.chanrobles law library : red
I
Defendants-appellants cannot complain that their downpayment of
P774.00 and installment payments of P5,655.92 8 were treated as
rentals even though the total amount of P6,429,92 which they
had paid, approximates one-third (1/3) of the cost of the three (3)
air-conditioners. A stipulation in a contract that the installments
paid shall not be returned to the vendee is valid insofar as the
same may not be unconscionable under the circumstances is
sanctioned by Article 1486 of the New Civil Code. 9 The monthly
installment payable by defendants-appellants was P774.00. 10 The
1953 December 10, 1955. The note stipulated that if default be made in the
payment of interest or of any installment, then the total principal sum still
unpaid with interest shall at once become demandable etc. The spouse
failed to meet any installment. Wherefore, they were sued, in the above Civil
Case No. 2942, for the amount of the promissory note.1 The spouses
defaulted, and the court, after listening to the Southern Motors' evidence
entered Judgment for it in the total sum of P24,755.75 together with interest
at 12 per cent, plus 10 per cent of the total amount due as attorney's fees
and costs of collection.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Carrying out the order of execution, the sheriff levied on the same
machineries and farm implements which had been bought by the spouses;
and later sold them at public auction to the highest bidder which turned
out to be the Southern Motors itself for the total sum of P10,000.
EN BANC
As its judgment called for much more, the Southern Motors subsequently
asked and obtained, an alias writ of execution; and pursuant thereto, the
provincial sheriff levied attachment on the Tajanlangits' rights and interests in
certain real properties with a view to another sale on execution.
To prevent such sale, the Tajanlangits instituted this action in the Iloilo court
of first instance for the purpose among others, of annulling the alias writ of
execution and all proceedings subsequent thereto. Their two main theories:
(1) They had returned the machineries and farm implements to the Southern
Motors Inc., the latter accepted them, and had thereby settled their
accounts; for that reason, said spouses did not contest the action in Civil
Case No. 2942; and (2) as the Southern Motors Inc. had repossessed the
machines purchased on installment (and mortgaged) the buyers were
thereby relieved from further responsibility, in view of the Recto Law, now
article 1484 of the New Civil Code.
For answer, the company denied the alleged "settlement and understanding"
during the pendency of civil case No. 2949. It also denied having
repossessed the machineries, the truth being that they were attached by the
sheriff and then deposited by the latter in its shop for safekeeping, before the
sale at public auction.
The case was submitted for decision mostly upon a stipulation of facts.
Additional testimony was offered together with documentary evidence.
Everything considered the court entered judgment, saying in part;
The proceedings in Civil Case No. 2942 above referred to, were
had in the Court of First Instance (Branch 1) of the Province and of
the City of Iloilo. While this court (Branch IV) sympathizes with
plaintiffs, it cannot grant, in this action, the relief prayed for the
complaint because courts of similar jurisdiction cannot invalidate
the judgments and orders of each other. Plaintiffs have not pursued
the proper remedy. This court is without authority and jurisdiction to
declare null and void the order directing the issuance of alias writ of
execution because it was made by another court of equal rank and
category (see Cabiao and Izquierdo vs. Del Rosario and Lim, 44
Phil., 82-186).
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint with costs against plaintiffs costs against plaintiffs. Let
the writ of preliminiary injunction issued on August 26, 1954, be
lifted.
The plaintiffs reasonably brought the matter to the Court of Appeals, but the
latter forwarded the expediente, being of the opinion that the appeal involved
questions of jurisdiction and/or law
Discussion. Appellants' brief elaborately explains in the nine errors assigned,
their original two theories although their "settlement" idea appears to be
somewhat modified.
"What is being sought in this present action" say appellants "is to prohibit
and forbid the appellee Sheriff of Iloilo from attaching and selling at public
auction sale the real properties of appellants because that is now forbidden
by our law after the chattels that have been purchased and duly mortgagee
had already been repossessed by the same vendor-mortgagee and later on
sold at public auction sale and purchased by the same at such meager sum
of P10,000."
"Our law" provides,
There are other points involved in the case, such as the authority of the
judge of one branch of a court of first instance to enjoin proceedings in
another branch of the same court. As stated, Judge Pelayo refused to
interfere on that ground. Appellants insist this was error on several counts.
We deem it unnecessary to deal with this procedural aspect, inasmuch as
we find that, on the merits, plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief demanded.
ESCOLIN, J.:
The issue posed in this petition for review of the decision of the respondent
appellate court is whether a vendor, or his assignee, who had cancelled the
sale of a motor vehicle for failure of the buyer to pay two or more of the
stipulated installments, may also demand payment of the balance of the
purchase price.
The pertinent facts are summarized by the respondent appellate court as
follows:
In their answer, the spouses Nonato alleged by way of defense that when
the company repossessed the vehicle, it had, by that act, effectively
cancelled the sale of the vehicle. It is therefore barred from exacting
recovery of the unpaid balance of the purchase price, as mandated by the
provisions of Article 1484 of the Civil Code.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the IFC and
against the Nonatos, as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby renders
judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
amount of P 17,537.60 with interest at the rate of 14% per
annum from July 28, 1976 until fully paid, 10% of the
amount due as attorney's fees, litigation expenses in the
amount of P 133.05 plus the costs of this suit. No
pronouncement as to other charges and damages, the
same not having been proven to the satisfaction of the
Court. 1
On appeal, the respondent appellate court affirmed the j judgment.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The applicable law in the case at bar, involving as it does a sale of personal
property on installment, is Article 1484 of the Civil Code which provides:
In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which
is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of
the following remedies:
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee
fail to pay;
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay
cover two or more installments;
DE CASTRO, J:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in
Civil Case No. 9140 for annulment of contract, originally filed with the Court
of Appeals but was subsequently certified to this Court pursuant to Section 3
of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, there being no issue of fact involved in this
appeal.
The materials facts of the case appearing on record may be stated as
follows: On April 14, 1964, plaintiffs purchased from the Supreme Sales arid
Development Corporation two (2) brand new Ford Consul Sedans complete
concerning other properties which are separate and distinct from those
which were sold on installment. This would indeed be contrary to public
policy and the very spirit and purpose of the law, limiting the vendor's right to
foreclose the chattel mortgage only on the thing sold.
SO ORDERED.
Payable on
Delivery
P1,006.82
Payable in 24
months at 12%
interest per annum
P7,920.00
Selling price
P7,500.00
Financing charge
P1,426.82
P8,926.82
The motor vehicle was delivered to the petitioner who 1) paid the initial
payment in the amount of P1,006.82; and 2) executed a promissory note in
the amount of P7,920.00, the balance of the total selling price, in favor of
respondent Luneta Motor Company. The promissory note stated the
amounts and dates of payment of twenty-six installments covering the
P7,920.00 debt. Simultaneously with the execution of the promissory note
and to secure its payment, the petitioner executed a chattel mortgage on the
subject motor vehicle in favor of the respondent. After paying a total amount
of P3,148.00, the petitioner was unable to pay further monthly installments
prompting the respondent Luneta Motor Company to extra-judicially
foreclose the chattel mortgage (Annex "A" to Answer, Original Record, p.
10,supra). The motor vehicle was sold at public auction with the respondent
Luneta Motor Company represented by Atty. Leandro B. Fernandez as the
highest bidder in the amount of P5,000.00 (Annex "B" to Answer, Original
Record, p. 11,supra). Since the payments made by petitioner Eutropio
Zayas, Jr. plus the P5,000.00 realized from the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage could not cover the total amount of the promissory note executed
by the petitioner in favor of the respondent Luneta Motor Company, the latter
filed Civil Case No. 165263 with the City Court of Manila for the recovery of
the balance of P1,551.74 plus interests.
Luneta Motor Company alleged in its complaint that defendant Eutropio
Zayas, Jr. executed a promissory note in the amount of P7,920.00 in its
favor; that out of the P7,920.00, Eutropio Zayas, Jr. had paid only P6,368.26
plus interest up to the date of the sale at public auction of the motor vehicle;
that the balance of P1,551.74 plus interest of 12% thereon from that date
had already become due and payable but despite repeated demands to pay
the same, Eutropio Zayas, Jr., refused and failed to pay.
In his answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim, Eutropio Zayas, Jr.
admitted having executed the promissory note for the monthly payments, on
a Ford Thames vehicle bearing Engine No. 400E-127738 which he
purchased from the Luneta Motor Company but he denied his alleged
outstanding liability of P1,551.74 plus interest thereon ... the said obligation if
there was any, had already been discharged either by payment or by sale in
public auction of the said motor vehicle as evidenced by a Notice of Sale
marked as Annex "A" and Certificate of Sale marked as Annex "B"; (Answer,
p. 7, Original Record). He alleged as affirmative defenses, among others: 1)
that the plaintiff has no cause of action against him; and 2) that pursuant to
Article 1484 of the New Civil Code and the case ofPacific Commercial Co. v.
De La Rama, (72 Phil. 380) his obligation per the promissory note was
extinguished by the sale at public auction of the motor vehicle, the subject of
the chattel mortgage which was executed by him in favor of the plaintiff as
security for the payment of said promissory note. (Answer, p. 8, Original
Record)
In its Reply, Luneta Motor Company denied the applicability of Article 1484
of the Civil Code ... for the simple reason that the contract involved between
the parties is not one for a sale on installment" (Reply, p. 13, Original
Record).
After several postponements, the case was set for hearing. As a result of the
non- appearance of the plaintiff and its counsel on the date set for hearing,
defendant Zayas, Jr. moved to have the case dismissed for lack of interest
on the part of the plaintiff. He also asked the court to allow him to discuss
the merits of his affirmative defense as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
The issue raised and argued by the defendant was whether or not a
deficiency amount after the motor vehicle, subject of the chattel mortgage,
has been sold at public auction could still be recovered. Zayas cited the case
of Ruperto Cruz v. Filipinas Investment (23 SCRA 791).<re||an1w>
C E R T I F I CAT I O N
This is to certify that Mr. EUTROPIO ZAYAS, JR. has paid
from us the following, of his FORD THAMES BEARING
Engine No. 400E-127738, promissory note dated October
6, 1966. Viz:
er
Escano Enterprises, a dealer of respondent Luneta Motor Company, was
merely a collecting-agent as far as the purchase of the subject motor vehicle
was concerned. The principal and agent relationship is clear.
But even assuming that the "distinct and independent entity" theory of the
private respondent is valid, the nature of the transaction as a sale of
personal property on installment basis remains. When, therefore, Escao
Enterprises, assigned its rights vis-a-vis the sale to respondent Luneta Motor
Company, the nature of the transaction involving Escano Enterprises and
Eutropio Zayas, Jr. did not change at all. As assignee, respondent Luneta
Motor Company had no better rights than assignor Escao Enterprises
under the same transaction. The transaction would still be a sale of personal
property in installments covered by Article 1484 of the New Civil Code. To
rule otherwise would pave the way for subverting the policy underlying
Article 1484 of the New Civil Code, on the foreclosure of chattel mortgages
over personal property sold on installment basis.
ART. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the
price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may
exercise any of the following remedies:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal on questions of law from the portion of the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII, in its Civil Case No. 66199,
ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant Casiano Sapinoso the sum of
P1,250.00.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 4, 1965, Casiano Sapinoso purchased from Northern Motors, Inc.
an Opel Kadett car for the price of P12,171.00, making a down payment and
Sapinoso failed to pay the first installment of P361.00 due on July 5, 1965,
and the second, third, fourth and fifth installments of P351.00 each due on
the 5th day of August, September, October and November, 1965,
respectively. Several payments were, however, made by Sapinoso, to wit:
P530.52 on November 21, 1965, P480.00 on December 21, 1965, and
P400.00 on April 30, 1966. The first and third payments aforesaid were
applied to accrued interest up to April 17, 1966, while the second payment
was applied partly (P158.10) to interest, and partly (P321.90) to the
principal, thereby reducing the balance unpaid to P10,218.10.
The vendee-mortgagor having failed to make further payments, Northern
Motors, Inc. filed the present complaint on July 22, 1966, against Sapinoso
and a certain person whose name, identity and address were still unknown
to the plaintiff, hence denominated in the complaint as "John Doe." In its
complaint, Northern Motors, Inc. stated that it was availing itself of the option
given it under the mortgage contract of extrajudicially foreclosing the
mortgage, and prayed that a writ of replevin be issued upon its filing of a
bond for the seizure of the car and for its delivery to it; that after hearing, the
plaintiff be adjudged to have the rightful possession and ownership of the
car; that in default of delivery, the defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P10,218.10 with interest, at 12% per annum from April 18, 1966,
until full payment of the said sum, as well as an amount equivalent to 25% of
the sum due as and for attorney's fees and expenses of collection, and the
costs of the suit. Plaintiff also prayed for such other remedy as might be
deemed just and equitable in the premises.
Subsequent to the commencement of the action, but before the filing of his
answer, defendant Sapinoso made two payments on the promissory note,
the first on August 22, 1966, for P500.00, and the second on September 27,
1966, for P750.00. In the meantime, on August 9, 1966, upon the plaintiff's
filing of a bond, a writ of replevin was issued by the court. On October 20,
1966, copies of the summons, complaint and annexes thereto were served
on defendant Sapinoso by the sheriff who executed the seizure warrant by
seizing the car from defendant Sapinoso on the same date, and turning over
its possession to the plaintiff on October 25, 1966.
On November 12, 1966, defendant Sapinoso filed an answer admitting the
allegations in the complaint with respect to the sale to him of the car, the
terms thereof, the execution of the promissory note and of the chattel
mortgage contract, and the options open to the plaintiff under the said
contract. He alleged, however, that he had paid the total sum of P4,230.52,
leaving a balance of only P5,987.58; that upon demand he immediately
surrendered the possession of the car to the plaintiff's representative; and
that the value of the car was only about P5,000.00, and not P10,000.00 as
alleged in the complaint. As special defenses the said defendant alleged that
he failed to pay the installments due because the car was defective, and the
plaintiff failed to have it fixed although he had repeatedly called the plaintiff's
attention thereto, hence, the defendant had to procrastinate in his payments
in order to move the plaintiff to repair the car; and that although the car could
not be used, he paid P700.00 to the plaintiff upon the latter's assurance that
the car would be fixed, but that instead of having the car fixed, the plaintiff, in
bad faith, filed the present complaint. The defendant prayed that the
complaint be dismissed and that the plaintiff be ordered to return the car to
him. He stated in his prayer that he would be very much willing to pay the
car in a compromise agreement between him and the plaintiff.
After trial, the court a quo, in its decision dated April 4, 1967, held that
defendant Sapinoso having failed to pay more than two (2) installments,
plaintiff-mortgagee acquired the right to foreclose the chattel mortgage,
which it could avail of as it has done in the present case by filing an
action of replevin to secure possession of the mortgaged car as a
the said plaintiff-appellant, the court below correctly considered the action as
one of replevin to secure possession of the mortgaged vehicle as a
preliminary step to this foreclosure sale contemplated in Section 14 of Act
No. 1508 (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Summers, 42 Phil., 3; Seo vs.
Pestolante, G.R. No. L-11755, April 23, 1958). The said court however erred
in concluding that the legal effect of the filing of the action was to bar
plaintiff-appellant from accepting further payments on the promissory note.
That the ultimate object of the action is the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage, is of no moment, for it is the fact of foreclosure and actual sale of
the mortgaged chattel that bar further recovery by the vendor of any balance
on the purchaser's outstanding obligation not satisfied by the sale. (Manila
Motor Co., Inc. vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil., 782, 786; Bachrach Motor Co. vs.
Millan, 61 Phil., 409; Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461,
471; Cruz et al. vs. Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation, G.R. No. L24772, May 27, 1968 [23 SCRA 791, 796].) In any event, what Article
1484(3) prohibits is "further action against the purchaser to recover any
unpaid balance of the price;" and although this Court has construed the word
"action" in said Article 1484 to mean "any judicial or extrajudicial proceeding
by virtue of which the vendor may lawfully be enabled to exact recovery of
the supposed unsatisfied balance of the purchase price from the purchaser
or his privy" (Cruz, et al. vs. Filipinas Investment & Finance
Corporation, supra), there is no occasion at this stage to apply the restrictive
provision of the said article, because there has not yet been a foreclosure
sale resulting in a deficiency. The payment of the sum of P1,250.00 by
defendant-appellee Sapinoso was a voluntary act on his part and did not
result from a "further action" instituted by plaintiff-appellant. If the mortgage
creditor, before the actual foreclosure sale, is not precluded from recovering
the unpaid balance of the price although he has filed an action of replevin for
the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure, or if a mortgage creditor who has
elected to foreclose but who subsequently desists from proceeding with the
auction sale, without gaining any advantage or benefit, and without causing
any disadvantage or harm to the vendee-mortgagor, is not barred from suing
on the unpaid account (Radiowealth, Inc. vs. Lavin, et al., G.R. No. L-18563,
April 27, 1963 [7 SCRA 804, 807]), there is no reason why a mortgage
creditor should be barred from accepting, before a foreclosure sale,
payments voluntarily tendered by the debtor-mortgagor who admits a
subsisting indebtedness.
10. That the proceeds of the sale of the bus were not sufficient to
cover the expenses of sale, the principal obligation, interests, and
attorney's fees, i.e., they were not sufficient to discharge fully the
indebtedness of plaintiff Cruz to the defendant;
11. That on February 12, 1964, preparatory to foreclosing its real
estate mortgage on Mrs. Reyes' land, defendant paid the mortgage
indebtedness of Mrs. Reyes to the Development Bank of the
Philippines, in the sum of P2,148.07, the unpaid balance of said
obligation...;
12. That pursuant to a provision in the real estate mortgage
contract, authorizing the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage
judicially or extra-judicially, defendant on February 29, 1964
requested the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to take possession of,
and sell, the land subject of the Real Estate Mortgage, Annex "B-1",
to satisfy the sum of P43,318.92, the total outstanding obligation of
the plaintiffs to the defendant, as itemized in the Statement of
Account, which is made a part hereof as Annex "F"...;
13. That notices of sale were duly posted and served to the
Mortgagor, Mrs. Reyes, pursuant to and in compliance with the
requirements of Act 3135...;
14. That on March 20, 1964, plaintiff Reyes through counsel, wrote
a letter to the defendant asking for the cancellation of the real
estate mortgage on her land, but defendant did not comply with
such demand as it was of the belief that plaintiff's request was
without any legal basis;
15. That at the request of the plaintiffs, the provincial Sheriff of
Bulacan held in abeyance the sale of the mortgaged real estate
pending the result of this action.
Passing upon the issues which, by agreement of the parties, were limited to
(1) "Whether defendant, which has already extrajudicially foreclosed the
chattel mortgage executed by the buyer, plaintiff Cruz, on the bus sold to him
on installments, may also extrajudicially foreclose the real estate mortgage
constituted by plaintiff Mrs. Reyes on her own land, as additional security, for
the payment of the balance of Cruz' Obligation, still remaining unpaid"; and
(2) whether or not the contending parties are entitled to attorney's fees
the court below, in its decision of April 21, 1965, sustained the plaintiffs'
stand and declared that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
on the bus barred further action against the additional security put up by
plaintiff Reyes. Consequently, the real estate mortgage constituted on the
land of said plaintiff was ordered cancelled and defendant was directed to
pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees in the sum of P200.00. Defendant filed the
present appeal raising the same questions presented in the lower court.
There is no controversy that, involving as it does a sale of personal property
on installments, the pertinent legal provision in this case is Article 1484 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, 2 which reads:
ART. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the price of
which is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of
the following remedies:
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay;
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or
more installments;
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has
been constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or
more installments. In this case, he shall have no further action
against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price.
Any agreement to the contrary shall be void.
The aforequoted provision is clear and simple: should the vendee or
purchaser of a personal property default in the payment of two or more of
the agreed installments, the vendor or seller has the option to avail of any
one of these three remedies either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of
the obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the
purchased personal property, if one was constituted. These remedies have
been recognized as alternative, not cumulative, 3 that the exercise of one
would bar the exercise of the others. 4 It may also be stated that the
established rule is to the effect that the foreclosure and actual sale of a
mortgaged chattel bars further recovery by the vendor of any balance on the
purchaser's outstanding obligation not so satisfied by the sale. 5 And the
reason for this doctrine was aptly stated in the case of Bachrach Motor Co.
vs. Millan, supra, thus:
Undoubtedly the principal object of the above amendment 6 was to
remedy the abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of
chattel mortgages. This amendment prevents mortgagees from
seizing the mortgaged property, buying it at foreclosure sale for a
low price and then bringing suit against the mortgagor for a
deficiency judgment. The almost invariable result of this procedure
was that the mortgagor found himself minus the property and still
owing practically the full amount of his original indebtedness. Under
this amendment the vendor of personal property, the purchase
price of which is payable in installments, has the right to cancel the
sale or foreclose the mortgage if one has been given on the
property. Whichever right the vendor elects he need not return to
the purchaser the amount of the installments already paid, "if there
be in agreement to that effect". Furthermore, if the vendor avails
himself of the right to foreclose the mortgage the amendment
prohibits him from bringing an action against the purchaser for the
unpaid balance.
It is here agreed that plaintiff Cruz failed to pay several installments as
provided in the contract; that there was extrajudicial foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage on the said motor vehicle; and that defendant-appellant
itself bought it at the public auction duly held thereafter, for a sum less than
the purchaser's outstanding obligation. Defendant-appellant, however,
sought to collect the supported deficiency by going against the real estate
mortgage which was admittedly constituted on the land of plaintiff Reyes as
additional security to guarantee the performance of Cruz' obligation, claiming
that what is being withheld from the vendor, by the proviso of Article 1484 of
the Civil Code, is only the right to recover "against the purchaser", and not a
recourse to the additional security put up, not by the purchaser himself, but
by a third person.
"The plaintiff's evidence shows among others that on December 7, 1984, defendants
Daniel L. Borbon and Francisco Borbon signed a promissory note (Exh. A) which
states among others as follows:
"'PROMISSORY NOTE
Acct. No. 115008276
Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines
December 7, 1984
'Acceptance by the holder hereof of payment of any installment or any part thereof
after due dated (sic) shall not be considered as extending the time for the payment or
any of the installments aforesaid or as a modification of any of the conditions
hereof. Nor shall the failure of the holder hereof to exercise any of its right under
this note constitute or be deemed as a waiver of such rights.
'Maker:
(S/t) DANIEL L. BORBON, II
Address: 14 Colt St., Rancho Estate I, Concepcion Dos, Marikina,
MM
'P122,856.00
'For value received (installment price of the chattel/s purchased), I/We jointly and
severally promised to pay Pangasinan Auto Mart, Inc. or order, at its office at NMI
Bldg. Buendia Avenue, Makati, MM the sum of One Hundred Twenty Two
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Six only (P122,856.00), Philippine Currency, to be
payable without need of notice or demand, in installments of the amounts following
and at the dates hereinafter set forth, to wit: P10,238.00 monthly for Twelve (12)
months due and payable on the 7 day of each month starting January, 1985, provided
that a late payment charge of 3% per month shall be added on each unpaid
installment from due date thereof until fully paid.
"Despite Communications with the Pangasinan Auto Mart, Inc., the latter was not
able to replace the vehicle until the vehicle delivered was seized by order of this
court. The defendants argue that an assignee stands in the place of an assignor
which, to the mind of the court, is correct. The assignee exercise all the rights of the
assignor (Gonzales vs. Rama Plantation Co., C.V. 08630, Dec. 2, 1986).
"The defendants further claim that they are not in default of their obligation because
the Pangasinan Auto Mart was first guilty of not fulfilling its obligation in the
contract. The defendants claim that neither party incurs delay if the other does not
comply with his obligation. (citing Art. 1169, N.C.C.)"[1]
In sustaining the decision of the court a quo, the appellate court ruled
that petitioners could not avoid liability under the promissory note and the
chattel mortgage that secured it since private respondent took the note for
value and in good faith.
In their appeal to this Court, petitioners merely seek a modification of
the decision of the appellate court insofar as it has upheld the court a quo in
the award of liquidated damages and attorney's fees in favor of private
respondent. Petitioners invoke the provisions of Article 1484 of the Civil
Code which reads:
ART. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which
is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the following
remedies:
"(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay;
"(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or
more installments;
"(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage or the thing sold, if one has been
constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more
installments. In this case, he shall have no further action against the
purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the
contrary shall be void."
The remedies under Article 1484 of the Civil Code are not cumulative
but alternative and exclusive,[2] which means, as so held in Nonato vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Investor's Finance Corporation,[3] that "x x x Should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property default in the payment
of two or more of the agreed installments, the vendor or seller has the option to avail
of any of these three remedies either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the
obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased
personal property, if one was constituted. These remedies have been recognized as
alternative, not cumulative, that the exercise of one would bar the exercise of the
others."[4]
When the seller assigns his credit to another person, the latter is
likewise bound by the same law. Accordingly, when the assignee forecloses
on the mortgage, there can be no further recovery of the deficiency,[5] and
the seller-mortgagee is deemed to have renounced any right thereto.
[6]
A contrario, in the event the seller-mortgagee first seeks, instead, the
enforcement of the additional mortgages, guarantees or other security
arrangements, he must then be held to have lost by waiver or non-choice his
lien on the chattel mortgage of the personal property sold by any mortgaged
back to him, although, similar to an action for specific performance, he may
still levy on it.
In ordinary alternative obligations, a mere choice categorically and
unequivocally made and then communicated by the person entitled to
exercise the option concludes the parties. The creditor may not thereafter
exercise any other option, unless the chosen alternative proves to be
ineffectual or unavailing due to no fault on his part. This rule, in essence, is
the difference between alternative obligations, on the one hand, and
alternative remedies, upon the other hand, where, in the latter case, the
choice generally becomes conclusive only upon the exercise of the
remedy. For instance, in one of the remedies expressed in Article 1484 of
the Civil Code, it is only when there has been a foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage that the vendee-mortgagor would be permitted to escape from a
deficiency liability. Thus, if the case is one for specific performance, even
when this action is selected after the vendee has refused to surrender the
mortgaged property to permit an extrajudicial foreclosure, that property may
still be levied on execution and an alias writ may be issued if the proceeds
thereof are insufficient to satisfy the judgment credit. [7] So, also, a mere
demand to surrender the object which is not heeded by the mortgagor will
not amount to a foreclosure, [8] but the repossession thereof by the vendormortgagee would have the effect of foreclosure.
The parties here concede that the action for replevin has been
instituted for the foreclosure of the vehicle in question (now in the
possession of private respondent). The sole issue raised before us in this
appeal is focused on the legal propriety of the affirmance by the appellate
court of the awards made by the court a quo of liquidated damages and
attorney's fees to private respondent.Petitioners hold that under Article 1484
of the Civil Code, aforequoted, the vendor-mortgagee or its assignees loses
any right "to recover any unpaid balance of the price" and any "agreement to
the contrary (would be) void."
The argument is aptly made. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio[9] we
have said that the phrase "any unpaid balance" can only mean the
deficiency judgment to which the mortgagee may be entitled to when the
proceeds from the auction sale are insufficient to cover the "full amount of
the secured obligation which x x x include interest on the principal, attorney's
fees, expenses of collection, and costs." In sum, we have observed that the
legislative intent is not to merely limit the proscription of any further action to
the "unpaid balance of the principal" but, as so later ruled in Luneta Motor
Co. vs. Salvador,[10] to all other claims that may likewise be called for in the
accompanying promissory note against the buyer-mortgagor or his
guarantor, including costs and attorney's fees.
In Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation vs. Ridad[11] while we
reiterated and expressed our agreement on the basic philosophy behind
Article 1484, we stressed, nevertheless, that the protection given to the
buyer-mortgagor should not be considered to be without circumscription or
as being preclusive of all other laws or legal principles. Hence, borrowing
from the examples made inFilipinas Investment, where the mortgagor
unjustifiably refused to surrender the chattel subject of the mortgage upon
failure of two or more installments, or if he concealed the chattel to place it
beyond the reach of the mortgagee, that thereby constrained the latter to
seek court relief, the expenses incurred for the prosecution of the case, such
as attorney's fees, could rightly be awarded.
car was sold at public auction to the plaintiff for P250, the latter incurring
legal expenses in the amount of P10.68, According to the liquidation filed by
the plaintiff, the defendant was still indebted in the amount of P342.20,
interest at 12 per cent from November 20, 1934, P110.25 as attorney's fees,
and the costs.
I. The plaintiff's first assignment of error is addressed to the appealed
judgment in so far as it applied Act No. 4122 and dismissed the complaint,
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant waived his rights under said law
by not making any appearance, by having been declared in default, by not
interposing any special defense, and not asking for any positive relief.
Under section 128 of our Civil Procedure, the judgment by default against a
defendant who has neither appeared nor filed his answer does not imply a
waiver of right except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in his
favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the facts and causes
of action of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires the latter to
adduce his evidence in support of his allegation as an indispensable
condition before final judgment could be given in his favor. Nor could it be
interpreted as an admission by the defendant that the plaintiff's causes of
action find support in the law or that latter is entitled to the relief prayed for.
(Chaffin vs. Mac Fadden, 41 Ark., 42; Johnson vs. Peirce, 12 Ark., 599;
Mayden vs. Johnson, 59 Ga., 105; Peo. vs. Rust, 292 Ill., 412; Madison
County vs. Smith, 95 Ill., 328; Keen vs. Krempel, 166 Ill. A., 253.) For these
reason, we hold that the defendant did not waive the applicant by the court
of Act No. 4122, and that the first assignment of error is untenable.
II. The plaintiff contends in its second assignment of error that Act No. 4122
is invalid because it takes property without due process of law, denies the
equal protection of the laws, and impairs the obligations of contract, thereby
violating the provisions of section 3 of the Act of the United States Congress
of August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law. This is not the first time that
the constitutionality of the said law has been impugned for like reasons.
InManila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Reyes (64 Phil. 461), the validity of the
said law was already passed upon when it was questioned for the same
reason here advanced. In resolving the question in favor of the validity of the
law, we then held: "2. Liberty of contract, class legislation, and equal
protection of the laws. The question of the validity of an act is solely one
has now disauthorized this practice, but has left a sufficient remedy
remaining.
Three remedies are available to the vendor who has sold personal
property on the installment plan. (1) He may elect to exact the
fulfillment of the obligation. (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Milan, supra.)
(2) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more installments,
the vendor may cancel the sale. (3) If the vendee shall have failed
to pay two or more installments, the vendor may foreclose the
mortgage, if one has been given on the property. The basis of the
first option is the Civil Code. The basis of the last two option is Act
No. 4122, amendatory of the Civil Code. And the proviso to the right
to foreclose is, that if the vendor has chosen this remedy, he shall
have no further action against the purchaser for the recovery of any
unpaid balance owing by the same. In other words, as we see it,
the Act does no more than qualify the remedy.
Most constitutional issues are determined by the court's approach
to them. The proper approach in cases of this character should be
to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the
absence of a clear conflict between it and the constitution. All
doubts should be resolved in its favor.
The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close
the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of
chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. The
public policy, obvious from the statute, was defined and established
by legislative authority. It is for the courts to perpetuate it.
We are of the opinion that the Legislative may change judicial
methods and remedies for the enforcement of contracts, as it has
done by the enactment of Act No. 4122, without unduly interfering
with the obligation of the contract, without sanctioning class
legislation, and without a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
We rule that Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. As a
consequence, the errors assigned by the appellant are overruled,
and the judgment affirmed, the costs of this instance to be taxed
against the losing party.
In his brief counsel for the plaintiff advances no new arguments which have
not already been considered in theReyes case, and we see no reason for
reaching a different conclusion now. The law seeks to remedy an evil which
the Legislature wished to suppress; this legislative body has power to
promulgate the law; the law does not completely deprive vendors on the
installment basis of a remedy, but requires them to elect among three
alternative remedies; the law, on the other hand, does not completely
exonerate the purchasers, but only limits their liabilities and, finally, there is
no vested right when a procedural law is involved, wherefore the Legislature
could enact Act No. 4122 without violating the aforesaid organic law.
III. In its last assignment of error plaintiff contends that, even granting that
Act No. 4122 is valid, the court should have ordered the defendant to pay at
least the stipulated interest, attorney's fees, and the costs. This question
involves the interpretation of the pertinent portion of the law, reading:
"However, if the vendor has chosen to foreclose the mortgage he shall have
no further action against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid
balance owing by the same, and any agreement to the contrary shall be null
and void." This paragraph, as its language shows, refers to the mortgage
contract executed by the parties, whereby the purchaser mortgages the
chattel sold to him on the installment basis in order to guarantee the
payment of its price, and the words "any unpaid balance" should be
interpreted as having reference to the deficiency judgment to which the
mortgagee may be entitled where, after the mortgaged chattel is sold at
public auction, the proceeds obtained therefrom are insufficient to cover the
full amount of the secured obligations which, in the case at bar as shown by
the note and by the mortgage deed, include interest on the principal,
attorney's fees, expenses of collection, and the costs. The fundamental rule
which should govern the interpretation of laws is to ascertain the intention
and meaning of the Legislature and to give effect thereto. (Sec. 288, Code of
Civil Procedure; U. S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil., 85; U. S. vs. Navarro, 19 Phil.,
134; De Jesus vs. City of Manila, 29 Phil., 73; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41
Phil., 322; People vs. Concepcion, 44 Phil., 126.) Were it the intention of the
Legislature to limit its meaning to the unpaid balance of the principal, it
would have so stated. We hold, therefore, that the assignment of error is
untenable.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs of
this instance to the plaintiff and appellant. So ordered.
When the case was called for pre-trial, the CFI advanced the opinion that
there was no need for the parties to adduce evidence and that the case
could be decided on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties.
CASTRO, J.:
Appeal by the spouses Lourdes V. Ridad and Luis Ridad from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case 64288, a replevin suit,
awarding to the appellee Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation the
amount of P163.65 representing actual expenses and P300 as attorney's
fees.
The spouses Ridad bought from the Supreme Sales & Development
Corporation, the appellee's assignor-in-interest, a Ford Consul sedan for the
total price of P13,371.40. The sum of P1,160 was paid on delivery, the
balance of P12,211.50 being payable in twenty-four equal monthly
installments, with interest at 12% per annum, secured by a promissory note
and a chattel mortgage on the car executed on March 19, 1964. The
spouses thereafter failed to pay five consecutive installments on a remaining
balance of P5,274.53. On October 13, 1965 the appellee instituted a replevin
suit in the city court of Manila for the seizure of the car (par. 7 of the
complaint alleged "unjustifiable failure and refusal of the defendants . . . to
surrender possession of the . . . motor vehicle for the purpose of
foreclosure"), or the recovery of the unpaid balance in case delivery could
not be effected. The car was then seized by the sheriff of Manila and
possession thereof was awarded to the appellee. During the progress of the
case, the appellee instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, as a
result of which, on December 22, 1965, the car was sold at public auction
with the appellee as the highest bidder and purchaser.
Meanwhile, in view of the failure of the defendants-spouses to appear at the
scheduled hearing of the case, allegedly due to non-receipt of the summons,
they were declared in default. The default judgment ordered them to pay to
the appellee the sum of P500 as attorney's fees, and P163.65 representing
actual expenses relative to the seizure of the car, plus costs.
Their motion to set aside his order of default and the decision having been
denied, they appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The trial court on September 5, 1966, rendered judgment for the appellee,
as follows:
As stated in the pre-trial order of this Court dated May 27, 1966, the
only issue remaining to be resolved is whether the plaintiff is
entitled to receive P500.00 as attorney's fees and P163.65 for
expenses incurred by the plaintiff in the seizure of the car which
was the object of the chattel mortgage executed by the defendants
in favor of the plaintiff.
Upon consideration of the circumstances of the case, the court
holds that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of P163.65
which represents the expenses incurred by the plaintiff in the
seizure of the car involved in this case.
Considering that the plaintiff had recovered the car involved in the
case while it is still in the lower court, and considering further that
the defendants did not resist the case and the only question said
defendants raised before this court is the amount of attorney's fees,
the court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction reduces the
attorney's fees granted to the plaintiff by the lower court to P300.00.
In this appeal, the appellants contend that the trial court erred: (1) in
rendering a decision which does not state the facts and the law on which it is
based; (2) in condemning the appellants to pay P300 for attorney's fees and
P163.65 for expenses incurred in the seizure of the car which was the object
of the chattel mortgage executed by them in favor of the appellee; and (3) in
not dismissing the appellee's complaint.
1. We uphold the appellee's contention that the disputed decision of the
lower court complies substantially with the requirements of law because it
referred to the pre-trial order it issued on May 27, 1966 which contains
substantial findings of facts. For although settled is the doctrine that a
decree with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, the law, however,
merely requires that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts upon which
the court's conclusion is drawn."1 There being an express reference to the
pre-trial order, the latter must be considered and taken as forming part of the
decision. The claim, therefore, that the judgment clearly transgresses the
legal precept2 because it does not state the facts of the case and the law on
which it is based and hence, is a nullity, finds no justification here.
2. The appellants theorize that the action of the appellee is for the payment
of the unpaid balance of the purchase price with a prayer for replevin. When,
therefore, the appellee seized the car, extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage, had the vehicle sold, and bought the same at public auction as
the highest bidder, it thereby renounced any and all rights which it might
have under the promissory note as well as the payment of the unpaid
balance, and, consequently, what it would otherwise be entitled under and
by virtue of the present action, including attorney's fees and costs of suit,
pursuant to article 1484 of the new Civil Code.
On the other hand, the appellee maintains that it is entitled to an award of
attorney's fees and actual expenses and costs of suit by virtue of the
unjustifiable failure and refusal of the appellants to comply with their
obligations (one of which is the surrender of the chattel to the mortgagee
upon the latter's demand), contending that what is prohibited in art. 1484,
par. 3 of the new Civil Code relied upon by the appellants is the recovery of
the unpaid balance of the purchase price by means of an action other than a
suit for replevin; that Luneta Motor Co. vs. Salvador, et al., (L-13373, July
26, 1960) is inapplicable to the present case because the remedy sought in
that case was in the conjunctive and not in the alternative, such that,
necessarily, when the appellee therein foreclosed the mortgage on the motor
vehicle during the progress of the action, the other action for a sum of
money had to be dismissed since the same could not prosper as it would
constitute a separate action for the recovery of the unpaid balance
contemplated in article 1484; and that in the present case, however, the
court awarded attorney's fees, costs of suit and expenses incurred in relation
to the seizure of the motor vehicle by virtue of the writ of replevin in the
same action because the appellee was compelled to institute the same on
account of the appellants' unjustifiable failure and refusal to comply with the
former's demands.
The appellee further argues that the award of attorney's fees and the costs
of suit together with expenses incurred, was stipulated both in the
promissory note and chattel mortgage contract; that even in the absence of
such stipulation, the award of attorney's fees is discretionary on the part of
the court pursuant to par. 2, art. 2208, new Civil Code; and that the said
award could likewise be made by the lower court on the basis of the general
prayer in the complaint for the award of whatever relief that the lower court
may deem just and equitable in the premises.
It is true that the present action is one for replevin, but because it culminated
in the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage and the sale of the car at public
auction, it is our view that the provisions of art. 1484 of the Civil Code (Recto
Law) must govern the resolution of the issue here presented.
This article recites that
In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which is
payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the
following remedies:
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay;
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or
more installments;
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has
been constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or
more installments. In this case, he shall have no further action
against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price.
Any agreement to the contrary shall be void.
This article was reproduced from the old art. 1454-A, which in turn was
inserted by Act 4122 (Recto Law). "Three remedies are available to the
vendor who has sold personal property on the installment plan: (1) He may
elect to exact the fulfillment of the obligation. (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Millan,
61 Phil. 409) (2) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more
installments, the vendor may cancel the sale. (3) If the vendee shall have
failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may foreclose the
mortgage, if one has been given on the property. The basis of the first option
is the Civil Code. The basis of the last two options is Act 4122 (inserted in
the Spanish Civil Code as art. 4154-A and now reproduced in arts. 1484 and
1485), amendatory of the Civil Code. And the proviso to the right to foreclose
is that if the vendor has chosen this remedy, he shall have no further action
against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance owing by the
same. In other words, as we see it, the Act does no more than qualify the
remedy."3
The legal issue which is the core of the controversy in the case at bar was
resolved in Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio,4 as follows:
The plaintiff brought the action against the defendant to obtain the
possession of an automobile mortgaged by the latter, and to
recover the balance owing upon a note executed by him, the
interest thereon, attorney's fees, expenses of collection, and the
costs. The defendant was duly summoned, but he failed to appear
or file his answer, wherefore, he was declared in default and the
appealed judgment was rendered accordingly.
The plaintiff sold to the defendant a De Soto car, Sedan, for the
price of which, P595, he executed in its favor the note of May 22,
1934. Under this note, the defendant undertook to pay the car in
twelve monthly installments, with 12 per cent interests per annum,
and likewise agreed that, should he fail to pay any monthly
installment together with interest, the remaining installments would
become due and payable, and the defendant shall pay 20 per cent
upon the principal owing as attorney's fees, expenses of collection
which the plaintiff might incur, and the costs. To guarantee the
performance of his obligations under the note, the defendant on the
same date mortgaged the purchased car in favor of the plaintiff,
and bound himself under the same conditions stipulated in the note
relative to the monthly installments, interest, attorney's fees,
expenses of collection, and costs. The mortgage deed was
registered on June 11, 1934, in the office of the register of deeds of
the Province of Rizal. On the 22nd of the same month, the
defendant paid P43.75 upon the first installment, and thereafter
failed to pay any of the remaining installments. In accordance with
the terms of the mortgage, the plaintiff called upon the sheriff to
take possession of the car, but the defendant refused to yield
possession thereof, whereupon, the plaintiff brought the replevin
sought and thereby succeeded in getting possession of the car. The
car was sold at public auction to the plaintiff for P250, the latter
incurring legal expenses in the amount of P10.68. According to the
liquidation filed by the plaintiff, the defendant was still indebted in
the amount of P342.20, interest at 12 per cent from November 20,
1934, P110.25 as attorney's fees, and the costs.
xxx
xxx
xxx
default of the buyer in the payment of two installments, still retained for
themselves all amounts already paid, and in addition, were adjudged entitled
to damages, such as attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs.
Congress could not have intended to impair much less do away with, the
right of the seller to make commercial use of his credit against the buyer,
provided the buyer is not burdened beyond what this law allows.7
It would appear from the emphasis and precision of the language employed
in the decisions already adverted to that in no instance whatsoever may the
mortgagee recover from the mortgagor any amount or sum after the
foreclosure of the mortgage, for, as we understand it, the philosophy of the
Recto Law is that the underprivileged mortgagors must be afforded full
protection against the rapacity of the mortgagees.
But while we unconditionally concur in, and give our approval to, the basic
philosophy of the Recto Law, we view with no small amount of
circumspection the implication, necessarily drawn from the above
discussion, that the mortgagee is not entitled to protection against perverse
mortgagors. Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the chattel
subject of the mortgage upon his failure to pay two or more installments, or if
he conceals the chattel to place it beyond the reach of the mortgagee, what
then is the mortgagee expected to do? It is part of conventional wisdom and
the rule of law that no man can take the law into his own hands; so it is not
to be supposed that the Legislature intended that the mortgagee should
wrest or seize the chattel forcibly from the control and possession of the
mortgagor, even to the extent of using violence which is unwarranted in law.
Since the mortgagee would enforce his rights through the means and within
the limits delineated by law, the next step in such situations being the filing of
an action for replevin to the end that he may recover immediate possession
of the chattel and, thereafter, enforce his rights in accordance with the
contractual relationship between him and the mortgagor as embodied in their
agreement, then it logically follows as a matter of common sense, that the
necessary expenses incurred in the prosecution by the mortgagee of the
action for replevin so that he can regain possession of the chattel, should be
borne by the mortgagor. Recoverable expenses would, in our view, include
expenses properly incurred in effecting seizure of the chattel and reasonable
attorney's fees in prosecuting the action for replevin. And we declare that in
this case before us, the amounts awarded by the court a quo to the
mortgagee (appellee) are reasonable.
To the extent that our pronouncement here conflicts with the ruling
announced and followed in the cases hereinbefore discussed, the latter must
be considered pro tanto qualified.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No costs.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On a pure question of law involving the application of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
5980, as amended by R.A. No. 8556 in relation to Articles 1484 and 1485 of the
Civil Code, petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI LEASING, for short) has
directly come to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to nullify and set aside the Decision and Resolution dated December 28, 1998
and February 15, 2000, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 227, in its Civil Case No. Q-98-34266, a suit for a sum of money
and/or personal property with prayer for a writ of replevin, thereat instituted by the
petitioner against the herein respondent, Giraffe-X Creative Imaging, Inc.
(GIRAFFE, for brevity).
The facts:
FIRST DIVISION
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Upon PCI LEASINGs posting of a replevin bond, the trial court issued a
writ of replevin, paving the way for PCI LEASING to secure the seizure and
delivery of the equipment covered by the basic lease agreement.
Instead of an answer, GIRAFFE, as defendant a quo, filed a Motion to
Dismiss, therein arguing that the seizure of the two (2) leased equipment stripped
PCI LEASING of its cause of action. Expounding on the point, GIRAFFE argues
that, pursuant to Article 1484 of the Civil Code on installment sales of personal
property, PCI LEASING is barred from further pursuing any claim arising from the
lease agreement and the companion contract documents, adding that the agreement
between the parties is in reality a lease of movables with option to buy. The given
situation, GIRAFFE continues, squarely brings into applicable play Articles 1484
and 1485 of the Civil Code, commonly referred to as the Recto Law. The cited
articles respectively provide:
ART. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property
the price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may
exercise any of the following remedies:
It is thus GIRAFFEs posture that the aforequoted Article 1484 of the Civil
Code applies to its contractual relation with PCI LEASING because the lease
agreement in question, as supplemented by the schedules documents, is really
a lease with option to buy under the companion article, Article 1485. Consequently,
so GIRAFFE argues, upon the seizure of the leased equipment pursuant to the writ
of replevin, which seizure is equivalent to foreclosure, PCI LEASING has no further
recourse against it. In brief, GIRAFFE asserts in its Motion to Dismiss that the civil
complaint filed by PCI LEASING is proscribed by the application to the case of
Articles 1484 and 1485, supra, of the Civil Code.
In its Opposition to the motion to dismiss, PCI LEASING maintains that
its contract with GIRAFFE is a straight lease without an option to buy. Prescinding
therefrom, PCI LEASING rejects the applicability to the suit of Article 1484 in
relation to Article 1485 of the Civil Code, claiming that, under the terms and
conditions of the basic agreement, the relationship between the parties is one
between an ordinary lessor and an ordinary lessee.
In a decision[7] dated December 28, 1998, the trial court granted
GIRAFFEs motion to dismiss mainly on the interplay of the following premises: 1)
the lease agreement package, as memorialized in the contract documents, is akin to
the contract contemplated in Article 1485 of the Civil Code, and 2) GIRAFFEs loss
of possession of the leased equipment consequent to the enforcement of the writ of
replevin is akin to foreclosure, the condition precedent for application of Articles
1484 and 1485 [of the Civil Code]. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Civil Case
No. Q-98-34266, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendant
[GIRAFFE] having relinquished any claim to the personal
properties subject of replevin which are now in the possession of
the plaintiff [PCI LEASING], plaintiff is DEEMED fully
satisfied pursuant to the provisions of Articles 1484 and 1485 of
the New Civil Code. By virtue of said provisions, plaintiff is
DEEMED estopped from further action against the defendant,
the plaintiff having recovered thru (replevin) the personal
property sought to be payable/leased on installments, defendants
being under protection of said RECTO LAW. In view thereof,
this case is hereby DISMISSED.
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court
in its resolution of February 15, 2000, [8] petitioner has directly come to this
Court via this petition for review raising the sole legal issue of whether or not the
underlying Lease Agreement, Lease Schedules and the Disclosure Statements that
embody the financial leasing arrangement between the parties are covered by and
subject to the consequences of Articles 1484 and 1485 of the New Civil Code.
As in the court below, petitioner contends that the financial leasing
arrangement it concluded with the respondent represents a straight lease
covered by R.A. No. 5980, the Financing Company Act, as last amended by R.A.
No. 8556, otherwise known as Financing Company Act of 1998, and is outside the
application and coverage of the Recto Law. To the petitioner, R.A. No. 5980 defines
and authorizes its existence and business.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
In addition, Sec. 6.1 of the Lease Agreement states that the guaranty
deposit shall be forfeited in the event the respondent, for any reason, returns the
equipment before the expiration of the lease.
At bottom, respondent had paid the equivalent of about a years lease
rentals, or a total of P3,510,372.00, more or less. Throw in the guaranty
deposit (P3,120,000.00) and the respondent had made a total cash outlay
of P6,630,372.00 in favor of the petitioner. The replevin-seized leased equipment
had, as alleged in the complaint, an estimated residual value ofP6,900.000.00 at the
time Civil Case No. Q-98-34266 was instituted on May 4, 1998. Adding all cash
advances thus made to the residual value of the equipment, the total value which the
petitioner had actually obtained by virtue of its lease agreement with the respondent
amounts
to P13,530,372.00 (P3,510,372.00 + P3,120,000.00 + P6,900.000.00
= P13,530,372.00).
The acquisition cost for both the Silicon High Impact Graphics equipment
and the Oxberry Cinescan was, as stated in no less than the petitioners letter to the
respondent dated November 11, 1996[14] approving in the latters favor a lease
facility, was P8,100,000.00. Subtracting the acquisition cost of P8,100,000.00 from
the total amount, i.e., P13,530,372.00, creditable to the respondent, it would clearly
appear that petitioner realized a gross income of P5,430,372.00 from its lease
transaction with the respondent. The amount of P5,430,372.00 is not yet a final
figure as it does not include the rentals in arrears, penalties thereon,
and interest earned by the guaranty deposit.
As may be noted, petitioners demand letter [15] fixed the amount
of P8,248,657.47 as representing the respondents rental balance which became due
and demandable consequent to the application of the acceleration and other clauses
of the lease agreement. Assuming, then, that the respondent may be compelled to
pay P8,248,657.47,
then
it
would
end
up
paying
a
total
of P21,779,029.47 (P13,530,372.00 + P8,248,657.47 = P21,779,029.47) for its use
- for a year and two months at the most - of the equipment. All in all, for an
investment of P8,100,000.00, the petitioner stands to make in a years time, out of the
transaction, a total of P21,779,029.47, or a net of P13,679,029.47, if we are to
believe its outlandish legal submission that the PCI LEASING-GIRAFFE Lease
Agreement was an honest-to-goodness straight lease.
A financing arrangement has a purpose which is at once practical and
salutary. R.A. No. 8556 was, in fact, precisely enacted to regulate financing
companies operations with the end in view of strengthening their critical role in
providing credit and services to small and medium enterprises and to curtail acts and
practices prejudicial to the public interest, in general, and to their clienteles, in
particular.[16] As a regulated activity, financing arrangements are not meant to quench
only the thirst for profit. They serve a higher purpose, and R.A. No. 8556 has made
that abundantly clear.
We stress, however, that there is nothing in R.A. No. 8556 which defines
the rights and obligations, as between each other, of the financial lessor and the
lessee. In determining the respective responsibilities of the parties to the agreement,
courts, therefore, must train a keen eye on the attendant facts and circumstances of
the case in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, in relation to the law and
the written agreement. Likewise, the public interest and policy involved should be
considered. It may not be amiss to state that, normally, financing contracts come in a
standard prepared form, unilaterally thought up and written by the financing
companies requiring only the personal circumstances and signature of the borrower
or lessee; the rates and other important covenants in these agreements are still
largely imposed unilaterally by the financing companies. In other words, these
agreements are usually one-sided in favor of such companies. A perusal of the lease
agreement in question exposes the many remedies available to the petitioner, while
there are only the standard contractual prohibitions against the respondent. This is
characteristic of standard printed form contracts.
There is more. In the adverted February 24, 1998 demand letter[17] sent to
the respondent, petitioner fashioned its claim in the alternative: payment of the full
amount ofP8,248,657.47, representing the unpaid balance for the entire 36-month
lease period or the surrender of the financed asset under pain of legal action. To
quote the letter:
Demand is hereby made upon you to pay in full your
outstanding balance in the amount of P8,248,657.47 on or before
March 04, 1998 OR to surrender to us the one (1) set Silicon
High Impact Graphics and one (1) unit Oxberry Cinescan 640010
We trust you will give this matter your serious and
preferential attention. (Emphasis added).
Evidently, the letter did not make a demand for the payment of
the P8,248,657.47 AND the return of the equipment; only either one of the two was
required. The demand letter was prepared and signed by Atty. Florecita R. Gonzales,
presumably petitioners counsel. As such, the use of or instead of and in the letter
could hardly be treated as a simple typographical error, bearing in mind the nature of
the demand, the amount involved, and the fact that it was made by a lawyer.
Certainly Atty. Gonzales would have known that a world of difference exists
between and and or in the manner that the word was employed in the letter.
A rule in statutory construction is that the word "or" is
a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of
one thing from other things enumerated unless the context
requires a different interpretation.[18]
happen. Not only to the respondent, but those similarly situated who may fall prey to
a similar scheme.
To principal 1,682.28
Total P3,582.06 1
It is equally undisputed that after February, 1956 up to the filing of
respondent's complaint in the Manila court of first instance in 1961,
respondent did not make further payments. The account thus shows
that he owed petitioners the sum of P1,317.72 on account of the
balance of the purchase price (principal) of the two lots (in the total
sum of P3,000.00), although he had paid more than the stipulated
purchase price of P1,500.00 for one lot.
Almost five years later, on February 2, 1961 just before the filing of the
action, respondent wrote petitioners stating that his desire to build a
house on the lots was prevented by their failure to introduce
improvements on the subdivision as "there is still no road to these
lots," and requesting information of the amount owing to update his
account as "I intend to continue paying the balance due on said lots."
Petitioners replied in their letter of February 11, 1961 that as
respondent had failed to complete total payment of the 120
installments by May, 1958 as stipulated in the contracts to sell,
"pursuant to the provisions of both contracts all the amounts paid in
accordance with the agreement together with the improvements on the
premises have been considered as rents paid and as payment for
damages suffered by your failure," 2 and "Said cancellation being in
order, is hereby confirmed."
From the adverse decision of July 17, 1963 of the trial court sustaining
petitioners' cancellation of the contracts and dismissing respondent's
complaint, respondent appellate court on appeal rendered its judgment
of July 27, 1966 reversing the lower court's judgment and ordering
petitioners "to deliver to the plaintiff possession of one of the two lots,
at the choice of defendants, and to execute the corresponding deed of
conveyance to the plaintiff for the said lot," 3 ruling as follows:
During the hearing, plaintiff testified that he
suspended payments because the lots were not
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
By letter4 of November 12, 1997, Pacifico requested Jestra that "the balance
be restructured" in light of the "present business condition."
By November 27, 1997, Pacifico had fully paid the 30% down payment, and
by December 4, 1997, he had paid a total of P846,600, P76,600 of which
Jestra applied as penalty charges for the belated settlement of the down
payment.
By letter of December 11, 1997, Jestra, through counsel, sent Pacifico a final
demand for the payment ofP444,738.885 representing the total of 11
installments due on the 70% balance of the purchase price, inclusive of 21%
interest per annum and add-on interest at the rate of P384.81 per day,
counted from January 7, 1997. Further, Jestra demanded the payment
of P73,750 representing "penalties for the [belated settlement of the] down
payment." And it reminded Pacifico that "as provided in Section 5 of the said
contract, [Jestra] reserves its right to automatically cancel or rescind the
same on account of [his] failure/refusal to comply with the terms thereof."6
Pacifico later requested Jestra, by letter of November 12, 1997, for a
restructuring of his unsettled obligation. His request was granted on the
condition that the interest for the period from December 1996 to November
1997 amounting to P224,396.37 would be added to the 70% balance on the
purchase price; and that Pacifico issue 12 postdated checks beginning each
year to cover his amortization payments.
In light of the restructured scheme, the monthly amortization on the 70%
balance was from P34,982.50 increased toP39,468, to commence on
January 5, 1998.
Pacifico thus issued to Jestra 12 postdated Security Bank checks to cover
his monthly amortizations from January to December 1998. The checks for
January and February 1998 were, however, dishonored due to insufficiency
of funds.7
By letter of March 24, 1998, Pacifico informed Jestra that due to sudden
financial difficulties, he was suspending payment of his obligation during the
10-month period, and that he wanted to dispose of the property to recover
his investment.8 And he requested that the postdated checks he issued be
returned to him.
Jestra, by letter9 of March 31, 1998, denied Pacificos request to suspend
payment and for the return of the postdated checks. It, however, gave him
until April 15, 1998 to sell the property failing which it warned him that it
would be constrained to re-open it for sale.
Thereafter, Jestra sent Pacifico a notarial Notice of Cancellation, dated May
1, 1998, notifying him that it was, within 30 days after his receipt thereof,
exercising its right to cancel the Contract to Sell. Pacifico received the notice
on May 13, 1998.
In a separate move, Jestra through its Credit and Collection Manager sent
Pacifico a letter dated May 27, 1998, demanding payment of the total
That the actual cancellation of the contract shall take place after
thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or
the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon
full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be included in the
computation of the total number of installment payments made.
As the records indicate, the total payments made by Pacifico (hereafter
respondent) amounted to P846,600. The appellate court, in concluding that
respondent paid at least two years of installments, adopted the formula used
by the HLURB by dividing the amount of P846,600 by the monthly
amortization of P34,983 to thus result to a quotient of 24.2 months.
Petitioner contests the computation, however. It claims that the amount
of P76,600 represents penalty payment and is a separate item to answer for
its lost income as a seller due to the delay in the payment20 of the 30% down
payment. It thus submits that the amount of P76,600 does not form part of
the purchase price and should thus be excluded in determining the total
number of installments made.
Petitioner likewise claims that the proper divisor is not P34,983 but P39,468
since the parties agreed to restructure the amortizations owing to
respondents inability to comply with the schedule of payments previously
agreed upon in the Contract to Sell, and that if respondents total payments
less the penalty is to be divided by P39,468, the total installments paid would
only cover 19.5 months, hence, it was not obliged under RA No. 6552 to pay
the cash surrender value of such total payments.
This Court finds that neither of the parties computations is in order.
The total purchase price of the property is P2,500,000. As provided in the
Reservation Application, the 30% down payment on the purchase price
or P750,000 was to be paid in six monthly installments of P121,666.66.
Under the Contract to Sell, the 70% balance of P1,750,000.00 on the
purchase price was to be paid in 10 years through monthly installments
of P34,983, which was later increased to P39,468 in accordance with the
agreement to restructure the same.
While, under the above-quoted Section 3 of RA No. 6552, the down payment
is included in computing the total number of installment payments made, the
proper divisor is neither P34,983 nor P39,468, but P121,666.66, the monthly
installment on the down payment.
The P750,000 down payment was to be paid in six monthly installments. If
the down payment of P750,000 is to be deducted from the total payment
of P846,600, the remainder is only P96,600. Since respondent was able to
pay the down payment in full eleven (11) months after the last monthly
installment was due, and the sum of P76,600 representing penalty for delay
of payment is deducted from the remaining P96,600, only a balance
of P20,000 remains.
As respondent failed to pay at least two years of installments, he is not,
under above-quoted Section 3 of RA No. 6552, entitled to a refund of the
cash surrender value of his payments. What applies to the case instead is
Section 4 of the same law, viz:
SECTION 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid,
the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from
the date the installment became due.
If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace
period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty days from receipt by the
buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the
contract by a notarial act. (Underscoring supplied)
In Fabrigas v. San Francisco del Monte, Inc.,21 this Court described the
cancellation of the contract under Section 4 as a two-step process. First, the
seller should extend the buyer a grace period of at least sixty (60) days from
the due date of the installment. Second, at the end of the grace period, the
seller shall furnish the buyer with a notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission through a notarial act, effective thirty (30) days from the buyer's
receipt thereof.
Respondent admits that under the restructured scheme, the first installment
on the 70% balance of the purchase price was due on January 5, 1998.
While he issued checks to cover the same, the first two were dishonored due
to insufficiency of funds.
While respondent was notified of the dishonor of the checks, he took no
action thereon, hence, the 60 days grace period lapsed. Respondent made
no further payments thereafter. Instead, he requested for suspension of
payment and for time to dispose of the property to recover his investment.
Respondent admits that petitioner was justified in canceling the contract to
sell via the notarial Notice of Cancellation which he received on May 13,
1998. The contract was deemed cancelled22 30 days from May 13, 1998 or
on June 12, 1998.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution dated January 31, 2005 and March 16, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
respondent, Daniel Ponce Pacifico, is DISMISSED.1avvphi1.net
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57552 October 10, 1986
LUISA F. MCLAUGHLIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RAMON FLORES, respondents.
R.C. Domingo Jr. & Associates for private respondent.
As agreed upon, private respondent paid P50,000.00 upon the signing of the
agreement and in addition he also paid an "escalation cost" of P25,000.00.
Under paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement, private respondent
agreed to pay one thousand (P l,000.00) pesos monthly rental beginning
December 5, 1979 until the obligation is duly paid, for the use of the property
subject matter of the deed of conditional sale.
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Compromise Agreement further state:
That the parties are agreed that in the event the defendant
(private respondent) fails to comply with his obligations
herein provided, the plaintiff (petitioner) will be entitled to
the issuance of a writ of execution rescinding the Deed of
Conditional Sale of Real Property. In such eventuality,
defendant (private respondent) hereby waives his right to
appeal to (from) the Order of Rescission and the Writ of
Execution which the Court shall render in accordance with
the stipulations herein provided for.
That in the event of execution all payments made by
defendant (private respondent) will be forfeited in favor of
the plaintiff (petitioner) as liquidated damages.
On October 15, 1980, petitioner wrote to private respondent demanding that
the latter pay the balance of P69,059.71 on or before October 31, 1980. This
demand included not only the installment due on June 30, 1980 but also the
installment due on December 31, 1980.
On October 30, 1980, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner signifying
his willingness and intention to pay the full balance of P69,059.71, and at the
same time demanding to see the certificate of title of the property and the tax
payment receipts.
Private respondent states on page 14 of his brief that on November 3, 1980,
the first working day of said month, he tendered payment to petitioner but
this was refused acceptance by petitioner. However, this does not appear in
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. case, the
Supreme Court further held that the object of certifying a
check is to enable the holder thereof to use it as money,
citing the ruling in PNB vs. National City Bank of New
York, 63 Phil. 711.
In the New Pacific Timber case, it was also ruled that the
exception in Section 63 of the Central Bank Act that the
clearing of a check and the subsequent crediting of the
amount thereof to the account of the creditor is equivalent
to delivery of cash, is applicable to a payment through a
certified check.
Considering that Flores had already paid P101,550.00
under the contract to sell, excluding the monthly rentals
paid, certainly it would be the height of inequity to have
this amount forfeited in favor McLaughlin. Under the
questioned orders, McLaughlin would get back the
property and still keep P101,550.00.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in not observing the
provisions of Article No. 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and in
having arbitrarily abused its judicial discretion by disregarding the penal
clause stipulated by the parties in the compromise agreement which was the
basis of the decision of the lower court.
We agree with the appellate court that it would be inequitable to cancel the
contract of conditional sale and to have the amount of P101,550.00 (P
l48,126.97 according to private respondent in his brief) already paid by him
under said contract, excluding the monthly rentals paid, forfeited in favor of
petitioner, particularly after private respondent had tendered the amount of
P76,059.71 in full payment of his obligation.
In the analogous case of De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
sustained the order of the respondent judge denying the petitioners' motion
for execution on the ground that the private respondent had substantially
complied with the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement, and
directing the petitioners to immediately execute the necessary documents
transferring to the private respondent the title to the properties (July 23,
1985, 137 SCRA 730). In the case at bar, there was also substantial
compliance with the compromise agreement.
Petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court in its Resolution of November 16,
1978 in the case of Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Building Co.,
Inc., to the effect that Republic Act 6552 (the Maceda Law) "recognizes and
reaffirms the vendor's right to cancel the contract to sell upon breach and
non-payment of the stipulated installments but requires a grace period after
at least two years of regular installment payments ... . " (86 SCRA 305, 329)
On the other hand, private respondent also invokes said law as an
expression of public policy to protect buyers of real estate on installments
against onerous and oppressive conditions (Section 2 of Republic Act No.
6552).
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6552 which took effect on September 14, 1972
provides as follows:
In case where less than two years of installments were
paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not
less than sixty days from the date the installment became
due. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the
expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the
contract after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of the cancellation or the demand for rescission of
the contract by a notarial act.
Section 7 of said law provides as follows:
Any stipulation in any contract hereafter entered into
contrary to the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6, shall
be null and void.
The spirit of these provisions further supports the decision of the appellate
court. The record does not contain the complete text of the compromise
agreement dated December 20, 1979 and the decision approving it.
However, assuming that under the terms of said agreement the December
31, 1980 installment was due and payable when on October 15, 1980,
petitioner demanded payment of the balance of P69,059.71 on or before
October 31, 1980, petitioner could cancel the contract after thirty days from
receipt by private respondent of the notice of cancellation. Considering
petitioner's motion for execution filed on November 7, 1980 as a notice of
cancellation, petitioner could cancel the contract of conditional sale after
thirty days from receipt by private respondent of said motion. Private
respondent's tender of payment of the amount of P76,059.71 together with
his motion for reconsideration on November 17, 1980 was, therefore, well
within the thirty-day period grants by law..
The tender made by private respondent of a certified bank manager's check
payable to petitioner was a valid tender of payment. The certified check
covered not only the balance of the purchase price in the amount of
P69,059.71, but also the arrears in the rental payments from June to
December, 1980 in the amount of P7,000.00, or a total of P76,059.71. On
this point the appellate court correctly applied the ruling in the case of New
Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. vs. Seneris (101 SCRA 686, 692-694) to
the case at bar.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to
deliver a written instrument or specific property is, if
rejected, equivalent to the actual production and tender of
the money, instrument, or property.
However, although private respondent had made a valid tender of payment
which preserved his rights as a vendee in the contract of conditional sale of
real property, he did not follow it with a consignation or deposit of the sum
due with the court. As this Court has held:
The rule regarding payment of redemption prices is
invoked. True that consignation of the redemption price is
not necessary in order that the vendor may compel the
vendee to allow the repurchase within the time provided
by law or by contract. (Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza,
25 Phil. 495.) We have held that in such cases a mere
As the Court held in the case of Soco vs. Militante, promulgated on June 28,
1983, after examining the above-cited provisions of the law and the
jurisprudence on the matter:
Tender of payment must be distinguished from
consignation. Tender is the antecedent of consignation,
that is, an act preparatory to the consignation, which is the
principal, and from which are derived the immediate
consequences which the debtor desires or seeks to
obtain. Tender of payment may be extrajudicial, while
consignation is necessarily judicial, and the priority of the
first is the attempt to make a private settlement before
proceeding to the solemnities of consignation. (8 Manresa
325). (123 SCRA 160,173)
In the above-cited case of De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals (137 SCRA
730), the vendee was released from responsibility because he had
deposited with the court the balance of the purchase price. Similarly, in the
above-cited case of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. vs. Seneris (101
SCRA 686), the judgment debtor was released from responsibility by
depositing with the court the amount of the judgment obligation.
In the case at bar, although as above stated private respondent had
preserved his rights as a vendee in the contract of conditional sale of real
property by a timely valid tender of payment of the balance of his obligation
which was not accepted by petitioner, he remains liable for the payment of
his obligation because of his failure to deposit the amount due with the court.
In his manifestation dated September 19, 1986, private respondent states
that on September 16, 1980, he purchased a Metrobank Cashier's Check
No. CC 004233 in favor of petitioner Luisa F. McLaughlin in the amount of
P76,059.71, a photocopy of which was enclosed and marked as Annex "A1;" but that he did not continue paying the monthly rental of Pl,000.00
because, pursuant to the decision of the appellate court, petitioner herein
was ordered to accept the aforesaid amount in full payment of herein
respondent's obligation under the contract subject matter thereof.
However, inasmuch as petitioner did not accept the aforesaid amount, it was
incumbent on private respondent to deposit the same with the court in order
to be released from responsibility. Since private respondent did not deposit
said amount with the court, his obligation was not paid and he is liable in
addition for the payment of the monthly rental of Pl,000.00 from January 1,
1981 until said obligation is duly paid, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the
Compromise Agreement. Upon full payment of the amount of P76,059.71
and the rentals in arrears, private respondent shall be entitled to a deed of
absolute sale in his favor of the real property in question.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
(a) Petitioner is ordered to accept from private respondent the Metrobank
Cashier's Check No. CC 004233 in her favor in the amount of P76,059.71 or
another certified check of a reputable bank drawn in her favor in the same
amount;
(b) Private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner, within sixty (60) days
from the finality of this decision, the rentals in arrears of P l,000.00 a month
from January 1, 1981 until full payment thereof; and
(c) Petitioner is ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of private
respondent over the real property in question upon full payment of the
amounts as provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) above. No costs.
SO ORDERED.