GARRY KASPAROV 0)! MODERN CHESS EVERYMAN CHESSGARRY KASPAROV ©) MODERN CHESS KASPAROV VS KARPOV 1988-2009 EVERYMAN CHESSFirst published in 2010 by Gloucester Publishers plc (formerly Everyman Publishers plc), Northburgh House, 10 Northburgh Street, London EC1V OAT Copyright © 2010 Garry Kasparov English translation © 2010 Ken Neat. First published 2010 by Gloucester Publishers plc The right of Garry Kasparov to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 978 185744 652 4 Distributed in North America by The Globe Pequot Press, P.O Box 480, 246 Goose Lane, Guilford, CT 06437-0480. All other sales enquiries should be directed to Everyman Chess, Northburgh House, 10 Northburgh Street, London EC1V OAT tel: 020 7253 7887 fax: 020 7490 3708 email: info@everymanchess.com website: www.everymanchess.com Everyman is the registered trade mark of Random House Inc. and is used in this work under license from Random House Inc, EVERYMAN CHESS SERIES Chief advisor: Byron Jacobs Commissioning editor: John Emms Assistant editor: Richard Palliser Translation by Ken Neat. Typesetting and editing by First Rank Publishing, Brighton. Cover design by Horatio Monteverde. Printed and bound in Printed and Bound in the US by Sheridan Books.Contents Foreword Tournament Races For the first time after Seville (games 1-4) ‘In view of irreconcilable differences...’ (game 5) The fate of the GMA and the World Cup (games 6-7) Preparation difficulties The Fifth Match: 1990 Under the Russian flag (games 8-10) Failure of the blitzkrieg (games 11-14) Difficult period (games 15-19) Campomanes again (game 20) Scotch ballads (games 21-23) Fall and rise (games 24-27) In the finishing straight (games 28-31) 35 50 73 81 81 108 142 183 190 220Passions around the Crown Under pressure by the new wave (games 32-36) Chess Wimbledon (games 37-39) Supreme court (games 40-41) End of the Duumvirate Knock-out Battle of the giants (games 42-45 (rapid)) Farewell Linares (games 46-47) Post scriptum (games 48-51 (rapid), 52-54 (blitz), 55-58 (rapid), 59-66 (blitz)) Bibliography Index of openings Index of complete games 283 283 317 344 368 368 374 386 400 429 430 431Foreword The concluding volume of the trilogy covering my duels with Anatoly Karpov is devoted to our tournament games, beginning in 1988, and to our fifth match for the world crown (1990). The three years after the Seville match (1987) were notable for the unprecedented enliv- enment of international chess life. This was the heyday of the Grandmasters Association (GMA), which succeeded in organising the World Cup - the first time in history that a tournament championship of the leading chess players on the planet had been held. It need hardly be said that this new competition was also marked by my sharp rivalry with Karpov. As, however, was the ‘stellar’ 55th USSR Championship (1988), which ended in a share of first place and a major scandal. In the meantime Karpov won three Candidates matches and again gained the right to battle for the championship title. By that time the GMA had united nearly all the grand- ‘masters in the world, it had powerful potential sponsors, and it was ready to take on the Tuning of the world championship, as expressed in a resolution of the GMA General Assembly, which was approved by an overwhelming majority of votes on 18 December 1989 in Mallorca. Chess had acquired a real chance of ridding itself of the FIDE dictatorship and moving onto professional lines. But Campomanes & Co. would not accept this. Six months later a part of the GMA management board, including Karpov, suggested leaving the running of the world championship with FIDE, and the next assembly in the Spanish town of Murcia approved this by a majority of just a few votes. From that point on the activity of the GMA was gradually reduced to nothing... ‘My fifth duel with Karpov (New York/Lyon 1990) turned out to be the last classical match for the world championship held under the aegis of FIDE. | won 122-1114. As always, the match took a very tense course, but, for all the wealth of ideas demonstrated, its influence on the development of chess was not so significant as our previous four matches, which byKasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 the early 1990s had produced a powerful new generation: Anand, lvanchuk, Gelfand, Short, Kamsky, Shirov, Kramnik, Topalov... The composition of the chess elite underwent a drastic change, and Karpov and | were no longer able to dominate unconditionally in tourna- ments. Previously it was unimaginable that neither of us would take first place, but in 1994 at the super-tournaments in Linares, Amsterdam and Reggio Emilia, we were over- taken by the new wave. | was able to readjust and win twice in succession at Linares (1992 and 1993), but Kar- pov, unable to overcome the crisis, suffered a sensational defeat against Short in their semi-final Candidates match in the spring of 1992. Then Short won the final against Tim- man and... unexpectedly suggested to me that we should play our match for the world championship outside of the FIDE framework. Deciding that this was a convenient oppor- tunity to finally place chess on a professional basis, | agreed. And the Kasparov-Short match (1993) took place under the aegis of a new organisation created by us - the Profes- sional Chess Association (PCA). In response, FIDE deprived me and Short of the rights of champion and challenger, and organised a match ‘for the world championship’ between the two reserve candidates, who had lost in the qualifying cycle - Timman and Karpov. The sudden opportunity to regain the crown, even if only the FIDE version, literally re- vived and transformed the ex-champion. In the spring and summer of 1993 he finished first in Dos Hermanas and Dortmund, and in the autumn, when | had overcome Short, he did not allow Timman any chances, and, after winning the title created by FIDE, he won a strong knock-out tournament in Tilburg. Then came the triumph of Linares 1994, where Karpov attempted to demonstrate that his official title meant no less than my historic one - and he won with the outstanding score of 11 out of 13. At the end of 1994, after numerous problems, a declaration of collaboration between FIDE and the PCA was signed, providing for a unifying match between the winners of the two forthcoming world championship cycles. In the final | won the PCA version against Anand (1995) and Karpov won the FIDE version against Kamsky (1996). But our sixth match, alas, did not in fact take place. At the super-tournament in Las Palmas (December 1996) | finished first, but Karpov shared last place and ceased to be regarded as a real contender for the crown, Sponsors lost interest in a match between the two ‘K's’, and the new FIDE President llyumzhinov began actively promoting ‘one-off’ knock-out world championships. The chess paths of Karpov and me diverged, and with the exception of Linares 2001 we never again met in classical tournaments. However, we played a number of rapid and blitz games, with which this volume concludes. Autumn 2009 was - just imagine! - the 25th anniversary of the start of the first Karpov- Kasparov match. Putin's Russia and FIDE ‘forgot’ about this date, but the Spanish marked it with a colourful chess festival in Valencia. The new meeting of the 12th and 13th champi- ons reminded many of their fierce duel, which was unique not only for chess, and also for top-class sport as a whole ~ five matches for the world championship in the space of six years! I should like to express my gratitude to my former trainers Alexander Nikitin and Alexan- der Shakarov for their help in the preparation of this manuscript for publication.Chapter One Tournament Races For the first time after Seville By winning the last, decisive game of my fourth match with Karpov on 19 December 1987, | did that which my opponent had failed to do in 1985: | drew the match and retained my title. Now, at last, | had the prospect of three quiet years at the chess summit. ‘| don’t know how easy they will be,’ I stated in an interview after the match, “but at any event this will be three years without a match for the world champion- ship. Playing such a match every year is pretty tiring. As for my plans... | want to play. | will play as much as | am able. | am teaching the age when ! am obliged to try and realise my full potential, to achieve the maximum | can in the game.’ But apart from this | also had plenty of other obligations. Wishing the readers of the magazine Shakhmaty v SSSR a Happy New Year in 1988, ! wrote: ‘I believe in the democratic principles of chess life, for which | have fought; | believe that justice will triumph everywhere. | think that in the next few years we will witness the con- struction of a new chess world, in which chess will fully conform to its moral status of a clean and honest game. Chess will proceed to a new qualitative level. And for this | will do everything I can.’ | was talking mainly about the creation the previous year of the international Grandmasters Association (GMA), which was embarking on the running of the World Cup, and about the prospect of creating an independent Union of USSR chess players. Engrossed in these various problems, for nearly five months after the Seville match | did not take part in any competitions (with the exception of the FIDE knock-out blitz championship in the Canadian city of Saint John, from which Karpov and | were elimi- nated before the semi-finals), whereas in January 1988 Karpov won in Wijk aan Zee ~ 9 out of 13 (+6-1=6), in March he shared 2nd-3rd places in the Euwe Memorial - 3Y2 out of 6 (+2-1=3), and in April he won the first stage of the World Cup in Brussels, where the first GMA Assembly was also held (cf. the chapter ‘The Fate of the GMA and the World Cup’). In the middle of May | also plunged intoKasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 tournament play - and immediately came a clash with Karpov, with not just one game, but a whole mini-match! We took part in a four-cycle match-tournament of four grandmasters in Amsterdam, where we were assisted by our regular trainers: Karpov by Igor Zaitsev, and | by Alexander Nikitin. Nikitin: ‘Our stars were opposed by the two strongest Dutch players - Jan Timman and John van der Wiel. The idea of the organisers was that the event should not only trivially arrange the contestants on four steps, but as though continue the Seville match of the two great “K's” against the background of a contest between the two leaders of the Dutch team and a kind of USSR-Holland match. The opening ceremony was colourful: after an original drawing of lots, two mime artists provoked laughter by resurrecting the suffer- ings of the contestants in the Seville match, familiar to us from videos...” Zaitsev: ‘Amsterdam greeted us with hot, blindingly sunny weather and the radiant smile of the marble foyer of the Barbizon Hotel. The opening ceremony was on a par with the standard of the tournament. The drawing of lots was highly unusual. About three weeks beforehand, each of the four was invited to guess the exchange rate of the Dutch Guilder against the American Dollar on 12 May 1988. The most far-sighted proved to be van der Wiel, who was exactly right ~ 1.825. Then came Timman, Karpov and Kasparov. It was in this order that they chose their numbers in the tournament table (of course, only the first three “chose” ~ the world champion had to take what was left). Once again displaying insight and far- sighted modesty, van der Wiel chose number 4 (within a couple of weeks this “prognosis” of his was also confirmed), Timman chose number 2, and Karpov, voluntarily con- demning himself to two Blacks at the start, selected 3. Kasparov was left with number 1, to his satisfaction.’ Yes, | took this to be a good sign - it was hard to imagine that the No.1 would re- main unclaimed. But they all had their own reasons: perhaps Timman would not object to finishing second, while Karpov wanted to have White against me in the first cycle. This next encounter of the champions was undoubtedly the main intrigue of the match-tournament, and it created great interest not only in the chess world. In the first two rounds we both defeated van der Wiel and drew with Timman. By the start of our individual encounter, the conference hall of the Barbizon Hotel was full to bursting point. Game 1 A.Karpov-G.Kasparov Amsterdam 15.05.1988, Ast cycle, 3rd round Grtinfeld Defence D76 1.d4 fe 2 cq g6 3 DFS In our first game after Seville, Karpov avoids an immediate continuation of the dispute in the main lines - 3 Ac3 d§ 4 cxdS (Game Nos.3, 6, 16, 20, 22, 24), 4 Df3 2975 Wb3, or 5 Rf4 (Game Nos.48, 50). Occasion- ally he began with 3 g3, to which | replied both 3...c5 (Brussels 1987), and 3...c6 (1st and 3rd games of the 1987 match), and later 3.2.97 4 &g2 ds (Game Nos.55, 57, 62, 66). 3...327 4 g3 (as we expected) 4...d5, ‘A surprise’ (Zaitsev). In the 1986 and 1987 matches | set up a ‘rampart’ here - 4..6 5 &g2 d5, and White retained certain hopes of success. On this occasion a genu- ine Griinfeld had been prepared, leading to more lively play.awe = oie "G58 8 @ oO BS aR BRE EULVNNY S77 Fh 5 cxd5 (5 &g2 - Game Nos.42, 47) 5...xd5, 6 2g2 Ab6 7 ANc3 “Nc6 8 e3 0-09 0-0 One of the tabiyas of the g2-93 system. 9..5€8 Hort’s preparatory move, known since 1965, although in 1988 Zaitsev wrote: ‘Today this is considered to be the most flexible direction of theoretical thinking.’ Earlier Black mainly employed 9...a5 or the straightforward 9..e5 — | once played this against Vaganian (Barcelona 1989), and after 10 d5 Has 11 e4 c6 12 &g5 f6 13 Re3 cxd5 14 exd5 (14 &xb6! Wxb6 15 Axds Wad8 16 Wc1!? and 2d1 is better, Podgaets- Notkin, Moscow 1995) 14...g4!? 15 &c5 Rf7 16 b3 f5 17 &b4 Daca! 18 bxc4 e4 an interesting battle developed. Tournament Races 10 Hea A symmetrical reply. White has also played 10 Ae e5 11 d5 Das 12 Ac2 Daca 13 e4 @d6 (Korchnoi-Hort, Luhacovice 1969) or 10 We2 e5 11 Axe5 Axes 12 dxeS &xe5 13 Bd1 We7 14 e4 hs!? (we also looked at this in our preparations) 15 &e3 Be6 16 Bd4 Rxd4 17 Hxda c5 18 Hd2 Bads (Smyslov-Korchnoi, Beer Sheva 1990), in each case with equality. But the main line is 10 d5 @a5 11 Ad4 d7. Here White has tried 12 ba Dac4 13 a4 a5 14 bS Wc8 (Portisch-Kasparov, Reyk- javik 1988), 12 We2 c6 13 dxc6 Axcé (Por- tisch-Kasparov, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1988; Korchnoi-Kasparov, Tilburg 1989), 12 b3 5. (Ljubojevic-Kasparov, Barcelona 1989), and 12 Ab3 Axb3 13 axb3 c6 14 dxc6é &xc6 (Yusupov-Kasparov, Belgrade 1989), with an equal game in every case. But most often he plays 12 e4, after which 12..c6 is now preferred, although 12...c5 appealed to me, with the idea of 13 dxc6 ®xc6 with equality (Hjartarson-Kasparov, Barcelona 1989), or 13 Ab3 Daal. A modern attempt to fight for an advantage is 13 #31? Doc4 (13...e6 14 &g5) 14 We2 b5 15 b3 b4 16 bxc4 &xc3 17 £d2!?, sacrificing the exchange (Bologan-Svidler, Wijk aan Zee 2004). 10...85 This undermining of the centre seems timely, but perhaps it is more accurate to make another patient move - 10...a5!?. Now 11 d5?! is weak: 11...2xc3 12 bxc3 Wxds 13 Ad4 Wea (a recent example is Navara-Ivanchuk, 7th rapid match game, Prague 2009), while if 11 b3, then apart from 11..e5 (Hulak-Tal, Moscow 1990), 11...a4 is also good. It would seem that this emphasises most simply the harmless nature of 10 He1, 11.d5 Aas 12 e4c6Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 13 Sgs This developing move is the most natu- ral. However, a novelty from the 21st cen- tury is stronger - 13 b3!? (crippling the black knights) 13...cxd5 14 exd5, and White has some advantage after both 14...2.g4 15 a3 (Tkachiev-lordachescu, Dresden 2007; Navara-lvanchuk, 5th rapid match game, Prague 2009), and 14...e4 15 Axed Hxed (or 15..Dxd5 16 Ag5 f6 17 Rd2) 16 Bxe4 Rxar 17 295! &f6 18 Axf6 Wxf6 19 Be8+ Hg7 20 Wei 294 21 Hxa8 Axa8 22 Des AAfs (22.08?! 23 ba, Podgaets-Nedilko, Odessa 2007) 23 b4 We7 24 bxa5 f6 25 ®d3 Wxe1+ 26 @xe1 4c7 - Black is obliged to fight for a draw in an endgame where he is a pawn down. 13...f6 (13..Rf6 14 &xfo Wxfe 15 b3 is better for White) 14 &e3 Daca Two other replies come into considera- tion: 1) 14...Abe4 15 b3 Dxe3 16 Hxe3 cxd5 17 Dxd5 Le6 (intending ...A\c6-d4) 18 Bd3 fs 19 2d2!? (but not 19 @c3 We7 20 Ads Was with equality, Grachev-Shipov, Sochi 2004) 19...R7 20 Aca Dxc4 21 dxc4, or 19.6 20 exf5 gxfs 21 Af4 Dd4 22 Axeb Exeb 23 @f3, and White’s chances are somewhat better; 2) 14...cxd5 15 &xb6 axb6 16 Axds Leb 10 17 We2!? (17 h4 &xd5!, Korchnoi-Smirin, Biel 2003) 17...axd5 18 exd5 f5 19 b4 e4 20 Bact exf3 21 Wxe8+ Wxe8 22 Exe8+ Exes 23 &xf3, and White's advantage is largely symbolic (Ivanchuk-Dominguez, _ Sofia 2009). But | chose the most energetic continua- tion, involving a pawn sacrifice. weg ate A 4 Lap eat 8 a Bota e 15 dxc6! Otherwise it is difficult to hope for any advantage at all. 15...Axe3! Only this move is a novelty. ‘Black agrees to give up a little material, merely to avoid any defects in his pawn structure. At the same time he markedly activates his forces.’ (Zaitsev). Indeed, there is no reason to leave himself with a weakness at c6 after 15...Wixd1 and ...bxc6 or 15..bxc6 16 $1 (Kasparov-Pares Vives, Barcelona simul’ 1988). 16 Wxd8 Hxd8 17 cxb7 2xb7 “Black could also have considered the variation 17...2xg2(?) 18 bxa8W Axes, but the crude 19 Wxa7 destroys all the charm.’ (Zaitsev) 18 Hxe3 2h6 19 Heea As a result White has reached an end- game with an extra pawn, but Black's activity promises him equal chances.19...Deq 19...2d3 was also suitable, for example: 20 Hadi Had8 21 Bxd3 Hxd3 22 Be2 &c1 23 Det Hd8 24 hd hs or even 24..2d2 25 45 &a5 with adequate counterplay. 20 Hada Sf8! An accurate reply: it is important to move the king off a light square. 21h4 Here (and on the next move) White could have played 21 Bxd8+!? Bxd8 22 @f1 Dd2 23 Qxd2 Sxd2 24 He2, but after 24..Rxe2 25 Bxe2 &c1 26 b3 Ad2 27 Abr (27 Ads Axd5 28 exd5 &b4 with equality) 27...2b4 28 &d3 f5 thanks to his two bishops Black gains a draw without difficulty: 29 exf5 e4 30 Sc4 gxf5 31 2e6 f4 32 gxf4 e3 33 fxe3 Tournament Races fed 34 a3 Bc5 35 Dc3 Axe3+ 36 Sf1 Bd3+ 37 &g2 Axf4. 21...Rac8 22 &h3 ‘This appears to enable White to seize the initiative, but it soon transpires that it is only temporary, and that Black has a sure way of neutralising it, (Zaitsev) 22..Exd4 (forcing play now begins) 23 Exda If 23 Dxda, apart from 23...2d8 it is also possible to play 23...2c6. 23...xb2! 24 Hd7 Bxc3 25 Exb7 ‘It made sense for White first to play 25 Ed8+ &e7 26 8d7+, forcing Black to repeat the position by 26.98! (26..%e8?! 27 &xb7 is risky and unfavourable), and thereby making things easier for himself with time-trouble approaching.’ (Zaitsev) ATs 25...De4! Retaining the active knight. This is a ‘more elegant and simpler way to draw than going into a position with opposite-colour bishops, which was condemned by Karpov and Zaitsev - 25...Axf3 26 Exb2, although even here after the possible 26..Bd3 27 Hb8+ @g7 28 Hb7+ Gh8 29 Le6 &d2 30 Exa7 Exg3+ 31 &f1 Hd3 32 a4 Ha3 Black should be able to hold on. 26 Dh2 Less good was 26 &e6 Adé6 or 26 Hc7? 11Kasparov vs, Karpov: 1988-2009 Hc1+ 27 Aft Ad2 28 Bxc1 Axf3+ 29 Hg2 @xh4t 30 gxh4 S2xca, ‘and now it is White who would have had to save an ending with opposite-colour bishops where he is a pawn down’ (Zaitsev). 26...0d6 27 Exh7 Karpov slightly oversteps the mark, by avoiding the clearly drawn 27 Sxa7 Hxg3+! 28 2g2 (28 fxg3 Re3+ and ...Axa7) 28..Bc3 ete. 27...8.g7! 28 h5 gxh5 29 Sxh5 White's pieces - in particular his rook - have ended up in rather strange positions. 29...Bed+ It would have been more cunning to play 29..8f7!2 and see what the opponent would do. Of course, the position after 30 ha Haz 31 &d7 Bxa2 32 &c6 is also drawn, but even so Black does have a passed a-pawn and Karpov would still have had to display a certain accuracy (White needs to transfer his knight to e3). 30 Wg2 Hc2! 31 Re6 Dxeg 32 Dga White may have a ‘bad’ rook, but Black also has a ‘bad’ bishop on g7. 32...Hd2 33 2b3 (or 33 &f3 AgS+ 34 bez Hdq with a draw) 33...a5 34 Zfs Dd6 (con- cluding the game by a repetition of moves - there is nothing better) 35 Bh5 eq 36 Bfs Dd6 37 Bhs Dea va-Ys 12 In the meantime Timman defeated van der Wiel and finished the first cycle level with me and Karpov on 2 out of 3. The status quo was not changed by the drawn 4th round. Zaitsev: ‘Now came the 5th round, which was destined to play a significant (here | deliberately avoid the word “fatal”) role in the allocation of the first three places. So that no one should have to play three suc- cessive games with the same colour - in particular, in the 6th, 7th and 8th rounds Karpov would have had Black in all his games (and | would have had White - G.K.), the organisers interchanged the order of the rounds ~ the 5th with the 6th and the 11th with the 12th, after agreeing this before- hand with the contestants. Thus the two “K's” met each other one round ahead of schedule, and the enormous queue of those wishing to see this clash again stretched back to the auditorium entrance. The 126th game between these two outstanding players was destined to become one of the most dramatic and bloody.’ Nikitin: ‘This game broke all records for competitive drama and largely decided the outcome of the entire event. The world champion, casting off the fetters of nerv- ousness and uncertainty seen in Seville, played boldly, uninhibitedly and at times even recklessly against his eternal opponent.’ Game 2 G.Kasparov-A.Karpov Amsterdam 18.05.1988, 2nd cycle, 5th round Caro-Kann Defence B17 1e4 In Seville | played this only twice, and both times | encountered the Caro-Kann.But | had not given up hope of breaching this ‘concrete’ defence. 1...66 (of course!) 2 da d5 3 Dd2 (at that time the ‘harmless’ 3 e5 had not yet come into fashion - Game No.46) 3...dxe4 4 @xe4 Dd 5 fs Before the 1987 match we also did a little analysis of both the emerging Geller varia- tion - 5 Ags Dgf6 6 &d3 (Game No.4), and the no less complicated 5 &c4 Dgfe 6 Ags (Game Nos.37, 39). 5..Dgte 6 Des And we briefly looked at this variation in the spring of 1988. Here | liked the games of Tal, who dashingly played this back in the 1960s. After 6 Dxf6+ Axfe 7 c3 Ag4 (10th and 14th games of the 1987 match) Black’s defences are solid, whereas the knight retreat retains more tension in the situa- tion and, as it turned out, some attacking chances (although the position of the knight at 3 did not altogether appeal to me) 6...e6 7 2d3 2e7 The main line was considered to be 7...c5 8 0-0 cxd4 (8...2e7 leads to a position from the game) 9 @xd4 £c5, and usually White replied 10 b3 or 10 Af3 (Tal-Vasyukov, Kiev 1964). But I was attracted by the Tournament Races spectacular game Tal-Flesch (Lvov 1981) - 10 c3!? &xd4?! 11 cxd4 0-0 12 &g5 etc. (Game No.146 in Volume Il of My Great Predecessors). 10...0-0 is sounder, and if 11 Bea - not 11...2xd4?! 12 cxd4 b6 13 DAhs or 12..b6 13 295 h6 14 Axf6 Wxf6 15 Dns, We7 16 Ze3 with an attack for White, but the cool-headed 11...Wb6 12 Dh5 Bes. However, Karpov decided to play ...6-c5 a move later. 80-0 c5 (11) A seemingly pointless waste of precious minutes: it is hard for Black to devise any- thing else. But perhaps Karpov was getting accustomed to the position, trying to pene- trate into White’s thoughts. ez A 2a0 i 9 We2 (04) 9...0-0 (04) It has become clear that Black will not hurry with the exchange on d4. He will make it only at the most appropriate mo- ment. 10 Eda (05) Here too | could have tried to obtain an isolated d4-pawn - 10 c3 b6 11 &2g5 &b7 12 Sadi. | made the more natural 9th and 10th moves, but in the end | was disillu- sioned with the outcome of the opening and | lost all desire to play 6 g3 - all the same this knight has to be exchanged for the one on f6. As it transpired, White’s 13Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 attacking potential is rather limited, and if the opponent deploys his pieces compe- tently, he is unable to repeat Tal's feats, But in this game | was still playing in a ‘Tal-like mood’, which almost ended in disaster for me... 10... Wie7 A.useful move, instead of the premature 10...cxd4 11 &xd4 (Tal-Filip, Moscow 1967). ‘Despite the understandable anxiety, as a trainer | had certain grounds for perceiving the outcome of the opening to be reassur- ing” (Zaitsev) 11¢4 11 &g5 is good only after 11...b6?! 12 ds! @xd5 13 &xe7 DAxe7 14 Bxh7+! Sxh7 15 g5+! &g8 16 Exd7! Wxd7 17 Whs Hds 18 Wxf7+ @h8 19 h4 with a dangerous attack (Capablanca-Ribera, Barcelona simul’ 1935). 11...h6! 12 Bh4 (12 &xfe Axfo with equal- ity) 12...b6 is correct, and the direct assault no longer works: 13 d5 @xd5 14 &xe7 DAxe7 15 Weg Af 16 Wxa8 £b7 17 Wxa7 Ea8 18 Wxa8+ &xa8 etc. 11...cxd4 (04) Now is the time! The old 11..2e8 (11...b6? 12 d5!) is weaker because of 12 dxc5 Axc5 13 c2 Dcd7 14 Ags!? (14 Baa 2d8 with equality, lvanchuk-Karpov, Monte Carlo (rapid) 1997) 14...0f8 15 D3e4, for 14 1) 15...50d7 16 Dxf6+ Sxf6 17 Wd3 &xgs (17.96 18 Wf3) 18 &xg5 Wes 19 Wd2 (Tiviakov-Adams, 9th match game, New York 1994) or 18..2%ac8 19 Hac1 Wes 20 Wd2 &c6 21 b4! with advantage to White (Adams-Karpov, Dortmund 1994); 2) 15...Axe4! 16 Wxed f5 17 We2 2d7 18 Whs! (a promising pawn sacrifice; 18 Df3 Bf6 is equal, Leko-Lutz, Horgen 1994) 18..h6 19 Wf7+ Bhs 20 DF3 Hac8 21 Re3 Rf6 22 Bxh6 Abs 23 Wxc7 Exc7 24 &g5 or 18...2xg5 19 Wxg5 Wxc4 20 2b3 Wbs 21 242, retaining some initiative. 12 Axd4 a6! Securing the position of the queen at c7. Otherwise White's chances are rather better: 12...2\c5?! 13 Abs Wc6 14 Bc2 b6 15 fs? (Aseev-Arkell, Leningrad 1989), 12..Re8 13 Abs Ws 14 Deg Axed 15 Bxeq a6 16 Ac3 Afé 17 &F3 or 12..b6 13 Abs Wb8 (to Karpov and Zaitsev’s move 13...Wc6 there is the strong reply 14 fs! &c5 15 ®Dfd4) 14 Ded! 2b7 15 295 Hd8 (15..a6 16 ®bd6) 16 &h4 with the idea of £93. Today | see that Black has created a very flexible, almost ideal defensive construc- tion, and | do not understand thanks to what, strictly speaking, can White hope for a successful attack, and why should anysacrifices work? But at the board, with a stubbornness worthy of a better applica- tion, | looked for a ‘decisive’ combinative blow. 13 b3 (11) It is this move that was a novelty, and not 11..cxd4 (labelled ‘N’ in Informator) After spending some time, | realised that it would be ineffective to play either 13 &g5 (Vogt-Spiridonov, Poljanica Zdroj 1982) in view of 13..h6, when White loses ignomini- ously after 14 &xh6? gxh6 15 Axe6? fxe6 16 Wxe6+ Bf7 17 &g6 Des 18 Lxf7+ wFs!, or 13 Adfs because of 13..exf5 14 Wxe7 Ee8 15 Wa3 Des 16 Ags Axd3 17 Wxd3 ®De4 with equality, or the cool-headed 13...¢5, when 14 b4?! &xb4 15 Axg7 &xg7 16 Ah5s+ Dxhs 17 Wxhs fs 18 &b2+ e5 19 Wg5+ @h8 20 Axfs Af 21 Axc8 Saxc8 22 &xes Wg7 favours Black. 13...He8 (13) A solid move in Karpov's style. ‘For the moment this too does not cause any anxi- ety, since the opposition of rook and queen is nearly always advantageous to the weaker side; besides, the e6-point is given additional protection and the manoeuvra- bility of the minor pieces is increased.’ (Zaitsev) The immediate 13...b6 is also possible, in order to parry 14 @df§ &c5 15 Axg7 &xg7 16 &b2 by 16..e5 17 Dhs+ Axhs 18 Wxhs f5 19 Wg5+ @h8 20 &xf5 Afe (and if 21 ed, then 21..Ha7 22 fixes Wg7), while if 14 &b2 Black should not hurry with 14...2b7 because of 15 dfs! exfs (15...&¢5? 16 Axg7!) 16 Wxe7 Bfes 17 Wha g6 18 &f1 with the better chances for White, but should deploy his rook more actively - 14..d8!?. Now he need fear neither 15 Adfs 2f8, nor 15 £e4 2b7 16 Dxe6?! fxe6 17 &xb7 Wxb7 18 Wxe6+ Sf8, nor even 15 Agfs!? £c5 16 Axes! fxe6 17 Tournament Races Wxeb+ G8 18 Ler Des! (18..he8? 19 @xqg7) 19 2xg7 Wa! 20 Wis+ Wxfs 21 Axfs &2b7 or 15...exf5! 16 Wxe7 He8 17 Wb4(a3) 4g4 18 g3 f4 with complicated, unclear play. 13...2d6 14 &b2 He8 is also acceptable, freeing himself from the need to calculate variations both with fs, and with @xeé6 (Ye Jiangchuan-Karpov, Beijing [rapid] 1998). 14 &b2 (12) 14...b6 (04) Black quite logically aims to complete his development. Later too Karpov makes the most correct moves - but he spends too much time on them! \ ay ww one SS SY \ < be a Ww Vays A ~~ \ WY a0 “TNE RE 15 Dh5 (23) ‘in such pawn structures this move is al- ways a key one in the attack on the kingside ~ and, naturally, it could not have escaped Karpov's attention’ (Zaitsev). ‘White is threatening to sacrifice his idle knight for the g7-pawn, exposing the king. What now follows resembles an enthralling Western with chasing and shooting.’ (Nikitin) A suicidal course! Here | was already dreaming of some kind of brilliancy, | was eager for ‘blood’, and | had no wish at all to force a draw, for example, by 15 Af3 2b7 16 eq Had8 17 Axf6+ Axf6 18 Axo Dxfe 19 Wes Wxes 20 Dxe5 Sf8 (Anand-Karpov, Monte Carlo (rapid) 1995). 15Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 15...8.b7 (16) A subtle practical decision: Karpov pro- vokes the knight sacrifice on e6, correctly sensing that it is incorrect. But after 15...0xh5? it would have won: 16 Axe6! fxe6 17 Wxh5 &f8 18 2xg7+ Gxg7 19 Wxh7+ (19 Wxe8?? Df6 and Black wins) 19.26 20 Wh6+ Bes 21 £2, with mate. 15...2f8? is also weak in view of 16 Acé! Axhs 17 Dxe7+ Wxe7 18 Wxhs &b7 19 Wes. But the simple move 15..Acs!? was safe enough - when there would be no Western! 16 xe6?! (05) ‘And the heavens opened! This sacrifice is the main thread from which White's idea is woven. Sitting in the auditorium, initially | was also afraid of 16 Axg7?! ¢xg7 17 Wxe6, until | realised that this could be partied in two ways ~ 17...fxe6 18 Dxe6+ 7 19 Dxc7 Bg! or 17..Wxh2+!? 18 Sxh2 fxe6 19 Dxe6+ &f7' (Zaitsev), for example: 20 Ags+ g8 21 DAxh7 Axh7 22 Sxh7+ &xh7 23 Bxd7 &c6 24 Ec7 Hac8 etc. 17..@2h8 18 Wxf7 Hg8 19 g3 Des 20 We Bae8 also favours Black. The move in the game also most proba- bly loses and fully deserves a question mark, the ‘2!’ being attached merely for the desire to fight. In fact, | reasoned, there was 16 no point in playing the weak-willed 16 Axfo+ 2xf6 or 16 Bac1 (recommended by Karpov and Zaitsev in Informator) 16...&d6}, when Black is completely alright... ‘The mirage of an attack seized Kasparov's imagination, and he launched an assault on the king's fortress.’ (Nikitin) 16...fxe6 (18) Played after considerable thought. ‘16...Wc6 17 Def4 &d6 18 Wa costs Black a pawn’ (Zaitsev). However, 17...sc5! is stronger, when the position is complicated and dynamically balanced: 18 Wf1 Dga (18..De5 19 Re2 Deg is also not bad) 19 Bf5 Axf2 20 Hxd7 Dh3+ 21 Shi Af2+ with perpetual check, or 18 Axf6+ Axf6 19 We2 ®aq4 20 Rxh7+ Bh8 21 Hds! Vxf2+ (if 21...Qxf2? there unexpectedly follows 22 ixg7+! Sxg7 23 We3+ BB 24 Bxcs! xcs 25 Ads f6 26 Hf1 with an obvious advan- tage) 22 &h1 Whé 23 Bhs &xg2+ 24 Sxg2 Wxf4 25 AfS+ Sg8 26 Act Re3 27 Bh4a &xc1 28 Bxg4 Wd2+ 29 Wxd2 &xd2, and things end in a draw. But after some hesitation Karpov decided to take the piece - and he was right: now White still has to demonstrate that he has sufficient compensation for the material deficit. Ait yyy Myf UEY U7 ie fae \17...2f8! (07) ‘Why did Black think for so long over this, the only reply? After all, 17..@h8? 18 W7! would have led to a crushing defeat: 18..Axh5 (18..g8 19 &xf6! - GK) 19 Wixhs 8 20 WF7.' (Zaitsev) ‘On his last five moves Karpov spent nearly a whole hour, and within a further five moves he would have just two (!) minutes left to the time control. This means that this part of the game came to him with great difficulty, but he wanted on no ac- count to give way. What a fighter!’ (Nikitin) Tournament Races &f3+). However, after 27 &c3! He3+ 28 Wd3 there is no guarantee, whereas 23...2xf5+ 24 @h1 Kxg2+ (24...he4 is also not bad) 25 &xg2 Hf2+ 26 gg3 Ed2! with the threat of w8.d6+ does indeed lead to a draw. Therefore | would have preferred 22 Wxfo+ U7 23 Wxt7+ dxf7 24 Hd7+ Be7 25 2xb7 Hxb7 26 @e4 Habs 27 &xb7 Axb7 28 Hd1, when the four pawns for the bishop give White the better ending. But the main thing is that after 18...8c5! (18...\4c6? 19 DF4) 19 WFS Black has the very strong reply 19...Wc6! 20 Af4 Zea!, fie -_ g ‘ghee m0 7%, Y £0 8 8am ee YY & 18 &xh7! There is simply nothing else. At the least, White picks up a third pawn for the piece and hopes to create an attack. The position seemed very interesting to me, but | over- tated my chances. 18...2¢5?! (03) ‘In view of his time shortage,’ writes Zait- sev, ‘Black might have taken a more sensi- ble decision - 18...&c5 19 WFS! (19 Dxg7? Wyal - G.K) 19..He2 (after 19...%e4?1 20 W95 White has a dangerous initiative) 20 Rxf6 Dxfo 21 Dxf6 gxf6 22 Hd7 (22 Wxfo+ Wf7 with equality) 22..2xf2 23 xc7 Bxg2+ (?- G.K) 24 Sf1 Hg1+ 25 we2 He8+ 26 ed2! Eg2+ 27 edi, and Black has a guaranteed draw’ (27..Bd8+ 28 2d7 Sxd7+ 29 Wxd7 Analysis diagram for example: 21 Dd5 He2 22 &d4 &xd4 23 Exd4 Hae8 with an obvious advantage, or 21 Rds! Rae8 22 deft (22 2c3 Wc7!) 22..We7! (22..2xfq 23 Wxf4 We6 24 Bd2 2b4 25 2xfé ixd2 26 @e7+ Sxe7 27 Wxd2 SF7 28 Lc2 is not so clear) 23 Ag6+ (23 Exd7 Wxfa!) 23...&f7 24 Bd2 &b4 25 Bdd1 Ads! 26 f3 (26 cxd5? Yxh2) 26..2xc4+ 27 bxca Wxc4+ 28 Sf2 Wcs+ 29 Wxcs5 Axc5+ 30 &g3 He2, and White's position is unenviable. These pretty variations show that my cavalier ‘Tal-style’ attack was, alas, incorrect. ‘Karpov made a solid move, but not the best. Apparently the choice between the two - 18..2c5 or 18...c5 - was made 17Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 beforehand, and not by calculation, but intuitively. In time-trouble there is no possibility of comparing how much one way is better than the other.’ (Nikitin) 19 Wh3 (there is nothing else: 19 WF5? 2eq 20 Wg5 De6! and wins) 19...xh7! (15) Simplifying tactics - 19...c8? 20 2f5 xfs 21 Wxfs Wc8 would have allowed White to win a fourth pawn for the piece by 22 Wg6 Axhs 23 Wxhs dg8 24 Was SF8 25 Wxb6 and to face the future with optimism. ee 7 am x ae at ae Sy sy al —_- WK ea ow \N XN Y oe at WS Ble mie 20 &xg7+?? (26) After thinking for nearly half an hour, | lost control of the situation and took an inexplicable decision, leading to the loss of two tempi. The attack could have been continued in one of two ways: 1) 20 @xqg7, attacking both the rook on e8, and the knight on h7. Black has two replies which might claim to refute the opponent's gambit play: a) 20...2f6 21 Axes Bxe8 22 Who+ Wg7 23 Wxg7+ &xg7 24 Axfo+ Axfe. In an express analysis after the game, here Karpov was able to demonstrate miracles of mobility for the black pieces, attempting to show that his chances were better - for example, after 25 He1 Hg8!. However, the white pawns are also a strength, and after 25 Edé followed by f2-f3 and the develop- 18 ment of the a1-rook the outcome is unclear; b) 20...il/c6 21 bal? (21 Hds? Wag6, but 21 ®xe8 Exe8 22 Rd4 &g5 23 Xg4 is playable) 21.295 22 Wh8+ &f7 23 Whs+ f8 (23...2g8? 24 Hd5!, and if 23...Wg6, then 24 Wxg6+ &xg6 25 Axes Dag 26 Hd7 etc.) 24 Bd5 (24 £31?) 24.27 25 bxc5 Af6 26 DxeB Bxe8 27 &xf6 Wxfé 28 Bf &xd5 29 Wxd5 with full compensation for the piece, or 21...Da4l 22 Bds! Wg6 (22...axb2 23 Wxh7 Af6 24 DFS and Whé6+ leads to perpetual check) 23 Ae6+ Sf7 24 Afa &c8 25 Wo3! with unfathomable complications; 2) 20 bal? - play over the whole board! ‘In this way - especially in view of the approaching time-trouble - White could have posed difficult problems: 20..De6? 21 xg7!’, writes Zaitsev, and together with Karpov he recommends 20...96(?), ‘guaran- teeing equality’, but overlooking the deadly 21 Wc3!. It is also weak to play 20...De4?! 24 &xg7+ SF7 22 Wt5+ Defé 23 Axfo Axfé 24 @xfé Axf6 25 Hd7+, but equality could have been guaranteed by 20...#98 21 ©xq7 2f8 22 Afs 2f6, as well as 20..2f6 or 20...We6 21 bxc5 Af6. But 20...Wc8! is even better: 21 Wg3 Deb 22 @xg7! (22 Wg6? &g8! and wins) 22..Df6! (in Nikitin’s variation 22..2f6 23 DxeB Wxe8 24 Kxf6 Dxf6 White should play 25 Hd6!, while if 23...2xb2, then 24 Dd6 Web 25 Babi Les 28 b5! etc.) 23 Axes (23 @fs? Wxc4) 23...Wxe8 24 Ber Deg (24... WF7!? 25 We3 leads to an incredibly complicated position) 25 Wg4 &xba 26 Exe4 &xe4 27 Wxe4 Hd8 with a comfort- able game for Black. 20...2g8 21 2b2 Forced: if 21 &d4, both 21..g5 and 21...g5 are strong. According to Zaitsev, ‘it is probable that better saving chances were offered by 21 bd’. Alas, they are no better: after 21..2g5 22 Ws Wc6 23 Bds Web 24bxcS (Karpov, Zaitsev; 24 &f6 is more tenacious: 24..Wxf5 25 ExfS Ace6) 24...5xd5! or 23...2\ce4! 24 h4 Weé White has nothing to hope for. However, he also has little hope after the following reply. WY, la, Gi Z Y x jen Sw je og y > 7 pg Y W, g y Dy WY: 7m Y Y \N Ss \ SN Tee WS e\Y \ WV DEN \ ae \ 21...We6! (04) “The picture changes sharply: apart from a big material advantage, now Black also has the initiative’ (Zaitsev). ‘Here the cur- tain could have been lowered, had it not been for the absence of pawns defending the king, and - the chess clock.’ (Nikitin) 22 Hida (09) With the opponent in severe time- trouble, | try to maintain at least some tension, by creating the threat of Bg4¥. 22 &d5 is refuted not by the ‘obvious 22...Wg6’ (Nikitin) - this is bad because of 23 ADf4, but by the quiet 22...0g5! 23 Wg4 Dced 24 Hes (24 h4 Web!) 24...2c8! 25 We2 Me6 etc. Or 22 Wg4+ Ags! (but not Karpov and Zaitsev’s recommendation 22...g5 in view of 23 %ds5!) 23 ha (if 23 Af4, then 23...ad8 is good, as is 23...ce4 24 h4 Lc8 or 24 Whs f7) 23...We4! 24 Hdg Wxga4 25 Hxg4 &c8 26 Hxg5+ (26 Hg3 “Ace4) 26...2xg5 27 hxgS &f7, and the four white pawns do not compensate for the missing rook. 22...De4 (08) Tournament Races Just in case, cutting off the rook on 4 from the kingside. 22.295 23 Bg4 Seq or 22....Dg5 23 Bg4 Ace4 would have won. 23 Hea (07) Again desperate play, aimed at ‘scaring’ the opponent. 23..0eg5 24 Wea (or 24 Eg4 a3!) 24...a3! 2 7 Y he \ ION AN AR \N Ae {Oey CBE Ww jar - a Both more flamboyant and more effec- tive than the also winning 24...c5. ‘Evi- dently this was the last stratagem that Karpov was able to use in the period when he still had even a little time to think. The flag on his clock began to rise inexorably, and what followed was pure improvisa- tion.’ (Nikitin) 25 &c3 Exei+ 25...$b2! would have prettily concluded the struggle - because of the weakness of the back rank, White would have lost his dishop. ‘But we should not forget about Karpov’s fearful time-trouble.’ (Zaitsev) 26 Sxea He8 27 &d2 Scr instinctively aiming for exchanges. 27...&c5 (Karpov, Zaitsev) 28 Bd7 &f8 29 &xh7 Wg6! 30 h4 Df3+ 31 gxf3 kxh7 would also have been decisive, although the most forceful was 27...@cB or 27...WWig6! 28 ha &c8. With such a material advantage for Black, any commentary is pointless... rs > SN N Ye mw 11.¢3!? (05) Amazingly, 11 c4 e5 12 &c2 would have led to almost the same position as in my game with Hiibner (Brussels 1986), where the opening was a Meran: 1 d4 d5 2 c4.c6 3 Dc3 D6 4 e3 e6 5 Af3 Abd7 6 &d3 &b4 7 a3 £d6 8 e4 dxe4 9 Deg Dxeg 10 Sxe4 eS 11 0-0 0-0 12 Sc2 (but not 12 dxeS Axes 13 @xes BxeS 14 &xh7+ &xh7 15 Whs+ kgs 16 Wxes Wa3! 17 c5 &e6 with compensation 27Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 for the pawn, Larsen-Bisguier, San Juan 1969). After 12..He8 13 He1 exd4 14 Exe8 Wxe8 15 Wxd4 2e7 16 2g5! White built up substantial pressure and in the end he obtained the same advantageous balance of forces, as in the present game: bishop against knight with a weak pawn on e6. True, Karpov would have had two trumps: my a-pawn would still have been at a2 and, far more important, his h-pawn would already have been at hé — a useful move! Black has practically an extra move compared with the variation 6..2d6 7 e4 dxe4 8 Axeg Axes 9 Lxe4 0-0 10 0-0 h6 11 &c2 (14th game of the Steinitz-Lasker match, 1894!) 11..e5 - here it is White to move, and after 12 He1 exd4 13 Wxd4 &c5 14 Wc3 a5 15 a3 Df6 16 Se3 (16 Bxh6!? gxh6 17 Sadi is sharper, with an attack) 16...,&xe3 17 Bxe3 he retains the initiative {Kasparov-Deep Blue, 4th match game, Philadelphia 1996). Therefore here 11 c4 has little point, and | played 11 ¢3. Of course, in this way not much can be achieved, but even so Black has to defend accurately. ie Ee Et, ane a2 ae “yl NY Ww" a “Ra : a a RW aX, Sa ba 11...e5 (04) In the only previous game Bellin-Thipsay (swansea 1987) Black switched to passive defence — 11..WWc7 12 &c2 He8?! 13 Wd3 28 28. But later he gained equality by 11..f6 12 &c2 c5 (Smirin-Kharitonov, Podolsk 1990) or 11...c5 12 &c2 (according to Karpov, 12 dxc5 @xc5 13 &c2 We7 14 We2 is better for White, but after 14...b6! Black is alright) 12...Wc7 13 Kea Hd8 (kam- sky-Karpov, Tilburg 1991). The opponent's novelty did not catch me unawares, since revolving in my mind was the set-up from my afore-mentioned game with Hiibner. 12 Se2 (05) 12...he8 13 He2 exda (06) 14 Hxe8+ Wxes 15 Wxd4 We7?! (05) 15...We2?! would have led in a round- about way to the same thing after 16 @d2! &c5 17 Wh4 We7 18 Wg3! (18 &gS We2) 18.846 19 &f4 &xf4 20 Wxf4, And 15.7?! 16 &F4 (of course, not 16 2xh6?! gxh6 17 Ke1 Af8 18 We3 &e6 19 Wxh6 because of 19...Wd8! and ...2f6) 16...2f6 (Karpov, Zaitsev) is weak in view of 17 Wd6! We7 (17..f8 18 &xh6) 18 He1, when Black faces a difficult struggle for a draw. However, 15...ac5! 16 Wh4 We7 (not 16...€7? 17 Wg3) was better, maintaining approximate equality: 17 Wxe7 Sxe7 18 2f4 Dfo 19 He1 2F8 or 17 &g5 (a recom- mendation of Karpov and Zaitsev) 17...f6! with the idea of 18 &xfé Wxfé and intend- ing ...,te6 and ...Re8.But, to all appearances, Karpov also con- sidered 15...We7 to be acceptable. 16 2f4! (05) The same motifs as in my games with Hiibner and Deep Blue: the exchange of the dark-square bishops, the development of the queen’s rook with gain of tempo, and the aim of obtaining light-square bishop against knight with the better pawn struc- ture. 16...Axf4 (08) Black should perhaps have gone into a slightly inferior position with the bishops on - 16...2¢5!? 17 Wd3 Df8 or 17 Wd2 Dfe, when it is unclear how serious White's initiative is. However, for the moment Black is still within the equality zone. 17 Wxfq DF8 (17...Df6?! is worse: 18 Her Be6 19 Dda4 etc) 18 Ber Se6 (but not 18...e6? 19 We4 g6 20 h4!, for example: 20...W6 21 HS gxhsS 22 Ke3! with a power- ful attack) 19 Ad4 19...0d8?! 19...Re8! (with the idea of 20 &b3 Wd8) was stronger - this recommendation of Karpov and Zaitsev was soon put into practice: 20 g3 (20 Af5? is refuted by the amusing 20...&xf§5 21 Bxe7 Sxe7) 20...Wds 21 Hdi?! 2h3 22 Af3 We7 23 Wde We2, and it was now White who had to seek a Tournament Races way to equalise by 24 Wd3 (Smirin- Khalifman, Moscow 1989). 21 Axe6 Exe6 is correct, and now either 22 Mxe6 Zxe6 23 ‘We3 (Khalifman), or 22 Sd1 We7 23 b4 and then £b3. It is probable that this too is a draw, but Fischer with White would have played on for a long time in an attempt to win. So that even after the best defence Black would have faced certain trials. 20 ha! This does not signal the start of an at- tack, but is a link in the strategic plan. White takes away the g5-square from the opponent and thereby further cramps the movements of the black pieces. 20... We5?! (10) Another small concession. Karpov does not sense the danger and he loses time. The immediate 20..Wd6 was preferable (Kar- pov, Zaitsev), and after 21 Axe6 Axe6 22 Weq Sf8 (22.817) 23 g3 (Ulybin- Giorgadze, Simferopol 1988; 23 Wh7?! Wd2!) 23..We7 White’s advantage would have been rather less. 21 He3! (15) One of my patent methods: the rook is threatening to join the attack on the king along the third rank. 21...Wd6 (19) 22 Dxeé fxe6? Hanging over the board is the spectre of 29Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 the 24th game of the match in Seville: Karpov goes in for the same pawn struc- ture, and with the same balance of forces - without the rooks it would be identical! Of course, 22..Axe6 23 Wea Af8 was more tenacious (if 23...¢f8?, then 24 Wh7! is unpleasant) - although after 24 g3 all the same Black's position is worse (White has gained several tempi and he can attack the f7-point), it is as yet too early to attach a ‘¥’. After the exchange of the heavy pieces the situation will begin to resemble the ending of the 10th game of the 1986 match, where there was also a light-square bishop against a knight - true, without the c-pawns. Whom does their presence favour? | think that it gives White certain additional possibilities. After 22...fxe6, on the other hand, Black's position is already almost lost. Karpov was hoping that by placing his knight passively at f8 he would somehow be able to defend, but why create chronic weaknesses for himself? 23 Wg4 (09) 23...Wd2 24 2b3! 24...2hB It transpires that 24...Wxb2? is bad in view of 25 Kq3! Wb1+ 26 @h2 Wh7 27 &c2! Wh8 28 hS, practically forcing 28..g5 29 hxg6 8d7 30 Wf4 or 29...Wg7 30 2b3 witha decisive advantage for White. 30 25 He2 Wd6 26 g3 To Black’s misfortunes has been added the weak e6-pawn, and now the only ques- tion is whether White will succeed in con- verting his advantage. The main thing is not to rush: this is the most terrible thing for the opponent, since White can alternate between various plans. 26...a6 27 tg2 Not rushing with 27 &xe6?! Axe6 28 Exeé, since after 28...Wd1+ 29 Wxd1 Bxd1+ 30 €g2 d2 Black easily gains a draw in the rook ending. 27...He8 28 He3 Ze7 29 Hf3 Xd7 30 Whs Exploiting the forced passivity of the op- ponent’s position, White gradually im- proves the placing of his pieces. 30...We7 32 Wes 31 g4l? came into consideration, with the threat of a direct attack on the king, for example: 31..%g8 32 g5 hxg5 33 hxg5 g6 34 Wg4 Wd6 35 Efe Be7 36 Wea(f3), and White has an obvious advantage. But in the fourth hour of play | did not want to weaken my king’s defences and determine the position too much 31...21d8 32 aq b5 (08) A questionable decision, typical of Kar- pov's manner of play in cramped positions:he did not like being ‘squeezed’ and he usually sought counterplay even at the cost of strategic risk. Thus here he weakens his a6- and c6-pawns, since he did not want to allow a4-a5 (after which any endgame would have been bad for Black). 33 Weg (06) 33...We7 34 Fg (07) Later 34 axbS was suggested with the idea of 34...axb5?! 35 Wb4!, but the strong reply 34...cxb5! would have made things more difficult for White, for example: 35 Ba2 Wd7 36 b4 tg8 37 £b3 Bc8. 34.05 35 WE Wade Tournament Races &xb7 (threatening Wc6) 41...Wd2 (if 41...b4, then 42 Wed is possible) 42 &c6 Wxb2 43 Re8 Wa3 44 WI7+ Hh7 45 Axbs Was 46 Aco WES 47 Wxf5+ exfs 48 &f3 dg6 49 te3, picking up the c4-pawn and winning. 38 Ba7? In the heat of the battle 1 missed the forceful 38 Wg4! Wes 39 f4 Wea+ 40 Sf2 g6 (40...2g6 41 Wxe6 or 40...Wh7 41 f5! exf5 42 Wf4 etc. does not help) 41 Wf3 Wxf3+ 42 <&xf3 with a won ending. 38...b4 39 £c2 (this appealed to me more than 39 cxb4 cxb4 40 Wea dg8 41 ca) 39...bxe3 40 bxc3 Wes? 40...2d8! was more tenacious, with the idea of ...4d7 (and if 41 &b3, now 41...We5). But Karpov, apparently remembering about Seville, did not himself want to initiate the exchange of rooks and, being in slight time- trouble, with his last move before the time control he simply centralised his queen. 36 axb5 Again there was some sense in maintain- ing the pawn tension, to retain the a4-a5 resource: after 36 Wb7!? Black would have faced a difficult defence. However, now too it is no easier. 36...axb5 37 Bf7 Bb8?! (06) Maintaining the b-pawn, but the lesser evil was 37...c4 38 &c2 &g8 39 Hb7 Hd7!, when 40 &xb5?? is not possible because of 40...Bf7 (41 Wea Wd2). 40 Bxd7?! is unclear: 40..Axd7! 41 &g6 Des 42 Was+ Ws 43 Bh7+ Sf7 44 Wa7+ (44 Wb7+ &f6 with the threat of ...g7-g6) 44...We7 45 Wb8 &f6 46 e4 Wd7. But after, say, 40 S&e4 sooner or later Black would have lost a pawn: 40...We5, 41 We3! Sf7 42 Hbé6 etc., or 40..Exb7 41 41 37 (13) Again | unhurriedly manoeuvre, assum- ing that White’s advantage will not run away. Meanwhile, 41 c4!, the move sug- gested by Karpov and Zaitsev, would not only have increased it, but also led to the almost forced win of the c5-pawn, and with it the game: 41..Hd8 42 Hf7 &g8 43 Wb7 Waa (the queen cannot be maintained on cE!Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 this square!) 44 We7! 2c8 (44...2b8 45 Bf4) 45 &h2 Bas 46 Hfa Was 47 Wxcs etc. 41...\h7 (09) 42 Wg? If 42 2b7(?!), then not 42.28? 43 We3! %xb7 44 Exb8! and wins (Karpov, Zaitsev), but 42...Bxb7 43 Wxb7 Wd5+ 44 Wxds exd5 45 &f3 5 with prospects of a draw. How- ever, 42 ca! was again strong, with the sequel 42..Wd4 43 Bf4 Wb2 (43..Wd7 44 Whs!) 44 &xh7 &xh7 45 Wea+ &h8 46 ‘Wxe6, and this time White has a won heavy piece endgame. 42...2g8 43 He7 Afs 44 Wt3 44...c4! (09) An excellent chance! ‘Exploiting the fact that White did not play a timely ¢3-ca and has not taken control of the very important ds-square’ (Zaitsev). Karpov is hoping to exchange his e6- and c4-pawns for the pawn on c3 and gain a draw with two pawns against three on the same wing. 45 Zea (08) White has acquired a new target - the c4-pawn, and | decided to aim for the exchange of rooks, in order to then win this pawn with the bishop and obtain the ‘Seville structure’ in pure form. It has to be said that the analogy with the ending of the 24th game of the 1987 match clearly weighed on both players. 32 After 45 &a4 (with the intention of Hes) 45...Wd5!? Black would have retained better saving chances. But it was possible to begin the pursuit of the c4-pawn while keeping the rooks on - 45 &a7!?, in order after 45...Wd5 46 2e4 Wes 47 Bad (or 45...8c8 46 Be4 Hb8 47 Mad) 47..Hc8 48 Hab Wfé 49 Wxf6 gxf6 50 Xc6! to transpose into a technically won endgame with bishop against knight. Therefore 45..Kd8!? is a more tenacious defence, with the idea of 46 &e4 Dd7! or 46 Wf7+ hs 47 We7 Hc8 48 ‘Wh7 (48 Wb4 Wd5+) 48.28 49 Wc7 Wd5+ 50 &g1 Hd7. 45...2@h8 (06) 46 &c6 Dh7 (09) 47 WF7 (06) 8 (09) Wi \ S S Ww NN wg’ AA b> x W \ WY N te ee we print Y \ \ SE WW \ Ss N WS S SS \ N WN we) 48 Hes (11) Achieving the desired exchange - and leaving Black hopes of eliminating the c3- pawn. 48 &e8 Jh7 49 Wxee Wxc3 would have led to this immediately - after 50 Hc7 or 50 &f7 White would have won the c4- pawn, but not the game. Obsessed by the ‘Seville syndrome’, | thought that without ‘the rooks White's position should be won. 48...Hxe8 49 2xe8 it is clear that the c4-pawn is doomed, and the fact that the Seville e3-pawn has moved to c3 should seemingly be only to White’s advantage.49...2h7! (07) A strong move - the knight is activated even at the cost of a pawn. ‘Although Black ‘has managed to get rid of the terrible rook on the 7th rank, nevertheless for the mo- ment it is only a question of obtaining practical saving chances’ (Zaitsev). Moreover, Karpov was once again in time-trouble... 50 Ad7 Af6 51 Sxe6 a oes as Of. eee i. a* Vay AD, la 4 “y NN ~ Me Vi, Y Y Yigg GY UY, BE GY Y Y 51..H5? Also the ‘Seville syndrome’: with his pawn on hs it becomes unacceptable for Black to exchange queens (it is curious that this important moment is not mentioned by Karpov and Zaitsev). The best chance was 52..@h7!, After 52 &xca Wxc3 53 Wes Wda the win for White is problematic. And in the event of 52 hs!? Wea+ 53 Sh2 We2 it is possible to exchange the queens, but after 54 Wg6+ Wxg6 55 hxg6+ dxg6 56 Axca HFS or 54 Wa7 Wea 55 We3 Wxe3 56 fxe3 AxhS 57 &xc4 dag6 Black retains hopes of saving the ending a pawn down. 52 2xca Weat White's task has become much easier. If 52...Wxc3 he wins by 53 Wf8+ &h7 54 Wes! (with the threat of &g8+) 54..2h6 55 Wa5+ #h7 56 &f7 or 54..Wd2 55 Ws+ hs (55..@h6? 56 RF7) 56 RF7 Wdi(e2) 57 2g6, picking up a second pawn. Tournament Races 53 Ph2 53..@h7? ‘The time deficit and the fatigue, caused by having to conduct a difficult defence, make themselves felt. 53...Wf3 was neces- sary, after which the world champion was intending 54 Wf8+! with the sequel 54..8h7 55 Wics Deg 56 &d5 Wxg3+! (this entire variation was given by Karpov im- mediately after the game) 57 fxg3 Axc5 58 2f3! (an important nuance, to which Kasparov draws particular attention - for a time the black king is restricted to playing a very modest role) 58...@#h6 59 g2 g5 60 c4! (but not 60 &f2? Dag 61 c4 Db2 62 Re2 @xc4 63 &xcd gxh4 with a draw - GK). Now Black can play either 60...gxh4, or, as Karpov suggests, the immediate 60...2g6, which is probably rather more cunning, since the g5-pawn covers the f4-square in the event of the white king invading. This would have left Black with definite practical chances, although the overall evaluation of the endgame is obviously unfavourable for him,’ (Zaitsev) And indeed, White gradually wins by ac- tivating his king and exploiting the weak- ness of the h5-pawn: 60...#g6 (things are not changed by 60..gxh4 61 gxh4 or 60...a4 61 Ff1!, and it is not possible to 33Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 give up the knight for the c-pawn) 61 of2 Beb 62 Se3 Ag7 63 Sed+ (or 63 weg) 63...8f6 64 dq Deb+ 65 dds etc. - Black is unable to prevent the advance of the c4- pawn to the queening square. By playing 53..2#h7, Karpov wanted to break out with his king, but after this move White immediately parries all the oppo- nent’s threats. 54 We6! WF3 55 Wed (it is all over: Black is simply two pawns down) 55...0g4+ 56 &g1 We6 57 203+ g6 58 We7+ Hh6 59 Req WE 60 Wf8+ Gh7 61 Wt7+ Lh6 62 ca Wa6 (12) Wi ee Y =~ ae Se . “a 1@ Eg a “ “at eimamae 6 #8 ¢ Baal j ‘Of course, it was also possible to resign, but it is typical for a human player to hope for a miracle. Suppose White were to play 63 Wf8+ dh7 and only now 64 c5 ? Will not the stalemating mechanism operate after 64...Wa1+ 65 dg2 Ae3+! (66 fxe3? Whit! 67 &f2 Wfi+ 68 &xf1 - stalemate)? Alas, on closer examination of this illusion it tran- spires that after 66 @f3! Wd1+ 67 &f4 Dd5+ (67..Wg4+ 68 wes Dc4+ 69 ef6 with mate) it self-destructs by 68 des Wai1+ 69 feb Dc7+ 70 &d7.’ (Zaitsev) 63¢5 1-0 An interesting game, full of instructive analogies with two of my previous wins ~ this never occurred again in my career. The situation before the last round was < .. 34 highly unusual: | was on ‘+6’, whereas the other contestants had not more than 50%. Something similar had already occurred with me at the super-tournament in Brus- sels (1986), where only Korchnoi, by win- ning in the last round, climbed to ‘+1’. In Amsterdam with a last effort Karpov reached ‘+1’, making the final outcome of the match-tournament: 1. Kasparov ~ 9 out of 12 (+626); 2. Karpov - 6Y (+3-2=7); 3. Timman - 5Y2; 4. van der Wiel ~ Zaitsev: ‘Kasparov was the genuine hero of the event. Objectively - on both competi- tive and creative indicators - he was supe- rior to his opponents. His ability to calculate long variations confidently and accurately in complicated positions was staggering. The duel between the two strongest players in the world was an enhancement to the Amsterdam match-tournament.’ Nikitin: ‘The world champion’s victory in Amsterdam was complete and impressive. He won all three mini-matches, did not lose a single game, scored more wins than all the others put together, and by a big margin won the prize for the most aggressive player. ‘Garry now has an optimal manner of play, and the correct approach to prepara- tion. What is evident is his striving for inter- esting play in every game, and for intensive work at the board, as Robert Fischer used to do. | was very afraid that the continuous match play with Karpov would stifle the world champion’s creativity, and that his style would become closer to that of his opponent. Fortunately, this has not hap- pened. Garry has remained above all a creator, a researcher; the main thing for him is the richness of the play, which (he firmly believes this!) also ensures the necessary number of points. ‘The event was attended by many specta- tors, but the small hall did not accommo-date more than one hundred people, al- though by no means alll of them tried to get in, In this hall it was always so quiet, than my brief exchange of whispers with Igor Zaitsev in the back row was invariably accompanied by astonished glances from our silent neighbours. Here there was no reign of electronics (as at the 1986 match in London or at the 1987 tournament in Brussels). Antediluvian demonstration boards, as if purchased in Riga, a leisurely demonstrator... But in @ neighbouring building a spacious room was set up, and it was here that the main mass of spectators gathered. Glancing at the demonstration boards and moving the pieces on their portable sets, they discussed all the finer points of the play with masters and grandmasters. It was for this open ex- change of opinions that the spectators had to pay, whereas entry into the tournament hall was not obligatory and was therefore free!” After winning the Amsterdam match- tournament, and then immediately after it the second stage of the World Cup in Bel- fort, my rating approached even closer to Fischer's stratospheric figure of 2780. Karpov also endeavoured not to fall behind: after beginning the year 1988 with 2715, he concluded it on 2750, a record high for him. ‘In view of irreconcilable differences...’ That same summer the star-studded 55th USSR Championship (Moscow, 25 July - 19 August 1988) was wedged in between the solid list of international — super- tournaments. This was the last in history to attract the entire cream of Soviet chess. Apart from the participants in the Candi- dates matches and talented young players, four world champions of different eras began the event - Kasparov, Karpov, Smyslov and Tal (true, after the first round the latter withdrew on account of illness and was Tournament Races replaced by Eingorn), while a fifth, Botvinnik, performed the role of chief arbiter. Here too there was a tough battle be- tween me and Karpov for the champion- ship, although, of course, we also had other rivals ~ in particular, Valery Salov, Alexan- der Beliavsky and Artur Yusupov. By pre- sent-day standards the length of the tour- nament - 17 rounds - was a genuine marathon! Tal: ‘initially it seemed that the tradition “he came, he saw, he conquered” would be observed. In the first three rounds the clear dictator of fashion, the clear choir leader, was the world champion. His two wins were highly spectacular and instructive. Then Kasparov rather lost his way with a series of six successive draws - | don’t remember him doing this before in a tournament!’ Indeed, | started very well: after a draw with Yusupov | won prettily against Ivan- chuk, after employing one of my best novelties in the English Opening (cf. p.292 in the previous volume), and then in a Griinfeld against Gurevich. But my ‘White’ game in the 4th round with Sokolov af- fected my fighting mood. After catching my opponent in a variation of the English Opening (also prepared for Seville), | emerged a pawn up ~ and suddenly | sim- ply blundered it away! | now had to fight for a draw in an inferior position... After this vexing lapse there followed colourless draws with Gavrikov and Smyslov. Karpov also began with 2%2 out of 3 and then he too slackened the pace. In the 7th round we played each other ~ a clash which would have been important ‘whatever the weather’, but especially when there was a fierce fight for the lead (in first place was Salov with 414 out of 6, and after him the two ‘K's’ and Beliavsky on 4). Again, as in the World Cup, | had the black pieces. 35Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 Game 5 A.Karpov-G.Kasparov 55th USSR Championship, Moscow, 1.08.1988, 7th round Nimzo-Indian Defence E32 1.4 Dfe 246 After the recent failure in Belfort (Game No.6) my Griinfeld needed repairing - and, as usual in such cases, | switched to classi- cal lines. 3 Ac3 The Queen's Indian with 3 Df3 b6 4 g3 (4 a3 - Game No.53) 4...&%a6, which was tested in our first and third matches, proved to be perfectly sound, and so Karpov decided to try his luck in the Nimzo-Indian Defence. 3...8b4 4 Wer An ancient system (Alekhine-Zubarev, Moscow 1915), which was revived in the last quarter of the 20th century. 4...0-0 Other defences involve 4...c5 or 4...d5 — the favourite move of many world champi- ons (cf. the games in Volumes |, Il and IV of My Great Predecessors) 5 a3 &xc3+ 6 Wxc3 b6 (since 2009, 6...d5 has also been popular at the highest level) 36 Now the queen’s bishop will be devel- oped on b2. Against Curt Hansen in Wijk aan Zee (1988) and usually later my oppo- nent played 7 25. | have also played this many times, including against Karpov himself (Game Nos.43, 45, 47). 7.867 8 b3 This rare move confused me. At that time the positions after 8 !f3 or 8 ba were topical, and we had looked at them in our preparations. But Karpov decided to keep his knight on g1, to retain the option of f2- £3, &d3 and Dez. ‘A new and very interesting continua- tion. With a slight lead in development, Black initiates active play in the centre’ (Khalifman). 8..4d6 9 f3 cS (Seirawan- Ehlvest, Rotterdam 1989) was not bad, or even 8..e4 9 Wc2 f5, since if 10 f3? there is 10..Wh4+. But another good idea had occurred to me - to try immediately to create counterplay in the centre (inciden- tally, 6...d5 is played with the same aim). 9 Df3 Abd7 10 Be2 dxcq It was hardly good to hurry with this cap- ture, 10...c5 11 0-0 Bc8 was perfectly accept- able, for example: 12 2d1 cxd4 13 exd4 &a6 with equality (Dreev-Bologan, Stepanakert 2005), while if 12 a4!? (killing my plan withpawn exchanges in the centre and ...b6-b5) there is a choice between 12...Wc7 (Mik- halevski-Palac, Paris 2000; —_Ivanchuk- Alekseev, Biel 2009) and 12...dxc4 13 bxc4 We7 (Carlsen-Bacrot, Dortmund 2009). 11 bxc4 c5 12 0-0 XcB Tournament Races play: ...a7-a5, ..Bb8, ...h7-h6 (preventing q5-e4-d6, although this is not so terrible) and, perhaps, even ...b5-b4. But for White no real plan is apparent - Black’s trumps are more weighty, and the exchange of queens leads to a favourable endgame. 2 — dary flor B® 78 Aga E: 2 Ti Tae Tr De Ye GY Joy fi b> 13 Rb2 ‘If the queen moves off the c-file - 13 Wb3 Black equalises by 13..cxd4 14 exd4 Saxf3 15 &xf3 eS!’ (Khalifman), But 13 a4!? comes into consideration - after 13...lWc7 a position is reached from the afore-mentioned Carl- sen-Bacrot game, which continued 14 &d1 Efd8 15 &b2 with slightly the better chances for White. The play is sharper after 14...S2xf3!? 15 gxf3 (a pawn is lost after 15 Sxf3 cxd4 16 Bxd4 e5) 15...cxd4 16 Exd4. 13...exd4 14 exd4 b5! Practically forcing c4-c5. | think that for Karpov this was an unpleasant surprise: of course, White has the two bishops and a protected passed pawn, but Black has a very strong blockading point at ds, ena- bling him to keep the b2-bishop shut in. 15 ¢5 a6?! Pleased by the ease with which | had been able to solve my opening problems, | promptly committed a positional error. | should have prevented a3-a4 by 15....2c6! or 15..2d5 16 Wd2 2c6! with very simple 16 aa! Of course, not 16 Ad2 Dbé with equality (Karpoy, Zaitsev) or 16...e5. White gets rid of his a3-pawn and either obtains play on the open a-file, or forces Black to weaken squares and his pawns on the queenside. 16...\d5 17 Wd2 ba A rapid and risky reply, dictated by an unwillingness to allow the opening of the a-file. Later Botvinnik asked me why | didn’t play 17..2c6!2. Then 18 axbS axb5 (18...@xb5 19 @a3!?) 19 Ka6 seemed un- pleasant to me, but after 19..Wf6 20 Rfa1 b4 it is hard for White to derive anything from his apparent activity, and therefore the bishop move deserved consideration. 18.a5! This move, severing the connection be- tween the black pawns, was made quite confidently by Karpov. Later he and Zaitsev commented in informator that in the event of 18 gs (with the idea of Ae4-d6) Black could have exploited the ‘hanging’ state of the knight - 18...c3!? 19 &xc3 bxc3 20 creKasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 We3 e5! 21 dxes xc5 with equality. Now, however, Black has an unpleasant position: his a6- and b4-pawns are weak, and the white pieces have posts at a4 and 4 (from where the knight will be eyeing not only dé, but also b6). In my preliminary assessment | had been hoping to create sufficient counterplay, but | underesti- mated my opponent's resources. 18...We7 “The world champion finds an interesting idea, involving the exchange of queens’ (Khalifman). However, with this aim it would have been better to play 1 Bfd1 (19 &d3 Ac3!; 19 Bfer!?) 1 (19...f4? 20 d5 and wins) 20 Zab1 wea, The machine suggests 18..e5 - in the variation 19 Axes Axes 20 dxe5 Hxcs 21 Wd4 Wg! Black is helped by tactics. 19 Hfd1 is better, when 19..e4 20 De1 is advantageous to White. There is also no clear equality after 19..2e8 or 19..Af4. Anyway, | did not want to lengthen the diagonal of the b2-bishop, and in addition | was afraid of further weakening my a6- and b4-pawns 19 Hfca Wea?! A dubious move: without the queens it will be easier for White to activate his Knight, and its invasion at d6 (or b6) may 38 cause chaos in the black ranks. Perhaps | should have sharpened the play with 19...f4l? (as | was initially intending to play). After this Karpov and Zaitsev sug- gested the gambit line 20 c6(?!) Axe2+ 21 Wxe2 &xc6 22 d5 (22 Wxa6 Wd6 is equal) 22...exd5 23 Ad4 with a ‘+’ evaluation, but after 23..Qe5! with the threat of ..ca it is White who would have to seek equality. In the event of 20 Rf1 &xf3 21 gxf3 Abs! 22 Wxb4 Acé or 20 Lc4 &xf3 21 gxf3 Df6 22 Sixaé (22 Wxb4 Dh3+) 22..Wc6 Black has good compensation for the pawn. But with the cool-headed 20 £41! White would have retained the better chances - 20...Re4!? (if 20...S.c6, then 21 Wxb4 Efd8 22 Wa3!) 21 c6 Df6 22 Aes A€ds 23 f3 LFS 24 g3, although there is still a lot of play in the position. 20 Aft Karpov welcomes the exchange of queens. 20 c6!? Hxcé 21 Exc6 Axc6 22 2xa6 was also interesting, obtaining a passed a-pawn instead of a passed c-pawn and also retaining some advantage. 20...Hfd8 21 Wxfa Dxf4 22 Zag Logical, although 22 3!? (but not 22 d2? Dxcs) deserved serious considera- tion: 22...8&xf3 (22...Dd5 23 Ad2!) 23 gxfa Hcé (23.8?! 24 Had) 24 Bag Bbs 25 Ec4. Now to 25...b3?! there is the strong reply 26Ecb4, and if 26...2d8 (Karpov, Zaitsev), then 27 &g2!. 25..e5 is more tenacious: 26 f5 exd4 27 Bxda! (27 &xd4 b3 28 Maba Mes!) 27..2xc5 28 Eaxb4 Hes!, although even here after 29 Eb6 Bc7 30 Hc4 Black's de- fence is not easy. 22...Dd5 23 Dd2 | remember well that after making this move Karpov looked very happy. And in- deed, now there is no doubt that the knight will end up on dé or b6. 23...8¢7! After a long think | ‘conceived’ a success- ful plan, which my opponent did not im- mediately figure out. True, even this de- fence should not have led to complete equality. 24 Baar In the event of 24 Acq Black would have had time to reply 24...&c6 25 Hat &bs!, exchanging the light-square bishops and approaching the drawing haven. 24...Db81 (24..e5 25 De4 would have activated the b2-bishop) 25 Deca Acé The bishop is striving for freedom - this is more reasonable than 25..Ac6 26 Ad6 (Pekarek-Stohl, Trinec 1988). 26 Ad6 26 Dbé6 could have been met by 26...A\c3 (with equality - Karpov, Zaitsev) 27 &xc3 Tournament Races bxc3_ 28 Exc3 Bxd4 and ...ef8 with an impregnable defence. 26...8a7 Preparing the planned unusual regroup- ing: ...De7, ...dad5 and ...Abc6l. 27 f32! The critical moment of the game. After this routine move my plan succeeds com- pletely, whereas the subtle reply 27 Hcbi! would have made 27...e7 pointless in view of 28 &ca with an attack on the b4- pawn. In any case White activates his bishop by £c1-d2, retaining a small, but enduring advantage, since Black has no real possibilities of active counterplay. 27...De7! 28 Hea After 28 &d3 &d5 and ..bc6 Black would have set up an impregnable block- ade. And with time-trouble gradually approaching, Karpov decided to avoid the slightest risk and force a draw. 28...d5 29 Hcci (in the event of 29 df2!? £5! 30 Axbs axbS 31 Bec1 Ac7! with the intention of ..c6é things would also have ended peacefully - an unusual knight fortress!) 29...@e7 30 Mea Ya-Ye By the start of the second half of the tournament the battle for the lead had ‘become extremely sharp. In the 9th round Salov won against Beliavsky and Karpov cb)Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 against Yusupov (Game No.92 in Volume V of My Great Predecessors), but in the 10th round | beat Kharitonov and Beliavsky beat Khalifman, while Salov and Karpov drew their games. After ten rounds Salov was still leading with 7 points, pursued by the two ‘K’s' and Beliavsky on 67. Then Salov lost to Yudasin, | shared the point with Beliavsky, while Karpov defeated Gurevich and burst half a point ahead. From the 12th round Beliavsky began to drop behind, whereas Salov and | each won two games and caught up with Karpov: after thirteen rounds the leading trio had 9 points. In the 14th round came my clash with Salov, which was of colossal competitive importance. Despite the apparently calm, even course of events, the underlying inten- sity of the struggle was very great. In the fifth hour of play | was able to set my oppo- nent some problems, and on the 40th move, the last before the time control, now deep in the endgame, he made a decisive mistake. For a couple of days | led the race, but in the 16th round Karpov scored a clean win against his fellow army club-mate Ma- lanyuk, and in the end we reached the finish together: 1-2. Kasparov and Karpov - 11’ out of 17 (+6=11); 3-4. Salov and Yusupov - 10; 5-6. Eingorn and Ivanchuk - 9%; 7. Yudasin - 9; 8. Beliavsky ~ 872 etc. A vivid comparative description of the performances of the two winners was given on the pages of the magazine 64 by Mikhail Tal: ‘Karpov acted in his own manner. With Black he usually plays very strictly. if his opponent plays normally, then unless it is particularly necessary he does not aim to ‘force the play. But he also does not release his opponent until the very end. These tactics fully crystallised in Moscow. With White, 40 Karpov's score was +6=3, while all his games with Black were drawn. The ex-world cham- pion would perhaps have achieved a better result, if he had played slightly more aggres- sively with Black. Of his “White” games, | was enormously impressed by his win over Yusu- pov ~ to so elegantly place the opponent in a hopeless position, and already in the opening! ‘It is not worth looking for outward effects in Karpov's games, and indeed he does not aim for them. It is the ability to find the most economical decision in a complicated posi- tion that distinguishes Karpov's play. | have been familiar with this trait of Anatoly for a long time. These sort of moves staggered everyone back in 1974, when he played his match with Spassky. Generally speaking, with all due respect to Karpov's creative “heritage”, that match for him was the summit! ‘Kasparov, by contrast, when playing White aims to conclude the game before the 40th move. Is it more difficult for him? After all, he makes every move with more ambi- tion, as it were, all the time forcing the oppo- nent to solve various problems. But Karpov is like a python. He conducts all his games without haste. Far fewer so-called miniatures (with a definite result!) occur in his games than in Kasparov’s (thus the Kasparov- Wwanchuk game, say, would be absolutely atypical for Karpov). For the ex-champion’s opponent, up to a certain point (as it appears to everyone) all is normal. And suddenly the position becomes so bad, that it is no longer possible to repair it! This is probably more marked with the six-hour time control, when the game concludes in one evening. ‘Many are saying: “How badly Kasparov played!”. Karpov knew that “+6” would be sufficient. The maximum that he could have imagined was “+9” (winning all his games with Whitel). Incidentally, the result that the ex-champion achieved was on par with hisrating. So that “only” +6 for the world cham- pion is an excellent advertisement for the championship of the country! After all, Kas- parov did not play worse than in Amsterdam or Belfort. It was simply that there he didn’t have the same opponents. But now everyone was clinging on “for dear life”. The fact that to maintain his rating Kasparov had to score +8 indicates that most Soviet players are rather under-rated... After all, this was a high result. And the fact that the winners finished 1/2 points ahead of their nearest rivals indicates that on this occasion victory was gained by them with an obvious superiority. ‘and now about home preparation. For example, Karpov reaches a position and evaluates it: “White is better”. This is suffi- cient for him. Kasparov begins analysing from this position. He concludes his analysis when it is clear that White is winning! Take that game with Ivanchuk. Anyone else, on finding the move 14 g4, would stop there. But | think that 19 &f4 was also found at home. | am not sure that the final position was reached at home, but even this is not ruled out. Therefore the impression is cre- ated that Kasparov wins entertainingly; he did not have any adjournments! (Not count- ing the game with Salov.) ‘My tastes are at variance with the opin- ion of the jury that awarded the prizes. Although Kasparov's combination in the game with Smirin was very good, the attack against Ivanchuk... To put it crudely, even | could have played like this against Smirin. ‘It was absolutely right that Karpov and Kasparov finished with an identical score. Judging from what happened, and what could have happened. But Kasparov achieved this with less pain. Based on some analytical parameters, it can be said that Kasparov was lucky only in his game with Salov. But nevertheless the world champion Tournament Races so exhausted his opponent, that as a result he stumbled on relatively even ground. So that Kasparov can also play in “Karpovian” style. ‘| don't really like conversations about competitive fortune or bad luck. Everything yields to diagnosis. Karpov and Kasparov simply played differently! Karpov played amazingly evenly throughout the tourna- ment, and from the very start he was under the command of a kind of internal metro- nome. He won when he was in the mood to win. And when he wasn't in the mood, he didn't even aim to. With Kasparov every- thing was spontaneous. He played with a rather uneven rhythm: an excellent start and a very interesting finish. A furious opening, and a furious finale, And such an adagio in the middle. In contrast to the match in Seville, both played equally well. ‘1am staggered by how much Karpov has played this year. But it is interesting that with every new tournament Karpov plays increasingly well. The approach to chess of the two “K’s” is different. On the one hand we have the Botvinnik school, with restricted practical appearances; on the other hand - the school of a person who does not like “digging” for something, but prefers direct contact with opponents. They are very different. But in strength of play and in class they are fully comparable.’ Now, according to the regulations, on 22 August an additional match of four games for the title of USSR champion between Karpov and me should have begun (and with a score of 2-2 - play to the first win). And on 19 August, at the closing ceremony of the tournament, in the presence of the contestants and hundreds of spectators, the chief arbiter Mikhail Botvinnik con- ducted the drawing of lots for the match, immediately inviting Karpov up to the 41Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 arbiter's table (alphabetically, although this was also a questionable decision: usually, to begin with ~ also by drawing of lots! — it is determined which of the contestants will draw first) and showed him his fists con- taining a white and a black pawn. Karpov drew the white pieces in the first game, and the match was therefore opened. But here a row, unprecedented in the his- tory of USSR Championships, blew up. A delayed action mine exploded! Karpov publicly expressed his non-agreement with the dates of the match and stated that he had not yet decided whether he would begin it, since an addendum - playing to the first win ~ had been included in the regulations while the event was in progress, and he (Kar- pov) had made a verbal protest against this, since now there could be more than four games, as prescribed in the initial regula- tions. But I, naturally, replied that the match should take place in full accordance with the final version of the regulations, approved by the USSR State Sports Committee. Later the arbiter team and the organisers - the Chess Administration of the Sports Committee - took the blame for the col- lapse of my match with Karpov. But who in fact was to blame is well seen from the ‘official dossier on the aborted match’, published in the tournament bulletin Sozvezdie [Constellation] (No.9). From the Regulations for the 55th USSR Chess Championship Premier League 4 July 1988 7. In the event of a share of 1st-2nd places, to determine the USSR champion a match of four games is to be held. in the event of a share of 1st-3rd or 1st-ath places a double- round match-tournament is to be held. In the 42 event of a share of 1st-5th, 1st-6th places etc. an additional single round event is to be held. The first game of the additional event is to be played on 22 August 1988. Head of the Chess Administration N. Krogius From a supplement to the Regulations for the USSR Chess Championship Premier League 1 August 1988 2. In the event of a share of 1st place and the conclusion of the additional event with an identical number of points: a) with two contestants: ~ the event is to continue to the first win (with a new drawing of lots); b) with three or more contestants: - the title of USSR will not be awarded. Head of the Chess Administration N. Krogius As usual, both of these documents - the Regulations and the addendum - were authorised by V. Gavrilin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Sports Committee. Resolution of the arbiter team of the 55th USSR Chess Championship 19 August 1988 In view of the share of the first two places in the tournament and in accordance with the regulations of the 55th USSR Champion- ship, the arbiter team announces an addi- tional event (of four games) for the title of USSR chess champion between A. Karpov and G. Kasparov in the Centre of International Trade building. Playing schedule: ist game - 22 August2nd game - 23 August 3rd game ~ 24 August adjournments - 25 August 4th game - 26 August If after the first two rounds there are any unfinished games, 24 August will be for adjournments and the schedule will be shifted correspondingly. If after four games the score is 2-2, the match is to continue until the first won game. in this case the drawing of lots is to be carried out anew. The main drawing of lots is to be held during the closing ceremony of the 55th USSR Championship on 19 August 1988. The starting times of games and adjournments, and also the time control, are to remain exactly as in the tournament. Chief arbiter M. Botvinnik Minutes of a meeting of the arbiter team of the 55th USSR Chess Championship 19 August 1988, 19.00 In view of the fact that G. Kasparov has agreed to play the additional event for the title of USSR champion, but up till now A. Karpov has not decided on his position, from the viewpoint of organising the match, and also of sporting ethics, the arbiter team has decided: 1. To request that by 10 a.m. on 20 August 1988 the contestants confirm their partici- pation in the match 2. In the event of mutual agreement, the match is to be conducted in accordance with the regulations announced. 3. If one of the contestants confirms his agreement by the time indicated above, and the other does not confirm, the one who has confirmed his agreement is to be declared USSR champion. Tournament Races 4. If neither contestant confirms his agree- ment by the indicated time, the title of USSR champion is to be considered uncontested. Chief arbiter M. Botvinnik, arbiter team secretary E, Dubov To M. Botvinnik, chief arbiter of the 55th USSR Chess Championship, and to the USSR State Sports Committee 20 August 1988, 9.45-10.05 My opinion regarding the regulations of the 55th USSR Championship and the pro- jected match between the winners G. Kas- parov and A. Karpov: 1. | still consider, as | did before the start of the championship, that the regulations used to conduct it are unacceptable. The two free days in the 25 days of the champion- ship, granted by the organisers, indicate that the work of a chess player is not respected. 2, The envisaged match between the win- ners two days after the conclusion of the championship says the same. | expressed this, my opinion, directly to you, Mikhail Moiseevich, in the presence of the chief secretary of the arbiter team E. Dubov the day after the start of the tour- nament, and | stated that in the event of me sharing first place | did not object to an additional match of four games, but that | would not play such a match two days after the conclusion of the championship. Obviously | was not expected to win, and therefore no attention was paid to my com- ment. Of course, in a normal situation, if a player does not agree with the regulations, he withdraws from the event. In the given in- stance the situation could not be treated in this way, since | gave my agreement to play in the 55th USSR Championship long before the 43Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 regulations were published. To withdraw from the event in connection with a disagreement over a point relating to a match between the winners would have been an impertinence, since even the world champion has no guar- antee that he will win or share first place in the championship of the country. Therefore | restricted myself to a verbal comment. Unfortunately for the organisers, | turned out to be one of the winners. My offer to find @ date for staging the match which would be acceptable to both winners has been disre- garded. it ended with me being presented with an announcement in the press about the start of the additional match on 22 August. It is only because | don't want to disap- point the fans who are now awaiting this match that | am agreeing to play. However, | consider the changes introduced into the regulations after the start of the champion- ship to be absolutely unacceptable and unlawful. Therefore | consider that: 1) the match should consist of only four games; 2) in the event of a definite result, the win- ner will be declared USSR champion for 1988; 3) in the event of a drawn match, it will be at the discretion of the arbiter team: either both contestants will be declared USSR cham- pion, or the title of champion will be consid- ered not resolved. I request that my statement be published. Yours sincerely, A. Karpov Statement by the chief arbiter of the 55th USSR Chess Championship 20 August 1988, 12.00 On behalf of the arbiter team | should like to express my satisfaction that both winners have agreed to play the match. As was 44 announced earlier, the match will begin on 22 August at 16.30. 1 personally find myself in solidarity with many of the comments by A. Karpov regard- ing the regulations of the tournament and the additional event, but regulations an- nounced before the start of an event are obligatory for everyone. As for refinements to the regulations of the additional match, made during the course of the tournament, personally | also agree with A. Karpov, and | will put his proposal to restrict the number of games in the match to four for discussion by the arbiter team after consulting with the contestants... M. Botvinnik To N. Rusak, chairman of the organising committee of the 55th USSR Chess Championship 20 August 1988 According to the Regulations of the 5sth USSR Championship Premier league, ap- proved by the USSR State Sports Committee on 4 July 1988, ‘in the event of a share of 1st- 2nd places, to determine the USSR champion a match of four games is to be held’. In the middle of the tournament it was decided by the arbiter team that the following condition should be added to this document: ‘2. In the event of a share of 1st place and the conclu- sion of the additional event with an identical number of points: a) with two contestants: - the event is to continue to the first win (with a new drawing of lots)’. At the closing cere- mony of the championship on 19 August these conditions were announced and | agreed to them. However, grandmaster A. Karpov publicly announced that he had not yet decided whether he would play theadditional match, and the following day, calling the changes ‘absolutely unacceptable and unlawful’, he declared that he was intending to play a match of only four games. In his reply the chief arbiter of the cham- pionship, grandmaster M. Botvinnik, ex- pressed his personal solidarity ‘with many of A. Karpov’s comments regarding the regula- tions of the tournament and the additional event’ and he decided to put this question to the discussion of the arbiter team. in connection with the above, | consider that ~ the additional match must be played in accordance with the conditions announced; - the match regulations, drawn up with the participation of the contestants’ repre- sentatives, must be approved not later than 11. a.m. on 22 August; - the regulations must stipulate and guarantee all the conditions for staging the match; - the number of arbiters must be re- stricted to three, including the managing director; ~ the playing venue and the conditions for the contestants must be known before- hand and must not change during the match; ~ the possibility of missing a game for any reason must be ruled out. Non-appearance for a game must be counted as a default. As my official second for the additional match | should like to nominate national master A. Nikitin, through whom the arbiter team must conduct official negotiations. I request that an immediate decision be taken on these questions, since it does not make sense to begin the match without clearly stipulated conditions. G. Kasparov Tournament Races Decision of the arbiter team of the 55th USSR Chess Championship 21 August 1988 After, on the morning of 20.08.1988, both winners agreed to play the match, it ap- peared that the obstructions to staging it had been removed. But here contradictory ultimatums were made, stating that if they weren't accepted, they would refuse to play. G. Kasparov insists that with a score of 2- 2, play should continue until the first win. A. Karpov thinks that the match should be limited to four games. The other ultimatums, including a change in the arbiter team, the introduction of special regulations for the given match and so on, do not need to be listed. The arbiter team considers that, since both grandmasters have displayed a lack of good will, and have behaved disrespectfully to chess and to the organisers, the additional match should not be staged, leaving open the question of the USSR champion. The USSR Chess Federation should make a statement about the situation, which in general does no credit to the top players. Chief arbiter M. Botvinnik Report 22 August 1988 On the authorisation of the arbiter team, | have had conversations with the world champion G. Kasparov and the ex-world champion A. Karpov - the winners of the 55th USSR Chess Championship. Both were asked whether they were prepared to hold personal discussions regarding the possibility of stag- ing the match for the title of USSR champion. 45Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 G. Kasparov stated that he will not per- sonally take part in discussions, but is ready to send a representative to discuss technical questions. The match regulations are not open to discussion. A. Karpov stated he will not meet Kaspa- rov and will not discuss anything with him. A. Bakh, Director of the 55th USSR Cham- pionship When | arrived on 22 August at 16.30 for the first game, in the hall there was no table with a chess set, nor any opponent (Nikitin: ‘That day Karpov was calmly strolling around the streets of Leningrad}, although | should have been informed beforehand in writing about the cancellation of the game. Instead of the match, | found myself at - a press conference (again a press-conferencel). To the question who had cancelled the match, | was told that this had been done on the verbal directive of Gavrilin, the deputy chairman of the State Sports Committee. And in general, ‘according to Krogius, everything was done on the basis of verbal directives after Botvinnik met Gavrilin in his office’ (from the press). Here a lawful ques- tion suggests itself: are the signatures of administrators on official documents in any way binding? Botvinnik and Krogius gave an explana- tion to the journalists. The chief arbiter revealed the decision of the arbiter team and read out the following text: Draft resolution of the Bureau of the USSR Chess Federation Praesidium, proposed by the arbiter team 22 August 1988 After considering the decision of the arbi- 46 ter team of the 55th USSR Chess Champion- ship of 21.08.88 about the additional event for the title of USSR champion between G. Kasparov and A. Karpov and all the related documents, the bureau has decided: 1. In view of irreconcilable differences be- tween the winners of the championship about the organisation of the match, the fatigue of both contestants, and also nerv- ousness in the current situation, to agree with the proposal of the arbiter team and to deem it inexpedient to stage the match. 2. That the question of awarding the title of 1988 USSR chess champion should be referred for consideration by an expanded meeting of the USSR Chess Federation Prae- sidium. Averbakh: ‘This move was typical of the State Sports Committee officials - initially, without consulting with anyone, they made a complete blunder, and then they began taking refuge behind the Federation’. The events of the next few days were re- ported by the magazine Shakhmaty v SSSR (1988, No.10): ‘The first expanded meeting of the Praesidium, with the participation of Kasparov and Karpov, did not have a quo- rum (ie. more than half of the members). The second meeting, which took place a week later with the champion and the ex- champion absent, reached a quorum - 17 out of the 27 members of the praesidium. After a discussion, five voted for the award- ing of two gold medals, one abstained, and 11 voted for the match’. Here is the text: Resolution of the USSR Chess Federation Praesidium 6 September 1988 1. To observe that in preparing the regu-lations, the championship organisers made mistakes, and the all-union arbiter team of the USSR Chess Federation remained apart from these omissions; 2, To draw attention to the refusal of the championship winners to display good will, to avoid inflaming the conflict, or to con- sider the other person and public opinion; 3. To consider it essential that an addi- tional match for the title of USSR champion should be held in accordance with the initial regulations and to suggest the following conditions - the match of four games for the title of USSR champion is to begin on 25 December 1988 in Moscow with a new drawing of lots. if after four games the score is equal - 2-2, the title of USSR champion and gold medals will be awarded to both contestants; 4. To invite grandmasters G. Kasparov and A. Karpov to inform the USSR Chess Federa- tion not later than 1 October 1988 of their agreement to play the match under these conditions; 5. If one of the grandmasters refuses to take part in the additional match under the conditions given above, the title of USSR champion is to be awarded to the one who has agreed to play; if both refuse, the title of 1988 USSR champion will not be awarded to anyone; 6. With the aim of unifying the regula- tions of USSR championships and creating the most acceptable system for conducting them, to set up a commission comprising: grandmasters V. Smyslov, L. Polugayevsky, N. Gaprindashvili, V. Mikenas and A. Yusupov, and international arbiters L. Vakhesaar and E. Dubov. However, there were many important events coming up, and the deadline for the match irreversibly passed, In the end, on 22 Tournament Races October the Plenum of the Soviet Chess Federation (for which read: the State Sports Committee) revoked the decision to hold the match and decided to award USSR champi- onship gold medals to both grandmasters. A professional evaluation of what had occurred was given in the magazine Shakhmaty v SSSR (1989 No.9) by Avraam Figner, a well-known chess arbiter: ‘The championship regulations contained a significant defect: in the event of a share of ast-2nd places, for determining the USSR champion a match of four games was to be held, but it was not stated what should be done in the event of a draw. This was the cause of the future conflict. If before the start of the event the regulations had been carefully studied by the arbiters, the defect would have been revealed and eliminated in good time (before the start of the tourna- ment). The first mistake by the arbiters led to subsequent ones. ‘The championship had begun, and a few rounds had been played. And here the chief arbiter Botvinnik suggested to the Chess Administration the idea of changing the regulations. Before the 7th round, on 1 August (precisely on the day of my game with Karpov! - G.K.), an addendum to the regulations appeared, according to which in the event of a share of 1st-2nd places and a draw in the additional match, play should continue to the first win! Instead of a match of four games, there was to be a match with an undetermined number of games, effec- tively an unlimited one. A radical change to the original concept had been made, practi- cally a replacement, and during the course of the event, which is inadmissible! After all, it was not too late to take a sensible decision - for example, that with a score of 2-2 gold championship medals should be awarded to both winners... 47Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 ‘The overwhelming majority of the par- ticipants agreed to the changes in the regu- lations. The only one to object (verbally) was Karpov. And he was fully within his rights to do this, although, of course, Karpov should have declared his position officially - by a written protest to the arbiter team. As it was, Karpov’s verbal protest was disre- garded. But the arbiter team was obliged (to avoid a possible future conflict) to sort things out with Karpov before the end of the event. Possibly Karpov would have continued to insist on his objections, and then the ill- fated “addendum” would have been re- moved and a sensible decision found. ‘On 19 August the chief arbiter signed the resolution with the regulations and the schedule of the additional match. It stated that in the event of a 2-2 score the match would continue until the first win. The drawing of lots was even held. And here Karpov stated that he was agreeable to playing only four games, as was initially (before the tournament) stipulated in the regulations. But Kasparov demanded that the regulations should be fulfilled, including the “addendum”. ‘Of course, based on the resolution of the arbiter team, the chief arbiter should have declared that at the appointed hour on 22 August the clock of the player with White would be started. Instead of this Botvinnik began trying to persuade both of the win- ners. But to try and persuade them was pointless: each was right in his own way. You don't argue with the arbiters - this applies fully to the kings of chess. Although Karpov's protest was just, this did not relieve him of the need (if the protest was not upheld) to comply with the demands of the arbiter and of discipline. ‘And the blame for the sad conclusion of the tournament should not have been 48 placed on Karpov and Kasparov, by repeat- edly talking about their “ultimatums”. It was not they who caused all the problems in the tournament, although on the front cover of the magazine 64 there appeared the silhouettes of the contestants turned away from each other and the bold headline: “in view of irreconcilable differences.” Mistakes by the arbiters, the absence of a firm controlling hand - this was the real cause of what happened.” Also of interest was the opinion of an- other experienced arbiter - grandmaster Yuri Averbakh: ‘In the resolving of this question, use should have been made of precedents, when additional events in the championships of the country ended in draws. Thus in the 45th USSR Championship (1977) the Gulko-Dorfman match ended 3-3 and the title of champion was awarded to both players. And in the 52nd Championship (1985), when an additional match- tournament involving Gavrikov, Gurevich and Chernin did not produce a winner, Gurevich, who had the best Berger coeffi- cient in the main tournament, was declared the winner. Thus here there was no need to “reinvent the wheel”, but simply introduce into the regulations a point saying that, in the event of a drawn match, champion’s medals would be awarded to both contest- ants.’ Strangely enough, in the previous, 54th USSR Championship (1987) a similar error was made. This is what Albert Plutnik wrote about this in Izvestiya (27.08.1988): ‘At the decisive stage of the championship it became clear that grandmasters Beliavsky and Salov could well share first place. And then the organisers - the Chess Administra- tion of the State Sports Committee - hur- riedly brought in the revision that if the match of six games provided for in theregulations should end in a draw (before the tournament such a possibility had appar- ently not occurred to anyone), then the Berger coefficient should come into force. Beliavsky had the higher coefficient, and therefore Salov did not want to play the match, stating that it was unlawful to make changes to the regulations during the course of the event. A familiar picture, wouldn’t you agree?! The conflict was seriously dis- cussed at a meeting of the USSR Chess Fed- eration Praesidium, which “brought Salov to order”. But at the same time it passed an “unofficial judgement” on the Chess Ad- ministration, for committing such a gross organisational mistake. The Federation, to which chess officials so like to turn when they are at a loss, remained silent. Otherwise how could all this have been repeated a year later? The situation was roughly the same, but the consequences were absolutely differ- ent...’ | should remind you: that match never- theless took place, and Beliavsky won 3-4. In the case of Karpov and me, | had the better ‘Berger’, and therefore the agreement in the event of 2-2 to play on to the first win can be considered a concession on my part. But Karpov had firmly decided to avoid the match, and as was customary the State Sports Committee played along with its favourite, in this case through the authority of Botvinnik. Nikitin: ‘Botvinnik, like Gligoric in 1985, showed that a strong grandmaster cannot always be a strong and independent arbiter. In this conflict the State Sports Committee authorities demonstratively took Karpov's side. It is amazing how sometimes events are repeated. The role of Campomanes, who terminated the 1984/85 match, was on this occasion, to great regret, played by none other than Botvinnik.’ Tournament Races For me this was a bitter spectacle: my great teacher, a highly-respected person, had violated the rules which he had fol- lowed all his life. Our good relations, which had become strained a year earlier, were conclusively destroyed after this press conference... Many were perplexed as to why Botvin- nik needed to do this. The authorities played on the fact that for many years he had been aggrieved, as though sidelined, and excluded from active chess life. He wanted to be involved again, to again have some influence! And suddenly he was given a room in the Central Chess Club, and allowed to open his own laboratory, acquire computers and travel abroad; he was made a member of USSR Chess Federation Prae- sidium, and they began listening to his opinions... But the price for this was high: the enormous prestige of Botvinnik’s name was exploited to the full by the chess offi- cials. The State Sports Committee endeav- oured to conceal its own unlawful action and arbitrary rule by excessively fanning the conflict between the two ‘K’s’. The myth started by the organisers about the sup- posedly ‘irreconcilable differences’ between me and Karpov was no more than a trick, aimed at concealing the reply to the main question: who, and on what grounds, cancelled the match which had already begun? In the draft resolution from the bureau of the Chess Federation Praesidium it is stated: ‘in view of. the fatigue of both contestants’. From what medical certificate was this unexpected conclusion drawn? Since when have events been stopped, because the contestants do not want to play or in view of their fatigue? The answer suggests itself: since 15 Feb- tuary 1985 - the date when Campomanes 49Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 terminated our first match for the world championship, citing the critical state of the contestants’ health, and the tiredness of the arbiters, organisers, spectators etc. The FIDE President tried to maintain that he was acting ‘in the higher interests of chess’, basing this on a letter from the Soviet Federation, signed by Sevastyanov. But after the scandalous conclusion of the s5th USSR Championship, Campomanes stated with undisclosed triumph: ‘Now you see that you are exporting your problems to FIDE!’ The fate of the GMA and the World Cup In the meantime the GMA successfully staged the first World Cup. The American grandmaster Ljubomir Kavalek was ap- pointed organisational director. The two- year series consisted of six big (16-18 par- ticipants) super-tournaments with the classical time control: in 1988 - Brussels, Belfort and Reykjavik, and in 1989 - Barce- Jona, Rotterdam and Skelleftea. The 25 strongest grandmasters in the world took part ~ each played in four of the six tour- naments, and the three best results were added up. One representative of each of the organising countries had the right to play without his score counting. For the unifica- tion of the tournaments the points scored were always counted out of 16 games (if in fact fewer were played, arbitrary draws were added) and to these points were added: for 1st place - 17 points, for 2nd place - 16, for 3rd - 15, and so on. After my very tough matches for the crown with Karpov, a no less fierce rivalry between us was expected in the battle of the new and prestigious trophy. He and | were due to meet in two tournaments, and where this would occur was discussed for a 50 long time in the preparation period: all the organisers wanted it to happen in their tournaments. In the end Bessel Kok, the chairman and chief sponsor of the GMA (during the two years, the SWIFT company directed by him invested some 5 million dollars in chess), voluntarily ‘sacrificed’ Brussels, and the choice fell on Belfort and Skelleftea - the peak of intrigue, the last stage! The initial tournament of the World Cup (Brussels, April 1988), in which | did not take part, was confidently won by my arch- rival: 1. Karpov ~ 11 out of 16 (+7-1=8); 2. Salov - 10; 3-5. Ljubojevic, Beliavsky and Nunn - 9%; 6-7. Andersson and Portisch — 9; 8. Speelman — 81/2; 9. A.Sokolov — 8; 10-13. Tal, Nikolic, Timman and Seirawan - 7/2; 14. Nogueiras - 7; 15. Korchnoi - 672; 16. Sax ~ 6; 17. Winants (score did not count) - 2% (Vaganian with 2 points withdrew after the 4th round). In Brussels immediately after the tour- nament, on 26 April, we held the first GMA General Assembly. By that time 143 grand- masters, including 23 Soviet, had already joined our organisation. And all of them had the right to vote in the election for the new GMA Board. Although there were comparatively few participants in the room, many of the absent grandmasters voted by proxy. As a result of the election, the composition of the Board remained the same: Kasparov (president), Timman and Karpov (vice-presidents), Ljubojevic, Por- tisch, Seirawan, Larsen and Nunn (the latter, however, while remaining in the GMA, asked to be relieved of his duties as a member of the Board). In passionate debates at the meetings of the assembly, the principles of the GMA began to take shape, and in particular its broad-based democracy. We realised thatthe young organisation, which for the moment was without any powerful finan- cial backing, was not fully accepted in the chess world, and had its own internal problems, would not find things easy. Therefore it was important not to succumb to the temptation to follow the path of administration. We overcame this critical moment, and for a good two years we were able to maintain our unity, despite re- peated attempts on the part of FIDE to wreck the GMA Apart from deciding on the subsequent program of action, we also had another burning issue to discuss: how to respond to the attempt by FIDE to introduce titles for tapid chess? The attitude to this was largely negative, especially from the average grandmasters. Many of them had devoted their lives to achieving the top title, which could now be obtained in 3-4 weeks, by playing 90 games. There would naturally be a devaluation of this title, confusion would arise, and within a short time one form of chess would have to make way for another. The rapid chess system of titles and the staging of a FIDE rapid-play world championship were aimed precisely at burying classical chess. Therefore as an alternative we considered events with a shortened time control (but without any titles!), which would serve to popularise chess, increase its spectator appeal, and so on. Examples of that time were my match with Short (London, February 1987) and the charity match between teams of Soviet grandmasters and the Rest of the World (Madrid, December 1988), but this idea was fully realised only in the 1990s, now under the auspices of the Professional Chess Assbuiatioer{Pivportant to decide what was meant by professional chess. In Brussels we took the following decision: ‘A professional Tournament Races competition is one in which not less than three minutes per move is allowed for thought (for example, 2 hours for 40 moves) and in which a player is not obliged to play more than one game a day.’ (Alas, this definition long ago became an anachro- nism: back in 1988 Andrey Sokolov was eliminated from the Candidates event, after losing in additional ‘rapid’ games to Spraggett, and today, even in matches for the world championship, if the scores are equal everything is decided by rapid chess and blitz.) Everyone agreed that for the development of the game it was profes- sional chess that was the most valuable, although rapid chess was also admissible, but not in the form in which it was being implanted by FIDE, and only if it did not threaten the classical, professional form of the game. | remember, when Portisch suggested appealing to FIDE, Kok asked the FIDE vice- president Krogius (he was also the head of the State Sports Committee Chess Admini- stration): ‘Is there any chance that FIDE will rescind its decision?’ And the grandmaster, who had only just suddenly joined the GMA (evidently, on the instructions of the au- thorities), replied: ‘None, of course’. But, as though frightened by his own categorical words, he promptly added: ‘This is my opinion, not the opinion of FIDE..." To repel such threats and to improve the working of the Board, a professional com- mittee headed by Timman was set up. In addition, the Association called on grand- masters, taking part in ‘rapid’ champion- ships of the continents, to sign a declara- tion refusing to accept any possible ranks and titles. It is interesting that Karpov happily played in championships of Europe and the World organised by FIDE in 1988 - and in both he shared victory. He and other 51Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 grandmasters, playing in these tourna- ments, justified their participation by the fact the system of titles had not been established, and if this were to be done, they subsequently did not intend to play... Fortunately, we coped with this new threat on the part of FIDE, and a year later hardly anyone remembered about ‘rapid’ tanks and titles. In May | again met with Karpov - in a four-player match-tournament in Amster- dam (cf. the chapter ‘For the first time after Seville’), and on 12 June we arrived in the French town of Belfort, for the opening of the second (for me ~ the first) World Cup tournament. Here, at the demand of the organisers, semi-forced pairings were made - such that Karpov and | would play each other as near as possible to the finish. The pairings had to be made several times, untit our game fell on the penultimate, 14th round. The Belfort tourmament took a very in- teresting course and could have been one of the best in my career, had it not been for - the game with Karpov! In the first 14 games | did not have one bad position, when suddenly... But let's take everything in order. Karpov began with a loss against Andrey Sokolov, and | took the lead - 2 out of 2, then 4 out of 5. But in the middle of the event | was caught and overtaken by Jan Ehivest - the World Cup tournaments were his finest hour, especially Belfort, where he played with great energy and invention. In the 8th round | was unable to win an abso- lutely won position against Hjartarson, and although in the 9th round | beat Ljubojevic, | failed to catch the leader, who that day defeated Beliavsky. After nine rounds the positions were as follows: Ehlvest — 7 (!); Kasparov - 6Y%3; 52 Karpov - 5¥2. But in the 1oth and 12th rounds Jan lost to Karpov and me, after which he dropped out of the fight for first place. Karpov won in the 11th round against Timman and then made a couple of draws, whereas | produced a series of five successive wins: after Ljubojevic, against Andersson, Beliavsky, Ehlvest and Short! Before the game with Karpov it was all practically decided: with 1072 out of 13, | was leading my rival by two points. How- ever, our games were always keenly con- tested, whatever the tournament situation But what operated here was the factor which | called the ‘five victory curse’. The point is that, until Wijk aan Zee 1999, where | ‘bagged’ 7 out of 7, five successive wins were always the limit for me. Even in Tilburg 1989, one of my very best tourna- ments, after this | was quite unable to play Black against Sax, and | was saved only by his peaceableness. After five successive wins | usually ‘cracked’! And that is what happened on this occasion. After losing the necessary concentration, | played what was probably one of my worst games. Game 6 A.Karpov-G.Kasparov World Cup, Belfort 1.07.1988, 14th round Griinfeld Defence D87 1 d4 Afé 2 ca g6 3 Ac3 (3 DAf3 - Game Nos.1, 42, 47; 3 g3 - Game Nos.55, 57, 62, 66) 3.45 The opening was easy to predict. 4 cxd5 (4 Df3 2g7 5 2f4 - Game Nos.48, 50) 4....Dxd5 5 e4 Axc3 6 bxc3 277 2c4 (7 Re} - Game Nos.16, 20, 22, 24) 7..c5 8 De2 Ac6 9 2e3 0-0 10 0-0 Ag4 11 f3 Das 12 Bxf7+For the last time in our games Karpov employs the variation which he revived at the match in Seville. 12...Exf7 13 fxg4 Hixfa+ 14 &xfa Wd6 15 eS. ‘Was 16 2f2 Bas Following two recent games - the 7th in Seville and the Amsterdam one (Game No.3), although, as has already been men- tioned, 16...2f8! is better. Now ...&ixe5 is threatened, and so White must move his queen from d1. But where to? 17 Waql? Another novelty. ‘During the game in Amsterdam | thought about playing 17 Wa4, but | nevertheless chose the planned move 17 Wc2, and decided to clarify this matter later. Naturally, we had also looked at 17 Waq earlier (cf. the commentary on the 7th game of the Seville match in Infor- mator 44), but | think we may have missed the subtle point 17..b6 18 Wc2 Wea 19 Wea!, when the black knight is left without support! For this idea to be properly im- plemented, it was necessary for that Am- sterdam game to be played (without the inclusion of ...b7-b6). So there is a time for everything.’ (Karpov) As we will now see, the queen move to a4 does not set Black any great problems. The Tournament Races strength of this move was rather in its surprise value: my confusion helped Karpov to gain an advantage and in the end to win the game. 17..b6 White is better after 17...2c67! 18 Wb3! or 17..Ac4 18 g5! (Gutman) 18..Bf8 19 &g1, as well as 17...0f8(!) 18 &g1 W7 19 Sih4 (Karpov) or 19 2g3!?. However, 18...22h6! (instead of 18... W721) 1g Wxas Wf7 20 Ba 2e3 was far stronger. | saw this spectacular possibility at the board, but the approximate variation 21 Wxc5 &xf2+ 22 @h1 2Qxd4 (as it later transpired, 22...Wxa2 is also good) 23 Exf7 xcs 24 Exf8 + &xf8 25 e6 seemed to me to be too dangerous. And subsequent analysis appeared to confirm that the black king does not manage to become active: 25...g7? 26 Ag3 and He or 25...2d6? 26 c4! Bes 27 Agi we8 28 Dh3!! (this para- doxical leap to the edge of the board leads to a decisive improvement in the knight's position) 28 ...h6 29 g5 h5 30 g3 and “fa, winning. For a long time | thought this endgame was lost, until | discovered that after 25..e8! the king can nevertheless ap- proach the e6-pawn: 26 g3 b5 27 De4 e3 28 g3 &d8 29 &g2 dic7 and ...ec6- d5xe6, or 26 Af4 Hd 27 Ads bs! (not allowing a2-a4) 28 g3 &c8 29 &g2 Sb7 30 Sf3 Gc6 31 He4 Hd6, and Black is perfectly alright. 18 We2 ‘There is nothing more for the queen to do on aa’ (Karpov). A dubious idea, since the weakness of the c6-square is illusory. White could have fought for a small plus by 18 ‘&g1! We4 19 Whs! or even the extravagant 18 Af4l? Wf7 19 Dh3 (Nielsen-Sutovsky, Dortmund 2005). 18...2f87! 53Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 ‘Now the black pieces come under pres- sure. 18...2ic8 is more accurate, with coun- terplay on the c-file’ (Karpov). This very obvious move (fighting for the light squares!) occurred to me immediately after the game. It neutralises White’s entire construction: 19 Wd1 Bd8!, and if 20 We1, then 20..b5! (I found this back in Seville - cf, Game No.3, note to White's 17th move). But the simplest was 18...Weal, not fear- ing 19 Wea in view of 19...Ef8 20 #g1 Ac6! (with the threat of ...Axes; | wanted to do the same in the game, only via a different move order) 21 Wxc6 (21 &g3 cxd4 22 cxd4. Qh6!) 21...Wxe2 22 We6+ #h8 23 Efi h6! 24 Wxe7 Exf2 25 We8 + &g7, and White has only perpetual check. 19 &ga Wa! Aiming to drive the white queen onto a square such that the knight on a5 will come into play with gain of tempo. ‘The bishop can no longer escape to freedom: 19...2h6 20 h4 WF7 21 Ag3 or 19...Ac4 20 hd’ (Kar- Pov). ty Wy +7 RAY 20 Wada! This is the whole point! Since 20 Wed is unfavourable on account of 20..Ac6! (cf. the note to Black's 18th move), ‘White continues to play for the restriction of the bishop’ (Karpov) 54 20...We6? If now 20...c6, then simply 21 gS. Also after 20..Wf7 21 Dg3 ‘it all turns out well for White: his knight moves to e4, and his queen to e2. 20...@h6 21 Wxh6 Hxe2 also does not get Black out of his difficulties in view of 22 We3 Wxg4 23 dxc5’ (Karpov). However, after 22...lib2!? 23 Hd1 cxd4 24 cxd4 @c4 25 Wel it is unclear how real White’s advantage is, although in connec- tion with d4-ds he retains the initiative. 20...Wd5!? was sounder, for example: 21 We1 “cq 22 gS b5 with the idea of ...b5-b4, undermining the centre, or 21 Df4 Wa7! 22 ig3 2h6 23 Hfa cxd4 24 Wxd4 Wrxda+ 25 cxd4 Ac6, and Black stands firm. The queen retreat to e6 is frankly a sec- ond-rate move, giving White a stable ad- vantage. The natural desire to play the knight to c4 as quickly as possible, gaining a tempo by the attack on the g4-pawn, encounters a strong rejoinder. 21h3 Deg \ br RG b> 2 Se 22 Wgs! ‘One of the main motifs of the game. Apart from 4\f4, now 2h4 is also a possible threat’ (Karpov). This was why White was not in a hurry to play g4-g5: unexpectedly the weakness of the e7-pawn in Black's position is disclosed.22...h6 This weakening of the kingside is unde- sirable, but was it possible to tolerate the queen on 5? ‘22...Sf6? did not work be- cause of 23 exf6 exf6 24 Df4’ (Karpov). 23 Wei Wh 23...WWd5 did not achieve its aim on ac- count of 24 We2!, while after 23..h5 the queen would have returned to g5 (after the preliminary 24 gxh5 gxh5 25 &h4 - GK). In search of counterplay, possibly 23..b5 should have been chosen, with the idea, say, of 24 fq WF7 25 4d3 bal?’ (Karpov). However, after 26 Wc2(e1) bxc3 27 Wxc3 White would have retained the advantage. 24 g3 The critical moment of the game. W, a ag % fe = a 24...g5? The losing move, which was rightly con- demned by the commentators. In Karpov's opinion, ‘the recommended 24...Wd5 would also have led to a difficult position after 25 Df4 Weq 26 De’. Thus 26..e3 27 Waa! is bad for Black, while after 26...cxd4 27 Axf8 De3 28 Wd2 dxc3 the most accurate is 29 Wf2l 2xf8 30 Ret c2 31 2f4, winning. However, 26...2c8! was clearly more te- nacious. After 27 Wb1 Karpov and Zaitsev give only 27... We3+(?) 28 &f2 Wxc3 29 Wxg6 Wxai+ 30 Sh2 with unavoidable mate, but Tournament Races 27..Wxb1+ 28 Exb1 £f7 is correct, with an inferior but still not simple ending. At any event, Black is not losing by force: after 29 Dc7 Bxc7 30 e6+ Sxe6 31 Axc7 cxd4 32 cxd4 &xd4+ 33 @h2 dd5 he has a pawn for the exchange and powerful centralisation. But | was so upset by the outcome of the opening, that | lost practically without a fight. You can imagine my state of mind: earlier, in the new, unexplored variation with 12 &xf7+ | had obtained acceptable positions, but here - after so many hours of work! - | played exceptionally badly... 25 Wea Wds 26 f2 26...b5? A final weakening. It really would have been better to suffer in a difficult endgame a pawn down after 26...e6 27 Ag3 cxd4 28 cxd4 a3 29 Wb3 Wxb3 30 axb3 Abs 31 Bca Bd8 32 Hcg etc. 27 Dg3 Ef7 (27...b4 28 Df5!) 28 Zea! ‘A natural move, although not the only one, retaining an enormous advantage. 28 ...b4 (even so, 28 ...cxd4 29 cxd4 @h8 was preferable) 29 Wg6 (29 e617) 29...2f8 29...bxc3 would have lost immediately to 30 hs. 304e4 30 Sf5 e6 31 Dxh6 (Karpov) or 30 Ahs 6 31 Af6 would also have been decisive. 55Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 Z a 30...Eixf2 Black would not have been helped by ei- ther 30...8g8 31 e6, or 30..cxd4 31 cxd4 &g8 32 He2! Bfs 33 Hc2 followed by 4c5(g3), but also ‘this exchange sacrifice is not able to rectify the situation - White is merely required to demonstrate a certain accuracy’ (Karpov). 31 &xf2 bxc3 If 31..cxd4 there could have followed 32 2d6! Dxdé (32...exd6 33 e6!) 33 exdé Wxd6 (33..e5 34 Bf! - an ambush!) 34 Wxd6é exd6 35 cxb4 and wins. But now the c5- pawn is lost. 32 W5+ g8 33 We8 + Gh7 34 Wxcs WE7+ 35 gi c2 36 Ag3 Af8 37 Dfs Sgs 38 Eca 1-0 56 “Black's pieces were not in fact able to break free. This game was judged to be the best in Informator 45', Karpov proudly comments on his only tournament win over me. This is from my interview with the Libération newspaper, which | gave soon afterwards: ‘For the whole tournament | played very well, but the defeat against Karpov was tragic. Via friends | learned that on the eve of our game the ex-champion’s trainer Zaitsev dictated to him certain variations from the editorial office of the 64 magazine. | have to admit that at the board | was unable to find a refutation of his novelty, which I consider to be harmless. As Botvinnik said to me after the game, | play the Griinfeld Defence through mixed feelings of curiosity and self-confidence. This loss to Karpov was very unpleasant for me, because throughout the tournament | played much better than him,’ Before the last round the fight for first place had unexpectedly sharpened: now Karpov was just a point behind me. How- ever, in the purely competitive sense the outcome of the tournament seemed prede- termined, since on the last day | had White against Sokolov, whereas my rival had Black against Spassky. However, the World Cup stimulated a fight not only for first place, but also for the maximum result. In addition, a new land- mark in my forward advance was Fischer's legendary rating of 2780, and every point brought me closer to the goal. | endeav- oured to assess objectively the standard of my play in Belfort, and | came to the con- clusion that it was at a fairly high level, giving me grounds for aggressive aims in the decisive game. And | decided to play for a win against Sokolov, although common sense suggested agreeing a quick draw. Inan English Opening | played a sharp varia- tion with a pawn sacrifice and, after em- ploying a novelty prepared for the match in Seville, | developed a strong initiative. But the situation remained very unclear and tense. Spassky, who had a slight but stable advantage against Karpov, suddenly blun- dered a piece literally on the spot! This shocked me: my individual triumph in the tournament was suddenly in doubt. But | composed myself, overcame the tempta- tion to offer a draw, and managed to win my game. For the third successive time (following the agonising 12-12 in Seville) | finished ahead of my eternal opponent in a tour- nament battle. In the second half of the event Karpov defeated his two main rivals and achieved a brilliant result - 572 out of 7, but this did not suffice for first place, because | scored 6 out of 7. The second World Cup tournament (Bel- fort, June-July 1988) produced the follow- ing results: 1. Kasparov - 11/2 out of 15 (+9-1=5); 2. Karpov - 10¥2 (+7-1=7); 3. Ehivest - 9¥2; 4-7. Ribli, Hiibner, Sokolov and Spassky - 8; 8. Short - 77; 9. Speelman = 7; 10-13. Ljubojevic, Andersson, Nogueiras and Beliavsky - 62; 14-16. Hjartarson, Yusupov and Timman - 52. As everyone expected, the main con- tenders for the Cup were the 12th and 13th world champions. A month later Karpov and | also crossed swords in the USSR Championship (cf. the earlier section ‘In view of irreconcilable differences...), and then our paths diverged: in September the ex-champion won a double-round tourna- ment in Tilburg (1. Karpov - 107 out of 14; 2. Short - 8/4), whereas at the end of Octo- ber | won the third stage of the World Cup in chilly Reykjavik. This marathon tournament - 18 contest- Tournament Races ants! - went very badly for me. Before the event | was unable to relax normally and cteate the necessary reserve of nervous energy. And it was quite logical that in the first thirteen rounds | managed with great anxiety (mainly because of missed oppor- tunities) to reach only +2, a pitiful score for my rating and title. Together with Timman, Nunn and Hjartarson | was half a point behind the leaders - Beliavsky, Tal and Ehlvest. At times | felt that | had no strength left, and it was not clear thanks to what | could make a finishing spurt. But on the day of the 13th round, friends phoned from Mos- cow and informed me of the details of another surprise, which the USSR State Sports Committee had prepared for me. Averbakh: ‘Back in August it became known that the chairman of the Federation, Alexander Chikvaidze, was retiring: he had been appointed USSR Ambassador in Hol- land. And on 22nd October, exploiting Kasparov's absence from Moscow, the State Sports Committee hastily arranged an extraordinary pre-election plenum of the Chess Federation, at which Vitaly Sevast- yanov was again elected chairman. The new praesidium also included a number of supporters of ex-world champion Karpov. In this way the States Sports Committee once again demonstrated how little account it took of the world champion’s opinion.’ The intentions of the real organisers of the extraordinary plenum of the USSR Chess Federation provided me with that so necessary stimulus of additional strength. A healthy competitive malice appeared, and | found my form! Three successive wins - over Timman, Sax and Ehlvest - enabled me to reach the last round level with Be- liavsky, who was playing very well. True, at the finish | was unable to beat Nikolic, but 57Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 my rival unexpectedly lost to Spassky and finished half a step behind. Here are the full results of the third World Cup tournament (Reykjavik, October 1988): 1. Kasparov - 11 out of 17 (+6-1=10); 2. Beliavsky - 102; 3. Tal - 10; 4-5. Hjartar- son and Ehlvest - 9¥2; 6-8. Timman, Sax and Yusupov - 9; 9-11. Andersson, Speel- man and Nunn - 82; 12-13. Nikolic and Sokolov - 8; 14. Ribli - 7/2; 15-16. Portisch and Spassky - 7; 17. Korchnoi - 6¥2; 18. Petursson (score did not count) - 6. In the second half of November, Karpov and | fought side by side on the top two boards for the Soviet team at the Olympiad in Thessaloniki and scored +7=3 and +6=4 respectively, which predetermined our overall success: 1. USSR ~ 4012 out of 56; 2- 3. England and Holland - 34¥2. All the games had already finished, the hall was empty, and only on one board was the game still continuing: Karpov was persis- tently and methodically converting a minimal positional advantage in an ending against Ftacnik. At the finish of the previ- ous Olympiad in Dubai | too was the last to finish, squeezing a win against Schmidt, but that was to ensure victory for the team, whereas Karpov was playing simply as a matter of principle (perhaps mentally competing with me) and he finally finished off his opponent on the 93rd move, when the concluding banquet was already begin- ning An object of pride for the GMA was the staging late in 1988 in Belgrade of the first qualifying tournament for the next World Cup (1991/92), which was. significantly superior in scale to the most prominent Swiss tournaments of those years, such as New York or Lugano. 258 players, including 100 (!) grandmasters, took part. Once it had become stronger financially, the Associa- 58 tion immediately began working not only for the elite, for whom there was no short- age of tournaments, but also for all grand- masters. In 1989 we planned a further two qualifying events, so that every competitor, every GMA member would have the chance to break ‘to the top’ - into the final qualify- ing tournament, planned for 1990. | con- sidered the creation of a whole series of mass events to be a great achievement on our part. Already then the GMA could well have replaced FIDE as the organiser of the world championship - this idea was in the air for the whole of 1989, and it was desperately opposed by FIDE, the State Sports Commit- tee, and the USSR Chess Federation, driven by Sevastyanov, Krogius and Botvinnik. Here is an extract from a resolution of the Soviet Federation praesidium dated 27 January: The praesidium expresses its particular concern over the current situation regarding attempts to transfer the world champion- ship from FIDE to the international Grand- masters Association (GMA). Discussions have been held and kept secret from the chess community; certain Soviet grandmasters have taken part in this (surely not the world champion himself? - G.K.). This is unaccept- able, and all these discussions should have been published in full. The praesidium vigorously insists that the world championship should be the preroga- tive of FIDE, as it was earlier, but that the GMA should possess a ‘right of veto’ on questions involving the world championship. This would ensure the fair and high- standard organisation of the world champi- onship. The praesidium rejects the GMA’s demands to hand over to the Association all rights regarding the chess activity of grandmaster-members of the GMA withrespect to Soviet grandmasters. The USSR Chess Federation will retain the right to take decisions, obligatory for all Soviet players, including grandmasters. The praesidium has contacted all federations that are members of FIDE, and also the GMA, outlining its position. If the FIDE leadership, neglecting the interests of chess players throughout the world, should nevertheless by-pass the charter and hand over the world champion- ship to the GMA, the USSR Chess Federation will demand the urgent summoning of an extraordinary FIDE Congress to discuss the situation and take decisive measures. It goes without saying that the ‘fraternal’ socialist countries hurriedly responded to the directive of their ‘older brother’, and already on 9 February in Havana the follow- ing statement was approved: The chairmen of the chess federations of the socialist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, DDR, Cuba, Poland, Romania, USSR and Czechoslovakia) express their concern over the situation involving attempts to hand over the world championship from FIDE to the GMA, and vigorously insist that all competitions for the world championship should, as formerly, (for the last 40 years) be the prerogative of FIDE. At the same time FIDE should play particular attention to the proposals of the GMA... The participants at the meeting in Havana emphasise that the GMA may use grandmaster members of the GMA in its competitions only with the agreement of the appropriate national federations. But in the meantime chess life contin- ued. In the first quarter of 1989, with a respite from World Cup tournaments until the summer, Karpov succeeded in winning his Candidates quarter-final match against Hjartarson (3¥1-1%) and a training mini- match against Andersson (2¥4-1'), and he Tournament Races also performed quite well in Linares (1. ivanchuk - 72 out of 10; 2. Karpov - 7; 3. Ljubojevic - 6). Meanwhile, at the end of March | set off to the fourth stage of the World Cup in Barcelona. Nikitin: ‘The tournament in Barcelona was an unusually difficult one for Kasparov. For a whole series of reasons the champion was in a far from ideal physical and nervous condition, and the first half of the event was mainly a battle against himself. Many of his games constituted a parade of missed opportunities. Thus in a winning position against Yusupoy, in the fourth hour of play he suddenly began to “drift”, made a series of inexplicably weak moves, and suffered a vexing defeat. The enormous social respon- sibilities of our champion are using up a mass of energy and hindering his further development. It is annoying that a consider- able contribution to this is made by certain officials of our federation and the executive administrators of the State Sports Commit- tee... Even so, in the second half of the tour- nament Garry warmed up, produced several “publishable” games and concluded the event quite worthily.’ In order to catch the leader - the bril- liantly performing Ljubojevic, | had to win ‘to order’ in my last two games - against Mescas and ex-world champion Spassky (for the first time in my life: before this | had twice lost to him ~ Game Nos,84 and 85 in Volume Ill of My Great Predecessors). | even had the better Berger coefficient, but since the games with IMlescas did not count for the World Cup, the winner of this stage was Uubojevic, who thus gained the greatest success in his tournament career. Results of the fourth World Cup tourna- ment (Barcelona, March-April 1989): 1-2. Ljubojevic and Kasparov ~ 11 out of 16; 3. Salov ~ 10; 4. Korchnoi ~ 92; 5-6. Hiibner 59Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 and Short - 9; 7. Nikolic ~ 8; 8-12. Va- ganian, Yusupov, Ribli, Spassky and Be- liavsky - 7%; 13. Speelman - 7; 14-15. Hjartarson and Seirawan - 6¥2; 16-17. Mescas (score did not count) and Nogueiras -Sia. From 15-25 May in Moscow the Grand- masters Association held the second quali- fying tournament for the 1991/92 World Cup, and on this occasion the standard of organisation silenced even the most obsti- nate sceptics. At the same time a second, more representative General Assembly of the GMA was held. By that time 234 grandmasters had joined the organisation = an absolute majority of the holders of the highest chess title. Of them 98 took part in the assembly, and with the inclusion of proxies they had 127 votes, which ensured the necessary quorum. My report provoked a lively exchange of opinions. As did the speech by Timman, devoted to the difficult relations between the GMA with FIDE. From the time of its emergence, the Association introduced draft agreements, but under various pre- texts they were boycotted by the FIDE leadership. In the spring of 1989 a special expert commission was even set up: Kas- parov, Karpov, Timman, Schmid, Kok (GMA representative), Botvinnik (official repre- sentative of the Soviet Federation) and Campomanes (FIDE President). And on 30 April at a meeting of the commission in Brussels (without Campomanes, who before that had visited Moscow), a new draft was worked out, containing five points and establishing a certain parity of interests. However, the FIDE executive committee (Campomanes, Krogius and Ko, with the participation of Sevastyanov), which met at the start of May in Warsaw, did not accept 60 the experts’ draft, but appointed a delega- tion for discussions with the GMA, after deciding on six points on which this delega- tion was authorised to hold discussions. Especially important for FIDE was the missing point that ‘plans of appearances by GMA members should be agreed with their national federations’. The expanding Association posed new problems for the Board: with grandmas- ters of the ‘second echelon’ in the major- ity, the privileged position of the elite became especially perceptible. And it was not surprising that at the assembly there was a demand to develop as soon as possible a long-term strategic program, which would consider the interests of all GMA members. The composition of the Board also underwent certain changes: instead of Seirawan, who had retired in the previous autumn, another American was elected - Max Dlugy. For the taking of a number of pressing decisions it was required that legal changes should be made to the Charter of the Asso- ciation, which operated under Belgian laws, and the participants in the Moscow assem- bly agreed to summon an extraordinary assembly of the GMA at the end of 1989... in June the time finally arrived for the fifth, Rotterdam stage of the World Cup, which was due to give an answer to the question: would Karpov manage to take first place and score a minimum of 10% out of 14 against the contestants who counted, in order to catch me before the concluding battle in Skelleftea? This tournament promised to be one of the most brilliant in Karpov's chess career, but in fact it probably became the most dramatic. The ex-world champion started excellently — 5 out of 6, then 9% out of 12 (1), including 9 points that counted. He onlyneeded to make three draws, but - his strength ran out. As a result of blunders he suffered three successive defeats ~ against Salov, Ljubojevic and Nunn - and conceded first place to Timman. At the closing cere- mony the Dutchman called this result the best in his career. And indeed, Jan finished with 6% out of 8 (!), producing a series of memorable games. Results of the fifth World Cup tourna- ment (Rotterdam, June 1989): 1. Timman - 1042 out of 15; 2. Karpov ~ 91/2; 3. Vaganian = 9; 4. Nunn - 872; §-8. van der Wiel (score did not count), Salov, Ehivest and Sokolov - 8; 9. Short - 74/2; 10. Seirawan - 7; 11-13. Sax, Nogueiras and Yusupov ~ 62; 14-15. Ljubojevic and Portisch - 6; 16. Hjartarson - 4's (Spassky did not take part, while Hub- ner with 2 point withdrew after the 1st round). Never before had Karpov lost three games in succession. What was the reason for this? The ex-world champion himself related on the pages of the magazine 64 that ina non-standard ending with Salov, where a draw was the most probable result, his prudence suddenly let him down and he began playing for a win, forgetting about a simple refutation: ‘The result was a first and very vexing defeat, which apparently left an unfavourable psychological residue in my sub-conscious. Otherwise it is simply not possible to explain what happened the following day in my game with Ljubojevic, where with White | several times missed a simple win, and then also a draw.’ And this is what the national master Yuri Kotkov wrote in the magazine Shakhmaty v SSSR (1989, No.9): ‘The objective of carrying out the maximum program (overtake!) had clearly been set. It is probable that this decision was also aided psychologically by Tournament Races his feeling of invincibility” over the first twelve rounds. And yet certain games (for example, with Short and Sax) already pro- vided a warning signal. They were a re- minder that a person is not a machine. And we, unfortunately, are unable to measure the reserve of remaining physical strength, of nervous energy... Not there with him was his trainer and faithful friend Igor Zaitsev, who had remained in Moscow. He would certainly have found the necessary words after the loss to Salov and tuned him up for relaxed, “Karpovian” play against Ljubojevic. Above all he needed to calm down ~ after all, nothing had yet been lost: now he simply needed to score 11/2 out of 2.’ Before the last tournament of the Cup, which began on 12 August in the Swedish town of Skelleftea, | had two first places and one second, while Karpov had one first. and two second. Thus Karpov could still achieve overall success, if he were to take clear first place in Skelleftea and score 11 out of 15 (again ‘+7'!) and finish a point ahead of me. The task looked ultra-difficult, and yet in Rotterdam, after conducting 12 rounds brilliantly, he had achieved this mark, and if it had not been for the three losses... It was clear that Karpov's collapse in Rotterdam had practically ensured my victory in the Cup, provided only - that | did not suffer a similar collapse! This thought preyed on my sub-conscious, and | involun- tarily began thinking that now the main thing was not to overdo things and not to leave anything en prise. At the start the ex-champion drew with Black against Sax, while | crushed Korchnoi with White. By the will of the pairings (on this occasion there were no ‘Belfort ex- periments’) the arch-rivals met as early as round 2, with Karpov once again having the white pieces. 61Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 Game 7 A.Karpov-G.Kasparov World Cup, Skelleftea 14.08.1989, 2nd round King’s Indian Defence E97 1.4 Df6 2 c4 g6 3 Dc3 Ag7 On this occasion | decided to avoid 3...d5 and engage my opponent in a large-scale battle in the King’s Indian, which after Seville | had gradually reinstalled in my opening repertoire. 4e4.d6 5 Df3 (5 f3 - Game Nos.8, 28, 30, 36, 38) 5...0-0 6 Se2 e5 7 0-0 (7 &e3 - Game Nos.10, 12, 14, 18, 26) 7...De6 8 d5 De7 RA YOR Bl wie 9 Adz At that time the main duels developed here, and it was only from the mid-1990s that 9 b4 came to the fore. On the contrary, the artificial 9 a4 gives Black a comfortable game: 9...a5! 10 Ae1 Ad7 11 &e3 f5 12 f3 Acs 13 Dd3 b6 14 b4 Dxd3 15 Wxd3 axb4 16 Dbs Shs! 17 Wb3 Ags (Korchnoi- Kasparov, Barcelona 1989). 9..a5 10 a3 (of course, not 10 b3?! c5, as in the 17th game of the 1987 match) 10...2d7 11 Zbi f5 12 bg The rapid development of this variation began after the games Gavrikov-Kasparov 62 and Kasparov-Smirin (5Sth USSR Champi- onship, Moscow 1988). ‘A multi-purpose move’ (Seirawan). And a very useful one! | also played this against Gavrikov, not yet imagining what to do next. Smirin preferred 12...b6?! (this merely creates a new target), but after 13 f3 f4 14 ®a4 axb4 15 axb4 g5 16 c5 White seized the initiative and gained a spectacular win. Black's problem is to overcome the crowding of his pieces, and before Skelleftea | devised the plan with ..@h8 and .Dg8, which later became the main line. Black should not hurry with ...f5-f4 and for the moment keep his knight on d7, hinder- ing White’s c4-c5 (if 12...\f6?!, then 13 c5!). 23 £3 The most solid move. Nothing is given by the gambit 13 5 axba 14 axb4 dxc5 ete. If 13, Wc2 again 13..g8 is good (the source game: Salov-Short, Skelleftea 1989), although the sharp 13..axb4 14 axb4 Af6 15 f3 g5!? 16 c5 Ag6 is possible, abandoning every- thing for the sake of a kingside attack (Va- ganian-Kasparov, Manila Olympiad 1992), but not the continuation | tried against Gavrikov: 13...b6?! 14 @b3 axb4 15 axb4 fred 16 Axe4 Df6 17 £43 with a slightly better - but above all, secure! - position for White.13...0g8!? By no means the only reply - nowadays 13..axb4 14 axb4 c6 is also played (an example: Kramnik-Radjabov, Wijk aan Zee 2008). Later | also analysed the typical 23...f4. Here the following lines are not dangerous for Black: 14 c5 axb4 15 axb4 dxcS 16 bxc5 xcs (Huzman-Temirbaev, Uzhgorod 1988), 14 a4 axb4 15 axb4 c6! (Salov- Nunn, Rotterdam 1989), or 14 )b3 axba 15 axb4 5, quickly building up an attack on the kingside (Ljubojevic-Kasparov, Linares 1993). However, 14 Ab5!? is better: 14...b6 415 c5 (Vladimirov-Temirbaev, Alma Ata 1989) or 14...g5 15 Wc2 bé 16 c5 - thisisa ‘more unpleasant pawn sacrifice. Therefore later too | usually played 13..Qg8. Black manoeuvres with his knights, maintaining the pawn tension in the centre and retaining the choice be- tween ...f5-f4 and ..fxed. As Makarychev wrote, ‘the world champion’s strategic plan probably became the most important contribution by Black to the theory of the classical variation since the famous game Taimanov-Najdorf (Zurich Candidates Tournament 1953)’. White must guard the e4-point and pre- pare c4-c5. But how? raat ay *e Tournament Races 14 Db3?! An inaccuracy in an unfamiliar situation - now after c4-c5 White will no longer have the strong manoeuvre Ad2-c4, and this is a considerable achievement for Black: he gains time to create counterplay. 14 Wc2 is correct, as Karpov was later to play against me (Game No.34). 14...axb4 15 axb4 Ddf6! My idea has proved fully justified. with the feeling of a duty performed, the knight abandons the d7-square and begins operat- ing on the kingside, at the same time making way for the bishop on c8. 16 &d2 (34) The fruit of agonising hesitation. After 16 c5 there would also have followed 16...hS. | prefer Seirawan's recommenda- tion 16 exf5!? gxf5 (this is how | would have replied) 17 f4 ‘with a complicated strategic battle’. 16 &d2 is aimed at seizing the a-file (16...f4?! 17 Bat!) but this takes a lot of time and does not bring any real benefits. It is curious that right to the end of the game White did not in fact play c4-c5 (a rare occurrence in the King’s Indian!). This means he must have done something wrong... 16...Dh5 17 g3 63Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 It is dangerous to allow the knight in at f4, as Khalifman did in a rapid game with me (cf. Game No.34, note to Black's 14th move). EVAW Fae a Salt hi, Mi “a BD SE g een ’ oS ISR ~ Pe Y A ws Pan est WY ou 17...Dhf6! ‘After provoking a weakening of the en- emy king's pawn defences, Black brings his knight back and awaits a convenient mo- ment to advance ...f5-f4’ (Seirawan). In addition, in the event of the exchange ..fxe4 he has acquired invasion squares at 94 and h3. Karpov did not like this, and in advance he moved his rook away from a possible attack. 18 Bf22! Again a delay. Black would also have been quite happy with 18 &d3 fxe4 19 Dxeq Dxe4 20 &xe4 Df6 or 18 c5 fred 19 fxe4 &h3 20 Zf2 Dhé6! (the g4-point!). However, 18 Hai Hxa1 19 Wxa1 was more consistent, when as yet there is nothing terrible for White: 19...fxe4 20 fxe4 &h3 21 2f3, while if 19...2h6 or 19...Dh6!? there is the good reply 20 exfs, with an unclear game. 18...Dh6! Apparently Karpov was ready to meet 18 .f4?1 with 19 g4!, and he underestimated the knight move to the edge of the board. 19 Haa (19 Wc1 Af7) 19...8xa1 20 Wxar 64 It becomes evident that 18 Ef2 was an unnecessary move. 20...7 Not bad, but the immediate 20...f4!? was also possible. In the event of 21 g4 the sacrifice of a piece for two pawns is tempt- ing - 21..Ahxg4!? 22 fxg4 Axg4a 23 Bxg4 .2xg4 with two bishops and a menacing pawn mass on the kingside, whereas the white knights are stuck over on the queen- side. 21 gxf4 exf4 is also dangerous for White, for example: 22 &xf4 Ahs 23 Re3 ‘Wha 24 Wei Df4 25 Aa Bes 26 Ada Af7 27 &h1 Ags or 22 Wa7 AF7 23 Das Ags with an attack. And after the thematic 21 c5 with the defensive idea 21...fxg3 22 hxg3 @®hs 23 Wet Df7 24 &g2 for the moment Black could play 21...f7!? and ..gs with good attacking chances. 21 Wer Another inexplicable ‘solid’ move. The white queen leaves the occupied a-file, in order to prevent the traditional exchange of bishops by ...2h6. But why should Black exchange the bishops, if he can play the advance ...f5-f4? 21...f4! This sets the opponent an unpleasant choice - 23 gxf4 or 23 g4. Which is the lesser evil?22 ga?! ‘Now White suffers without compensa- tion. Of course, it was dangerous - and against Kasparov simply terrifying - to take the pawn 22 gxf4, but in this way he would at least have something for his suffering.’ (Nikitin) Indeed, 22 gxf4! was now the best chance - after 22..Qh5 23 fxeS dxeS or 22..exf4 23 &xf4 DAhs 24 &e3 g5 (both these variations were recommended by me in Informator; 24...\Wh4 25 f4 Dh6 is also suitable) Black has excellent compensation for the pawn and clear play on the kingside, but White's position is still quite solid. 22...h5, A standard undermining idea. 22...0g5 also suggested itself - if 23 Wf1, then 23..h5, 243 c6! (also a standard undermining idea, but from the other side), and if 23 #92, apart from 23...h5, the aggressive 23...Axf3!? 24 &xf3 Dxg4 is possible, with the initiative. However, | didn’t want to rush into a not altogether clear piece sacrifice. 233 Dh7 23..\g5!? was again possible, and if 24 &g2 the waiting move 24...%g8, in order after, for example, 25 c5?! to sacrifice a piece advantageously: 25...hxg4 26 hxg4 &xg4! 27 fxg4 Dfxe4, and Black's passed Tournament Races pawns are potentially very strong. But before making any sacrifices | decided to carry out the normal King’s Indian plan of activating my g7-bishop via the route f6-h4. 24 fer Af6 ‘The storm clouds are gathering over the white fortress.’ (Makarychev) Y AR \ eon og LE Wis I), wi “< ER z \ PoRe = a \r Wry AGS ww ipod \ Ce re ope ss \ ps 25 Sga?! A seemingly natural move, but in the light of what follows 25 Hh2 was more tenacious, although here too after 25...a@h4 26 &g2 &g7 27 cS Bxe1 28 Wxer Ehs followed by ...hg5 or ...2f6 White has an unpleasant position. 25...%7 (not rushing with the simplifying 25..&h4 26 Bfi Rxe1 27 Wxe1) 26 Efa ®hgs 27 Sha Apparently Karpov was hoping to stand firm - after, say, 27...2h8 28 .f2. But at this moment the tactical blows begin, which is not surprising: ‘the concentration of black pieces in the danger area has become extreme’ (Nikitin). 27...Dxh3! 28 Sxh3 Dgs! 28...hxg4!? 29 fxg4 Hh8! also looks dan- gerous for White (but not 29...g5 30 Rd3 Hhs, as suggested by me in informator, because of 31 “d2! and 4d1-f2), but the move in the game is apparently neverthe- less stronger. 65Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 “ Yew 29 Bh2 Not 29 Hh1? on account of the deadly 29...hxg4 30 fxg4 (30 &h4 Dh3!?) 30...f3+1, exploiting the position of the rook on h1: 31. Bxf3 Dxf3 32 Whos &F7 33 Wh7+ (33 xf3 Bh8!) 33.297 34 &xf3 Bhs and wins. 29...hxg4 30 fxg4 (and here 30 &h4? is bad in view of 30...g3! 31 Eh1 Dh3 32 Axfo+ s&xf6!, when the white king cannot be saved) 30...2h8 Now 30..f3+? 31 &xf3 @xf3 32 Whe+ &f7 33 &xf3 Bh8 does not work on account of 34 Wd2!, when the rook on h2 is de- fended. 32. &h4 In time-trouble Karpov again makes the only move: the invasion cannot be allowed! 31...f3+ (the piece has to be regained) 32 xfs Duf3 33 Brxf6+ Wxf6 34 Hxhs eexhs 35 Sg3 Again the only move, with the clock flag now hanging. The last critical moment in the game had arrived. In contrast to my opponent, | still had 14 minutes left to reach the time control, and | had to make a choice from several tempting continuations. Alas, | played quickly... 35.85? A premature move. The cool-headed 66 35...8g7! was far better. We looked at this in a joint analysis after the game. That night, in my sleep, the move 35...¢g8 occurred to me, ruling out 36 We3 Dda! 37 95 in view of the study-like 37...h8! and wins, but then White acquires the resource 37 Dxd4! exd4 38 e5! Wres (38...dxe5 39 Beg!) 39 Wxe5 dxe5 40 Ded, gaining a draw a pawn down. But after 35..8g7 it is bad to play 36 @®b5? Dh4! or 36 De2? Wh4+ 37 exf3 Gxg4+ 38 &e3 Wh3+. 36 cS is also insuffi- cient in view of 36...2d7 37 We3 Dd4 38 ®Das dxcs! 39 bxc5 bs, creating an outside passed pawn, which is all the more danger- ous with the white pieces tied to the de- fence of their exposed king There only remains 36 We3 “\d4! 37 g5! - it was this, the only chance, that concerned me at the board, although after 37...Wf4+ 38 Wxf4 exfa+ 39 e&xf4 Dxb3 40 DAbs White's hopes based on the restricted amount of material remaining may prove unjustified: 40..2d2 (more forcing than 40...6f7 41 Dxc7 Be7) 41 c5 dxcS 42 bxc5 ®b3 43 Dxc7 Dxcs 44 Ges SF7 45 Sd4 bo 46 e5. In the opinion of Makarychev, ‘to evaluate this endgame as definitely win- ning for Black would hardly be correct - an interesting battle is in prospect.’ But, in my view, after 46..%e7 or 46..2b7 Black should be able to convert his extra piece into victory. Thus 35...g7! would have left Black with an obvious advantage, and in the oppo- nent's severe time-trouble it would proba- bly have led to a quick win. 36 De2 hg7 If 36..Ah4, then 37 @d2! Dg (37...Who 38 c5!) 38 D3 Df4 39 Dega, and the white knights succeed in covering the vulnerable points around their king (say, 39...We7 40 5 Wd7 41 Sh2 etc.).37 Wha? A time-trouble ‘gift’ (only 37 Wf1? &xga! was worse). It was essential to play 37 c5! 247! (the bishop has acquired the impor- tant square b5; 37...Dh4 38 Ad2!) 38 cxd6 hdl. An amazing trick - in the event of 39 )d2?! 2b5!! White's position is unenviable, both after the weak 40 Wxc7+ &g6 or 40 dxc7 &xe2 41 Wg1 Wi4a+ 42 Sh3 D3 43 Wag2 Dxd2 44 c8 Q Af1 45 Wxb7+ W7, as well as the more tenacious 40 We1 cxd6 41 Wf2 &xe2 42 Wxe2 Wfa+ 43 &h3 &f6 44 bs Se7 45 bé6 Sd8 etc. But by 39 We3 cxd6 40 ‘Wf2! White would nevertheless have main- tained the balance. 37..0da? An error in reply, although | still had time Tournament Races on the clock. A big, virtually decisive advan- tage would have been given by 37...h4! 38 @d2 Dg6 and ..Af4 (as indicated in the tournament bulletin), whereas the move in the game is equivalent to a draw agreement. 38 Dbxd4 exd4 39 Wd1! (the attack on the d4-pawn denies Black time for any regroup- ings) 39...We5+ 40 &f3 W6+ 41 g3 Wes+ 42 &f3 Wi6+ a-Ya Nikitin: ‘This draw did both players a bad service. Under the impression of his oppo- nent’s obvious superiority, for a long time Karpov was unable to play a more or less normal game. While Garry tormented himself with the question: “Why did | so quickly play 35...g5?” Nevertheless, in this tournament Kasparov's playing advantage over his opponents was obvious. Only in two games did they worthily withstand the onslaught, whereas in a good dozen games his advantage varied between ‘+’ and ‘+~’. But at decisive moments, during the third or fourth hour, there were short-term (for two or three moves) slumps in the champion’s play, his calculating machine switched off, and his intuition stopped working. He had to spend a mass of effort, so as not to lose confidence in himself” Indeed, on the number of missed chances this was one of my record tournaments! Fortunately, Karpov too did not play very brilliantly in Skelleftea: apparently the trauma received in Rotterdam had not yet healed. Therefore on this occasion we did not have such a tense race as, say, in the previous year’s USSR Championship. In the 3rd round | employed a novelty against Hiibner and after a mistake by my opponent on the 19th move | achieved a completely winning position - but | was unable to apply the finishing touch. In the 4th round | won quite well against Short. In the 5th round in a better ending | allowed 67Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 Andersson to escape, and in the 7th | com- pletely outplayed Tal, | was two pawns up, but in my opponent's wild time-trouble | plundered a piece! Again a draw... And yet, good wins over Portisch (in the gth tound) and Vaganian (in the 12th) enabled me to become the sole leader - 8 out of 12. Half a point behind was Karpov, after holding out with difficulty against Portisch (in the 4th round) and Tal (in the 12th), but defeating Ehlvest (in the 6th), Seirawan (in the 8th) and Nikolic (in the 10th). Then we each made two draws, as in the 13th round my impulsive 29th move allowed Seirawan to escape, and in the 14th | failed to exploit a blunder by Ribli - | of- fered him a draw after my 26th move, which, as it later transpired, would have led to a win (a rare instance: | overlooked a pretty combinative strokel). Finally, in the 15th and last round, | out- played Nikolic with Black, but on the 25th move | missed a very real winning chance, and although | tormented my opponent until the 68th move, in the end | had to reconcile myself to a draw. But on the same 68th move Karpov overcame the resistance of the hard-to-beat Andersson - and he caught me at the very last moment. Nikitin: ‘Thus the two eternal opponents, playing in completely different styles, arrived at the tournament finish with identical results. Each of them fought mainly with himself, and both in their own way deserved the favour of Caissa: the one for the rich creative content of his games, and the other for his mighty fighting spirit.” The results of the sixth World Cup tour- nament — (Skelleftea, August-September 1989): 1-2. Karpov and Kasparov - 91/2 out of 1S (+4=11); 3-5. Portisch, Seirawan and Short - 8Y2; 6-7. Salov and Sax - 8; 8-9. Nunn and Andersson - 714; 10-12. Hiibner, 68 Ribli and Tal - 7; 13. Ehlvest - 6%; 14-15. Nikolic and Korchnoi ~ 6; 16. Vaganian - 5. Of course, for me this ‘+4’ was an indiffer- ent result, but the main thing was that it was sufficient for victory in the World Cup. After the series of exhausting matches, | had shown that | was also the strongest in tour- nament play. The combined lead achieved by me and Karpov over the other contestants comprised almost a whole tournament (never again would the world see such an imposing superiority of the two ‘K’s'!): 1. Kasparov ~ 83; 2. Karpov - 81; 3. Salov - 68Y2; 4. Ehlvest ~ 68; 5. Ljubojevic - 66%; 6. Nunn - 65¥2; 7-8. Beliavsky and Short - 63¥2; 9-10. Hiibner and Timman - 5742; 11. Sokolov ~ 57; 12. Portisch - 56; 13. Tal - 55%; 14, Sax - 54; 15. Andersson - 53%; 16. Seirawan - 5242; 17. Ribli - 52; 18. Speelman - 54; 19. Vaganian - 4972; 20. Yusupov - 472; 21. Spassky - 45¥2; 22. Nikolic - 43¥2; 23. Korchnoi - 43; 24. Hjartarson - 40; 25. Nogueiras - 37. The top six gained the right to play in the 1991/92 World Cup. In the World Cup tournaments a marked improvement in the financial and organisa- tional conditions was achieved. The overall cost of the six stages came to 3 million dollars, of which 1.2 million went into the prize fund (the top prize was 100 thousand, the first prize in each event - 20 thousand, and so on). The undoubted success of the Cup both for the sponsors, and in the press, led to hopes that there would be a signifi- cant increase in the prizes in the next cycle. These gripping but cumbersome tourna- ments, each lasting more than three weeks, went down in history as the last ‘monsters’ of the classical chess era. After the GMA the maximum number of contestants in such events became 14 (as in the current FIDE Grand Prix, which is largely copied from the World Cup), with 10 the most commonnumber. Therefore, even now, one has to be impressed by the scale of the events con- ducted then ~ over the course of just two years! - and united in a single system: six all-play-all super-tournaments and four grandmaster ‘Swisses’ (Belgrade, Moscow, Palma de Mallorca and Moscow). The World Cup was undoubtedly a trademark event, part of the global confron- tation between the GMA and FIDE, At that time my trainer Alexander Nikitin wrote this in the magazine Shakhmaty v SSSR (1989, No.1): ‘A very important outcome of the recently-concluded World Cup was a consid- erable strengthening of the GMA, of which the world champion is the President. While conducting, brilliantly and without a hitch, all six stages of the Cup, the GMA has also organised a broad-scale qualifying event for the next cycle. Now practically all the grand- masters in the world have joined it. Both organisationally and materially the GMA is ready to take over from the weakening hands of FIDE the conducting of the world champi- onship cycle.’ Yes, every day the Grandmasters Associa- tion was gathering strength. Work on at- tracting sponsors was proceeding at full speed. Our objective was also to democratise the very process of managing chess - we devoted more effort and energy to solving it than FIDE had ever done. Our future plans included creating a system of professional team events and a network of international jumior schools, and social and pension funds, thus transforming the GMA into a fully- fledged chess trades union In November 1989, on the wave of pere- stroika and as a counter to the dominance of the State Sports Committee, an inaugural meeting of the independent Union of USSR Chess Players was held in Moscow, and | was elected President. And in December the Tournament Races appearance of the Soviet Chess Federation finally changed: at a meeting of the coun- try's chess players, in place of Sevastyanov its chairman became Vladimir Popov, a minister in the Russian Federation govern- ment. This victory was unexpected: 109 of the 148 delegates voted against the State Sport Committee's protégé ~ a terrible blow to the authorities! Soon Krogius was pen- sioned off, and the Chess Administration of the State Sports Committee was altogether done away with (but not the influence of the Committee itself). But then, at the end of 1989, after lengthy and difficult discussions with the active participation of Botvinnik, the representa- tives of the FIDE board (8 November in Luzern) and the GMA (26 November in Belgrade) approved a draft agreement, including the following points: 1. GMA recognises FIDE as the leading or- gan of chess federations in the world and the organiser of FIDE competitions. 2. FIDE recognises GMA as the representa- tive organ of international chess grandmas- ters. 3. FIDE recognises that GMA should acquire a role with regard to chess rules and resolu- tions which directly affect GMA members. Obviously FIDE had no option, other than to come to an agreement which, in the opinion of Karpov, was ‘mutually acceptable and extremely favourable to the GMA’. From a TASS report: The agreement of the GMA and FIDE effectively removes all the problems in relations between these chess organisa- tions. in particular, the GMA has obtained the right to participate on an equal basis in the solving of questions relating to the develop- ment of world chess, including establishing the world championship cycle, and allotting the financial resources from the world cham- pionship match prize fund: FIDE and the GMA 69Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 will each receive 8.5%, and 3% will go into the fund of a new organisation for developing chess in the world.’ In December the third qualifying tourna- ment for the 1991/92 World Cup took place in Palma de Mallorca, and after it came the third GMA General Assembly, at which the grandmasters had to discuss and then ratify or reject the agreement with FIDE. The agreement in this form no longer sat- isfied me, and the day before the Assembly, ‘on my initiative, the GMA Board (in the absence of Karpov; he was not present either in Palma, or six months later in Murcia) worked out a proposal which | put to my colleagues. | said that the agreement would have met our aims a year or two earlier, but the development of the GMA had been very rapid, and now, thinking about the future, we should make the next step - take from FIDE the running of the world championship. This step would bring the GMA independ- ence, not only political, but also financial. However, we should certainly aim for an agreement with FIDE, since we were not able to control all chess: grandmasters were only a portion of alll chess players. Therefore an agreement should be made between the two organisations with equal rights. In recent discussions about the future world championship match (1990), apart from representatives of the French city of Lyon nominated by FIDE, the American side also took part, wishing to stage the match and agreeing to share it with Lyon. At the same time the Americans also offered to finance the entire following world champi- onship cycle, including the 1990 Interzonal Tournament, but on condition that these events be handed over to the GMA. There- fore | brought to the Assembly a draft resolu- tion, which would confirm the Board’s position, retain the unity of the GMA, and 70 help it to gain the necessary financial sup- port: ‘The General Assembly has considered the proposed agreement between the GMA and FIDE, dated 26 November 1989. The Assembly considers that the first point of the agree- ment, in which FIDE is named “the organiser of FIDE competitions” should exclude the world championship cycle. From now on, as the most important professional competi- tions, they should be held under the aegis of the GMA. ‘The General Assembly requests the GMA Board to act in accordance with this position and in the true interests of all GMA members. ‘On this basis the General Assembly ratifies the afore-mentioned agreement and dele- gates Garry Kasparov and Bessel Kok to solve jointly the problems which may arise in connection with this.’ In conclusion, | specified that we should definitely try to reach a financial agreement with FIDE and pay it compensation for having deprived it of the next world cham- pionship cycle. After heated debates and speeches by the Board members, a secret vote was taken, and on the suggestion of Hans Ree this was done in two stages: on my resolution, and then on the agreement with the inclusion of this resolution. Here are the results of this historic vote: for the resolution - 89 in favour, 22 against, with three abstentions; for the agreement with the inclusion of the resolution - 96 in favour, 14 against, with two abstentions (a few ballot papers were deemed void). Thus on 18 December 1989 the Grand- masters Association decided to take the tunning of the world championship under its control. It appeared that from that day the genuine history of professional chess might begin. Naturally, the FIDE leadershiprejected our amendment, but the GMA Council had to act in accordance with the approved resolution Meanwhile, the final qualifying tourna- ment for the 1991/92 World Cup took place (Moscow, May-June 1990): 1-5. Speelman, Gurevich, Khalifman, Azmaiparashvili and Bareev - 7 out of 11; 6-12. Beliavsky, Por- tisch, Gelfand, Ivanchuk, De Firmian, Chan- dler and Polugayevsky - 673; 13-18. Seira- wan, Nikolic, Kir.Georgiev.. - 6 etc. (42 contestants in total). Here there were 12 qualifying places, but by the GMA rules Soviet players could take not more than five, and therefore Gelfand, Wvanchuk and Po- lugayevsky missed out (later, after Linares 1991, lvanchuk was nevertheless included in the Cup). Another seven grandmasters -- Short, Timman, Korchnoi, Andersson, Ribli, Gulko and Agdestein - were admitted into the second World Cup on rating (averaged over the period 1.01.1989-1.07.1990). Immediately after the Moscow event more than a hundred grandmasters travelled to the capital of the Spanish province of Murcia, to contest the GMA Rapid Cup (1. Tukmakov ~ 11 out of 13) and to take part in the fourth, pre-election GMA General Assembly. The first question to be considered by the Assembly was the agreement between the GMA and FIDE. Bessel Kok suggested return- ing to the ratification of this document in its initial form, since FIDE had not agreed with the amendment which we had approved in Palma de Mallorca. At the same time Kok announced that if the Assembly were to reject this, then he, Timman, Karpov, Larsen and Ljubojevic would leave the Board. In response to this ultimatum, | con- firmed my adherence to the course of full GMA independence and | promised that, ‘provided nothing unexpected occurred’ in the forthcoming world championship Tournament Races match, | would organise an enormous influx of funds into international chess. And | explained why such an agreement with FIDE did not satisfy me: it did not give the GMA fully equal rights (the juridical supremacy of FIDE in questions relating to the running of, the world championship according to the text of the discussed agreement was con- firmed by a well-known international law- yer, specially invited to the Assembly in Murcia). The point was that the Americans, who respected champions and high profes- sionalism, were prepared to allot ‘big money’ to an organisation of professionals, but not to a federation in which the votes of small third-world countries were capable, as everyone knew, of ‘democratically’ blocking any decision. Asensation: a split in the GMA leadership! In the hall a heated discussion flared up Spassky called my program ‘Bolshevik’ in spirit: ‘We don’t know what we want, but we will definitely achieve it’, | retorted that the program of ‘what we want’ was formulated quite definitely... What happened next was described on the pages of 64 by Sergey Makarychev: ‘The point of the criticism largely reduced to an analysis of the correspondence between the “bird in the hand” and the “two in the bush". And also, the risk of wrecking interna- tional chess life (there, where it was in good order!) in the event of an effective boycott by FIDE seemed very real. Above all it was the West Europeans who would suffer from this. “With each new pronouncement the posi- tions of the two sides, which had earlier split into ‘West European’ and ‘American-Soviet’, became increasingly distinct. It was also sensed that the words were no longer aimed at trying to convince anyone, but were merely demonstrating positions adopted beforehand, Bessel Kok himself kept in the 71Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 background: only once did he remark that, in the activity of any organisation, moments occur when it is necessary to halt for a time. It is not possible to push forward constantly. And a favourable agreement for the GMA would enable the boundaries achieved to be consolidated, and the status and authority of the Association legalised. ‘But searches for a compromise were also made, The most vivid speech was made by Yasser Seirawan - perhaps the only “neutral” among the Americans. He compared himself with a person, a child, who was forced to choose between his right and his left arm, to say quite definitely whom he loved more - his mum or his dad? “Don’t do this!” Yasser appealed. “For Garry and Bessel are our two arms, the parents of our organisation, which is hard to imagine without either of them”. Thus a compromise proposal was formulated, and it was put to a secret vote. The sense of it was ~ don't vote for the agreement at all! ‘To be honest, | was convinced that the compromise would be easily passed. But this did not happen... With a minimal majority of 65-60 (had it not been for the proportional “reduction” of the Soviet votes, which were limited to 25% of voters, it would have been a draw ~ 68-68!) the agreement with FIDE was ratified. The “West Europeans” won - they had done a great deal of preparatory work. The votes of the Soviet grandmasters were divided roughly 5-2 against the agreement’. Indeed, in these conditions the most sen- sible and acceptable thing would have been to defer taking a decision about the ratifica- tion to the end of the year, when the world championship match would have concluded, as well as the pre-election FIDE Congress in Novi Sad. But on 10 June 1990 Kok and his supporters in the GMA decided to leave the running of the world championship to FIDE... Then the re-elections to the GMA board 72 took place, bringing overall victory to the ‘West Europeans’: the new Board comprised Kasparov (115.2 votes), Timman (79.1), Larsen (74.1), Short (69.3), Ljubojevic (66.6), Kouatly (60.2) and Beliavsky (57.2). From the previous personnel Portisch had already retired (and had begun helping Karpov prepare for his match with me), while among those not elected were Diugy and Karpov (54.3 votes). At that time the latter was at a training session in Odessa, and later he stated in print that ‘on the expiry of the Board’s term of authority | considered it possible to leave the GMA leadership, and therefore | did not carry out a pre-election campaign, did not put myself forward as a candidate and did not give an agreement to run for office.’ But for some reason he featured as a candidate in the official documents of the Assembly, and Timman referred to the proxy, allegedly given to him by the ex-world champion. According to the GMA Charter, if the world champion was elected to the Board he automatically became the president of the Association. But as soon as Seirawan, the chairman of the accounting committee, declared the result of the elections, | thanked. all those who had voted for me and an- nounced that in connection with my prepa- rations for the world championship match | was obliged to cease my participation in the work of the Council. After which | stepped down from the stage, where the GMA board was seated, into the hall. This lead to total confusion. Kok asked me not to make such an abrupt step, but without success: | was disillusioned and convinced that my activity within the framework of the GMA had lost its point... Alexander Beliavsky comments: ‘The for- mal grounds for Kasparov's decision were the probable situation which might arise if hewere to lose his forthcoming match to Kar- pov. According to the GMA Charter, the Board could not have two citizens of one country. An exclusion was made only for the world champion: his citizenship was not taken into account. If Kasparov were to lose his title, there would be two USSR citizens left on the Board: he and Beliavsky. The Charter would not be violated, if Karpov instead of me was elected onto the GMA Board: then, whatever the outcome of the match in the autumn, one of the contestants would pass on to the Board as world champion.’ But | did not return to the post of GMA President even after winning the match. The Association drifted on for a whole year more, it conducted the first tournament of the next World Cup (¢f. the section ‘Under pressure by the new wave', p.283), but then Bessel Kok left and it conclusively collapsed. | can't help remembering the words of Seira- wan, who said in his speech to the assembly that Kok and | were the right and left arms of this organisation. More precisely - its two wings, and the GMA was unable to fly on one wing. What would have happened to our game, if the GMA had nevertheless taken on the tuning of the world championship? Today, of course, it is hard to make a judgement about this with hindsight, but | think that chess missed a rare opportunity to become one of the worthy forms of professional sport. At that time of turbulent changes throughout the world (the era of the fall of the Berlin Walll), the dictatorial power of FIDE began to crack, and its traditional supports became shaky - the Soviet Union with the Socialist camp and the State Sports Committee. And instead of submitting to a thoroughly rotten structure, existing thanks to world championship matches, it would have made far more sense for the leading Tournament Races grandmasters to build a new chess house, where all professionals would have played an important role in the decision-making process. The GMA was ruined by an internal con- flict, skilfully stirred up from outside. But it is hard for me to criticise the West European grandmasters, who at the time, in Murcia, conducted a very forceful campaign: many of them were genuinely afraid that, after the collapse of the totalitarian regimes and the opening of the borders, a mighty detachment of ‘hungry’ Soviet chess players would flood into Europe. They, the represen- tatives of the free world, were afraid of free competition and, as they saw it, they were fighting for their livelihood, seeking a de- fence in FIDE... It is also hard for me to criticise Bessel Kok - one of the most outstanding chess figures of the past decade. He did not want over- rapid professionalism. At that point he was satisfied with the possibility of coming to an agreement with FIDE, for the moment restricting the GMA's activities to staging the World Cup, and to expert and purely trades union functions. But | was also dreaming of managerial functions! This dream of mine was realised by the creation in 1993 of the Professional Chess Association (PCA), but it, by contrast, lacked that mass support and ‘trades union’ status. It is also hard for me to criticise my deci- sion to resign the post of GMA President. | had no choice, since I was in a clear minority on the Board and would hardly have been able to carry out my declared ‘American Soviet policy’. Preparation Difficulties While various passions were raging in the chess arena, the time of my next match for the crown was inexorably approaching. The ra)Kasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 choice of venue for it became yet another bone of contention between FIDE and the GMA. In the summer of 1989 the FIDE Congress in Mayagiiez (Puerto Rico) considered two bids to stage the match - from Lyon (to all appearances, Karpov wanted to play there) and from Wellington. Objectively, disregard- ing any politics, it would have been better for chess if we had played in the New Zea- land capital - there the 150th anniversary of the country was being celebrated, and on this background the match would have looked very impressive. But no one asked my opinion... At the Congress four members of the commission of experts were present (not counting Campomanes, who ignored this commission): Kok, Botvinnik, Timman and Schmid. FIDE's style of working made a shocking impression on them. Botvinnik’s appeal to treat grandmasters with respect (‘the world champion cannot be dismissed - he can only be defeated, whereas another FIDE president can be elected’) and Kok’s conciliatory and business-like report were given a hostile reception by the delegates. The sixth world champion Mikhail Bot- vinnik recalls: ‘That which happened later at the Con- gress led to the dispelling of all illusions. During the presidencies of Rogard, Euwe and Olafsson the tendency to treat the leading players in the world with a lack of respect was covered by law (by the rules), but under president Campomanes the camouflage was effectively discarded. That which happened in Mayagiiez seems altogether incredible. Both the president himself, and the officials close to him, declared that FIDE can act, without taking account of either traditions or rules. The FIDE Congress, the executive committee and even the president can take any decisions at any moment.’ 74 “Botvinnik is wrong’, declared the italian delegate Palladino. “We have been elected, we cannot be dismissed, we have power, and if the world champion does not submit to the decision of FIDE to play the match at the established place, at the established time and under the established conditions (even if all this has not been agreed with the partici- pants), the match will be conducted without the champion...” ‘Sevastyanov (! - G.K), Kok and Spassky tried in vain to convince the delegates that it was impossible to take a decision about the match without the agreement of the partici- pants; Kok justifiably commented that it was a dialogue of the deaf. When the Wellington representative learned that the match might take place without the world champion, she promptly withdrew her offer. Thus only the Lyon proposal remained. Campomanes put this to the vote, and the staging of the match in Lyon was approved by an overwhelming majority, ‘One couldn't help gaining the impression that this entire “presentation” was a provoca- tion with respect to the world champion: he might not accept such an ultimatum, and - what good luck! - it would be possible to stage the world championship match in Lyons without Kasparov. Yes, FIDE is seriously ill.” At the time | genuinely thought that this was Campomanes's last deed, and | joked that Lyon had helped the last mistake in the history of FIDE to be made: to hold a match for the world championship ~ without the world champion. Botvinnik: ‘The next act of the play took place on 6 September in Brussels, where the GMA council took place... The council appar- ently set a date for the concluding of an acceptable agreement with FIDE, and if FIDE did not meet it half-way, the GMA woulddeclare that it was staging the next match for the world championship (without the par- ticipation of FIDE and Mr. Palladino...)’ That same September day in Brussels, where the closing ceremony of the World Cup took place and prizes were presented to the winners, a meeting was held of the experts’ commission (again without Cam- pomanes), which confirmed: ‘A necessary condition for the continuation of discussions between FIDE and the GMA is an acceptance of the GMA and the experts commission on the part of FIDE. if this does not happen, and, as a consequence, an agreement will not be reached between FIDE and the GMA, the commission recommends that the GMA should take on the conducting of the world championship, beginning with the match for the world championship in 1990. In this case the GMA should announce its decision as soon as possible and enter into direct discussions with those interested in organising this match.’ In addition, an agreement was signed be- tween me and the participants in the Candi- dates semi-final matches - Karpov, Yusupov, Timman and Speelman - by which the winner of the series was obliged to play a match only with the current world cham- pion. Soon after this, in an interview for the New in Chess magazine, | replied to a ques- tion which interested many, about the relations now between me and Karpov - the president and a vice-president of the GMA: ‘Whether it's workable depends entirely on him, because | think that he was com- pletely unreliable in our GMA discussions. He was too pro-FIDE. First of all he had his own interests, secondly FIDE interests, and thirdly GMA interests. It was very bad. Right now he has changed a little. He doesn’t care about FIDE any more and is ready to com- bine his interests and GMA interests, which Tournament Races is very good. I'm very glad that he signed the petition (the afore-mentioned agreement of the candidates with the champion) and he wasn't isolated. | appreciate that we have this kind of unity. But still | think that Karpov is not really ready to give up some advan- tages in the interests of the GMA.’ By my efforts - | found a sponsor, Ted Field - a solid claim from New York was made for staging the match, and in the end the FIDE leadership agreed to share the match between two continents, between New York and Lyon (October-December 1990). In essence, this was a compromise, political decision (| repeat: initially the best choice was Wellington). In one of his inter- views before the match, Karpov remarked on its obvious pluses and minuses: ‘1am not very happy that the match will be divided into two parts, since there has already been the very bad experience of dividing the match between London and Leningrad. But, on the other hand, the American organisers have increased the prize fund and have put forward an irrefutable argument: since the start of the century there has been no match (for the crown on the American continent. For the chess world in general it is not a bad idea: the staging of the match both in the USA and in Europe will certainly raise interest in chess in both places. But for the contestants them- selves, such a formula creates great problems. They face a long journey from New York to Lyons, exacerbated by the time difference of six hours, which requires a certain adapta- tion.’ But in the autumn of 1989 the match still seemed a long way away... As will be appar- ent, | ‘warmed up’ well in the last stage of the World Cup in Skelleftea: in the double- round super-toumament which began two weeks later in Tilburg (September-October 1989) | won with the impressive score of 12 retKasparov vs. Karpov: 1988-2009 out of 14 (+104). My rating promptly rose 20 points, and | finally surpassed Fischer's old, seemingly unattainable record - 2780. And at the end of November, by scoring 9/2 out of 14 (+8=3) at the super-tournament in Belgrade, | also conquered the stratospheric height of 2800 - this was comparable to a Jong-jump leap of nine metres. Nikitin: To be honest, | didn’t believe that Garry could reach 2800 in such a short time. But the incredible happened: with all his chess and non-chess disadvantages, although burdened with a mass of problems, a dozen major matters and hundreds of minor ones, after his customary jocular lamentation about poor health and a complete lack of energy, he already reached the 2800 mark by the end of 1989! | happened to be helping him in Tilburg, and at the time | suggested discussing preparations for the forthcoming world championship match the following year. After thinking for about a minute, Garry replied: “Let's wait until | return to Baku. A couple of months won't decide anything, especially since all the same | will have to play Karpov.” | understood the reason for his unwillingness at that moment to build plans for the coming year: freed of the need to achieve some important goal, he was playing easily and, above alll, very confidently.’ As for Karpov, at that time the most im- portant event was his semi-final Candidates match with Artur Yusupov (London, October 1989). It was a very difficult contest for the ex-champion: what told were his fatigue after the World Cup battles, and the fact that Yusupov and his trainer Mark Dvoretsky did not pin any great hopes on the World Cup tournaments but had prepared well for the main test and adopted the correct opening tactics. Even so, Karpov managed to snatch victory by 4¥2-3¥2 (+2-1=5). In the other semi-final Timman beat Speelman by 76 the same score. At the end of December it was announced that | had been chosen as the top USSR sports person of 1989. In an interview about this, published on 2 January in the newspa- per Izvestiya, | also talked about the forth- coming match for the crown: ‘It is most probable that my opponent will again be Karpov. Although Timman also has some chances, | will support Karpov - and | think that he will win. | very much want to play him again’ And | explained: ‘I have not once won a match convincingly against Karpov. | think this is the only thing I have not yet managed to do in chess’. However, for some mysterious reason (the /zvestiya chess col- umnist, Alexander Roshal, could have known something about this) these two statements were not in fact published. But on 16 January Sovetskii Sport re- printed my interview with the Chess Life magazine, where | nevertheless explained why | wanted to play Karpov again: ‘You see, | want to complete the history of our chess relations. A win in the final game of the Seville match enabled me to retain the title of world champion, but | want a genuinely decisive result’ Karpov confirmed my prediction - after a modest 3rd place in Reggio Emilia (1989/90) Karpov very confidently defeated Timman 62-2‘ in the final Candidates match (Kuala Lumpur, March 1990). In one of his inter- views after the match, the ex-world cham- pion declared: ‘With time and with increas- ing age one has to seek new stimuli, to find the strength that is so necessary for a fight. But in this case | simply want very much to win against Kasparov,’ In another he added: 4 am confident. | intend to devote great attention not only to purely chess prepara- tion, but also to physical and psychological preparation.’In the spring and summer my opponent prepared for the match at his usual base in Odessa, without giving up tournament performances. In May he played in Haninge (a. Seirawan ~ 872 out of 11; 2-3. Ehivest and Karpov - 714), and in July at the festival in Biel (1. Karpov ~ 9¥2 out of 14; 2. Andersson — 8) and he remained happy with his play and results: ‘in Biel | played well. Most impor- tantly, | gained enormous creative satisfac- tion. My victory in the tournament was my 88th win in an international competition.” Apparently this endless counting of the occupied or shared first places in all kinds of tournaments, without exception (individual, team and even rapid) created an additional motivation for Karpov to continue working on chess. Nikitin: ‘For a long time Karpov was accustomed to considering himself No.1 - a completely essential feature of his “cham- pion’s” character. Secondary roles did not interest him, and after losing the title of world champion he had two stimuli: the first - the desire to regain the crown, and the second, more realistic - to establish a record for the number of tournaments won, which would be extremely difficult for Kasparov to beat, and probably would never be done. As a result Karpov succeeded in passing 100 and even approaching the figure 150...’ For me and those close to me, 1990 was a critical year and virtually the most difficult in my life. It began with some tragic, ex- traordinary events. After returning from my lengthy foreign wanderings to Baku, | ended up at the very epicentre of an ‘international conflict’: everywhere Armenian pogroms were taking place... My mother and I had to travel to Zagulba, to my training base, 40kms. from the city. There we were joined by our relatives, friends, and my trainer Shakarov and his family. But there too it was not safe. In Moscow a headquarters was set Tournament Races up to save the ‘Kasparov group’, directed by Popov, the chairman of the USSR Chess Federation. The government allowed a special plane to be sent to Baku, and on 17 January 1990, abandoning our flats and nearly all our possessions, we left our native lands for ever. Many thousands of Armenians ended up as refugees. In Moscow, with the help of Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev (who, | should remind you, saved me from dis- qualification in the summer of 1985) | obtained a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and for a long time | chatted with him, explaining how | saw things. Alas, this was hopeless... Soon | returned my Communist Party card to the Azerbaijan State Sports Committee, where | was registered, with a letter explaining why | was leaving this organisation. And in the spring | took a very active part in the creation of the Democratic Party of Russia, and at the end May | was elected its deputy chairman. Thus unexpect- edly - in the year of the match! - my political activity began and Moscow became our second home (| will give more details of the events in Baku and my first steps in politics ina future auto-biographical volume). At those terrible times, strangely enough, | managed to perform worthily in Linares (February-March 1990): 1. Kasparov - 8 out of 11 (+6-1=4); 2. Gelfand - 71/2; 3. Salov - 7; 4. lvanchuk - 61; 5. Short - 6; 6-7. Gulko and Yusupov - 572; 8. Beliavsky - 5 etc. After this | was faced with a serious question: how to prepare for the world championship match? For the first time in many years | was un- able to hold my training sessions in Zagulba. All my life | had regularly prepared in the same place, in familiar surroundings. Daily tuns along the banks of the Caspian Sea, intensive swimming, regular games of 77