The Gettier Problem

Author(s): Scott Sturgeon

Source: Analysis, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 156-164
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
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The GettierProblem
SCOTTSTURGEON
Thirty years ago this journal published the most influentialpaper of
modernanalyticepistemology- EdmundGettier's'Is JustifiedTrueBelief
23, 1963, pp. 121-23). In it Gettier refuted a clasKnowledge?' (ANALYSIS

sic theory of propositionalknowledge by constructingthought experiments to test the theory.A cottage industrywas born. Each responseto
Gettierwas quicklymet by a new Gettier-stylecase. In turntherewould be
a responseto the case, a furtherGettierscenario,and a reiterationof the
process. The industry'soutput was staggering.Its literaturebecame so
complicated,its thoughtexperimentsso baroque,that commonsensewas
stretchedbeyondlimit.The deepsignificanceof Gettier'swork drownedin
the resultingcacophony.That significancecan be seen by reflectingon two
points:first,why the problemarises;and second, how it is to be solved.
1. WhatgeneratesThe GettierProblem?
Infallibilismis the view that whatevergives rise to epistemicjustification
guaranteestruth.Accordingto the infallibilist,it is impossibleto justifiedly
believesomethingfalse. This has the tidy result that justificationis sufficient to convert belief into knowledge. Thus the InfallibilistView of
knowledge:
(IV) S knows P iff (a) S believesP
(b) S'sbeliefin P is justified.
But since guaranteesof truth are hardto come by, Infallibilismleads to a
dilemma:either we are justifiedin believingfar less than commonsense
admits,or justificationis fallible.
Fallibilistsopt for the latter horn of the dilemma. This has the messy
result that justification is not sufficient to convert belief into knowledge. For you cannot know something false. Since you can, according
to the fallibilist, justifiedly believe something false, it follows that
knowledge is more than justifiedbelief. The question then is, what has
to be added?
The view attacked by Gettieranswers this question very simply:add
truth.This is the so-called'traditionalview of knowledge':
(TV) S knows P iff (a) S believesP
(b) S's beliefin P is justified
(c) P is true.
ANALYSIS
53.3, July 1993, pp. 156-164. @ Scott Sturgeon

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THE GETTIERPROBLEM 157

Heretwo ingredientsare usedto convertbeliefinto knowledge:fallibilistic

justificationand truth.This is the theoryrefutedby Gettier.
Gettiertargetedthe right-to-leftdirectionof (TV). He presentedclear
cases in which justifiedtrue beliefdoes not amountto knowledge.Here is
a typicalGettierscenario:
(S) Suppose I burgle your house, find two bottles of Newcastle
Brown in the kitchen, drink and replace them. You remember
purchasingthe ale and come to believethere will be two bottles
waitingfor you at home. Yourbeliefis justifiedand true, but you
do not know what'sgoing on.
(TV) is thus false. The right-handside does not providea sufficientcondition for the left-handside. The GettierProblemis that of delineatingthe
minimalcondition which, when appendedto (a) to (c), generatesa sufficient conditionfor knowledge.In brief,the problemis to findthe minimal
link betweenjustificationand truthwhich precludesGettierscenarios.
2. Solvingthe GettierProblem.
The standardsolution to The GettierProblemspringsfrom a simpleidea.
We may sketchthis idea as follows:
(SS) S knows P iff (a) S believesP
(b) S's belief in P is justified
(c) P is true
(d) S'sjustificationstandsup to the relevant
set of facts.
(d) is intended to capture a complex relation holding between those
featuresresponsiblefor (b) on the one hand, and a certainset of facts on
the other. To fully understand(d), two things must be explained:first,
which facts are relevant;and second, what it is for one's justificationto
'standup' to them.
The relevantfacts will vary as one thinksof the past, presentor future.
To see this, supposeyou believesomethingat time t about an earliertime
t*.' Whetheror not this is knowledgewill dependon factswhich post-date
t*. But in such cases the possessionof knowledgewill not dependon facts
post-datingyour belief-state.Factsof this sortcannotmakeyoursa Gettier
scenario.Thus, when you think of the past or presentonly facts occurring
For the sake of simplicityI ignore iteratedknowledgestates, knowledgeof intentional
states, and any other situationwhich would force a distinctionbetween facts 'strictly'
about the past (like the fact that therewas no McDonald'son the Moon in 1900) and
facts not strictlyabout the past (like the fact that Einsteinknew that no one would live
on the Sun in 1999).

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158

SCOTT STURGEON

on or before the moment of thought will determinewhether you have

knowledge.
On the otherhand,supposeyou believesomethingat time t abouta later
time t*. Whetherthis is knowledgewill dependon facts which post-date
your belief-state.Not only will the factsat t * needto be as you believe,but
the interimfacts must be kosheras well. Yetwhen you believesomething
at t about a later time t *, facts which post-date t * cannot generate a Gettier

scenario.Therefore,when you think of the past or present the relevant

facts will obtain no later than your thought;and when you think of the
futurethe relevantfacts will obtain no later than the time considered.So
for any token beliefat time t in a propositionabout t*, the relevantfacts
will be those occurringup to, and including,the laterof the two.
Let 'T' name the set of truths describingthese facts in an arbitrarily
chosen case. For condition (c) of (SS) to be non-redundant,we must
excludeP fromT (alongwith any truthtriviallyimplyingP). We may then
ask:What is it for one'sjustificationto 'standup' to T?
Letus say that one'sjustificationfor P consistsin 'evidence'for P,leaving
the natureof this phenomenonopen. We noticethat evidenceis defeasible:
{E)may be evidencefor P despitethe fact that {E)u {E*)is not evidence
for P.In the eventwe say that {E*)defeats{E),or that {E*)is a defeaterfor
{E). Intuitively,{E) is ultimatelyundefeatedrelative to a set S iff every
elementof S which defeats{E)is itselfdefinitelydefeated;and somethingis
definitelydefeatedin S when somethingin S defeatsit for which thereare
no furtherdefeaters,or,if thereare,they arethemselvesdefinitelydefeated.
Turningthis recursivegloss into an explicit definitionis not hard, but we
needn'tbother.Our presentunderstandingis enoughto explain (SS):
(M) S knows P iff (a) S believesP
(b) S's beliefin P is justified
(c) P is true
(d) S'sevidence{E}is ultimatelyundefeated
relativeto T.
(M) is the standardpost-Gettiermodel of propositionalknowledge. Its
fourth condition is intendedto capturethe minimalconnection between
justificationand truthnecessaryto excludeGettierscenarios.
What does (M) teach us?
3. Internalism/Externalism.
Call justificationthat is ultimatelyundefeated'full justification'.Whateverthis comes to precisely,full justificationis the crucialfeatureresponsible for turning belief into knowledge. One lesson to be learned from
(M) is that epistemic externalism deeply characterizes the nature of full

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THE GETTIER PROBLEM

159

justification.Let me explain.
debate springsfrom this quesEpistemology'sinternalism/externalism
tion: what determinesepistemicjustification?Internalistssay justification
is determinedby an agent'sperspective:reasonerswho are perspectivally
equivalentare justificationallyequivalent;while externalistssay justification is determinedby featuresindependentof an agent'sperspective.But
what does this differencereallycome to?
Notice first that two scenarios appear the same to a person iff her
perspectiveon each is the same.So if we can reckonthe featuresgivingrise
to appearance,we will have found those definingan agent'sperspective.In
this regardit is customaryto say that two scenariosappearthe same to a
person when her relevantappearance-statesare phenomenallythe same.
More carefully,scenariosP1 and P2 appearthe same to S just in case her
mental-representationsof them are, or would be, tokens of the same
phenomenaltype. Epistemicinternalismthen amountsto this idea:
justificationis determinedby the phenomenalfeaturesof an agent's
mind:reasonerswhose mental states are phenomenallyidenticalare
justificationallyidentical;
and epistemicexternalismamountsto this idea:
justificationis determinedby featuresindependentfrom the phenomenal featuresof an agent'smind.
Now, we can easily see that full justificationis determinedby features
independentfrom an agent'sperspective.Thus externalismis true of the
crucial ingredientneeded to convert belief into knowledge:
Lesson One - externalismis true of full justification.
To see this, notice that full justificationmustsatisfyall externalconstraints
on knowledge.For instance:
(El) one is fullyjustifiedin believingP only if one is reliableaboutP,
(E2) one is fully justifiedin believinga truepropositiononly if one
does so becauseone is reliable,
beliefonly if one's
(E3) one is fully justifiedin a perceptually-based
states
are
caused.
perceptual
non-deviantly
And so forth.The point is: everyobjectivereal-worldconnectionnecessary
for knowledgewill be necessaryfor full justificationas well. The failureof
any such connectionwill functionas a defeaterfor condition (b) of (M).
Hence the justificationof that condition will convert to full justification
exactlywhen the externalconstraintson knowledgeare satisfied.Gettier's
work thus provides a direct route to the conclusion that epistemic externalism is true of the crucial ingredient needed for knowledge.

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I60

SCOTTSTURGEON

4. Infallibilismrevisited.
(M) asserts that knowledge is fully justified true belief. The second lesson
of Gettier is this:

Lesson Two- full justificationis infallible.

Whenever you are fully justified in believing a proposition, that proposition
is true. This means that full justification is the only ingredient needed to
convert belief into knowledge. Condition (c) of (M) is redundant after all.
To see this, suppose you are fully justified in believing P. Now consider
the relationship between T and P. There are three possibilities:
T logically implies P
(i)
T logically implies not-P
(ii)
neither (i) nor (ii).
(iii)
Case-(i) scenarios ensure that P is true. So no beliefs in this category will
be mistaken. Case-(ii) scenarios rule out full justification. For if T logically
implies the falsity of your belief in P, then your justification for this belief
will not be ultimately undefeated. There will be facts described in T which
defeat that justification. This leaves category (iii) as the only potential
home for fully justified mistakes. If there are none here, then full justification is infallible. What sort of proposition falls into category (iii)?
To begin, notice that T will logically imply P if P is a nomic consequence
of the matters of fact up to the salient time. For T will contain a description
of the laws of nature along with those facts. Similarly, T will logically
imply not-P if this proposition is a nomic consequence of the matters of
fact. So T will logically imply neither P nor its negation only if P is nomically indeterminate relative to T. But for P to be logically indeterminate
relative to T, and thus belong to category (iii), it must be more than nomically indeterminate relative to T. It must also fail to follow from any of the
matters of fact described in T. If, for example, T describes a particular
causal relation having E as one of its relata, then T will logically predict E
even when E is nomically indeterminate relative to T. (A case like this will
be considered shortly.) Thus, for P to be logically indeterminate relative to
T it must be nomically indeterminate relative to T and logically indeterminate relative to that set got by subtracting the laws described in T.
Three sorts of propositions have been thought to fit the bill: (a) nomic
indeterminacies, (b) universal generalizations, and (c) laws of nature. Each
category gives rise to familiar epistemic problems. As we are about to see,
(M) is a model of propositional knowledge which both explains and helps
solve these problems.
(a) Suppose you shoot a photon toward the slit in a piece of polaroid and
wonder if it will go right or left when passing through. Suppose further that

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THE GETTIER PROBLEM

161

you know all lawsof natureandall mattersof factup to the momentin question. In other words, suppose you know everythingin T. Finally,let this
knowledgerenderit indeterminate,
thoughlikely,that the photonwill go to
the right.On the basisof this you come to believethat the photonwill go to
the right.And supposeit will. Do you know the photonwill go to the right?
I submit that you do not know where the photon will go. After all,
there'sanotherpossible world exactly like yours save the photon goes to
the left. In it you believethe photon will go to the right with exactly the
sameevidence- namelyall the evidence- but you are mistaken.Hencethe
view that you actuallyhave knowledgeimpliesthat bruteluck makesthe
differencebetweenknowledgeand ignorance.This is unacceptable.Luck
does not contributeto our possessionof knowledge.
Eitherwe have located a counter-exampleto the standardpost-Gettier
model of knowledge,or there lurks a defeatersomewherein the photon
case. The latteroption seemsappropriate:indeterminacyitselffunctionsas
a defeater.When all the facts save the issue at hand do not fix the issue,
then this is reasonto withholdjudgement.Case-(iii)scenariosof this sort
are incompatiblewith full justification.
On the other hand, nomic indeterminaciesare not unknowable.If, for
example,the photon goes to the rightand then strikesa screen,we might
verywell come to know the path taken.The lesson is: nomic indeterminacies are knowablewhen they fit into mattersof fact which forge an epistemic route to them. In particular,nomic indeterminaciesare known
through their effects. They are known when the moment of knowledge
itself post-datesthe moment known. But T will logically imply the fact
known in these cases (as suggestedfive paragraphsback). We will have
shiftedfromcategory(iii) to category(i).
This suggeststhe following lemma:
LemmaA If microscopicindeterminaciesclimb into the macroscopic
domain, then we have much less knowledge than commonsense
would admit.
Indeed:if the wobblinessof the tiny reachesup into the world of commonsense, then I submitwe know truthsalmost exclusivelypost facto. Naturally, this does not mean that our commonsensebeliefs are in any sense
unreasonableor less useful.Theyjust do not amountto knowledge.As far
as I can tell, this differencedoes not make any difference.
(b) Supposewe expressthe fact that all Fs are H thus:
UF

(Vx)(Fx -+ Hx).

Does (M) provide a useful model for understandinghow we can know

facts of this sort?

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162.

SCOTTSTURGEON

Yes. For on the present definition of T, T will imply UF . Suppose

xl,...,xn are the Fs, and each is an H. In the event, T will not only
capturethe fact that Hx1, and Hx2,..., and Hxn, it will also capturethe
fact
EF
(3x)(Fx-+ (x = xl v x = x2 v ... v x = n)).
All this togetherimpliesUF . Thus knowledgeof universalfact is, for (M),
straightforwardcase-(i)knowledge.
Many will find this a cheat. They will arguethat generalfacts must be
known on the basis of non-generalfacts, and thus that our definitionof
T should be changed. They would have us impoverishT so that it no
longer entails facts like UF or EF . Once trimmedin this way, T will no
longer form a set sufficientlyrobust to ground our evidencein the usual
way.
(M) thus helpsclarifyone particulartrade-offbetweenmetaphysicsand
epistemology:
LemmaB Knowledgeof generalfact seemspossibleonly when general
fact is admitted into the backgroundontology of one's epistemic
theory.
Unlessyou admitinto your epistemictheorya backgroundof generalfact,
into whichreasonablebeliefmay be grounded,such beliefwill not amount
to knowledgeof generalfact. But once you do, knowledgeof generalfact
will pose no special problem. It will be straightforwardcategory-(i)
knowledge.
(c) SupposeL statesa law of nature:
L
(Vx)(Fx =- Hx).

L claimsthatallmovingobjectstravelat or belowthespeedof
Perhaps

how we can
light.Does (M) providea usefulmodelfor understanding
knowfactsof thissort?
Yes.ForT willcontaina nomictruthabouteveryspeedgreaterthanthat
Thesewilljointly
at thatspeedis impossible.
of light,to wit,thattravelling
on
a
with
entailL . Thus,(M)rendersnomicknowledge par
anyothersort
to
of knowledge.Wehaveit whenour evidencestandsup the facts,and
our evidenceso standswhenthe relevantfactsimplythe nomicfact in
question.
On the otherhand,(M) explainswhy nomicknowledgeis problematic froma Humeanperspective.Thereare two Humeanperspectives
worth distinguishinghere:weak and strong.Accordingto the weak
perspective, nomic knowledge is grounded solely in non-nomic fact.
According to the strong perspective, nomic knowledge is grounded
solely in empiricalfact.

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THE GETTIER PROBLEM

163

A weakHumeanversionof (M)is got by excludingnomictruthsfrom

T.Callsucha weakHumeansetof truths'TwH'.
Theissuethenis:is Llogirelativeto TwH?
callyindeterminate
but
TwHwilldescribenotonlythenon-nomicfactswhichareempirical,
as well.Forinstance,TwHmightdescribethe
thosewhicharemetaphysical
factthatwateris essentiallyH20. So if theempiricalfactsmetaphysically
implyL thenthiswill be describedin TwH,andhenceTwHwill logically
implyL. The resultwill be a case-(i)scenario.On the otherhand,if the
empiricalfactsmetaphysically
implythe negationof L thenthis will be
describedin TwH,andhenceTwHwill logicallyimplythatnegation.The
L will be logicallyindetermiresultwill be a case-(ii)scenario.Therefore,
naterelativeto TwHonly if L does not metaphysically
superveneon the
facts.
Thus:
empirical
LemmaC Nomicknowledgeis possibleon a weakHumeanversion
of (M)onlyif the lawsof naturemetaphysically
on empirsupervene
icalmattersof fact.
TheweakHumeanversionof (M)explainstheHumeanviewthatsupervenienceof the nomicon the non-nomicis a preconditionfor nomic
knowledge.Accordingto this perspective,if the laws of naturedo not
on mattersof fact,thenthelawsof naturecannotbeknown.For
supervene
withoutsupervenience,
nomicknowledgeis exactlyanalogousto knowlin
the
case.
Butwe haveno knowledgein thephotoncase.So
edge
photon
withoutsupervenience
we haveno nomicknowledgeeither.
Finally,a strongHumeanversionof (M)is got byexcludingeverything
fromT butcontingentmattersof fact.Thisnaturallyexcludesthemodal
factsusedon the weakHumeantheoryto accommodate
nomicknowledge. The resultinghighlyimpoverishedset of truthswill implyvery
little.Thus:
LemmaD Nomic knowledgeis impossibleon a strongHumean
versionof (M).
Hereagain(M)explainsa trade-offbetweenmetaphysics
andepistemology.Unlessyouadmitintotheontologyof yourepistemictheorya robust
of metaphysical
fact, into whichreasonablebeliefmay be
background
grounded,suchbeliefwillnotamountto nomicknowledge.Butas soonas
youdo, nomicknowledgewillposeno specialproblem.Itwillbe straightforwardcase-(i)knowledge.
we havelocatedonepurecase-(iii)scenario:
thephotoncase.
Therefore,
And we have claimedthat knowledgeis missingin such a case. This
restrictsthe scope of our everydayknowledgeto the extentthat indeterminacy muddies our everyday world. On the other hand, general facts and
laws of nature fall into category (iii) only when substantial restrictions are

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164

ROBERTJ. FOGELIN

placedontheontologyof ourepistemic
theory.Butonceenforced,thelimit
as well.Weareleftthenwith
of ourknowledgeseemsnaturallyrestricted
definitionof knowledge:
a streamlined
post-Gettier
(PG) S knowsP iff (a)S believesP
(b)S'sbeliefin P is fullyjustified.
Therecan be no doubtbutthatGettierput his fingeron somethingvery
indeed.2
important
King'sCollegeLondon
Strand,London WC2R2LS
2 I thank the discussiongroup to which I belong for encouragement:Tim Crane,Keith
Hossack,Mike Martin,LucyO'Brien,David Papineau,GabrielSegal,BarrySmithand
BernhardWeiss;and I thank Tom Senor,Peter Smith and an anonymousrefereefor
helpfulcomments.

Hookway on KnowledgeInferences
ROBERT
J. FOGELIN
Inhisbook,Scepticism
1990),Christopher
(London:
Hookway
Routledge,
callsattentionto a classof knowledgesentenceshe labelsQ-claims:
Some[knowledge
sentences]likethefollowingtakean indirectquestioncompliment:
themurder
X knowswhocommitted
X knowswhywaterexpandson freezing
X knowswhenthetrainleavesfor London
X knowswhethertheatomicweightof sodiumis 29
X knowshowtheprisonerescaped.
Theirformcanbe expressed:
X knowsQ. (pp.196-97)
Hookwaycontrastssuch Q-claimswith sentenceshe call P-claims.Pclaimshavetheform:
X knowsthatP.
Hookwaypoints out, quite correctly,that the analysisof knowledge
on P-claimsto the relative
sentenceshas to a largeextentconcentrated
ANALYSIS
53.3, July 1993, pp. 164-168. @ Robert J. Fogelin

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