FROM OUR CORRESPONDENTS

Muslim Personal Law

Questions of Reform and Uniformity Be Delinked
Balraj P u r i
IN an otherwise well reasoned ruling on
the right of maintenance of a divorced
Muslim woman, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court raised issues which are not
directly related to it and might have the
effect of dampening the enthusiasm of
Muslim women and provoking the resistance of the Muslim male.
He has linked the issue of the right of
women, including Muslim women, with
the cause of national integration. Emphasising the need for removing disparate
loyalties to taws which have conflicting
ideologies, the Chief Justice, in his ruling
on behalf of the five-judge constitutional
bench, expressed regret that Article 44 of
the Constitution, which said the State
shall endeavour to secure fpr the citizens
a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India, has remained a dead letter.
Do rights of women need to be justified
on the touchstone of their contribution to
national integration instead of on their
own merit? Must justice to Muslim
women wait till a uniform civil law is
adopted? And does uniformity always
promote unity?
The cause of Muslim women and of
national integration has already suffered
due to their linkage with a common civil
law, which is far from axiomatic.
The issue of personal law is, in fact,
closely linked with the Muslim urge for
identity. The near unanimity among the
Muslinos of the country against a uniform
personal law is more a reflection of this
urge than of their obscurantism. Similarly
most of the clamour for a common law
by the Hindus is motivated by a desire for
cultural arid political uniformity rather
than for reform of the so-called retrograde
features of the Muslim law. In fact these
features are usually cited merely to buttress the case for a common law.
U R G E FOR M U S L I M IDENTITY

The urge of identity of Muslims has

survived their traumatic experience of the
partition of India. Though the Muslim
community, nationally and internationally, has its own peculiarities, its urge for
identity is no different for the universal
phenomenon of sharpening of ethnic and
religious identities under the impact of
modernisation.
Every identity has its symbols which are
not acquired through a rational and conscious choice of its members but emerge
imperceptibly though a complex interplay

of factors.
The sudden fall of Urdu from the high
cultural and political pedestalthough
for known reasons, changes in the
Muslim character of Aligarh Muslim
University and campaign for a uniform
personal law threw up three rallying points
for the Muslim community of India.
It does not mean that Muslims today are
in greater need for Urdu than English and
the regional languages or that despite the
mushroom growth of universities they still
depend on Aligarh for their academic
needs or that they are over-eager to marry
four wives. The Muslim attitude on these
issues is determined by entirely different
reasons, which need to be understood
rather than merely condemned.
Nobody explicitly insists that subnational identities, including that of
Muslims, should just cease to exist
altogether. In a democratic and secular
country, there is hardly any way of getting
rid of them. What is in effect subject to
debate is the legitimate limits and fields
of the autonomy of these identities. It is
argued, on the one side, that appeasement
widens the limits of autonomy till it
threatens national unity. But does not
imposed uniformity provoke revolts of
diversities and the resultant tension pose
a greater threat to unity? On the other
hand, a legitimate degree of autonomy, by
providing means of gratification of subnational urges, is likely to improve their
emotional attachment with the nation and
hence their sense of Indian patriotism and
pride as Indian nationals. Of course,
autonomous rights must not transgress
similar rights of other communities and
override claims of national interest and
commonly accepted national values.
TEST CASE

Muslim personal law "has, in this context, in a, way, become the test case.
Whether it comes within 'the legitimate
range and region of autonomy of Muslims
is a question on which opinion is sharply
divided on communal lines. One vital
question that arises in this connection is
whether this autonomy is compatible with
the principle of equality before law?
There is no doubt that in a secular
democratic country all people likely to be
involved in any action should be governed
by the same law. If a Muslim robs or
assaults a Hindu, or vice versa, the
criminal must be dealt with under the
Economic and Political Weekly
Vol XX, No 23, June 8, 1985 '

same law, irrespective of his community.

Similarly disputes over contracts, business
deals, wages, employment, etc, must be
subject to a uniform law, whatever be the
caste, community and cited of the persons
involved. For these logical reasons,
codification of common criminal and civil
laws by the British government was held
by the Ulemas of India to be in accordance with the spirit of the shariat.
While communal diversity is not taken
into account in criminal and civil legislation of the country, customary practices
of various cultural groups are not completely disregarded. Variations of laws within
other federations of the world are indeed
wider. In USA, for instance, not only
criminal and civil laws vary from state to
state, but even personal law, except that
relating to monogamy, varies. The basic
principle, however, is that people similarly
situated, geographically, culturally, etc,
should be treated equally before law.
Variations in law to make allowance for
variations in situations and categories of
people are nothing unusual. What is
usually resented is not the difference but
the discrimination in treatment; unless it
be in the nature of compensatory discrimination, i e, confering more than equal
rights on the weaker sections.
Is the right of a Muslim male to marry
four wives a discrimination against males
of other communities? If at all it is a
privilege, it is at the cost of Muslim
women. And if the so-called male privilege and female disprivilege are added up,
can we surely say that the Muslim community is a privileged community on this
account.
A graver apprehension, widely whispered and occasionally publicly expressed
by many Hindus is that Muslims insist on
their legal right to polygamythe only
known provision of the Muslim personal
lawwith a view to outnumbering
Hindus.
The first premise of the apprehension,
that legal provision for polygamy automatically leads to its practice, is not substantiated by statistical studies. For the percentage of polygamous Muslim families is no
larger than that of such families in any
other community.
The second premise that polygamy
would increase the total number of
Muslim wives is logically fallacious. For
if some men marry more than one
woman, less women would be available
for the remaining men, some of whom
might have to remain unmarried. While
the total stock of child-bearing women
would remain constant, the number of
men engaged in the task of procreation
would be reduced. Thus if at all polygamy
987

June 8, 1985
makes a difference as compared to
monogamy on the rate of population
growth, it' is likely to be in the direction
of depressing it. For four men with four
wives have chances of producing more
children than one man with four wives.
Incidentally, the number of wives a
Muslim may have under the present law
is not limited to four. The law states: "If
he marries a fifth wife, when he has
already four, the marriage is not void
(Batil), but merely irregular (Fasid)" (vide
Mulla's "Mahommedan Law", section
255).
LIBERAL ARGUMENT

A sizeable liberal Hindu opinion is, in

fact, outraged by such provisions of the
Muslim law. While general opposition of
Hindus to a separate personal law for
Muslims is based on ignorance, prejudice
or fear, liberals object to it on two
grounds. First, the individual and not the
community should be the basic unit of a
democracy. Second, Muslims too must
benefit by a progressive law to the extent
Hindus are doing.
The first is a question of should and
reality. Shouldn't a liberal take cognisance
of reality instead of imposing on it his
view of it. Moreover, a community is also
a means of self-expression of an
individual.
The second argument confuses the
issues of uniformity with reform. The
solid resistance of the Muslim community to the question of reform of its personal
law has been built up because it was linked with uniformity. No progress in the
field of reform seems possible unless the
two issues are delinked. Further, it is
patronising to suggest that Muslim law
should be as progressive as Hindu law.
Why should not it be more or less than
the latter in some of its provisions, depending on what one means by the adjective
progressive?
Already in one crucial sense Muslim
law is closer to the modern spirit. It is
basically a contract between the man and
the woman and not a sacrament as is the
case in most other religions. It also implies that consent of the girl for marriage
is necessary which nobody elseparent or
guardiancan give on her behalf.
And what would one say of the Muta
(temporary) marriage, which the Shia law
recognises and in which the period of
cohabitation is fixed and may be a term
of years. In theory it could be as temporary as a year, a month, a day or a
night.
A debate on what personal laws are
progressive or desirable for the Muslim
community is likely to be less inhibited if
988

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

a uniform code is not insisted on. The

proposed reforms should keep in view the
religious prescriptions as well as the values
of the modem age like equality of man
and woman. Let us see how far are the two
compatible.
ISLAMIC LAWS NOT RIGID

Neither Muslim history nor any theological doctrine suggests that Islamic
laws have been immutable and rigid. As
M Hidayatullah observes in his introduction to "Principles of Mohamedan Law"
(Bombay, 1969), "the invocation of the
right of the Ruler (pr the State) to take
public good into account, to change an
established rule, is not new. It was practised by the Khulafai-Rashidin. Changes
in Hadd (limit of punishment) were made
from time to time as a part of public
policy, during the Prophet's own time and '
that of all the Caliphs". Citing an instance,
Hidayatullah says that while the Prophet
did not order compensation against a
bailee who had lost the bailed article by
theft, without any neglect on his part,
Caliph Ummar ordered such compensation because the bailees began to take
advantage of the rule.
Again the governor designate of Yemen,
according to a Hadith, told the Prophet
that he would use his own reason in making decisions on issues on which he
failed to get guidance from the holy book
or the usage of the Prophet. The Prophet
approved of it which is an eloquent
testimony to the fact that Islam is not
unresponsive to new situations not contemplated in the Quran and the Hadith.
During the 1400-year long odyssey of
Islam through a large part of the world,
Islamic laws are known to have widely
changed, from time to time and country
to country. Even within India, all Muslim
communities in different parts do not
follow a uniform personal law and the
courts respect diversities of customs and
practices. The acceptance of modern common criminal and civil laws without any
reservations by the Muslim intelligentsia
and masses in Indiaas also in many
other countries of the world, including
Muslim countriesin place of what was
strictly ordained in the Quran again bears
out the fact that Islam has been responding to the needs of the times. However,
Islamic scholars have insisted that all
reforms must be subject to the fundamental moral and spiritual principles of Islam.
Real controversy is, however, not about
the possibility and need of change in laws
but its manner; who has the authority to
decide that fundamental principles havt
not been violated?
There are four known sources of

Islamic law and hence of reform: Quran,

Hadith, Qiyas and Ijmaa. While divine
revelation through the Quran and the
practices and precedents of the Prophet
recorded in the Hadith are the final
authority, Qiyas or interpretation of their
intention must guide in situations uncovered by them.
It is, however, the concept of Ijmaa, the
congregation of scholars, which has, the
power of independent judgment or innovation called Ijtehad that is a distinctive
feature of the rationality of Islam.
SPIRIT OF IJTEHAD

Many Muslim scholars have urged the

revival of the spirit of Ijtehad to restore
a dynamic role to Islamic jurisprudence.
Ameer Ali (1848-1928) who made a pioneering contribution to reviving Muslim
consciousness in the subcontinent as an
original thinker bewailed that "a follower
of Muhammad should abandon his judgment completely to the interpretations of
men who lived in the 9th century and
could have no conception of the necessities of the 20th".
Similarly, Mohammad Iqbal (1876-1938)
attached special importance to Ijtehad as
a source of Muslim law. In his famous
"Lectures on Reconstruction of Religious
Thought in Islam", he held that Ijtehad
"within the limits of the revealed text, is
absolutely free" and "was permitted even
in the life-time of Holy Prophet" (Delhi
edition, p 147).
With the expansion of the sphere of
Islam, territorially and numerically, it
became increasingly difficult to hold an
Ijmaa. For Islam is not a cadre-based,
hierarchised church with registered
Ulemas. Who is then authorised to convene an Ijmaa? What should be the qualifications of the participants? Should they
merely be scholars of Arabic and theology
or also of modern knowledge? But who
is to determine religious and secular
qualifications?
As Iqbal gives serious thought to the
questions of Ijtehad and Ijmaa, his learned views deserve to be quoted at length
and to form the starting point of a discussion on the subject.
He believes that principle of change
applies even to eternal principles. For
"change is, according to the Quran, one
of the greatest signs of God". He therefore
regrets the immobility of Islam for the last
500 years" largely due to the decling in the
spirit of Ijtehad (p 147).
Iqbal does not regard the Quran as a
legal code (p 165). Treating it as a source
of moral and spiritual guidance, tie relies
on Sura 26-69: "Those who exert themselves in our paths, we will surely guide."

He rejects the claim of the Ulemas of

Islam a b o u t the finality of the
Mahomedan law and pleads for Ijtehad
to reinterpret it in "the light of modern
experience and the altered conditions of
the modern life" (p 168).
Faced with the problems of convening
an Ijmaa, Iqbal observes: "Legislative
assembly is the only possible form Ijmaa
could take in modern times", to which the
power of Ijtehad may be transferred. In
other words, laws passer by Parliament
would be as valid as those adopted by
Ijmaa of earlier times. If the Muslim
personal law was passed by a majority of
Muslim MPs while others abstained, the
decision, according to Iqbal's logic, should
have perfect religious sanctity.
While there may be no unanimity about
the modus operandi, scholarly opinion
overwhelmingly favours the view that
Muslims have a right to change their laws
(1 e, those which exclusively concern
them). In any case, who but Muslims can
decide that they have this right.
The remaining question is the criteria
for change; indicated by modern human
values and spirit of Islam. Could equality
of man and woman be one of the criteria
for judging the provisions of the Muslim
personal law?
RIGHTS OF WOMEN

It seems unlikely that the Muslim community can be led to believe that equality
of sexes is in conflict with the spirit of
Islam. But who is the final authority on
the basic principle, the Constitution or the
community? If the community, can its
male members arrogate the right to decide
that they have superior rights over
females? Or shouldn't it be the right of
Muslim women to decide whether they
continue to prefer an inferior status? If
the right of non-Muslims to impose their
views on the legal status of the families
of Muslims is challenged, the right of the
Muslim men to impose their views on the
status of women would similarly be
challenged.
If the principle of equality is conceded,
present legal provisions regarding
polygamy, divorce, guardianship, inheritance, Iddat and maintenance would have
to be drastically modified.
While Mahomedan law permits a male
Muslim to have as many as four wives
(fifth marriage being irregular though not
void), "it is not lawful for Mahomedan
woman to have more than one husband
at the same time" (Mulla, sections 255 and
256). The provisions for men and women
in this respect are grossly different and
inequitable
As far as divorce is concerned, "any
Mahomedan of sound mind, who has attained puberty, may divorce his wife
whenever he desires without assigning any

cause" (Mulla, section 308). The divorce

may be oral or written (section 310).
The power to give divorce belongs
primarily to the husband. But he has a
right to delegate the power to his wife who
by virtue of power acquired from her husband can divorce him (Mulla, section 314)
It, again, is a patently unequal position.
However, the Dissolution of Muslim
Marriages Act VIII of 1939 gives substantial relief to Muslim women on this issue
and lays down the following grounds of
divorce: (1) the whereabouts of the husband are unknown for a period of four
years; (2) failure of the husband to provide for the maintenance of the wife for
a period of two years; (3) sentence of
imprisonment on husband for a period of
seven years; (4) failure without reasonable
cause to perform marital obligations;
(5) impotence of husband; (6) insanity of
husband; (7) repudiation of marriage by
wife (a minor girl married by a father or
grandfather has a right to repudiate marriage after attaining age of 18 years provided it was not consummated); (8) cruelty of husband, and (9) apostasy from
Islam of the husband.
The enactment definitely improved the
status of Muslim women. But all the
grounds for divorce in the ease of a
woman are subject to proof and judicial
scrutiny whereas a man need not assign
any reason for divorcing his wife. This is
far from the requirements of equality of
sexes.
Inequality is equally glaring in the law
relating to guardianship. For it recognises
the father as the primary and natural
guardian of his minor children. The
mother is only entitled to the custody of
her male child until the age of seven and
of her female child until she attains puberty. But the right of custody is subject to
the supervision of the father and this
right, too, lapses after her remarriage.
The law of inheritance is no less inequitable. For whatever be the line of
succession, the share of male heirs at every
level shall be twice that of female heirs at
that level.
Provision of Iddat, period of seclusion,
applies only to a woman after divorce or
death of her husband and is clearly discriminatory.
Another issue that concerns the rights
of women, though not directly linked with
the question of equality, is that of
maintenance. Under the Mahomedan law
there is no provision for maintenance for
a widow or a divorcee; except that in the
case of the latter, it is limited to the period
of Iddat (seclusion) which lasts from three
months to the period of pregnancy, whichever is longer.
The right to maintenance of a married
woman, according to the Mahomedan
law, is valid only so long "she is faithful

to him and obeys his reasonable orders"

and she is "not too young for matrimonial
intercourse". Inferiority of woman implied
in this provision, is unmistakable.
However, Sections 125 and 127 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 recognise the right to maintenance as a distinct
statutory right irrespective of the nationalities or creed of parties and makes it
independent of personal law or any
custom governing the parties. Section
127(3), in fact, grants additional rights to
a divorced Muslim woman for receiving
maintenance beyond the period of Iddat,
till such time as she has not married after
her divorce (1979, Allahabad Law Journal,
210).

The right of a Muslim divorcee to maintenance, independent of mehr, was categorically upheld by the Supreme Court in
1980. In his judgment on Fuzlunbi versus
K Khadar Vali, V R Krishna Iyer observed, "Section 126-127 is a secular code
deliberately designed to protect women,
who are victims of neglect during marriage and divorce. It is rested in the State's
responsibility to the weaker sections of
women and children and is not confined
to members of one religion and region"
(AIR 1980, S C, 1730).
The latest judgment of the five-member
constitutional bench of the Supreme
Court (April 1985 confirmed the legality
of the right of a Muslim divorcee to
maintenance earlier upheld by Allahabad
High Court (1979) and Supreme Court
(1980). The Chief Justice ruled that section 125 of the Cr PC was not only consistent with the Muslim personal law but
also with Quranic injunctions.
The amended criminal code and the
Supreme Court judgment raise a number
of vital issues. The right of a Muslim
woman to maintenance is now guaranteed
by a common secular law overriding the
personal law. Would other provisions of
the personal law be similarly void if they
clash with the basic law of the land? What
would then happen to the autonomy of
the Muslim community in this respect?
While this is not the place for a fine
constitutional debate on the subject, ii
seems obvious that religious groups do
come in the category of reasonable classification entitled to be governed by their
respective personal laws. However, the
constitutional obligation to the rights of
womenwho also constitute a distinct
category, in particular their right to
equality with man, cannot perhaps be
dismissed. But does the constitutional
position clash with the moral and natural
rights of Muslim women? Or with the
spirit of Islam?
Some eminent Muslims do maintain
that Mahomedan law does not represent
the spirit of Islam, Justice Krishna Iyer,
in the above cited case, referred to an
989

June 8, 198!>

elaborate judgment of Justice Beharul

Islam "replete with quotes from the Holy
Quran" in which he expressed the error
of regarding "Talaq in Muslim law as
good even if pronounced at whim or in
tantrum".
Further, it is pointed out that the practice of Talaq, by thrice pronouncing the
word, is merely permitted. It is not commended, and is, in fact, condemned by the
Prophet. That women had as much right
of "blaq as man is borne out by a Hadith
in which the Prophet granted a woman's
request for divorce.
Again, polygamy is permitted but not
commended. If the conditions prescribed
by the Quran for permitting a second wife
were to be enforced, polygamy would
simply become impossible.
But the only way to judge the spirit of
Islam is by the direction it gave to preIslamic laws and customs. The attempt to
humanise an unjust patriarchal system
was indeed revolutionary. It is unfair to
measure the reforms introduced by Islam,
torn out of its historical context, in terms
of the values of today. Equality of sexes
is a very recent concept which is a product
of opportunities of independent careers
for women and universal education and
franchise.
The traditional rights of a man were
based on the presumption that he was the
head of the family, its bread-winner and
protector. Asghar Ali Engineer quotes the
Quran (4:34) to show that this precisely
is the reason cited therein for conceding
male superiority over the female. What
would the spirit of the Quran indicate if
this situation changes and woman is no
more exclusively dependent on man? The
situation may call for a revolutionary
change in the status of women in society,
as the Prophet had introduced in the
Arabian society 1,400 yeas ago. Isn't it a
situation like this for which Islam had
made a provision of Ijtehad?
UNIFORMITY VS INTEGRATION

The purport of this note is not to settle

all legal and theological issues on the
subject. It merely examines the scope for
reform in Islamic laws, on human, constitutional and religious grounds and the
capacity of the reformed laws to meet the
needs of modern society. It is a plea for
a debate on a subject of vital importance
to Muslim community as it concerns the
happiness of its families, the urge of its
women for an equitable status and its
socio-economic life. Such a debate should
not only be possible but should also
become necessary if it is insulated against
the threats and provocations of a uniform
personal code. In fact the debate itself
990

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

would help in ensuring this insulation.

Needless to add, the health and growth of
a community also depend on its ability to
debate its problems. And no tradition has
survived long without continuously
changing.
Some sort of debate is, in fact, going
on in the Muslim community. It has for
instance been vigorously pleaded that a
permissive and not a compulsory law may
be enacted for those who may opt for it.
Again, the All-India Women Conference,

under the presidentship of Begum Hamid

Ali, had suggested way back in the early
thirties the inclusion of the rights of
women in the Nikahnama. As Muslim
marriage is based on the principle of contract, it can be made as equitable as one
likes without violating the present law and
a rigid fundamentalist position. Kamila
Tyabji who has been campaigning foF this
course and whose family has been following it, refers, in this context, to an agreement drafted bv a Muslim firm of solici-

APPOINTMENTS

Institute of Public Enterprise

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY CAMPUS
HYDERABAD 600 007, INDIA

NEEDS

FACULTY
The Institute is an independent non-profit research agency funded by Public
Enterprises, State and Central Governments and is recognised by the Indian
Council of Social Science Research as a national centre in the field of Public
Enterprise. Besides undertaking research on areas of relevance to public enterprise management it conducts an MBA in Public Enterprise programme
clusively to benefit practising executives. The Institute also conducts a one
year post-graduate programme leading to Diploma in Computer Systems. It
also supports Ph D programmes. The growing research, training, consultancy
and teaching activities of the Institute offer excellent opportunities to persons with brilliant academic record and proven research/teaching experience.
The Institute needs Faculty in the following areas:
1 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Minimum Qualifications: Chartered or Cost
Accountant with at least 6 years experience in industry or training/research institutions. Ph Ds/MBAs with specialisation in Finance area
with less than 6 years work experience will also be considered.
2 ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR/DEVELOPMENT Minimum Qualifications
Ph D in Organisational Behaviour/Industrial Psychology with at least 6 years
of Research/Management Development Experience.
3 MARKETING: Minimum Qualifications: MBA with specialisation in Marketing
with experience of consultancy, training, research on marketing in public
enterprise.
A ECONOMICS: Minimum Qualifications: Ph D in Economics with consistently
good academic record. Research/Consultancy experience of about 6 years
in a reputed organisation/Institution.
5 CORPORATE MANAGEMENT Minimum Qualifications: MBA from any of
the premier Management Institutes; Experience/aptitude in training or
research would be preferred.
EXPERIENCE IN PEs: Persons with qualifications close to these indicated above
but who have work experience in relevant area in PEs will be preferred.
SCALE OF PAY: Depending upon the Qualifications and experience the candidates may be placed in Rs. 700Rs. 1600; Rs. 1200-Rs. 1900; Rs. 1500-Rs. 2500
(UGC Scales) with allowances as per UGC Rules.
Please apply in strict confidence with full particulars of age, qualifications,
experience and present/expected emoluments alongwith two references to
the Director of the Institute within 15 days of the Advertisement.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

tors, included as an appendix in F y z e e ' s
"Outlines of the Mohamadan Law" as
also to a "shorter and much dramatic
version of the contract" drafted by Daniel
Latifi which bears the stamp of the Chief
Qazi of Aligarh, The latter had three provisions: first, equal position of husband
and wife as regards divorce; second, mehr,
half of which to be paid immediately and
the rest deferred to death or divorce; and,

third, no right of polygamy to the

husband.
It is a liberal trend like this that is likely
to be threatened by the obiter dicta of the
Chief Justice who has, transgressing his
judicial role, sanctified the general Hindu
obsession for uniformity of the civil law.
If at all there is a correlation between
uniformity and integration it is more a
negative than a positive one.

MAHARASHTRA

Change of Patil
J VD
THE last time when Vasantdada Patil
resigned from a ministerial office in the
mid-seventies, he was irrigation minister
in S B Chavan's cabinet. At that time, he
not only resigned from the cabinet but
had also announced his retirement from
active politics. Within a few months he
was back in office, in fact as the chief
minister. "He could not stay retired when
the ship of the Congress party was afire",
he explained then. His return effectively
ended the political career at the state level
of S B Chavan.
Almost a decade has passed since then,
the Congress party has undergone several
editions more, Vasantdada himself has
been in and out of the Indira/Rajiv version of the party a couple of times; indeed
so have been S B Chavan, Gadgil, Shivraj
Patil and most other frontline leaders of
the Indira Congress in Maharashtra. Once
again Vasantdada Patil has now found it
necessary to resign from office, this time
from the chief ministership of Maharashtra. Significantly though, no. retirement
from active politics is perhaps planned
this time, at least it has not been
announced.
One may take with a grain of salt the
ostensible reasons behind the latest
resignation (Vasantdada himself has not
publicly given any). In the Congress
culture as it has evolved in the past decade
or two, chief ministers of states have, at
best, been no better than errand boys and
justifiably enough, have been treated no
differently by the central leadership of the
party. As a general secretary of the party
for a few years, Vasantdada himself has
been a willing collaborator in the systematic downgrading of state-level leaders,
through a succession of Anjiahs and
Pahadias and Antulays and Bhosales.
Evidently, after becoming a chief minister,
one changes one's perspective.
Starting out as a freedom fighter ovei
forty years back, and later as a leader in
the co-operative movement, and as a loyal
organisation man in the state Congress,

Vasantdada established widespread contacts at the grassroots level, throughout

western Maharashtra and today has a
good following there. When, after the
debacle under Antulay and Bhosale, the
party leadership had no option but to turn
to Vasantdada, he proceeded to build
upon this following by a shrewd use of
state patronage. It is believed that in the
current legislative assembly, a majority of
the party members are allied with him.
Such a situation could not be expected
to last, given the preference of the party
bosses for weak chief ministers beholden
to the central leadership. Till such time as
there was no alternative, Vasantdada had
to be kept on. It was always clear that if
and when Sharad Pawar decided to switch
sides and join with Rajiv Gandhi, Vasantdada would get short shrift. By not
waiting till the Rajiv Gandhi-Sharad
Pawar axis crystallised, Vasantdada once
again has exhibited his political acumen.
By resigning just when Sharad Pawar
had started talking sympathetically of
'Congress culture', Vasantdada has not
only put both Rajiv Gandhi and Sharad
Pawar on the defensive but has probably
postponed the party-switch of the latter
by at least a few months. Also by subtly
presenting himself as a victim of the
overbearing ways of New Delhi, he has
ensured that he can carry the banner of
the self-respect of Maharashtra a la NTR,
should the need arise, depriving Sharad
Pawar of the same role in the process.
By neither leaving the selection of the
new leader to New Delhi nor waiting for
the clearance by New Delhi of the cabinet
list of new chief minister, the Congress
party in Maharashtra legislature has
shown how influential Vasantdada Patil
continues to be, even as an ex-chief
minister. However, not much should be
read into this seeming show of independence. The picture may change substantially when the chips are really down. It
may be recalled that the Congress
members in the legislature had expressed

June 8, 1985
full confidence in Antulay just before he
was asked to resign.
Moreover, on the wider state level, there
are clear limitations to Vasantdada's influence. The co-operative political
machine which has brought prosperity
and power to the rich and the middle
peasantry in western Maharashtra,(which
is popularly called the 'Maratha lobby' or
the 'sugar lobby') and of which he is one
of the major representatives today has not
been able to go beyond and encompass the
scheduled castes, the rural landless or the
urban masses. Indira Gandhi showed in
the past that even with a rag-tag of
Antulays and Tirupudes behind her, it was
possible to bypass this Maratha machine
to a significant extent. (It was only after
that a somewhat chastened Vasantdada
joined her again.) Today there seems to
be no political-movement in Maharashtra
capable of harnessing this potential force.
With Rajiv Gandhi's preference for a
new style of politicsdepending more on
mass media and less on local resources
the influence of the old-style politicians
like Vasantdada Patil is bound to wane in
the party. Nevertheless, there are evident
limitations to the new politics in the
Indian context, as the central leadership
is now discovering. Just as it cannot wish
away Jagannath Mishra in Bihar, similarly
it will have to learn to cope with leaders
like Vasantdada Patil and the forces he
represents in Maharashtra for quite some
time to come. It is in this context that an
alliance between Sharad Pawar and Rajiv
Gandhi may prove fruitful to both.
Of course, no one is under any illusion
that any such realignment of these groups
and the sections of the society will lead
to any betterment of the lot of the common man. It is notable that in all the
hullaballoo over the resignation of the
chief minister and the change in the
ministry, no one has a word to say about
its likely impact on the common man
There is not going to be any. So for as the
most urgent problems facing Maharashtra
today are concernedwhether it is the
matter of drinking water to about 40 per
cent of the state's population, or whether
it is the growing nexus between the
criminals and the rulers, whether it is the
rising cost of living or the crumbling state
of administration, no observer of the
state's political scene expects any improvement. Understandably so, because, quite
realistically whether Patil goes or
Nilangekar-Patil comes, whether Pawar
changes sides or not, it may be confidently
expected that the common man will continue to be where he has always beenat
the bottom of the priorities of the
politicians.
991