CEREZO V.

TUAZON
G.R. No. 141538
March 23, 2004
A Country Bus Lines passenger bus, driven by Danilo
Foronda and owned by Mrs. Cerezo, collided with a tricycle,
driven by Tuazon, along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines,
Mabalacat, Pampanga. Because of this, Tuazon suffered serious
physical injuries, making him unable to walk and disabled,
with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut.
Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against: (1) Mrs.
Cerezo; (2) Attorney Juan Cerezo (husband of Mrs. Cerezo);
(3) Foronda. Tuazon alleged that at the time of the incident,
Tuazon was in his proper lane, while Foronda willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a
negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard
to traffic rules and regulations, there being a Slow Down
sign near the scene of the incident.
Alias Summons was served at the office of Atty. Cerezo, in
Tarlac after the initial summons were returned unserved.
Cerezo spouses participated in the proceedings before the
RTC. Atty. Valera, the counsel of the Cerezo spouses, filed a
motion praying for the issuance of new summons on the
Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the
Rules of Court. RTC denied such motion, claiming that any
infirmity in the service of the summons has been cured. The
RTC also declared the spouses Cerezo in default for its failure
to file an answer.
On May 30, 1995, the RTC: (1) ruled in favor of Tuazon;
(2) made no pronouncement on Forondas liability since no
summons was served on him; (3) held Mrs. Cerezo solely
liable due to the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee,
pursuant to Article 2180 ; (4) did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable

as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezos business benefited

the family. Mrs. Cerezo filed the following:
(1) RTC: petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of
fraud, mistake or excusable negligence denied
(2) CA: petition for certiorari, questioning whether the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over her case, considering there was
no service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo
spouses claimed was an indispensable party. denied
(3) SC: petition for review on certiorari denied (became final
and executory)
(4) CA: petition for annulment of May 30 1995 judgment with
prayer for TRO, contending that the basis is lack of
jurisdiction, because RTC could not validly render
judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda for there was no service of summons to him. Also,
Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action for damages in the criminal action. denied
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N it is required for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction
over Foronda first, before Mrs. Cerezo, as Forondas
employer, could be held liable for the damages due to
Forondas negligence. NO
(2) W/N it was necessary for Tuazon to reserve the right to
institute a separate action for damages in the criminal
action. NO
(3) W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the Cerezo
spouses. YES
(4) W/N the remedies of petition for relief from judgment and
petition for annulment of judgment were proper in this case.
(not relevant) NO

HELD:
1. NO. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case.
A negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a
delict under Article 103 of the RPC, or an action for a quasidelict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An action based
on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal
action. In this case, Tuazon chose to file an action for
damages based on a quasi-delict and RTC found Mrs.
Cerezo, as Forondas employer, vicariously liable under Article
2180 for Forondas negligence.
An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by
the courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final
resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezos
liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not
only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not
an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazons
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo. Furthermore, where
the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party
because complete relief is available from either. Therefore,
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon
may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
An employers liability based on a quasi-delict is primary
and direct, while the employers liability based on a delict is
merely subsidiary. Although liability under Article 2180
originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an
employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer
has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing
or avoiding the damage. The action can be brought directly
against the person responsible for another, without
including the author of the act. The action against the

principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence

of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the
judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is
subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility
of the employer is in itself a principal action.
In contrast, to hold the employer subsidiarily liable in a
delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where
the employees delict and corresponding primary liability are
established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then
the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of
Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda. Since Foronda
is not an indispensable party to the present case, therefore,
RTC had jurisdiction and was competent to decide the case
in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the
absence of Foronda.
2. NO. It is not necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a
separate civil action, because he opted to file a civil action for
damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly
liable for her own civil negligence, pursuant to Art. 2180.
3. YES. RTC acquired jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezos
person. Any irregularity in the service of summons that might
have vitiated RTCs jurisdiction over the persons of the Cerezo
spouses was deemed waived when the Cerezo spouses filed a
petition for relief from judgment.
4. (skippable) NO. Being a party declared in default, the
following are the remedies that Cerezo spouses could have
availed of, according to the case of Lina v. CA:

(1) motion under oath to set aside the order of default

(Sec. 3(b), Rule 9);
(2) motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
(3) petition for relief (Section 1 of Rule 38)
(4) appeal from the judgment (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
(5) petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a
judgment by default
Mrs. Cerezo could have availed of these remedies within
the reglementary periods, but she incorrectly filed a petition for
relief from judgment, despite the absence of fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented her from filing
an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for certiorari.

Also, Mrs. Cerezo thereafter filed in CA a petition for

annulment of the judgment of the RTC, based on lack of
jurisdiction. But a party may avail of the remedy of annulment
of judgment only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the party. Since she
erroneously filed a petition for relief, she could no longer avail
of the remedy of annulment.
The petition is DENIED.