Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Greek Foreign Affairs Council

Europes Long Peace
Professor Mark Gilbert
Leonidas Marcantonatos

The Significance of Aligning Greece with the West during the Cold War

Introduction
I.
II.

III.
IV.
V.

Aligning Greece with the West

From Civil War to Cold War
a. Greeces strategic importance
b. Greeces accession in NATO
The US support of the Colonels regime
Abandoning Cyprus
Greeces accession in the EEC
a. The additional patron and the role of Karamanlis
b. The Papandreou controversy

Page 2
Page 3
Page 4

Page 6
Page 8
Page 11

Final Notes

Page 14

Bibliography

Page 15

Appendix

Page 16

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

The significance of aligning Greece with the West during the Cold War
Introduction
When looking at Greeces Foreign Policy in the 19th century, one can see the clear
alignment of Greece with the West. Undoubtedly, Greek Politicians took major long-term
decisions, which propelled the country in the Wests sphere of influence. These were: the
alliance of Greece with the winners of the First and Second World Wars, Greeces membership
in NATO in 1952, and the entrance of Greece in the European Economic Community in 1981.
Although this alignment directed Greek foreign policy to a great extent throughout the
Cold War, the subject of Greek-Turkish relations has attracted the interest of a large number of
scholars and historians due to its significance in the regional affairs of the Eastern
Mediterranean. Therefore, although the topic of Greek-Turkish relations has already been studied
extensively, the significance of Greeces alignment with the West has not been thoroughly
assessed.
When assessing the effects of this decision, it is evident that it created a foundation for
Greeces economic development and also made a small country in the Mediterranean an
important strategic ally for the U.S and Western Europe. However, although one can argue that
this alignment came with the cost of abandoning the unification with Cyprus, this analysis will
support that the Cyprus issue is a case of missed opportunities since in principle the West
favored Greece on the matter. In addition, though some scholars correctly have stressed that the
West and particularly the U.S, exerted influence on Greek foreign policy during the Cold War,
this analysis will focus on the benefits of this influence.
Finally, Greek policy makers often have stated that Greek Foreign Policy has needed and
still needs alternatives. However, when looking upon the alternatives during the Cold War,
Greece could not consider an option of aligning with the other side of the Iron Curtain. In
essence, had Greece not been invited to join the Western camp in the aftermath of the World War
Two, it would have looked far from different as we know it today.

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

I.

Aligning Greece with the West

Greeces economy was in a devastating position after the Second World War, the Nazi
occupation had left a ruined economy, an unstable political system, a torn Greek society and a
country that was on the verge of a civil war. The first step of aligning Greece with the West was
the Percentages Agreement in Moscow (October, 1944) between Winston Churchill and Joseph
Stalin when essentially Romania was sacrificed for Greece1. In fact, the future of Greece became
clear at the meeting where it was decided that Greece would join the Western camp within the
British sphere of influence. Britains patronage did not last long and in February 1947, the
British government informed the United States that it could no longer support Greece because of
the costly Greek Civil War (1946-1949) that had erupted a year earlier, between the Greek
government and the communist party2. Besides, Great Britain was facing its own economic
problems and it was evident that it could not financially support the Greek government at the
time being3.
Due to the strategic significance of Greece, the United States took the decision to
intervene and apply the Truman Doctrine on March 19474. This brought Greece under the United
States wing, in an attempt to battle the spread of communism in the Balkan Peninsula. More
specifically, a possible communist victory in the Greek civil war (1946-1949) convinced the
United States to support the conservative government in Athens and become actively involved in
Greek politics so as to ensure that power would not fall into communist hands5. In effect, had it
not been for the military and economic support of the U.S, the Greek communists would have
possibly won the civil war67. Although it can be counter claimed that the reasons that led to the
Greek communists defeat in 1949 varied, the U.S assistance to the Greek government was
decisive in turning around the outcome of the Greek civil war8.

Mark Gilbert, Cold War Europe, Rowman and Littlefield,2015 p13

Mark Gilbert, Cold War Europe, Rowman and Littlefield,2015 p27
3 A book that describes Great Britains post war economic condition is Labour in Power, 1945-1951 by Kenneth O. Morgan. In
chapter 3 and especially in Section III Social Services and the Economy he describes Atlees reforms and Labours
macroeconomic management taking in account Great Britains economic situation.
4 The Truman Doctrine was an American foreign policy to stop Soviet imperialism during the Cold War. It was announced to
Congress by President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947 when he pledged to contain Soviet threats to Greece and Turkey.
5 In July 1947, George Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, informed Dwight Griswold, Chief of American Mission for
Aid to Greece (AMAG), that we desire to see in Greece a government whose members are . . . primarily interested in keeping
their country from falling under Communist control or Soviet domination. Ideally, members of the government should be drawn
from the political parties of the left, the centre, and the right, but not so far to the left that they are disposed to make
concessions to, or deals with, the Communist or so far to the right that they would refuse to cooperate with non-Communists.
6 Goldbloom, Maurice. United States Policy in Post-War Greece. In Greece under Military Rule, edited by Richard Clogg and G.
Yannopoulos, New York: Basic Books, 1972
7 Mark Gilbert, Cold War Europe, Rowman and Littlefield,2015 pp66-67
8 The United States position was strengthened when a National Security Council report (12 February 1948) which stated that
Greece would need foreign assistance from 1 July 1948 onwards to fight the communist guerrilla forces. The report stressed the
point that the Greek Government rests on a weak foundation and Greece is in a deplorable economic state.
2

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

II.

From Civil War to Cold War

The military and financial aid that Greece received from the United States as a result of
the Truman Doctrine, was seen as both an embrace of the country by its new powerful patron and
a crucial step to becoming a part of the Westerndemocraticworld. The Truman Doctrine
(March 1947) deeply affected the political orientation of Greece, since then on Greece was
considered a part of the Western alliance. Besides the training of the Greek Armed Forces from
U.S officials, Greece received $1.7b in economic aid and $1.3b in military aid between 1947 and
the 1960s.
The first act of the U.S exerting influence in Greek politics was after the Greek civil war
when the United States became seriously engaged in Greek domestic affairs in order to ensure
that Greece would remain in the Western Sphere of influence. Taking in account the sensitive
political climate of the country at the time being, the intervention of the U.S was the only
possible act that could ensure that Greece was not going to collapse politically and
economically9. More specifically, the U.S attempted to thwart the ambitions of the Greek Left,
while supporting the political activities of the non-communist parties. The extent to which the
United States was prepared to interfere in Greek domestic politics is indicated in Christos
Kassimeris book Greece and the American Embrace. According to the study done by Kassimeris
the State Department issued a directive to the U.S embassy in Athens (1949) which clearly stated
the U.S intervention in Greeces domestic affairs.10 The report essentially increased the role of
the United States ambassador, allowing him to act as the sole representative of the United States
in the capacity of the chief decision-makerwhenever necessary regarding a variety of Greek
domestic issues. Moreover, the ambassadors authority was not limited to domestic matters, but
was also extended to Greek foreign affairs. The focal point of the directive, nevertheless, is its
particular reference to the holding of elections in Greece.

Giannis Stefanidis, From Civil War to Cold War, Greece and the Allies (1949-52), Sideratos, Athens, 1999, Introduction
According to the directive, the United States ambassador in Athens would have a rather influential, if not dominant, role in
making decisions regarding: (a) Any action by United States representatives in connection with a change in the Greek cabinet;
(b) Any action by United States representatives to bring about or prevent a change in the high command of the Greek armed
forces; (c) Any substantial increase or decrease in the size of the Greek armed forces; (d) Any disengagement arising with the
Greek or British authorities which, regardless of its source, may impair cooperation between American officials in Greece and
Greek and British officials; (e) Any major question involving the relations of Greece with the United Nations or any foreign
nation other than the United States (f) Any major question involving the policies of the Greek Government toward Greek
political parties, trade unions, subversive elements, rebel armed forces, etc., including questions of punishment, amnesties and
(g) Any question involving the holding of elections in Greece.
10

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

a. Greeces strategic importance

As with every other state, Greece had to align with one of the two superpowers or become
neutral. Destined to join the Western camp, Greece found itself involved in a rather peculiar
situation. It was the only state in the Balkans aligned with the West, thus immediately labelling
its northern neighbours (Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) as enemies. Moreover, Greece was
strategically located at the southern part of the Balkans and had control over most of the Aegean
Sea. Therefore, Greece was important to the United States because it provided essential military
facilities as well as access to the Middle East, while it could also help to prevent the expansion of
the Soviet navys activities in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the possibility of establishing U.S.
military bases in Greece provided the ability to accommodate the entire U.S Sixth Fleet when
necessary provided that the nearly 3,000 Greek islands in the Aegean Sea would monitor any
action in the Dardanelles.
It is noteworthy that the U.S. bases in Greece were used for surveillance purposes and to
monitor Soviet activities in the region. Hence, there is little doubt that the significance of Greece
to the Western alliance was crucial, perhaps, even equal to that of Turkey, given that its
neighbour only provided facilities for collecting information and was bordered with the USSR.
The next step which deepened Greeces alignment with the West and was seen as the
predecessor of the countrys membership in NATO, was the Korean War (1950-1953). Greece
had to demonstrate solidarity to the West in order to become a member of NATO thus having to
participate militarily in the alliance against communism in Korea. Greece formed the Greek
Expeditionary Force (GEF), involving ground and air forces. The Greek participation in the
Korean War was highly recognized by the South Koreans as well as by the allied forces and the
United Nations11. It comprised a reinforced Hellenic Army infantry battalion and a Royal
Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) flight of seven transport planes. Greece was the fifth largest troop
contributor to U.N. Forces in Korea.

11

Individual Greeks received six U.S. Distinguished Service Crosses, 32 Silver Stars, 110 Bronze Stars. 19 members of 13th Flight
received the US Air Force Air Medal for the Hagaru-ri evacuation operation in December 1950.

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

b. Greeces accession in NATO

Greeces accession in NATO took place in 1952 along with that of Turkey. Although, it had
been already considered a member of the Western Camp, the main reasons as to why the West
wanted Greece to become a member of the alliance were that Greece was strategically located in
the Southern region of the Alliance, in close vicinity to South Eastern Europe, the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa. Although the importance of Turkeys
accession to NATO was regarded more important to that of Greece, it was essential that both
countries had to become members of this alliance as this broad region was characterised by
geopolitical uncertainty and the US had strategic interests with regards to the USSR. Thus, by
inviting Greece and Turkey in NATO, the alliance was securing its South-Eastern flank12.
On the other hand, membership to NATO became a fundamental pillar of Greeces defence
and security architecture as it secured its position in the Wests sphere of influence and from its
northern neighbors. Furthermore, although the Greek-Turkish relations can be described as a
history of wars and confrontation in the early 19th century, the fact that Greece and Turkey
became members of the NATO created the necessary effects in order to deteriorate the tensions
between the new allies in the sake of the common enemy which was the Soviet Union.
III.

The US support of the Colonels regime (1967-1974)

Greece at the time, was a parliamentarian monarchy which had a long period of economic
and democratic stabilization for the first time in its modern history. However, in the beginning of
the 60s, the inability of the Royal Palace and either political parties (Center and the Right) to
maintain a stable parliamentary majority created a political climate of discontent in the Greek
society.
In 1967, a group of Colonels lead by Colonel George Papadopoulos established an
authoritarian regime in Greece (1967-1974). The U.S silently supported it as the Nixon
administration regarded Greece as a force of stability in the East Mediterranean region 13. The
dictators were soon regarded by the US government as pro-US, pro-NATO, rigorously if not
fanatically anti-communist, while the regime saw itself as revolutionary with a mission of
reorienting Greek economic, political and social life on a new and wholesome basis. Once the
dictatorship had been installed, the US government was unsure whether to express regret even
though democracy had been ironically suspended in its birthplace. It is clear that the US did not
wish to overtly condemn the military regime and alienate Greece from the Western camp. In fact,
when the dictatorship was established (April 1967), the US government proceeded by
immediately relaxing certain restrictions (July 1967) that were imposed on the dictatorship on
the provision of military equipment that was intended for NATO purposes.14
12

J.E Miller ,The United States & The Making of Modern Greece, The Greek Tar Baby, The University of North Carolina
Press,2003, pp 24
13 According to documents released from the U.S Department of State, President Nixon in a conversation about the Greek Junta
in 1971 with a Greek-American businessmen named Pappas, stated : You see, look, I am the best friend they got
U.S Department of State, DOCUMENT 309. Accessed through: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v29/d309
14 Sotiris Rizas, The Greek Policy after the Civil war, Parliamentarism and Dictatorship, Kastaniotis, Athens, 2008, pp431

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

What asserts the argument that the U.S did not consider a condemnation of the Colonels
regime were the U.S Ambassadors reports from Athens to the State Department at that time:
According to reports, the U.S had to support the Colonels regime as Greece (1) was strategically
significant, (2) had to remain an active and functioning member of NATO, and (3) had to avoid
opposing US policies as France had under Charles De Gaulle15. Evidently, the US government
had vested interests in normalising relations with Greece, since the regime had strengthened its
power and the US had to safeguard its foreign policy objectives. Paradoxically, the US
government, at the time, had not publicly announced the above stated decisions or the
recognition of the military regime in Athens. Hence, it can be also argued that were the US to
withdraw their support to the regime, the latter would not necessarily collapse but would have
opposed U.S interests. This would generate further anxiety among NATO circles and jeopardise
US military facilities in Greece. On the other hand, it was evident that Greece under the
Colonels could not consider aligning with the other side of the Iron Curtain due to their anticommunist rhetoric and its support from the U.S.
During the years of the Nixon Administration (1969-1974), relations between the regime in
Greece and the United States improved, particularly after September 1970 when the shipment of
arms to Greece was completely resumed after an earlier ban in 1967. It is also noteworthy that
the Nixon Administration aimed at reducing the US role in the Cyprus issue, while also opposing
any tension between Greece and Turkey16.
Notwithstanding the U.S support, Greece was isolated during the years of dictatorship in
International Organizations and the accession talks with the European Economic Community
(EEC) which had started earlier in 1961, had come to a halt. In addition, there is no doubt that
during the dictatorship Greek foreign policy suffered several memorable diplomatic defeats,
notably, the countrys expulsion from the Council of Europe and the later forceful partition of
Cyprus, which will be analyzed in the next section. Needless to say, such events were a massive
blow for Greek foreign policy interests.

15
16

Christos Kasimeris, Greece and the American Embrace, A history of intervention I.B.Tauris Publishers, New York, 2010
Gregoriades, Solon. History of the dictatorship. 4 vols. Athens: Kapopoulos, 1975

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

IV.

Abandoning Cyprus

Much has been written about the Cyprus issue and the effects of the Turkish invasion of 1974
with regards to Greeces alignment with the West. The island of Cyprus, a then British colony,
was and still is strategically important not only for the U.S but also for Great Britain, as the latter
holds until today two sovereign-military bases on the island and is also a part of the Treaty of
Guarantee of 1960 (The parties of the Treaty consist of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Great
Britain). In principle, it can be claimed that the West favored the Greek positions in the Cyprus
issue as early as World War One, up to the Turkish invasion of 1974. Although throughout that
period Great Britain opposed any annexation of the island with Greece, and by extent surfaced
the rights of the Turkish minority on the island (by 1950, the Turkish population of the island
was 20% with the rest being Greek), the U.S played an important role in preventing a possible
Turkish invasion. Additionally, when times favored the Greek, the Greek-Cypriot leadership
opposed any union plans and instead turned to Moscow for assistance. The reasons as to why the
West favored Greece in the Cyprus issue, making it a series of missed opportunities, will be
analyzed chronologically.
The argument that in principle the West favored Greece in the Cyprus issue is evident as
early as the First World War were the strategic significance of Greece to the Western powers was
important. As hostilities in the Balkan Peninsula became widespread, Great Britain attempted to
engage Greece in the conflict by proposing to the latters Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos
the annexation of Cyprus. Against all expectations, Greece rejected the proposition twice in 1914
and 1915. However, as it later became clear, this favored Great Britain in the long run as the
island of Cyprus was significant due to the access it provided to the oil resources of the Middle
East17.
Although Greece had fought on the side of the Allies during the Second World War, at the
Paris Peace Treaties of 1947, Greece did not raise the issue of annexing Cyprus and the islands
of Dodecanese were given from the Allies to Greece for its contribution during the World War
Two18. Moreover, in 1946, the British government announced its plans to invite Cypriots to form
a Consultative Assembly in order to discuss a new constitution, however the Greek Cypriot
leadership rejected the plan since there was no mention of union with Greece.

17

Christos Kasimeris, Greece and the American Embrace, A history of intervention I.B.Tauris Publishers, New York, 2010
A book that captures the missed chance of Greeces possible annexation of Cyprus during the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 is
Memoirs of a Greek Ambassador by Leon Melas were he describes the British ambassadors to Paris reaction towards the
Greek representative at the Paris Conference. The scene is described in the last chapter of the book and it quotes While the
process was taking too long, all the countries were bargaining about pieces of land. Suddenly, the floor was given to the
representative of Greece. I said to myself At last, here is a proud nation that stood firm on the Allies side and deserves to be
given what it claims, instead the Greek representative made a statement on the importance of peace and the negotiations were
continued.
18

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

In January 1955, a Greek general named Grivas, founded the National Organisation of
Cypriot Fighters (EOKA). On 1 April 1955, EOKA opened an armed campaign mainly against
British rule, which resulted in a well-coordinated series of attacks on police, military, and other
British installations. In 1957 the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT), which had already
been formed in 1955 to protect the Turkish Cypriots from EOKA, took action. Due to the
growing demand for union with Greece, a number of Turkish Cypriots became convinced that
the only way to protect their interests in the event of a union would be to divide the island a
policy known as taksim into a Greek sector in the south and a Turkish sector in the north19.
However, the union with Greece did not take place and Cyprus achieved independence on 16
August 1960 with the signature of the London and Zurich Agreements. The independence
reduced for the time being the imminent threat of a Greek-Turkish war within NATO and
temporarily gave Greek-Cypriots hope for a union with Greece.
In 1964, after tensions broke out between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, U.S
President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to the then Turkish Prime Minister Inonu urging Turkey
not invade Cyprus. The State Department at that time had substantial evidence that Turkey
would of invaded the island the same year. It is crucial to note here that due to the fact that
Greece and Turkey were considered as important allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the government in Washington did not want a crisis within the Alliance. Moreover,
the fact that President Johnson states in his letter that You may consider that what I have said
is much too severe and that we are disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation20
asserts the argument that the U.S felt that it had overwhelmingly supported Greece in the issue of
Cyprus and therefore felt obliged to express an unofficial apology to Turkey for its stance on the
matter.
Another action which asserts that the U.S favored Greece in the Cyprus issue was The
Acheson Plan in 1964, which aimed at the imposition of both partition and union with Greece
and was proposed by the then US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson21. The Greek Prime Minister
George Papandreou, appeared hesitant to accept the plan and so was the Cypriot President
Makarios, who threatened to turn to the Soviet Union. Thus, the Acheson Plan was abandoned
for the time being, only to reappear in a revised form later on then rejected by Turkey.

19

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (1991) Blocking Enosis: Britain and the Cyprus question, MarchDecember 1956, The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 19:2, 247-263
20 See Appendix 1 for the whole letter
21
See Appendix 2 for the Acheson Plan 1 and Acheson Plan 2

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

Essentially, the trigger to the events that led up to the Turkish invasion of 1974 was the rise
of communism in Cyprus, where in local elections, the Greek-Cypriot communist party (AKEL)
came second after receiving 9 out of 35 seats (1970). The result caused tension within NATO
circles and President Makarios threatened by the colonels regime in Greece, appealed to
Moscow once again for support. This act caused further frustration for Greece and NATO22. In
addition things were further complicated by the decision of the colonels regime to dispatch
Greek guerilla forces to the island with the aim of overthrowing the Cypriot leader and effecting
union with Greece.
Turkey decided to proceed with its invasion on Cyprus in August 1974, an action that the
government in Ankara perceived as wholly legitimate, based on Article 4 of the Treaty of
Guarantee of 196023. Following the Greek colonels coup against the Cypriot President in July
1974, Turkey was left with no alternative other than to intervene militarily in order to protect the
rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The Turkish invasion took place in two phases between
20th July and 18th of August 1974. The Colonels regime in Athens immediately collapsed and
the new Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, decided that Greece could not engage in a war with
Turkey at that time. The U.S for the first time decided not to intervene and ceasefire ended with
the islands division in August 1974.
The reason why the U.S did not intervene in favor of Greece during the Cyprus invasion has
always been questioned, as the Cyprus invasion became the main reason for Greek antiWesternism. One can argue that the President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger also had to cope with the embarrassment caused by the Watergate scandal and the
impeachment of President Nixon which occurred during the exact same period as the Cyprus
invasion. Thus, the Cyprus invasion was tackled by low-ranking State Department officials who
could not risk taking important decisions in order to deescalate the crisis. In effect, it can be
valuably argued that the Watergate scandal, along with the Arab-Israeli war (1973) and the last
phases of the Vietnam War (1955-1975) diverted Washingtons attention from Cyprus.
Here, it is also important to note that all of the possible solutions for the Cyprus issue (union
with Greece, double union with Cyprus, independence) would have brought Cyprus, indirectly,
into NATO, thus enabling the Western alliance to achieve control over the island and install
military sites on its territory. Therefore, the argument that is often posed by Greek historians, that
the U.S did not want the Cyprus issue to be solved is incorrect.

22

Christos Kasimeris, Greece and the American Embrace, Greek relations with US and NATO, I.B.Tauris Publishers, New York,
2010
23 The Treaty of Guarantee is a treaty between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland promulgated in 1960. Article II requires the other parties to guarantee the independence, territorial
integrity and security of Cyprus. Article IV reserves the right of the guarantor powers to take action to re-establish the current
state of affairs in Cyprus

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

The results of the Cyprus invasion, affected Greek foreign policy to a great extent and,
consequently, forced the new government led by Konstantinos Karamanlis to proceed with
drastic measures as to withdraw Greece from NATOs military wing (1974). The new National
Unity government intended not only to appease public opinion and express its frustration with
the Western alliance, but also to emphasise its determination to achieve independence from the
United States.
V.

Greeces accession in the EEC

a. The additional patron and the role of Karamanlis

Greece decided to apply for association with the EEC in order to secure its position and
status within the Western camp, improve its economy, and contain communism. Following the
restoration of democracy in Greece (1974), it became essential for the country to strengthen its
position within the Western sphere of influence. The role of the then right-wing Greek Prime
Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis was crucial as he believed that an EEC membership would
not only strengthen democracy and bring about political stability in Greece, but also support the
development of the economy. At the same time, Karamanlis hoped that EEC membership would
lessen Greeces dependence on the United States and NATO, particularly since Greece had
decided to withdraw from NATOs military wing after the Cyprus crisis24. Moreover,
Karamanlis believed that EEC membership would bring Greece out of its diplomatic isolation
and enable it to participate in European affairs with other leading countries.
In effect, the search for an additional patron did not last long and the European
Economic Community (EEC) prevailed with the new Greek government. Despite the view of
Karamanlis for lesser dependence from the U.S, for Greece, a possible membership in the EEC
would of further promoted the countrys integration within the European scheme and secure its
position in the Western camp. Karamanlis traveled from country to country to secure the
concession of the nine, at the time, European partners. The President of France Giscard
dEstaing, an outspoken supporter of the Greek membership, assisted the Greek Prime Minister
in his efforts but the German Chancellor H.Schmidt was against Greeces accession. As soon as
Schmidt met with Karamanlis in 1975, he was convinced that they shared their same concerns
about the politics of security and realized that failure to meet Greeces EEC demands would
undermine Karamanliss position, imperil the countrys democratization process and, ultimately,
Greeces foreign policy orientation. 25

24

Karamanlis Foundation, Archive: Events and Texts, vol.7 (Athens, 1996), pp.22
Karamanlis had been informed by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg of the German resistance to the Greek request and asked
for a meeting with Schmidt in 1975. The German Chancellor set the meeting in Bonn. After the formalities, the two men where
left alone in the garden of the official guesthouse of the German government. Karamanlis and Schmidt sat together in the
garden and spoke for about two hours. The press never found out what Karamanlis told Schmidt and managed to change his
mind. Karamanlis himself told the journalists that we are doing alright abroad.
25

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

Considering that Greeces major foreign policy goal was to strengthen its ties with the
West, the primary reason that Greece opted for full membership (1981) in the EEC rests on the
notion of Greeces European integration. Moreover, as mentioned, it is widely argued that
Greece became an official member of the EEC out of the desire for economic support, political
stability, and independence from the United States26. The first two goals were seemingly within
reach. Economic support was achieved by strengthening trading ties with other member-states
and from receiving economic packages (in total 18 billion dollars in 1985 and 1988) from the
EEC. Political stability was ensured through the EEC efforts towards the consolidation of
institutional democracy. However, the fulfilment of the third objective was evidently not an easy
task. The issue in question was certainly not straightforward and was clearly controversial due to
the ongoing US financial and military support which continued even after the Cyprus invasion.
Theoretically, Greece, was also important to Europe because of its location. Greece could
give the European Community economic access to the Middle East and could serve as a bridge
for good relations with the Arab world. According to Karamanlis, Greece was the bridge
between the West and the developing countries of the Middle East27. While Greece also enjoyed
relatively good relations with the other Balkan states, the positive Greek-Yugoslav relations
during the 70s could have improved the Communitys relationship with the Balkan countries
and therefore, contributed to the stability and peace in the region28.
With regards to the U.S, It seems that because of the economic and geopolitical benefits
that Greece would derive from the EEC, they did not want to oppose Greeces membership. In
addition, throughout the first years of membership, the EEC might have influenced Greeces
external affairs to a certain degree, however, the United States retained its status as the dominant
force in east Mediterranean affairs and thus the only effective mediator in the Greek-Turkish
rivalry. Accordingly, the impact of the United States upon Greece remained unabated, however,
the arrival of a new Prime Minister would change Greeces attitude towards the West.
b. The Papandreou controversy
On 13 December 1974, the then socialist opposition leader and next Prime Minister of
Greece, Andreas Papandreou, questioned whether Greece could ever be free from US foreign
policy objectives. He stated that the EEC was controlled by the United States, at least financially,
and was dominated by US companies. Furthermore, he stated that Europe remained dependent
on the United States in matters of military substance, which could have serious repercussions for
Greece and the military balance in the Aegean29.
In October 1981, the same year of Greeces accession in the EEC, Andreas Papandreou
won a victory with the slogan change and assumed power. Throughout his campaign, he used a
rhetoric against foreign domination and in favor of Greek self-assertion. More specifically,
Papandreou pledged to close U.S bases and pull Greece out of both NATO and the EEC in order
26

J.E Miller ,The United States & The Making of Modern Greece, The University of North Carolina Press,2003
Tsalicoglou, Iacovos, Negotiating for entry (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), pp.30
28 Christos Kasimeris, Greece and the American Embrace, Greek relations with the EEC, I.B.Tauris Publishers, New York, 2010, pp
154-156
29 Grivas, Kleanthes. Papandreism. Thessaloniki: Thessalonikes, 1989.
27

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

to create an independent Greek foreign policy. During his years in power (1981-1989),
Papandreou reneged his promises to withdraw either from NATO and the EEC by winning some
concessions from both organizations and turned them into national triumphs30. Instead, he
actually negotiated the reduction in the number of U.S bases but gave the U.S access to one of
the most important NATO military installations in the Mediterranean, Souda Bay in Crete.
Furthermore, Papandreou took an anti-Israeli rhetoric and a pro-Arab stance such as assisting the
escape of Yasser Arafat with Greek naval ships in the 1982 siege of Beirut and supported
Muhamar Khadafy of Libya. Not only did these certain policies not provide any benefits for
Greece, but they also angered U.S and Israel thus bringing the latter closer to Turkey.
Papandreous foreign policy changed the rhetoric of Greeces foreign policy, but did not
change its direction. Greece still remained in the Wests sphere of influence as it was already an
EEC member, had returned to NATOs military wing in October 1980, and Papandreou now had
to focus on his tackling Greeces economic stagnation and containing Turkey.
In 1993, at the end of the Cold War, Papandreou returned to power with a new set of
objectives revising his earlier anti-Western rhetoric. Papandreou embraced the policy design to
close the gap between Greece and the rest of the European Union and tried to reconcile with the
United States. The Clinton administration soon responded and in 1994 Papandreou achieved a
formal invitation to the White House. During the following months, relations with the U.S. were
centered around the Macedonian issue and Greeces new position in the Balkans. Papandreou
was faced with numerous scandals and the next year he died leaving a legacy of fruitless
confrontation with the West and an economically stagnant country.

30

J.E Miller ,The United States & The Making of Modern Greece, Epilogue: The Andreas Era, The University of North Carolina
Press,2003

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

Final Notes
The end of the Cold War found Greece still aligned with the West. Undoubtedly, the
Cyprus crisis and Papandreous foreign policy provoked this alignment, however, what this
analysis asserted was that the West showed considerable generosity towards Greece throughout
the Cold War. The latter argument is enforced as early as the aftermath of the Second World War
when the West invited Greece to join the Western camp and gave Greece the opportunity to
enjoy the privileges and the prestige of the Western World. Ironically these privileges derived
from Ancient Greece but Modern Greece did not possess them at that time, however the fact that
Greece grasped the opportunity by making long-term decisions to the benefit of its foreign
policy, made a small country in the Mediterranean an important ally for the West.
When assessing the alignment of Greece with the West during the Cold War, one can see
that the relationship is deeply rooted. Modern Greece owes its creation, to a great extent, to the
Western Europeans who aided the Greek Revolution back in 1821. Since then the West has
continued to support Greek policies, not because many in the West are Philhellenes but because
Greece is and will be strategically valuable the West. On the other hand, Greek politicians must
understand that this is a two-way relationship. Greece cannot be a part of the West without
offering the West the opportunity to take advantage of its strategic location, on the other hand,
Greece needs allies in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. It was only when Greece
was aligned with the West that it achieved substantial foreign policy objectives. When it decided
to act on its own (Minor Asia Catastrophe 1922, Cyprus Crisis 1974, Bail Out Crisis and
Referendum 2015), it experienced humiliation and international isolation.
Finally, for the purposes of this analysis, it is noteworthy to mention a famous political
moment which took place on June 12, 1976 and symbolizes the two ongoing Greek opinions of
Greek foreign policy with regards to the Western alignment. The then Greek Prime Minister,
Konstantinos Karamanlis, and the opposition leader, Andreas Papandreou, were debating
Greeces Western orientation in the Greek Parliament. Karamanlis interrupted Papandreou
during his speech after the latter had expressed his severe criticism on Greeces decision to apply
for membership in the EEC. Karamanlis then angrily stated, Like with every nation, Greece has
to belong somewhere,Thus, Greece, politically, economically and culturally belongs to the
West. The floor was returned to Andreas Papandreou who responded to Karamanlis by stating
Mr. Prime Minister, we prefer to state that Greece belongs to the Greeks.

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

Bibliography
Christos Kasimeris, Greece and the American Embrace, I.B.Tauris Publishers, New York, 2010
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (1991) Blocking Enosis: Britain and the Cyprus question, March
December 1956, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 19:2, 247-263
Giannis Stefanidis, From Civil War to Cold War, Greece and the Allies (1949-52), Sideratos,
Athens, 1999, Introduction
Grivas, Kleanthes. Papandreism. Thessaloniki: Thessalonikes, 1989
Goldbloom, Maurice. United States Policy in Post-War Greece. In Greece under Military Rule,
edited by Richard Clogg and G. Yannopoulos, New York: Basic Books, 1972
Gregoriades, Solon. History of the dictatorship. 4 vols. Athens: Kapopoulos, 1975
J.E Miller, The United States & The Making of Modern Greece, The University of North
Carolina Press, 2003
Iacovos, Tsalicoglou , Negotiating for entry, Aldershot,Dartmouth, 1995
Mark Gilbert, Cold War Europe, Rowman and Littlefield,2015
Sotiris Rizas, The Greek Policy after the Civil war, Parliamentarism and Dictatorship,
Kastaniotis, Athens, 2008
Archives
Karamanlis Foundation, Archive: Events and Texts, vol.7 (Athens, 1996)

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

APPENDIX
1. Letter to Prime Minister Inonu from President Johnson dated June 5, 1964
2. The Acheson Plan 1
3. The revised Acheson Plan
1. Letter to Prime Minister Inonu from President Johnson dated June 5, 1964
Dear Mr. Prime Minister,
I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare
from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to
intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest
friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught
with such far reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your government to
consult fully in advance with the United States. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you
postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally
whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your government, in effect, to present an
ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United
States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete
consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.
It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under
the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our
understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting
an attempt by Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the island, a solution which is specifically
excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that treaty requires consultation among the
guarantor powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation
have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right
to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.
I must call to your attention also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There
can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military
engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent
meeting of the ministerial council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece
must be considered as "literally unthinkable". Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that
NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of
animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and
Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct
involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not
had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet
Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and
understanding of its NATO allies.
Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a
member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the island to keep the
Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been
progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that island. The United Nations
Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the
United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would
defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could
assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreeement between
the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the
agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States
consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance
was furnished. Your government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States
that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States
cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish
intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.
Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call
to your attention in the most friendly fashion that fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the
slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus. Such an action on
your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part
could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are
trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe.
You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are
disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that
this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of
Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the
consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the
United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy
has caused the liveliest resentment in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us)
and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said
to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our
relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common
interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we
have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to
resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to
us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your government and to your people. We have
no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish
Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly,
one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply
concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.
Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war
and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the
United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could
Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral

intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as chief of the government
of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the
deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action
without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of
secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the
United Nations Security Council
I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation.
Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present constitutional position, I am
not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome
it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the
possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to
delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have-in mind until you and I have had
the fullest and frankest consultation.
Sincerely.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON

2. The Acheson Plan

Acheson Plan 1
In return for Turkish agreement to the union of Cyprus with Greece, Greece would make certain
concessions to Turkey along the lines suggested below:
1. To give Turkey assurance that its security would not be threatened from Cyprus or from the
direction of Cyprus, Greece would cede to Turkey a portion of the island in perpetuity, that is in
full sovereignty.
A. This area would be used by Turkey as a military base with full rights to deploy ground, air
and naval forces therein. The military purpose of this base would be to deny the island to hostile
forces as a base of operations against Turkey and to keep open the approaches to the ports of
Mersin and Iskenderun.
B. The area should be fairly substantial in size, large enough both to permit the building of
facilities and the conduct of training manoeuvres and operations.
C. It seemed that a logical location for the base area might be the Karpas Peninsula because it
was detached from the main body of the island and was ideally situated to cover the approaches
to the Turkish ports. Different boundary lines for a base on the peninsula were discussed at
different times; one, which appeared to be the minimum acceptable to the Turkish government,
ran from Peristeria on the north coast to a point just south-west of Boghaz on the southeast coast.

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

2. Special arrangements should be made for the protection and welfare of those Turkish Cypriots
who would not be included within the area of the Turkish sovereign base. These were outlined as
follows:
A. There might be one, two or three relatively small areas of the island in which Turkish
Cypriots would be in the majority or very nearly so and which could be treated as separate
geographical units for administrative purposes within the general governmental structure of the
whole island. The Turkish quarter of Nicosia and the area stretching north of it to the Kyrenia
Range was a de facto example of such an area. These administrative sub-divisions could have a
special local administration of their own, directed and implemented on the ground by Turkish
Cypriots. The function of these local administrations might include such things as the
collection of taxes, the expenditure of local revenues for local purposes (schools, mosques, local
water supply and local roads), the direction of local police forces and the general administration
of justice insofar as it applied to Turkish Cypriots, and possible other attributes of municipal and
provincial governments elsewhere
B. In all the rest of the island, where Turkish Cypriots would necessarily continue to be a
relatively small minority of the population, a different arrangement could be made. There might
be a central Turkish Cypriot administration established in Nicosia, which would control, for
Turkish Cypriots only, many of the same activities and functions that would be undertaken by
the local authorities in the separate small geographic units mentioned above. This could be done
by demarcating the Turkish quarters of the major towns and identifying the scattered villages that
are all-Turkish or have a clear Turkish majority. These would then be considered as under the
authority of the central Turkish organisation in Nicosia, which would supervise the election or
appointment of local leaders, the selection and administration of police and other normal
municipal functions and could provide a system of lower courts for the handling of personal
status cases, civil suits between Turks, criminal trials involving only Turks and similar matters of
purely Turkish Cypriot concern.
C. The Turkish Cypriots would necessarily have to be citizens of whatever central authority was
in control of the island. Subject to the privileges and responsibilities of this citizenship, they
could have the local and personal rights and privileges indicated in the preceding two
paragraphs. It goes without saying that they would be guaranteed all normal human and minority
rights, of which those provided in the Treaty of Lausanne are good examples.
D. As a special safeguard in addition there should be an international commissioner or
commission, perhaps appointed by the UN or the International Court of Justice, who or which
could be physically present on the island and charged with watching over the observations of the
special status and rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Precedents for this exist in the cases of Danzig
and the Soar during the period between the world wars, and the US government considers that
this experiment worked well until the advent of Hitler to power in Germany upset all established
arrangements. The commissioner or the commission would be empowered to hear complaints,
investigate them and make recommendations to the appropriate authorities for correction of
injustices. It is conceivable that he might be empowered to order correction and or compensation
subject to appeal by the party opposed. If his recommendations or decisions were not accepted
Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved

by one party or the other, there would be a right of appeal either to the International Court of
Justice at the Hague or to some other judicial body which might be specially established under
the authority of the UN. An alternative the parties might wish to consider would be for the
commissioner and the court to be appointed by NATO, with the NATO members assuming
responsibility for enforcement of their decisions.
E. The island of Kastellorizo to be ceded to Turkey.

3. The revised Acheson Plan

1. The Turkish base area simply be leased to Turkey for an agreed period of years 50 was
suggested as reasonable instead of being ceded as sovereign Turkish territory.
2. The boundary of the base area on the Karpas peninsula would be a line drawn north and south
just west of the village of Komi Kebir (thus reducing the area considerably). Alternatively the
line could be drawn on the basis of military considerations after study by the Supreme Allied
Commander for Europe.
3. The special provisions and guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots would be modified from those
in Acheson Plan 1 to eliminate the special areas containing a Turkish Cypriot majority which
would have been treated under the first plan as moderate administrative units. Instead, it is
suggested that at least two of the eparchies into which Cyprus might be divided under Greek rule
would always be headed by Turkish Cypriot eparchs. These eparchies would always be those
containing a substantial Turkish Cypriot population. In the eparchies containing such a
substantial Turkish Cypriot population, the administrative staffs and police would always contain
a substantial proportion of Turkish Cypriot officials and employees.
4. Instead of the central Turkish Cypriot administration in Nicosia which was proposed in
Acheson Plan 1, there would be a high official in the central government of Cyprus, under the
chief Greek administrator, who would be provided with a staff and would be charged with
looking after the rights and welfare of all Turkish Cypriots. This official would advise and assist
Turkish Cypriots, receive and investigate complaints about discriminatory treatment or failure to
give guaranteed rights, and could appeal to the courts or central government of Greece in case of
need.
5. The special guarantees or minority rights envisaged in the first plan, such as those provided by
the Treaty of Lausanne and the European Convention on Human Rights, would be retained.
Similarly, the proposed International Commissioner appointed by the UN would be part of the
second plan as of the first.

Copyright Leonidas Marcantonatos SAIS Europe Greek Foreign Affairs Council All rights reserved