Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
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Presented to
University of Houston
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In Partial Fulfillment
Bachelor of Arts
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By
May, 2009
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EPIGRAPH...............................................................................................................2
ABSTRACT...............................................................................................................3
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................4
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................78
Bibliography.........................................................................................................................81
2
EPIGRAPH
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Allen W. Dulles
30 November 1954
Address to the Alumni Dinner of the University of Chicago Law School.
3
ABSTRACT
In the post-World War II era, America had become the world’s greatest superpower. The
Cold War, however, was not a period of total war but rather a period of clandestine
confrontations. The Central Intelligence Agency was the clandestine arm of the United States in
this period, and despite its small amount of experience in such activities, the agency was destined
to become as dominant among the intelligence community as Washington, D.C. was in the
United Nations. The 1953 coup marked the point where the CIA replaced the British Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS). In essence, the American agency was the only agency capable of
carrying out a proposal from the British directed at the nationalist Prime Minister of Iran, Dr.
Mohammad Mossadegh. The SIS wanted Mossadegh removed and to bring to power a leader
that would seek an end to an oil crisis that had enveloped London and Tehran since the
conclusion of WWII. The outcome of the coup rested in American hands in August 1953
4
Introduction
When did the Central Intelligence Agency first reach a point of power? The birth of the
agency was officially created in 1947 and within a decade would be revered throughout the
international intelligence community. The events within its first decade of existence shaped the
agency into the foreign arm of American influence and determination against the spread of
communism. In 1953, the capabilities of the CIA were tested in Iran where an oil dispute was
engulfing Great Britain and Iran in political impasse. Additionally, the growing influence of
communist sympathizers within Iran pulled the United States into the situation. The resulting
coup in August 1953 replaced the standing democracy of Iran with what would become more of
a Western-friendly autocracy. With the overthrow of the Iranian government, the CIA’s position
of power and leadership was secured. Every successful mission thereafter worked to further
strengthen the image of the agency. The coup thus served as a test case for the feasibility of
clandestine warfare.
In the years after WWII’s conclusion, the Farsi-speaking State of Iran dared to challenge
a major European power that had a monopoly on Iranian oil--Great Britain. While the United
States could not initially support Iran or Britain more than the other, the failing economy in Iran
hastened American intervention because the conflict had lasted too long. While the oil question
distracted Iranian politicians from the domestic strife of Iran’s citizens who were bearing the
brunt of the economic hardships, the country was slowly falling under the expanding Iron
Curtain. U.S. leaders realized prolonged negotiations had allowed pro-Communist factions to
5
spread throughout Iran. The United States could not afford to lose Iran to the Soviet bloc and
therefore agreed to carryout a proposal by the British SIS to remove the nationalist prime
minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, from office and instate a more Western-friendly regime.
The coup in Iran that took place August 1953, was a result of both the oil dispute and Communist
expansion and these factors led to the CIA’s stature of supremacy over the international
The history between the conclusion of WWII and 1953 coup illustrates the growing
tensions between East and West forces. The United States became one of two global
superpowers in the post World War II era. The Soviet Union and the United States had greater
political leverage, economic capacity, and military might than any other country in the world, but
the Soviets came out of the war in a worsened economic and demographic condition than did the
United States because so much of the fighting occurred on Russian soil. While the Soviet Union
was working to rebuild in the post war era before becoming an equal opponent to the United
States, however, America had already established its supremacy over the West; neither Britain
nor France could rival the military or economic might of postwar America.1
accomplishments: The U.S. Senate ratified a treaty creating the United Nations, which built off
the failed League of Nations and promised to implement international collective security.
Additionally, the Marshall Plan was the most wide-reaching and successful manifestation of U.S.
economic leadership at that time. As a result of it, billions of dollars and tons of American
products flowed into a joint recovery plan in order to rebuild the economies of war-torn Europe.
! 1 Thomas J. McCormick, Americaʼs Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War
6
Additionally, the military arm of the United States was consolidated with the National Security
Act of 1947 that reorganized the armed service branches, created a council of advisers to help the
president, and formed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These extensions of American
power worked to unify many Western nations behind the United States in the developing
The Central Intelligence Agency, in particular, reinforced the increasing influence of the
United States abroad. Prior to WWII, the United States had lacked a permanent peacetime
intelligence agency. Each branch of the military had their independent intelligence groups, but
they had limited use and answered solely to their respective branches of the armed forces. The
National Security Act of 1947, however, created an unprecedented prospect for America: a
foreign arm of the United States designed to operate like the British Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS).3 Thus, President Harry S. Truman had effectively abolished whatever sense of
The creation of the CIA was the culmination of events dating to the first decade of the
twentieth century. The British had determined by 1909 than an independent, peacetime
intelligence bureau was necessary to monitor interests not necessarily pertinent to their military
intelligence services. Such a venture proved useful in the interwar period with the rise of
! 2 Ibid, 72-85
! 3 Elias Huzar, “Reorganization for National Security,” The Journal for Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1
! 4 Isolationism had become more of a mythical term used to identify those who wanted the United
States to retract from its global leadership. The term however is problematic in that one can argue the
United States had not been isolationist in practice since the eighteenth century at its founding. Whether
in aspirations for Manifest Destiny or Caribbean, Central, and South American interference, the United
States has been involved in the affairs of other nations since its inception. The term is here used to
identify the anti-war, anti-involvement groups within Washington at the end of WWII.
7
Nazism and Fascism in addition to the early surveillance on Soviet Russia. The United States
followed suit during WWII with the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) whose
members were trained by the SIS. Still, at the end of the war, the OSS was dissected and its
responsibilities dispersed among different organizations because officials believed its usefulness
Because the world had transformed with the conclusion of WWII, President Truman
became convinced that a centralized foreign intelligence agency was necessary to combat and
check the rising communist threat. The expanding Soviet Union forced Washington to change its
policies toward Stalin and his regime. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets dictated governmental
structures, contradicting agreements made with its Western allies during wartime. Additionally,
its new line of satellite states stretched from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. Where
once the USSR had been an ally, it had become a threatening menace to Western principles of
freedom and democracy. This realization came to light when American troops were withdrawing
from Europe and the Middle East along with other former allied powers, but Soviet troops were
not. Because a conventional defense was not possible with the withdrawing armies, the former
Central Intelligence Group (CIG)--which had been used to appease parties wanting a peacetime
intelligence agency before the CIA was established--was authorized to work clandestinely to
! 5 Trevor Barnes, “The Secret Cold War: The C.I.A. and American Foreign Policy in Europe,
1946-1956. Part I,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June, 1981): 399-415.
8
While the CIA’s mandate was clearly defined in the National Security Act, the agency’s
role would expand significantly within a few short years of its inception. 6 In 1953, the growing
in Iran. Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, had engrossed his country in a
conflict with Great Britain over oil concessions and the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC).7 Because of the declining capability of Great Britain--in particular the SIS--
the CIA was approached with a plan for removing Mossadegh. By carrying out the covert
operation, named TPAJAX, the CIA exercised its increasing credence among the international
intelligence community. In essence, the successful coup was a direct result of CIA interference
in Iran and created the threatening image of the new arm of the United States whereby third
When approaching Iran, one must realize that it had undergone continual change
throughout the twentieth century, but, oil had remained its chief export. In the first chapter we
will explore the role oil played in the CIA’s intervention and eventual coup. Iran lies on the
border of the Soviet Union and was a major trafficking region during WWII for the Allies. The
AIOC in the postwar period was the dominant benefactor of Iranian oil and Britain had
developed a monopoly over Iran’s oil. However, the AIOC was a manifestation of
! 6 The National Security Act of 1947 is available from the United States Intelligence Community
Online, “National Security Act of 1947,” 50 U.S.C. 401, U.S. Senate and House of Representatives,
signed 26 July 1947, http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml.
! 7 Also referred to as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company by some scholars because of the name
! 8 This myth was tested the next year, in 1954, and proved to be correct with the regime change in
Guatemala. See Chief of Station, Guatemala, “PBHistory Summary Report,” Central Intelligence Agency,
1 October 1954, http://www.foia.cia.gov/.
9
economic extortion--and Iran, under Mossadegh’s leadership, was undergoing a new wave of
negotiations during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the AIOC failed to find an acceptable
settlement with Iran. This was in part because Mossadegh and others in the Iranian Parliament
(the Majlis) were advocating the nationalization of the AIOC. However, it was also because of
the attitudes presented by AIOC officials who were not accepting the declining influence of
Great Britain. Yet the protracted oil negotiation was leading to detrimental estimates in
Washington, so when the CIA was approached by SIS officials, a way to secure Iran in the
Western bloc was realized. National security ordinances and foreign policy directives in the
Middle East were only attainable if Iran sided with the West.
The second chapter will explore the extent to which the American intelligence agency
approached the proposed coup. Although the plans were first established by the British SIS, the
planning stages during late 1953 through summer 1953 revealed how the CIA had a greater
capacity to carryout clandestine operations. All in all, the CIA was realizing how powerful the
agency could be. The plan sought to remove Premier Mossadegh from office as he was deemed
the culprit obstructing an oil settlement and allowing the Communist Tudeh Party to flourish.
Because of the British resolve to counter the oil crisis between the AIOC and Iran, the M16
foreign branch of the SIS was asked to implement an operation to overthrow Mossadegh and
replace him with a more favorable prime minister. The SIS had to call on the CIA to finish its
systems such as economic methodology, setting up governmental framework and military prowess. The
distinct difference between older imperialism or colonialism, was that the mother country would directly be
in control of every aspect of life, whereas with neoimperialism any source of control is mostly through
indirect forces. For more see Jerome Slater, “Is United States Foreign Policy Imperialist or Imperial,”
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 1 (Spring, 1976), 63-87.
10
operation because the British were thrown out of Iran before their clandestine operation could
begin because of failed oil negotiations. Borne from the proposals given the CIA was Operation
TPAJAX. 10
In the third chapter, the coup’s military portion will be examined in order to answer how
the CIA recovered from an initial failure. Operation TPAJAX was originally unsuccessful at
ousting Prime Minister Mossadegh. This was largely because of delays due to communication
failures, but within a week of the initial failure, the CIA saved face. The field agents were able
to adapt to chaotic environment filled with mass protests in the wake of the initial coup attempt
and incited popular uprisings against Mossadegh who was portrayed as a tyrant who had
disbanded the Majlis and refused to accept royal decrees from the Shah replacing him with
General Fazlollah Zahedi. The CIA chose to feed on popular discontent that had developed
because of the economic sanctions placed on Iran due to the failed AIOC negotiations and
subsequent nationalization. The success of the operation secured the dominance of the new
American intelligence agency within the international intelligence community. However, both
the success and initial failures leant a hand to future covert operations because the agency
Notwithstanding the assertions made by the TPAJAX planners, the operation was almost
lost to history. Truman had originally revoked the proposals of TPAJAX because he felt it went
beyond the mandate of the CIA. However, the new Dwight D. Eisenhower administration in
1953 was more accepting of the proposal. This was because the CIA worked to successfully
portray Mossadegh as a communist sympathizer. The Tudeh Party of Iran had originally been
! 10 Dr. Donald Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,
November 1952-August 1953,” Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Paper No. 208, Written March
1954, Published 1969. i-iii
11
founded as a pro-Soviet faction in Iran, not necessarily as a communist party. Nonetheless,
Soviet infiltrators in the party transformed it into a perceivable communist support party in a
nation on the border of the Soviet Union.11 The presence of communism in Tehran and its
By 1951, the British were realizing their inevitable descent from imperial domination.
They had released India, retreated from Greece, and handed the Palestinian mandate to the
United Nations. The last remnants of a weakening British Empire were the oil monopolies in
Iraq and Iran.12 The nationalization of the AIOC in Iran, however, challenged the legitimacy of
British authority in Iran. The SIS was also losing power along with the declining British
Empire.13 Thus, From November 1952 through summer 1953, plans were made that further
revealed the CIA’s capacity and capability. Continually, the SIS bowed to the wishes of the CIA
proposals regarding Iran and the TPAJAX project. In essence the British were forced to accept
CIA supremacy in the operation because only the CIA had the funds and personnel to carry out
the coup.
The coup’s success firmly established the CIA as the dominant intelligence agency in the
world. The SIS had fallen from its power mainly because of the constraint placed upon by the
declining condition in Great Britain. So the power vacuum for Western leadership was filled by
the only country capable of financing a broad-reaching intelligence agency: the United States
! 11 “The Tudeh Party: Vehicle of Communism in Iran,” Central Intelligence Agency, 18 July 1949.
! 12Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold
War, 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana States University Press, 1999), 50-57.
! 13 For more on the decline of British power see Andrew Gambleʼs chapter "Hegemony and
Decline: Britain and the United States,"within Patrick Karl O'Brien and Armand Clesse, eds., Two
Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.,
2002)
12
and its Central Intelligence Agency. While the United States was guided by containment foreign
policies, conventional warfare was becoming a fleeting solution to the new era of the Cold War.14
No longer could the United States send entire armies to fight wars; it was publicly unpopular and
economically unsound. Clandestine operations, thus, became the ideal way to exert American
influence and advance U.S. interests abroad. The 1953 Iranian coup marked a pivotal moment in
twentieth century history where the United States replaced Britain as the dominant force for the
Iran was chosen as the test case for clandestine warfare because it met the preliminary
requirements that Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA’s Near East Division chair, outlined. The public
had to want what the same end that America wanted. In this case, it was the removal of the
forces ruining the country’s economy by not finding a solution to the oil crisis. American
propaganda had been working to indict the once popular Iranian Prime Minister, Mossadegh,
throughout the early 1950s. If the propaganda campaign was successful, popular sentiments
would turn against Mossadegh making a regime change more feasible. Furthermore, while there
were several forms of nationalism within Iran in 1953, the Shah was still popular because of his
title and ceremonial position in Tehran. Iranian citizens, Roosevelt believed, would support their
Shah over a prime minister if they had to make a choice. For these reasons, Iran became the
! 14 The wars in Korea and Vietnam signified the last massive deployment of American troops and
the draft.
! 15 Kermit Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1979), 210. For more information on the American propaganda campaign in Iran see,
Haimeh Saghaye-Biria, “United States Propaganda in Iran: 1951-1953,” Masterʼs Thesis. !Louisiana State
University. May, 2009.
13
Chapter I:
Oil Showdown
Oil has been at the root of most conflicts involving the Middle East throughout the
twentieth century. Iran is no exception to this approach of oil’s role in the 1953 coup. The
conflict between the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Iran had been escalating since the
first British oil entrepreneur, William D’Arcy was granted an oil concession in 1901 through its
renegotiations in 1933 and culminating mid century in the oil crisis that all but destroyed Iran’s
domestic economy. Because of the vast history of confrontations and the animosity shared
between Great Britain and Iran over oil revenues the oil crisis never met an equatable, nor an
agreeable conclusion. It was this inability of the AIOC and Iran to reach a settlement that
The Soviet Union had also been vying for oil concession rights within Iran since the first
decade of the twentieth century. For the Soviets, however, the world wars made Moscow realize
that there was more to be had than just oil from Iran. There was also a satellite state that could
inhibit Western advances against the spread of Communism. The prospect of a Soviet-friendly, if
not Soviet-dominated Iran was unacceptable for the United States and this too added to the
entrance of Washington into the oil crisis during the early 1950s.2
Oil played a crucial role in bringing the United States into a conflict that was between
two separate sovereign states - Iran and the United Kingdom. Because of the protracted and
! 1 Reader Bullard, “Behind the Oil Dispute in Iran: a Birth View,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3
! 2 “The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for US Security,” Central Intelligence
Agency, 3 September 1948. All Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Group, and Office of
Strategic Services released documents are available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/.
14
failing negotiation processes over oil concessions concerning Iranian oil and the profit sharing
between Tehran and the AIOC, the United States became an important player first as a mediator
and later as a protagonist of intervention. However, the growing influence and presumed
aspirations of Soviet expansion into Iran hastened an American response as U.S. foreign policy
could not allow a Soviet takeover of Iran. If Iran were to fall behind the Iron Curtain,
Washington believed the results would have been detrimental to the strategic interests of the
West in the region and the European recovery. The United States had emerged from WWII as
the dominant country and the Truman administration recognized the importance the country had
in the post-war world. It was under this pretext of American hegemony that the United States
had to intervene in the oil crisis that served as a precursor for actions to be taken by the CIA in
Iran had mostly been an issue left to the British who were--the Truman administration
believed--more than capable of representing the West for the region in the early decades of the
twentieth century. However, the British withdrawal from Greece in 1947 troubled Truman and
his foreign policy advisors. It became apparent that the British Empire was no longer in a
position equal to that of Soviet Russia who stood as the reigning opponent of the British in that
region before and after WWII. Moreover within three years of the Allied victory over Germany
and Japan, the Big Three were at ideological odds with each other. The Soviet Union had
! 3 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and
the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 237; “Memorandum of a Meeting of the Foreign
Ministers of the United States and the United Kingdom at the Department of State,” United States
Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor, 9 January 1952, Foreign relations of the United States,
Iran, 1952-1954, Vol. X, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 311-320.
15
reneged on agreements for troop withdrawal and free elections, causing the United Kingdom and
the United States to react with containment policies that pitted the West against the Communist
USSR. Iran, thus, stood in the middle of the East-West conflict. Coincidentally, the tripartite
Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1942, which provided for the integrity and independence of Iran
to be maintained by withdrawing troops within six months of the war’s conclusion, was upheld
only by the United States and Great Britain; Soviet troops remained in Iran past the deadline. 4
The United States negotiated with the Soviet Union in hopes of overcoming the troop
withdrawal and returning Iran to an independent, yet Western-leaning state. The USSR, on the
other hand, sought an oil concession and means to defend the rising Tudeh Party of Iran. The
only bargaining chip the USSR had for their aspirations was their extended military presence.
By March 1946, it was apparent that Iran would be one of the obstacles limiting future relations
among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.5 This realization so early after
WWII set the stage for the oil controversy that would engulf Iran until the eventual coup in 1953
Oil was among the chief reasons for the East-West conflict, more specifically, Iranian oil.
At its core, the East-West confrontation in Iran was focused on two contrasting views of the
region: the Soviets wanted oil and another buffer state, while the West also sought oil in addition
to policies that would give no more influence to the USSR than already existed. The way events
were unfolding, both sides in the amassing Cold War had legitimate reasons to distrust their
! 4 The treaty is printed in Philip W. Ireland, ed., The Near East (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1942; 2nd edition, 1945); also in Philip W. Ireland, The Middle East, 1948 (London: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1948), 29-30.
! 5 “Russians Said to Bar Curb on Iranian Bloc,” New York Times, 2 September 1945 and “Text of
16
former allies. The Soviets distrusted the West because Premier Stalin feared any possible
aggressor to be in close proximity of its borders while the West distrusted the Soviets for the
expansionist moves since WWII’s conclusion. In reality, each side had plans for the abundant
Iranian oil reservoirs and did not want the other to have greater influence over the future of Iran’s
oil supply.
Oil had been a point of contention among Iran, Russia, and Great Britain since the turn of
the twentieth century. The United States, however, had been remote from the oil conflict in Iran
during the first half of the century because it held sufficient domestic sources of petroleum and a
large component of the Arabian American Oil Company in Saudi Arabia6. The discord between
Russia and Great Britain over Iran began in 1901 when British entrepreneur William D’Arcy was
given a sixty-year franchise on all oil in the country. D’Arcy’s enterprise took twelve years to
find commercial amounts of petroleum and build a refinery independent of Iranian aid, however.
The large amount of funds and person hours spent in developing the original refining capacity of
the future AIOC became a point of contention in negotiations years later. 7 Nonetheless, the
concession lacked foresight on the part of the ruling Qajar monarchy at the time as it constrained
economic growth throughout the subsequent decades because iranian oil would become the
country’s largest export capital. Furthermore, Britain and Russia in 1907 split Iran into three
zones during the Anglo-Russian Entente Convention without the consent of the Iranian
Parliament (Majlis). The partitions were a way to isolate oil exploitation whereby the North was
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy Study found in article “How Dependent are we on Foreign
Oil?,” http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm.
17
dominated by Russia, the South by Britain, and a neutral zone placed between the two.8 Iran was
Foreign interference with Iranian oil continued after WWI when the proposed Anglo-
Iranian Agreement of 1919 sought to establish unprecedented British oversight of all economic
reforms and social modernization in Iran. The agreement failed to pass ultimately, but it still
represented the enormity of British power and influence over Iranian sovereignty. Members of
the Majlis, chiefly Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, the future Prime Minister, fought against the
proposed agreement. Iranian mistrust of the Soviets took root when Marxist rebels occupied
Rasht, the Capital of the Gilan province in northern Iran where the Red Army moved into
defensive postures and recognized the new Soviet Republic of Gilan from 1920-1921. 9 Both
Britain and Russia were becoming more of a nuisance than models for modernization.
establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1925, which harkened in little more than a new
dictatorship that was purportedly against foreign influences. Under Shah Reza Khan, Iran began
its own modernization strategy and claimed to seek the withdrawal of all external influence over
the country. Reza Khan granted American Standard Oil Company an oil concession in the North
in hopes of combating the British AIOC in the South. However, Standard Oil and the AIOC
negotiated a shared concession thus counteracting the Shah’s attempts to pit the United States
against the UK; Americans would mostly support the AIOC rather than Iranian sovereignty. The
! 8 T. Cuyler Young, “The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 2,
No. 1 (January, 1948): 51; A copy of the Anglo-Russian Entente Agreement can be accessed from Lillian
Gold Library at Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angrusen.asp.
! 9 P. Avery, G.R.G. Hambly, C. Melville, eds., The Cambridge History of Iran Volume 7
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 214-215; Homayoun Katouzian, “Nationalist Trends in
Iran, 1921-1926,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (November 1979): 533-536.
18
oil crisis that would develop after WWII had its roots in this episode; like before, the British
AIOC would be predominantly supported by the United States. Cheap oil was sought well
before the outbreak of the Great Depression revealing its importance to the growing power of the
United States. The importance of oil would only increase as WWII approached in the late 1930s.
Iranian oil was seen as the next reasonable source of oil for the West because of the large refinery
at the port of Abadan which was the largest oil refinery in the world at the time. Despite this
brief appearance of U.S. enterprises before WWII, Iran continued to be dominated by Britain
Because of the history of oil controversies throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, Iranian discontent with foreign powers was growing. Nationalist movements
culminated in the post-WWII years when oil nationalization was suggested by a number of
different faction leaders within the Majlis. Arguments for nationalization of the oil industry in
Iran did not come about abruptly. Rather, it was the culmination of events that had plagued
Iranian supremacy throughout the twentieth century thus far. 11 Immediately after WWII’s
conclusion, Iranian nationalism had climaxed and mentions of oil nationalization became
mainstream. While the Soviet Union’s extended occupation remained the dominant concern of
Tehran, the solution for an agreed withdrawal was none other than oil. The CIG (Central
Intelligence Group) and later CIA in 1947 onward became involved with the situation because of
the alleged existence of Communism in the state of Iran. The Tudeh Party, in particular, was
! 10 Mamed Abbasov, “The Anglo-Iranian Oil Controversy in Iran 1919-1924,” hosted by Khazar
University. Abbasov calls on many primary documents between the AIOC and Standard Oil in his essay
on the controversy in the early 1920s, http://www.khazar.org/jas/text/politics.htmla.
! 11 Edward Ashley Bayne, “Crisis of Confidence in Iran,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July,
1951): 580.
19
deemed to be the most ardent pro-Soviet, pro-Communist vehicle that Iran had seen. Once the
Tudeh party gained momentum in the postwar years, the party sought to envelop all of Tehran in
a greater Soviet scheme to control Iran. So it was because of the mass nationalist movements
that the Communist Tudeh Party became popular. This is the great irony of the Iranian oil
equation: foreign powers aggravated Iranian citizens culminating in the acceptance of strong
nationalist movements like that of the Tudeh Party in turn causing foreign powers such as the
United States and Great Britain to repress the popularity of the Tudeh Party. This circle of events
surrounding Iranian oil’s role in the twentieth century can be found at each step of the growing
Oil had become the major export of Iran by 1949, but oil assets were mostly owned by
the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The D’Arcy oil concession was renegotiated in 1933
and increased the contribution of the AIOC that doubled payments to Tehran from 1933-1944. 12
But, by the late 1940s, a new wave of discontent among the public against the seemingly
inescapable form of Western control brought the AIOC and Tehran into negotiations yet again.
Iranian nationalist waves had all pinpointed foreign interference as the root cause for the
economic hardships of the country. While such a claim had relevant arguments, the AIOC did
hold the D’Arcy concession and its revisions giving the oil company the legal rights to Iranian
oil exploitation. Both sides had legitimate arguments, but what brought America into the
equation was the inability of the AIOC and Tehran to reach a settlement in a timely manner. The
! 12 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup Dʼetat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East
20
pro-Soviet Tudeh Party was gaining momentum amid the escalating atmosphere between Iran
and Britain, and the United States was not prepared to let Iran become another Soviet puppet
state.
The British AIOC was the largest oil supplier for the Royal Fleet and most of the British
Isles in 1946. It also contributed roughly thirty-two percent of the Iranian government’s income,
despite the alleged unfair concessions. Its operations accounted for eighty percent of the foreign
exchange of Iran. The AIOC was all encompassing and dwarfed all other enterprises in Iran. Yet
even with such vast wealth, Tehran was only receiving marginal funds compared to Britain. The
ambitious Seven-Year Development Plan proposed by Mohammad Reza Shah was not in the
realm of financial feasibility, which added to the escalating tensions between Tehran and the
AIOC. The new Shah’s development plan was a last attempt at domestic reform geared towards
modernizing Iran. The plan would begin May 1949 despite the obvious lack of available funds.
Inflation from 1939 to 1945 had caused wages to increase 200 percent compared to the cost of
living at 585 percent increase. The growing Tudeh Party was benefiting from the economic
situation, however.13 It was only natural that during hard economic times, the Iranian public
moved to support outspoken groups such as the Tudeh Party. As the escalating crisis absorbed
the attention of Tehran authorities and Majlis officials, the Tudeh Party was rallying support from
the lower classes that had become disillusioned with the postwar government deficiencies.
Growth of the Tudeh Party had begun soon after the Allied victory in Europe. The Tudeh
Party had helped with the northern Azerbaijan province rebellion of 1945 where the Soviets also
backed the establishment of an independent state. From this rebellion, the Tudeh Party gained
! 13 “British Report their Iranian Oil,” New York Times, 1 April 1946 and Bayne, “Crisis of
21
momentum. They were armed with the weapons previously confiscated by the Allied occupation
of 1941. By December, the province declared itself autonomous from Tehran and received
Soviet support immediately. The new leader of Azerbaijan was Jaafar Pishevari who also was
considered to be the head of the Tudeh Party by U.S. estimates. When Tehran sent forces to
recapture Azerbaijan in February they met significant resistance from Soviet-supplied troops in
the northern province. The Azerbaijan crisis served as an early warning to the United States that
the USSR had the capability to meddle in Iranian affairs and was not easily matched by the
meager defense forces under the Shah.14 Happening so soon after WWII’s conclusion, the
United States depended mostly on media reports and estimates from the State Department
because there was no CIG nor CIA - there was no centralized intelligence gathering service.
Concurrently, the Tudeh Party was very active in Tehran. On 4 March 1946, Tudeh
personnel barred the entrance to the Parliament building to obstruct meetings of politicians that
were catering to foreign powers. The demonstration amassed a crowd reaching into the
thousands and required police to break it apart. To that point the fourteenth Majlis was still in
session because of a clause in the constitution that didn’t allow for new elections amid times of
armed conflict (the Azerbaijan crisis). Western audiences saw the demonstrations as a Soviet-
supported uprising in the capital because the Tudeh in Azerbaijan were the root of the armed
confrontation in the first place.15 For the Western observer, impeding legislature meetings was a
travesty of immense proportions that could not be overlooked. Unsupportive views of Iran then
! 14 “North Iran Sets up Autonomous Rule,” New York Times, 16 December 1945; “Fighting in
Progress in North Iran: Rebels Clash With Teheran Army,” New York Times, 21 February 1946.
! 15 Gene Currivan, “Clash in Tehran Bars Parliament,” New York Times, 4 March 1946.
22
grew among the West which aided in the eventual condemnation of groups such as the Tudeh
The eventual halt of Tudeh demonstrations succeeded in ending the fourteenth Majlis.
When Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam returned from Moscow after lengthy oil concession
negotiations, there were not enough deputies to convene the parliament legally.16 Nevertheless,
after heated diplomatic battles between the Soviet Union and Iran, the Red Army withdrew from
the country with a modest oil concession for Moscow. 17 However, the fifteenth Iranian Majlis
did not accept the concession as negotiated by Prime Minister Qavam with the Kremlin. In
response, Qavam outlined his own five-point bill that was approved by the Majlis. The bill
stated:
“1) Iran would explore her own oil resources during the next five years and
exploit them with her own capital. 2) The Premier’s negotiations for an oil pact
with Russia were null and void. 3) Iran would not be permitted to grant any
exploration. 4) If oil were found by Iran in the next five years, the country might
negotiate with Russia with a view to selling oil. 5) Iran must negotiate with the
! 16 Gene Currivan, “Sole Rule Passes to Premier,” New York Times, 12 March 1946.
! 17 Gene Currivan, “Big Issues Settled,” New York Times, 5 April 1946.
! 18 “Iranʼs Parliament Rejects Oil Accord with Soviet, 102-2,” New York Times, 22 October 1947.
23
The proposal pleased neither Russia nor Britain. In fact, this bill was the start of a
renewed oil crisis that would soon envelop Iran. Iranian government was seen as a weak entity
where the legislature could overrule any executive diplomatic agreement hindering any progress
in foreign relations. Furthermore, the fifth point calling for larger AIOC subsidiaries was the
move than created the oil crisis and let the crisis last as long as it did. But, why was the postwar
oil battle focused on Iran? Iran had a lush supply of oil in the north and south--more so in the
North--but for the Soviet Union, Iran was a country with grain, livestock, fruit, timber, and a
warm water port. Likewise, the British saw Iran’s geographic position as the final stronghold
against Soviet expansion into the Middle East. Notwithstanding geographic significance,
however, oil was the prime target for both Britain and the Soviet Union because of its strategic
value.19
Within a year of WWII’s conclusion, Iran had become a focal point in the escalating
East-West confrontation. The political atmosphere of Iran was of rising discontent with
economic mismanagement championed by the strengthening Tudeh Party. At its roots, the Tudeh
Party was originally a pro-Soviet organ in Iran, yet because of the infiltration by Soviet agents
and a unifying sense of nationalism against all foreign intervention, the party was labeled
Communist by the West. The difference between being pro-Soviet, and Communist was vague
for Western observers. Essentially, the Tudeh Party supported the ability of Stalin as de-facto
leader to get things done. But, it seems most of the purported ‘pro-Soviet but not Communist’
propaganda of the early Tudeh Party was fabrication; the Tudeh media papers were simply trying
to appear as if they were independent of foreign support or identity because they were supposed
! 19 C.L. Sulzberger, “British, Soviet Aims Clash in Iran,” New York Times, 24 November 1945 and
Edwin M. Wright, “Iran as a Gateway to Russia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2 (January, 1942). 367-371.
24
to be against all foreign intervention. This, however, was simply not the case. The growing
concern over Tudeh aspirations was exacerbated when Qavam named three of their members to
his cabinet 1 August 1946.20 The recognition of the Tudeh Communists in Tehran, however,
began another uprising in southern Iran. Along the Persian Gulf, the southern provinces of Iran
were filled with large land owners who had a natural distaste for communism. Therefore, they
sought a similar autonomy as Azerbaijan. Their proposed regime wanted to outlaw communism
in its entirety. 21
So by the end of 1946, Iran was effectively split. The undeclared civil war during the
postwar years advanced simultaneously with worsening relations among Britain, Iran, and the
Soviet Union. The constant notions for oil nationalization seemed to be the perfect route to fix
the economy of Iran and satisfy anti-imperial nationalist sentiments. But, underlying all the
seemingly short term fixes was the question of Iran’s alignment in the world; was the Tehran
government ultimately for, or against communism? Qavam had convinced U.S. Ambassador
George Allen that without American military and financial support, the Shah’s regime would fall
if it were attacked by the rising factions throughout Iran.22 This assertion brought the United
States closer to the conflict as it continued to become an international incident rather than a
Because of Iran’s strategic importance to both the West and to the USSR, oil negotiations
had the potential to affect every major power. In 1947, the CIA estimated that the massive
! 20 “The Tudeh Party: Vehicle of Communism in Iran,” Central Intelligence Agency, 18 July 1949
and “Tudeh Gets 3 Posts in New Iran Cabinet,” New York Times, 1 August 1946
! 22 State Department, Cable #1293, Ambassador Allen to Secretary of State. 30 September 1946.
As reprinted in Yora Alexander and Allan Names, eds, The United States and Iran: A Documentary History
(Frederick, Maryland: Publications of America, 1980), 178-179
25
propaganda campaign throughout Iran was intended to soften the country for Soviet domination.
They accurately pinpointed the weakness of the government and the economy as the main
culprits for the increasing Soviet influence, especially through the Tudeh Party. The estimate
also recognized the declining state of the British Empire. While Britain had been left as the chief
representative of Western influence in the Middle East after WWII, their power was declining as
domestic issues began to mount in England. Consequently, Iran turned more and more to the
United States and the United Nations for support. But, Iran was not united as it had once been;
widespread corruption practiced by the civil and military officials were alienating a large portion
of the population, the tribal groups. Moreover, continued failures to give “effective execution to
long-standing promises of economic and social reforms” was working to the benefit of leftist
parties such as the Tudeh. In lieu of such deficiencies, the CIA feared Iran would fall to Soviet
To understand why the public would approve of oil nationalization, one must delve into
the failing economic structure of Iran. The economy of Iran was based on agriculture and
petroleum. Its agriculture had the capacity to supply 80 percent of the population and produced
all foods for the country except tea and sugar. In 1947, Iran was the fourth largest petroleum
producer and had a production of 145 million barrels annually. The oil income had allowed Iran
to survive much of the immediate post war years without extensive external debt. Additionally
the oil reserves in Iran provided the government large credence among the international scene.
Yet despite the prosperity of the oil business, the national budget had not been balanced in years
because of increased expenses that accompanied Iran’s ambitions to become a modernized state.
26
The Shah’s seven-year plan for modernization was not supported by the tax base either.24 In
essence, the budget control officers and bureaucracies in Iran were ill trained to deal with the
Iran’s foreign policies under the standing government lacked direction, also. The Majlis
had the ability to reject foreign agreements, so any ground made with the Soviet Union through
negotiations could be lost to party conflict in the Majlis. Iran had become accustomed to having
two opposing foreign powers vying for influence, the British and Soviets. However, as the
British presence in the Middle East retreated, Iran should have changed its foreign outlook. This
did not happen immediately, and much of the negotiations with the Soviet Union found no
superior counter offer from the British; the lack of offers from the British in this period allowed
the Soviet Union to believe they were gaining ground in the battle for influence over Iran.
Because America had grown to dominate the Western powers, Washington had to step in to serve
negotiations was forcing Washington to become more involved with the Iranian oil situation.
Political dissension further pushed Tehran into turmoil through the remaining years of the
1940s. The declining political stability within Iran hastened America’s entrance into the conflict
between the AIOC and Iran because the weakened state of the country was feared to be a
breeding ground for Communist fervor. Of great importance in the political insecurity problem
was the office of the prime minister and the Majlis itself. Abd al-Hussein Hajir was appointed
Prime Minister in 1948 because of the support of Qavam’s coalition in the Majlis. Before his
! 24 Ibid
! 25 “The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for US Security,” Central
27
election, a six month cabinet under Premier Ebrahim Hakimi had perpetuated the American’s
fear of Iran by failing to act against the rising power of the Tudeh Party; he had reformed little if
anything. Hajir had enemies within the anti-court faction, religious representatives and the
leftists, it was as if nobody in the country approved of his administration. One might wonder
why Qavam was not elected again to be Prime Minister, but it was Qavam who expressed no
desire for the office after his previous terms.26 After 1947, the Prime Minister position was in
constant flux with six men holding the position over the course of three years. The
inconsistencies within the Majlis and the central Tehran government perpetuated the declining
economic and social conditions of the Iranian people. This realization allowed the Shah to
condemn the Majlis, citing irresponsibility and creating subsequent proposals aimed at curtailing
the power of the Majlis. The Shah wanted to dissolve the Majlis for six months and end the
ability of the Majlis to dismiss the Prime Minister and his cabinet at any time. However the
wealthy bureaucrats and Majlis officials feared a revival of the dictatorship of the former Shah,
so the Shah’s proposals only added to the internal problems of Iran.27 All of this coupled with
the ongoing economic woes of the country to create the breeding ground for Communism that
Washington feared.
Underneath the endless political strife in Tehran, the Tudeh Party was gaining additional
momentum. In 1948, the party was believed to be the only representative of the people, but it
had no official representation of its own in the Majlis. Only the Tudeh Party was composed of
the majority poor population while other significant parties in the country were mostly led by
! 26 “Communist and Pro-Soviet Groups in the Arab World,” Office of Strategic Services, Research
and Analysis Branch, 30 March 1945. OSS Documents are available through the CIAʼs FOIA online
reading room.
28
large landowners, tribal leaders and “other notables, who use their local power to obtain the
election of their candidates.” The Tudeh Party, however, had formed cells throughout the
country in 1947 and 1948 instituting provincial and urban councils. The CIA labeled the Tudeh
Party the “best organized political party in Iran,” and expected it to run campaigns for the Majlis
elections in 1949.28 This was troubling news for the Americans and British who hoped the
illegality of their Communist ties would have been dealt with by the Shah or at least the Prime
Minister.
While Iran was dealing with intergovernmental conflicts, the USSR began more
provocative attacks on the country. Although not in a state of war, the Soviets were transmitting
radio propaganda twenty-four hours a day around the world. Within Iran, the previous CIG
noticed that the Red Army had left a parting gift in Tabriz (the Azerbaijan capital): a powerful
radio transmitter. From the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic, the USSR broadcasted agitprop against
the Iranian Government and Western influences. The propaganda radios were helping to
establish and maintain the USSR as a major contender for world supremacy at the time, and it
worked alongside the expansive conventional war material buildup already underway. The
USSR was afraid that America was aiming to become the sole world hegemon and was going to
subvert communism with an “Anglo-American military alliance against the USSR.”29 Within the
boundaries of Iran, Stalin both feared American military influence and was irritated with non
committal negotiations over the oil question by Iranian diplomats. The Soviet Union was not
oblivious to Western movements to contain the USSR in its current borders, but due to the vast
! 28 Ibid.
! 29 “Analysis of Soviet Foreign Propaganda Broadcasts.” Central Intelligence Group, 23 July 1946;
Central Intelligence Group documents are accessible through the CIAʼs online FOIA reading room.
29
history between Iran and Russia, Stalin continued to antagonize the West in hopes of gaining a
In spring 1947, Soviet policy seemed to calm down. Rather than beckoning an imminent
armed conquest, the Kremlin was moving to consolidate power with what it had conquered. The
Soviet interest in the Middle East for oil supply and a warm water port was still strong, but
domination of the Aegean Sea rather than the Persian Gulf was obviously more enticing. In
Greece, the Soviets went up against the British ultimately forcing the British to withdraw men
and money from the country. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the United States forked the
necessary arms and funding to drive the Soviets out.30 With the communist defeat in Greece, the
United States had made its first stand to contain communist expansion. Nevertheless, the USSR
still wanted a warm water port and access to the oil of the Persian Gulf area, so it returned to the
Iranian theatre. The Americans feared the USSR was trying to form coalitions among
neighboring Arab states in the Middle East; Washington believed the USSR sought to seclude
and surround Iran. Leaving Iran isolated in the region was not an option for the United States at
that time.31 As time would show, the rising Tudeh Party in Iran was a new expansionist element
The 1947 refusal to grant oil rights to the USSR was, nonetheless, the main culprit for the
new line of attacks on Iran and United States that increased before the end of the year. Moscow
began sending a series of threatening notes rebuking U.S. military missions inside the Iranian
Army and the purchase of U.S. military supplies. The Soviets believed the United States was
! 31 Gene Currivan, “Iran Faces Showdown with Russians on Oil: Britain has Great Interest in
30
slowly taking over the Iranian Army and would use this influence to encourage an anti-Soviet
press and armed forces. The threats were hinting at a likely intervention in Iran, which would be
legal under the Iranian-Soviet Treaty from 1921 that permitted such action “if Iran is unable to
halt the efforts of a third party to turn Iranian territory into a base for military attack against the
USSR.”32 What the Soviets did not fathom, however, was that Iran’s move for oil nationalization
was real. Thus, the popular movement was against interference from both the Soviet Union and
Great Britain. If any Western country was gaining footing with Tehran, it was the United States
who had been a calm median power throughout the war years and post-war era thus far. Iran was
enveloped in an ever-escalating oil crisis and the calls for oil nationalization exacerbated
tensions. The United States by that time was worried about Soviet relations improving between
Tehran and Moscow in the absence of Great Britain. This concern was well founded as it would
turn out, because neither Iran nor Britain had any desire to appease the other and reach a
settlement.
The British AIOC held strong to their view that the renewed concession of 1933 had no
contingency for future revisions. Early in 1947, the AIOC stated that they would refuse anything
more than minor revisions in the oil concession with Iran that was not to expire until 1993. 33
But, Iran wondered why it--as the oil rich country--could not receive a greater profit share. After
all, the AIOC had seen its greatest profit in 1947, more than double the production income from
! 32 “Current Situation in Iran,” Central Intelligence Agency, September 1948; Rami Ginat, “Soviet
Policy towards the Arab World, 1945-48,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4 (October, 1996), 326;
“Soviet Foreign and Military Policy,” Central Intelligence Group, 23 July 1946
! 33 “Britain will Resist Iran Pact Changes,” New York Times, 23 October 1947.
31
1946.34 While the worsening confrontation over oil revenue was being fought, the United States
was becoming more aware of the severity of Soviet expansion. The Truman Doctrine of 1947
outlined the new American foreign policy: containment. Even the American press was aware of
the disastrous implications a Soviet expansion into the Middle East would curtail.35 The Soviets
would have great advantages over any Western tactical response in the event of a military
confrontation because Iranian oil would give the USSR an additional source of fuel near to
home.
However, Iran was still largely under the influence of the British as negotiations had not
yet gone afoul. Estimates and other reports were being ordered among American bureaus, but all
contingencies and concerns required failed negotiations or an anxious Moscow move into Iran
before U.S. national interests would be compromised. Rather than bearing down on America, the
British government--which then still owned a large portion of the AIOC--was battling Tehran in
oil negotiations on behalf of the AIOC. The Iranian economy was faltering and the main source
of income for the country was owned by the British who demonstrated no sense of urgency in
resolving complaints from Iran. Such sentiments gave rise to new factions within the Majlis,
chiefly among them was the National Front that would dominate Iranian politics by 1951. 36
Ongoing political discourse engulfed Iran ever more through the early stages of the AIOC
negotiations. The 1933 amendment agreement to the D’Arcy concession and the Iranian
discontent with its existence was revived in 1948. A twenty-five point memorandum was handed
! 34 “Bonds and Shares on London Market,” New York Times, 1 June 1948.
! 35 J. H. Carmical, “Oil Shortage seen in Event of War,” New York Times, 30 October, 1948.
! 36 “Developments in the Azerbaijan Situation,” Central Intelligence Group, 4 June 1947; “Weekly
Summary: Soviet Union; Molotov-Mikoyan Shift; Iran; Soviet Relations,” Central Intelligence Agency, 18
March 1949.
32
to AIOC Vice Chairman N.A. Gass upon his arrival in Tehran in September 1948. This
memorandum outlined the Iranian complaints about the 1933 oil agreement. While the Tehran
government still seemed willing to negotiate grievances, a movement towards oil nationalization
was gaining momentum, even more so as factionalism increased among the Majlis. In fact, the
first cancellation proposal of the AIOC concession was introduced December 1948 to the Majlis.
Following this startling development, the Shah was shot at during a speech at Tehran University
in January 1949, creating an upsurge of popular support for the Shah in Iran.37 To the AIOC
negotiating team, however, it seemed to signal a point of contention between the Shah and his
people. Thus, the AIOC remained rigid in negotiations and continued to present small changes
to the existing 1933 concession. The Majlis could not vote on the matter for the fifteenth Majlis
expired 28 July when debate had only begun in the parliament five days earlier. The elections to
the sixteenth Majlis were rigged and discovered, thus weakening the momentum the Shah had
In 1950, the oil agreement was introduced to the new sixteenth Majlis’s special oil
commission, where Mossadegh was chair. For several months the oil commission brooded over
the implications finally rejecting it 25 November. About this time, the Arab-American Oil
Company (ARAMCO) in Saudi Arabia negotiated a 50/50 profit-sharing agreement between the
government of Saudi Arabia and the United States. Similarly, the British had given Venezuela a
50 percent profit-sharing concession. The AIOC, though likely taken aback, then aimed
negotiations at matching that of the new Saudi ARAMCO.38 The sudden face change of the
! 37 Chris Paine and Erica Schoenberger, “Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers: 1872-1954,”
MERIP Reports, No. 37 (May, 1975): 22. Middle East Research and Information Project, http://
www.merip.org/mer/backissues.html.
! 38 Ibid.
33
negotiators may have come too late, however. For within the Majlis in 1950, interior conflict
was slowing any progress for or against an oil concession. The theme of nationalization was
reemerging.
The National Front, a broad coalition of political parties comprised of urban middle and
lower classes, gained power in the sixteenth Majlis. At its helm was Mossadegh who called for
mass demonstrations against the British and their puppet Shah. The coalition’s main aims in the
Majlis were the reduction of Shah’s powers and oil nationalization. While they wreaked havoc
in the Majlis and for the Shah, Mossadegh submitted a bill March 1951 officially calling for the
nationalization of the AIOC in Iran. Because of the support behind the broad National Front
coalition, the notion passed and the Shah was forced to name Mossadegh Prime Minister of Iran.
The first day of May 1951, Mossadegh signed the nationalization bill into law.39 In doing so, he
fomented the British fear that Iran was too susceptible to regime change.
It seems important to take a brief period to explain how Mossadegh became the center
focus of Iranian politics by 1950. He was born into a politically active family where his father
was Minister of Budget and Finance for the Qajar government in the late nineteenth century.
Mossadegh himself began his political career during the Constitutional Revolution in 1905 where
he developed his strong sense of nationalism. During WWI, he was given a post in the School
for Political Science in Tehran where he published Capitulations and Iran speaking out against
British interference with the new constitutional monarchy. These actions caused the British
foreign legion to condemn his work and this history surely carried over to his later political
career. After WWI, he organized the famous Sheikh Abdol-Hussein Mosque sit-in demonstrating
34
against the 1919 Anglo-Iranian proposal that would have given the British incredible power over
Iranian domestic progress for decades. In 1921 he was elected to the Majlis where he protested
everything foreign bred until his self exile in 1928 after the secret police purged the Shah’s
political enemies. 40 Mossadegh returned from exile in 1941 when the new Shah, Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi gave a comprehensive pardon for political prisoners and dissenters. Throughout
the 1940s, Mossadegh reemerged as a defender of what Iranian nationalism had been at the
Nevertheless, his past was filled with confrontations among him, both Pahlavi Shahs, and the
British.
In a meeting with Ambassador Grady, the day after the nationalization bill was signed,
Mossadegh rejected American sponsored loans to Iran citing that the conditions necessary for
disbursement would undermine the advances already made. Mossadegh may have been
portrayed more negatively towards the 1953 coup, but immediately after the nationalization bill
was signed, he was demonstrating his mastery of politics. He had already recognized that even if
the United States wanted to side with him against British neocolonialism, Washington could not
! 40 Farhad Diba, Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography, (Dover, NH: Croom helm, 1986),
3-7, 14-20; Richard H. Pfaff, “Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran,” The Western
Political Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March, 1963): 84; Psychological assertion originally from Edward G.
Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-09, (London: Luzac & CO, 1910) and defended by Richard H.
Pfaff, “Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 16,
No. 1 (March, 1963): 84; T. Cuyler Young, “The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran,” Middle East
Journal, Vol. 2 No, 1 (January, 1948): 51; P. Avery, G.R.G. Hambly, C. Melville, eds., The Cambridge
History of Iran Volume 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 214-215; Homayoun
Katouzian, “Nationalist Trends in Iran, 1921-1926,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10,
No. 1 (November 1979): 533-536; Michael P. Zirinsky, “Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the
Rise of Reza Shah 1921-1926,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24 (1992): 639.
35
afford to lose its close ally.41 Throughout May 1951, Mossadegh escalated the fears that many
estimates had predicted. By continuing down the tract to ardent anti-foreign interference Iran
was doomed. Tehran was politically weak aside from Mossadegh’s growing influence and
power. The U.S. State Department feared Mossadegh was leading the country into a decline
where the Tudeh Party could prosper while it (the Tudeh Party) restructured the country into a
For the AIOC, the loss of 50 percent of their stock was absurd and they prompted London
to pressure Mossadegh to reenter negotiations. The greater implication here was that they turned
to the British government, a recognition of Britain’s historic dominance in the region. The
conflict was between AIOC and Tehran, though, and seeing how quickly the British government
got involved once things went sour signaled trouble for Mossadegh’s new government in Tehran.
The AIOC then took their case to the new International Court of Justice within the UN seeking
an arbiter likely to be sympathetic to their side of the nationalization argument. The court
suggested a 50/50 profit-share between the two parties, just like Saudi ARAMCO, but it was
rejected by Mossadegh. A second proposal was introduced by Richard Stokes, a British Labor
Party politician who briefly served as Lord Privy Seal, but it too was turned down by the Iranian
Prime Minister. Thereafter, the AIOC and the British government refused to work with
! 41 Telegram, “No. 18: The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Department of State.” United States
Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor, in file “The Question of Economic Assistance to Iran;
United States Interest in the Settlement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, January-December 1951,”
United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor, 2 May 1951, Foreign relations of the United
States, 1952-1954. Iran, 1952-1954, Vol. X, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989),
46-47.
! 42 Telegram, “No. 20: The Secretary of State to Embassy in Iran.” United States Department of
State. Glennon, John P., Editor, “The Question of Economic Assistance to Iran; United States Interest in
the Settlement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, January-December 1951,” 10 May 1951, United States
Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor, Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Iran,
1952-1954, Vol. X, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 50-51.
36
Mossadegh and turned more to the UN and the United States for mediation. Because the legal
attacks failed, the British moved to undermine Mossadegh’s popularity with his people; they
imposed economic sanctions and began military maneuvers in the region. Within these
economic sanctions was also a steady slowdown in production of oil ultimately leading to a
blockade of the Abadan port. Mossadegh was still not to be dissuaded, and he announced that
the first shot fired from the British military just off shore would “signal the start of World War
III.”43 Mossadegh’s actions during the crisis are often approached through a negative slant as it
is easier to attribute the harsh atmosphere with Iran and the conflict abroad to him alone.
However, one most realize that Mossadegh was a seasoned politician and recognized inevitable
scenarios. In this case, because oil nationalization had become a public outcry, returning to the
UK part of the Iranian oil supply would have been political suicide.
The situation became an example of Mossadegh’s unyielding stance against what he saw
as encroaching Western imperialism. The new Prime Minister was thrust into power amid the
worst possible time for his dreams of modernization to be realized; the domestic situation was
dire and required immediate action rather than slow, progressive reform. The Shah’s seven-year
plan for development had to be fulfilled to some extent to keep what cohesion still existed in
Tehran. Thus, the oil dispute that intensified until the 1953 coup was fundamentally related to
domestic issues. The Nationalization Law of 1951 was the result of failed negotiations between
! 43 Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup Dʼetat in Iran,” 263 and Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne,
eds. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004),
6-10.
37
Iran and the British, and it set in motion the clandestine operations that would lead eventually to
The AIOC moved to threaten any importers of Iranian oil, effectively cutting off the flow
of money for Iran. Simultaneously, the AIOC was abolished and replaced with the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), but it had trouble hiring workers in Europe because of British
legal threats to censure and even blockade countries who would work with the NIOC. Despite
all of this, Mossadegh did not change his stance, so the British initiated a strategy aimed at
removing the Prime Minister through covert, political action. Since no negotiations could be
scheduled through Mossadegh, the British envoys met with the Shah pushing for him to remove
Mossadegh. But, such a notion was political suicide for the Shah, and Mohammad Reza knew
Ironically, the oil nationalization had not resolved the bruised, overexerted economy of
Iran. Anti-British propaganda spread by the National Front created the impression that Britain
was to blame for the bitter domestic situation. The public slowly turned against Mossadegh then,
because the policies he was enforcing were doing nothing different than the former Prime
Minister’s. Negotiations continued between Tehran and London, much with American
mediation. The Americans understood the nationalist credo of Iran and wanted to remain neutral
to avoid offending Iran while at the same time avoiding any problem with the special relationship
! 44 N. Marbury Efimenco, “An Experiment with Civilian Dictatorship in Iran; The Case of
Mohammed Mossadegh,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3 (August, 1955), 390-392.
! 45 While the young Shah was still a relative newcomer to international politics, he had grown up
under the watch of his father and influence of his strong-minded mother and sister. Both of these women
in his life continued to scold him for political choices throughout this time, but he was nonetheless
educated as well if not better than other vying politicians within the Majlis at the time. The Shah was
growing into his position still in the early 1950s. Perhaps the coup was his defining moment also in terms
of finding a way to overcome the criticisms thrown on him from multiple parties.
38
developed between Britain and the United States. The United States was in a binding
relationship with Britain as a maritime ally and therefore limited in the amount of pressure it
could exert on London. However, the Washington negotiation team was a bit concerned with the
British behavior which seemed to be “out of tune with the mood of modern times.” The
Americans questioned British motives in Iran because Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Truman--though Truman not to the same extent as FDR--both sought an end to colonial
empires.46 Despite these early reservations in helping the British mediate the oil negotiations,
Amid the British assault on Iran, the United States originally began protesting in defense
of Mossadegh and his government. The Americans felt Mossadegh was surely anxious to reach
settlement by that point and advised the British to reopen negotiations. Even without U.S.
support, the British increased their pressure on Mossadegh culminating in their expulsion 20
September 1951 from the oil fields. The notion to invade Iran at Abadan was then, also, scolded
by the Truman administration and Prime Minister Clement Attlee was forced to tell his cabinet
that because the Americans were against any invasion, they would have to abandon their plans.47
So here one sees another prime example of the United States gaining supremacy. Even in the
region where Truman had previously decided to grant sway to the British, Truman now was
exerting the influence of the United States over its once equal ally.
Mossadegh seemed to exploit the xenophobia between the Iranian public and the British.
He moved to expel all British presence in Iran in 1952, including journalists and educators, but
! 46 George Lenezowski, “United Statesʼ Support for Iranʼs Independence and Integrity, 1945-1959,”
Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 401, America and the Middle East (May,
1972), 51-53. The major push for an end of colonialism was championed by FDR throughout WWII.
39
failed to replace the vacuum left behind from the British expulsion. It was British citizens who
were largely responsible for shaping Iran into a modernized states and without their presence,
Iran was set back. Additionally, the thousands of workers formerly employed by the AIOC site
in Iran found themselves unemployed and requiring additional government welfare funds to
support their families. A solution to the oil dispute would have been a move in the right
direction, but Mossadegh had rejected all proposals even those on par with the comparable
foreign companies in Venezuela, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. While original American assessments
had questions on legitimacy of British objections to the nationalization, by 1952 it seemed all too
apparent that Mossadegh and the remnants of a democratic Majlis were consistently refusing all
proposals in bilateral talks between London and Tehran, International Court decisions, American
mediation propositions, and UN programs. The final proposal in February 1953 recommended:
To Iran, the proposal seemed to revive the 1933 agreement which was considered invalid
in Tehran. So, the British closed the Abadan refineries in Iran which proved disastrous for
Iranian oil workers. The British hoped to make the Iranian people despise Mossadegh through
! 48 Efimenco, “An Experiment with Civilian Dictatorship in Iran; The Case of Mohammed
Mossadegh,” 393.
40
blockading all possible forms of oil revenue from Iran. Having been schooled in Europe, and
having been in politics so long, Mossadegh understood the technique and pushed the National
Front to try to blame the worsening conditions further on the remnants of British imperialism.
By this point, such anti-British propaganda was cliché, however, and by making the conflict
between Iran and Britain one of anti-imperialism the United States had to publicly renege on
earlier statements in defense of Great Britain.49 Mossadegh had underestimated the congruent
approach to Iran of the United States and Great Britain; the United States was not about to
undermine its special relationship with the UK just to support a regime that was on unsteady
already been created and the American CIA and State Department were onboard as Dwight
Oil’s increased strategic importance to the major powers after WWII instigated the oil
crisis between the AIOC and Iran. While at the surface the situation may seem limited to the
British and Iranians, the very mention of oil concessions and control invited the attention of the
Soviet Union and the United States. For the Soviets, Iran was a border state with warm water
ports and vast oil supplies that would be an ideal buffer state from Western aggression should a
future war breakout. To the United States, however, Iran was important not only because of its
geographic location near European countries, but because it’s independence was necessary for
national security interests in the Middle Eastern region. Additionally, “loss of Iranian oil
production and of the refinery at Abadan” would have been a drastic blow to “Western
! 49 Ibid, 395.
! 50 Telegram, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran (No. 84)," United States
Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor, 7 September 1951, Foreign relations of the United States,
1952-1954. Iran, 1952-1954, Vol. X, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 160.
41
economic and military interests,” as it would have undermined Western Europe reconstruction
under the Marshall Plan and the weakened the firm stance of American foreign policy against the
Soviet Union.51 Essentially Iran became the focal point of the East-West confrontation in the
Middle East by 1951. The Soviets were wanting the British concession to be nullified so they
could take over the state by way of the Tudeh Party, while the United States wanted an end of the
oil crisis almost at any cost just to contain Communism within the Soviet Union’s already
established borders. In effect, the oil crisis in the eight years after WWII inadvertently allowed
the CIA to enter into the picture because the nationalization of the AIOC signified the end of
British influence and presence in the country and Western influence had to be maintained. Even
more than the nationalization of oil, however, “It was the inability of the British and the Iranians
to resolve the oil dispute on their own that ultimately brought the United States into the
conflict.”52
Oil was a determining factor for the entrance of the CIA into Iran. Moreover, the lack of
resolutions between London and Tehran allowed the clandestine removal plan to expand. To
enter Iran like the allies had in 1941 was out of the question, and the lack of friendly relations
with the Soviet Union restricted large military maneuvers anyway. Clandestine warfare was the
future, and Iran would be the location of the first, large scale experiment of such tactics.
! 51 “Memorandum of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the United
Kingdom at the Department of State,” United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor, 9
January 1952, Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Iran, 1952-1954, Vol. X, (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 311-320.
! 52 Mary Ann Heiss, "Real Men Don't Wear Pajamas: Anglo-American Cultural Perceptions of
Mohammad Mossadeq and the Iranian Oil Nationalization Dispute," in Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss,
eds., Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945 (Columbus, OH: Ohio
State University Press, 2001), 180.
42
Chapter II:
Clandestine Preparations
operation solutions were being explored. While the CIA would not be approached until late
1952, the older British SIS agency moved forward with planning for the removal of Mossadegh.
Iran was a logical location to test the abilities of a covert regime change. Kermit Roosevelt
would also notice this when presenting his case to his superiors in 1953. While the oil dispute
was a definitive reason to carryout covert actions, oil alone could not justify a coup at the time.
Many requirements had to be met. Primarily, since the British had no diplomatic presence in
Tehran, the CIA would have to carryout any operation. However, because the CIA acted on
behalf of Washington and the National Security Council, many key figures would have to be
persuaded to remove Mossadegh. Even though advances towards Cold War warfare had been
made under Truman’s administration, no operation of this magnitude had been attempted yet.
The oil crisis between Iran and Britain had escalated to a point of no return for
Mossadegh by 1952. Behind the scenes of negotiations, the British SIS was plotting the
overthrow of the Mossadegh regime in the spring of 1952. However, the sudden expulsion of
British personnel in 1952 marked the end of British supremacy in Iran. With their diplomatic
foreign offices swept out of the country, the SIS was incapable of fulfilling the clandestine
operation that would remove Mossadegh. Thus, the SIS looked to the United States to execute
the coup. Once the CIA was given control of the planning, the agency was able to demonstrate
its capacity to carry out such a risky clandestine operation. The planning stages for the coup
43
revealed the strength of the relatively young American intelligence agency. Notwithstanding the
CIA’s age, steps taken in late 1952 through summer 1953 added to the predominant stature the
To bring the Americans on board the British movement against Mossadegh and his
intransigence with the oil dispute, the SIS had to convince multiple parties in Washington. First
and foremost, the CIA was originally seen as equals to the SIS, even as such a young agency.
This was because of the relationship formed while many CIA operatives were part of the OSS
during WWII which worked with the British SIS on many occasions. Furthermore, the U.S.
State Department was needed in order to give the operation a diplomatic foundation. Finally, to
carry out the coup, both the SIS and CIA would have to convince the U.S. President that the
In order to achieve these three preliminary goals, the SIS had to convince Washington
that mediation and neutrality in the oil crisis was not working for the benefit of the free world.
Rather, inaction was allowing Soviet forces to expand within Iran mostly in the form of the
Tudeh Party. Moreover, by allowing nationalization of the oil in Iran, other countries where
Western oil refineries were located would be in danger. American foreign policy had been paved
by the Truman Doctrine and extended with the Marshall Plan for European recovery. The
success of the European Recovery Plan was linked the outcome of the oil crisis in Iran as it was
the greatest source of oil for the European continent located in the Middle East. However
pertinent the national security measures were to the decision to become engaged in the conflict
44
between Britain and Iran, oil’s presence could be found in every point of the proposal, even if
oil’s role was denied.1 Nevertheless, political instability had to be portrayed as the leading
reason for intervention because of the evolving anti-Communist movement in the United States.
It would not be a stretch to suggest the antipathy towards the Soviets and fear of Communism
was exploited by British agents when presenting the case against Mossadegh to Washington
Outlawed in 1949, the Communist Tudeh Party had been politically active especially
since the nationalization of oil in 1951. 2 Soviet agents were allegedly spotted by British contacts
throughout Iran reportedly aiming to stir up riots and “mastermind the revolution when Iran is
judged ripe to be taken over.” Tudeh agitation later caused the Tehran University to shut down in
November 1951 along with other campuses and would not reopen its doors completely until
Mossadegh was removed in August 1953.3 Iran was imploding because of the failed oil
negotiations and their backlash. Because of the inner conflict between factions within the
country, the CIA agreed with the former SIS assertion that a coup was possible through inciting
MI6, the foreign branch of the British SIS, had begun operations as early as March 1952
through the sympathetic Rashidian brothers who had been British informants throughout the
1940s. Two of the three Rashidian brothers, Assadollah and Seifollah, had been British contacts
for a withheld period of time. They worked to create friction among National Front leaders.
! 4 Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, 13-18
45
Hostilities arose when Mossadegh criticized Ayatollah Kashani, the Shia religious leader who
shared incredible political power with the Prime Minister within Iran, for attempting to rig the
seventeenth Majlis elections--like the Shah had tried with the sixteenth. Other leaders within the
National Front also found themselves at odds with each other because of rumors that had been
started by the Rashidian brothers. Mossadegh recognized the activities and tried to counter their
effects by resigning from office 16 July 1952. In giving up power, Mossadegh hoped to silence
the opposition to him and let the country’s political arena calm down. The Shah moved quickly
and appointed Qavam al-Saltaneh (former Prime Minister from 1946-1948) as the new Prime
Minister. Demonstrations broke out across Tehran and other urban centers ending with the death
of sixty-nine Iranians and another 750 wounded. Mossadegh’s supporters then swept him back
into office just five days after his resignation by constant demonstrations throughout Tehran. 5
The five day episode had several implications and revealed serious problems within
Tehran. First, Mossadegh was forced to purge the officer corps of the army because they had
proven to be more loyal to the Shah than the Majlis during the five days of demonstrations. This
action caused Mossadegh to lose any support or credibility he had created therein. Second, the
National Front coalition was not resolving any issues between its leaders and members, and the
next upcoming power within Tehran was the Tudeh Party. This signified a dire moment for the
West as communist forces within the Tudeh Party were indeed taking advantage of the weakened
state and moving into positions of influence within the Majlis. General Fazlollah Zahedi, who
had once worked as a cabinet member for Mossadegh, now began to turn against the Prime
Minister as well. But, he also expressed concern with growing U.S. influence within Iran and
46
thus began to work with the Rashidians who were only suspected of favoring British influence,
not necessarily American. MI6 supplied Zahedi arms for his uprising, but Mossadegh learned of
the plot and he signed arrest warrants for the Rashidians and one of Zahedi’s generals, Abdul
Hejazi. Zahedi avoided arrest because of his parliamentary immunity. Three days after the
failed coup, Mossadegh cut all diplomatic relations with Great Britain effectively booting them
out of the country.6 From this point onward the British had to depend on the Americans to see
While Tehran continued to sink into chaos throughout 1952, the British had already
advanced their plans to remove Mossadegh through a clandestine operation. However, as they
were removed from Iran, there was no solid base of operations for British agents; the embassy
and station home were vacated. Rather than work more broadly and oversee any coup attempts
from outside the country, they took their plans to the CIA in late 1952. On a return trip from
Tehran, Kermit Roosevelt, CIA Near East and Africa division chair, stopped in London
November 1952. There a representative for the SIS, John Cochran, approached Roosevelt and
orally introduced him to the first coup proposal.7 The Americans still had diplomatic ties with
Iran, and most importantly they had an embassy in Tehran. The operation was entitled TPAJAX
and it set out “to cause the fall of the Mossadegh government; to reestablish the prestige and
power of the Shah; and to replace the Mossadegh government with one which would govern Iran
according to constructive policies.”8 Essentially, the British had lost a large percentage of their
! 6 Ibid, 266
! 7 Kermit Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, 107
! 8 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
47
oil supply from Iran with the Iran blockade and they now wanted a concession. The mindset of
the British AIOC and London was that anything at that time was better than bowing to
nationalization.
escalating power of the CIA and its role in the new Cold War. The British had approached
Truman with the operation and were rejected because Truman did not believe the United States
nor its CIA had the right to overthrow governments, especially in peacetime. Truman had set up
the CIA as a collective source of intelligence gathering abroad. The National Security Act of
1947 had not abolished intelligence services from different military branches and domestic
bureaus, but had centralized the intelligence compilations of all other intelligence services. The
aspect of clandestine activities was but a remnant of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) from
WWII. Such activities were not blocked in the original charter within the National Security Act,
but neither were they condoned specifically. Within a year of the CIA’s establishment, the
agency was charged with “the conduct of covert psychological, political, paramilitary, and
economic activities.” The new clandestine operations helped with Turkey and Greece by guiding
the paramilitary anti-communist groups before climaxing with the proposed coup in Iran.
Truman had never intended the agency to go much further than media-related propaganda or
money handling for anti-communist groups. There was, however, a caveat in the foreign policy
directives of the Truman Doctrine that the British could exploit in order to bring America on its
side: communist containment. The Truman Doctrine’s broad statements allowed the agency to
48
investigate the British proposal for Mossadegh’s forced removal without the consent of President
Truman. 9
In November and December of 1952, British SIS representatives met with the CIA’s Near
East and Africa Division (NEA). The anticipated discussion points of the meeting, however,
were not to explore a proposal for joint actions against Prime Minister Mossadegh. As Dr.
Donald Wilber of the CIA stated in his operation report, “the NEA Division had not intended to
discuss the question at all and was unprepared to do so.” Nevertheless, the SIS left their
proposals with the NEA members who agreed to look into it. 10 It was at this meeting that the
British SIS capitulated to the arising CIA capabilities. While one can argue that the operation
was carried out jointly between the CIA and SIS, the outlook of such an amiable alliance simply
did not exist. The SIS was incapable of removing Mossadegh independently, and it was not just
because of their forced withdrawal from Iran. Rather, it was because of the decades of
subversion working against Iranian independence that culminated in their expulsion from Iran.
Because the British had established themselves as a colonial overlord to Iran, they had lost all
credence with Iranians. To try and save face, the British aimed for an oil negotiation four years
after the disputes arose in vigor. To this end, it would be up to the Americans to carry out any
attempted coup.
Dwight Eisenhower entered the picture with the elections of 1952. Once sworn into
office in January 1953, he was introduced to the coup by his NSC and trusted Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles. Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles aimed to create a more fervent stance
! 9 William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, (Tuscaloosa,
! 10 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
49
against Soviet expansion than Truman had with his containment policy. They called their foreign
policy objectives the “New Look” whereby simple containment philosophies from Truman were
not sufficient. The United States, Eisenhower believed, was destined to roll back the USSR and
establish a path of proactive defense. The major ideological difference between Truman and
Eisenhower with regards to the CIA was the Iranian coup. While Truman had flatly rejected the
proposal in its early stages because he did not think such covert action was allotted to the agency,
Eisenhower had seen the effectiveness of the OSS during WWII first hand. Therefore, he
encouraged further planning and would eventually sign onto the engagement summer 1953.11
While it may seem as though Truman and Eisenhower held opposing views of what the CIA
should do and how foreign policy should be dictated, the two approaches were quite similar in
the end. What made the difference in granting permission for the coup was the Communist
threat that the British and CIA hoped to exploit to carryout the operation.
After the election of Dwight Eisenhower in the United States, the Director of Central
Intelligence, Allen Dulles (Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s brother), asked Kermit
Roosevelt to go to Iran and assess the situation independently from any British estimations.
Dulles had brought the British proposal to the attention of Truman who dismissed it all together
in disgust because he did not believe overthrowing governments was something the CIA should
be doing. With Eisenhower in office, however, there was time for Roosevelt to establish a more
solid case with Soviet ambitions involving the Tudeh Party and Mossadegh. Ideally, the CIA
wanted to prove that the Soviets were involved with the Tudeh Party and at least indirectly
influencing the decisions of Premier Mossadegh. Roosevelt also was comfortable with
! 11 Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an
Enduring Cold War Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-8
50
contradicting what the State Department had mentioned months earlier during the five day
determination to continue his work after he so willingly resigned at the first outset of problems.
In addition, it seemed likely that if given the choice between a Shah and Prime Minister,
the Iranian people would side with the Shah. Mossadegh’s actions, though proudly nationalistic
in origin, had ruined Iran’s economy. The new oil company was understaffed and uneducated,
and former employees were living off government stipends. The situation was appalling by any
stretch of measuring a country’s morale. With this in mind, Roosevelt felt confident in saying
“the Iranian Army and the Iranian people will back the Shah” in the event of a showdown
To an extent, Roosevelt was proved to be right in the actual coup, but at the time he was
figuratively putting his political career on the line with his assertions.14 He undoubtedly could
do this because there was an accepted Soviet threat. The Tudeh Party had always been pro-
Soviet, and unwittingly the party transformed into the communist faction in the Majlis under
Mossadegh’s watch because of Soviet propaganda’s influence. The Iranian people may have
despised the British, but they had identical antipathy towards Soviet Russia. 15 Therefore, when
the coup went into action the Iranian people showed up to support their “King of Kings,” the
Shah.
! 12 Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, 9-11
! 13 Ibid, 12
! 14 The initial hours in the first coup attempt in August 1953 failed because public support was not
behind the Shah due to the Shahʼs sudden flight from the country. However, over the next remaining
days, the public began to side with the Shah once they learned he had removed Mossadegh by legal
decree.
! 15 “The Tudeh Party: Vehicle of Communism in Iran,” Central Intelligence Agency, 18 July 1949
51
Roosevelt took care to emphasize the necessity of having Iranian public support for the
proposed operation. He outlined three objectives for Secretary Dulles: 1) the operation needed
the Shah’s support which would also ally the Iranian Army with the CIA, 2) the operation needed
to instate General Zahedi as the new Prime Minister, and 3) create a popular uprising to make the
coup look like it was a legitimate grassroots revolution. Secretary Dulles, however, wanted to
know the expected cost of such an operation and Roosevelt quoted a “one, or perhaps two,
hundred thousand dollars.”16 Though this was the first regime change instigated by the CIA,
Roosevelt was approaching the operation as if he had been planning it for years. The plan was
acceptable, the required funds were reasonable, and Roosevelt had a team of experienced agents
from the OSS years. Yet despite the quoted price given in early 1953 to John Dulles, Allen
Dulles on 4 April allotted $1,000,000 to be used at the CIA’s Tehran Station in any way
necessary.17
A determining factor in the CIA’s quick rise to power was the close relationship between
the State Department and the CIA; the Dulles brothers held the commanding offices of each
department. These brothers were able to get things done that seemed unimaginable, such as the
coups of Iran in 1953, and Guatemala in 1954.18 In the case of Iran they exerted heavy influence
on President Eisenhower. Eisenhower, however, was also using the Dulles brothers to carryout
his plans to pursue a proactive foreign policy that would engage Soviet expansion preemptively
rather than merely containing it to allotted borders. This is not to dissuade from oil’s role in the
! 17 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
August 1953,”1-4
! 18 For additional information about the Dulles brothersʼ influence on policies see Stephen E.
Ambrose, Ikeʼs Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 1999)
52
decision to remove Mossadegh. Rather, one must remember the coup was a culmination of
Enter Dr. Donald N. Wilber, the covert consultant to NEA, who was selected to draw up
the actual plan of operations for the Iran coup. He met with the SIS chief of the former Iran
station and together they organized the strategy that would be initiated in the summer of 1953.
The two gentlemen spent just over two weeks in May discussing the situation and writing the
draft, but it is clear that Wilber and the CIA had the last say in everything. Wilber even noted in
his report that the SIS representative, Norman Darbyshire, had “quite similar views of Iranian
personalities and had made very similar estimates of the factors involved in the Iranian political
scene.”19 It was becoming increasingly more apparent that the CIA had an incredible amount of
influence over the British SIS. The CIA had better equipment, a more dedicated staff, larger
funding, and superior general facilities than the SIS did. The quality of field agents under
Roosevelt would be a large determining factor later. The vast amounts of resources and staff was
due to the overwhelming anti-communist movements within the early Cold War era. Under
Eisenhower, the buildup of military weapons increased alongside the CIA’s resources. While
such realizations undoubtedly made the British envious of the newer American agency, no party
involved with the British attaché to the CIA could do much; the British did not want to see Iran
continue on its present course and the CIA was their last resort and hope.
! 19 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
August 1953,” 6
53
Official discussions for the final draft of TPAJAX began 13 May 1953 in Nicosia where
the SIS was then stationed in exile from Tehran. Wilber and SIS representatives had to review
the proposals thus far and come to a final consensus. First, they agreed that General Zahedi was
the most prominent politician that could oppose Mossadegh. Additionally, they set up the
communications network for the operation whereby a three-way channel between Tehran,
Nicosia, and Washington would be kept up to date. When the discussions revealed the asset
sharing, however, the CIA’s Tehran station estimated that even the SIS knew their sources had
been “overstated and oversold.” Essentially, the British had themselves concluded that without
the CIA, Mossadegh would remain in power as they had no way of carrying out their plans. In
light of the lack of assets within the British camp, the CIA did not disclose its principal agents in
Tehran. This was another example of how the American agency was becoming more confident
in its supremacy. 20
The Nicosia meeting in May 1953 concluded that the operational draft must include the
assumptions that Zahedi was the sole candidate worthy of U.S. support, that the Shah would act
after some coercion, that the army would support the Shah’s decrees, and that the operation’s
success depended heavily on the appearance of at least a quasi-legal base rather than an outright
coup. To achieve this end, both sides agreed public opinion would have to be turned against
Mossadegh and the new regime would have to receive immediate aid from the West to avoid a
Within the plan that was submitted to Washington and London 1 June 1953, stages were
outlined for the operation. The involvement of the British by this point was mostly ceremonial,
! 20 Ibid, 1-12
! 21 Ibid
54
however as they were powerless to carry out the coup themselves. The primary stage discussed
ways to convince the Shah that Britain and the United States were united behind the plot and in
support of the monarchy. Next, the plan outlined ways to arrange for Zahedi to be notified
followed by the bribes necessary to get the Majlis support for the Shah’s decrees. In order for a
successful mission, however, the architects of the proposal noted that each phase of the operation
had to be carried out effectively. Lacking a comprehensive completion of each stage, the mission
The preliminary steps in TPAJAX aimed to get the support of key figures such as the
Shah and Zahedi. In the initial plan, the CIA would supply $35,000 to Zahedi while the SIS
would also give $25,000. These funds presumably would allow the general to communicate with
other loyalists and make steps towards the ground movement of the army. The CIA hoped that
by presenting the Shah many high ranking officials that he would give his support for the coup.
However, estimating that he would be reluctant, it was suggested within the plan that all
presentations insist that the oil controversy was not a reason for the coup.23 The oil controversy
was, however, a prominent force perpetuating the eventual clandestine regime change; the idea
that oil was not a motivation was merely political deception to gain the Shah’s support. The
major issue was to keep the Soviets from gaining additional influence and control over Iran. To
this end, the United States and Britain would offer financial assistance to the Shah’s regime and
! 22 “Initial Operational Plan for TPAJAX as Cabled from Nicosia to Headquarters on 1 June 1953,”
Central Intelligence Agency, Near East, located in Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of
Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953,” Appendix A
! 23 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
55
All along the Shah’s role in the coup had been emphasized within the multiple proposals,
but only with the suggested demands within the initial plan had officials attacked the Shah. The
CIA wanted the Shah involved to give the coup legitimacy, so they threatened that if he would
not take leadership that he would bear the responsibility for the collapse of an independent Iran.
Furthermore, U.S.-British aid would be cut if the Shah’s dynasty fell because of inaction on his
part. The CIA planned to take the Shah’s support and bring Zahedi into the operation. The plan
had contentions for two strategies to replace Mossadegh: quasi-legally whereby the Shah’s
To rally political support for Zahedi’s imminent rise to power, the CIA convinced the SIS
that relations with the Majlis would have to be rectified. Previously, the Rashidians, acting as
British assets, had begun spreading rumors aiming to dislodge party loyalty within the National
Front coalition. The CIA asserted that deputies, individually, be bribed rather than depend on
rumors. They aimed to secure forty one votes against Mossadegh to meet the quorum for
removal. The SIS asserted that twenty of those would have to be bribed. The religious
establishment within Iran had become a powerful political force by 1953. The CIA sought to
stage demonstrations against them posing as Tudeh members while promoting faithful Muslim
The largest forces of oppositions to the initial plan were expected to be the Tudeh Party
and its sympathizers. The CIA assumed there would be a violent reaction from the Communists,
therefore they planned to have Zahedi’s army seal off South Tehran and arrest Tudeh leaders on
the night of the coup’s outbreak. Additionally, false leaflets would be dropped directing Tudeh
! 24 Ibid, 1-3
! 25 Ibid, 2-6
56
members not to take action against the riots in Tehran.26 Surely the CIA and SIS officials were
recounting the Azerbaijan crisis and the military capability of the Tudeh Party with Soviet
The Iranian society was engrossed in their press and media venues. Especially since the
oil crisis broke out in 1951, the public had grown more accustomed to hearing the negotiations
debated and propaganda for and against intervention in their country. To exploit this reliance and
intrigue on the media, the CIA called for intensified propaganda against Mossadegh through
Radio Tehran primarily and an unidentified newspaper that was bought out. 27 The aim was to
widely publicize that the Mossadegh government was leading Iran into decay. The religious
attacks from impersonated Tudeh members would work to show that Mossadegh was in league
with the Tudeh because he was incapable of action against the party. The CIA would release
fabricated documents proving secret agreements between Mossadegh and the Tudeh Party to
create the illusion of an alliance against Muslim society. Exploiting the failing economy, the
CIA planned to portray paper money as illegal issues of a government seeking to inflate the
economy. The coup was expected to take place on the 14 August and last less than one day.28
Hasty negotiations ensued through the end of June, but the British still offered little
resistance to American revisions to the operation’s draft. On 9 June 1953, representatives met
again in Beirut to discuss proposed changes from London and Washington to the initial plan.
There, the CIA consolidated changes, but, hardly any of the initial draft was changed. The CIA
! 26 Ibid
! 27 The paperʼs identity and many other key agents are still redacted in the latest release of the
clandestine report.
! 28 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
57
had backed that plan, and the British were not about to change the direction TPAJAX was
moving. In mid June, Kermit Roosevelt and Wilber arrived in London to present the Beirut
revisions and write the final “London Draft” that would guide TPAJAX to its conclusion in
August. Wilber noted in his operational history that the SIS had “no major comments of their
own.” The British were more concerned with phraseology than additional revisions.29 While
this may have been an effort to implicate any failures of the operation on the CIA’s shoulders, the
Throughout the proposal negotiations, the operation was already known to Secretary of
State Dulles and his undersecretaries, General Walter Bedell Smith, Harrison Freeman Matthews,
and a few other high ranking officials. The U.S. State Department seemed more concerned about
the aftermath of the coup and the plausibility of its success. In particular, Dulles wanted
assurance that the British would be flexible in approaching the question of governmental
succession and economic structure after Mossadegh and Zahedi were removed from power. In
addition to this, Dulles wanted to make it clear that the oil question was not a concern of the
coup, because America had become involved solely because of communist maneuvers within
Iran, Mossadegh’s failure to combat the Tudeh Party, and the ever increasing Soviet aspirations
for expansion into the Middle East.30 However, oil was definitely a driving motivation behind
! 29 Ibid, 16-17
Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953,” Appendix C.
58
The U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Loy W. Henderson, contended that assuming the Shah’s
fallacious. Henderson had been the American ambassador since 1951, and he, more than anyone
in the State Department, knew the Shah’s tendencies. He believed the Shah would not issue the
decrees to replace Mossadegh with Zahedi unless the Majlis acted first. Thus, CIA officials
decided to use Henderson as another ploy in persuading the Shah to act against Mossadegh; they
asked him not to return to Tehran until after the coup in hopes of creating another “factor in the
By 11 July 1953, President Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers, and the British authority had
approved Operation TPAJAX. From the beginning of the discussions, the Shah’s support for the
coup was deemed necessary and utterly essential. The Shah was, however, timid, most likely
because of the reactions from the five day period when Mossadegh had resigned of his own
accord. To get him on board, SIS and CIA agents met with his sister, Princess Ashraf, and
convinced her to help persuade the Shah to do his part in dismissing Mossadegh and appointing
Zahedi. Her arrival in Tehran angered both Mossadegh and the Shah for neither had given
permission for her return to Iran. Because of her outspoken nature, Ashraf was forced to leave
the country. Mossadegh did not like her influence over her the Shah, and the Shah was
embarrassed by her. Nevertheless, she eventually met with the Shah as did Asadollah Rashidian
and many American contacts to discuss plans for the coup.32 Among the American contacts
were Kermit Roosevelt and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Schwarzkopf had developed a
! 31 This personal account can be found within Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of
! 32 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
August 1953,” 18
59
relationship with the Shah during the Allied occupation in 1941 and his counsel proved to be
In early August 1953, the CIA was forced to increase the pressure on the Shah because he
alone was delaying the military aspect of the coup. To this end, CIA operatives acted as Tudeh
Communists and threatened Muslim leaders with “savage punishment if they opposed
Mossadegh.” These harassment attempts stirred anti-Communist sentiment among the religious
community and further alienated Mossadegh’s base of support. But, even with the new upsurge
against Mossadegh, the Shah doubted the army would support the monarchy in the event of a
coup. While the Shah’s intransigence was holding back the operation, Mossadegh learned of the
plot because of a leak within the army of Shah supporters. The zealous prime minister then
consolidated his power by calling for a referendum aimed at dissolving the Majlis. Mossadegh
won the vote for the referendum, but was attacked for the obvious fabrication of vote tallies.
Because Mossadegh had won 99.9 percent of the vote, the media claimed the referendum voting
had been rigged. With the Majlis dissolved, Mossadegh had created his own dictatorship. The
Shah, still refusing to sign the papers to replace Mossadegh then requested that President
Eisenhower direct him through a statement that was later made on television. Wilber’s
clandestine report noted “the president while addressing the governors’ convention in Seattle on
4 August, deviated from his script to state by implication that the United States would not sit by
! 33Fakhreddin Azimi in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in
60
idly and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain.” By 13 August, the Shah had signed the papers
The stage was set for the removal of Mossadegh. The military aspect of the coup was
scheduled for the evening hours 14 August. The CIA had demonstrated its capability to stir
public discontent against the once favored prime minister. The SIS laid dormant through much
of the preparations and early execution of the plan once TPAJAX was authorized by London and
Washington. In a way the British agency was looking on at one of their last protectorates falling
under a radical nationalism that pitted it against the mother country. To see the intelligence
agency they had trained during WWII rise to a higher esteem than they had reached before the
decline of the empire was a shattering blow to British morale. On 14 August 1953, the CIA’s
Tehran station cabled that upon the success of TPAJAX, Zahedi’s new government would need
$5 million to cover expenses and stabilize the country after the tumultuous period from the oil
nationalization to the coup. Those not in Tehran could only wait for the action to begin.
While the British SIS had instigated the first plans to overthrow Premier Mossadegh, the
British agency was unable to carryout the eventual coup. Because of the expulsion from the
country after a long line of failed oil negotiations, Britain had lost all safe houses for operatives
and their national embassy in Tehran. The United States was seen as the only power capable of
carrying out the coup and in agreeing to do so, the CIA demonstrated its capabilities even at a
young age. The SIS, on the eve of the coup in August 1953 had to grasp that the American
agency was the more capable of the two western offices. The evolution of the coup’s plans was
dominated by CIA directives because the SIS did not want to lose the relationship that had
! 34 Kennet Love, “Mossadegh gets 99.9% of the Vote in Iran Plebiscite on Majlis Ouster,” New
York Times, 3 August 1953 and Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of
Iran, November 1952-August 1953,” 29-38
61
developed. Therefore, the SIS, in a relatively short period of time, deferred to the leadership of
the CIA.
62
Chapter III:
The Coup and its Immediate Aftermath
In carrying out the 1953 coup in Iran, the CIA replaced the SIS as the dominant
intelligence agency in the world. The quality of agents in the field as the coup unfolded secured
a victory for the United States. However, the coup also illuminated weaknesses and errors in the
operational plan. The coup initially failed because of communication problems that hurt
coordination between General Zahedi’s troops and the CIA station at the American Embassy in
Tehran. The coup was also leaked revealing security breaches that would have to be fixed before
another operation commenced. Nevertheless, the coup came to mark a new era in the CIA and
the successful rise of the CIA marked a transitional period in U.S. History; clandestine wars and
Operation TPAJAX was carried out in mid August 1953. Although the extensive
planning for the coup had already projected the CIA’s new capacity for clandestine operations,
the coup itself solidified the American intelligence agency’s prominence. More specifically, the
operation’s execution secured the CIA’s reputation. Nevertheless, implementing the plan was
more troublesome than the agency had believed would be the case. After the first night of
military moves within Tehran, the coup failed to oust Mossadegh. Because of the seemingly
faulty execution of the coup the Shah fled the country leaving the CIA station to fend for itself
without royal endorsement. One must remember the emphasis throughout the planning about the
Shah’s role in the coup; he was needed to validate Zahedi’s appointment and Mossadegh’s
removal. Despite the drastic setback from the initial failure of the operation, CIA agents within
Tehran worked quickly to regain face and see the undertaking to its conclusion. While mostly
63
undisclosed, the field agents of the CIA did more in a week’s time to modify TPAJAX and
overthrow Mossadegh than ever anticipated by the planners. The ultimate success of the 1953
coup then was because of the Tehran agents’ determination and ability to adapt to changing
situations. Since the coup was an eventual success, the CIA’s rise to supremacy over its British
counterpart was clinched.1 Agent’s determination was defined by Dr. Wilber in his
memorandum. Essentially, “determination” in this sense was illustrated by the like mindedness
of the agents with the evolving U.S. foreign policy that was against Soviet expansion and how
they used their beliefs to see the operation through to its conclusion.2
In early August, the CIA had advanced their timeline hoping to convince the Shah that the
public would support him against Mossadegh. Operatives pretending to be Tudeh Communists
harassed Muslim leaders throughout Tehran and even bombed a cleric’s house. Additional
learned of the British-American plot beforehand because of a leak among Zahedi’s troops and
chose to move towards power consolidation. This was a critical error in the coup’s timeline.
Because of Mossadegh’s dissolution of the Majlis, the CIA had legitimate reasons to ask the
Shah for Mossadegh’s dismissal. The CIA, realizing the Shah’s intransigence, feared it would be
the Shah who would undermine his own coup even as events were creating a lucrative
! 1 Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, 208-210; Zachary Karabell,
Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946-1962, (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999). 88-91; Telegram, “No. 348: The Ambassador in Iran
(Henderson) to the Department of State.” U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States: The Question of Military and Economic Assistance to Iran; interest of the United States in the
settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, 1952-1954, vol. X, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1989), 20 August 1953, 752-755.
! 2 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
64
atmosphere for him. The Shah finally capitulated, signing the decrees that named Zahedi as
With the Shah’s edicts in hand, operation TPAJAX was ready for commencement. The
CIA planned to utilize the worsening domestic situation in Iran to jump-start the operation’s
pivotal, final stages. Throughout July, operatives were instilling additional fear of the Tudeh
Party and linking the communists within Iran to Mossadegh. They did this through dressing as
Tudeh members and parading through residential areas and mosques condemning the religious
establishment claiming to have Mossadegh’s favor. The military aspect of the coup was planned
to exploit the popular discontent and forcibly remove Mossadegh overnight with the Shah’s
decrees in support. On the thirteenth of August, Mossadegh’s campaign for the dissolution of the
Majlis was successful. However, the disbanding was counterproductive to his strategy to settle
the domestic situation in Iran; rather than expediting legislation the CIA capitalized on the
situation while the Western media portrayed him as a tyrant.4 Mossadegh’s popularity was
faltering abreast and abroad. The CIA was exploiting the feelings of disillusionment of the
public with their once favored Prime Minister to rally additional support for the Shah. With
public support operatives would then repudiate Mossadegh’s claims to power and halt the Soviet
Union’s expansion into the Middle East before it first consumed Iran. The East-West show down
was taking place between the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party and their alleged manipulation of
! 3 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
August 1953,” 24-33; “Mossadegh Terms Majlis Dissolved,” New York Times, 15 August 1953.
65
15 August 1953 and the Initial Attack
The first moves to confront Mossadegh in the streets of Tehran via the army and riots
were scheduled to begin on the night of 14 August. An Iranian Army officer leaked the
operation’s plans, ruining the element of surprise. This leak, Wilber asserted, was likely because
of the protracted delay that pushed the operation back to the night of the fifteenth. The
postponement of the operation from the fourteenth to the fifteenth was because General Zahedi’s
Chief of Staff was out of contact with the CIA’s station for unknown reasons. Nevertheless, once
nightfall came on the fifteenth, the army moved on the western side of Tehran, arresting
Truckloads of pro-Shah supporters and soldiers soon filled the streets of Tehran and arrested key
members of Mossadegh’s National Front coalition. By 2:30 a.m. the next day, an unplanned
chaos consumed the capital city because there were many differing accounts of the actions taken
The lack of reliable communication between the CIA station and the Iranian Army
handicapped the operation. TPAJAX architects had called for an army radio-equipped jeep to
arrive at the American compound as Zahedi’s troops entered Tehran. Neither the jeep nor any
army radio arrived and thus the station’s personnel were out of contact with Zahedi yet again.
Communication failures due to faulty equipment and a belief that it was not needed on the part of
the royalist army members left the CIA station agents in an anxious mood. Without direct
contact, the coup was entirely in the hands of the Royalist forces. Furthermore, there was no
definitive account of Mossadegh ever receiving the Shah’s decrees. At best, the royal edicts
! 5 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
66
were handed to Mossadegh’s door attendant and the messenger arrested. Accounts differ over the
events that transpired 15 August late in the evening through the peak hours of the following
morning. What is clear is that the unnamed colonel who was to deliver the Shah’s decrees was
not able to get them to Mossadegh either because of the pro-Mossadegh security forces of the
National Front or because he was arrested in Tehran suspected as a pro-Shah supporter. Because
there was no receipt that the Shah’s decrees were ever presented or passed around on the night of
the coup, Mossadegh was able to rally troops to his side and slowly drive Zahedi into hiding.
The pro-Mossadegh forces were led by Mossadegh’s military commander, General Tahi Riahi,
who was quick to get defenses to key areas of Tehran. Since the military action planned by
Zahedi had not begun on time mostly due to failing communications, by early morning of the
sixteenth, many had left their posts believing the operation’s cause was lost. The CIA field
agents were as clueless as the Iranian public. CIA headquarters even wanted to recall the station
in Tehran because the situation had become too unpredictable and unstable.6
By six in the morning on the sixteenth, Tehran radio reported that Mossadegh was
meeting with his cabinet to figure out a course of action to calm the situation in the streets. The
antennas of Tehran radio were supposed to have been disabled by Zahedi’s men, so the broadcast
was a shock to the CIA station. Copies of the Shah’s edicts had not been distributed properly and
Zahedi was without credence. To counter this lacking, the CIA station relayed messages to the
New York Associated Press and around Tehran that “unofficial reports are current to the effect
that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the Shah, one dismissing Mossadegh and
the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him.” Later that day, Tudeh Party members
! 6 Ibid.
67
began giving speeches throughout Tehran backing Mossadegh. A rumor spread that Mossadegh
had staged the coup himself to get more support for his referendum. It is unclear where this
rumor initiated, but, it was plausible in the eyes of the public. If Mossadegh had staged a failed
coup it would give him the ability to call for even more powers than he already had as his office
Despite CIA intentions to dominate media outlets during the coup, Wilber’s report noted
that they did not have control over American reporters, but their reporting worked to the
advantage of the coup nonetheless. The reporters in Tehran for the American media just
happened to be at the right place at the right time as far as the CIA was concerned. They did not
have to buy out American sources because American sensationalism was helping the coup
without CIA dictation. The New York Times reported on the fifteenth that their prior view of
Mossadegh was incorrect. Much of the American media had defended Mossadegh at the
outbreak of the oil crisis since 1951, hailing him as an ardent patriot of Iran. This was because he
was among the first of Third World Leaders to stand up to a major power. However, the
dissolution of the Majlis damaged his reputation. The newspapers then portrayed him as a
“power hungry, personally ambitious, ruthless demagogue who was trampling upon the liberties
of his own people.” Mossadegh had alienated the social classes that were publicly anti-
communist, which gave the appearance that he was supporting Communism within Iran.
Mossadegh’s actions were being seen in the precise light that the CIA had worked to portray
them as months earlier when the CIA propaganda team briefed President Eisenhower. 8 Now, the
! 7 Ibid, 45 and Kennett Love, “Shah Flees Iran after Move to Dismiss Mossadegh Fails,” New York
68
American public was in accord with the decision to label Mossadegh and his regime as
Communist sympathizers.
Mossadegh tried to renounce the international media coverage of events before the
military occupation phase of the coup began by having loyal military and police secure the
antenna stations around Tehran; he wanted to set up a quarantine. Nonetheless, his attempts were
in vain because of the actions he had taken throughout early August. With each attempt to grab
additional power, Mossadegh weakened his position domestically. The dissolution of the Majlis
was the final piece in the CIA’s plan to gain support in labeling Mossadegh a Communist. Part
of the one million dollars of discretionary funds given the CIA station in Tehran had been handed
out to Majlis deputies. Partly because of the bribery, and partly because of the confusion left in
the wake of the failed initial coup, the deputies even labelled Mossadegh a tyrant. He had
already gone too far trying to consolidate his power, and was then faced with the imminent coup
Radio Tehran announced early on the sixteenth that an attempted coup had failed to
unseat Premier Mossadegh. The radio announcement also indicated the the Prime Minister was
meeting with his cabinet to decide procedures necessary in strengthening the security forces of
government buildings. One of Zahedi’s colonels briefed the CIA’s Tehran station of the failures
to deliver the messages to Mossadegh and of the failed attempts to knock out city-wide
communications. Zahedi himself had already gone into exile north of Tehran but requested to
meet with Roosevelt, claiming there was hope for salvaging TPAJAX. They agreed that the
public had to be convinced that the Shah had removed Mossadegh through legal decree and
! 9 “Mossadegh Charges Distortion on Iran,” New York Times, 15 August 1953 and “Mossadegh
69
appointed Zahedi as his successor.10 Even while Mossadegh was using his monopoly of the
Iranian media against the coup members, CIA agents were working to salvage the operation.
The Associated Press in New York was given a statement that the leaders of the attempted
coup had two decrees by the Shah: one dismissing Mossadegh and the other appointing Zahedi to
replace him. To distribute the message throughout Iran, however, was impossible because of the
strict quarantine of the important government buildings, including the newspapers and radios.
Rumors circled in Tehran that Mossadegh had instigated the coup in order to remove the Shah
from power which was little more than a suspicion that sensationalist media representatives
spread. Yet, even with the release of documents signed by the Shah, pro-Mossadegh forces were
able to deny their authenticity because the Shah had fled the country without acknowledging
publicly his wishes. The CIA learned that even the Tudeh Party had prior knowledge of the coup
and moved quickly to denounce the Americans within the embassy. There were crowds
gathering throughout Tehran denouncing the Shah, but Mossadegh let the anti-Shah movement
go too far in that he did not keep his cabinet members from speaking out against the Shah.
Failing to censor his ministers’ speeches, Mossadegh reopened the nationalist call of the public;
support the Shah who was their ruler. In a press conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
stated his intention to release a personal statement to Bakhtar Emruz, a newspaper in Iran, that
was also broadcasted over Radio Tehran later that evening. It was a lengthy attack on the Shah
and his father who was still respected by the Iranian public. As Wilber noted in his report, “It
may be said that this editorial did a great deal to arouse public resentment against the
government of Mossadegh.”11
! 10 Ibid, 44-45.
! 11 ibid, 46-49.
70
Reactions to the Attempted Coup
The night of 16 August saw more crowds take to the streets, especially in Majlis Square
to hear arguments for and against the Shah and Mossadegh. There it became known to the public
that the Shah had fled Tehran for Baghdad earlier.12 Neither Washington nor London could allow
their intelligence agencies to seek out the Shah and ask him to make a public statement while in
Baghdad because it would implicate their governments in the coup. On the morning of 17
August, the CIA heard that Iranian troops had beaten civilians with their riffle butts while
breaking up Tudeh Party groups the night before. The crowds in Tehran then united behind the
shouting “Long live the Shah,” and the Tehran station regained their composure.13
To their surprise, the Shah spoke on the Baghdad radio that was heard throughout Iran.
This moment was the culmination of efforts to get the Shah to publicly support the coup and his
signed edicts. While it may have been a surprise to the CIA station in Tehran, one cannot forget
the efforts throughout the summer aimed at getting the Shah’s support. The Shah’s
acknowledgement of the edicts was needed for a successful conclusion of the coup, and with the
Shah’s long-awaited participation the CIA was nearing the end of their mission. The Shah said:
“What has taken place in Iran cannot be considered a coup d’etat in the real sense.” The Shah
then admitted he had signed the two documents in question removing Mossadegh and replacing
him with Zahedi. Furthermore, the Shah asserted that he had not abdicated the throne. Since the
! 12 Kennett Love, “Shah Flees Iran after Move to Dismiss Mossadegh Fails,” New York Times, 17
August 1953.
! 13 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
71
Shah’s address was an independent maneuver, the CIA’s Tehran station secured support from
Mossadegh and his cabinet rounded up army officials who were suspected of
involvement with the coup and rumors circulated that they were scheduled for execution on 20
August. The CIA station in Tehran then went to work in circulating photocopies of the royal
decrees, especially among army bases. Sentiments turned slowly against Mossadegh and
questions of his legitimacy were brought to the fore. The public knew the Shah signed the
decrees and was angry that Mossadegh would try to cover up the facts. The American press
continued to label Mossadegh as a Communist puppet who would be replaced sooner rather than
later by an official spokesperson for the Tudeh Party. Nonetheless, Mossadegh was still in power
days after the attempted coup. Meeting beneath the American Embassy, Roosevelt convened a
council of Zahedi and other assets then to determine the best time and method for a second
Meanwhile, the main question among citizens of Tehran was about the office of the Prime
Minister and who the legitimate official was. Zahedi had the edicts dismissing Mossadegh and
naming himself the replacement, but Mossadegh had successfully dissolved the Majlis the day
before and thus, he was the government essentially. Mossadegh did not recognize Zahedi,
naturally, and without the Shah in Tehran neither Zahedi nor the Shah had much credibility. 16
! 14 Ibid, 49-53.
! 15 “Upheaval in Iran,” New York Times, 17 August 1953 and Wilber, “Clandestine Service History:
! 16 Kennett Love, “Statues of Shahs Torn Down in Iran,” New York Times, 18 August 1953.
72
Things turned back to the assumptions and contingencies within the plans of TPAJAX. Further
Roosevelt’s war council prepared to take action on 19 August. Roosevelt--as the station
chief--wanted to try to persuade the supreme cleric, Ayatollah Borujerdi, to issue a fatwa
(religious decree) and call for a holy war on Communism. In addition to the religious backing
from the Ayatollah, Roosevelt wanted military support from outside of Tehran as the previous
attempt had shown that many within the capital’s defenses were still susceptible to Mossadegh’s
authority. The British were uninvolved in the coup itself but London would still not let
Darbyshire at Nicosia meet with the Shah while he was in Baghdad. Thus, Roosevelt’s decisions
with Zahedi were independent of the SIS and CIA headquarters in Washington. Roosevelt was
not alone in acting under pressure as the situation changed. Wilber took time to mention a few
withheld names, but mostly praised the collective work of the Tehran CIA station personnel for
Roosevelt’s actions were early testaments to the courage and capabilities of the new
intelligence agency. Not only had his Operation TPAJAX been a failure thus far, but also the
United States was being implicated in the coup by Tudeh propagandists by distributing anti-West
pamphlets. The secret police had taken control of every major media outlet in Tehran limiting
the spread of pro-Shah sentiments and counter propaganda, yet still the CIA allowed Roosevelt
to carry out the mission. The British were monitoring the progress updates sent from Tehran, but
could not act on anything; the coup was by this point a product of American efforts in the field.
! 17 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
73
The Tudeh Party was also trying to change events in the wake of the coup further supporting the
condemnations thrown at Mossadegh and regime, claiming that he was friendly to Communists.
While the CIA was reorganizing Zahedi’s forces, the Tudeh Party had torn down the
statue of Reza Khan and removed street signs dedicated to the Pahlavi dynasty throughout the
week after the 15 August coup. The party was pushing for a comprehensive reform where a
peoples’ democracy would replace even Mossadegh. Mossadegh had hoped to exploit
factionalism within the Tudeh Party, but his attempts were negligible as it became increasingly
more apparent that Tudeh members were dictating events rather than Mossadegh. The two fronts
collided and created a new power vacuum in Iran that Zahedi and those loyal to him and the
Shah sought to utilize in overthrowing Mossadegh.18 In light of the Tudeh Party’s actions during
the coup, the premise for Operation TPAJAX was confirmed, at least enough to satisfy Western
observers. Communist forces were indeed spreading throughout Iran and the coup ended
The army rallied behind Zahedi on 20 August and seized control of Tehran while
assaulting Mossadegh’s heavily fortified homestead. Zahedi used the momentum to outline his
mechanization of agriculture, raise workers’ wages and free medical treatment for all. It was
ironic that in 1953 the United States would support social services not available in America in a
foreign country. Many of Zahedi’s promises and goals were not achieved, however. Because the
Shah was the new supreme leader of the country again, not the Prime Minister. Only the wealthy
would receive government benefits like those promised by Zahedi over the course of the
! 18 ibid, 61-64 and Kennet Love, “Statues of Shahs Torn Down,” New York Times, 17 August 1953.
74
successive decades. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Communist stations within Tehran
were burned and massive crowds moved against Mossadegh demanding his expulsion from
Iran.19
Immediately, the Soviet Union accused the United States of helping overthrow
Mossadegh and the Tudeh Party. Soviet media charged that the coup was financed through a
subversive works allowance Congress gave the CIA.20 The reactions from the Soviets about the
coup’s success signified an even greater victory for the new intelligence agency, and indeed the
United States at large. The Soviet Union was threatened because the United States had just
created a surrogate power along the Soviet southwestern border. Though the American action in
the coup would not be admitted for decades afterwards, Eisenhower was proud that his proactive
policy against the Soviet threat had yielded such an elaborate victory. In Roosevelt’s White
John Foster Dules was leaning back in his chair. Despite his posture, he was
anything by sleepy. His eyes were gleaming; he seemed to be purring like a giant
cat. Clearly, he was not only enjoying what he was hearing, but my instincts told
me that he was planning as well. What was in his mind I could not guess. Would
! 19 Kennett Love, “Royalists Oust Mossadegh; Army Seizes Helm,” New York Times, 20 August
1953.
! 20 Kennett Love, “Moscow Says U.S. Aided Shahʼs Coup,” New York Times, 20 August, 1953.
! 21 Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, 209-210.
75
In retrospect, having Iran join the U.S. sphere of influence as a surrogate power in the
Middle East was essential. The coup was nevertheless a test of clandestine capabilities. Had the
United States failed to remove Mossadegh it would have changed the climate of the region and
its situation with the British very little. The two countries would continue to negotiate and likely
would have seen a resolution eventually. However, since the coup was a success in the end, it
Roosevelt was cautious to emphasize that the coup was a success because their
assessments of the deteriorating situation in Iran was correct. The Iranian public was presented
with two sides in the revolution and they had chosen to support their King of Kings, the
Shah.22 The CIA had become the silent, strong arm of the United States and would remain so for
decades. The succeeding two decades in Iran saw the rise of Mohammad Reza Shah’s regime
and an ever growing relationship between America and Iran who had just become the chief
Western surrogate power in the Persian Gulf region along with the rise of the CIA.23
Despite the lack of publication of the Shah’s decrees on the eighteenth, 19 August saw
type-set copies of the documents in most papers. The CIA’s operation was drawing to a close
with a fabricated interview of Zahedi where he was portrayed as the Prime Minister that would
lead Iran back into a stable condition. By nine in the morning, pro-Shah groups had assembled
in the Tehran bazaar area where speakers stirred tensions against the Tudeh activity that had
reeked havoc around the city in the preceding days. The crowd marched toward the parliament
building and burned the newspaper offices of the Foreign Affairs Minister that had printed “most
! 22 Ibid, 210
! 23 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War
Strategy, 217-221.
76
bitter and scurrilous attacks on the person of the Shah.” They also set fire to the Tudeh papers’
offices. The CIA intervened by attempting to recruit security forces that were still guarding
many key buildings within Tehran. As the crowds approached Sepah Square, the guards shot
With the chanting crowds shouting “the Shah is victorious,” the CIA’s role in the
overthrow of Mossadegh and the Tudeh Party was masked behind the belief that the coup
attempts and ultimate success were grass roots movements. The new mobs filling the streets of
Tehran were not the “hoodlums” seen in the previous weeks, but rather a diverse representation
of the population including members of each social class because the entire population loved
their Shah. At 10:30 in the morning, General Riahi--who had outmaneuvered Zahedi--submitted
his resignation letter to Mossadegh, citing that he had lost control of the army. Throughout the
rest of the afternoon, buildings fell to the royalist crowds. With the fall of Radio Tehran’s anti-
Shah defenses, the crowds had won back Tehran from Mossadegh’s police and Tudeh fanatics.25
The operation revealed a need to develop long-term assets in other countries. In essence
the Operation TPAJAX was a test of the CIA’s capabilities. The CIA would, thus, seek out new
safe houses and additional personnel especially in countries surrounding the Soviet bloc. The
main role of the SIS was to convince the Shah that both the United States and Great Britain
supported the removal of Mossadegh. While the CIA had clearly become the leading agency for
! 24 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
! 25 Ibid, 69-74.
77
the West, U.S.-British special relations had been supported yet again. This relationship, Wilber
Additionally, as Roosevelt had concluded also, the operation was ultimately successful
because of the caliber of field agents and analysts who rightly predicted the Iranian public’s
reactions to the coup. When the military plan had gone afoul, many field agents acted
unilaterally to rectify the situation in their areas-even without working forms of communication
with the Tehran station.27 That the operation was successfully changed in the field to adapt to the
The popular discontent was exacerbated by the initiatives of the CIA operatives and
succeeded with the creation of a battle between the Shah and Prime Minister. These opposing
forces created trouble even for the CIA agents, but American agents had proved to be very
adaptive to changing circumstances well beyond any planned contingencies. In the attempts to
overthrow Mossadegh in August 1953, the CIA supplanted among the intelligence community its
resolve to combat Communism on all fronts and to any end, even a regime change. Whether one
chooses to cast aside the potent capabilities of the CIA up to 1953, the successful regime change
instigated by CIA operatives firmly established the agency’s supremacy in the intelligence
community across the world. While the coup would later add to the darker reputation of the
CIA, the agency’s irrefutable stature of prominence climaxed along side America’s rise to
hegemony. The 20th century was the American Century, and the events that transpired during
! 26 Ibid, 93-95.
! 27 Ibid, 90-93.
78
the 1953 coup solidified the anxiety felt by many new independent third world countries, that a
! 28 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War
Strategy, 249-259; Telegram, “No. 350: The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State.”
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Question of Military and Economic
Assistance to Iran; interest of the United States in the settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute,
1952-1954, vol. X, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 20 August 1953, 7526-758.
79
Conclusion
The CIA’s successful rise to power culminated in the removal of Mossadegh. In effect,
the friendly position towards the Communist forces within the Tudeh Party lost Mossadegh his
office and his country. Additionally, the oil dispute had allowed for a climate favorable to a
clandestine regime change. From Truman’s containment policy to Eisenhower’s push back
policy, communism was identified as the scourge of the free world and thus required attention on
all fronts. Although Eisenhower’s approach seemed to be more proactive, in retrospect it was
merely a continuation of the containment philosophy of Truman. The only country that could
actively combat Soviet communism was the United States. However, after WWII, no president
felt comfortable engaging in a total war. So smaller, more prudent clandestine operations were
the only logical replacement, and presidents since Eisenhower used the CIA for the same reasons
as he had.29
In retrospect, the United States became the greatest power in the world because of its
successful Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the National Security Act of 1947
implementations. The CIA’s rise to a powerful and influential intelligence agency was only the
last aspect of hegemony needed in claiming American supremacy and it had to wait until the
1953 coup offered a momentous opportunity to feature its capabilities. The coup was possible
because Communist expansion was allegedly part of the deteriorating domestic situation in Iran.
Had the Tudeh Party never been labeled the vehicle of Communism in Iran, the coup may have
! 29 Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, 222-225 and
Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy,
249-259.
80
never been carried out. Thus, it was because of these reasons--communism and the ultimate
success of the 1953 coup--that the CIA became the most cogent, prominent intelligence agency
In addition to the success of the coup, Washington realized the importance of broadening
the capacity of the CIA. While in today’s world we may look back at the decisions that allowed
the CIA to expand in contempt, at the time the agency was the anti-Communist foreign arm of
the country. Being a relatively new intelligence agency, the CIA arguably needed the coup to
prove its worth to the new Eisenhower administration and to the world. As a general,
Eisenhower had used the OSS (the mother organization of the CIA during WWII) to carry out
clandestine operations so he knew how useful a powerful furtive agency could be.
In the case of Iran, by 1953 it had become clear to CIA analysts that Premier Mossadegh
was no longer seeking a conclusion to the oil dispute with Britain and because of his stubborn
attitude towards Britain, his country’s domestic situation was faltering. The prospect of a Soviet
dominated Iran was deemed unacceptable and this allowed the CIA to replace the SIS in the
region. While many, including Dr. Wilber in his memorandum, emphasize the partnership of the
CIA and the SIS in undertaking Operation TPAJAX, the relationship stopped at sharing sources
and fine-tuning the plans. Once the operation began, the British intelligence agency was out of
the picture. Wilber alluded to the decreasing activity of the SIS estimating that they were angry
at their own inabilities to match the capabilities of the CIA. Yet, later--possibly for political
purposes or merely out of professional courtesy--Wilber noted the importance of the special
relationship between the SIS and the CIA and its worthwhile benefits mostly being sources.
Notwithstanding the contradictory tones in Wilber’s assessment of TPAJAX, one must always
81
have leverage on the other in the intelligence community. Because of the successful coup of Iran
in 1953, the dominant agency at the start of the Cold War was the Central Intelligence Agency.30
Extensions of U.S. Influence had spread throughout the world and now to the border of
the Soviet Union. However, 1953 did not mark an end to the expansion of U.S. foreign policy,
rather it was the climax of America’s ability to combat Communism everywhere. After WWII
and the Korean War, American troops had spread through the Pacific, Asia, Europe, and Africa.
A total war, however, would never be seen after 1945. In its place, small confrontations where
troops were equipped with modern weapons and incredible amounts of funding would be the arm
of U.S. foreign policy. The 1953 coup proved that this was possible; the country did not have to
invade, dismantle and rebuild a country in order to replace the regime in power. It was from
1953 onward that the covert operations department became as important as the central
intelligence gathering department.31 Arguably, based on the amount of covert activity that we
know of throughout the Cold War and beyond, one can assume that clandestine activities was
given a higher authority. There may still be interventions that the public does not know of, but
what we can surmise of the CIA at the start of the Cold War in the post-WWII era is that the
! 30 Wilber, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-
! 31Amy P Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and the NSC, (Palo Alto:
82
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