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While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession
for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.
4. Jones vs. Insular Government, G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906, 6 Phil.122
5. Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-24066, December 9, 1925
6. Mapa vs. Insular Government, G.R. No. L-3793, February 19, 1908, 10 Phil.,1753
Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the
Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the name of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots
3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are the very lots which had been ordered registered in her name in the
former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court upon the ground that the lower court committed
an error in not registering all of the land included in her opposition in her name. She then presented a motion
for rehearing and in support thereof presents some proof to show that the northern portion of the land in
question is not forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an error in registering the lands
Ruling:
It was held that no error has been committed. Whether particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes
than for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the trial of
the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be settled in each
particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the
intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in question.
(Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause the
appellant made no effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in
her favor, was more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes.
DENR vs Yap
(G.R. No. 167707, October 08, 2008)
FACTS:
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes for the land theyve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief.
The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the
mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC
Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side
of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved
for forest land protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with the Supreme Court
(SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged
that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their
lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject
of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a
positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUE:
Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay
et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at
bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied
by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the
requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is
alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act
No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither
do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession.
The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993.
Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of
possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the
island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They
say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally
rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a
vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently
occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws
applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.
Agricultural Land
de Aldecoa vs Insular Government
(G.R. No. 3894. March 12, 1909)
Facts:
Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, situated in the town of
Surigao; a plan and technical description of said parcel was attached to his application.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion of the examiner of titles opposing the
request of the applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General objected to the registration applied for,
alleging that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States, and is now under
the control of the Insular Government.
Aldecoa, amended his former petition, and relying upon the provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of
Act No. 926, alleged that at the time he requested the registration of the land in question, comprised in the
plan then submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force, and as the latter affords better facilities
for securing titles to property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land in question, the applicant
availing himself of the benefits granted by the said Act, prayed that the same be applied to the inscription of
his land.
Issue:
Whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and, ceasing to be agricultural land,
was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in force regarding Government public
lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or corporations.
Ruling:
Any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted
with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestall in its nature, it must
necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the
purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other
circumstances.
The SC said in special cases like the present one, wherein is sought the registration of a lot situated within a
town created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply thereto the laws in force and classify it
as agricultural land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior to its conversion into a building lot, and is subject at
any time to further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not appear that it was ever mining or forest
land.
Article 1 of the royal decree states: "Vacant lands, soils, grounds, and mountains in the Philippine Islands
shall be deemed to be alienable Crown lands, provided they are not included within the following exceptions:
(1) Those of private ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone; (3) those comprised in the communal
laws, or within zones reserved for the use in common by residents of the community; and (4) those lands
which are susceptible of private appropriation by means of composition or possessory information.
It is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned
by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are
not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they
may be acquired by any private or judicial person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the
general uses to which they were accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urban lands or building lots
being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral and
timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such classification as the
possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates.
Mineral Lands
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Dumyung
(GR No. L-31666, April 20, 1929)
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City for annulment of Free Patents Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of
the corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of
misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung,
Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles are
Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or
less, and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The
Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal party defendant.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that they had complied with all the
legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and
that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because the
same were duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these properties became the private
properties of the defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles enjoy the same
privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485,
July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are
now indefeasible and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel the
same.
The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet
Province and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of Mountain Province.
Issue:
Whether or not the Original Certificate of Title of private respondents were 'indefeasible' simply
because that they were issued pursuant to the registration of the free patents of the private respondents and
whether or not they are entitled to the benefit of R.A 3872.
Held: No!
Doctrine: A certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or
timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent
purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.
Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide:
Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands
shag be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to
change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those
which being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which
may hereafter be enacted.
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of
their administration and disposition.
Likewise, the trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to the
benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads:
SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows:
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares
and who since July fourth, ninth hundred and twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by, himself' or through his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public
lands subject to disposition- or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has, not been
occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provision of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to
him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself
or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4,
1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the
time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under
this provision of the Public Land Law.
Held:
No. The Courts holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at
the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by
virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest
land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in
Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this
was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land
and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals
justified this by saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the
owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of
piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up
to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in
its practical application.
Ancestral Domain (RA No. 8371) "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
Cruz vs. DENR Secretary
(G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
W/N Sec. 3 (a) and (b), 5,6,7,8, 57 and 58 of RA 8731 (IPRA) and its IRR are unconstitutional for
unlawfully depriving the State of its ownership over lands of the public domain, minerals and other natural
resources therein, violating the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7
vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs
petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural
resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS: (NOTE: more important in this case)
Justice Kapunan: NO
Said provision affirming the ownership by indigenous people of their ancestral lands and domains
by virtue of native title do not diminish the States ownership of lands within the public domain,
because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as private land, and never to have
been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cario vs. Insular Government.
Sec. 3(a) does not confer or recognise any right of ownership over the natural resources to the
ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
Sec. 57 only grants priority rights to ICCs/IPs in the utilisation of natural resources and not
absolute ownership thereof. The State retains full control over the exploration, development and
utilisation of natural resources through the imposition requirements and conditions for the
utilisation of natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Neither does the grant of said rights exclude non-
indigenous people from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon
authority granted by the proper government authority.
Justice Puno: NO
Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The classification of lands in the public domain under Sec. 3,
Art. XII of the Constitution does not include ancestral lands nor ancestral domains. The rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by
native title over both ancestral lands and ancestral domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public
Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral land only. Both modes presume
or recognise the land as private and not public.
The right of ownership to ancestral domain under Sec. 7(a) involves lands,bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains, not waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and the mineral oils, all forces of potential energy fisheries, forests or
timbers, wildlife, flora and fauna and other natural resources enumerated in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the
constitution. Ownership therefore of natural resources remain with the State.
Small-scale utilisation of resources in Sec. 7(b) is also allowed under paragraph 3, Sec. 2, Art. XII
of the Constitution.
Finally, the large-scale utilisation of natural resources in Sec. 57 of RA 8731/IPRA is allowed under
paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2, Art. XII of the Constitution since only priority rights are given to
ICCs/IPs.
However, by including natural resources, Sec. 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond Sec. 7(a) and therefore unconstitutional.
Survey Error
1. Republic vs. Peralta, et al., En Banc (G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003)
Lands declared by the courts as agricultural lands prior to the introduction of land classification;
Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(189 SCRA 792)
FACTS:
In 1912, the Court of Land Registration of Zambales, through Judge James Ostrand, confirmed the
title of Justo de Perio over two parcels of land in Zambales, namely Parcel No. 1, which consists of an area
of 11,697 sq.m., and Parcel No. 2, which consists of 340,820 sq.m.
In 1985, herein respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with the
Court of Appeals a complaint for the annulment of the decree, alleging that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was
null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was
still within the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only in 1961, and as such, cannot be the
subject of disposition or alienation as private property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land are forest land.
RULING:
It was held that the lands are agricultural. Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was
enacted into law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to De
Perio's petition for confirmation of his title to the two parcels of land. A person who had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious session and occupation of public agricultural land for a period of at least
ten years prior to July 24, 1904 could petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so
possessed and occupied.
*SEC. 54 OF ACT 926
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands
in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to
such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine
Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by
said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as
against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when
prevented by war or force majeure shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to
such land under the provisions of this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
Manila or in Quezon City is as yet not covered by torrens title". In this case defendant claimed that he was a
possessor in good faith From petitioners-movants' own submission. A part of Las Pias comprising 1200
hectares was declared as alienable and disposable on September 3, 1928, thus:
"The map showing the area included in the 1200 hectares was destroyed during the Second
World War, and it was in view of the loss of the map indicating the 1200 hectares that then Sec.
Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 declaring the entire Las Pias as well as part of the adjacent
municipalities as alienable and disposable on January 3, 1968."
The implication is that the 1968 order was meant to confirm or reiterate the earlier declaration and
serves to affirm that indeed parts of Las Pias, albeit the map indicating this area has been lost, were
already open to disposition to private claimants long before the issuance of FAO 4-1141. Since there are
extant numerous titles covering various portions of Las Pias.