Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189281

February 23, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROMEO ANCHES, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the appeal of appellant Romeo Anches from the March 25, 2009 decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00205-MIN.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On October 30, 1990, the appellant was accused of murder2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Iligan
City, under the following Information:
That on or about the 30th day of May, 1990, at Bacolod, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with
Pat. Edgardo Gedo Cruz, whose case is now pending before the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Parang,
Maguindanao, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength and nighttime, assault, attack and use personal violence upon
one Vicente Pabalay by then and there shooting the latter with firearms thereby inflicting upon him multiple gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death soon thereafter.
CONTRARY to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and attendance of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength & nighttime.3
On April 4, 2002, the appellant was arrested. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and was brought to trial.
The case for the prosecution is summarized below.
At about 11:00 p.m. of May 30, 1990, Manuel Pomicpic was standing at the balcony of his house near the corner of
the National Highway and the Municipal Road of Bacolod. It was a moonlit night, and the electric light at the ceiling
of a nearby house also illuminated the area. From the balcony, he saw the victim, Vicente Pabalay, standing in front
of the waiting shed along the National Highway. He also saw the appellant and Edgardo Gedo Cruz, on board a
motorcycle, stop in front of the victim. The appellant said, "Vicente sakay sa motor kay ako ka nga ihatud" (Vicente
ride on the motorcycle and I will bring you to where youre going). The victim declined the appellants offer, walked
away and crossed the national highway. While Edgardo remained on the motorcycle, the appellant alighted and
followed the victim. Upon reaching the other side of the national highway, the victim stopped. As he turned around,

the appellant shot him several times. The victim fell on the ground while the appellant simply turned around and fled
towards the municipal road. The wounded victim stood up and sought help from the nearby house of Nida
Pomicpic.4
Nida, who was awakened by the gunshots, saw the victim through her window and heard him shout "Help, Martin,
Andres." Nida told her husband Olimpio to go and get the local Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF). When
Olimpio returned minutes later with the CHDF members, Nida opened their front door. They saw the victim sitting
on the floor of their foyer, bleeding from his shoulder, abdomen and thigh. Roger Paracale, the CHDF team leader,
asked the victim "Dong, who shot you?; the latter replied that it was the appellant who shot him. The victim was
then brought to the Mercy Community Hospital. When Dr. Daniel Rigor performed an exploratory laparatomy on
the victim on May 31, 1990, he found the victims small intestine severed and his liver injured by 9 gunshot wounds.
The victim died 10 hours later.5
The appellant, interposing alibi, claimed that he was at PC Camp in Kolambugan together with his fellow policemen
on the night of the killing; they were not allowed to leave the camp because the replacement commanding officer
was expected that day.6
THE RTC RULING
In its April 21, 2003 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty of murder. The trial court gave credence to Manuel
Pomicpics positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator, as corroborated by the victims antemortem
statement less than an hour after the shooting. It noted that the appellants flight from the crime scene and his arrest
12 years later were evidence of his guilt. In rejecting the appellants alibi, the RTC noted that the 20-kilometer
distance between Kolambugan and Bacolod can be traveled by motor vehicle in just 20 minutes. The RTC
appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the appellant shot the victim by surprise and without
giving him any opportunity to defend himself. However, it disregarded the qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength for lack of proof. It also noted that nighttime was absorbed by
treachery. The RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, P15,000 as nominal damages and P25,000 as
exemplary damages.7
THE CA RULING
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, giving full respect to the RTC's
assessment of the testimonies. However, it deleted the award of nominal damages and awarded P25,000 as
temperate damages.8
OUR RULING
We affirm the appellants conviction.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The records are replete with evidence
establishing the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The eyewitness account of Manuel Pomicpic, supported
by the victims antemortem statement, is more plausible than the appellant's alibi. Both the RTC and the CA
correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery; although the attack on the victim was frontal, it was
deliberate, sudden and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist
or to defend himself.9 The appellant was correctly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua since there
lawphi1

was no aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime. To conform to recent jurisprudence,
however, we increase the awarded exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.10
WHEREFORE, the March 25, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00205-MIN is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Romeo Anches is found guilty of murder, as defined and
penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
is further ordered to pay the heirs of Vicente Pabalay P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral
damages, P25,000 as temperate damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 173477
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FRANCO DE GUZMAN a.k.a. FRANCISCO V. DE GUZMAN, JR., Appellant.

vs

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On automatic review is the Decision1 dated March 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00679
affirming with modification the Decision2 dated October 12, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42,
Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 2003-0914-D. The RTC found the appellant Franco de Guzman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of
Appeals modified the appellants sentence to death.
The facts are as follows:
In an Information3 dated December 8, 2003, the appellant was charged before the RTC as follows:
That on November 14, 2003 in the evening at Brgy. Guiguilonen, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a handgun and with the use of a
motorcycle to facilitate the commission of the offense, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, shoot and
hit DR. FIDELITO MANAOIS several times, inflicting upon him fatal gunshot wounds in the vital parts of the
body, causing his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.4

A Warrant of Arrest5 was issued on November 28, 2003 for the appellants arrest. On December 15, 2003, he was
incarcerated at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Dagupan City.6
During arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty.7 Trial ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Nestor Quijada 8 of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), Mangaldan, Pangasinan, testified on a certification on the police blotter regarding a confrontation
between the appellant and his wife, Dr. Ma. Odah Manaois de Guzman, daughter of the victim Dr. Fidelito Manaois.
The Certification9 narrated that on November 29, 2003, Dr. Ma. Odah Manaois de Guzman visited the appellant at
the municipal jail and asked him why he killed her father. The appellant replied that she was the one he intended to
kill.
The second witness was Dr. Ophelia T. Rivera, the Municipal Health Officer of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, who
conducted the autopsy on the body of Dr. Fidelito Manaois on November 15, 2003. As per post-mortem report
signed by Dr. Rivera, the victim sustained the following wounds:
Dr. Rivera indicated the cause of death of Dr. Fidelito Manaois as cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic
shock due to multiple gunshot wounds.11
The prosecution next presented Armando B. Nipales, a pedicab driver. Nipales testified that at about 7:30 in the
evening on November 14, 2003, he transported the appellant to Barangay (Brgy.) Guiguilonen, Mangaldan. While
on the way, the appellant called someone through his cellular phone and then alighted near a junkshop owned by Dr.
Fidelito Manaois. Nipales heard the appellant instruct someone on the cellular phone to remove the plate number of
a certain motorcycle as they would execute someone. The appellant then poked a gun at him and advised him to
leave. When Nipales heard a gunshot, he moved his vehicle fast.12
The fourth witness presented was Angelito Malanum. Malanum testified that he and the appellant were employed in
the hardware business of Dr. Fidelito Manaois.13 At about 6:30 p.m. of November 14, 2003, he drove Dr. Fidelito
Manaois in a tricycle to Brgy. Cabaruan, San Fabian, Pangasinan, where they stayed for about an hour. On the way
home to Mangaldan, they took the San Fabian-San Jacinto route. At the Embarcadero Bridge, they saw in the
opposite direction two persons riding in tandem on a motorcycle. Upon seeing them, the two suddenly turned around
to pursue them and switched off their headlight. When they reached the boundary of Brgy. Guiguilonen, the back
rider shot them three times. Malanum looked back and recognized the appellant as the person who fired at them. Dr.
Fidelito Manaois who was riding behind him was hit by the first volley of gunfire. Malanum, for his part, was hit
twice by the succeeding gunshots fired by the appellant. He lost control of the tricycle, swerved to the left and fell.
He managed to stand up despite his wounds and attempted to cross the road. He met the appellant, but he continued
his way to the other side of the road. He then heard a gunshot. He looked back and saw the appellant shooting Dr.
Fidelito Manaois. About the same time, some people from the nearby house helped him. He was taken to the Region
I Medical Center in Dagupan City.14 Malanum further testified that none of the police officers who responded to the
scene escorted him to the hospital.
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, Malanum admitted that he was confined at the hospital for one week
and was not investigated by the policemen at the scene of the crime because he was immediately rushed to the
hospital. He added that he did not divulge at once the identity of their assailant to the police because he was not sure
who their enemies were and he needed to see a counsel. When asked why he was not sure of the identity of their
assailant, Malanum answered that he was sure that their assailant was the appellant. 15 He likewise affirmed his sworn
statement16 given on November 23, 2003 at the Mangaldan PNP station. He also testified that during the police
investigation on November 23, 2003, he had already told the investigators the name of their assailant before he was
shown the appellants picture.

The fifth witness presented by the prosecution was PO2 Vicente Abrazaldo, a member of the PNP Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. His oral testimony, however, was dispensed with upon the admission of the defense counsel of a set of
six colored photographs of the victim and the empty shells and slug of a 9mm caliber handgun.17
Lastly, the prosecution presented Dr. Ma. Odah Manaois de Guzman. She testified that she was married to the
appellant on March 6, 2002. They both lived with her father, Dr. Fidelito Manaois, at the latters residence in
Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan for about five months. The appellant however had irreconcilable differences with
her father. Their relationship turned sour so she left him and took a job in Angeles City where she stayed up to the
death of her father.18 She further testified that the appellant had been threatening her and her family with serious
harm, and even death, before the incident. After her father was buried, she confronted the appellant inside the
municipal jail and exacted explanation for the crime. The appellant did not deny killing her father albeit he retorted
that she was the one he planned to kill.19 She added that at the time her father was killed, she was no longer residing
in Mangaldan but in Angeles City and that they had not seen or talked to each other for quite sometime. The
appellant did not know of her whereabouts.
The defense for its part presented the appellant himself, Franco de Guzman, who denied the charges against him.
The appellant alleged that he had been separated from his wife since February 3, 2003, when his wife left their
house, and that he had stopped going to the victims house. He also testified that he was interrogated at the
Mangaldan Police Station on November 19, 2003, but was sent home. He was again summoned on November 23,
2003 and was identified by Armando Nipales as the one who rode on the latters pedicab. The appellant also averred
that he did not see Angelito Malanum inside the station nor was he ever confronted by Malanum.
The defense also presented Mark John Placido, who testified that he was at the appellants house in Brgy. Sto.
Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan on November 14, 2003 from 6:30 p.m. up to 10:00 p.m. He watched a movie with
the appellant, a certain Manang and Lolo Delfin and left said house after 10:00 p.m. The appellant allegedly never
left the house.20
Lastly, the defense presented SPO4 Bennie Centeno. SPO4 Centeno testified about the application the appellant had
filed with the PNP and the result of the appellants medical, dental, neuro-psychiatric and physical examination. The
prosecution underlined the result of the appellants neuro-psychiatric test as "minimally recommended." 21
On October 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Franco de Guzman, Jr. a.k.a. Francisco V. de Guzman, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony charged and aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.22
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated March 29, 2006, affirmed with modification the RTC ruling. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision dated October 12, 2004
is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby meted the penalty of DEATH. Appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in addition to the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this case
together with the entire record, is hereby forthwith certified, and ordered elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
SO ORDERED.23

Hence, this appeal.

The Court accepted the case on September 5, 2006 and required the parties to submit supplemental briefs.
In his brief, the appellant alleges that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO OVERCOME THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED WITH PRECIPITATE
DISFAVOR APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI IN THE LIGHT OF EXCULPATORY FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ARE SUFFICIENT TO ACQUIT APPELLANT.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ANGELITO MALANUM AND ARMANDO NIPALES
WHICH FOR THE MOST PART ARE CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND NOT WORTHY OF
BELIEF[,] THUS GIVING RISE TO A LOT OF ROOM FOR REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO APPELLANTS
GUILT.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT APPRECIATED THE PRESENCE OF
TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE KILLING WAS QUALIFIED AND/OR AGGRAVATED BY SAID
QUALIFYING AND/OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FOUND APPELLANT RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM DESPITE THE TENUOUS IF NOT FLAWED OUT-OF-COURT
IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT WHICH VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.24
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the prosecution meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the appellant? (2) Did the trial court err in dismissing the appellants defense of denial
and alibi? (3) Did the trial court err in giving credence to the testimonies of Angelito Malanum and Armando
Nipales? (4) Were treachery and evident premeditation present in this case? (5) Was the out-of-court identification of
the appellant flawed?
As to the first issue, the 1987 Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the
presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right. In this case, the prosecution
was able to meet the quantum of proof required to convict the appellant. The testimonies of six witnesses for the
prosecution, and the documentary and other exhibits presented amount to no less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

As to the second issue, the trial court and Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi
is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For it to prosper, proof that the
defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed is insufficient. He must likewise demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. In the case before us, the
appellant himself testified that he was at the very same area where the crime was committed. He never testified that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on the date and at the time it happened. What is
clear is that he was within the vicinity of the locus criminis.25
As to the third issue, the rule is well-settled that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked matters
of substance which if considered would change the result.26 There is, however, no such fact or circumstance in this
case sufficient to overturn the trial courts finding. We thus uphold the findings of credibility of the witnesses of the
trial court as upheld by the Court of Appeals.
As to the fourth issue, treachery is present in this case. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution, affording the hapless and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape.27 In this case, the victim Dr. Fidelito Manaois was shot fourteen times resulting
in numerous wounds in his body. He was attacked suddenly and unexpectedly while on the way home aboard a
tricycle. He was shot several times in the back and so was the eyewitness Angelito Malanum. He was shot without
warning and with no means to put up any defense. The manner of commission of the crime was deliberately adopted
when the assailants purposely stopped their motorcycle, turned around and followed the tricycle where the victim
and Malanum rode. The assailants then attacked the victim and Malanum in a secluded area to ensure that no one
could witness the crime or come to the victims aid.
On the other hand, for evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the
crime itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 28
1avvphi1

In this case, there is no showing of the specific time, in the evening of November 14, 2003, when the crime was
executed. The evidence showing (1) that the appellant said over his cellphone, at around 7:30 p.m. on November 14,
2003, that they were going to hit somebody, and (2) that sometime that same evening the crime was committed, fails
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that sufficient time had elapsed to allow appellant time to reflect and that he clung
to his determination to kill the victim.<lavvphi1.zw+< cite=""> Hence, evident premeditation was not proven in this
case.</lavvphi1.zw+<>
As for the last issue, the appellant was positively identified by eyewitness Angelito Malanum. Even if he was
identified only nine days later, this delay does not cast doubt on the veracity of Malanums testimony. The failure of
the witness to reveal at once the identity of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime does not impair his
credibility. His fear for his life, the fact that he was nearly killed himself, must be taken into consideration. The
situation of the witness must be taken in the context of reality and his diffidence on the matter is therefore
understandable.29
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse. (As amended by R.A. 7659) (Emphasis supplied.)
There being present the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed by the appellant is murder in
accordance with Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code above-mentioned. Since there is no aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
As for the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. 30
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than
the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex
delicto of P75,000 for the heirs of Dr. Fidelito Manaois is in order.31
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000 should be given in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant
grief of his family.32 Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, like treachery,33 as in this case. Hence, and as an
example and deterrent to future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000 for exemplary
damages is proper.34
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00679
affirming with modification the Decision dated October 12, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan
City in Criminal Case No. 2003-0914-D is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Franco de Guzman is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
qualified by treachery. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The appellant is
further ORDEREDto pay the heirs of Dr. Fidelito Manaois the amounts of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC

G.R. No. 124131 April 22, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL BORCE, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:
Samuel Borce was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, in a decision, promulgated on 23 October 1995, in the jointly-tried Criminal Case No. 1481 and
Criminal Case No. 1482. The trial court there adjudged:

WHEREFORE:
In Criminal Case No. 1481 for Rape, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of the crime of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon aggravated by mutilation defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659, and sentences him to suffer two death penalties.
In Criminal Case No. 1482 for frustrated murder, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated murder defined and penalized under the provision of Article 248 in relation
to Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
EIGHT (8) YEARS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision mayor as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of P250,000.00 as actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. 1

The penalty of death having been imposed on the accused by the court a quo, the records were elevated to this Court, in
accordance with Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, for automatic
review.

Samuel Borce, the accused-appellant, had been charged in two separate informations, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 1481 for Rape:
That on or about April 29, 1994, at around 8:30 o'clock in the morning, at the hill of the western part of
Bariquir, Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and with the use of
deadly weapon, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie upon one REGINA BAGA and
succeed in having carnal knowledge against her will and consent and this was repeated for the second time
around, to the great damage and prejudice of the said offended party. 2
In Criminal Case No. 1482 for Frustrated Murder:

That on or about April 29, 1994, at around 8:30 o'clock in the morning, at the hill of the western part of
Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery, use of superior
strength and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack the face
of one REGINA BAGA, inflicting multiple hack wounds on her face, thus the accused having performed
all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of the timely medical attendance rendered to said victim which
prevented her death. 3
The accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the two charges.

The Solicitor General, closely paraphrasing the trial court in its decision, summed up the evidence for the
prosecution; thus:
Complainant Regina Baga is 45 years old, married, and whose husband works abroad as an overseas
contract worker. She is thin and weighs not more than 100 pounds. She and appellant, Samuel Borce, are
neighbors in Barangay San Antonio, Bangued, Abra (TSN., August 22, 1994, p. 3).
On April 29, 1994, at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning, Regina took her bolo and ventured alone to gather
firewood at Barikir, a forested area situated about one kilometer away from her house. (TSN, August 22,
1994, p. 4) While ascending a hilly portion of the forest, she noticed appellant behind her (p. 3). Without
saying a word, appellant approached Regina, took hold of her right arm, twisted it and wrested away her
bolo (p. 3). Appellant poked the tip of the bolo on Regina's neck and threatened to kill her (p. 10). At this
point, appellant's bestial desires were aroused. Giving vent to it, he pinned complainant on the ground and
forcibly removed her "Cullots" and underpants. Regina unceasingly fought to resist his advances.
Nonetheless, being stronger and heavier, appellant placed himself on top of Regina and after a protracted
struggle succeeded in raping her. Thereafter, appellant dragged Regina away from the pathwalk and into the
woods (p. 7). His lust not yet satiated, appellant raped Regina for the second time. When he was through,
appellant dragged Regina farther into the forest. There, he executed his plan to kill and abandon Regina.
However, Regina did not die. When she regained consciousness after being strangled by appellant, she
noticed that her face was hacked (Ibid. p. 9). Terrified, she screamed for help but [no one] came.

Meanwhile, Regina's son, Raymund, was worried that at a late hour his mother had not yet returned home
(TSN, Sept. 26, 1994, p. 10). Fearing that something bad may have happened, he, together with his brother
and sister, went to search for her in the woods. There, they found their mother lying on the ground and
bleeding profusely on the face. Her brain tissues were exposed. When asked what had transpired, Regina
told her son that she was raped and hacked by appellant. (ibid., p. 11). Immediately Raymund brought her
mother to their house. 4
Regina was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital where she was promptly attended to. Her treatment in the hospital lasted for
16 days. The medical certificate, 5 dated 11 May 1994, disclosing the findings of attending physician Dr. Cynthia Cacho Viado on
the injuries suffered by the victim, pertinently read:
Samuel Borce denied the accusation. Presented at the witness stand by the defense were the accused himself, his mother Lydia
Borce and one Dr. Herminio Venus. Highlighting the testimony of the defense witnesses, the Public Attorney's Office, acting as
counsel for the accused, narrated its version of the case; thus:

Accused Samuel Borce testified that on April 29, 1994, he went to get the firewood that he gathered and
when he arrived in the place he saw Regina Baga gathering the firewood which he already gathered; then
he prevented the victim from gathering the firewood. She tried to hack him with her bolo so that they
grappled for possession of the bolo and while grappling, the bolo hit the head of Regina Baga afterwhich
the accused left her. He denied having raped Regina Baga. After grappling with the bolo, the accused went
home and thereafter he went to see Regina Baga when he was informed that she was already dead and this
was the time he was arrested and detained up to the present. When he was arrested by the police officers he
was not informed of his human and constitutional rights.
LYDIA BORCE testified that she is the mother of the accused. That on April 29, 1994, she said that she and
her son went to gather firewoods and after gathering firewoods they went home and that he never raped the
complainant. She admitted that she did not see Regina Baga stabbed the accused because she went home
already. She only learned Regina Baga was hurt from the people who told her. She tried to go and help her
but she was already brought to the hospital. She testified that when her son was brought to the police
station he narrated that he accidentally hacked her (Regina Baga) when the latter attempted to steal his
firewood. She also asked the accused if he raped Regina Baga and told her that he did not rape Regina
Baga. Her son was detained up to the present. She stated that she was not able to do anything for her son
because they are poor and have nothing to offer. She tried to asked the help of the Brgy. Captain but they
did not pay attention to her. When asked by the Court Regina Baga alleged that when victim prevented her
son to get the firewood gathered by her son she personally witnessed the incident in fact she tried to prevent
her and not to steal the firewood, but Regina Baga did not heed her.
DR. VENUS when asked by the court if there was rape committed against victim stated, thus: "As to my
findings there is no physical injuries." He stated that the lacerations were old ones and when rape
committed within three hours, the lacerations would have been fresh and not old. The victim was allegedly
raped on April 29, 1994 so that on the same day she was examined. The doctor also admitted if there are no
lacerations there is consent to the sexual intercourse. The doctor also admitted that moderate bleeding was
due to menstrual period. When asked if there is spermatozoa, he answered in the negative. He stated that a
spermatozoa has a lifetime of within 24 hours or for 2 days and if the spermatozoa were inside already in
the vagina it will live for 17 days. 7
The trial court, Hon. Benjamin A. Bogolan presiding, was not persuaded by the theory put up by the defense in the face of the
strong evidence submitted by the prosecution. The accused was convicted, as aforesaid, of the crimes charged.

In this appeal from the judgment finding him guilty, appellant Samuel Borce assigned two related errors allegedly
committed by the court below; to wit:
1. The trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution and in disregarding the theory of the defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant Samuel Borce of double rape despite the
fact that the results of the medical findings contradicted to the testimony of Regina Baga thereby showing
that no rape was committed. 8
At the cost of being overly repetitious, the court, once again, must here echo the familiar doctrine that in the assessment and
evaluation of contradictory asseverations of witnesses, it is with the trial court where the main responsibility, as well as its
concomitant authoritativeness, really lies. The appellate court, absent cogent justifications that can warrant otherwise, would
almost certainly defer to the findings and conclusions made thereon by the trial court. Several reasons have been advanced,
nurtured by a host of jurisprudential holdings, that are all too compelling to be ignored. The trial judge is he who gets the
opportunity to directly and intimately observe the witnesses and to determine, by their demeanor at the witness stand, the
probative strength or weakness of that which they declare. The witnesses can reveal much more than what can ordinarily be
reflected in and perceived from the transcripts that merely would contain the matter which is stated but not how it is said. Telltale marks of either honesty or fabrication, truth or concoction, reality or imagination, may eventuate from a meaningful pause or
spontaneous ready reply, the angry or subdued denial, the forthright stare or the elusive eyes, the sudden pallor or the flush of
face, and all that characterizes the deportment and peculiar outward behavior of witnesses when their examination and cross
examination is elicited. These signs, although available to the trial judge, 9 are, however, easily lost on the appellate court.

In rape cases particularly, the judge is often asked to arbitrate between the discordant and irreconcilable declaration
of the victim and the denial of the accused. In the estimation of such conflicting versions, hardly can the appellate
court assert a preponderant competence over that of the trial judge. It is true, of course, that an accusation for rape
can be managed with facility, while the defense, upon the other hand, is invariably hard put to dispute the claim of
rape. It is precisely for these reasons that a court does not merely take in stride the charge but gives a full and
concentrated attention on, as well as great caution in, the assessment and evaluation of the victim's testimony.
On cross-examination, the complainant repeated, in the same straightforward fashion, her direct testimony. Continuing, she went
on to respond to further searching questions of counsel; thus:

The testimony of Regina Baga is plain and unswerving. The Court is amply convinced that the trial court could not
have erred in giving credence to her testimony. Even an uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, is
enough to warrant conviction. If the rule were otherwise, there rarely would be convictions in rape cases which
almost invariably are committed with no eye-witnesses around to attest to their commission. Neither can alibi, verily
a mere denial and basically self serving in nature, be held to prevail over positive and affirmative testimony. The
rule is even strengthened where the complainant appears to have no nefarious motive to charge the accused wrongly.
It would be unthinkable that Regina Baga, a frail woman, weighing barely 100 pounds, married, and 45 years of age
at the time of the attack on her honor, would open herself and her family to public scrutiny and embarrassment, let
alone send an innocent man possibly to the gallows, for no strong reason at all.
Already in the past, the Court has rejected the argument that the absence of sperm in the vaginal area is a good
defense in a rape case. It may not be amiss to add that the medical certificate was issued by Dr. Viado only on 11
May 1994 or several days after the commission of the offense on 29 April 1994. Medical findings indicative of
pressure on the genitalia, coupled with the testimony of the victim, have repeatedly been held to suffice. 12
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 reads:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
In fine, relevant to the case at bar, when the crime of rape is committed "with the use of a deadly weapon," the
penalty prescribed is reclusion perpetua to death. The death penalty is imposed when by reason or on the occasion
of rape, the victim has suffered "permanent physical mutilation." In this regard, the Court a quo stated:

It is therefore crystal clear to the mind of this Court that the two counts of rape were committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, i.e., the bolo used by the accused in hacking, with the bestiality of an enraged
beast, the victim with three strokes on her face all of which were fatal and nearly cost her life. This
dastardly and heinous act was accompanied by unusual cruelty and savagery. The victim was left for dead;
that she survived is, to the Court, the will of providence so she can identify to the strong arm of the law and
to the unerring sword of justice, her attacker.
In the advent of the reimposition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 7659, Sec. 11, this Court is mandated
to impose the death penalty, considering that the victim sustained fatal wounds which left her permanently
deformed with the three ugly scars across her face. Furthermore, the wounds were inflicted after she was
ravished so that these were therefore unnecessary for the commission of rape, thus displaying the cruelty of
the offender. 13
The imposition of the death penalty on accused-appellant by the trial court on each count of rape has been premised on the
infliction of three scars on the victim's face. The phrase "permanent physical mutilation" has not been defined in the law. Neither
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as so amended by Republic Act No. 7659, nor any of the chapters in Title Eleven, entitled
"Crimes against Chastity," provides any further clue on the meaning that should be given to the term. In Title Eight on "Crimes
against Persons," 14 the Code simply states in Article 262 thereof that

Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
No specific ascription having been given by the law to the word, "mutilation" must perforce be understood in its
generic sense and ordinary usage. Webster 15 defines mutilation as cutting off or permanently destroying a limb or an
essential part thereof. Black 16 defines the term, in its criminal law concept, as one that would deprive a person of the use of any of
those limbs which may be useful to him in fight, the loss of which amounts to mayhem.

A thorough reading of the records of the case would fail to disclose that accused-appellant inflicted the wounds on
the victim deliberately to maim her. It would, in fact, appear that the victim sustained the wounds only as a result of
a clear attempt by appellant to kill her and cover-up his misdeeds. The injury thus borne by private complainant
should not be taken as a circumstance which would raise the penalty to death for the crime of rape but should instead
rightly be taken up and absorbed in the crime of frustrated murder.
Accordingly, for each count of rape, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance alleged and proved
in the commission thereof, the penalty, conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, that should properly
be imposed on accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 1481 is reclusion perpetua.
Relative to Criminal Case No. 1482, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage or superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
When the crime is frustrated the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed; hence, Article 50 of the same Code
states:
Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. The penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated
felony.
The prosecution has satisfactorily shown that accused-appellant did likewise commit the crime of frustrated murder.
The wounds inflicted on the hapless victim could have resulted in her death had it not been for the timely medical
treatment administered to her. On accused-appellant's contention that he has had no intention to kill the victim, the
Court agrees with the Solicitor General in his observations that
(the) claim is completely belied by the nature and number of the wounds he inflicted on his victim. The
medical examination of the victim reveals that the victim's hack wounds were indeed fatal. Observedly, the
hack wounds extended to the brain matter of Regina. The court a quo dismissed appellant's defense as a
"naive story." According to him, complainant tried to steal the firewood which appellant had gathered; that
when appellant caught complainant in the act, she tried to hack him with her bolo; that in the struggle for
possession of the bolo, complainant was accidentally wounded on the face. As correctly concluded by the
court a quo, it befuddles the mind how complainant could have accidentally suffered three (3) deep hack
wounds on her forehead and face when allegedly, in the course of the struggle, the sharp edge of the bolo
faced the accused while its blunt edge faced the complainant. That the wounds inflicted were deep and fatal
belies appellant's claim that the blows were purely accidental. 17
On the award in lump sum of "P250,000.00 as actual, moral and exemplary damages" to the victim, the court a quo has acted
inaptly. In order to sustain any award for such damages, each must be independently justified and substantiated which is here
unfortunately wanting. For one, exemplary damages are awarded in a criminal offense only when its commission is attended by
an aggravating circumstance, a matter which has not been established. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, 18 however, the
victim is entitled to an indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, in Criminal Case No. 1482, finding
appellant SAMUEL BORCE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder and sentencing him
accordingly, is AFFIRMED. The decision in Criminal Case No. 1481, finding the same appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS, however, that the penalty
imposed on accused-appellant for each count of rape is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua, and appellant is

ordered to pay, instead of the P250,000.00 damages awarded by the court a quo, an indemnity of P50,000.00 for
each count of rape.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 178546

April 30, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MUKIM ELING y MAALAC, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Appellant Mukim Eling y Maalac assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 13 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00191-MIN, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated 1 October 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of the Ninth Judicial Region, Branch 16, Zamboanga City, in Criminal Case No. 16315. The RTC found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
On 7 September 1999, an Information3 was filed before the RTC charging appellant of Murder, the accusatory
portion thereof, reads:
That on or about September 2, 1999, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a .45 Caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 652479,
by means of treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
suddenly and without any warning, assault, attack and shoot with the use of said weapon that he was then
armed with, at the person of MOHAMMAD NUH TUTTOH y HAMIDUL, thereby inflicting upon the
latter's person mortal gunshot wound on the fatal part of his body which directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim; furthermore, there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the crime charged herein was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
On 22 October 1999, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of his counsel de oficio. He pleaded "Not Guilty."
Thereafter, pre-trial was held, and trial ensued accordingly.
Evidence for the prosecution showed that at about 5:45 in the afternoon of 2 September 1999, the brother of the
appellant, Alangan Sakandal (Sakandal) and the deceased Mohammad Nuh Tuttoh (Tuttoh) were seated beside each
other on a platform or bench at the side of a small nipa hut owned by Tuttoh. The hut was located along the
shoreline of Tictabon Island in Zamboanga City. It was situated roughly 10 meters away from Tuttoh's house. The
hut has a wide door and walls made of bamboo slats with gaps in between. The walls did not reach up to the ceiling.
The floor of the nipa hut was about one meter and 20 centimeters from the ground, while the platform or bench on
which Tuttoh and Sakandal were seated was about one meter high from the ground. At that time, the appellant was
inside the nipa hut. Crispin Kaluh was standing about four meters away from Tuttoh and Sakandal. While Tuttoh and
Sakandal were conversing, Sakandal heard a shot. He saw a pistol poised just above his shoulders. He grabbed the
pistol, and it fell. He saw that the man holding the pistol with both hands was his brother, the appellant, who was
inside the nipa hut. The appellant shot Tuttoh from behind. Tuttoh was hit on the nape and the bullet exited on his
right cheek. After the pistol fell to the ground, the appellant ran away to the seashore. Sakandal took the pistol while

Crispin Kaluh chased the appellant, held him, and tied his hands. Tuttoh was already dead when he was brought to
the nipa hut, 10 meters away from his house. The cause of his death was discovered to be hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wound.
Sakandal testified that in the evening of 2 September 1999, he turned over the gun to Birri Ahagin (Ahagin), the
right hand man of Tuttoh. It was a colt .45 cal. pistol with Serial No. 652479. Ahagin confirmed the testimony of
Sakandal. According to Ahagin, after receipt of the gun from Sakandal, he filed a report with the Police Detachment
and turned the gun over to SPO1 Amadol Nasihul at seven o'clock in the evening of the same day.
The prosecution also presented its eyewitness Crispin Kaluh (Kaluh) who testified that he is a seaweed farmer
working at the seaweed farm owned by Tuttoh in Tictabon Island.4 Kaluh further testified that at the time of the
incident, he was five (5) arms' length away from Tuttoh.5 He saw Tuttoh seated and conversing with Sakandal on the
bench near the nipa hut. He suddenly heard a gunshot and saw Tuttoh fall down and die. 6 He testified that he saw the
appellant shoot Tuttoh from inside the nipa hut.7 Kaluh added that he saw Sakandal grab the pistol from the appellant
which caused the latter to run away.8 Kaluh chased the appellant. When he caught up with the appellant, he tied his
hands.9
Forensic Chemist P/Sr. Inspector Mercedes Delfin Diestro testified that both hands of the appellant were found
positive of gunpowder nitrates.10
Dr. Efren Apolinario, medico-legal doctor of the Zamboanga City Health Office, was presented by the prosecution
as an expert witness.11 He testified on the cause of death of Tuttoh, as well as on the postmortem examination he
conducted on the cadaver of Tuttoh on the morning of 3 September 1999. He noted that Tuttoh's body sustained a
gunshot wound measuring .8 to 1.2 cm. at the back occiput directed also on the right portion between the right upper
and the right lower mandibular bone measuring 1.5 inches everted.12 From the size of the wound, he approximated
that the firearm used was a .45 caliber.13 He issued a death certificate reflecting therein "hemorrhage secondary to
gun shot wound neck, back" as the cause of death of the victim.14
SP02 Jesus Guray Ortega was presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant had not applied for a license
to possess the firearm, nor did he have a license to carry firearm or authorized to carry firearm outside his
residence.15
Finally, the prosecution presented as witness, Tuttoh's mother, Jaihan Abu. She testified that Tuttoh was his only son.
At the time of Tuttoh's death, he and his wife had five (5) children, and the wife was pregnant with child. The wife
had given birth after the demise of Tuttoh. Jaiham Abu further testified that she incurred expenses in connection with
the death of her son in the total amount of P54,075.00. She said that in connection with Tuttoh's funeral, they spent
10 sacks of rice in the total amount of P8,500.00. They also slaughtered a cow, and bought cigarettes and fish.16
The appellant was presented as the sole witness for the defense. According to him, at about 5:45 in the afternoon of
2 September 1999, he was sleeping inside the nipa hut.17 He woke up when he found himself being mauled by
Tuttoh. According to the appellant, he was mauled by Tuttoh for the purported reason that he was having an affair
with the latter's relative.18 Tuttoh hit him on the nape.19 They grappled for the pistol that was being held by
Tuttoh.20 While they were in that position, the pistol accidentally fired and Tuttoh was hit.21 Afterwards, he
surrendered to a person by the name of Bario.22
After trial, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of Murder. The RTC reasoned that Murder was committed
by means of treachery because the victim, who was shot at the back with a .45 caliber pistol, was totally
unaware.23 The RTC also ruled that the attack was sudden and unexpected and Tuttoh had no chance whatsoever to

defend himself or to escape.24 It appreciated the presence of the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm which was not offset by any mitigating circumstance.25
On 1 October 2001, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MUKIM ELING y MAALAC GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder, as principal, for the unjustified killing of Mohammad
Nuh Tuttoh with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm and SENTENCES said accused to suffer the penalty of DEATH and its accessory
penalties; to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death; P54,075.00 as actual
damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to the provision of Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659, amending Art. 47 of the Revised Penal Code, let
the complete records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.26
With the imposition of the death penalty on appellant, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic
review. Pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Mateo,27 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals.28
On 13 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the appellant's conviction by the RTC. The Court
of Appeals ratiocinated in this wise:
Culled from the records of this case, the prosecution substantially established that appellant was in fact the
assailant and not the assailed. Its eyewitnesses gave an interlocking account of the facts, leading to no other
conclusion than that appellant committed a treacherous assault on the person of the victim. Their
testimonies, with intricate attention to details, were narrated in straightforward, categorical and candid
manner, thus, worthy of belief and credit.
Appellant was positively identified by no less than his older full-blood brother, Alangan Sakandal, as the
one who shot the victim to death. The latter was seated beside the victim when appellant shot the victim
from behind hitting the victim's nape. After the victim was shot, he tried to grab the gun from appellant. In
the course of their struggle for its possession, the gun fell down. Appellant then fled towards the seashore. 29
The Court of Appeals similarly appreciated the finding of the RTC that the killing was qualified by treachery. It
ruled that the appellant positioned himself without risk to himself from any defense which the victim might have
made. However, it disagreed with the penalty of death imposed by the RTC. It argued that on 30 June 2006,
Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,
took effect. Citing Section 230 thereof, it downgraded the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua and awarded
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. It deleted the award of actual damages for the reason that no receipts
were shown to support the claim of expenses incurred for the wake and the burial of the victim. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision
dated 1 October 2001 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that
appellant Mukim Eling y Maalac is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty pursuant to Section
2 (a) of R.A. No. 9346 and appellant is directed to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.31

In his brief, the appellant raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER WHEN TRECHERY WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN BY THE
PROSECUTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
WHEN THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS WAS
NOT DULY PROVEN.32
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt; (2)
whether treachery was sufficiently proven; and (3) whether the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of
firearms was duly shown.
We are unable to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Appellant assails the full faith and credit given to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, especially on
the testimony of Sakandal. Appellant avers that Sakandal's testimony is marred by inconsistencies considering that
he initially stated in categorical terms that he was sitting beside the victim when the latter was shot from behind.
Sakandal later testified that he was passing behind the nipa hut where the appellant was sleeping when he saw the
latter shoot the victim. We have consistently ruled that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the trial
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses since it has observed firsthand their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grilling examination.33 The trial court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while on the stand, it can discern whether or not they are telling the truth. 34 The unbending jurisprudence is
that its findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.35 It is well to remind appellant that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, as in the case at bar, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. 36 The
jurisprudential doctrine that great weight is accorded to the factual findings of the trial court particularly on the
ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses can only be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the record that the
trial court overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if
considered would have altered the result.37 There are no cogent reasons to depart from the findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Sakandal does not negate his eyewitness
account that he saw appellant shoot the victim. Even then, witnesses cannot be expected to give a flawless testimony
all the time.38 Although there may be inconsistencies in minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the
witnesses, where, as in this case, there is no inconsistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the assailant.39 Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish the
prosecution's case as they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby negating any
misgivings that the same were perjured.40 Similarly, we note that the eyewitness Sakandal, who is appellant's brother,
was shown to have no ill motive to falsely testify against the appellant. In fact, from the mouth of the appellant

himself, it was confirmed that prior to the incident, he was in good relationship with his brother, Sakandal.
Moreover, appellant also testified that they were very close to each other, and that they did not have any
misunderstanding.41 The same was also true with eyewitness Kaluh who testified against him. Kaluh was five arms'
length away from the scene of the crime. Indeed, the testimonies of Sakandal and Kaluh are a positive identification
of appellant as the assailant. These constitute direct evidence. 42Sakandal and Kaluh are eyewitnesses to the very act
of the commission of the crime and positively identified the appellant as the offender.
On the question of treachery, the RTC supports its findings on the following ratiocination:
It is difficult to imagine how the gun could have fired while [appellant] and the victim were grappling for it
and hit the victim at the back of the neck and the bullet exited at the victim's right cheek. Moreover, there
were no powder burn at the entry wound at the back of the victim's neck indicating that the victim was shot
at a distance of more than twenty four (24) inches or two (2) feet, such that the victim could not have been
shot while he was grappling for the gun with the accused.43
The Court of Appeals affirmed such findings and found that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases the imposable penalties for
the offense.44 Hence, like the delict itself, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.45 Treachery can be appreciated
when the following requisites are present: (1) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which
would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity
being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.46 Appellant was shown to have shot the deceased Tuttoh from
behind, hitting him in the nape, and with the bullet exiting the victim's right cheek. During the commission of the
crime, the deceased Tuttoh was sitting on a bench or a platform outside the nipa hut. He was conversing with
Sakandal. He was unaware of any attack that appellant had planned against him. What existed here was such a
sudden and unexpected attack by the appellant and without warning on an unsuspecting victim, depriving Tuttoh of
any real chance to defend himself, and thereby ensuring, without risk, its commission.
Anent the issue of the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm, appellant questions the same on
the claim that no evidence was shown that he had prior physical possession and/or ownership of the .45 caliber gun
before the same was used against the deceased. We are not impressed. When Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on 6
July 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm was considered merely an aggravating circumstance, if murder or
homicide or any other crime was committed with it.47 Two requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of
firearms: first, the existence of the subject firearm; and second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. In the case at bar, the existence
of the subject firearm was duly established. Secondly, it was ascertained that the appellant who used the subject
firearm to commit the crime did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry the gun outside of his
residence. Even then, Section 548 of Republic Act No. 8294 enumerates, "unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the
commission of the crime" as covered by the term "unlicensed firearm." It was not shown that appellant had the
authority to use the firearm.
We are in accord with the grant by the Court of Appeals of civil indemnity; however, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, we increase the same to P75,000.00. The amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is awarded only if
the crime is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty.49 Though the penalty
imposed on appellant was reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, civil indemnity to be
awarded remains at P75,000.00. We also agree with the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. We

award the same as the circumstances surrounding the untimely and violent death, in accordance with human nature
and experience, could have brought nothing but emotional pain and anguish to the victim's family.50
We retain the award of exemplary damages but reduced the amount to P25,000.00 following current
jurisprudence.51 Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 must be awarded, given the presence of treachery
which qualified the killing to murder. Article 2230 of the Civil Code allows the award of exemplary damages as part
of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term
aggravating circumstance as used therein should be construed in its generic sense since it did not specify otherwise.
Notwithstanding the absence of receipts to prove actual damages, we affirm the grant of the Court of Appeals of
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages. The award of P25,000.00 in temperate
damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the
trial court.52 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that
the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. 53
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 July 2006 in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 00191-MIN is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Mukim Eling y Maalac is
found GUILTY of the crime of MURDER. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However,
pursuant to Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without possibility of parole. Appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Mohammad Nuh Tuttoh the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00
as temperate damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187077

February 23, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALEX CONDES Y GUANZON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the July 31, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00926,
which affirmed the July 21, 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Calamba City (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 7383-2000-C, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed against AAA.3

Accused Alex Condes y Guanzon (accused) was charged with the crime of rape in an information4 dated February
23, 2000, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about February 14, 1999 at Brgy. Bitin, Municipality of Bay, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while conveniently armed with a bolo through force,
violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
relation with one AAA, a fourteen (14) year old minor, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Version of the Prosecution
The thrust of the prosecutions evidence has been summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
Brief5 as follows:
On the eve[ning] of February 14, 1999, the 14-year old victim, AAA, was left alone with her stepfather, appellant
Alex Condes, at their house in Brgy. Bitin, Laguna. She was cleaning the upstairs area of the house, when appellant
entered the room, pointed a bolo at her neck, and warned her not to shout. He pulled her down to the floor, removed
her clothes, and when she tried to push him away subdued her with a threat of a cut from his bolo. Appellant
removed his own garments, positioned himself on top of his stepdaughter, and succeeded in inserting his penis into
the victim. He made push and pull movement for about ten minutes. The pain the victim felt in her sex organ was
excruciating.
After satisfying himself, appellant wiped his sex organ. Threatening to kill her brothers and sister, he made AAA
promise not to tell anyone about the incident. She kept the unpalatable promise until December 30, 1999, when
appellant tried to rape her again. Determined to obtain justice, the victim called her aunt in San Pablo City and
disclosed the revolting incident. On January 4, 2000, accompanied by her aunt, AAA was taken to the PNP Regional
Crime Laboratory Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang Calamba, Laguna, where she was examined by Dr. Joselito
Rodrigo whose findings revealed the following:
"scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coapted with pinkish brown labia minora
presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed an elastic fleshy type hymen with deep-healed laceration
at 6 oclock position. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index
finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is soft. Findings are compatible with 9 to 10
weeks pregnant already"
Version of the Defense
In his Brief,6 the accused denied the charges against him and presented his own version of the circumstances before
and during the alleged incident. Thus:
Rose Catalan is a lady guard of the Guzent Incorporated in Tiwi, Albay, where the accused used to work since 1991.
She is in-charge of the time records of all the employees in the said establishment.
On February 13, 1999, the accused reported for work, which was indicated in their logbook. The accused left the
company at 11:10 in the morning but proceeded to Tiwi Hot Spring.

Alex Condes vehemently denied the accusation hurled against him. He recalled that in the morning of February 14,
1999, he returned the service vehicle to his office at No. 1237 EDSA, Quezon City. He went home soon thereafter to
take a short nap in his house in Quezon City. At 5:00 oclock in the morning, he decided to go to his house in Brgy.
Bitin, Bay, Laguna. Upon reaching home, he went to sleep again until his brother-in-law and a companion arrived.
They had a drinking spree. The complainant asked permission to attend a fiesta at her friends house.
At 7:00 oclock in the evening, he asked his mother-in-law and the complainant to prepare his things as he would
return to Manila the following day. He left his house on February 15, 1999 at 3:30 in the morning.
Alberto Navarette, barangay captain of Bitin, in Bay, Laguna, averred that he saw the accused inside the latters
house in the morning of February 14, 1999. He also saw the complainant washing dishes in their kitchen. Then, in
the afternoon, he passed by the house of the accused and saw him carrying a child while the complainant was in
front of their house. He did not notice anything unusual.
On July 21, 2003, the RTC rendered its judgment convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
rape. It rejected the defenses of denial and alibi proffered by the accused stating that said defenses fell flat in the
face of the testimony of AAA on her harrowing ordeal in the hands of the accused. It found her testimony to be
credible, natural, convincing, consistent with human nature, and in the normal course of events. 7 The lower court,
however, ruled that the accused can only be convicted of simple rape and not in its qualified form. It reasoned out
that while the prosecution was able to establish the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship which would warrant the imposition of death penalty under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
the circumstance of stepfather-daughter relationship was not alleged in the information. Thus, the dispositive portion
of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the herein accused ALEX CONDES Y GUANZON is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of rape. There being no modifying
circumstances properly alleged in the Information to be appreciated, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim
AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.8
The records of the case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to People v. Efren Mateo,9the
Court issued a resolution10 dated January 19, 2005 transferring this case to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.
The CA eventually affirmed11 the guilty verdict on the basis of AAAs testimony which it found credible and
sufficient to sustain a conviction. It debunked the defense of alibi of the accused holding that it was not satisfactorily
established and not at all persuasive when pitted against the positive and convincing identification by the victim.
On August 29, 2008, the accused filed the Notice of Appeal,12 which was given due course by the CA in its Minute
Resolution13 dated September 8, 2008.
On June 1, 2009, the Court issued the Resolution14 requiring the parties to submit their respective supplemental
briefs. On July 7, 2009, the OSG manifested15 that it would forego the filing of a supplemental brief if appellant
should opt not to file one. On October 12, 2009, the Court dispensed16 with the filing by the Public Attorneys Office
of a supplemental brief for appellant when it did not file one during the prescribed period.

From the Appellants Brief of the accused filed with the CA, he prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the guilty
verdict anchored on the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MOTIVE BEHIND THE
FILING OF THE INSTANT CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLEGED ACT WAS NOT
PROVEN WITH CERTAINTY.
In essence, the accused claims that AAA merely concocted the accusation of rape out of hatred because she resented
the hard discipline imposed by him and she feared that he would punish her once he would learn that she had a
boyfriend and pregnant at that. He tags AAAs story of defloration as both preposterous and ridiculous conjured by
an overly imaginative individual anchored on ill motives.
Professing innocence, he insists that he could not have possibly committed the offense charged as he was preoccupied and even left the house on the day of the alleged commission of the sexual assault. He discredits AAAs
testimony stressing that it would be difficult for him to commit the crime considering that her siblings and
grandmother were staying in the same house. Thus, he concludes that the evidence for the prosecution failed to meet
that quantum of proof necessary to warrant his conviction.
The OSG, on the other hand, counters that AAAs testimony was credible and sufficient to convict and that the
culpability of the accused for the crime of rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal must fail.
In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by three settled principles: First, an accusation for
rape can be made with facility and it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; Second, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and Third, the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.17 Corollary to the above principles is the rule that the credibility of the victim is always the
single most important issue in the prosecution of a rape case. 18 Conviction or acquittal in a rape case more often than
not depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony because, by the very nature of this
crime, it is usually the victim alone who can testify as to its occurrence.
In his Brief, the accused put in issue the credibility of AAAs testimony contending that she merely fabricated the
accusation to place him behind bars and rid him out of her life forever. This contention deserves scant consideration.

Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective
testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The
trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance,
blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an
oath"19 are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore,
can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.
Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case,
its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying and detect if they were lying.20 The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings
are sustained by the CA.21
In the case at bench, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the trial courts findings and its calibration of
private complainants credibility.
A meticulous review of the transcript of stenographic notes would show that AAA narrated in the painstaking and
degrading public trial her unfortunate and painful ordeal in the hands of the accused in a logical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank manner. There were no perceptible artificialities or pretensions that tarnished the veracity of
her testimony. She recounted the tragic experience, unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material
points and unshaken by the tedious and grueling cross-examination. Her declaration revealed each and every detail
of the incident and gave no impression whatsoever that her testimony was a mere fabrication. Had her story been
contrived, she would not have been so consistent throughout her testimony in the face of intense and lengthy
interrogation.
When offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16 years of age, courts are inclined to lend credence
to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to
which they would be exposed by a court trial, if their accusation were not true.22 Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity.23 It bears stressing that not an iota of evidence was presented by the defense showing
that AAAs account of her defilement was not true.
Without hesitation, AAA pointed an accusing finger against the accused, her stepfather no less, as the person who
sexually assaulted her on that fateful night of February 14, 1999. She vividly recalled that he poked a bolo at her
neck and told her not to shout or else he would kill her. Bent on satisfying his lust, he embraced and pulled her down
on the floor. He took off her pajamas, undressed himself and placed himself on top of her. She resisted by pushing
him away but he again pointed the bolo and ordered her not to move or shout. He then succeeded in penetrating her
organ with his own causing her excruciating pain. Thereafter, he warned her that he would kill her and her siblings if
she would tell anyone about what happened. The following excerpts from the Transcript of Stenographic Notes are
revealing:
The Court is convinced that the accused did employ threat and intimidation to subjugate AAAs will and break her
resistance. She categorically stated that he poked a bolo at her neck and threatened to kill her if she would make a
noise and resist his advances. Undoubtedly, fear and helplessness gripped her. To an innocent girl who was only 14
years old, his menacing acts engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she would resist or not yield to his bestial
demands, he would make good his threats. She was obviously cowed into submission by the real and present threat
of physical harm on her person. Obviously, she was silenced to do his bidding. Her submission was re-enforced by
the fact that the accused was her stepfather who exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her. When a victim
is threatened with bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or bolo, such
constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist. 25

In the present case, it appears that AAA chose to suffer the February 14, 1999 rape in silence had it not been for the
second attempt to defile her on December 30, 1999. After he mauled her when she resisted, she was compelled to
seek her aunts assistance. This was apparent from her testimony when she declared:
AAAs failure to immediately report to anyone what she had suffered in the hands of her stepfather does not vitiate
the integrity of her claim. Apparently, the accused succeeded in instilling fear upon her young mind when he
threatened to kill her and her siblings should she say a word about the incident. Thus, paralyzed by the fear that he
would make good his threats, she remained silent and only broke it when he tried to repeat the sexual assault. The
subsequent attack brought her silence to the breaking point and forced her to come out in the open to prevent and
avoid further assaults. Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Neither does
it necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. 27
Any insinuation of ill motive on the part of AAA in the filing of the rape case against her stepfather does not merit
any consideration. It is highly improbable that she would concoct a sordid tale of sexual abuse against the accused,
whom she called "Papa," simply because she was reproved or censured for her irresponsible ways and was afraid
that he would punish her for getting pregnant by her boyfriend. Parental punishment is not enough reason for a
young girl to falsely accuse her stepfather of a crime so grave as rape. Reverence and respect for the elders are two
values deeply ingrained in Filipino children.28
Granting AAA indeed resented his stepfather, the Court does not necessarily cast doubt on AAAs credibility as
witness. Motives, such as those arising from family feuds, resentment, or revenge, have not prevented the Court
from giving, if proper, full credence to the testimony of minor complainants29 who remained steadfast throughout
their direct and cross-examination.30 After all, ill motive is never an essential element of a crime. It becomes
irrelevant and of no significance where there are affirmative, nay, categorical declarations towards the culpability of
the accused for the felony. Well-entrenched is the doctrine which is founded on reason and experience that when the
victim testifies that she has been raped, and her testimony is credible, such testimony may be the sole basis of
conviction.31 In this case, there could not have been a more powerful testament to the truth than her public
outpouring of her unspoken grief.
In an attempt at exculpation, the accused claims that it is difficult to commit the crime of rape inasmuch as AAAs
siblings and grandmother were staying in the same house at Barangay Bitin, Municipality of Bay, Laguna.
The argument fails.
According to AAA, her siblings were all outside the house while her grandmother was doing an errand in the market
when the accused molested her. Granting arguendo that there were other people in the house when the rape was
committed, rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby or the
members of the family.32 Lust, being a very powerful human urge, is, to borrow from People v. Virgilio
Bernabe,33 "no respecter of time and place." Rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest places and circumstances
and by the most unlikely persons.34 The beast in a man bears no respect for time and place, driving him to commit
rape anywhere - even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school premises, in a
house where there are other occupants, in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping, and
even in places which to many would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission. Besides, there is no
rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.35
In stark contrast to AAAs firm declaration, the defenses of denial and alibi invoked by the accused rest on shaky
grounds. The accused insists that "the accusation is a lie"36 and claims that "I did not do that."37 He avers that he

could not have committed the offense because he was preoccupied and was not in their house at Barangay Bitin,
Bay, Laguna on the date and time the alleged rape was perpetrated.
Judicial experience has taught this Court that denial and alibi are the common defenses in rape cases. Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.38It is
a negative self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
The barefaced denial of the charge by the accused cannot prevail over the positive and forthright identification of
him as the perpetrator of the dastardly act.
Alibi, on the other hand, is the weakest of all defenses for it can be easily contrived. For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.39 In this case, not a shred of evidence was adduced by the accused to substantiate his alibi.
A perusal of his own testimony discloses that he arrived at their house at Barangay Bitin, Bay, Laguna at past 9:00
oclock in the morning; that he had visitors who came to attend their town fiesta and they had a drinking spree; that
after his visitors and AAA left at past 12:00 oclock noon, he took a slumber; that he woke up at around 7:00 oclock
in the evening and asked AAA and her grandmother to prepare his things as he would return to Manila; and that he
left for Manila at 3:30 oclock in the morning of February 15, 1999.40 From the foregoing, it is clear that he was at
home in the evening of February 14, 1999. Alibi necessarily fails when there is positive evidence of the physical
presence of the accused at the crime scene.41 Taken in this light, the plausible and emphatic testimony of AAA must
prevail.
Finally, the Court sustains the two courts below in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the accused. The
applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (effective October 22,
1997), covering the crime of Rape are Articles 266-A and 266-B which provide:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 7383-2000-C specifically alleged that AAA was 14 years old at the time of
the commission of the rape. In proving her minority, the prosecution presented a birth certificate 42 issued by the
Office of City Civil Registrar of San Pablo City showing that she was born on January 2, 1985. Hence, she was 14
years old when she was raped by the accused on February 14, 1999. However, the courts below correctly noted that
the qualifying circumstance of her relationship with the accused as his stepdaughter was not alleged in the
Information, although proven during the trial and not even contested by the accused.43 This omission prevents the
transformation of the crime in its qualified form.
The twin requisites of minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender being special qualifying
circumstances, which increase the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the
period of the penalty, should be alleged in the information because of the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.44 The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect on
December 1, 2000, explicitly mandates that the information must state in ordinary and concise language the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending an offense. Although the crime of rape in this case was
committed before the effectivity of the new rules, it should be applied retroactively, as the same is favorable to an
accused.45
The Court notes, however, that the Information also alleged that the accused committed the rape "while conveniently
armed with a bolo through force, violence and intimidation." The prosecution was able to prove during trial his use
of a deadly weapon and threatening words which caused the victim to submit to his will for fear for her life and
personal safety.
When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is the range of two indivisible
penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. In this connection, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
lawph!l

The Court also sustains the monetary awards granted by the RTC and the CA in favor of AAA, except for the
exemplary damages which is increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with our ruling in People v. Gilbert
Castro46 and earlier cases.
Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding
of the fact of rape.47 Moral damages in rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that the victim
suffered trauma, with mental, physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the basis thereof. These are too
obvious to still require their recital by the victim at the trial.48
The award of exemplary damages is likewise called for because the rape was committed with the use of a deadly
weapon. In People v. Silverio Montemayor,49 the Court has stated that "exemplary damages are justified under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. Since the
qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the rapes subject of these
cases, exemplary damages x x x may be awarded to the offended party in each case."
WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00926 is
hereby AFFIRMED except as to the exemplary damages which is hereby increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168649

December 6, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE ALVIZO AUDINE, accused-appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us for review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00338 which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 272, finding accusedappellant Jose Alvizo Audine guilty of two (2) counts of rape committed against his fourteen-year old daughter,
AAA3 and sentencing him to suffer the capital punishment for each count.
On the basis of the complaint filed by AAA, two informations for Rape4 against accused-appellant were filed with
the RTC of Marikina City. The accusatory portions thereof read:
Criminal Case No. 2001-4093-MK
That on or about the 24th day of December 1999, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the father of the minor victim, by

means of force, coercion and intimidation, with the use of small knife which is a bladed weapon, and with
lewd design or intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire upon complainant AAA, a minor and fifteen (15)
years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said
complainant against her will and consent which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of said child as a human being.5
Criminal Case No. 2001-4094-MK
That on or about the 8th day of January 2000, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the father of the minor victim, by means of
force, coercion and intimidation, with the use of a small knife which is a bladed weapon, and with lewd
design or intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire upon complainant AAA, a minor and fifteen (15) years
old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said complainant
against her will and consent which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said
child as a human being.6
The cases were raffled to Branch 272. Finding probable cause, a warrant of arrest was issued against accusedappellant who was arrested and detained at the Marikina City Police Station.
When arraigned on 10 June 2002, accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded "not guilty" to
the two counts of rape.7 Thereafter, the cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
During the pre-trial, the following stipulation of facts8 was entered into by the prosecution and the defense:
1. The jurisdiction of this court to try these cases;
2. The identity of the accused as AAA;9
3. The existence and due execution of Medico Legal Report No. M-187-01 issued and prepared by Dr.
Ruby Grace D. Sabino dated January 17, 2001;
4. The existence of the medico legal examination issued and prepared by Dr. Ruby Grace D. Sabino
addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory;
5. The existence and due execution of the initial of the Medico Legal Report No. M-187-01 dated January
16, 2001; and
6. The existence of the manifestation of consent signed by the victim and the Department of Social Welfare
and Development who is the guardian of the victim.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private complainant AAA, Dr. Ruby Grace D. Sabino, SPO4
Nenita Sadullo Abanes and Lucila Sulte Arresu. For the defense, only accused-appellant took the stand.
The records bear the following:
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that AAA, the only daughter of the accusedappellant, was born on August 4, 1985.
On November 7, 1999, the accused-appellant was supposed to bring AAA to the house of his wifes cousin
in Bulacan. Instead, he brought her to the house of his own cousin, Arminda Arginosa, at XXX, XXX City.

On December 24, 1999, AAA was alone reading magazines in the house of her aunt when the accusedappellant arrived and ordered her to get his clothes from the masters bedroom. AAA did as told. But the
accused-appellant almost at once followed AAA inside the room and pushed her towards the bed. She
fought back but the accused-appellant boxed her in the abdomen. The accused-appellant then forcibly took
off AAAs dress and shorts. AAA continued resisting the accused-appellant and pleaded with him to stop,
but to no avail. The accused-appellant kissed AAAs body, laid on top of her, and inserted his penis into her
vagina, satiating his lust. After the violation, the accused-appellant warned AAA not to tell anybody about
the rape. AAA feared for her life because the accused-appellant pointed a knife at her before and after the
rape incident.
The second violation occurred on January 8, 2000. AAA was sleeping alone in her room when she felt
something pressing on her thigh. It was again the accused-appellant, a knife pointed at her abdomen, who
was undressing her. It was the same knife the accused-appellant used during the December 24, 1999
incident. AAA shouted and fought back, but as in the first incident, the accused-appellant again boxed her
in the stomach. The accused-appellant masturbated first before inserting his male member into AAAs
vagina. At the conclusion of the bestial assault, he threatened to kill AAA and her siblings if she reported
the rape to anybody. After the incident, the accused-appellant left for Quezon Province.
As a result of her successive violations, AAA got pregnant. On August 19, 2000, she gave birth to a baby
boy, who however died five (5) days later.
Since she was in virtual isolation, AAA went to see medical social worker Lucila Arresu and revealed to the
latter that the accused-appellant had raped her. Armed with that information, Lucila called up the Marikina
City Police. SPO4 Nenita Abanes interviewed AAA and took down her statement.
On January 16, 2001, Dr. Ruby Grace Sabino conducted a physical examination on AAA. She found the
condition of AAAs genitalia exhibiting signs of penetration. According to her, AAAs hymen has
"carunculae myrtiformis" or, in laymans term, there is already a rose bead appearance on it, which is an
indication that AAA has already given birth.
Interposing disavowal or alibi, the accused-appellant simply denied the charges against him. He claimed
that on December 24, 1999 and January 8, 2000, he was in Sariaya, Quezon working in his tailoring shop.
He further testified that in September 1999, AAA was missing for three (3) days. His family searched for
her and learnt that she had eloped with her sweetheart BBB.
He claimed that it was not his idea to take AAA anywhere, since she was still studying in Quezon Province.
It was AAAs mother who prevailed upon him to bring their daughter to XXX City to prevent AAA from
seeing her friends, who had badly influenced her, as well as her boyfriend, with whom she later eloped.10
On 5 December 2002, the trial court, convicting accused-appellant of two counts of rape and imposing on him the
death penalty for each count, disposed of the cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the accused, JOSE ALVIZO AUDINE, is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape (RA 8353) filed against him and is sentenced to suffer
the extreme penalty of DEATH in each case. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private
complaint in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP100,000.00) and FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP50,000.00) as moral damages so as to serve as deterrent to this disturbing trend,
plus the costs of the suit.11
Ignoring accused-appellants defenses, the trial court ratiocinated:

The accused interposed a number of defenses. First, that of alibi. Jose Audine stated that the December 24,
1999 and January 8, 2000 alleged rape incidents could not be true as he was already in Sariaya, Quezon
then, having returned to the province right after taking AAA to her cousin Arminda Arganosas house in
XXX. Second, the accused denied having raped her daughter and stressed that her daughter had ran away
with her boyfriend, BBB, in Sariaya, Quezon on September of 1999 giving an implication that the
pregnancy could be attributed to that. He only wanted to stop AAA from seeing her womanizer-cumaddict boyfriend, BBB. He corroborated AAAs testimony that he filed a rape case in Sariaya, Quezon
against BBB.
However, realizing the futility of his defense, the accused shifted his defense in the middle of the trial.
According to the accused, his cousin Arminda Arganosa was arrested for illegal possession of a big amount
of shabu in Dalampasigan Beach in Dalahican, Sariaya, Quezon, and Arminda suspected that he was behind
her arrest. He also accused Arminda of acting as a "pimp" to her daughter as she vowed to get even with
Jose Audine, an allegation too incredible to believe considering AAAs pregnancy was very noticeable then.
In People vs. Balgos, 323 SCRA 372, it was held that an "accuseds shift of theory, upon realizing the
futility of his earlier defense, rather than help his cause, only further damaged his credibility." 12
Considering that the penalty it imposed was the death penalty, the trial court forwarded the records of the case to the
Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.13 However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,14 the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.
On 18 February 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant,
together with the imposition of the death penalty for each count of rape, but modified the awards of civil indemnity
and damages. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the appealed Decision dated December 5, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2001-4093-MK and 20014094-MK, finding the accused-appellant JOSE ALVIZO AUDINE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape and sentencing him in each case to suffer the penalty of death is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that for each count of rape, the accused-appellant is also CONDEMNED to pay the
private complainant, AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Should no motion for reconsideration be filed in this case by the accused-appellant within the allowable
reglementary period, or after the lapse thereof, let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the
Honorable Supreme Court for appropriate action hereon.15
On 15 March 2005, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration16 of the decision but same was denied by
the Court of Appeals on 28 June 2005.17 In accordance with Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124, the entire records
of the case were elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Thereupon, the parties were required to submit
supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice.18 Accused-appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief on
the ground he had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in his appellants brief. On the part of the Office of the
Solicitor General, despite notice, no response was received therefrom.
Accused-appellant makes a lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.19
In trying to discredit private complainant AAA, accused-appellant cites several circumstances that tend to create
doubt as to his guilt, to wit: (1) It is quite unimaginable how the accused-appellant could still manage to undress
AAA while he was holding her hands and at the same time pointing a knife at her who was then putting up a fight;
(2) It is unbelievable that accused-appellant could have penetrated her considering that she was kicking him while he

was inserting his penis into her vagina; (3) The failure of AAA to exercise any precaution in securing herself, like
locking her room or arming herself with a weapon, to prevent accused-appellants sexual advances considering her
alleged horrible experience with accused-appellant; (4) The delay in reporting the incidents notwithstanding the
absence of the accused-appellant who was in the province all the time, renders doubtful her charges of rape; (5) The
charges of rape were filed by AAA as revenge against accused-appellant whom she considered as the person who
separated her from her lover; (6) AAAs admission that she executed a sworn statement charging BBB with rape
which she later recanted, indicates that she can concoct untruthful stories under oath.
In the review of rape cases, we are almost invariably guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2)
in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 20
Accused-appellants contention that he could not have committed the rapes the way private complainant described
them deserves scant consideration. We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:
AAA never testified that the accused-appellant undressed her, while he was holding her hands and pointing
a knife at her, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest. A plain reading of AAAs testimony during her
direct examination shows that such acts of the accused-appellant were done at different points in time.
We also fail to see anything extraordinary or unbelievable in AAAs testimony that despite her act of
kicking the accused-appellant he still succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. While it may be
admitted that AAAs act of kicking made penetration somewhat difficult, it certainly did not render the
satyrs maniacal attack irresistible, nor his penetration into the citadel of his daughters purity anything
impossible.21
Private complainant is being faulted for not taking the necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of her horrible
experience with accused-appellant last 24 December 1999. Her failure to perform what accused-appellant claims she
ought to have done cannot be taken against her. A fourteen-year old girl cannot be reasonably expected to exercise or
put into place any measure that would avert the repetition of the ordeal with her father. How the victim comported
herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape. 22 Not all
victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of
behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that
different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. 23 The workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.24 This Court, in People v. Luzorata,25 held:
This Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she
has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on
the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt x x x.
Private complainant narrated in a clear and straightforward manner her harrowing experience. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals gave credence to her testimony. She recounted her ordeal as follows:
After a review of the testimony of the private complainant, We find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of
the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to
evaluate properly testimonial evidence.27 In the case at bar, there being overwhelming evidence showing that on 24
December 1999 and 8 January 2000 appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant by means of force,
coercion and intimidation, we have no reason not to apply the rule and to apply the exception.

Accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than
that alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is
generally rejected.28 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1)
he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene at the time of its commission.29
In the case at bar, accused-appellant claimed that on 24 December 1999 and 8 January 2000, he was in Sariaya,
Quezon working in his tailoring shop. He, however, did not present any witness to corroborate such claim.
Unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, his alibi is self-serving and deserves no weight in law; thus, same
must necessarily fail. An alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and where
such defense is not corroborated, it is fatal to the accused.30 Uncorroborated alibi must be disregarded.31
Accused-appellant further argues that the delay in reporting the incidents renders doubtful private complainants
charges of rape.
We are not persuaded. The delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is
neither unknown nor uncommon. Particularly in incestuous rape, this Court has consistently held that delay in
reporting the offense is not indicative of a fabricated charge.32 It has been repeatedly held that the delay in reporting
a rape incident due to death threats cannot be taken against the victim.33 The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only
if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. In this case, private complainant, who was fourteen years old when
she was ravished, satisfactorily explained why she did not immediately report the matter to anybody. She revealed
that she is afraid of her father and that the latter threatened to kill her and her siblings if she would divulge the
sexual attack on her.34 Accused-appellant, being her father, exercises moral ascendancy and influence over her. Thus,
her reluctance that caused the delay should not be taken against her. Neither can it be used to diminish her credibility
nor undermine the charge of rape.
The fact of delay does not necessarily lead to an acquittal. In several cases we have decided, 35 the delay lasted for
two years or more; nevertheless, the victims were found to be credible. As above-mentioned, we found the delay to
be reasonable and sufficiently explained. The testimony of the victim herself has convinced the Court that her
accusation has a ring of truth sufficient to justify the conviction of appellant.
The defense tried to impute ill motive on private complainant claiming that the latter filed the two cases of rape to
exact revenge because he separated private complainant from her lover-boyfriend.
We find this hard to believe. Motives such as feuds, resentment and revenge have never swayed us from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor complainant.36 This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape
victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender
age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by
being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her.37 It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would
impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.38 Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth.39 Full weight and credit should, indeed, be accorded AAAs testimony. It is very unlikely for her to
accuse her father of so heinous a crime if it were not true. Her credibility was bolstered beyond reproach by her
spontaneous emotional breakdown during trial.40
So traumatized by her horrific experience with her father, private complainant testified that, in the event her father is
found guilty, she will not regret or repent if he is sentenced to death because she only wants justice for what he did
to her.41 Furthermore, her refusal to reveal in the Birth Certificate the name of the father of her child indicates that it
was accused-appellant who sired her son. She testified:
A child of tender years will not make these declarations unless the bestial attacks on her were not truly perpetrated
by her father.

The contention of the defense that private complainant cannot be considered a credible witness because she has the
propensity to concoct untruthful stories under oath in light of her admission that she executed a sworn statement
charging BBB with the crime of rape which she later recanted, deserves scant consideration.
Private complainant explained to the satisfaction of this Court that she was merely forced by her father to execute a
sworn statement against BBB that the latter raped her.43 It is very apparent that she was under her fathers moral
authority and influence. This ascendancy, together with the threats from her father, is so great that private
complainant failed to resist or overcome it.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code relative to the case on hand are Articles 266-A and 266-B, which
read:
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
xxxx
Art. 266-B. Penalties.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.
For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code must be alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. 44 In the
instant case, since the special qualifying circumstances of the victims minority and her relationship with the
offender have been properly alleged in the informations and established during trial, the imposition of the death
penalty for each count of rape is justified.
With the effectivity,45 however, of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section
2 thereof, the penalty to be meted on accused-appellant shall be reclusion perpetua. Said section reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on accused-appellant, he is not eligible for parole following
Section 3 of said law which provides:

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
As regards the award of damages for each count of rape, the same must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by
the trial court as civil indemnity46 was properly reduced by the Court of Appeals to P75,000.00 which is the amount
awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty.47With respect
to moral damages, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals must be
increased to P75,000.00 without need of pleading or proof of basis thereof.48 Moreover, the P25,000.00 awarded by
the Court of Appeals as exemplary damages was proper due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship.49
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 February 2005 finding
accused-appellant Jose Alvizo Audine guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility to parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. He is also ordered to pay private
complainant AAA, for each count of rape, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178325

February 22, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DOMINADOR SORIANO, SR., appellant.
R E S O L U T IO N
CARPIO, J.:
This is an appeal from the 21 April 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 004191 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, finding appellant
Dominador Soriano, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of multiple rape.
The prosecution charged appellant with raping his then 12-year old daughter AAA, in an Information2 that reads:
That sometime between October 2000 to December 11, 2001, at Barangay San Leonardo, Municipality of
Bambang, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, threat, intimidation and grave abuse of
authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own
daughter AAA, 12 years old, against the latter's will and consent, to her own damage and prejudice.

The Information specified Article 266-A of Republic Act No. 8353, Section I, paragraphs (a) and (c) in relation to
Republic Act No. 7659, as the law violated.3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.4 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented AAA who narrated the harrowing ordeal she went through with her father. AAA testified
that one evening in October of 2000 she was awakened from her sleep as she felt someone moving on top of her. She
became aware that it was appellant, her father, sexually molesting her. She tried to push her father away but he was
too strong. She then tried to reach out to her sister, BBB, who was sleeping nearby, but the latter was sleeping
soundly. At that time, her mother was in Manila. Afterwards, appellant threatened to kill AAA if she would tell her
mother what transpired. Appellant thereafter repeatedly raped AAA, the last incident took place on 11 December
2001. AAA further testified that her father impregnated her and she eventually gave birth to a baby boy.5
AAA's testimony was corroborated by her aunt, CCC. CCC testified that on 7 February 2002 she observed that AAA
was sick and vomiting. CCC thus accompanied AAA to Dr. Anthony Cortez (Dr. Cortez) for a check-up as a result
of which she learned that AAA was pregnant. When CCC asked AAA who fathered her child, AAA at first did not
reveal who made her pregnant. AAA eventually admitted to CCC and Dr. Cortez that appellant raped her and
appellant is the father of her child.6
The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Anthony Cortez, Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya, who conducted the medico-genital examination of AAA. According to Dr. Cortez, based on the
examination he conducted on the victim on 7 February 2002, AAA was in the second trimester of her pregnancy.7
For his defense, appellant merely denied the charges against him. He claimed that from Monday to Friday, with the
exception of his son DDD, his children sleep at the house of their aunt CCC, because his wife works in Manila and
cannot take care of them. His children only sleep at home during weekends when their mother is at home. According
to Dominador, even when his children are at home, it is his son DDD and his wife who sleep on each of his side and
not AAA.8
The defense also presented EEE, apellant's wife and victim's mother. On the witness stand, EEE presented the
affidavit of desistance allegedly executed by AAA.
In its Decision9 of 26 August 2004, the trial court found that "it was conclusively shown that accused Dominador
Soriano raped his daughter AAA, several times on or before 11 December 2001, in their house in Barangay San
Leonardo, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, which caused her pregnancy and giving birth to a baby boy." The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Dominador Soriano, Sr. is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and is hereby sentenced to DEATH. He shall indemnify the
victim AAA, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages.
On appeal, appellant questioned the ruling of the trial court on the ground that there were inconsistencies in the
testimony of AAA as to what transpired during the alleged first rape, in particular as to whether appellant removed
her undergarments prior to the sexual act. Appellant further makes issue of the fact that the trial court disregarded
the affidavit of desistance signed by his daughter.

In its 21 April 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and found that the prosecution
had proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused for the crime of multiple rape. According to the
appellate court, AAA's testimony was straightforward, consistent on material points, and unshaken by crossexamination and the alleged minor inconsistency in her narration of events of the first rape did not tarnish her
credibility.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the affidavit of desistance presented by appellant could not exonerate him
especially since AAA refused to validate the due execution and veracity of said affidavit in open court.
Hence, this appeal. Appellant raises the following errors:10
1) The trial and appellate courts failed to appreciate the inconsistencies in the statement of AAA; and
2) The trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the affidavit of desistance of AAA.
We find no merit in the appeal.
Appellant makes issue of the fact that AAA could not remember whether her father had pulled down her panties.
This inconsistency refers merely to a minor and insignificant detail which does not even pertain to the gravamen of
the crime. The Court has repeatedly ruled that discrepancies referring only to minor details and not to the central fact
of the crime do not affect the veracity or detract from the credibility of a witness' declaration, as long as these are
coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.11 It would be too much to expect AAA, a 13-year old girl then, to
remember each and every detail of the fate she suffered under the hands of her father. The Court has recognized that
even the most candid of witnesses make erroneous, confused, or inconsistent statements, especially when they are
young and easily overwhelmed by the atmosphere in the courtroom. It is even expected when the victim is
recounting the painful details of a humiliating experience which are difficult to recall in open court and in the
presence of other people.12
In any case, this issue goes into the credibility of AAA as a witness. Well-settled is the rule that findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having
observed the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.
For this reason, the trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood, or misappreciated and which, if
properly considered, would alter the result of the case.13 In the case at bar, we find no such circumstance so as to
disturb the findings of the trial court.
As the Court of Appeals stated, AAA's testimony was straightforward, consistent on material points, and unshaken
by cross-examination. Appellant has failed to come out with any plausible reason why AAA would fabricate a story
of rape against him. Equally telling too is the fact that appellant's repulsive act of sexually abusing his own daughter
resulted to the birth of a baby boy. Appellant further argues that the affidavit of desistance is evidence that AAA by
her own declaration was not raped by appellant.
This Court looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance.14 In the case of People v. Junio,15 we stated:
The appellant's submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was
assisted by her mother supported the 'inherent incredibility of prosecution's evidence' is specious. We have
said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite

incredible that after going through the process of having the accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her
anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the case,
(she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative
value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because
the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a
solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court notes that it was AAA's mother who presented the affidavit of desistance while on the witness stand.
AAA, however, refused to validate the due execution of the affidavit. Moreover, during cross examination, EEE
admitted that she had personal knowledge of the act committed by her husband against her daughter and that the
affidavit of desistance was executed on the condition that appellant would leave his family, thus:
In sum, the prosecution had established that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, his minor daughter, on at least
two occasions, in violation of Article 266-A paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353. The first rape incident took place sometime in October of 2000 and the second on 11
December 2001.
The Court observes that the information charged more than one offense in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.17 Considering that appellant did not seasonably object to the multiple offenses
in the information, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved. 18 We note, however,
that both the trial court and the appellate court merely found the appellant guilty of "multiple rape" without
specifying the number of rapes that appellant is guilty of. While this may have been irrelevant considering that
appellant would have been sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death even if only one count of rape was
proven, the same is still important since this would have bearing on appellant's civil liability. Further, there is no
such crime as "multiple rape." In this case, appellant is guilty of two counts of rape qualified by the circumstances
that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the parent of the victim.
As the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and established, the death penalty
imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals is proper. In view, however, of the subsequent
enactment on 24 June 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, appellant must be sentenced for each count of rape to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award of civil indemnity from P75,000 to P150,000
considering that appellant is guilty of two counts of rape. We likewise increase the award of moral damages for each
count of rape from P50,000 to P75,00019 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. Further, in view of the
qualifying circumstance of minority, we award P25,000 as exemplary damages for each count of
rape.20WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya in
Criminal Case No. 1556 and Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00419 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Appellant Dominador Soriano, Sr. is found guilty of two counts of qualified rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of rape, and to pay
the victim, AAA, P150,000 as civil indemnity, P150,000 as moral damages, and P50,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 169642

September 14, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee

vs.
ENRIQUE CEBALLOS JR. y CABRALES, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Enrique Ceballos Jr. y Cabrales1 (appellant) was charged with six counts of rape, five on complaint of his minor
daughter AAA, and one on complaint of another minor daughter BBB. The Informations were filed on November
23, 1998 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. C-55119, C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan.
The accusatory portion of each of the informations follows:
Criminal Case No. C-55119
That [in] December, 1997 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one [AAA], 14 years old2 , against the
latters will and without her consent, the rape was committed with grave abuse of authority.3 (Underscoring
supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-55120
That [in] January, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one [AAA], 14 years old, against the
latters will and without her consent, the rape was committed with grave abuse of authority.4 (Underscoring
supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-55121
That [in] February, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one [AAA], 14 years old, against the
latters will and without her consent, the rape was committed with grave abuse of authority.5 (Underscoring
supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-55122
That [in] March, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one [AAA], 14 years old, against the
latters will and without her consent, the rape was committed with grave abuse of authority.6 (Underscoring
supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-55123

That on or about 5th day of November, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one [AAA], 14 years
old, against the latters will and without her consent, the rape was committed with grave abuse of
authority.7(Underscoring supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-57126
That on or about during the period from December 25, 1995 until July 16, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro-Manila
[sic] and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the father of [BBB], a
minor of 17 years old,8 with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully,
[u]nlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with one [BBB] against the latters will and without her
consent.9 (Underscoring in the original)
AAAs birth certificate shows that she was born on October 13, 198410 while BBBs shows that she was born on
October 16, 1981.11 At the times material to the first five cases, CCC, appellants wife with whom he has six
children, was working abroad in Qatar.12
Culled from the evidence for the prosecution are the following respective versions in the cases:
Criminal Case No. C-55119:
One nighttime in December 1997, AAA and four of her siblings were sleeping at the second floor of their house in
Caloocan City when their father-herein appellant touched AAAs breast and vagina, catching her by surprise.
Appellant thereafter removed her short pants and underwear and tried to insert his penis inside her vagina but failed,
drawing him to, while AAA was in a lying position, instead insert his finger inside her vagina and mash her breasts.
She boxed appellant but she was subdued by him. And she cried, but appellant covered her mouth, rendering it
difficult for her to breathe. Appellant thereafter dozed off to sleep.13
AAA did not report the incident as appellant had threatened that he would kill the members of the family if she did.
She had no opportunity to narrate the incident to her older sisters because every time she was conversing with them,
appellant would send her away. And while she had the opportunity to report to her classmates and teacher, she did
not do so, apprehensive that they might tease her.14
Criminal Case No. C-55120:
Also at nighttime sometime in January 1998, while AAA was sleeping with her five siblings at the upper floor of
their house, she was awakened as appellant forcibly undressed her and again succeeded in inserting his penis inside
her vagina. She tried to resist appellants moves by boxing his chest, but to no avail. And while she cried, appellant
again covered her mouth.15
Again, AAA did not narrate the incident to any of her siblings with whom she often quarrelled in the discharge of
household chores.16
Criminal Case No. C-55121:
On the night of February 14, 1998, while AAA was sleeping with her siblings, she was again awakened as appellant
touched her vagina. He removed her underwear, inserted a finger and then inserted his penis inside her vagina. She

resisted by boxing him but appellant held her hands and told her to give in; otherwise, he would harm her. She was
frightened, but she did not cry anymore because she did not want appellant to cover her mouth again to render her
unable to breathe. 17
She did not also report the incident because appellant had warned her against doing so.18
Criminal Case No. C-55122:
On March 26, 1998, three days before her graduation from grade school, AAA was awakened as appellant took off
her clothes and directed her to, as she did, lie down on her side. With appellant at her back, he inserted his penis
inside her vagina. She could not offer any resistance, however, on account of her position.19 While she initially cried,
the fear that appellant would again cover her mouth prompted her to stop. After appellant ejaculated, he went to
sleep.20
Every time appellant had sexual intercourse with AAA, he would be kind to her the following morning; otherwise,
she expected appellant to beat her buttocks with a fiber glass object,21 the same object which he was using to hit her
brothers head.22
Asked by the defense counsel during cross-examination, on observing her to be "aggressive" in answering the
questions he was propounding, whether that was "how [she] [had been] talking within the household," AAA replied
in the negative, but explaining that her "aggressive" manner was reflective of her anger at her father for the
"ginawang kahayupan" to her and her sister BBB "Ginahasa niya po kaming dalawa."23
Criminal Case No. C-55123:
On November 5, 1998, between two and three oclock in the morning, appellant removed AAAs short pants and had
sexual intercourse with her. She offered no resistance as she was afraid that he would beat her again. Besides, it
would just be an exercise in futility. Appellant thereafter went to sleep, while AAA put on her short pants and went
downstairs to clean the house.24
On November 19, 1998, AAA narrated to her classmates in high school what she had been through. On November
21, 1998, SPO4 Bayani Feria of the Northern Police District (NDP) who had in the meantime been informed of
AAAs plight, accompanied AAA to the NDP Headquarters where she executed a sworn statement25 charging
appellant, who was soon after arrested, with rape.
At the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) where AAA was subjected to medico-legal examination, AAA informed
the resident doctor on duty at the Emergency Room that she was raped several times by appellant.26
Dr. Bernadette Madrid of the PGH Child Protection Unit, who conducted on AAA general physical and genital
examination with the use of a colposcope, an apparatus that enlarges the view of ones genitalia by 15 times and
takes pictures of it,27 found a deep cleft between 3 oclock and 4 oclock positions in AAAs hymen28 and a healed
laceration at her fossa navicularis or "part of the genitalia beside or before the hymen."29 In the Provisional Medical
Certificate30 which she issued, Dr. Madrid gave her impression as follows:
IMPRESSION
Patient with a statement made at the Caloocan Police Station on Nov. 21, 1998. Physical findings are highly
suspicious of sexual abuse.31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Criminal Case No. C-57126:

On December 25, 1995, after BBB arrived home from the church together with her aunt, BBB learned that her
mother CCC had left the conjugal house and went to her parents house, after a quarrel with appellant, bringing
along her (BBBs) siblings.32 At about two oclock in the morning of even date, BBB was awakened to find appellant
on top of her. Appellant succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina, following which he went to sleep. 33
BBB did not inform her mother CCC about the incident before she left for Qatar in May 1996 as she was threatened
by appellant that he would kill them, and he would create a scandal in the neighborhood. 34
After the rape on December 25, 1995, BBBs travails continued as appellant raped her on the average of ten times
every month and every birthday of his on July 15 except his birthday in 1998, she having allowed her boyfriend to
sleep in their house. The following day, July 16, however, appellant raped her.35
When BBB eventually learned that appellant had also raped her younger sister AAA who even witnessed 36appellant
having sexual intercourse with her (BBB) to thus prompt her to instruct AAA not to tell anybody what she had
witnessed, she broke her silence.37
While BBB was brought to a doctor for medical examination, she was no longer examined as she was at that time
already cohabiting with her boyfriend.38
By the account of CCC, mother of AAA and BBB, she left for Qatar on May 17, 1996 and returned to the
Philippines in November 1998; and while her husband was in jail, he sent her and her children letters39 through his
mother DDD asking for forgiveness.40
For the defense, appellant testified as did his mother DDD and sister EEE.
Appellant declared that it was impossible for him to commit the acts complained of as the family of his sister EEE
was also living with them41 and there were many other people in the house.
With respect to the alleged rape of BBB on December 25, 1995, appellant declared that he could not have committed
it as he followed his wife and children who earlier left that day for Pangulo, Malabon. 42
Appellant also denied having asked his wife and children for forgiveness bearing on the acts complained of. If he
had asked for forgiveness, it had to do with his being strict with them and it was in fact on that account that AAA
filed the charges against him.43 As for BBB, he could not think of any reason why she filed a case against him.44
Appellants mother DDD found it impossible too for appellant to rape his daughters because of the presence of
people in the house.45 She surmised that CCC could have instigated her daughters to file the charges against him in
view of his objection to her (CCCs) going abroad.
DDD claimed that AAA and BBB in fact usually went out of the house to avoid being scolded by appellant, adding
that she herself usually got mad at the two since they could no longer help in the discharge of household chores. 46
Appellants sister EEE affirmed that her family used to live with appellant and family during which she usually saw
AAA and BBB being scolded by appellant. She claimed that before CCC left for Qatar, she witnessed a quarrel
between CCC and appellant because of the hardheadedness of their children. She tried to convince both AAA and

BBB to withdraw the charges against appellant but the two were adamant, apprehensive that the withdrawal would
infuriate their mother CCC and some of their relatives.47
By Decision48 of October 14, 2002, the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 128, found the testimonies of AAA and BBB
"straightforward, categorical and convincing" and accordingly convicted appellant of rape in all the charges except
that in Criminal Case No. C-55119 where it convicted appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. The decretal portion
of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds accused Enrique Ceballos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. C-55119, hereby sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correc[c]ional and for
Criminal Cases Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126, the Court finds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, for five (5) counts of consummated rape, hereby sentences Enrique Ceballos to five (5)
death by lethal injection. He is further adjudged to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of [P]50,000.00 as moral
damages and [P]50,000 as exemplary damages for count[s] of four (4) consummated rape. Further, Enrique Ceballos
is adjudged to indemnify [BBB] [P]50,000.00 as moral damage[s] and [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damage[s][.]
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the accused to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City, to serve his sentence.
Let the entire record of th[ese] case[s] be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review as mandated by
law.49 (Italics supplied)
The records of the cases were forwarded to this Court for automatic review where they were docketed as G.R. Nos.
155493-155498. Per this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,50 however, the cases were referred to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.51
By the assailed Decision52 of July 20, 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court. It modified the duration of the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. C-55119, for acts of lasciviousness, the
amount of moral damages awarded in each rape case which it increased to P75,000 from P50,000, and the amount of
exemplary damages in each rape case which it reduced to P25,000 from P50,000. Additionally, the appellate court
awarded the amount of P75,000 in each rape case as civil indemnity.
In modifying the penalty for acts of lasciviousness, the appellate court explained:
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance alleged and proven in this case, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period, i.e.,
from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said penalty
shall constitute the maximum term, while the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, i.e., arresto mayor or 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.
Appellant should, therefore, be sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional, as maximum.53 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Thus the appellate court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128, convicting
accused-appellant Enrique Ceballos of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. C-55119 and of five (5) counts of
rape in Criminal Cases Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that in Criminal Case No. C-55119 for acts of lasciviousness, appellant
is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition to the moral damages awarded by the trial court which is
increased to [P]75,000.00 and exemplary damages which is hereby reduced to [P]25,000.00, civil indemnity in the
amount of [P]75,000.00 is awarded to the victims, in each of the five (5) counts of rape.54 (Emphasis and italics in
the original)
The cases are now before this Court for final review and have been given one docket number.
By Resolution of November 8, 2005,55 this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit Supplemental Briefs
if they so desired. Both parties filed their respective Manifestations56 that they were no longer filing supplemental
briefs.
In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single most important issue. 57 If the testimony of the
victim passes the test of credibility, which means it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things, the accused may be convicted solely on that basis.58
In its Decision, the trial court observed:
. . . Though inherently shy, [AAA and BBB] displayed an air of confidence and sincerity in their narration. Their
testimony was straightforward, categorical and convincing. Showing no signs of remorse, they braved the
embarrassment and stigma of a public trial, came forward and courageously revealed the dastardly acts of their own
father. At some points during the taking of their testimony, when they were narrating the rape committed on their
person by their own father, both cried. This emotional condition displayed by the sisters is evidence of the veracity
of their claim. The Court sees no reason at all to doubt their narration of what happened during the instances they
were defiled by the accused, and no reason at all why these two young sisters would impute so grave a crime as
rape against their own father, if the same were not true.
Indeed, it would be the height of depravity for the two sisters who have no experience of sexual perversity to
concoct a scenario that would lead their father on the death row and in the process, drag themselves and the rest of
the their family to a lifetime of ridicule and shame.59 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The observations of the trial court, which are substantiated by the records of the cases, deserve the respect of
appellate courts. Apropos is the following observation of this Court in People v. Briones:60
. . . [A] daughter would not accuse her own father of a serious offense like rape, had she really not been
aggrieved. Her testimony against him is entitled to greater weight, since reverence and respect for elders is too
deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is even recognized by law. . . . That she would accuse her own father of
this heinous crime had she not been aggrieved would be absurd.61 (Underscoring supplied)
Appellants argument that the acts complained of could not have been committed due to the presence of other people
fails. As repeatedly held by this Court, lust is no respecter to time and place. The nearby presence of the relatives of
the victim,62 the cramped condition of the room, the presence of other people therein, or the high risk of being
caught, have been held as not sufficient and effective to deter the commission of rape. 63
As for appellants allegation that AAA and BBB falsely charged him as he was strict and had had quarrels with his
wife CCC, the same was correctly brushed aside by the appellate court as "puerile and . . . too flimsy to merit even
scant consideration." Indeed, People v. Bidoc64 teaches:

. . . [P]arental punishment or disciplinary chastisement is not enough for a daughter in a Filipino family to falsely
accuse her father of rape. She would not subject herself to an examination of her private parts, undergo the trauma
and humiliation of public trial, and embarrass herself with the need to narrate in detail how she was raped if she was
not in fact raped. It takes depravity for a young girl to concoct a tale of defloration, which would put her own father
on death row, drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame, and make them the object of gossip
among their classmates and friends.65 (Underscoring supplied)
1wphi1

One of appellants letters, Exhibit "L," dated July 13, 1999, sent to CCC and children, which reads in part:
. . . Nalulungkot ako sa mga pangyayari sa ating buhay. Sana matanggap niyo na ito sa sarili ninyo at mapatawad
na ninyo ako sa aking kasalanang nagawa. Siguro naman alam naman niyo na hindi naman ako likas na
masama. Kung nagawa ko man iyong mga bagay na iyon dala na rin ng naging kahinaan ko. Lahat naman tayo
ay nagkakamali at ang nangyari sa akin ay kinamuhian ko rin ang aking sarili sapagkat hindi ko alam matagal akong
nabilanggo sa bisig ng diyablo na siyang tunay na may kagagawan sa pagwasak sa buhay natin. Alam niyo lahat ng
kasalanan ng nagagawa ng tao ay simbuyo ng damdamin na inutos ng diyablo na di natin napaglalabanan sapagkat
wala sa puso natin si Cristo. Alam mo siguro na nangarap din ako sa buhay natin. Lahat ay ginawa ko para sa inyo
naging mabuti rin akong ama. Inaamin ko na akoy nalulong sa bawal na gamut at ito rin ang naging dahilan
kaya ako nakagawa ng di ko gusto. Patawarin niyo ako kung di ko kayang aminin sa korte ang kasalanan ko .
. .66 (Emphasis supplied)
in fact strongly reflects his admission of guilt to thus negate his professed innocence.
The offenses of rape subject of Criminal Case Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122 and C-55123 having been
committed in 1998, appellant should have been charged under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.67Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 835368 ("Anti-Rape Law of 1997") introduced Articles 266-A, 266-B, 266-C and 266-D on Rape, and
effective October 22, 1997, rape was reclassified as a crime against persons.
Since, as the Office of the Solicitor General observes, "the acts constituting the crime of rape and its qualifying
circumstances as averred in the information in each of said cases, which were all filed under the then Article 335 69of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are substantially the same as those required to be stated
under Articles 266-A, paragraph 1, and 266-B70 of the said Code," appellants right to be informed of the charges
against him was not violated.71
Appellants conviction in Criminal Case No. C-55119, for acts of lasciviousness,72 is in order. While under R.A. No.
8353, which was, as reflected above, already in effect when the criminal act was committed in December 1997, the
act of inserting a finger into anothers genital is penalized as rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the Information charged appellant with rape still under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of rape by means of sexual assault even if it was established that he inserted his
finger into the vagina of AAA. To do so would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the
charge against him. It bears noting, however, that the crime of acts of lasciviousness is necessarily included in the
crime of rape.73
The appellate court, however, erred in finding that no aggravating circumstance was alleged and proven in the case
for acts of lasciviousness. Relationship, which was alleged in the information and admitted by appellant, 74 is under
Article 1575 of the Revised Penal Code (alternative circumstances) aggravating in acts of lasciviousness. 76

Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional.
Appreciating relationship as an aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant
should suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to six (6) years
ofprision correccional as maximum.77 Further, the amount of P30,000 as moral damages may be awarded to the
victim.78
The award of exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness is also justified under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code,79there being an aggravating circumstance. This Court finds the amount of P2,000 reasonable for the purpose.80
Going back to the charges for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126 in
which appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt is affirmed, in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 9346, "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the death penalty can no longer be imposed.
Appellant must thus be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.81
WHEREFORE, the assailed July 20, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
In Criminal Case Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126, in lieu of the death penalty, appellant,
ENRIQUE CEBALLOS, JR. y CABRALES, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay the victim AAA in each of the first four cases and the victim BBB in the last
case P75,000 as moral damages, P25,000 as exemplary damages, and another P75,000 as civil indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. C-55119, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months of arresto mayor as
minimum, to Six (6) Years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the victim AAA P30,000 as moral
damages and P2,000 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172321

February 9, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RENATO DADULLA y CAPANAS, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A rapacious father who vented his lust on his own daughter without any qualms is allowed to suffer the lesser
penalty because of the failure of the criminal information to aver his relationship with the victim. Even so, the Court
condemns his most despicable crime.
The father is now before the Court to assail the decision promulgated on January 20, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01021, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) pronounced him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape in
Criminal Case No. 98-2304, imposing reclusion perpetua, and of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 982305, thereby modifying the sentences handed down by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272 (RTC), in Marikina
City.1

The Charges
On January 28, 1998, the accused was charged in the RTC with rape and attempted rape through separate
informations, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK
That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threats, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA,2 against her will and consent.3
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd design,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to have carnal knowledge of herein
complainant one AAA, thus commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution that could have produced the crime of rape by reason of cause or causes other than
his own spontaneous desistance.4
Evidence of the Prosecution
In the evening of January 15, 1998, AAA, then sleeping in the bedroom that she and her five younger siblings shared
with their father, was roused from sleep by someone undressing her.5 It was her father. AAA resisted, but the
accused, wielding a bladed weapon,6 threatened to kill her if she shouted.7 The accused then forcibly kissed her on
the lips, mashed her breasts, touched her private parts, and had carnal knowledge of her. After her ordeal, she put on
her garments and just cried.8 She recalled that her father had first sexually abused her on February 14, 1992.9
On January 22, 1998, AAA was again roused from sleep by her father touching her body. Noticing that her shorts
were already unzipped and unbuttoned, she zipped and buttoned them up and covered herself with a blanket. But her
father pulled the blanket away and tried to unzip her shorts. However, she was able to go under the wooden bed to
evade him. She resisted his attempts to pull her out from under the bed by firmly holding on to the bed. She told him
that she would not get out from under the bed because what he was doing to her was bad.10 Upon hearing her, he
stopped and withdrew, telling her to leave the house. He then went to sleep.11 In the meanwhile, BBB, AAAs
younger sister, was awakened by what she thought was an argument between her father and AAA. She heard him tell
AAA: Tumigil ka na nang kaiiyak, wala ka nang pakinabang. AAA just cried under the bed and did not say
anything. BBB soon fell asleep,12 but AAA could not sleep and remained under the bed until morning when the
accused left to ply his jeepney route.13
Upon waking up, BBB saw her father as he was about to leave the house. She heard him telling AAA to leave the
house.14 As soon as he had left, BBB approached the crying AAA and asked what had happened to her. AAA related
her ordeal and pleaded with BBB to help her.15 Together, they went to their uncle, CCC, to report the incident. CCC
queried AAA whether she wanted her father to be thrown in jail, and she replied in the affirmative. Thus, CCC
requested his wife to accompany AAA to the barangay to file a complaint. Later, AAA and CCCs wife went to
Camp Crame for the physical and genital examinations, which established that AAA had a deep healed hymenal
laceration at 5:00 oclock position.16
Evidence of the Defense

The accused denied molesting AAA. He narrated that on January 15, 1998, AAA and BBB left the house at around
6:30 p.m. to watch television elsewhere and returned only at around 11:00 p.m.; that on January 22, 1998, he
scolded AAA for her failure to cook on time; that at around 4:00 a.m. of January 23, 1998, he struck AAAs face
with his fist (dinunggol sa mukha) and told her to leave the house because he was slighted by AAAs laughing
instead of answering his query of whether she had understood why he had scolded her the previous night; and that
AAA was no longer a virgin due to her having been raped by Joel Cloma in 1992, and by another man in 1993.17
The RTC Decision
On March 24, 1999, the RTC found the accused guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK, and imposed the
death penalty, ordering him to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages; and of
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, and imposed the indeterminate penalty of four years, nine
months, and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, to five years, four months, and twenty days, as
maximum, ordering him to pay to AAA P20,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 982304 DESPITE THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT PROPERLY INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE
OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ATTEMPTED RAPE
DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-2305.
Nonetheless, the CA disposed in its decision promulgated on January 20, 2006:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
In Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y Capanas is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered
to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in addition to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y Capanas, is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay
AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that the correct penalty in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK was reclusion perpetua because the accused
was liable only for simple rape by virtue of the information not alleging any qualifying circumstances; and that in
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK the accused was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape, because

his act of opening the zipper and buttons of AAAs shorts, touching her, and pulling her from under the bed
constituted only acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling of the Court
We sustain the conviction but correct the award of civil liability.
I
Criminal Liabilities
The CA correctly determined the criminal liabilities in both cases.
To begin with, the finding and conclusion of the RTC that the totality of the evidence presented by the State painted
a convincing tale of AAAs harrowing experience at the hands of the accused are well founded and supported by the
records. Her unwavering testimonial account of the bestiality of her own father towards her reflected her singular
reliability. The CAs holding that a woman would think twice before concocting a story of rape unless she was
motivated by a desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her18 was apt and valid. Indeed, her revelation
of being sexually assaulted by her own father several times could only proceed from innate sincerity, and was
entitled to credence in the absence of strong showing by the accused of grounds to disbelieve her. Also, her
immediate willingness to report to and face the police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a
public trial was a badge of trustworthiness.
Secondly, the failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the information in Criminal Case No.
98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified rape against the accused. Section 8,19 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
has expressly required that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the information. Due
to such requirement being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even those charged
with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of the 2000 revision of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement).20
The term "aggravating circumstance" is strictly construed when the appreciation of the modifying circumstance can
lead to the imposition of the maximum penalty of death.21 Consequently, the qualifying circumstance of relationship,
even if established during trial, could not affect the criminal penalty of the accused by virtue of its non-allegation in
the information. The accused could not be convicted of the graver offense of qualified rape, although proven,
because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily included in the information.22Accordingly, the accused was
properly convicted by the CA for simple rape and justly punished with reclusion perpetua.
Thirdly, it is notable that the RTC outrightly concluded that the crime committed on January 22, 1998 constituted
attempted rape, after quoting the testimony of AAA and BBB. It offered no analysis or discussion of why the
accused was criminally liable for attempted rape. The omission contravened Section 14,23 Article VIII of the
Constitution, as reiterated in Section 1,24 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which enjoined that decisions should state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based.25
Nonetheless, the omission did not invalidate or render ineffectual the conviction, for the CA in due course reformed
the RTCs error. In its disquisition on why the accused should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness, instead of
attempted rape, the CA explained the true nature of the crime of the accused thus:

We likewise agree with accused-appellant that the court a quo erred in convicting him of attempted rape in Criminal
Case No. 98-2305-MK. In connection with the incident that transpired on January 22, 1998, Liza testified as
follows:
The act of accused-appellant in opening the zipper and buttons of the shorts of Liza, touching her and pulling
her when she hid under the bed showed that he employed force on Liza and was motivated by lewd
designs. The word "lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of
immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried in a wanton manner.Thus, the
crime committed by accused-appellant is merely acts of lasciviousness, which is included in rape. The elements
of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2)
that it is done: (a) by using force and intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another
person of either sex.26
According to People v. Collado,27 the difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness lies in the intent
of the perpetrator as deduced from his external acts. The intent referred to is the intent to lie with a
woman.28 Attempted rape is committed when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts of lasciviousness.29 Thus, the accuseds act of opening the zipper and
buttons of AAAs shorts, touching her, and trying to pull her from under the bed manifested lewd designs, not intent
to lie with her. The evidence to prove that a definite intent to lie with AAA motivated the accused was plainly
wanting, therefore, rendering him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK.
And, fourthly, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the RTC was erroneous for not being in accord with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. This impelled the CA to revise the indeterminate penalty, rationalizing:
Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional. We
impose the penalty in its medium period, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance alleged and proved.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty imposable is from six months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum.30
We uphold the revision by the CA. The RTC fixed the minimum of the indeterminate penalty from within prision
correccional, when Section 131 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law expressly required that the minimum "shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." The penalty next lower is
arresto mayor.
II
Civil liability must be modified
Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,32 the attendance of any aggravating circumstance (generic, qualifying, or
attendant) entitles the offended party to recover exemplary damages. Here, relationship was the aggravating
circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to award P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in rape and
of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness.
Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit
established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the established presence of
one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature

entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of
specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. The Court has
well explained this in People v. Catubig:33
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public
as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike
the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages
to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only
be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect
of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
lavvphil

That People v. Catubig was subsequent to the dates of the commission of the crimes charged did not matter. Like
any other judicial interpretation of an existing law, the ruling in People v. Catubig settled the circumstances when
Article 2230 of the Civil Code applied, thereby reflecting the meaning and state of that legal provision. The
retroactivity of the ruling vis--vis the accused could not be challenged or be barred by virtue of its being civil, not
penal, in effect.
WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on January 20, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01021 is affirmed in all
respects, subject to the modification that the civil liabilities include P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for the rape
(Criminal Case No. 98-2034-MK), and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for the acts of lasciviousness (Criminal
Case No. 98-2035-MK).
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167954

January 31, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
PERLITO MONDIGO y ABEMALEZ, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 16 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals convicting appellant Perlito
Mondigo y Abemalez (appellant) of Murder and Frustrated Murder.
The Facts
The prosecution evidence showed that in the morning of 27 September 1998, appellant, Damaso Delima (Damaso),
Damasos son Delfin Delima (Delfin) and three other unidentified individuals were having a drinking spree in Ligas,
Malolos, Bulacan. At around noon, Damasos other son, Anthony Delima (Anthony), joined the group. At around
6:00 p.m., appellant, using a "jungle bolo," suddenly hacked Anthony on the head, causing him to fall to the ground
unconscious. Appellant next attacked Damaso. A witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita Lumagi (Lumagi), hearing
shouts coming from the scene of the crime, rushed to the area and there saw appellant repeatedly hacking Damaso
who was lying on his back, arms raised to ward off appellants blows. Damaso later died from the injuries he
sustained. Anthony sustained a 15.25-centimeter long lacerated wound on his left temporal area.
Appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 (trial court) with Murder
(Criminal Case No. 2001-M-99) and Frustrated Murder (Criminal Case No. 1993-M-99) qualified by treachery,
evident premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength.
Appellant invoked self-defense. According to him, a quarrel broke out between him and Anthony during their
drinking spree. Damaso and Delfin arrived and ganged-up on him. He ran home, followed by Anthony, Damaso, and
Delfin. Upon reaching his house, he got hold of a "flat bar" and whacked Anthonys head with it. Damaso attacked
him with a bolo but Damaso lost hold of the weapon which fell to the ground. Appellant retrieved the bolo and used
it to hack Damaso.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 15 February 2002, the trial court found appellant guilty of Murder for the killing of Damaso
and Serious Physical Injuries for the hacking of Anthony, mitigated by intoxication. 2 The trial court gave credence to
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Anthony and Lumagi, and correspondingly found unconvincing appellants
claim of self-defense. The trial court also held that treachery qualified Damasos killing which was done swiftly,

giving him no opportunity to make a defensive stance and protect himself from the attack, thereby insuring the
commission of appellants aggressive act.
Petitioner appealed to this Court, contending that (1) the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the manner of
the attack on Anthony, the presence of other individuals at the site of the incident, and the identity of the individual
who shouted during the attack are contradictory; (2) Lumagis failure to execute a sworn statement before taking the
witness stand renders her testimony unreliable; (3) the nature of the wound Anthony sustained, as indicated in the
medical certificate, belies his claim that he was hacked by a bladed weapon; and (4) treachery did not attend the
killing of Damaso as mere suddenness of an attack does not suffice to show alevosia, not to mention that neither
Anthony nor Lumagi saw how appellant initiated the attack against Damaso.
In its appellees brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended the modification of the trial courts
judgment by holding appellant liable only for Homicide for the killing of Damaso.
We transferred the case to the Court of Appeals following the ruling in People v. Mateo.3
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 16 March 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling with the modification that
appellant was liable for Frustrated Murder for the hacking of Anthony.4 The Court of Appeals held that (1) the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are credible despite the inconsistencies appellant noted as these had nothing
to do with the central question of whether appellant attacked Anthony and Damaso with a bolo; (2) the lack of
motive for appellant to attack the victims does not negate the commission of the crimes in question as motive
becomes material only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt; and (3) Damasos killing was attended by
treachery as appellant launched his attack without any warning, leaving the victims no chance to defend themselves.
Hence, this appeal. In separate manifestations, the parties informed the Court that they were no longer filing
supplemental briefs and accordingly agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the points raised in their briefs
filed with the Court of Appeals.
The Issue
The issue is whether appellant is guilty of Murder and Frustrated Murder, as charged.
The Ruling of the Court
We find appellant guilty of Homicide and Frustrated Murder.
Appellant Failed to Prove Self-defense
By invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was charged albeit under
circumstances which, if proven, would justify his commission of the crimes. 5 Thus, the burden of proof is shifted to
appellant who must show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the killing of Damaso and wounding of Anthony were
attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.6

As the Court of Appeals observed, appellants version of how Damaso and Anthony ganged-up on him, wholly
uncorroborated, fails to convince. Appellant does not explain why a flat bar, which he claims to have used to whack
Anthony on the head, conveniently lay outside his house. Further, the nature of the wound Anthony sustained, a
15.25-centimeter long laceration, could only have been caused by a bladed weapon and not by a blunt-edged
instrument such as a flat bar. As for Damasos alleged unlawful aggression, assuming this claim is true, such
aggression ceased when Damaso lost hold of the bolo. Thus, there was no longer any reason for appellant to pick-up
the bolo and attack Damaso with it.
In contrast, the prosecution witnesses testimonies that appellant, without any provocation, attacked two of his
drinking companions with a bolo ring true and are consistent in their material points. After reviewing their
testimonies, we find no reason to disturb the lower courts findings giving full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
Appellant is Guilty of Frustrated Murder and Homicide
Treachery Attended the Attack Against Anthony
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the location and nature of the wound inflicted against Anthony and the
manner by which appellant carried out his attack show intent to kill and treachery. Contrary to appellants claim,
treachery attended the attack as the evidence showed that while the group was in the midst of their drinking spree,
appellant slipped out, went to his house to get the bolo, and while Anthony was sitting among the group, appellant
took out his bolo and hacked Anthony on the left side of the head, causing a 15.25-centimeter long laceration.
Treachery is present when the offender commits the crime employing means, methods or forms in its execution
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.7 Anthony, totally unprepared for what was to befall him, was completely defenseless.
Appellant is Guilty of Homicide for the Killing of Damaso
We find merit in the OSGs recommendation that appellant is only liable for Homicide for the killing of Damaso.
None of the prosecution witnesses saw how the attack on Damaso commenced. Anthony testified that after he
regained consciousness, he saw his father, with multiple stab wounds, crawling towards their house. 8 For her part,
Lumagi testified that after hearing shouts coming from the scene of the crime, she ran towards that direction and saw
appellant hacking Damaso who was lying on his back, arms raised to ward off appellants blows.9 This evidence fails
to meet the requirement that for treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must show how the criminal act
commenced, developed and ended.10 That treachery may have attended the attack against Anthony does not follow
that the same also attended the assault against Damaso as treachery must be shown in the performance of the acts of
execution against each of the victims.
Intoxication as Mitigating Circumstance not Proven
The trial court erred in crediting appellant with the circumstance of intoxication as having mitigated his crimes
because "the stabbing incident ensued in the course of a drinking spree."11 For the alternative circumstance of
intoxication12 to be treated as a mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual,
not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the accuseds drunkenness affected his mental faculties. 13 Here, the
only proof on record on this matter is appellants testimony that before Damaso, Anthony, and Delfin attacked him,
he drank "about 3 to 4 bottles of beer."14 The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor appellant
imbibed, and the absence of any independent proof that appellants alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all
negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough at the time he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.

The Penalty Applicable for Homicide

Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the penalty imposable on appellant is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In the absence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, we find it proper to impose upon appellant a prison term of 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is
also liable to pay the heirs of Damaso civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 which are awarded
automatically.15
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 16 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals, with
the MODIFICATIONthat appellant Perlito Mondigo y Abemalez is found GUILTY of Homicide for the killing of
Damaso Delima. Appellant Perlito Mondigo y Abemalez is sentenced as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 1993-M-99, eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
2. In Crim. Case No. 2001-M-99, eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Perlito Mondigo y
Abemalez is further ordered to pay the heirs of Damaso Delima civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral
damages of P50,000.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167502

October 31, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLO CUDAL, accused-appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Under final review is the Court of Appeals Decision1 of February 11, 2005 affirming that of Branch 39 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan2 convicting Pablo Cudal (appellant) of parricide and meting out to
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
About 2:00 oclock in the morning of January 1, 1998,3 as appellant arrived home in Barangay Bonlalacao,
Mangatarem, Pangasinan from a drinking spree with his cousins and nephews, he roused his 79-year old father
Crispin Cudal (the victim) from his sleep. Appellant then asked money from the victim so he could go back to the
drinking session and pay for the liquor that he consumed. The victim replied that he had no money, and told
appellant that he was already drunk.4 This drew the two to a fight.5
Some 50 meters away from the place of the incident, Camilo Cudal (Camilo), appellants first cousin who was then
in the house of his mother-in-law, heard the commotion.6 Camilo immediately rushed to the place and there saw the
victim sitting on his bed and wiping blood oozing from his forehead. When asked about what happened, the victim
quickly replied that he quarreled with appellant and that he was hit by him with a stone.7

When Camilo confronted appellant, the latter reasoned out that he was asking money from his father but the latter
refused.8
Camilo brought the wounded victim to the house of his (victims) brother Segundino Cudal9 where first aid was
applied on his wounds. Camilo then fetched from Urbiztondo, Pangasinan the victims daughter Leoncia10 who
brought the victim to a nearby hospital where he expired the following day, January 2, 1998, at about 4 oclock
p.m.11 The postmortem report prepared by Dr. Cleofe Orence, Rural Health Physician of Mangatarem, Pangasinan
who examined the body of the victim revealed the following findings:
Denying having struck the victim, appellant claimed that it was he who was assaulted with a bolo,16 and that while
going after him, the victim accidentally fell down and hit the bedpost in the process, wounding himself on the
forehead.17 Asked how the victim sustained injury on his abdomen, appellant explained that the victim subsequently
fell on the floor, hitting his abdomen with the handle of the bolo he was holding.18
After trial, Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, by Decision of October 28, 1998,
convicted appellant of parricide, but considered his intoxication at the time of the commission of the offense as a
mitigating circumstance under paragraph 3, Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Pablo Cudal Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide for the killing of his father Crispin Cudal, on the early
morning of New Year, January 1, 1998 with the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, and
accordingly the Court sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs
of the accused the sum of P30,000.00 representing funeral expenses, plus indemnity of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is credited with his detention to its full extent.
SO ORDERED.19
Appellant appealed his conviction before this Court, assailing the trial court for "accept[ing] the prosecutions
account as gospel truth despite the fact that its witnesses were not actually direct witnesses to the crime
charged."20 The appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 140637.
By Resolution21 of August 30, 2004, this Court ordered the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition conformably with People v. Mateo.22
The appellate court affirmed, with modification, appellants conviction. The decretal text of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
dated October 28, 1998, in Criminal Case No. L-5778, convicting the appellant, Pablo Cudal, of the crime
of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. The last
sentence of the first paragraph of its dispositive portion is however hereby modified to read, as follows:
"Accused-appellant Pablo Cudal is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Crispin Cudal, the sum
of P30,000.00 representing funeral expenses, plus indemnity of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs."
No pronouncement as to costs.23 (Emphasis in the original)
Hence, the elevation of the case to this Court for final review.
In a Manifestation dated September 7, 2005,24 appellant informed that he was opting not to file a Supplemental Brief.

The appeal fails.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Another prosecution witness, Segundino Cudal, declared that when his brother the victim was brought to his house
by Camilo, the victim who was "strong," albeit his face was bloodied, told him that he was struck with a stone by
appellant.
That the complained act of appellant was the proximate cause of the death of the victim is evident from the abovequoted postmortem report on the body of the deceased showing the probable cause of his death as "INTERNAL
HEMORRHAGE secondary to Craniocerebral Injury secondary to Trauma" and "T/C Ruptured Viscus, abdomen."
It is axiomatic in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, an appellate court will
normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless the latter has reached conclusions that are clearly
unsupported by evidence, or unless some facts or circumstances of weight or influence were overlooked which, if
considered, would affect the result of the case. The rationale for this is that trial courts have superior advantages in
ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe at close range the manner
and demeanor of witnesses while testifying.28 In the absence of any showing that the trial court, whose findings were
affirmed by the appellate court, acted arbitrarily in the appreciation of evidence, this Court respects the same.
That Camilo and Segundino were not eyewitnesses to the incident does not render their testimonies inadmissible, for
they may be considered part of the res gestae,29 an exception to the hearsay rule. For the same to be considered part
of the res gestae, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and the statement was made during the
occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.30
The spontaneity of the utterance and its logical connection with the principal event, coupled with the fact that the
utterance was made while the declarant was still "strong" and subject to the stimulus of the nervous excitement of
the principal event, are deemed to preclude contrivance, deliberation, design or fabrication, and to give to the
utterance an inherent guaranty of trustworthiness.31 The admissibility of such exclamation is based on experience
that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be
produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which
then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the
external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather
than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully
brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed
by him.32
The victims information to Camilo and Segundino as to the material facts was made immediately after the startling
incident occurred. It is as categorical as it is spontaneous and instinctive. It cannot be concluded that in a very short
span of time, taking into consideration the ripe age of the victim, his relationship to appellant, and the cruelty and
suffering which immediately preceded the confession, the victim had the opportunity to concoct the facts
surrounding the incident and its authorship. Besides, there appears to be no reason or motive on the part of the
victim to point his son as the culprit if such were not indeed the truth.

Appellants intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime, being an alternative circumstance under Article
15 of the Revised Penal Code, may be appreciated as aggravating if the same is habitual or intentional, otherwise it
shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance. The trial court observed:
We now come to another matter, which is the fact that during the incident, the accused was drunk. This was
testified to by Camilo Cudal and admitted by the wife of the accused. The accused himself admitted that he
had been drinking with his cousins and nephews, but he claims that he did not drink much. Drunkenness is
an alternative circumstance. It is aggravating if the accused is a habitual drunkard. It is mitigating if it is
otherwise.
The date of the incident is two (2) hours after midnight which ushered in the new year. Before that, the
accused and his relatives were celebrating and they drank San Miguel gin. No evidence was presented to
establish that he is a habitual drunkard. It is a legal maxim that when there is doubt, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused. This court[,] therefore, believes that this should be taken as a mitigating
circumstance, which is favorable to the accused.33 (Underscoring supplied)
Absent any showing then that appellants intoxication was habitual or intentional, it may only be considered as
mitigating to correctly call for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63,
paragraph 2(3) of the Revised Penal Code.34
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of February 11, 2005 which affirmed the October 28, 1998 Decision
of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, convicting appellant Pablo Cudal of parricide
and meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 148247 August 7, 2006
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ENRICO E. ZAMORA, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Only those pleadings, parts of case records and documents which are material and pertinent, in that they may
provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case of abuse of discretion, are required to be attached to a
petition for certiorari. A petition lacking such documents contravenes paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 65 and may be
dismissed outright under Section 3, Rule 46. However, if it is shown that the omission has been rectified by the
subsequent submission of the documents required, the petition must be given due course or reinstated, if it had been
previously dismissed. 1
Other pleadings and portions of case records need not accompany the petition, unless the court will require them in
order to aid it in its review of the case. Omission of these documents from the petition will not warrant its
dismissal. 2
For being allegedly contrary to the foregoing rule, the Resolutions dated January 11, 2001 and May 23, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 62388 entitled, "Air Philippines Corporation, Petitioner, versus, National Labor
Relations Commission (5th Division) and Enrico Zamora, Respondents" are sought to be annuled in the Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 that is now before us. 3
The facts are not in dispute.

Enrico Zamora (Zamora) was employed with Air Philippines Corporation (APC) as a B-737 Flight Deck Crew. 4 He
applied for promotion to the position of airplane captain and underwent the requisite training program. After
completing training, he inquired about his promotion but APC did not act on it; instead, it continued to give him
assignments as flight deck crew. Thus, Zamora filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter. He argued that the act of
APC of withholding his promotion rendered his continued employment with it oppressive and unjust. He therefore
asked that APC be held liable for constructive dismissal. 5
APC denied that it dismissed complainant. It pointed out that, when the complaint was filed on May 14, 1997,
complainant was still employed with it. It was only on May 22, 1997 that complainant stopped reporting for work,
not because he was forced to resign, but because he had joined a rival airline, Grand Air. 6
In a Decision dated September 16, 1998, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Zamora and declared APC liable for
constructive dismissal. It held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondent liable for illegal dismissal and ordering the
respondent to:
1. Reinstate complainant to his position as B-737 Captain without loss of seniority right immediately upon receipt
thereof (sic);
2. Pay complainant his full backwages from May 15, 1997 up to the promulgation of this decision on (sic) the
amount of P1,732,500 (sic);
3. Pay complainant the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) in the concept of moral damages and
ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
4. Pay attorneys fees equivalent to TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total award. (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED. 7
Zamora immediately filed a Motion for Execution of the order of reinstatement. On November 6, 1998, the Labor
Arbiter granted the motion and issued a writ of execution directing APC to reinstate complainant to his former
position. 8
Meanwhile, APC filed with the NLRC an appeal assailing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that it was liable for
constructive dismissal. 9
The NLRC granted the appeal in a Resolution dated February 10, 1999. It held that no dismissal, constructive or
otherwise, took place for it was Zamora himself who voluntarilly terminated his employment by not reporting for
work and by joining a competitor Grand Air. 10
However, upon Motion for Reconsideration 11 filed by Zamora, the NLRC, in a Resolution dated December 17,
1999, modified its earlier Resolution, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by complainant is DENIED for lack of merit and the
appealed decision AFFIRMED, while the instant petition for injunction filed by respondent is GRANTED.

However, respondent Air Philippines Corporation is ordered to pay complainant his unpaid salaries and allowances
in the total amount of P198,502.30 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
Displeased with the modification, APC sought a partial reconsideration of the foregoing resolution 13 but the NLRC
denied the same. In its Resolution of October 11, 2000, the NLRC justifed the award of unpaid salaries in this
manner:
The grant of salaries and allowances to complainant arose from the order of his reinstatement which is executory
even pending appeal of respondent questioning the same, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code. In the eyes of
the law, complainant was as if actually working from the date respondent received the copy of the appealed decision
of the Labor Arbiter directing the reinstatement of complainant based on his finding that the latter was illegally
dismissed from employment. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
This prompted APC (hereafter referred to as petitioner) to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals to
have the December 17, 1999 Resolution of the NLRC partially annulled and its October 11, 2000 Resolution set
aside on the ground that these were issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner attached to its petition, certified
true copies of the Resolutions of the NLRC dated February 10, 1999, December 17, 1999 and October 11, 2000 and
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 16, 1998, and photocopies of the February 24, 1999 notice of
garnishment, March 11, 1999 Order of the Labor Arbiter authorizing Sheriff Fulgencio Lavarez to implement the
writ of execution, and March 23, 1999 Resolution of the NLRC enjoining implementation of the writ of execution. 15
In a Resolution dated January 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to "x x x
attach copies of all pleadings (such complaint, answer, position paper) and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations therein x x x." 16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the said Resolution and attached to it the pleadings and portions
of the case record required by the Court of Appeals. 17 Zamora (hereafter referred to as respondent) filed an
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration. 18
In a Resolution dated May 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Up for consideration is petitioners motion for reconsideration (pages 64-71 of the Rollo) of this Courts resolution
of dismissal (page 54, id.), which was promulgated on January 11, 2001. Considering private respondents
undisputed comment on said motion (pages 159-161. id.), the same is hereby DENIED. The resolution of dismissal
stands. 19 (Emphasis supplied)
And so, herein Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner would have us annul and set aside the
January 11, 2001 and May 23, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner APC on the ground that petitioner APC supposedly failed to
attach copies of all pleadings (such as complaint, answer, position papers) and other materials portions of the record
as would support the allegations therein.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it
denied petitioner APCs motion for reconsideration in spite of the fact that petitioner APC submitted copies of all
pleadings and documents mentioned in its petition for certiorari.

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it
denied petitioner APCs motion for reconsideration on a new ground namely, the alleged failure of petitioner APC to
dispute respondent Zamoras comment and/or opposition to motion for reconsideration ("Opposition"), in spite of
the fact that (i) the Honorable Court of Appeals did not order petitioner APC to reply to the said opposition; and (ii)
the said Opposition is patently unmeritorious. 20
Respondent filed his Comment to the petition. 21
We grant the petition.
We agree with petitioner on the first and second issues.
In its Resolution of January 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals cited as ground for the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari its lack of certified true copies of the pleadings and material portions of the case record. This is an
erroneous ruling, petitioner insists, for the deficiency was excusable: pleadings and other portions of the case
records were not attached to the petition because these documents had no bearing on the sole issue raised therein,
which was, whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding unpaid salaries to respondent
despite having adjudged the latter at fault for abandonment of employment. 22
Respondent disagrees. He argues that the requirements under Section 1, Rule 65 are mandatory and jurisdictional;
petitioners failure to comply with them was a valid ground for the dismissal of its petition. 23
Both views are actually correct.
Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking it must strictly observe the requirements for its
issuance. 24 Some of these requirements are found in paragraph 2, Section 1 of Rule 65, which reads:
SECTION. 1. Petition for certiorari.
xxxx
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto x x x.
These requirements are emphasized in Section 3, Rule 46, thus:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements.
xxxx
[The petition] shall be x x x accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein,
and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto x x x.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

Note that the foregoing rules speak of two sets of documents to be attached to the petition. The first set consists of
certified true copies of the judgment, order or resolution subject of the petition. Duplicate originals or certified true
copies thereof must be appended to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the court, body or tribunal,
which rendered the same committed grave abuse of discretion. 25 The second set consists of the pleadings, portions
of the case record and other documents which are material and pertinent to the petition. 26Mere photocopies thereof
may be attached to the petition. 27 It is this second set of documents which is relevant to this case.
As a general rule, a petition lacking copies of essential pleadings and portions of the case record may be
dismissed. 28 This rule, however, is not petrified. As the exact nature of the pleadings and parts of the case record
which must accompany a petition is not specified, much discretion is left to the appellate court to determine the
necessity for copies of pleading and other documents. 29 There are, however, guideposts it must follow.
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are
relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the
material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition. 30
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the
contents thereof can also found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations
in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the
judgment is attached. 31
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated
(if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, 32 or that it will serve the
higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. 33
It is readily apparent in this case that the Court of Appeals was overzealous in its enforcement of the rules.
To begin with, the pleadings and other documents it required of petitioner were not at all relevant to the petition. It is
noted that the only issue raised by petitioner was whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
respondent unpaid salaries while declaring him guilty of abandonment of employment. Certainly, copies of the
Resolutions of the NLRC dated February 10, 1999, December 17, 1999 and October 11, 2000 would have sufficed
as basis for the Court of Appeals to resolve this issue. After all, it is in these Resolutions that the NLRC purportedly
made contrary findings.
There was no need at all for copies of the position papers and other pleadings of the parties; these would have only
cluttered the docket. Besides, a summary of the material allegations in the position papers can be found in both the
September 16, 1998 Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the February 10, 1999 Resolution of the NLCR. Quick
reference to copies of the decision and resolution would have already satisfied any question the court may have had
regarding the pleadings of the parties.
The attachments of petitioner to its petition for certiorari were already sufficient even without the pleadings and
portions of the case record. It was therefore unreasonable of the Court of Appeals to have dismissed it. More so that
petitioner later corrected the purported deficiency by submitting copies of the pleadings and other documents.
This brings us to the third issue. Again, we agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in denying its
motion for reconsideration.

In its May 23, 2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals cited as basis for denying the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner from the January 11, 2000 Resolution the latters purported failure to contravene the Opposition filed by
respondent. 34 This is certainly a curious ground to deny a motion for reconsideration. As pointed out by petitioner, a
reply to an opposition to a motion for reconsideration is not filed as a matter of course. An order from the court may
issue though to direct the movant to file a reply. In this case, no such order came from the Court of Appeals
instructing petitioner to counter the Opposition filed by respondent. Hence, it cannot be assumed that in failing to
file a reply, petitioner, in effect, conceded to the Opposition of respondent.
It is not as if the Opposition which respondent filed required any answer. The matters discussed therein were not
even germane to the issue raised in the motion for reconsideration. It was as though respondent passed in silence
petitioners arguments against the January 11, 2000 Resolution. If we are to be technical about it, it was instead the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner which was not contravened by respondent. It was error on the part of the
Court of Appeals to have denied it.
In sum, we annul and set aside the January 11, 2000 and May 23, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. There is
no more obstacle then to the petition for certiorari taking its course. However, rather than remand it to the Court of
Appeals for resolution, we resolve it here and now to expedite matters. 35
We hold that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable to respondent
for P198,502.30.
The premise of the award of unpaid salary to respondent is that prior to the reversal by the NLRC of the decision of
the Labor Arbiter, the order of reinstatement embodied therein was already the subject of an alias writ of execution
even pending appeal. Although petitioner did not comply with this writ of execution, its intransigence made it liable
nonetheless to the salaries of respondent pending appeal. There is logic in this reasoning of the NLRC.
In Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., we resolved the same issue as follows:
We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a
suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. [36][25] Hence, even
if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal
by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received
for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.37
There is a policy elevated in this ruling. In Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, we held:
In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming
reason for its execution pending appeal.
xxxx
x x x Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate
implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is
designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat
or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family. 38
We cannot do less. The petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No. 62388 must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.The January 11, 2000 and May 23, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, and the Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 62388
is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated December 17, 1999 and October 11, 2000 of the National Labor Relations
Commission are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 140405

March 4, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
MAJOR EMILIO COMILING, GIL SALAGUBANG (acquitted), MARIO CLOTARIO (acquitted),
GERALDO GALINGAN, EDDIE CALDERON (at large), BALOT CABOTAJE (at large) and RICKY
MENDOZA (at large),accused.
MAJOR EMILIO COMILING and GERALDO GALINGAN, appellants.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision1 dated September 1, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug,
Pangasinan, convicting Maj. Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan alias "Bong" and Ricky Mendoza alias "Leo" of
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing them to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
The three accused were charged under an information which alleged:
The undersigned hereby accuses MAJOR EMILIO COMILING, GIL SALAGUBANG, BONG
CLOTARIO, GERALDO GALINGAN, EDDIE CALDERON, BALOT CABOTAJE and RICKY
MENDOZA @ Leo of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE and PHYSICAL INJURIES,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 1995, in the evening, inside the Masterline Grocery
located at Bonifacio Street corner Quezon Blvd., municipality of Tayug, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
including certain JOE, REY and PAUL, whose family names have not yet been known, armed
with firearms and handgrenade, aboard an owner-type stainless jeep and motorized tricycle, with
intent to gain and with the use of violence against or intimidations upon persons, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter the Masterline Grocery pretending to be customers and once inside, poked their guns and
intimidated the owner of said grocery, MR. INCIONG CO, and his worker to open the drawers of
the tables of said grocery and when opened, took and carried away EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P81,000.00) and three (3) pieces of Chinese gold necklace worth TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P26,000.00), and afterwhich the above-named accused on their way out to
escape with their loot, shot and hit a responding Tayug Policeman, PO3 ERWIL V. PASTOR,
mortally wounding him on his face that subsequently led to his untimely death, and when said
accused were cornered by other responding policemen, ran and passed to an adjacent store (Good
Taste Bakery) and used it as their exit and while there also shot, hit and mortally wounded MRS.
CONCHING CO, the owner of said bakery causing her injuries, the accused having thus
performed the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, and that is due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said MRS.
CONCHING CO, to her damage and prejudice and also to the heirs of PO3 ERWIL V. PASTOR.
CONTRARY to Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.2

Accused Eddie Calderon and Balot Cabotaje have remained at large to this day. The remaining accused (Comiling,
Galingan, Mendoza, Salagubang and Clotario) pleaded not guilty during their arraignment. Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter.
On March 28, 1997, Mendoza escaped from detention and was thus tried in absentia.
The records show that at sundown on September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the owner of Masterline Grocery and his
helper Mario were about to close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes. Masterline
was located at the corner of Quezon Blvd. and Bonifacio St. in Tayug, Pangasinan.
As soon as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men suddenly barged into the store and announced a holdup. One of the robbers shoved Ysiong into the recesses of the grocery where he threatened to kill him if he did not
give them his earnings. Ysiong retorted that he only had a small amount, which remark apparently irked the robber
who then hit Ysiong's thumb with the butt of his gun. A simultaneous kick made the grocer fall down in pain.
As Ysiong lay prostrate on the floor, he saw the two other intruders, and a little later the robber who hit him,
ransacking the drawers of his desk. Fortunately, he was able to quickly recover from the blows; whereupon he darted
to the adjacent Good Taste Bakery and out to the Tayug Police Station farther west along Quezon Blvd. to report the
incident.
SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the Tayug Police Station rushed to the crime
scene where SPO1 Torio chanced upon Sonny Rimas, a barangay councilman, and his friend Jessie Batalla at the
grocery entrance. He asked them if they knew what was going on inside the store but the two did not answer. While
SPO1 Torio was standing outside the store's door, he heard three gunshots coming from inside the store, all directed
towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor was then on the street while Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ran
and hid behind a concrete marker, then moved westward as if to return to the police headquarters. Unfortunately, in
his attempt to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face. He was rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On
September 6, 1995, PO3 Pastor died from the injury he suffered.
Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered that he lost three gold necklaces worth P26,000 and cash amounting to P81,000.
On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan decided to reveal to
police authorities what she knew about the case. During the trial, she testified that she was present in all the four
meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline Grocery was hatched.
The first meeting was on June 30, 1995 at the Zariza Inn in Tayug, Pangasinan. Among those present were
Comiling, Galingan, Salagubang, Calderon, Clotario and Mendoza, along with two other persons known only as
Paul and Rey. Another meeting was held by the group in July 1995 in the house of a certain Lani Galingan also in
Tayug, Pangasinan. There were two other meetings in August 1995. Finally, on September 2, 1995, the group met at
Lani's house where they received their final instructions and the firearms they were to use from Comiling and
Galingan. The entire group headed for Masterline Grocery at around 4:00 p.m. except for Naty who stayed behind in
Lani's house.
At around 8:00 p.m., she met the group in the house of a person named Joe. Galingan blamed a companion for
shooting the policeman. The group planned to escape to Manila. She and Lani were given $50 by Galingan for their
fare to Manila. Upon arrival there on September 3, 1995, they, together with Galingan, proceeded to Comiling's
house in Paraaque. They discussed where she and Lani should stay as Comiling did not want them around.
Comiling decided that the two of them should stay in Makati. It was while she was hiding in Makati that she was
able to reflect on the events that transpired, gathering enough courage to confess the robbery to the police
authorities.3
On the other hand, all the accused denied culpability for the felony. Each of them claimed to be somewhere else at
the time the crime happened on September 2, 1995. The witnesses for the defense also tried to impugn the credibility
of the lead witness for the prosecution, Naty Panimbaan.

On September 1, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having failed to establish their alleged guilt beyond moral certainty, a
judgment of ACQUITTAL is hereby rendered in favor of the accused Gil Salagubang and Mario Clotario
alias "Bong," and their respective bail bonds are hereby ordered released.
However, on the basis of the evidence the prosecution has adduced, which in the Court's perception
satisfies the requisite proof beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, the Court hereby renders a judgment, as to the accused MAJ. EMILIO COMILING of Block 18, Lot
3, Camella Classic Phase II, Bicutan, Paraaque, Metro Manila, GERALDO GALINGAN alias "Bong" of
Iris, Brgy. "B," Tayug, Pangasinan and RICKY MENDOZA, said to be a resident of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, as per records of the BJMP district jail, Balugnao, Pangasinan, finding them GUILTY of the special
complex crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under paragraph 1, Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended, and pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 63, same Code, hereby sentences
them to each suffer the penalty of DEATH, and in solidum to restitute, when possible, to private
complainant Ysiong Chua his lost valuables, otherwise to make reparation therefor and pay to him their
value of P26,000.00, plus the cash amount aggregating P81,000.00, and the heirs of PO3 Erwil Pastor,
P50,000.00 for his death, and P100,000.00 for consequential damages as naturally must have arisen
therefrom; and, to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.4
Appellants Comiling and Galingan filed separate appeal briefs.
Appellant Comiling, who was a major in the Philippine Army, assails his conviction by asserting that the killing of
PO3 Erwil Pastor happened after the robbery took place, hence the "homicide" could not have been a necessary
means of committing the robbery. Neither could it be said that the robbery produced another offense.
The argument is specious. As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, robbery with homicide is a "special
complex crime." It is enough that in order to sustain a conviction for this crime, the killing, which is designated as
"homicide," has a direct relation to the robbery, regardless of whether the latter takes place before or after the killing.
For as long as the killing occurs during or because of the heist, even if the killing is merely accidental, robbery with
homicide is committed.
Comiling also questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Naty Panimbaan, who was
supposedly a polluted source since she was one of the conspirators. The reasoning is out of line. This Court is not a
trier of facts. All we have to discern from the records to believe the trial court's findings is a reasonable basis for its
method of examining the credibility of witnesses and its assessment thereof. We do not second-guess the court a
quo for as long as it does not gravely abuse such power.
In the case at bar, there is nothing to suggest that the trial court was whimsical or capricious in the performance of
its tasks. Thus we have no recourse but to uphold its findings on the credibility of Naty Panimbaan and of the other
prosecution witnesses. In any event, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, Naty Panimbaan was examined
three times not only under the close scrutiny of two defense counsels but also, in some instances, under the abrasive
tirades of the trial judge who called her a "whore." Yet, despite the trial court's apparent misgivings about her
character, it still gave full credence to her testimony:
None of their dark attributes dissuades the Court from giving credence to their respective narratives,
however. The Court agrees that Panimbaan knew too much, for her open-court testimony was abundantly
detailed, generally consistent, straightforward and credible.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Court believes Panimbaan's testimony that finally, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September
2, 1995 the accused Comiling, Galingan, Calderon, Clotario and Mendoza, together with Rimas, Paul, Rey
and Jose left Lani's place, while she stayed behind.
The Court believes Panimbaan's testimony that all throughout the four meetings conducted before
September 2, the accused Comiling and Galingan presided, gave instructions and provided firearms and
explosives.5
We find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court. Indeed, prosecution
witness Naty Panimbaan proved credible during the trial. She never wavered in her testimony on the details of the
crime:
Naty's tenacious insistence on the minute details of what happened suggested nothing else except that she was
telling the truth. We do not doubt her credibility.
The time-tested rule is that, between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the mere denials of the
accused, the former undisputedly deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary value. 7
Appellant Comiling likewise contends that Naty's testimony was inadmissible against him to prove conspiracy
because of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him
alone but not against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by other independent evidence.
According to Comiling, Naty's testimony showed that she was also a conspirator, thus, the existence of conspiracy
must be shown by evidence other than Naty's admission. As there was no independent proof of conspiracy except
the testimony of Naty, the latter's testimony concerning appellant's participation in the conspiracy was inadmissible
against him. This contention is misplaced. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial declarations or
admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.8 In the present case, Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling was made in
open court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.
Lastly, Comiling asserts that he cannot be held liable for robbery as he was not physically present at the Masterline
Grocery and had no ostensible participation therein. The contention is off-tangent. Although Comiling was never
tagged as one of the three robbers who entered the store of Ysiong Chua nor the one who mauled the victim or who
shot PO3 Erwil Pastor to death, his participation was his leadership in the conspiracy to commit robbery with
homicide and his inducement to his cohorts to perpetrate the same. As held in People vs. Assad, 9one who plans the
commission of a crime is a principal by inducement. As testified to by Naty Panimbaan:
Naty's testimony showed that Comiling was determined to commit the crime as early as June 1995. The fact that the
heist was finally executed only on September 2, 1995 indicated that Comiling had indomitably clung to his
determination. Principalship by inducement (or by induction) presupposes that the offender himself is determined to
commit the felony and must have persistently clung to his determination.11 In all the meetings prior to the
commission of the crime, Comiling was seen and heard presiding over and leading the group. He was even the one
who assigned each of his men his specific role in the robbery. Then, in the house where the perpetrators regrouped
after the commission of the crime, Comiling was handed the money and jewelry stolen from the grocery store. It
was also Comiling who instructed Naty and Lani to hide in Makati after the incident. He paid for the monthly rental
of the room where Naty and Lani stayed. All this can only prove that Comiling was the acknowledged leader of the
group.

Moreover, another witness for the prosecution, Sonny Rimas, testified that while serving beer to the accused at
Zariza Inn, he heard that Comiling was planning the robbery of Masterline. He even heard Comiling say, "We will
enter the place of Isko," referring to Ysiong Chua's store. Indeed, appellant Comiling was the undisputable
mastermind. The judgment of conviction of Emilio Comiling must therefore be affirmed.
For his part, appellant Galingan interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that he was in the house of his uncle in
Novaliches, Metro Manila when the incident happened on September 2, 1995. He was in Manila because his wife
was scheduled to arrive from Hong Kong on September 4, 1995.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in another place for such period of time that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission.12
In this case, Galingan did not meet the settled requirements of time and place. He failed to prove that he was indeed
in Novaliches at the time of the commission of the crime; his alleged presence therein was not established by a
positive declaration from an independent witness. Likewise, the place where he claimed to be on the night of the
crime was not of such distance that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission considering that either place could be reached in just about four hours by land. The fact that he met his
wife upon arrival on September 4, 1995 was likewise inconsequential as it was two days after September 2, 1995,
the date material to this case. Alibi, in order to be given full faith and credit, must be clearly established and must
not leave any room for doubt as to its plausibility and verity.13
It should also be noted that Rimas testified that, while he was standing near the door of Masterline Grocery at
around 6:30 p.m. on September 2, 1995, he noticed the arrival of an owner-type jeep. Rimas positively identified
appellant Galingan as the driver thereof.
Galingan's invocation of alibi should be disregarded not only because of its inherent weakness but also because of
the circumstances pointing to its contrived nature and his positive identification by prosecution witness Rimas as
one of those present during the Masterline Grocery robbery on September 2, 1995.
Appellant Galingan also impugns the credibility of prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan. He denies Naty's claim
that they were lovers. He maintains that Naty was a woman of ill-repute whom he paid P700 everytime they had sex.
Galingan insists that the only reason why Naty implicated him in the offense was because she wanted him to leave
his wife which he did not want to do. Furthermore, according to Galingan, Naty was a drug user and this supposedly
tainted her credibility.
These attacks on Naty's character and reputation are too flimsy and irrelevant to deserve serious consideration. The
fact that a witness is a person of unchaste character or even a drug dependent does not per se affect her credibility.
Character is frequently used to refer to one's reputation in the neighborhood. It means the estimate attached to the
individual by the community and not the qualities of the individual as conceived by one person. 14With respect to a
witness in both criminal and civil cases, evidence of his character, in order to affect his credibility, must refer to his
"general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity."15 Thus, testimonies attacking the character of a witness for the
purpose of impugning his credibility must relate and be confined to the general reputation which such witness has in
the community or neighborhood where he lives or has lived. Personal opinions on the moral character of a witness,
being usually too general, sweeping or subjective, are excluded.
Measured against the foregoing standard, appellant Galingan's testimony on the alleged bad character and
unreliability as a witness of Naty Panimbaan deserves no merit. Other than his adverse testimony, Galingan never
credibly established that Naty was reputed in the community or neighborhood to be a woman of loose morals or a
drug user. Clearly, Galingan's testimony and evidence concerning Naty's character was based solely on his own selfserving claim or private opinion, and did not at all reflect the general reputation by which Naty was held by the
community. We therefore remain convinced of Naty's credibility as a witness.

Besides, the credibility of a witness is left primarily to the judgment of the trial judge. Given the direct opportunity
to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge is in a vantage position to assess the witness' demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grueling examination.16
In People vs. De Guzman, we held that:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the
witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able
to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the
contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if
the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in
remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis
of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.17 (italics ours)
Moreover, Galingan failed to substantiate his claim that Naty was driven by ill will or false motive in testifying
against him. His vain attempt to portray Naty as a "woman scorned by her lover" certainly did not constitute
sufficient reason for Naty to accuse him of a very serious crime where the possible penalty could either be death or
life imprisonment. In fact, the trial court did not perceive such improper motivation on the part of Naty and the other
prosecution witnesses as would make them falsely implicate appellants in the commission of the very serious crime.
To us, the only plausible motivation for Naty was her honest desire to speak the truth.
Our established doctrine is that the witness' testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why he should
implicate the accused in a serious offense.18
More importantly, PO3 Erwil Pastor identified Galingan as the robber who shot him. In the emergency room of the
Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital, at around 7:00 p.m. on September 2, 1995, Pastor moaned "I might die. I
might die." in the presence of SPO1 Conrado Hidalgo and SPO4 Emilio Nagui. Hence, PO3 Pastor's statements
were taken down by SPO1 Hidalgo who assisted PO3 Pastor in affixing his thumbmark with his own blood:
Q Who shot you?
A Bong Galingan, x x x 19
Under Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the declaration of a dying person with the consciousness of
impending death may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause
and the surrounding circumstances of such death. There are four requisites which must concur in order that a dying
declaration may be admissible: (1) it must concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) the declarant was
competent as a witness; and (4) the declaration is offered in any criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in
which the declarant was the victim.20
(1) The first requisite is present in the ante-mortem statements of deceased PO3 Pastor. Certainly, the narration made
by Pastor at the hospital's emergency room before SPO1 Hidalgo and SPO4 Nagui concerned the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. The two policemen heard from the declarant's own lips his
utterance of the name "Bong Galingan" as his assailant. This fact was even testified to by these policemen.
(2) The declarant, at the time he gave the dying declaration, was conscious of his impending death. PO3 Pastor knew
at the time he was being questioned that his chances of recovery were nil. In fact, he uttered the words, "I might die.
I might die." to signify his perception that death was forthcoming.

(3) PO3 Pastor, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness. This fact is too obvious to
warrant further discussion.
(4) The dying declaration of PO3 Pastor was offered as evidence in a criminal case for robbery with homicide in
which the declarant was the victim.
Indubitably, PO3 Pastor's dying declaration is complete in the sense that it was a full expression of all that he wanted
to say with regard to the circumstances of his death. An ante-mortem statement is evidence of the highest order.21 It
is doctrinal that, when a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced. 22 The mind is induced
by the strongest of reasons to speak the truth the declarant's impending meeting with his Creator.
Insofar as Ricky Mendoza is concerned, the evidence likewise confirms his responsibility for the offense. He was
positively identified by prosecution witness Rimas as one of the men who alighted from the jeep, barged into the
Masterline Grocery and shot his way out therefrom. Naty Panimbaan also positively confirmed his participation in
the crime. More than that, as shown by the records, Mendoza flew the coop after he was arraigned and remains at
large up to the present. Flight from justice is evidence of guilt.
The existence of conspiracy in this case cannot be doubted. The rule is, whenever homicide is committed as a
consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who take part as principals in the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. 23
While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, we cannot
impose the penalty of death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,24 the crime of robbery carries
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft and disguise against appellants. However, these circumstances
were not specifically alleged in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have
attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on them.
On the award of damages, this Court modifies the amounts as well as the designations thereof. Thus, appellants
Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan alias "Bong" and accused Ricky Mendoza alias "Leo" must in solidum restore to
Ysiong Chua his lost valuables, and if impossible to do so, must pay him as reparation the amount of P26,000, plus
the P81,000 in cash he lost, as actual damages. They should also pay the heirs of PO3 Erwil Pastor P50,000 as civil
indemnity for his death as this is in accord with prevailing jurisprudence.25 In addition, the heirs of PO3 Pastor are
entitled to P25,000 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, pursuant to the case of People vs.
Abrazaldo.26 However, we cannot award moral damages to the heirs of PO3 Pastor because of their failure to present
any proof or testimony that they suffered anguish and distress as a result of his death.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Emilio
Comiling, Geraldo Galingan and accused Ricky Mendoza are hereby found guilty of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
They are also ordered to return to Ysiong Chua his lost valuables, and if this cannot be done, to pay him
in solidum its value of P26,000 as reparation, plus P81,000 which was the amount of the cash stolen, as actual
damages, and to pay the heirs of PO3 Erwil Pastor P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150762

January 20, 2006

COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision2 and the 7 November 2001
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 30 September
1997 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 ("trial court") in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-13505556. The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista ("Abarquez") guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an
accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055.
The Charge
The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide in two Informations, 5 as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 94-135055
The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of HOMICIDE, committed
as follows:
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for the same
offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93-129891 and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one RICARDO QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon
and hitting him with a gun at the back, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 94-135056
The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for the same
offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila under Crim. Case No. 93-129892 and mutually helping each
other, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the
crime of homicide directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and
stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left arm, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his

own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon said JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI is only slight
and not fatal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly.
The Version of the Prosecution
On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz8 ("Paz"), Ricardo Quejong ("Quejong") and their friends were
in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were drinking liquor in celebration of the
birthday of Boyets son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquezs son Bardie
and Sonito Masula ("Masula") joined Paz and Quejong. They proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St.
Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyets house, Alberto Almojuela also known as Bitoy
("Almojuela"), a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale, were likewise drinking liquor in front of
Almojuelas house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main road, Almojuela and his companions blocked
their path.
Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a knife. Paz
parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie
pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez, "What is our atraso, we were going home, why did you block our way?"
Abarquez answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na."
Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from
Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to
free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela
stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the
exit of San Jose St. to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, "You left your
companion already wounded!"
When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still
in the area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital. They next proceeded to Police Precinct
No. 4 to report the incident. However, there was nobody in the precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to
the WPD General Headquarters to report the incident. At the WPD General Headquarters, they learned that Quejong
died at the UST Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital.
The medico-legal certificate showed that Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his left forearm.
About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at the WPD Homicide Division, his station
received a call from the UST Hospital informing them of the death of Quejong. SPO1 Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went to
the UST Hospital morgue and investigated the incident. They learned that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed
Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn statements by Paz and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez
for homicide and frustrated homicide and prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.
Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to one SPO4 Soriano at
Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to the WPD Homicide Division.

Dr. Antonio Rebosa9 ("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital, conducted the post-mortem
examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported that Quejong sustained two stab wounds and suffered
from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds to the heart and left lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a
sharp instrument probably caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa also reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and
contusions on the right upper body, the wrist and on the lower extremities.
The Version of the Defense
Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence at 3363 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila.
About 7:30 p.m., Almojuelas wife informed him that the group of Paz was challenging Almojuela to a fistfight.
Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded to Almojuelas house. Almojuelas house was about twenty meters
away from Abarquezs house. When he arrived at Almojuelas house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being
strangled by Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuelas waist and boxing him at the stomach. Masula was near
Almojuelas head holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted at the group to
stop. The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the air. Still, the group did not heed
Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and Masula scampered away.
Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from smoking marijuana. Almojuela
then went inside his house while Abarquez went home. On his way home, Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the
barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego ("Lego") advised him to report the incident to the police. They all
proceeded to Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the incident to the desk officer. The desk officer told them that a
person had been stabbed. When Abarquez reached their house, he saw policemen and media men with their
barangay chairman. He informed them that he had just reported the incident. Upon the request of SPO1 Vidad,
Abarquez then went to the police station to shed light on the incident.
Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter informed him that there was marijuana smoke
coming to their window. He went outside to look for the source of the smoke and saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula
smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to move away as there were children inside the house. He was on his
way back to the house when Quejong tried to strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard
Abarquez shouting, "Tumigil na kayo." Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away.
Winfred Evangelista10 ("Evangelista") testified that he was resting in front of his house when he heard a commotion.
He noticed that Paz and Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to
break up the fight but he was told not to interfere. Abarquez was forced to fire a warning shot and the persons
involved in the commotion ran away.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision11 dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela
in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However,
the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and
allowed Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the accused, Coverdale Abarquez, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide only as accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate

penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No.
94-135056, the accused is hereby acquitted.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.12
Abarquez appealed the trial courts Decision before the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision13 of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision. The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court in giving more credence to the testimony of Paz. The Court of Appeals held that the
prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals
rejected Abarquezs allegation that he was merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties.
In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,14 the Court of Appeals denied Abarquezs motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
The issues15 Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;
2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.
Abarquez alleges that the prosecutions evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support his conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges that there was a misapprehension of facts and that the
trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures. Abarquez also assails the credibility of the witnesses against him.
The Ruling of This Court
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimony of a witness.
The exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of substance and value, which if considered, might
affect the result of the case.16 This case is an exception to the rule.
Concurrence in Criminal Design
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts."17
Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of design, which means
that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2)

the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of
the crime.18 Mere commission of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough.19 Thus:
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous
cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice,
that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. 20
Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to
mean that he committed the crime charged.21
Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz
testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was
grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:
Pazs testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuelas criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means
"stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he
was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to
portray, because Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquezs action as an
attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the
Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or
reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping
Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquezs act of trying to
stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela.
In People v. Fabros, 25 the Court explained:
To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the criminal act. In
other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same
end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design.
xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the (principals) criminal design did not automatically
make him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principals criminal
intent.
Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified that Abarquezs son Bardie,
who was one of Pazs companions, was the one trying to pacify Almojuela. The trial court in its factual findings
confirmed this when it stated that while Abarquez was holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela. 26
The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in not extending assistance to
the then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show concurrence in Almojuelas criminal act.
When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he left his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not
aware of the extent of Quejongs injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Thus:
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the
prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational

basis must be removed. The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework,
the prosecution must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The
presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.27
We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.28 Hence:
xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found
lacking.29
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and 7 November 2001
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale
Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 192251

February 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BARANGAY CAPTAIN TONY TOMAS, SR., BENEDICTO DOCTOR, and NESTOR
GATCHALIAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before Us is an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03405, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated May 27, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 06-92 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac. The RTC found accused Tony Tomas, Sr. (Tomas, Sr.),
Benedicto Doctor (Doctor), and Nestor Gatchalian (Gatchalian) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder.
The Facts
In an Information3 filed on July 21, 2006, the three accused were indicted for the crime of murder under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about July 19, 2006, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill,

with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot several times one Estrella Doctor Casco which
[caused] her instantaneous death.
Upon arraignment on September 14, 2006, the three accused pleaded not guilty to the above charge. 4 Trial5 on the
merits ensued after the pre-trial conference.
Version of the Prosecution
Estrella Doctor Casco (Estrella) was based in the United States, working there as a procurement specialist with
Safeway, Inc. and as a planner. She arrived in the Philippines on July 9, 2006 or about 10 days before her untimely
demise.
At around 9:45 in the evening on July 19, 2006, the victim (Estrella), with her mother Damiana Doctor (Damiana)
and caretakers Liezl Toledo (Liezl) and Angelita Duque (Angelita), were traversing the road towards her house in
Barangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac after she had parked her rented car at the house of Liezls mother-in-law,
Erlinda Toledo. They had just come from the clinic of Dr. Salvador for a medical check-up of Damiana.
Estrella was walking slightly ahead of her mother and Angelita when appellants Tomas, Sr., Doctor and Gatchalian
suddenly came out from the side of the road. Tomas, Sr. and Doctor are cousins of Estrella. Thereupon, without
saying anything, Tomas, Sr. drew a gun and shot Estrella twice at a distance of about 1.5 meters away. Gatchalian,
without a gun, allegedly supported Tomas, Sr. by standing in a blocking position along the road, while Doctor
positioned himself at the back of Damiana and Angelita and poked a handgun at them, telling them to lie face down
on the ground, though they did not totally drop on the road but were in a kneeling position.
When Tomas, Sr. fired the first two shots at Estrella, the latter fell down but the former still followed it with three
more shots when she was already prone on the ground. After the five shots, the three accused fled towards the house
of Tomas, Sr. Liezl, who was standing about four meters away from Estrella, shouted, "Saklulu, tulungan ninyo kami
(Help, help us)," then ran to her house. Meanwhile, Angelita came to the aid of 80-year-old Damiana, who suffered a
hypertensive attack after seeing what happened to her daughter. Angelita waved her hand to seek assistance from
Barangay Kagawad Yolanda Pablo (Kagawad Pablo) who came out on the road.
Both Liezl and Angelita recognized the three accused from the light coming from the lamppost. The road was well
lit. Doctors house was barely seven (7) meters from the scene of the crime, that of Tomas, Sr. about 15 meters away,
while Gatchalian was staying in a hut in the fields.
The people in the neighborhood heard the gunshots, and most of them came out of their houses to see what
happened. Kagawad Pablo was watching TV in her house when she heard the gunshots and immediately went out to
investigate. She saw three persons on the road: Damiana who was seated, Angelita who was squatting and holding a
fan, and a person lying on the ground who was Estrella, already shot. She responded to Angelitas call for help to
take Estrella to the district hospital. Rosalinda Areniego (Rosalinda), first cousin of Estrella, was with her child,
Ryan, in her house watching the TV program "Sa Piling Mo" with actress Judy Ann Santos between 9:30 to 10:00
p.m. when she heard the gunshots. Her house was 10 to 15 meters away from the road.
Liezl contacted Estrellas cousin, Captain Joel Candelario (Capt. Candelario), the Chief of Police of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) detachment at Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac, who, in turn, contacted the police in Mayantoc, Tarlac. A
half-hour later, Capt. Candelario arrived at the scene and, using a rented car, brought Estrella to the Malacampa
District Hospital in Camiling, Tarlac accompanied by Liezl, Domingo Toledo (Liezls husband), Neri Corpuz

(Liezls first cousin) and Kagawad Pablo. Estrella was declared dead on arrival by the attending doctors. Estrella
was 56 years old when she died.
Thereafter, Police Inspector Eleno Mangrobang (P/Insp. Mangrobang), the Chief of Police of Mayantoc, Tarlac
arrived in the district hospital and asked questions from Liezl and Angelita. They were then brought to the police
station for investigation where Liezl executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay (Sworn Statement). 6 Angelita likewise
accomplished her Sinumpaang Salaysay.7 Both Liezl and Angelita categorically identified the three accused as the
ones who perpetrated the crime.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Saturnino Ferrer (Dr. Ferrer) a day after the shooting, or on July 20, 2006, showed
four (4) gunshot wounds, one of them perforating the heart of Estrella. Dr. Ferrer issued the death certificate, citing
the cause of death as "MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS, LACERATIONS OF THE UPPER PORTION OF THE
HEART, MULTIPLE RIB FRACTURES, HEMOPERICARDIUM, LEFT HEMOTHORAX; SEVERE
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE."8
On the same day, July 20, 2006, Tomas, Sr. and Doctor were arrested in their respective homes, while Gatchalian
was arrested in the woodland (kahuyan). The three were subjected to paraffin tests shortly after the policemen took
them in custody and were found negative for gunpowder burns.
Liezl opined that what probably prompted the three accused to murder Estrella were the facts that: (1) Tomas, Sr.
was removed as administrator of Estrellas properties in Barangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac; (2) Tomas, Sr. lost
several cases against Estrellas father, Cecilio Doctor (Cecilio); (3) Tomas, Sr. accused Estrella of instigating and
financing several cases filed against him; and (4) Cecilio filed a case against Alejandro Doctor, the father of accused
Doctor, involving an easement of a property. These apparent motives were corroborated by Angelita.
Version of the Defense
The accused denied involvement in the incident.
Tomas, Sr. averred that he was at home sleeping when the incident happened. Since he suffered a cardiac arrest in
December 1988, he had regular attacks and, on that day, feeling bad, he slept early at around 7:00 p.m. in a bed in
the living room in front of the television and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the next day. He was not awakened by the
gunshots the previous night and it was his wife who told him about Estrellas death from the shooting. In the
morning of July 20, 2006, as barangay captain, he confirmed Estrellas death in front of Doctors house from his
neighbors. His investigation did not identify the persons responsible for the crime.
On the other hand, Doctor, the brother-in-law of Tomas, Sr. and a cousin of Estrella, likewise denied any
involvement in the incident. He asserted that after working in the field the whole day of July 19, 2006, he went
home at 4:00 p.m. At around 9:00 p.m. he went to sleep. At 10:00 p.m. he awoke to urinate and was told by his wife
that his cousin Estrella met an accident. He was prevailed upon by his wife not to go out of the house. He then went
back to sleep and woke up at 5:00 a.m. the next day.
Gatchalian admitted that he was a farm helper of Tomas, Sr. and worked in the latters rice field. On the night of the
incident, he claimed he was at home asleep with his 10-year-old son Jayson. He woke up the next day at 5:00 a.m.
and proceeded to work in the farm of Tomas, Sr.

On July 20, 2006, P/Insp. Mangrobang invited the accused to the Mayantoc police station for investigation but
instead immediately brought them inside the municipal jail. An hour later, policemen brought them to Camp
Macabulos for paraffin tests. Thereafter, they were returned to jail.
The Ruling of the RTC
On May 27, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Tony Tomas, Sr., Benedicto Doctor and Nestor
Gatchalian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Likewise, all of the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim, the following:
1]. The amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2]. The amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
3]. The amount of Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4]. The amount of Php285,416.33 and another amount of $2,182.78 US dollars or its equivalent in
Philippine pesos at the time of its payment as actual damages; and
5. The amount of $368,000.00 US dollars or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment for
loss of income of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC appreciated the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita (caretakers of Estrella), Avelino
Casco (husband of Estrella), Dr. Ferrer (the doctor who conducted the autopsy), and P/Insp. Mangrobang. It gave
credence to the positive identification by Liezl and Angelita of the accused as the perpetrators. The RTC held as
sufficient the positive identification, coupled with sufficient motive, on the part of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor and other
circumstantial evidence proving the accused as the perpetrators of the murder of Estrella. The RTC appreciated
treachery in the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack upon the unarmed Estrella without the slightest
provocation, and the attendance of conspiracy through the accuseds contributory acts to successfully carry out the
crime. Thus, the trial courts finding beyond reasonable doubt of the accuseds guilt to the offense of murder and the
corresponding sentence of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole in lieu of the death penalty.
The RTC found the accuseds similar defenses of denial and alibi bereft of merit. It ratiocinated that these defenses
were but mere denial and self-serving statements of the accused without any shred of supporting evidence. The
additional defense testimonies of Milagros Reguine (Milagros), Rosalinda, Kagawad Pablo, Police Superintendent
Daisy P. Babor (P/Supt. Babor), Rosendo Toledo (Rosendo), Police Officer 3 (PO3) Luciano Captan, and PO1 Celso
Isidro did not disprove the evidence of the prosecution, much less proved the accuseds innocence. The trial court
found incredulous the defense testimonies of Rosalinda, Milagros and Rosendo to the effect that the assailants were
two young men, with the gunman sporting a flat-top haircut while his companion had long hair. The RTC
ratiocinated that it would not have been easy for defense witnesses to identify the assailants due to the speed of the
incident, their distance from the crime scene, and the fact that, at the start of the shooting, Rosalinda and Milagros

were watching television in their respective homes while Rosendo was busy drinking with his buddies. Thus,
between the testimonies of Liezl and Angelita who were with the victim and those of Rosalinda, Milagros and
Rosendo, the RTC found the testimonies of the former more credible.
Anent the negative paraffin tests on appellants, the RTC relied on Marturillas v. People,9 where the Court reiterated
its consistent ruling that a negative paraffin test conducted on an accused does not ipso facto prove said accused is
innocent, for a negative paraffin test result is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed10 their conviction to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On August 12, 2009, the appellate court rendered its Decision, affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction
of the accused but modifying the award of actual damages to PhP 385,416.33 from PhP 285,416.33 to correctly
reflect what was proved during trial. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, dated May 27, 2008
in Criminal Case No. 06-92 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, awarding the total of P385,416.33 as and
by way of actual damages in addition to the US$2,182.78 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos previously awarded.
The rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
The CA found that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and their positive identification of the accused as
perpetrators of the killing of Estrella were more credible than the denial and self-serving averments by the defense
witnesses, which were unsubstantiated. Reiterating the RTCs ruling that a negative paraffin test result is not
conclusive of the accuseds innocence, the appellate court also found the presence of treachery and conspiracy in the
manner the accused carried out the nefarious deed.
The Issues
Thus, the instant appeal, where both accused-appellants and the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the
People of the Philippines, opted not to file any supplemental brief, since no new issues are raised nor any
supervening events transpired, and correspondingly filed their respective Manifestations11 to the effect that the Brief
for the Accused-Appellants,12 accused-appellants Motion for Reconsideration,13 and the Brief for the Appellee14 filed
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03405 be used in resolving the instant appeal.
Thus, accused-appellants raise the same assignments of errors earlier passed over and resolved by the CA, to
wit: first, that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita were incredible and repugnant to human
experience and behavior; second, the RTC erred in disregarding their negative paraffin test results and their defense
of denial and alibi; third, there was no conspiracy; and fourth, there was no treachery. Elsewise put, accusedappellants question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and raise the issue of insufficiency of evidence to
convict them, much less the presence of treachery and conspiracy.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.

First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Accused-appellants assert that prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita are not credible witnesses on the grounds of
their partiality since they rely on the family of Estrella for their livelihood. They argue that the testimonies of Liezl
and Angelita are too perfect since appellants could not have committed the crime in such a well-lit place where they
could easily be identified, coupled with the fact that Liezl, Angelita and Damiana were spared from harm. They infer
that the testimonies of Liezl and Angelita were fabricated. They also point to the reason that the adverse testimony
of Liezl is on account of her ill feelings towards Doctor who previously subjected her to shame when he slapped her
in public, and also to ingratiate herself to her employer, Cecilio, Estrellas father, who was charged by Tomas, Sr. in
a case.
To cast more doubt on their testimonies, accused-appellants point to the incongruity of both Liezl and Angelita not
identifying them as the perpetrators of Estrellas killing immediately after the incident when they had ample
opportunity to do so. In the case of Angelita, she only mentioned Tomas, Sr. to Cecilio and did not include Doctor
and Gatchalian. And much worse in the case of Liezl, who rushed home looking for her cellular phone, and did not
even bother to reveal accused-appellants identities to the responding policemen.
We disagree.
At the outset, We reiterate the consistent principle the Court applies when the issue of credibility of witnesses is
raised in the backdrop of the findings of the trial court which are wholly affirmed by the appellate court. An
established rule in appellate review is that the trial courts factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility
of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual
findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect.15 Indeed, it is settled that when credibility is in issue, the
Court generally defers to the findings of the trial court considering that it was in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves, and observed their deportment during trial. 16
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in
itself.17 The trial court found more credible the testimony of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita, who narrated
in a straightforward and candid manner what transpired that fateful night of July 19, 2006. One with the appellate
court, We find no reason to set aside their testimonies.
The grounds of partiality and ill motive raised by accused-appellants cannot discredit the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. For one, as the appellate court aptly noted, close relationship to the victim does not make a
witness biased per se.18 It has to be amply shown that the witness is truly biased and has fabricated the testimony on
account of such bias. Accused-appellants have not sufficiently shown such a bias. The fact that Liezl and Angelita
depend on the victims family for their job as caretakers does not make them biased witnesses. Besides, their
testimonies have not been shown to be fabricated. The trial court that had scrutinized their deportment, facial
expression, and body language during the trial has found them more credible. For another, the ill motive raised by
accused-appellants has not been shown to affect the testimony of Liezl to suit her alleged personal ill feelings
against Doctor. If it were so and the content of her testimony was fabricated, why did Liezl not make Doctor as the
gunman who shot Estrella? And why include Gatchalian and Tomas, Sr.?
But more telling of the veracity of the testimony of these prosecution witnesses are the following facts: (1) Angelita
has not been shown to have any ill motive against accused-appellants; (2) during the time immediately after the
shooting incident when Liezl ran to her house and Angelita brought Damiana home, Angelita was queried by Cecilio
about who shot Estrella, and Angelita replied without hesitation that it was Tomas, Sr. who shot Estrella; 19(3) when
Angelita mentioned Tomas, Sr. to Cecilio as the gunman, she had not conferred with Liezl; thus, they could not have

made it up that Tomas, Sr. was the gunman; (4) while it is true that Angelita did not mention the names of Doctor
and Gatchalian, such does not denigrate from the fact that it was indeed Tomas, Sr. whom Angelita saw shooting
Estrella with a handgun; (5) Angelita sufficiently showed by her testimony that she was busy attending to Damiana
who had a hypertensive attack and the house was in chaos because of the incident and, thus, was not able to
enlighten Cecilio more about the incident; and (6) the fact that both Liezl and Angelita made their official statements
(sinumpaang salaysay) a few hours after the incident during the investigation conducted by P/Insp. Mangrobang
initially at the district hospital and later at the police station shows that their account of what happened was not
fabricated and they positively identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators.
Consequently, the testimonies of Angelita and Liezl were neither fabricated nor prompted by any ill motive but were
truly eyewitness accounts of what transpired that fateful night of July 19, 2006.
Second Issue: Negative Paraffin Test and
Defenses of Denial and Alibi
Accused-appellants also allege error by the trial court in disregarding their negative paraffin test results coupled with
their defenses of denial and alibi which, they strongly asserted, were corroborated by credible witnesses Rosalinda
and Rosendo who do not appear to harbor any ill motive against the victim and her family. The testimonies of
Rosalinda and Rosendo, according to accused-appellants, attest to the fact that the assailants were two young men.
Moreover, they contend that their act of not fleeing is a circumstance that should favorably be considered.
We are likewise not persuaded.
Negative paraffin test not conclusive
Accused-appellants were subjected to paraffin tests on July 20, 2006 at 11:05 a.m. or the very next day and a little
over 14 hours after the shooting incident. Since gunpowder nitrates stay for 72 hours in the hands of a person who
fired a handgun, a timely paraffin test, if positive, will definitely prove that a person had fired a handgun within that
time frame. A negative result, however, does not merit conclusive proof that a person had not fired a handgun. Thus,
the negative paraffin test results of accused-appellants cannot exculpate them, particularly Tomas, Sr., from the
crime.
Time and again this Court had reiterated that "even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show
that a person did not fire a gun,"20 and that "a paraffin test has been held to be highly unreliable."21 This is so since
there are many ways, either deliberately or accidentally, that the residue of gunpowder nitrates in the hands of a
person who fired a handgun can be removed. This point was aptly explained and clarified by defense witness P/Supt.
Babor, a Forensic Chemist and the Regional Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas in San Fernando,
Pampanga. She explained in open court the various factors affecting the non-adhesion, disappearance or removal of
the residue of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a person who fires a gun, like the wind direction and velocity
when the handgun was fired, the type of firearm used, the humidity or moisture present in the ammunition, and
when the person wears gloves to preclude adhesion of the gunpowder nitrates. 22 Also, she explained that opening the
pores of the skin will make the nitrates slough off or disappear and this could be done by subjecting the hands to
heat, like steam from boiling water, or sufficiently washing the hands with warm water. Finally, gunpowder nitrates
are also dissolved by diphenylamine.23
Positive Identification

As adverted to above, the credibility of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita has not been successfully assailed
by accused-appellants. Besides, in Our assiduous review of the records of the instant case, We cannot weigh and
view the evidence in the same light as accused-appellants. It is axiomatic that positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than their alibis and
denials.24
It must be pointed out that prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita knew accused-appellants well since they were
neighbors. Thus, they have attained a high level of familiarity with each other.
Once a person gains familiarity with another, identification becomes an easy task even from a considerable distance.
Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victim and eyewitness
minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.27 Their positive identification of accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime charged was categorical and consistent; hence, We cannot cast any doubt on their
credibility as prosecution witnesses.28 As aptly pointed out by the CA:
With regard to the purported identification made by defense witnesses ROSALINDA ARENIEGO and ROSENDO
TEODORO of the alleged culprits different from the accused-appellants, the Court notes with approval the RTCs
observation that between the testimonies of eyewitnesses LIEZL and ANGELITA, and that of defense witnesses
ROSALINDA and ROSENDO, the formers declarations were more credible, as they were in fact walking together
with the victim when she was shot, while ROSALINDA and ROSENDO were supposedly about fifteen (15) meters
away from the crime scene.29
Besides, denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence that cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of credible witnesses.30
Third and Fourth Issues: Appreciation of Treachery
and Presence of Conspiracy
We tackle the last two issues together for being related and intertwined, dealing as they were on how the crime of
murder was perpetrated.
Accused-appellants strongly maintain the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treacheryqualifying the
killing of Estrella to murder; and the lack of conspiracypenalizing them equally for the crime of murder. They
strongly assert the lack of treachery since their simultaneous and sudden appearance could not amount to it, for
Tomas, Sr. still had to draw his gun before shooting Estrella, and Doctor still had to position himself behind
Damiana and Angelita before ordering them to drop or lie face down on the ground. Evidently, the victim Estrella
had ample opportunity to dodge or defend herself.
And finally, accused-appellants point to the dearth of evidence showing their concerted acts in pursuing a common
design to kill Estrella. Prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita point to Tomas, Sr. as the one who fired a handgun;
Doctor was purportedly carrying one but did not use it, while Gatchalian did not carry one. They aver that the
prosecution failed to show evidence of their intentional participation in the crime with a common design and
purpose since Doctors act of holding a gun was never shown to be in furtherance of the killing of Estrella. And
much less can Gatchalians act of merely standing on the road in the path of the four ladies ever constitute
furtherance of the common purpose of killing Estrella.
Accused-appellants arguments are partly meritorious.

After a judicious study of the records at hand, We are compelled to affirm the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and of conspiracy. However, the evidence adduced and the records do not support a
finding of conspiracy against appellant Gatchalian.
Treachery duly proven
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases the imposable penalties for
the offense.31 Murder is defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the RPC, as amended, which provides:
ART. 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, for the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender killed the victim,
(2) through treachery, or by any of the other five qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information.
Generally, the elements of murder are:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.32
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Estrella was shot to deathshe succumbed to four gunshot wounds, one
of which perforated her heartand it is neither parricide nor infanticide. That Tomas, Sr. killed the victim in a
treacherous manner was established by the prosecution during the trial.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms
which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that

the offended party might make.33 Mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.34The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.35 Thus, frontal attack can be treacherous
when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.36
For alevosia to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that: (1) the malefactor employed such means, method
or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the
said means, method and manner of execution were deliberately adopted.37 Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated,
it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.38
Consequently, the issue of the presence of treachery hinges on the account of eyewitnesses Liezl and Angelita, who
witnessed everything from the inception of the attack until accused-appellants fled from the crime scene. Both were
not only certain and unwavering in their positive identification of accused-appellants, but their testimony, as aptly
noted by the courts a quo, were also factual, straightforward and convincing on how the murder transpired.
To reiterate, as quoted above, while the party of Estrella was walking, accused-appellants suddenly appeared from
the side of the road. Without uttering any word, Tomas, Sr. drew his gun and shot Estrella twice, while Doctor
simultaneously poked a gun at Angelita and Damiana. And when Estrella already fell down, Tomas, Sr. shot her
thrice moreperhaps to ensure her death. Then accused-appellants fled. It is, thus, clear that the shooting of Estrella
by Tomas, Sr. was done with treachery. The nefarious act was done in a few moments, it was unexpected as it was
sudden. The act of Doctor in immobilizing Angelita and Damiana in those brief moments afforded and ensured
accused-appellants impunity from the unarmed Estrella and her three similarly unarmed companions.
Conspiracy duly proven
While We likewise affirm the presence of conspiracy, as adverted above, We cannot agree to the finding of the trial
court as affirmed by the appellate court that Gatchalian is equally guilty on account of conspiracy to merit the same
criminal liability as accused-appellants Tomas, Sr. and Doctor.
Findings of facts are matters best left to the trial court. However, where the "trial court overlooked, ignored or
disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the
result,"39 then this Court will not shirk from its duty of ascertaining the proper outcome of such reversible error
committed by the trial court.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words or conduct of
the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose.40 Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crimeproof beyond reasonable
doubt;41 as mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.42
In the instant case, the ascertained facts of the shooting to death of Estrella with treachery established beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of murder. Tomas, Sr.s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. To be equally guilty for murder, it must be shown that Doctor and Gatchalian conspired with Tomas, Sr., for
in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or purpose of such a
conspiracy is the act of all.43 From the clear testimony of Angelita and Liezl, it has been duly established that
Doctors contemporaneous act was made in furtherance of the common purpose of killing Estrella and ensuring
impunity from the act. Indeed, Doctors cooperation in the shooting of Estrella ensured its accomplishment and their

successful escape from the crime scene. Doctor is, thus, equally guilty and liable for the murder of Estrella on
account of conspiracy.
Gatchalian guilty as an accomplice
Gatchalian, however, is differently situated as Doctor. We note that the evidence adduced and the records would
show that Gatchalian did not do overt acts for the furtherance of the shooting of Estrella. As mentioned above, mere
presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or agreement to
cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.44
It appears that Gatchalian is a party to the conspiracy as found by the courts a quo. Gatchalian appeared in the
company of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. He also fled together with them. However, Gatchalian was unarmed and did not
say anything or commit any overt act to externally manifest his cooperation with the shooting of Estrella. On the
other hand, Gatchalian never attempted to stop the shooting, which tends to show that he was aware of the plan and
intent to kill Estrella or, at the very least, that he acquiesced to the shooting of Estrella.
1avvphi1

The trial court viewed Gatchalian as supporting Tomas, Sr. by taking a "blocking position" in the road. We, however,
cannot subscribe to such a view considering that his presence is merely extraneous to the accomplishment of the
crime. Besides, Angelita and Damiana were covered by Doctor who poked a gun at them, while Liezl was so far
back that it would be incongruous, to say the least, that Gatchalian was blocking the road. Who would he be
blocking then when the road is wide and Liezl was far back?
Thus, with his lack of overt acts manifestly contributing to the accomplishment of the common design to shoot
Estrella, there is some doubt if he indeed conspired with Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. This, however, does not exculpate
him from criminal liability absent proof that he merely tagged along or just happened to meet his employer (Tomas,
Sr.) shortly before the incident or was merely taken along without being told about the other accused-appellants
plan. The fact that Gatchalian appeared together with the other accused-appellants and fled with them, while not
constitutive of proof beyond reasonable doubt of conspiracy, still proves a certain degree of participation and
cooperation in the execution of the crime. Consequently, in line with the principle that whatever is favorable to an
accused must be accorded him, Gatchalian is guilty as an accomplice only. As We aptly explained in People v.
Ballesta:
Mere presence at the scene of the incident, knowledge of the plan and acquiescence thereto are not sufficient
grounds to hold a person as a conspirator. x x x Lacking sufficient evidence of conspiracy and there being doubt as
to whether appellant acted as a principal or just a mere accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and is
thus held liable only as an accomplice.
x x x Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the
appellant acted as principal or as accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability
that of a mere accomplice.45
Proper Penalties
We agree with the courts a quo that Tomas, Sr. and Doctor merit to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the
murder of Estrella.
As an accomplice to the murder, Gatchalian is liable to a penalty of reclusion temporal or one degree lower than the
imposable penalty for murder. Considering that there are no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances

applicable, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is proper. Considering further the applicability of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law since Gatchalian is not disqualified under Section 2 of said law, the proper penalty
imposable is prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.
Award of Damages
Finally, on the damages awarded, the CA correctly modified the actual damages to PhP 385,416.3346 and USD
2,182.78,47 the amounts duly proven during trial with supporting official receipts and corresponding documents
related to actual expenses for the casket, funeral services and the airfreight of Estrellas remains back to the United
States.
Anent the grant of damages for loss of income or earning capacity in the amount of USD 368,000, We find it proper
and duly proven. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for loss
of earning capacity.48 The prosecution duly proved Estrellas loss of earning capacity by presenting the statement
from her employer, Safeway Inc., which showed her earning an hourly rate of USD 25.233.49 Likewise, Estrellas
2006 Wage and Tax Statement from her Employees Records in the Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue
Service50 shows her earnings for 2006 at USD 29,828.72. Evidently, as shown by her husband Avelino Cascos
testimony, Estrella was averaging gross earnings of USD 48,000 annually. In applying the formula51 used in the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the RTC arrived at the figure of USD 368,000 as compensation for
Estrellas heir for loss of income or earning capacity. We find no reason to disturb this finding of the trial court as
affirmed by the appellate court.
Moreover, civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of any
evidence or proof of damages other than the commission of the crime.52 Based on current jurisprudence, the award of
civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Estrella is in order.53 Likewise, the CA correctly
awarded moral damages in the amount of PhP 50,000 in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant
grief to her family.54 With the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the award of PhP 30,000 as
exemplary damages is justified under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code.55 Besides, the entitlement to moral damages
having been established, the award of exemplary damages is proper.56
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED as to appellant NESTOR GATCHALIAN.
Accordingly, the CA Decision dated August 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03405 is hereby MODIFIED in that
NESTOR GATCHALIAN is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the offense of Murder
under Art. 248 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Gatchalian is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The rest of the appealed decision stands.
The May 27, 2008 RTC Decision should be modified to read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Tony Tomas, Sr. and Benedicto Doctor guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. This Court also finds accused Nestor Gatchalian guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice to the
offense of Murder and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months
of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
Likewise, all of the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim, the following:

1.) The amount of PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2.) The amount of PhP 50,000.00 as moral damages;
3.) The amount of PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4.) The amount of PhP 385,416.33 and another amount of USD 2,182.78 or its equivalent in Philippine
pesos at the time of its payment as actual damages; and,
5.) The amount of USD 368,000 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment for loss of
income of the victim.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 121982 September 10, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONILO CUI y BALADJAY, BEVERLY CUI y CANTUBA, EDUARDO BASINGAN y SABELLO,
WILFREDO GARCIA, alias "TOTO", JOSELITO GARCIA, alias "TATA GARCIA", EMMANUEL
GARCIA, alias "MAWI", a certain SADAM, BEINVENIDO NACARIO y PARDILLO, alias "REY
NACARIO", a certain EDGAR, a certain BENJIE, LUIS OBESO, alias "LEOS", HILARIA

SARTE, alias "LARING", and YUL ALVAREZ, accused, LEONILO CUI y BALADJAY, BEVERLY CUI y
CANTUBA, LUIS OBESO, alias "LEOS", and HILARIA SARTE, alias "LARING", accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:
In the evening of December 5, 1990, some ten (10) armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and Rose Lim on
Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The Lims, their three (3) children, and the employees of the family-owned
business, William's Educational Supply, were able to see the faces of the leader Wilfredo alias "Toto" Garcia and
two of his men, Mawe Garcia and a certain Edgar. The other robbers could not be identified as they had flour sacks
over their heads.
The robbers carted away cash and jewelries worth twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). They also blindfolded and
forcibly abducted seventeen (17) year old Stephanie, the youngest daughter of the Lims. They demanded a ransom
of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) for her release.
Johnny Lim turned over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the afternoon of the next day at an arranged meeting
place. Stephanie, in turn, was released to her father.
Initially, the Lims kept the crime a secret. But on the third day, they reported the kidnapping to the Philippine
National Police Cebu Metropolitan District Command (Cebu Metrodiscom) at Camp Sotero, Cabahug, Cebu City.
The Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST) 1 conducted an investigation and Johnny Lim was shown

photographs of criminal elements to identify the suspects. From around ninety (90) photographs, Lim
picked that of Toto Garcia.
The identification of Toto Garcia gave MIST a valuable lead. Toto Garcia was known as the leader of a group of
armed robbers called the Baong Gang. The gang's base of operation was pinpointed at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu. When the
police learned from Lim that his house guard, Eduardo Basingan, hailed from Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, they decided
to interrogate him.
Basingan's interrogation broke the case wide open. He identified Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia and Edgar as the three
(3) who did not wear masks, Sadam and Rey as the two (2) who held him and the Lims at gunpoint, and Tata Garcia,
Yul Alvarez, a certain Benjie, a certain Leos and a certain Laring as the look-outs who stayed outside the Lim
compound. He named Toto Garcia as the chief plotter of the crime at bar, and revealed that his neighbor and close
family friends, the spouses Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan. Basingan said he was asked to join the
plot and was assured that he would not be under suspicion because he would be placed at gun point together with the
other members of the Lim household when the crime is committed. However, he refused to join the plot during the
December 2, 1990 meeting of the group at the residence of the Cuis in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. Leonilo Cui even
invoked their close ties as godfathers of each other's children but he was unmoved. At the meeting were Toto Garcia,
Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey, Sadam and the Cuis.
On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a sworn statement 2 reiterating these revelations in writing. Johnny

and Rose Lim then formalized their complaint by executing a Joint Affidavit. 3 The members of the
Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team also executed a Joint Affidavit 4 relating their investigation. With
these as bases, Assistant Prosecutor Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr. filed an information 5 for Kidnapping

with Ransom against Basingan, the Cuis, and the members of the group of Toto Garcia as identified by
Basingan in his sworn statement.
On the same day, December 18, 1990, Basingan and Leonilo Cui were arrested. 6 Beverly Cui was also taken into

custody on January 17, 1991. 7 The Cuis, however, were later granted bail and their plea for preliminary
investigation was given due course. 8
On March 14, 1991, Joselito "Tata" Garcia, Hilaria Sarte and her live-in partner, Luis Obeso, referred to by Basingan
as "Laring" and "Leos", respectively, were arrested in the neighboring Negros Island. The next day, however, Tata
Garcia died due to "hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds" 9. Upon presentation of his death

certificate, the trial court ordered his name deleted from the information.
On March 22, 1991, Obeso and Sarte filed their own motions for preliminary investigation. 10 Their motions were

granted in an Order dated April 2, 1991. 11

On April 1, 1991, Basingan executed a second sworn statement 12 reiterating his first. In addition he detailed the

role of the Cuis in the planning of the crime at bar.

After preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Manuel J. Adlawan found that the participation of the Cuis was only that
of accomplices. Thus, on May 13, 1991, an Amended Information was filed downgrading the charge against the
Cuis as mere accomplices in the kidnapping with ransom of Stephanie Lim. It reads:
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1990, at about 9:00 P.M. more or less and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accuse, all private individuals, conniving and confederating together, and mutually
helping with one another, armed with unlicensed firearms, with deliberate intent, with intent of
gain, enter the dwelling house of spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and while inside therein with
violence and intimidation, take and carry away cash and jewelries in the amount of P20,000.00
from the possession of and belonging to spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and that on the occasion
thereof, and in connection therewith and for the purpose of extorting ransom from said spouses
Johnny and Rose Lim, herein accused, in pursuance of their superior strength did then and there
kidnap and detain Stephanie Lim 17 years old [sic] daughter of spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and
while Stephanie Lim was under detention in the place other than the latter's dwelling place, the
said accused demanded the amount of P1,000,000.00 for the release of Stephanie Lim to which
demands and for fear of the latter's life spouses Johnny and Rose Lim delivered and caused to be
delivered the amount of P1,000,000.00 to said accused; and accused
(1) Leonilo Cui y Baladjay and
(2) Beverly Cui y Cantuba
who are hereby charged for the same offense as accomplices cooperate in its execution by
previous acts and subsequently profiting in the effects of the crime by receiving the amount of
P10,000.00 from the principal accused as their share of the loot, to the damage and prejudice of
Johnny, Rose and Stephanie Lim in the total amount of P1,020,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 13

On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte were arraigned and they all pleaded not guilty. 14 On June

27, 1991, Basinga escaped from the prison. 15

Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Basingan was tried in absentia.
On February 13, 1992, Beinvenido Nacario, alias "Rey Nacario", was arrested. On arraignment on April 13, 1992,
he pleaded not guilty. However, on May 5, 1991, he, too, escaped from detention and remains at large to this date.
On August 18, 1992, the prosecuting fiscal manifested before the trial court that, per newspaper report, Toto Garcia
had been killed in Davao.
On December 6, 1993, the trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and Nacario. 16 It held:
In the light of the totality of the evidence adduced in the case at bar and the law and
aforementioned jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that a conspiracy was hatched by all the
accused in perpetrating the crime charged. For instance, as borne out by the testimony of Sgt.
Narciso Ouano, Jr., police investigator of the Cebu Metrodicim [sic], accused Eduardo Basingan
declared during his investigation that the plan was indeed carried out and he knew all the persons
who participated in that robbery, naming Toto Garcia, Tata Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Rey, Edgar,
Sadam, Yul Alvarez, Benjie, Leo and Laring. When the named robbers entered the residence of his
master Johnny Lim, the robbers were wearing masks except Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia and Edgar.
The others, Rey, Sadam, Laring, Leo, Benjie and Yul Alvarez were wearing masks but Basingan
was still able to identify them in spite of the fact that they were wearing masks because these
persons were familiar to him already as they used to frequent the house of Leonilo and Beverly
Cui. At the time of the robbery, only Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia and Edgar, Rey and Sadam went
inside the house of his master while Yul Alvarez, Benjie, Leos and Laring were guarding outside
the building. On December 7, 1990, two days after the robbery, he was called by his Comadre
Beverly Cui and the latter handed to him the amount of P40,000.00 in her house, saying that Toto
Garcia left the said amount to be given to him. During the talk, Basingan verbally told them about
the incident relative to the kidnapping and his having received P40,000.00 from Toto Garcia as his
share of the ransom. A Formal investigation was conducted by Sgt. Armando Ballon in the
presence of Atty. Elias Espinosa who assisted Eduardo Basingan.
. . . The denial of accused Luis Obeso and Hilaria Sarte as to their participation in the commission
of the crime does not hold water for they were duly identified even during the initial phase of the
commission of the crime. They were the renters of the house where Stephanie, the kidnapped
victim, was placed. Stephanie had identified the house. The flight of these two accused to Bacong,
Dumaguete City is indicative of their guilt. . . .
The prosecution has indeed established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt as
against accused Eduardo Basingan, Bienvenido Nacario y Pardillo, @ "Rey Nacario," Luis Obeso,
@ "Leos", Hilaria Sarte, @ "Laring", Leonilo Cui y Baladjay and Beverly Cui y Cantuba, the
latter two are only as accomplices, to the crime of kidnapping with
ransom. . . . 17
They were sentenced to suffer the following penalties:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered

convicting the accused Eduardo Basingan, Bienvenido Nacario y Pardillo @ "Rey Nacario," Luis
Obeso, @ "Leos", Hilaria Sarte, @ "Laring", as principals for the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH
RANSOM and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accused Leonilo Cui and
Beverly Cui being accomplices, to suffer an imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are further ordered to jointly restitute to the victim the
ransom money less the amount recovered. Accused Hilaria Sarte and Luis Obeso, being detention
prisoners are credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided that they signify
in writing that they will abide with the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 8
Obeso and Sarte filed their Notice of Appeal 19 on May 19, 1994. The Cuis filed theirs 20 on May 31, 1994.
In their Brief dated April 21, 1997, Obeso and Sarte prayed for their acquittal on the following grounds:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATEMENT MADE
BY EDUARDO BASINGAN AND THE TESTIMONY OF SGT. NARCISO OUANO
JR. THEREON, WHICH ARE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS
PRINCIPALS BY CONSPIRACY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMPETENT
AND CONVINCING PROOF OF THEIR CULPABILITY 21
On June 25, 1997, the Cuis also filed their Brief. They contended:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF APPELLANTS-SPOUSES LEONILO CUI AND BEVERLY CUI TO REMAIN SILENT, TO
COUNSEL AND AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION HAD BEEN GROSSLY VIOLATED
DURING THEIR CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING HEARSAY EVIDENCE OFFERED TO
PROVE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY AND PARTICIPATION OF APPELLANTS-SPOUSES
LEONILO CUI AND BEVERLY CUI, AS ACCOMPLICES IN THE CRIME CHARGED. 22
On August 13, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General filed, in lieu of an Appellee's Brief, a
Manifestation 23 recommending the acquittal of the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte on the ground that the

prosecution failed to present adequate proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It was postulated:

It is clear that the only piece of evidence that would link appellants directly to the kidnapping of
Stephanie Lim is the Sworn Statement executed by Eduardo Basingan (Exhibit "C") implicating
appellants and describing their participation in detail. Basingan's extra-judicial confession,
however, is inadmissible for being hearsay as he was not presented by the prosecution as its
witness, he having escaped after arraignment. Hence, appellants were not afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine him. Cross-examination is an indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give
substance and meaning to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against
him and to show that the presumption of innocence has remained steadfast and firm . . . . It was
intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex-parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the
exercise of his right of cross-examination . . . .
Perhaps realizing the futility of relying solely on Basingan's extra-judicial (sic) confession in order
to secure appellants' conviction, the prosecution presented Sgt. [O]uano who testified on the
informal investigation he conducted on Basingan. Part of his testimony was the same extrajudicial confession made by Basingan which was strongly objected to by appellants. It cannot be
overemphasized that Sgt. [O]uano's testimony is not based on his own personal knowledge but on
other evidence. He has no personal knowledge of the participation of the appellants in the
kidnapping of the victim. Hence, his testimony is purely hearsay evidence and has no probative
value, whether objected to or not . . . . 24
There is no question that Basingan escaped and never testified in court to affirm his accusation against the Cuis,
Obeso and Sarte. Thus, the trial court committed reversible error in admitting and giving weight to the sworn
statements of Basingan. In the same vein, the testimony of Sgt. Ouano confirming the content of Basingan's sworn
statements is not proof of its truth and by itself cannot justify the conviction of appellants. Both the extrajudicial
sworn statement of Basingan and the testimony of Sgt. Ouano are clear hearsay. Indeed, the records show that the
trial court itself admitted Basingan's statements merely as part of the investigation of Sgt. Ouano, thus:
Despite its ruling, the trial court used the statements of Basingan, as testified to by Sgt. Ouano, as proofs of the guilt
of the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Undeniably, they are hearsay for any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by
nature if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some
other person who was never presented on the witness stand. 26
Conviction cannot be based on hearsay evidence. In the 1996 case of People v. Raquel, 27 we squarely addressed

the issue of whether or not the extra-judicial statements of an escaped accused implicating his co-accused
may be utilized against the latter. There we ordered an acquittal and held:
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein
appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado
Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused
escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to
cross-examine his co-accused on the extra-judicial statements, it is elementary that the same are
hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of
appellants, in the case at bar.

Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused
which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extra-judicial
and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to crossexamine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for crossexamination and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extra-judicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 28
The res inter alios has exceptions. Thus, Section 30 of Rule 130 provides:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
For this provision to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
a. That the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself;
b. that the admission relates to the common objects; and
c. that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. 29
The general rule is that extra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator made before the formation of the
conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible in evidence as against the other coconspirators, on the ground that the accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. 30
In the case at bar, the alleged conspiracy among the accused was not priorly established by independent evidence.
Nor was it was shown that the extra-judicial statements of Basingan were made while they were engaged in carrying
out the conspiracy. In truth, the statements were made after the conspiracy has ended and after the consummation of
the crime. They were not acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence. Since the extra-judicial
admissions were made after the supposed conspiracy, they are binding only upon the confessant and are not
admissible against his co-accused; as against the latter, the confession is hearsay. 31 In fine, the extra-judicial

statements of Basingan cannot be used against the Cuis, Obese and Sarte without doing violence against
their constitutional right to confront Basingan and to cross-examine him. 32
Be that as it may, we hold that on the basis of other evidence on record, the Cuis are guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of being accessories, not accomplices as held by the trial court, in the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim.

Art. 8 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accomplices those persons who cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts not indispensable to the consummation of the offense.
Accomplices cooperate in the execution of the crime by previous or simultaneous acts, by means of which they aid,
facilitate or protect the execution of the crime, without, however, taking any direct part in such execution, or forcing
or inducing others to execute it, or contributing to its accomplishment by any indispensable act. 33 Had Basingan

been able to testify on his affidavit detailing the role of the Cuis in the planning of the robbery of the Lim
household, the trial court would have had sufficient basis to convict them as accomplices therein. As
discussed above, however, Basingan escaped before taking the witness stand.
This Court, however, holds that the Cuis profited from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and are liable as
accessories.
Art. 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accessories to the crime those who, subsequent to its
commission, take part therein by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime,
without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices. Conviction of an accused as an accessory
requires the following elements: (1) that he has knowledge of the commission of the crime; and (2) that he took part
in it subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. 34 These twin elements are present in the case of the Cuis, and indubitable proof thereof is extant

in the records of the case.

The members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST), namely, Lt. John P. Campos, Lt. Michael Ray
B. Aquino, Sgt. Narciso L. Ouano, Jr., Sgt. Felipe Honoridez, Sgt. Armando Ballon, Sgt. Oscar Dadula, Cpl.
Jeremias Canares, and Sgt. Catalino Ybanez, executed a Joint Affidavit dated December 18, 1990 stating, among
other things, that "the couple Leonilo and Beverly Cui, although denying knowledge of the kidnapping revealed that
Toto Garcia is their Compadre" and that "they also turned over to us the amount of P10,000.00 representing that
given to them by Toto Garcia out of the ransom money". 35
This statement charging the Cuis with having partaken of the ransom money was not denied either in the CounterAffidavit of Leonilo Cui dated February 15, 1991 or in the Counter-Affidavit of Beverly Cui of the same date. In his
Counter-Affidavit, Leonilo Cui even admitted that he knew that Toto Garcia and Basingan had held secret meetings
in his house and that he had already become suspicious of their acts, but he did not confront them because they
treated each other as special friends, they being godfather of each other's children.
In their defense, the Cuis submitted an Affidavit dated February 15, 1991 executed by Myrna M. Limbagan, a niece
of Beverly Cui who lived with them in their house in Pardo, Cebu City. But instead of exonerating the Cuis, this
Affidavit inculpates them as it states in paragraph 10 that "on December 7, 1990, Toto Garcia, Eduardo Basingan
and other persons visited the residence of the Spouse[s] Cui[s] and handed some amounts of money to the
couple". 36 Significantly, it is Limbagan, a witness for the defense, who corroborates the incriminating

statements made by the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team in their Joint Affidavit.
Realizing the aggravation caused them by the affidavits of Limbagan and the members of the Metrodiscom
Intelligence Security Team, the Cuis jointly executed a Supplement Counter-Affidavit 37 dated April 24, 1991 this

time denying that they profited in any way from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim. They explained that
they turned over the sum of P10,000.00 to Lt. Michael Ray Aquino not as their share in the ransom
money but as a "bribe" to prevent the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team from
further inflicting physical harm on the person of Leonilo Cui. In her testimony in open court, Beverly Cui
claimed that she and her husband were arrested on December 14, 1990 at their residence in Pardo, Cebu

City but that she was later released by the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team so
that she could withdraw money from the bank to them in exchange for her husband's freedom.
Two of the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team, Sgt. Narciso Ouano and Sgt. Catalino Ybanez,
testified rebutting the claim of Beverly Cui. Sgt. Ouano testified as follows:
Significantly, it is again the Cuis themselves, in their Motion for Reconsideration dated December 2, 1993, who
corroborated Sgt. Ybanez's claim that Beverly Cui was temporarily released for the particular purpose of
accompanying the police to the hideout of Toto Garcia and his men. Thus, in par. 5 of their Motion for
Reconsideration, they allege that ". . . Beverly Cui was temporarily released from custody in order for her to lead the
police to the hideouts of the other suspects of the crime". 40
As accessories to the consummated crime of kidnapping for ransom, the penalty imposable upon Leonilo and
Beverly Cui is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law. 41 Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,

as amended, the penalty shall be death where the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom. However, when the crime was perpetrated in December 1990, the death penalty has been
suspended by the 1987 Constitution and commuted to reclusion perpetua. Since no modifying
circumstance is appreciated for or against the Cuis, the imposable penalty should be in the medium period
of the indeterminate sentence applicable under Republic Act No. 4103, as amended. 42
Finally, while we affirm the conviction of the Cui spouses, we acquit Obeso and Sarte.
The only evidence linking Obeso and Sarte to the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim is Basingan's sworn statements that a
certain Leos and a certain Laring were among the lookouts who stood as guards outside the house of the Lims while
Toto Garcia and his group were inside. Basingan's sworn statements are hearsay, hence, inadmissible in evidence
against his co-accused because he escaped before he could take the witness stand.
Except for Basingan who could not even give the real names of Obeso and Sarte and just referred to them as Leos
and Laring, respectively, no one really knew them. And significantly, no prosecution witness identified them, not
even Stephanie Lim. She never saw any of them during the robbery or in the house where she was detained. Her
testimony runs, viz.:
Obeso and Sarte interposed the defense of alibi. They asseverated that in late November, 1990, they left the house
they were renting in Linao, Minglanilla, Cebu and went to Banilad, Bacong, Dumaguete City where the parents of
Sarte reside. It was there, in March 1991, that they were arrested.
The prosecution never rebutted the claim of live-in partners Obeso and Sarte that they were in Bacong, Dumaguete
City as early as November, 1990. No direct evidence has been proffered by the prosecution to place Obeso and Sarte
at the scene of the crime. Their alibi has to be given credence.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, dated December 6, 1993, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-20464, is MODIFIED. Appellants Leonilo and Beverly Cui are CONVICTED as
ACCESSORIES and are ORDERED to serve the indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Appellants
LUIS OBESO alias "LEOS", and HILARIA. SARTE, alias "LARING" are ACQUITTED and if presently detained,
they are ordered immediately released from detention unless other legal reasons exist to detain them. The Director of
Prisons is ordered to inform this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision his compliance. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 130654 July 28, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 dated April 15, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch
32, 2 in Criminal Case No. A-3155, convicting accused-appellant Eduardo Javier of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P21,730.00 as actual expenses.
1wphi1.nt

The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused-appellant with the crime of parricide reads as
follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with the intent to and being then armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use of personal violence, by hacking with the said weapon one
FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate spouse, and as a result of which his said wife
suffered fatal injuries which directly caused her death immediately thereafter, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to law. 3
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Consolacion Javier Panit and Alma Javier, daughters of
the victim and accused-appellant, and SPO1 Rotelio Pacho are detailed as follows:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier were legally married on December 18,
1954. 4 In their forty-one years of marriage, they begot ten children. Accused-appellant and Florentina lived at Tubod, Sto.
Tomas, La Union with one of their daughters, Alma Javier. 5

On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three o'clock in the morning, Consolacion Javier Panit, who lives near
her parent's house about ten to fifteen meters away, heard her mother, Florentina shouting "Arayatan dac ta
papatayen nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill me). After she heard her mother scream for help,
Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her sister, Alma who, weeping, told her that their parents were
quarrelling. Alma, at the time of the incident was living in her parents' house. Consolacion and Alma then proceeded
to their brother Manuel's house, which is located about seventy to eighty meters away from their parents' house. The
three then proceeded to their parents' house. Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless body of his mother and his
father, accused-appellant, wounded in the abdomen. Manuel then ordered Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their
father to the hospital. At this point, Manuel informed her sisters that their mother was dead and that their father
confessed to him that he killed his wife and there after allegedly stabbed himself. Florentina was found dead in their
bedroom, drenched in her own blood. 6
Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's husband, and her son, Jefferson, while Manuel went
out to get help. 7
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas Police Station in La Union, testified in the
investigation he conducted with SP04 Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton Laroza regarding the incident of June 15,
1996. He stated that he received a call for assistance from the barangay captain of Tugod, Sto. Tomas because
accused-appellant allegedly killed his wife. The police authorities then proceeded to accused-appellant's house in
Brgy. Tugod, Sto.Tomas, where they saw Florentina lying in the bedroom floor covered with blood. Upon
interviewing the victim's children, Pacho testified that Manuel told him that his father confessed to killing his wife.
Manuel then surrendered to him the bolo covered with blood which was found in the bedroom. The bolo was
allegedly used by accused-appellant in assaulting his wife. 8 The medical findings indicated that the victim suffered from
multiple injuries and her neck was almost cut off from her body. 9

Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a
sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as the same one presented by the prosecution as Exhibit "A" and which he used in
wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed his wife because he could not sleep for almost a
month. He claimed that when the killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he was
doing. 10 He claims that he was insane at the time of the incident.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and on April 15, 1997 rendered a decision finding
him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the accused, Eduardo Javier y Basin is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death; to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of the victim and P21,730.00 as actual expenses; and
to pay the cost of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 11
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty, considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances of illness of the offender and passion and obfuscation. 12 While accusedappellant does not question the decision of the trial court in rejecting his defense of insanity, he argues that he should be meted a
lower penalty because at the time of the incident, he was suffering from loss of sleep for a prolonged period of time, which would
have caused him to commit the crime.

He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man, aggravated
by his illness, goaded him to commit the crime.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that accused-appellant cannot claim the mitigating
circumstance of illness in the absence of a medical finding to support his claim. Accused-appellant cannot likewise
be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in the absence of sufficient evidence.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but interposed as defense the exempting circumstance of
insanity. However, the trial court rejected this defense of insanity for failure of the defense to prove that accusedappellant was indeed insane at the time of the incident. The defense never presented any medical record of the
accused-appellant, nor was a psychiatrist ever presented to validate the defense of insanity. Equally important, the
defense, during trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances of illness and passion and
obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had been suffering from insomnia for around a
month, thus leading him to commit an act beyond his control, the killing of his wife, Florentina. The defense went
on to cite medical literature on the effects of total and partial sleep loss to support his contentions. 13
For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the presence of the
following requisites: (1) illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and (2) such illness
should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. 14

Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the claimed
mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the accused that his mind went
blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental condition
at the time of killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere
presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-appellant was suffering an
illness which diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of the killing.
On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he committed. First, he remembered
killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying to
commit suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in killing his wife; and he remembered being
brought to the hospital. Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time
of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full control of his mental
faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering from an illness that diminished the exercise of his will-power.
On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance alleged by accused-appellant.
Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and obfuscation to mitigate his criminal liability.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and to obfuscation, the following elements should
concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act
which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. 15 The foregoing elements were not proved to be
present in instant case. In fact, during accused-appellant's testimony, he even stated that he was not jealous of his wife.

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:

In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced alleged passion and
obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not account how he killed his wife nor did he explain
the cause why he was prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable basis for
applying to him this mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause which
produced it has not been established. 16
All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his suspicions regarding his wife, aggravated by his
illness made it possible for him to kill his own wife, is but a mere afterthought to whittle down his criminal liability.
Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will generally not be disturbed by the appellate
court because it is in the best position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence considering that it observes the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses during the trial. In the case at bar, the trial court was able to observe the
behavior of accused-appellant and it stated that his recollection of the details surrounding the killing is so
impeccable that only a person in his right mind can make it.
Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of parricide under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides that:
Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by mandatory death penalty but by the
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater
penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 17
In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did not allege any aggravating circumstance.
Nor did the evidence show that the prosecution was able to prove any aggravating circumstance. 18 Likewise, no
mitigating circumstance is appreciated by this Court in favor of the accused-appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court as one of civil
indemnity instead of as moral damages.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. A3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y Basin should suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129694

August 18, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO MANTE, accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.:
Alfredo Mante, herein accused-appellant, was sentenced to die by lethal injection by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 34, or Panabo, Davao, after having been charged with and found guilty of murder. The death penalty having
been decreed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review in consonance with Republic Act No. 7659.

1wphi1.nt

The information that charged Alfredo Mante for the offense read:
That on or about November 29, 1994, in the Municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Davao, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with intent to kill and armed with a hunting knife, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Evelyn Into, thereby inflicting upon her wounds which caused
her death, and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The accused pleaded "not guilty" to the charge when arraigned; forthwith, trial ensued.
The facts according to the prosecution, predicated largely on the testimony of its lone witness, Jerson Into, were
narrated in the People's Brief submitted by the Solicitor General.
On 29 November 1994, at around four o'clock in the afternoon, Evelyn Into and her son, Jerson Into, were on their
way to Tulalian, their home in barangay Sto. Tomas, Davao, after they had their corn milled in the nearby town of
Panabo, Davao. Arriving in Tulalian at around five o'clock in the afternoon, Evelyn and Jerson alighted from the
passenger jitney which brought them from Panabo. Jerson saw the accused, sporting a yellow "sando" and "maong"
pants, near the store where the jitney had stopped. After unloading the milled corn from the vehicle, Evelyn and
Jerson proceeded to walk home towards Purok 6 of Tulalian. Jerson noticed that the accused had left shortly ahead
of them. When Evelyn and Jerson were about to reach their house, the accused, whom Jerson had seen trying to hide
under a cacao tree moments earlier, suddenly blocked their path and, without uttering any word, struck Evelyn with
a hunting knife on her right breast. Evelyn attempted to get away. Just as she had shouted at her son to flee, she was
stabbed once again by the accused at her back. She fell, and the accused hastily fled. Jerson rushed back to attend to
his mother. Unfortunately, she succumbed in no time to her wounds. Jerson sought the help of Roy Codenes, a
neighbor, but the latter hurriedly left evidently because of fear. When "CAFGU" members arrived at the crime scene
and asked who had been responsible for the killing, Jerson immediately named the accused, Alfredo Mante, as being
the assailant.

The defense interposed denial and alibi.

The accused testified that on 18 November 1996 he went straight home after the day's work. He first fed the pigs in
their yard and then prepared the feeds for the following day. He took his supper and was ready to go to bed when he
heard someone, whose voice he recognized to be that of a certain "Doc," calling from outside the house. Informed
that the commander of the CAFGU was interested in seeing him, the accused proceeded to the commander's house.
He did not realize why he was being summoned until minutes later when some people passed by in front of the
commander's house carrying a dead person. It was only then that he was informed of being the suspected assailant.
The accused was brought to the Tibal-og Police station where he denied the accusation.
After assessing the evidence before it, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, of Panabo, Davao, found accused
Alfredo Mante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, the Court finding the accused Alfredo Mante guilty, with having committed the crime of
Murder, and beyond reasonable doubt, for the killing of Evelyn Into, hereby imposes on said accused the
Supreme penalty of death.
Accused is further directed to pay the offended party of P10,000.00 for expenses for wake; P6,000.00, for
embalming and P3,000.00 for the tomb and further the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.2
The Public Attorney's office representing appellant, assails the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The defense contends that the prosecution has failed to ascertain the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime charged.
The Court disagrees; it is convinced that the eyewitness account given by Jerson Into has amply established the case
for the prosecution.
On cross-examination, Jerson admitted that the face of the assailant, when the stab thrusts were delivered, was
covered with a yellow sando but Jerson was quick to explain thus:
Jerson stated that he saw appellant Mante late that afternoon before the stabbing incident sporting a yellow "sando"
and "maong" pants; he declared:
Jerson had known appellant for at least three years prior to the stabbing incident. The Court more than once in the
past had ruled that the identification of a person could be established through familiarity with one's physical
features.6 Jerson testified:
There would indeed appear to be no plausible reason, even as it would certainly be unnatural, for Jerson to point at
the appellant as being the perpetrator of the crime if it were not true and thereby seek a vindication by accusing
anyone else but the real culprit.8 The victim was his own mother, killed before his very eyes. Jerson was merely
twelve years old at the time and only fourteen yeas old when he testified in court. Looking closely at the
circumstances, it would be most difficult to ignore his testimony and discard his credence. 9
Jerson Into stated both in his affidavit and before the court that the motive behind the killing of his mother by
appellant was the chopping of the latter's gabi plants. While it was really his uncle Romeo Jimino who destroyed the
gabi plants, appellant Mante suspected, however, that it was his mother who had been responsible for it. 10Jerson was
corroborated by Democrito Into, husband of the victim and father of Jerson, in his own sworn statement and
testimony in open court.11

Appellant would advert to the alleged inconsistency in Jerson's testimony, i.e., that, at one point, Jerson said his
mother, after receiving the first stab thrust, fell down on the ground while, at another time, he declared that his
mother still was able to run about twenty meters away.12 This and other innocuous inconsistencies would not be
sufficient to downgrade the testimony that, upon, the other hand, should be taken in its entirety and on material
points.13 The testimony of Jerson did not deviate from his categorical statement on how the appellant stabbed his
mother to death which jibed with the autopsy examination conducted by Dr. Tenchavez.14
Moreover, ample margin of inaccuracy should be accorded to a young witness who, much more than adults, would
understandably be gripped with tension by the novelty of testifying before a court.15
Denial and alibis, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are self-serving and hardly deserve greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of witnesses on affirmative matters.16 For alibi particularly to prosper, the
defense must be able to show that the accused could not have been physically present at the situs of the crime, or its
immediate vicinity, during the time of its commission.17 Here, appellant's house, where he claims to have been at the
time of the stabbing incident, is only 200 meters away from the scene of the crime.
The trial court was not in error in holding that the killing had been attended by treachery. The unarmed victim was
suddenly and without any warning attacked with a knife by appellant. Evelyn Into was totally unaware and
completely taken by surprise when appellant, masked to conceal his identity, lunged at her with a hunting knife.
Even if the attack were frontal, the deceased had no time to prepare for any kind of defense. 18 The essence of
treachery would be a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the
latter's part.19
The killing of Evelyn Into, being qualified by treachery,20 constituted murder defined by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and penalized by reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty of reclusion perpetua would be the apt
penalty absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
The award of damages made by the trial court has been sufficiently substantiated by the evidence on record; in
addition, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delicto should be ordered to be paid by appellant
conformably with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision convicting appellant Alfredo Mante of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the death sentence imposed on him by the court a quo is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. Appellant is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim, in addition to the damages awarded by the
trial court, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex-delicto. Costs against appellant.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 129288

March 30, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOEY AQUINO y ACEDO, EDUARDO NEJAL y FRONDES and JOSE TRINIDAD y PROGRESO,
accused, JOEY AQUINO y ACEDO, and JOSE TRINIDAD y PROGRESO, accused-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused Joey Aquino y Acedo (hereafter AQUINO), Eduardo Nejal y Frondes (hereafter NEJAL) and Jose Trinidad
y Progreso (hereafter TRINIDAD) were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1817-BG of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Bauang, La Union, under an Information, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses JOEL AQUINO Y ACEDO, EDUARDO NEJAL
Y FRONDES and JOSE TRINIDAD y PROGRESO, of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of November, 1994 at Barangay Paringao, Municipality of Bauang, Province
of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused
conspiring, and confederating and aiding one another, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of force, violence, intimidation against one, GREGORY
BITMEAD, take, steal and carry away jewelries and cash amounting to TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent and against the latter's will, and did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the use of a rifle said victim,
thereby inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds which caused his death to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the victim.1

The information was subsequently amended by changing the date of the commission of the offense from 18
November 1994 as originally alleged to 13 November 1994 to conform to the stipulation during the pre-trial. Upon
re-arraignment on 27 April 1995, each of the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thus, the prosecution presented evidence tending to establish the following narration of facts.
On 13 November 1994 at 9 p.m., Stefen Slaton, Marilou Ortega, Janet Ysip and Asuncion Ulanimo (hereafter
Stefen, Marilou, Janet and Asuncion, respectively) arrived at the Sportsman Retreat Club and Restaurant in Bauang,
La Union. The restaurant, operated by Gregory Bitmead, an Australian national and fiance of Stefen, had 7 tables, a
bar and 2 billiard tables located at the far end.2
At around 9:15 p.m. on 13 November 1994, while Stefen's group was eating pancit, a car stopped in front of the
restaurant. Accused AQUINO, followed by TRINIDAD and NEJAL, entered announcing, "dapa kayong lahat, holdup ito (get down, this is a hold-up.)" Scared, most of the "customers dropped to the floor." Stefen thought that
AQUINO was merely jesting so she stood her ground. Marilou "just stooped," while Janet froze in shock. Gregory
Bitmead, then drinking near the bar when all the accused arrived, got mad and shouted at them: "you can't do this to
my fucking restaurant."3
AQUINO brought out his armalite and aimed it at Bitmead. NEJAL and TRINIDAD stood behind AQUINO holding
short handguns and surveying the customers inside the restaurant. 4 Stefen hid her money, then ran towards Bitmead.
She embraced Bitmead and begged all the accused not to kill him, "huwag, maawa po kayo (don't, have
mercy)."5 AQUINO, who was standing two meters from Bitmead and still aiming his gun at the latter, said nothing.
Bitmead challenged AQUINO, "c'mon just hit me, just hit me."6 While Stefen was still embracing Bitmead, Marilou
heard a click from a short firearm, and saw someone go out.7 Stefen, perceiving an imminent shoot-out, lowered her
hand and released Bitmead. Two to three minutes later, shots rang out. Bits of flesh flew out of Bitmead's body and
he was thrown to the side. He fell on the floor, unable to move.8
AQUINO then divested Stefen of three rings and one bracelet, and took Bitmead's belt bag which contained
P20,000. TRINIDAD and NEJAL also went around the restaurant and took things from the customers.9
The incident lasted for ten minutes. All the accused went out of the restaurant with their loot and fleet on board a
maroon car with plate number ACL 843. There was another person left inside the car but nobody saw his face. 10
Meanwhile, Bitmead who laid motionless on the floor, sustained a wound in the middle of his chest. One of his arms
was almost torn loose from his torso. He was brought to the Provincial Hospital of La Union where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. 11
Dr. Benardo Parado, Chief Municipal Health Officer of the Bauang Rural Health Unit, conducted the autopsy on
Bitmead's body at the Joces Funeral Homes, Quinavite, Bauang, La Union.
Stefen, Marilou and Janet executed their separate sworn statements 12 wherein they narrated the tragic events at
Bitmead's Restaurant before the police at Bauang, La Union. Stefen and Marilou were also made to describe the
assailants to the cartographers of the National Bureau of Investigation. 13
On 17 November 1994, Stefen and Marilou identified all the accused at a police line-up conducted at Camp Diego
Silang, Bauang, La Union. Janet also identified AQUINO but was so nervous that she was unable to identify
TRINIDAD. Stefen, Marilou and Janet confirmed their identification of the accused when called at the witness

stand. Janet explained her failure to identify TRINIDAD at the police line-up because of his shaven moustache. All
these girls only found out the real names of all the accused at Camp Diego Silang. 14
Dr. Parado was called to testify to confirm his autopsy findings which indicated that Bitmead's.
1. liver is lacerated, [with] multiple massive hemorrhage noted at the abdominal area, fragmented slug
recovered at the abdominal area (R).
2. (Rt.) lung, lower lobe is lacerated with massive hemorrhage noted at the thoracic area (Rt)
3. 10th rib (Rt) is fractured, complete close with one slug recovered at the (Lt) left abdominal wall, massive
hemorrhage noted. 15
Dr. Parado then concluded that Bitmead died of "Cardio Respiratory Arrest secondary to Hemorrhagic shock
secondary to Multiple Gunshot Wounds." 16 Dr. Parado also opined that the victim was facing the assailant and was
very near the latter when he was shot; the assailant may have fired his gun thrice; and Bitmead was first hit on the
right nipple, then he turned to the right and was hit on the forearm, then turned his back and was hit again. Two slugs
met at the back and lacerated the liver, with the lacerated liver causing Bitmead's death. 17
Bitmead's father, Reginald Bitmead testified that he spent P30,000 for Gregory's burial on 25 November 1995 at the
Lingsat Cemetery, but he presented no receipt for the expenditure. As to the compensation for his son's death,
Reginald declared "I don't want any money, sir. Dumb shit them." 18 Bitmead who was 41 years old at the time of his
death, was a retired army man in Australia, and was receiving a monthly pension of P19,000. 19
The prosecution rested its case on 17 October 1995 and was granted ten days to make a Formal Offer of Exhibits,
which it did on 21 November 1995. 20 The defense then filed its opposition to or comments on the exhibits offered.
In its Order of 17 January 1996, the trial court admitted the exhibits.
In its order of 6 March 1996, the trial court granted the motion of AQUINO and TRINIDAD for the
reconsideration 21of the admission of Exhibits "B" (photograph), "D" (cartographic sketch) and "C" (photograph) on
the ground that they are hearsay evidence.
For his part, NEJAL filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Motion (to Exclude Exhibits "B," "C," and "E"). 22 AQUINO
and TRINIDAD filed a motion for Acquittal on Demurrer to Evidence, 23 alleging that the out-of-court declarations
and the testimonies of Stefen, Marilou and Janet were "rehearsed," and were contradicted by the autopsy findings of
Dr. Parado; conspiracy was not proved; and the warrantless arrest was illegal. The motions were denied on 15 July
1996. 24
In its Order of 15 July 1996, the trial court denied the Demurrer pleas.
The defense thereafter presented its lone witness SPO1 Marcelino Gamboa who testified that Captain Tommy
Cabigas, his immediate superior at the Criminal Investigation Service [CIS], Dagupan City, relayed to the Provincial
Command the information that an Australian national was killed on 13 November 1994. By the early morning of the
next day, the police were briefed and the identities of the alleged suspects, including their appearances, were
supplied. SPO1 Gamboa learned from assets that AQUINO and TRINIDAD were the ones who staged the
robbery/hold-up in Bauang, La Union. He claimed to know all the accused as there was an alarm raised against them
for their involvement in a carnapping and hold-up robbery at Alice Restaurant, Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan. 25

SPO1 Gamboa further claimed that at 9:30 p.m. on 15 November 1994, AQUINO and TRINIDAD were arrested
while walking along Arellano St., Dagupan City. NEJAL was arrested at dawn two days later at his house in Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan. In both instances, Gamboa admitted that arrests warrants were not served, all the accused were
not committing any crime, and they were not informed of their constitutional rights. Further, the arresting officer
have no personal knowledge of the killing of Bitmead. All the accused were brought to the CIS office in Dagupan
City where they were investigated. 26
On 18 March 1997, the trial court promulgated its decision, 27 the decretal portion of which reads:
(a) finding the accused, Joey Aquino y Acedo and Jose Trinidad y Progreso, GUILTY of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentencing them to the supreme
penalty of DEATH;
(b) acquitting Eduardo Nejal y Frondes of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and shall forthwith be released from confinement unless he is being held for any
other lawful cause; and
(c) Ordering Joey Aquino y Acedo and Jose Trinidad y Progreso to indemnify the heirs of Gregory Bitmead
in the sum of P200,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 28
The trial court considered the testimonies of Stefen, Marilou and Janet "cogent, straightforward and convincing." It
ascertained that their narrations of events on the complicity of AQUINO and TRINIDAD as attacker and robbers
were candid and constituted the true version of the events. 29 However, it noted "with much concern" the failure of
law officers to respect the rights of all the accused against unlawful arrests and during custodial investigation. Thus,
the trial court ruled that the arrests were illegal. The trial court nonetheless concluded that it was unnecessary to
apply the doctrine on the inadmissibility of evidence taken as a consequence of illegal arrests, since the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses was the basis for their conviction.
The decision was elevated to us for automatic review pursuant to Section 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by R.A. No. 7659.
In compliance without resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections confirmed the detention of AQUINO at
the National Penitentiary. 30 The Director of Prisons confirmed that AQUINO was received at the New Bilibid
Prisons on 15 April 1997, while TRINIDAD had no record of confinement since he escaped therefrom on 9 April
1997 after the promulgation of the trial court's decision.
Although TRINIDAD had escaped from detention and is now a fugitive, the automatic review in death penalty cases
compels us to review the case as against him pursuant to our ruling in People v. Esparas. 31
In this Court, Aquino sought the substitution of his counsel de parte with the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG].
As required, the FLAG filed the Appellant's Brief wherein AQUINO attributes to the trial court the commission of
the following errors:
I
FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS IDENTIFIED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AS THE ASSAILANT OF THE VICTIM, GREGORY BITMEAD, AND
ONE OF THE PERPETRATORS OF THE ROBBERY.

II
FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, INSTEAD OF
HOMICIDE ONLY.
III
IMPOSING UPON APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH, INSTEAD OF THE LESSER
PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.
IV
AWARDING DAMAGES DESPITE LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT AND THE REJECTION
BY THE FATHER OF THE VICTIM.
Anent the first assignment of error, AQUINO points out that the initial description by Stefen of Bitmead's assailant
as 5'3" tall, with fair complexion, medium build and sporting long and slightly wavy hair conflicted with AQUINO's
actual physical features. Marilou, who gave a detailed description of one of AQUINO's companions, vaguely
remembered AQUINO's appearance. As for Janet, she could only identify AQUINO in court. Also, it was highly
impossible for her to remember the face of AQUINO when she had seen him for only a few seconds due to the
confusion and tension inside the restaurant and her obvious nervousness when the robbery took place.
AQUINO claims that the manner of identification was less than objective and fair. First, there were two police lineups and Marilou was made to identify all the accused twice. Second, the three persons included in the second police
line-up were so dissimilar in appearance to all the accused, contrary to what was enunciated in People v.Acosta, 32 in
that a police line-up should be confined to persons of the same height and built as the accused. Third, the witnesses
for the prosecution were informed by the police that all the accused were in Camp Diego Silang prior to the
identification, thereby psychologically conditioning the witnesses to find said accused in the police line-up.
AQUINO also maintains that the prosecution failed to establish the robbery as the evidence thereon was limited to
the statements of Stefen and Marilou on the taking of Bitmead's beltbag. No proof was presented that Stefen had
personal knowledge of the P20,000 allegedly contained in Bitmead's beltbag; and Janet testified that the assailants
immediately fled after Bitmead was shot without mentioning the robbery.
AQUINO further argues that the absence of modifying circumstances negates the imposition of the death penalty
pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code; and there is, as well, no factual basis for the award of damages.
Finally, AQUINO prays for the remand of the case to the lower court because he was denied of his right to the
assistance of counsel due to the gross incompetence of his previous counsel who was less than zealous in defending
his interest. His counsel confined his defense to the illegal arrest subsequent to arraignment and disregarded his plea
to present other witnesses.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommends that the penalty be lowered
to reclusion perpetua due to the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and that the indemnity be
fixed at P50,000 in accordance with established jurisprudence instead of P200,000. There was also no evidence in
support of said amount.

As to the first assignment of error, the OSG countered that the witnesses for the prosecution had the opportunity to
scrutinize the faces of AQUINO and his companions because the interior of the restaurant was brightly lit when the
crime was committed. Further, the witnesses remained seated at their table and they did not get down to the floor
despite being ordered to do so. Stefen, in particular, had a close look of AQUINO who stood two to three meters
from her when she embraced Bitmead; she had also seen him prior to the incident. Marilou noticed the face of
AQUINO from the time he and his companions entered the restaurant, announced the hold-up and approached
Bitmead. Janet clearly observed the faces of all the accused.
The OSG further rationalizes that Stefen could not be expected to give an accurate measurement of AQUINO's
height. She is a tall caucasian whose perception may be different from the other witnesses. It is also possible that
AQUINO had a haircut prior to the police line-up.
The OSG also asserts that contrary to the claim of AQUINO that the police line-up was unfair and had to be repeated
for Marilou's benefit, there was only one police line-up conducted inside Col. Lomibao's office. When Marilou saw
AQUINO and his companions outside the office of Col. Lomibao, there was as yet no line-up being conducted;
besides, a police line-up is not necessary for the identification of offenders.
The OSG likewise claims that the robbery was sufficiently proven. A determination of the exact amount asported is
immaterial since it is not one of the elements of the crime of robbery. Janet's failure to see the robbery could be
attributed to her nervousness.
The OSG opposes AQUINO's prayer for the remand of his case to the trial court. It maintains that AQUINO was not
denied of his constitutional right to counsel, which, in any event, he should have invoked during trial. This
notwithstanding, the conviction of AQUINO could not be attributed to the ineffectiveness of his counsel or
weakness in his defense but on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution.
After poring through the records and the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the witnesses presented by both
parties, we are convinced that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of AQUINO
and TRINIDAD.
Anent the first assignment of error, when an accused challenges his identification by witnesses, he, in effect, attacks
their credibility. 33 It is settled that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is involved, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial,
unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked, which if considered, might affect the result of the case. 34
We cannot find any reason to overturn the trial court's favorable assessment of the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. The eyewitnesses were straightforward, consistent and objective in the narration of the events they
witnessed. The restaurant was "fairly bright" and when conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not
appear to be biased, their assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be accepted as truthworthy. 35
Any conflict between Stefen's initial description of AQUINO in her sworn statement and AQUINO's actual physical
characteristics is inconsequential as Stefen cannot be expected to accurately estimate AQUINO's height. Witnesses
frequently concentrate on the facial features and movements of the accused. Victims of violence tend to strive to see
the appearance of the perpetrators of crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being committed 37 and not
unduly concentrate on extraneous factors and physical attributes unless they are striking. Furthermore, we have long
since recognized that a sworn statement or affidavit when taken ex-parte is generally considered inferior to in-court
testimony. An affidavit is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion or for

want of suggestions and inquiries. Its infirmity as a species of evidence is a matter of judicial
experience. 38 Affidavits are oftentimes executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford
him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident that has transpired. 39 What is important is that Stefen
positively identified AQUINO in open court. This recognition is bolstered by Stefen's testimony that she had also
previously seen AQUINO and TRINIDAD eating at the same restaurant prior to the incident 40 but she only found
out their names during the police line-up.
Marilou's identification of AQUINO and TRINIDAD is unassailable. She did not heed the order to take the floor.
She merely stooped, thus witnessing the tragic events. She saw Stefen pleading for Bitmead's safety and TRINIDAD
pointing his gun at Bitmead. Then she heard a click followed by two shots. When the smoke cleared, she saw
AQUINO's gun stilled leveled at Bitmead. 41 She also saw AQUINO at close range, thus:
As to NEJAL, Marilou admitted not to have immediately noticed him during the incident but she recognized him
afterwards during the police line-up. She clarified:
There is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime may react. Often, the face and body movements of the
assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from the memory of witnesses, 44 which was obviously
the case with Marilou, upon whose mind the physical features of AQUINO and TRINIDAD were imprinted.
Janet remembered AQUINO under similar circumstances. On that fateful night, Janet saw AQUINO brandishing a
long gun. AQUINO's allegation that Janet's identification of him in open court was highly suspect as she admitted to
being nervous and panicky during the incident. But her momentary glance at AQUINO left an indelible mark on her
mind. True, the workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react
differently; some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility. 45 But despite her fears
Janet saw the unusual acts of bestiality committed before her. As an eyewitness and a victim she remembered with a
high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. 46 During the police line-up, she remembered AQUINO's face and
accordingly pointed him out as the gunman, thus:
It is also clear to us that Stefen, Marlon and Janet have no motive to falsely impute the wrongdoing upon AQUINO
and TRINIDAD; on the contrary, being victims of the robbery, (with Stefen as Bitmead's fiance) they were
expected to seek justice. It would be contradictory to human experience if they attributed authorship of the dastardly
acts to persons who did not commit them. It is settled that if the accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would
be against the natural order of events to falsely impute charges of wrongdoing upon him. 48 There is no indication in
this case that either Stefen, Marilou or Janet was actuated by improper motive in implicating AQUINO and
TRINIDAD. Their testimonies then, being credible, are entitled to full faith and credit.
On the claim that the conduct of the police line-up was not objective and fair, suffice it is to state that there is no rule
requiring that before a subject can be identified as the culprit he should be first placed in a police line-up and
pinpointed by witnesses. 49 A police line-up is not indispensable for the proper and fair identification of
offenders. 50 The important consideration is for the victim to positively declare that the persons charged were the
malefactors. Such goes into the credibility of the witnesses as tested during the trial. 51
It is not true that two police line-ups were formed. What AQUINO alleged to be the "first" line-up formed outside
the office of Col. Lomibao was not a line-up. The accused and other persons were only milling about the building
waiting for the real police line-up inside Col. Lomibao's office during which time Marilou was able to identify
AQUINO and TRINIDAD.

It is also untrue that the prosecution witnesses were psychologically conditioned to find all the accused in the police
line-up. Previously, Stefen and Marilou had already described the physical features of AQUINO to the NBI
cartographer; and when all the accused were presented to them during the police line-up, they just confirmed their
earlier impressions of the malefactors. AQUINO cannot invoke People v. Acosta. 52 In that case, Acosta was alone in
the detention cell when he was identified; Acosta's picture was not mixed with others when the witnesses were asked
to identify him; and the shirt he wore during the police line-up was the same one he had on in the picture. The
situations which we have therein considered suggestive were: where the accused was the only Oriental in a line-up
composed entirely of blacks, the sole black-haired person among light-haired individuals, the only tall person among
short individuals, the lone youth among suspects over 40 years old, and the only person who wore distinctive
clothing. None of these suggestive conditions was present during the positive identification of AQUINO and
TRINIDAD at the police line-up.
As for conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other element of the crime. 53 Taking with intent to
gain of personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or force
upon things constitutes robbery. 54
On this score, the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proof. Both Stefen and Marilou saw AQUINO
divest Bitmead of his belt bag containing P20,000. Stefen was certain of the amount as she did the bookkeeping on
that day for Bitmead. Stefen herself was robbed of three rings and one bracelet. She categorically declared:
Marilou also saw AQUINO take not only Bitmead's bag but the personal property of the other customers:
AQUINO thus missed the point in claiming that Stefen's testimony on the amount contained in the belt bag was
uncorroborated. There is no need to prove the exact amount taken. What is material is that there be proof of the
unlawful taking as in this case. Regardless of the actual amount inside the beltbag, the crime committed is still
robbery with homicide. The elements of the crime were proved beyond reasonable doubt. In any event, in robbery
with homicide, the important consideration is that there be a nexus between the robbery and the killing whether
prior, subsequent to or committed at the same time. 57
Nonetheless, we find meritorious the third assignment of error. No mitigating or aggravating circumstance was
proved during trial. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that, when the law prescribes a penalty composed
of two indivisible penalties, such as reclusion perpetua to death for the complex crime of robbery with homicide,
and neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. The imposable penalty then in this case is reclusion perpetua.
As to AQUINO's invocation of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel, we find it undeserving of
credit. AQUINO was assisted by a counsel and if he had difficulties with this counsel, he should have informed the
trial court of this fact. He had the opportunity to do so, yet he chose to keep quiet. He could have insisted on
presenting his own version of the events but he did nothing, thereby clearly indicating his full agreement with his
counsel's chosen strategy. Besides, his conviction was not based on the weakness of the evidence for the defense but
on the strength of the prosecution's case.
1wphi1

We agree with AQUINO however, that there was no basis for the award of P200,000. Jurisprudence has fixed the
indemnity for death at P50,000 without need of proof.
As a general proposition, whenever a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those
who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, although some did not actually

take part in the homicide. 58 Even though throughout the trial it was only AQUINO who was seen to have pulled the
trigger against Bitmead, conspiracy was adequately established by the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
Hence, all the conspirators are liable as principals regardless of the extent of their respective individual participation,
for in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 59
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused JOEY AQUINO y ACEDO and his co-accused JOSE
TRINIDAD y PROGRESO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide defined and penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the penalty of death imposed by the trial court should be, as it hereby,
reduced to reclusion perpetua, and that indemnity of P50,000 for the death of Gregory Bitmead be paid to his lawful
heirs.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

1wphi1.nt

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127756-58

June 18, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
BENJAMIN MEDINA, SR. yPALANCIO, Appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before this Court on automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27,
finding appellant Benjamin Medina, Sr. y Palancio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape and
imposing upon him the supreme penalty of triple death2 and life imprisonment.3
The appellant was charged with four counts of rape upon the sworn complaint of the victim Ma. Theresa Salvatierra
which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 7062
That on or about the 3rd day of August 1996, in the morning, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, motivated by lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
Ma. Theresa Salvatierra y Basa, who is above twelve years old but under 18 years of age, and the accused is the step
father of the complainant, to the latters damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 7099
That sometime in the year 1990, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, motivated by lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Ma. Theresa
Salvatierra y Basa, the girl then being six (6) years old and the accused is the stepfather of the complainant, to the
latters damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 7100

That sometime in the year 1994, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, motivated by lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Ma. Theresa
Salvatierra y Basa, the girl then being ten (10) years old and the accused is the stepfather of the complainant, to the
latters damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 7101
That on or about the 3rd day of August 1996, in the evening, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, motivated by lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
Ma. Theresa Salvatierra y Basa, who is above twelve years old but under 18 years of age, and the accused is the
stepfather of the complainant, to the latters damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the arraignment on September 18, 1996, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to each
charge of rape.4 The four criminal cases were thereafter jointly tried.
The Evidence of the Prosecution5
The Spouses Cornelio Salvatierra and Virginia M. Basa had three children, namely: Ma. Theresa, born on March 22,
1983,6 Shiela and Pajek. For some reason, the marriage failed and the couple decided to live separately. By March
1990, Virginia and the appellant began living together as husband and wife. The appellant was then about twenty
years old. Virginias children by her husband also stayed with them in the farm of De Belen at Barangay Patallac,
Cabanatuan City. Ma. Theresa could no longer remember her biological father and regarded the appellant as
her tatay.
Shortly thereafter, still in 1990, the appellant asked Ma. Theresa to accompany him to catch fish in a creek at the De
Belen farm by means of pante. It was then noontime. She agreed. While they were preparing the pante, the appellant
suddenly embraced her. Frightened, Ma. Theresa fled, but the appellant caught up with her. He led her to a grassy
place and undressed her. He then removed his short pants and briefs and laid on top of her. He held both her hands
and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt excruciating pain. Completely helpless, Ma. Theresa cried. After
satiating his lust, the appellant dismounted. He threatened to kill her, including her mother and sister, if she told
them about what he did to her. Cowed by the appellants threat, Ma. Theresa kept the harrowing incident to herself.
By 1994, the appellant, Virginia and her children had by then transferred their residence to Manoy Taba, Barangay
Patallac. One day, at around noontime, Ma. Theresa was left alone in the house with the appellant. He had earlier
sent away her younger sister Shiela on an errand to buy cigarettes. Ma. Theresa was outside the house when the
appellant summoned her inside, and asked her to help him squeeze the pimple on his back. Ma. Theresa dutifully did
as told. Forthwith, the appellant took hold of Ma. Theresas hands, pulled her and forced her to lie down on the
wooden bed. She resisted, but the appellant was too strong for her. He removed her dress and undressed himself. The
appellant then laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her sexual organ. Ma. Theresa again felt pain. After a few
minutes, the appellant dismounted. The appellant once more threatened to kill her and her family if she told them
what he had done to her. Ma. Theresa kept the ordeal to herself because of the appellants threat.

In 1996, the appellant and Virginia had transferred their residence to Paloc, Sta. Arcadia, Cabanatuan City. At around
noontime of August 3, 1996, the appellant and Ma. Theresa were left alone in the house. Virginia was out selling
fish, while Shiela was again sent out on an errand by the appellant. Ma. Theresa was in the kitchen when the
appellant suddenly grabbed her arms. He then pulled her to the bedroom and made her lie down on the wooden bed.
She put up a struggle, but the appellant held her hands, pinned down her legs and then laid on top of her. The
appellant removed her clothes and undressed himself. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. Again, Ma. Theresa
felt pain on her sexual organ. After several minutes, he dismounted. He warned Ma. Theresa anew against reporting
the matter to her mother. But he told her that after the harvest, he would bring her to Mindoro.
Later that evening, Ma. Theresa was sleeping with Shiela, when she was suddenly awakened by the appellant. When
she stood up, the appellant grabbed and pulled her towards the other unoccupied wooden bed. He undressed Ma.
Theresa and laid on top of her. Ma. Theresa again tried to free herself, to no avail. After unclothing himself, he
forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina.
On August 6, 1996, Virginia was doing laundry when Shiela told her that the appellant had a nickname for Ma.
Theresa. She told her mother that the appellant called Ma. Theresa Tamis because her private part was sweet.
Virginia was incensed, and asked Shiela where she and Ma. Theresa slept on August 3, 1996, when Virginia was not
in the house. Shiela replied that Ma. Theresa slept beside the appellant. Virginia then asked Ma. Theresa if the
appellant did anything to her. Ma. Theresa became hysterical and tearfully embraced her mother. She was trembling
as she told her mother that the appellant would kill them if she said anything. Virginia assured her daughter that they
would soon leave the appellant. It was only then that Ma. Theresa narrated everything to Virginia, how and when the
appellant sexually assaulted her. Ma. Theresa confided to her mother that the appellant had been raping her since
1990, and that the last time she was raped was on August 3, 1996. Virginia was afraid that if they all left the house,
they might be killed by the appellant. Thus, she instructed her daughter to go to school as usual and to meet her in
the street corner after class if she and her sister could leave the house; otherwise, Virginia told Ma. Theresa, she
would send somebody to fetch them. Virginia forthwith left the house. Ma. Theresa and Sheila could not leave
because the appellant ordered Ma. Theresa to cook rice, and Shiela to catch fish at the pretil. Unknown to Ma.
Theresa, her mother had already told their neighbors what the appellant had done to her daughter. Ma. Theresa was
surprised when their neighbors, including Mang Araboy, arrived at their house armed with bolos and empty pails,
pretending to gather kangkong near the house of the appellant. Momentarily, the appellant arrived and greeted the
visitors. He was shocked when one of the visitors grabbed him by the neck and demanded to know: "Is it true that
you molested your daughter?" The appellant tried to disengage himself and enter the house, but failed when the
same visitor boxed him. The neighbors then brought Ma. Theresa to the barangay hall where she met her mother.
The rape incidents were reported to the police authorities on August 7, 1996. On the same day, Ma. Theresa gave her
sworn statement to the police investigator.
Dr. Ma. Lorraine de Guzman, an obstetrician-gynecologist, conducted a physical examination on Ma. Theresa. In
her medical report, Dr. de Guzman disclosed her findings, stating in part:
External Genitalia: no pubic hair noted, labia majora and minora are not yet prominent, no discharge noted.
Internal Examination: Cervix admits 1 finger with ease, 2 fingers with difficulty, multiple hymenal lacerations
with old shallow healed laceration at 12,2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11:00 oclock position, no discharge noted, Uterus small,
Adnexae-negative.
PREGNANCY TEST - NEGATIVE. Gram. Staining-negative [of] the [presence] of spermatozoa.7
The Evidence of the Appellant

The appellant denied having raped Ma. Theresa. He avers that it was his son Benjamin, Jr. who had consensual
sexual relations with Ma. Theresa. He testified that he was married to Mercedes Estabillo by whom he had two
children, Benjamin Medina, Jr. who was born in 1980 and Arlene Medina, who was born in 1983. However,
Mercedes married another man. The children lived with their mother in General Natividad, Nueva Ecija.
The appellant met Virginia and they started living together as husband and wife in March 1990. They had a turbulent
life together. She was the jealous type and they quarreled often. Virginia actually suspected that the appellant and her
daughter had an amorous relationship. She even told Ma. Theresa that perhaps Ma. Theresa wanted to take her place
as the live-in partner of the appellant.
In 1992, Alfredo Medina, the appellants father, moved in with the appellant and his second family. Aifredo helped
the couple reap palay and looked after the children as well. The appellants children and Virginias daughters got
acquainted with each other. Ma. Theresa and Arlene (the appellants daughter) studied in the same school. Benjamin,
Jr. was a frequent visitor in their house in Sta. Arcadia. When he stayed the night, he slept with Ma. Theresa, Shiela
and his grandfather in one room. He treated the girls like his own sisters.
In 1994, Benjamin, Jr. stayed in his fathers house for about a year. In the month of November, the appellant saw his
son and Ma. Theresa, having sexual intercourse in the farm. Ma. Theresa was barely ten years old then. The
appellant knew it was immoral, but he kept silent about the incident because he did not want to have problems with
Virginia. In June of 1996, Benjamin, Jr. came for a visit and stayed for two nights. The appellant again saw his son
and Mr. Theresa having sexual intercourse. When he talked to Benjamin, Jr., the latter said that he liked Ma.
Theresa. The appellant kept the matter to himself.
In the evening of August 6, 1996, the appellant and Virginia had a violent quarrel. He told her that he was leaving
her. Virginia was enraged. She then instigated her young daughter Ma. Theresa to charge him with rape, to get back
at him for wanting to leave her.
In due course, the trial court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty of four counts of rape. The dispositive
portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused BENJAMIN MEDINA y PALANCIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of:
1. Life imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 7099 and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
2. Death in Criminal Case No. 7100 and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages;
3. Death in Criminal Case No. 7101 and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages; and
4. Death in Criminal Case No. 7062 and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.8
In his appeal brief, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court, contending that:

1. THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED BIAS AND PARTIALITY THEREBY DEPRIVING THE ACCUSED
APPELLANT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL WHEN THE PRESIDING JUDGE ACTIVELY
PARTICIPATED IN THE EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINING WITNESS AND THAT OF DRA. MA.
LORRAINE DE GUZMAN BY ASKING LEADING QUESTIONS AND ON CROSS EXAMINATION
OF THE ACCUSED.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
COMPLAINING WITNESS IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM.9
On the contention of the appellant that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, he argues
that the trial judge exhibited bias and partiality in favor of the prosecution when he propounded leading questions to
Dr. Ma. Lorraine de Guzman requiring hearsay testimony. The judge allegedly asked questions on matters pertaining
to his defense even before the prosecution rested its case. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends
that the questions propounded by the judge to the witness for the prosecution were meant merely to expedite the
proceedings and to clarify events subject of her testimony. Besides, the counsel of the appellant never interposed any
objections to the questions of the trial court, and even cross-examined the said witness on those matters.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General.
The trial judge in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts. The judge has the right, nay the duty, to
ask questions to elicit relevant facts and to make the records bear the truth. He is not a mere figurehead or an umpire
in a trial and it is his duty to see that justice is done. He cannot be expected to remain always passive and stoic
during the proceedings.10 Being the arbiter, the judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to
expedite the progress of the trial and prevent unnecessary waste of time. 11
The trial judge may even be considered negligent in the performance of his duties if he permits a miscarriage of
justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material facts
upon which the judgment in the case should turn.12 In an effort to ascertain the truth, a judge may examine or crossexamine a witness by leading questions. He may even seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that
testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.13 Questions designed to clarify
points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.
The extent to which the trial judge may intervene in the presentation of evidence must largely be a matter of
discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case.14 But the interrogatory must be such as not
to intimate or express an opinion as to the truth of the case or the merits of the contentions of either of the parties.
An intimation of opinion by question is as repugnant as a direct statement of opinion.15 The judge must remember
that he is as much judge on behalf of the accused whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the State
for the purpose of safeguarding the interest of a society.16
In this case, the appellant asserts that the trial judge propounded leading questions requiring hearsay evidence to Dr.
de Guzman, which in some way, helped the prosecution build its theory of the case. The questions objected to by the
appellant and the answers to said questions read:
The Court believes that the questions propounded by the trial judge to Dr. de Guzrnan were proper, the purpose of
which was only to clarify certain aspects of the testimony of the doctor in relation to the examination of the private
complainant and her report thereon20 and not really to help the prosecution build its case against the appellant.

The questions of the trial judge do not call for hearsay evidence. The purpose of the trial judge in propounding
questions to the doctor was to elicit informations relayed to her by the private complainant as the bases for the
physical examination and not to prove the truth of the said informations. In other words, the questions call for
independently relevant statements.21
The appellant cannot now argue that he was prejudiced by the questions of the trial judge on Dr. de Guzman. The
counsel of the appellant did not register a whimper of protest to the questions of the trial judge. The records show
that the appellant, through counsel, even cross-examined the doctor on the private complainants answers regarding
her (private complainants) medical history. The doctor stated that it was her duty to take down the medical history
of the private complainant preparatory to and in the course of her examination, The doctor even confirmed on crossexamination her answers to the questions of the trial court that no less than the private complainant had informed her
that she had been raped by the appellant several times:
Neither can the appellant contend that the questions of the trial judge pertaining to the absence of new lacerations in
the private complainants hymen were improper. By his questions, the trial judge merely wanted to know how it was
possible for the private complainant to have been raped on August 3, 1996 and yet when she was examined on
August 7, 1996, no fresh lacerations were found in her hymen. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented the
doctor as an expert witness. The trial judge had the right to require the doctor to give her expert opinion upon the
matter subject of her testimony and in relation to her report on her examination of the private complainant. 23 The
opinion of the doctor was important, although not conclusive on the trial judge in the resolution of the primordial
issue before him whether or not the private complainant was raped on August 3, 1996 two times as claimed by
her on direct examination.
The appellant cannot likewise fault the trial judge for asking the private complainant if aside from the appellant,
there was another male residing in the house. There is no evidence on record that when the trial judge asked the said
questions, he already knew the defenses yet to be established by the appellant after the prosecution had rested its
case.
The appellants claim that the trial judge was biased in favor of the prosecution is belied by his own admission
during trial that the judge exerted every effort to have his witnesses brought to the court for them to testify for the
appellant:
Coming from the very mouth of the accused, your honor, that he has no other witnesses to testify in his favor and
notwithstanding the effort of this Honorable Court to have certain persons to testify in his favor, these persons failed
to appear despite receipt of the subpoena from this Court. After the witness testified by himself and considering that
the defense has no other witness to present the defense respectfully rests its case, your honor.24
On the second assignment of errors, the appellant avers that he was deprived of his right to be informed of the
charges against him in Criminal Cases Nos. 7099 and 7100, because the complaints filed in the said cases did not
state the precise dates when the crimes were committed by the appellant. He contends that the complaints are
defective because the same merely allege that the crimes were committed in 1990 and 1994. The appellant asserts
that if the precise date of the commission of the crime in Criminal Case No. 7099 was properly alleged in the
complaint, he would have been able to prove that it would have been impossible for him to have raped the private
complainant in the creek during dry season because people would usually go to the creek during this time. He would
not have dared rape the victim with people within the vicinity of the creek. He further claims that he could not have
raped the private complainant on August 3, 1996 because when the latter was examined by Dr. de Guzman on
August 7, 1996, the doctor found no fresh lacerations in the hymen of the private complainant. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to prove that he used force or intimidation in raping the victim on the said date. The trial court

erred in not giving credence and probative weight to his testimony that it was his son, Benjamin Medina, Jr. who had
raped the victim.
The contentions of the appellant are bereft of merit.
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to
have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a).
The precise date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of said crime. Failure to specify the exact
dates when the rapes were committed does not render the complaints defective. Allegations in the Complaints in
Criminal Cases Nos. 7099 and 7100 that the crimes charged were committed in 1990 and 1994 are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the said rule. Indeed, in People v. Lizada,25 this Court ruled:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective
on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the
offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that
allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days
thereafter," "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about
and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the dates when the sexual assaults took place,
we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were committed, "sometime during the month of March 1996 or
thereabout," "sometime during the month of April 1996 or thereabout," "sometime during the month of May 1996 or
thereabout" substantially apprised appellant of the crimes he was charged with since all the elements of rape were
stated in the informations. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the
nature of the cases filed against him. Accordingly, appellant's assertion that he was deprived of the opportunity to
prepare for his defense has no leg to stand on.
Significantly, the appellant did not even bother filing in the court a quo a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule
116, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before arraignment. The appellant was duly arraigned
with the assistance of counsel under the Informations and entered his plea of not guilty to the charges. The appellant
was able to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. He even adduced evidence to prove his defenses after
the prosecution had rested its case. Indeed, the appellant testified that it was his son Benjamin Medina, Jr. who had
consensual sexual intercourse with the private complainant and that the charges lodged against him are but
concoctions of his common-law wife Virginia. He also averred that it was impossible for him to have raped the
private complainant in the creek.26 It was only on appeal that the appellant alleged for the first time that the criminal
complaints were defective. The Court believes that the appellants assertion is but an afterthought.
The lack of fresh lacerations in the hymen of the private complainant when she was examined by the doctor on
August 7, 1996 does not negate the commission of the rape on August 3, 1996. Case law has it that a freshly
lacerated hymen is not an essential element of rape.27 Mere touching, no matter slight of the labia or lips of the
female organ by the male genital even without rapture or laceration of the hymen is sufficient to consummate

rape.28 Besides, Dr. de Guzman testified that there could be no new or fresh lacerations on the hymen of the private
complainant after she was raped on August 3, 1996 because she was no longer a virgin as of the said date:
In reviewing rape cases, the Court has always been guided by three well-entrenched principles: (a) that an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves two persons, the
complainants testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of evidence of the
defense.32 Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the
credibility of the complainant's testimony.33 The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the foregoing
testimony of the private complainant as it aptly observed, thus:
The Court has carefully perused the testimonies of the complainant and found that the same were related in all
candor and sincerity; the testimonies of Maria Theresa Salvatierra are credible and, therefore, sufficient to sustain a
verdict of conviction; her straightforward narration of the rape incidents that occurred before, during and after the
rapes were consistent, unwavering and, therefore, obvious proof of the veracity of her declaration.34
The unbroken line of jurisprudence is that this Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the
credibility of witnesses. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken
by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude, especially under cross-examination. Its assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and value
were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.35
There is nothing in the records that would impel this Court to deviate from the said findings and conclusion of the
trial court. Indeed, the private complainant testified in a categorical, straightforward and consistent manner. Her
testimony, bearing badges of truth, is sufficient to establish the appellants guilt for the crimes charged. 36
In contrast, the appellants bare denial of the crimes charged is inherently weak. It cannot prevail over the positive,
candid and categorical testimony of the private complainant, whose credibility was upheld by the trial court.
Between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the appellant, the
former deserves more credence.37 Denials must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.38 There is none
in the case at bar.
The appellants claim that Virginia fabricated the rape charges because of jealousy and to get back at him for
wanting to leave her is flimsy and fanciful. An act of desperation is the appellants insistence that the lacerations on
the hymen of the private complainant were caused by her sexual relations with his son Benjamin, Medina, Jr. A
young girl on the verge of womanhood would not concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts, and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of a public trial, unless she
was in fact raped.39 Further, it is unnatural for a mother to use her offspring as an instrument of malice, even for the
purpose of avenging a personal slight, especially if it will subject her daughter to the embarrassment and stigma
attendant to a rape trial.40 The appellant has failed to show any ill or dubious motive on the part of the private
complainant and her mother to impute such grave crimes upon him. The revelation of the private complainant could
have been borne only by her desire to obtain justice for the wrongs committed by the appellant against her.41 If
indeed Benjamin Medina, Jr. had consensual sexual intercourse with the private complainant, he could have testified
to bolster his fathers defense. However, despite the subpoenae ad testificandum served upon him, he refused to
testify for the appellant.
The Proper Penalties for the Felonies

When the appellant raped the private complainant in 1990, the prescribed penalty for the crime under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code was reclusion perpetua.
The proper penalty imposable on the appellant in Criminal Case No. 7099 is reclusion perpetua, not life
imprisonment. It bears reiterating that reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous penalties. They
are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties.42 The Court distinguished the two penalties in this wise:
The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of "life imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein
defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the . . . Code but by the special
law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for
pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as
"life imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not
appear to have any definite extent or duration.43
The penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant in Criminal Case No. 7099 shall thus be modified
accordingly.
On the other hand, when the appellant raped the private complainant some time in 1994, and twice on August 3,
1996, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the law which
re-imposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. Article 335, as amended by Section 11 of Rep. Act No.
7659, provides in part:

The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.

While the Court affirms the trial courts finding that the appellant is likewise guilty beyond reasonable doubt of each
count of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 7100, 7101 and 7062, it finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty on the appellant for the said crimes. To warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the minority of the
victim and her relationship with the accused must be both alleged and proved. 44
Although the minority of the private complainant had been established by the prosecution, her relationship to the
appellant was not alleged and proved concurrently. The complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 7100, 7101 and 7062
uniformly allege that the appellant is the "stepfather" of the private complainant. However, this allegation was not
proven during the trial, as the evidence adduced therein shows that the appellant is merely the common-law spouse
of Virginia, the mother of the private complainant. Virginia and the appellant were never legally married to each
other; hence, the appellant could not be considered the private complainants "stepfather." On the other hand, while
it was indeed proven that the appellant was the common-law husband of the victims mother, the same was not
alleged in the criminal complaints. Given the discrepancy between the allegation of the nature of the relationship
between the appellant and the victim in the criminal complaints and what was proven during the trial, the appellant

can only be found guilty of simple rape. Consequently, the penalties imposed in Criminal Cases Nos. 7100, 7101
and 7062 shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count of simple rape.
The Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
Likewise, a modification of the damages awarded in favor of Ma. Theresa is in order. The amount of P50,000
awarded by the trial court as "moral and exemplary damages" for each count is insufficient. Under prevailing
jurisprudence, when the commission of rape is not qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is to be imposed, the victim shall be awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000. 45 Civil indemnity is
separate and distinct from moral damages. In this case, the private complainant shall be awarded p50,000 as civil
indemnity for each count of rape. In addition, the award of P50,000 as moral damages for each count is warranted,
as the same is awarded in rape cases without need of pleading or proof for it is assumed that the victim has suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such an award.46 Lastly, the appellant should be made to pay exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000 for each count, to deter others similarly minded from sexually abusing the children of their
common-law spouses.47
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 23, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 7062, 7099, 7100 and 7101 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Benjamin
Medina, Sr. y Palancio is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of simple rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. He is, likewise, ordered to pay private
complainant Ma. Theresa Salvatierra, the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and
P25,000 as exemplary damages for each of the four counts of rape.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127327

February 13, 2009

LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO, and CRISANTO AMBITO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Decision1 of respondent Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 12727, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Liberata Ambito, et al., filed by petitioners Liberata Ambito, Basilio Ambito and Crisanto
Ambito. The assailed CA decision affirmed the judgment of conviction of multiple charges of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) meted upon co-petitioner Basilio Ambito; multiple charges of the complex offense
of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), meted upon co-petitioners Liberata and Basilio Ambito; and two charges of
Falsification of Commercial Document, as defined and penalized under Articles 171 and 172 of the RPC, meted
upon co-petitioner Crisanto Ambito in the Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City,
Branch 26, dated November 29, 1990, in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14587.
The facts of this case, as summarized in the assailed CA decision, are as follows:
Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were the principal owners of two rural banks in the province of Iloilo namely,
the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in the municipality of Leon, and the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. in the
municipality of Banate. In addition, the spouses Ambito were the owners of Casette [Kajzette] Enterprises, a
commercial establishment in Jaro, Iloilo City engaged in procuring farm implements intended for the use of the
agricultural loan borrowers of the said banks. The spouses Ambito obtained their supply of farm implements and
spare parts from the Iloilo City branch of Pacific Star Inc. which was then engaged in selling Yanmar machineries
and spare parts.
On several occasions in 1979, the spouses Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito transacted business with Pacific Star,
Inc. whereby they purchased Yanmar machineries and spare parts from the said company allegedly for the use of the
loan borrowers of their banks. In these transactions, the spouses Ambito made down payments in their purchases
either in case, in checks or in certificates of time deposit issued by the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.
However, when the Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank) checks issued by Basilio Ambito
as down paymentof their purchases were presented for payment by the drawee bank, the same were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. These are Check No. 79173946 dated June 20, 1979 in the amount of P39,168.75 (Exh. A,
CC No. 14556); Check No. 79173948 dated June 15, 1979 in the amount of P75,595.00 (Exh. A, CC 14557);
Check No. 79173947 dated June 30, 1979 in the amount of P45,957.00 (Exh. A, CC No. 14558); Check No.

79182639 dated October 18, 1979 in the amount of P4,501.36 (Exh. A, CC No. 14559); Check No. 79182638
dated September 27, 1979 in the amount of P1,957.60 (Exh. A, CC No. 14560); Check No. 79182637 dated
September 18, 1979 in the amount of P 2,425.50 (Exh. A, CC No. 14561) and Check No. 79175930 dated August
9, 1979 in the amount of P2,875.25 (Exh. A, CC No. 14562).
At the time the spouses Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito made purchases of farm implements from the Pacific
Star, Inc. in 1979, the general manager of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. was Liberata Ambito herself and the
cashier, Marilyn Traje, while the general manager of the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. was Crisanto Ambito,
brother of Basilio Ambito, and the cashier, Reynaldo Baron.
On three separate occasions, Liberata Ambito forced the cashier of the Rural Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign
several blank certificates of time deposit and to give the same to her alleging that she needed the said certificates in
connection with some transactions involving the bank. Marilyn Traje at first refused to give Liberata Ambito the said
certificates but the latter scolded her, at the same time assuring her that she would be responsible to anybody for the
issuance of said certificates including personnel and investigators of the Central Bank tasked with the examination
of the accounts of the bank. Afraid that she would lose her job if she would not follow Liberata Ambito. Marilyn
Traje signed and gave the blank certificates of time deposit to her without receiving any consideration therefore.
The same thing happened to Reynaldo Baron, the cashier of the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. who was
asked by the spouses Ambito as well as the manager of the bank, Crisanto Ambito, to sign and give blank certificates
of time deposit to them. Reynaldo Baron was at first hesitant to accommodate the request of the Ambitos but due to
their persistence and considering that they were his superiors and owners of the bank, Baron signed the certificates
of time deposit in blank and gave the same to the Ambitos. When Baron asked for the duplicate copies of the
certificates, he was told that they were still negotiating with Pacific Star, Inc. Later, the Ambitos told Baron that the
transaction was cancelled and that he should just cause the printing of similar blank certificates by the Apostol
Printing Press in Iloilo City. Baron got scared and objected to the idea vouched to him by the Ambitos until finally
he resigned from his job because he could no longer withstand the pressure exerted on him involving transactions he
believed were anomalous. Baron worked as cashier of the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. from August to
December 1979. When the Central Bank investigators came and conducted examination of the records and
transactions of the bank, Baron reported the anomalies to them.
The blank certificates of time deposit of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained by the spouses Basilio and Liberata
Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up with the amounts of deposit and the name of the Pacific Star, Inc. as
depositor and used by the spouses as down payments of the purchase price of the machineries and spare parts
purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc. These certificates of time deposit are as follows:
The certificates of time deposit of the Community Rural Bank of Leon found to have been falsified are (1)
Certificate of Time Deposit No. 039 , due date February 4, 1980 in the amount of P32,555.25 (Exh. A, Crim. Case
No. 14586) and (2) Certificate of Time Deposit No. 040, due date February 14, 1980 in the amount of P9,103.19
(Exh. A, Crim. Case No. 14587).
The said certificates of time deposit supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of the Banate, Inc. and the Community
Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded and not covered by any deposit so that when presented for redemption by
the (sic) Pacific Star, Inc., the same were not honored. As a consequence, Pacific Star, Inc. suffered actual damages
in the amounts representing the total value of the machineries and spare parts sold and delivered by the complainant
to the Ambitos and the latter failed and refused to pay the same despite demands on them.

In view of the anomalous transactions entered into by the Ambitos, both the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. became insolvent and so sometime in May 7, 1980, the Central Bank of the
Philippines placed both banks under receivership and liquidation. Maria Luz Preires, bank examiner of the Central
Bank, was appointed deputy receiver and later deputy liquidator of the Community Rural Bank of Leon. The Central
Bank took over the affairs and records of the banks including their deposits, assets and liabilities. Records showed
no certificate of time deposit in the name of Pacific Star, Inc. properly funded and covered by any deposit.
Anomalous issuances of certificates of time deposit were uncovered as, for instance, Community Rural Bank of
Leon, Inc. Certificates of Time Deposit Nos. 039 (Exh. A, Crim. Case No. 14586 and 040 (Exh. A, Crim. Case
No. 14587) which were supposed to be in the name of Pacific Star, Inc. were actually issued in the name of
Paciencia Cantara on October 17, 1979 and Francisco Alinsao on November 19, 1979 and only in the amounts
of P1,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively (Exh. B, Crim. Cases Nos. 14586 and 14587).
Subsequently, on complaint of Pacific Star, Inc., the Ambitos were charged of violations of B.P. Blg. 22,
Falsification and Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document under the Informations filed in the
aforecited cases.
After due proceedings, the Court a quo, promulgated a Decision, dated November 29, 1990, the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Cases Nos. 14556, 14557, 14558, 14559, 14560, 14561 and 14562, the Court hereby
finds the accused, Basilio Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of the provisions of
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in each of the seven cases, the
penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and to indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star,
Inc. the total sum of P173,480.55, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of
the Informations on May 10, 1982, until paid, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14574 and 14585, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document,
defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer in each case, an indeterminate sentence ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11)
DAYS of prision correccional as maximum, and pay a fine of P3,000.00 and to indemnify the offended party, Pacific
Star, Inc. the total sum of P18,287.00 with interests thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the date of the
filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982 until paid, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
together with the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14563, 14570, 14580, 14582 and 14584, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito
and Liberata Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Document, defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences the said accused to suffer, in each of these cases, an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from
TWO (2) YEARS, ELEVEN (11) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum, to SIX
(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and TWENTY ONE (21) DAYS of prision mayor as maximum, and to
indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of P83,095.00, with interests thereon at the legal rate
of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982 until paid, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14566, 14569, 14571 and 14573, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito and
Liberata Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Document, defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
the said accused to suffer, in each of these cases, an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum, and
to indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of P103,900.00 with interests thereon at the legal
rate of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982 until paid, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay costs.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14564 and 14578, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document,
defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer, in each of these cases, an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to ELEVEN (11) YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum, and to indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of P116,530.00 with interests
thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982 until
paid, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with the accessory penalties provided for by
law and to pay costs.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14565, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document, defined and
penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer, in each of these cases, an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum, and to
indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star, Inc., the sum of P35,190.00 with interests thereon at the legal rate of 12%
per annum from the date of the filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982 until paid, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay costs.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14567, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document, defined and penalized
in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said accused each, to suffer an
indeterminate prison sentence ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star,
Inc., the sum of P50,555.00 with interests thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of
the Informations on May 10, 1982 until paid, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with
the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay costs.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14568 and 14575, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document, defined and
penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer, in each of these cases, an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum, and to indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star, Inc., the sum of P134,375.00 with interests thereon at
the legal rate of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982 until paid, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay
costs.
1avvphi1

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14572, 14576 and 14581, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito and Liberata
Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document,
defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer, in each of these cases, an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of P235,170.00 with interests thereon at the legal rate
of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982 until paid, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay costs.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14577, 14579 and 14583, the Court hereby finds the accused, Basilio Ambito and Liberata
Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Document, defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
the said accused to suffer, in each of these cases, an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum,
and to indemnify the offended party, Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of P1,110,500.00 with interests thereon at the
legal rate of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982 until paid, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay
costs.
The foregoing penalties imposed upon the accused are, however, subject to the threefold rule as provided for in
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code so that the maximum duration of the accused imprisonment shall not be more
than three times the most severe of the penalties the total period of which not to exceed Forty (40) years.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14586 and 14587, the Court hereby finds the accused, Crisanto Ambito, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Falsification of Commercial Document, defined and penalized under Articles 171
and 172 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer, in each of these two cases, an
indeterminate prison sentence ranging from ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum,
to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum, and pay a fine of P2,000.00,
together with the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs. For insufficiency of evidence, Basilio
Ambito and Liberata Ambito are hereby ACQUITTED of the offenses charged in these Criminal Cases Nos. 14586
and 14587.
On reasonable doubt, the accused Marilyn Traje and Reynaldo Baron, are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
charged in all the criminal cases against them and the bail bonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby
ordered cancelled.3
After they were convicted by the RTC, petitioners appealed their case to respondent CA which, in turn, denied their
appeal via the assailed CA Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs
against the Appellants.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners promptly interposed a Motion for Reconsideration of the adverse CA Decision but this was succinctly
rejected by the CA in its Resolution5 dated November 8, 1996, hence, petitioners recourse to this Court for review
on certiorari.

This Court initially denied said Petition for Review on Certiorari6 through a Resolution7 dated January 29, 1997 on
the ground that the said petition raised factual issues. Undaunted, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration8dated February 25, 1997 seeking to persuade this Court to give due course to their petition which
this Court granted in a Resolution9 dated April 28, 1997, thereby reinstating the petition. Respondents were required
to file comment on the petition as ordered in the same Resolution. Respondents filed their Comment 10 on September
9, 1997, while petitioners filed a delayed Reply11 on September 4, 1998. In turn, respondents filed a Rejoinder12 on
January 18, 1999.
On January 17, 2005, this Court issued a Resolution13 directing both parties to submit their respective memoranda
within thirty (30) days from notice. Respondents submitted their Memorandum 14 on March 18, 2005 but petitioners
failed to submit theirs despite the fact that this Court had already granted numerous extensions of time to file as
requested by petitioners counsel. This Court even resorted to imposing a fine on petitioners counsel for his repeated
non-compliance as stated by our Resolution15 dated March 8, 2006 but to no avail. Thus, in a Resolution16 dated June
20, 2007, this Court resolved to dispense with the filing of petitioners memorandum.
lawphil

In their Petition,17 petitioners raised the following grounds:

A. THE RESONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE
PETITIONERS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES IMPUTED TO THEM, THERE BEING UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT FROM THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTIONS AND DEALINGS BETWEEN
THE PETITIONERS AND PSI FOR A LONG PERIOD OF 14 YEARS, THE LIABILITY OF THE
PETITIONERS, IF ANY, IS ONLY CIVIL IN NATURE, AND NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY ATTACHES TO
THEM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE
PETITIONERS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ALL THE OFFENSES IMPUTED TO THEM,
THE FACTS OF THE CASE SHOWING THAT THE VALUE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS AND CCTDS
[CREDIT CERTIFICATES OF TIME DEPOSIT] HAVE ALREADY BEEN FULLY PAID PRIOR TO THE
INSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES BELOW.
C. ANENT CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 14556 TO 14562, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE PETITIONER BASILIO AMBITO GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF BP22 DESPITE THE LACK OF
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PRIOR NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT OF THE
ALLEGED DISHONORED CHECKS GIVEN BY PSI TO PETITIONERS.
D. ANENT CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 14556, 14557 AND 14558, THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING PETITIONER BASILIO AMBITO GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF BP22
DESPITE THAT THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE NOT PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT WITHIN 90 DAYS
FROM DATE OF CHECK.
E. ANENT CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 14556 AND 14557, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING PETITIONER BASILIO AMBITO GUILTY OF THE
OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF BP22 DESPITE THAT THERE WAS IN EACH CASE NO PROPER EVIDENCE
OFFERED TO PROVE THE CRIME CHARGED.
F. ANENT CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 14563 TO 14585, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA BY FALSE PRETENSES COMPLEXED WITH FALSIFICATION OF A

COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT, THERE BEING PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THE LACK
OF THE ELEMENT OF DECEIT.
G. ANENT CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 14563 TO 14585, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF ESTAFA BY FALSE PRETENSES COMPLEXED WITH FALSIFICATION OF A COMMERCIAL
DOCUMENT, IT BEING CLEAR FROM THE FACE OF THE SUBJECT CCTDS THEMSELVES THAT THERE
THEREIN EXISTS NO FALSE NARRATION OF FACTS.
H. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO
RESOLVE THE ASSIGNED ERROR OF DOUBLE PAYMENT OF IMDEMNITY OR CIVIL LIABILITY ON
THE MERITS THEREOF, IT BEING IN A POSITION TO DO SO, AND DESPITE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE
PRIOR INSTITUTION OF THE CIVIL CASE INVOLVING THE SAME TRANSACTIONS AS IN THE CASES
AT BAR.18
In essence, petitioners recourse to this Court is hinged on their belief that their conviction in the lower court was not
based on proof beyond reasonable doubt and that the respondent CA failed to perform its duty to fully ascertain
whether the prosecutions evidence was sufficient enough to warrant a finding that would support their conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
We hold the petition to be meritorious in part.
Anent the issue of whether or not co-petitioner Basilio Ambitos conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562
for the seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was in accordance with law, petitioners argue that he cannot be
convicted of the same since the prosecution allegedly failed to prove the dispensable elements of prior notice of
dishonor and demand for payment of the checks at issue.19 Furthermore, they insist that there is no violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, particularly in Criminal Case Nos. 14556, 14557 and 14558 as the subject checks therein were presented for
payment more than ninety (90) days from date.20
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that petitioners claim of necessary and indispensable
elements of notice of dishonor and demand to pay cannot be found in the statute defining the essential elements of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The OSG further insists that, from among the said essential elements, there is no particular
manner prescribed in which the person who made and issued the dishonored checks should be notified of the fact of
dishonor.
Be that as it may, the OSG avers that as far as the checks subject of the charges of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in these
criminal cases are concerned, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito had been more than sufficiently notified of the fact of
dishonor because on December 28, 1979, Pacific Star, Inc. (PSI) filed with Branch 2 of the RTC of Manila a civil
complaint for collection against petitioners, or more than three (3) years before the thirty-two (32) Informations for
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against
petitioners on May 10, 1982. Within that three-year span of time, the OSG points out, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito
failed to pay the value of the checks despite having been notified of their dishonor. 21
As to petitioners contention that the prosecution was not able to prove the indispensable element that the drawer
had knowledge that the checks were not backed up by sufficient funds since the checks subject of Criminal Case
Nos. 14556, 14557 and 14558 were presented for payment more than ninety (90) days from date, the OSG claims
that the said element had been clearly established by the petitioners testimony in the lower court where petitioners

contend that the subject checks were issued only as mere guarantee and, as such, were not supposed to be deposited
as previously agreed by PSI and petitioners.22 In any case, the OSG argues that under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, the
makers knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of the check for
insufficiency of funds.23
After carefully reviewing the records and the submissions of the parties, we find that the prosecutions evidence was
inadequate to prove co-petitioner Basilio Ambitos guilt beyond reasonable doubt for seven (7) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or
for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.24
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.25 Thus, the mere act of issuing a worthless check
whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt is malum prohibitum. 26
In light of the foregoing, petitioners contention in the lower court that the subject checks were only issued as mere
guarantee and were not intended for deposit as per agreement with PSI is not tenable. Co-petitioner Basilio Ambito
would be liable under B.P. Blg. 22 by the mere fact that he issued the subject checks, provided that the other
elements of the crime are properly proved.
With regard to the second element, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence. A disputable
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is assumed from the act of making,
drawing, and issuing a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when
presented within 90 days from the date of issue. However, such presumption does not arise when the maker or
drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the check within five banking days after receiving notice that
such check had been dishonored. In order for the maker or drawer to pay the value thereof or make arrangements for
its payment within the period prescribed by law, it is therefore necessary and indispensable for the maker or drawer
to be notified of the dishonor of the check.
Under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that was subsequently
dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he
or she failed, within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution
for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.27
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually sent to and
received by the accused. The accused has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the
notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by the same to afford him/her the opportunity to avert prosecution
under B.P. Blg. 22.28

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records that would indicate that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was given any
notice of dishonor by PSI or by Manila Bank, the drawee bank, when the subject checks were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds upon presentment for payment. In fact, all that the OSG can aver regarding this matter is that
co-petitioner Basilio Ambito had been notified of the fact of dishonor since PSI filed a collection case against
petitioners more than three (3) years before the same filed the criminal cases before this Court. 29
Likewise, respondent CA merely cited, in its assailed Decision, co-petitioner Basilio Ambitos July 17, 1989 trial
court testimony as basis for concluding that he was properly informed of the dishonor of the subject checks, viz:
Appellant Basilios claim that he was never notified of the dishonor of the checks he issued in partial payments of
the purchases Kazette Enterprises made from PSI is belied by his own admission made when he testified in the
Court a quo thus:
Nothwithstanding his notice of the dishonor of the checks, Appellant failed to replace the same with cash or make
arrangements with PSI, for the payments of the amounts of the checks. 30
Verily, the aforementioned circumstances are not in accord with the manner or form by which a notice of dishonor
should be made under the law and existing jurisprudence.
The notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to the drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the check,
or the offended party either by personal delivery or by registered mail. The notice of dishonor to the maker of a
check must be in writing.31
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction,
however with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay
would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court has previously held that both the spirit and
letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused
issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of
dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.32
There being no proof that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was given any written notice either by PSI or by Manila
Bank informing him of the fact that his checks were dishonored and giving him five (5) banking days within which
to make arrangements for payment of the said checks, the rebuttable presumption that he had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds has no application in the present case.
Due to the failure of prosecution in this case to prove that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was given the requisite
notice of dishonor and the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, We cannot
with moral certainty convict him of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
However, Basilio Ambitos acquittal for his violations of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove all
elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt did not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the
dishonored checks. In a number of similar cases,33 we have held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not
preclude the award of civil damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, in the
case at bar, the trial courts directive for Basilio Ambito to indemnify PSI the total sum of P173,480.55, with interest

thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982, until paid,
and to pay the costs is affirmed.
Anent the question of whether or not petitioner spouses Liberata and Basilio Ambitos conviction for the offense of
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioners
interposed the defense that they cannot be properly convicted of the same as there was no finding of false narration
of facts and of deceit.
Petitioners assert that PSI was not deceived by the issuance of the subject credit certificates of time deposit
(CCTDs), which did not contain a false narration of facts, for the reasons that: (i) said CCTDs, which were undated
as to their respective dates of issuance, did not state that funds had already been deposited by PSI; (ii) during the
course of their alleged fourteen-year long business relationship, PSI, which had been accepting said CCTDs, knew
that they were unfunded as said certificates of time deposit were issued to serve as "promissory notes" to guarantee
payment for the balance of the invoice price of the machineries;34 (iii) petitioners did not represent to PSI that "the
money was already deposited" because the subject CCTDs were "even postdated";35 (iv) the amounts stated in the
CCTDs were not "downpayments" but "CREDIT extended to petitioner Basilio Ambito payable six months after the
sales/purchases were made;36 (v) petitioners obligation is civil in nature because current and savings deposits
constitute loans to a bank and, thus, a CCTD is an evidence of a simple loan; 37 (vi) the essential element of fraud was
absent because PSI knew that the CCTDs issued to it by petitioners were not covered by funds because it knew that
the deposits were yet to be made when the farmers, to whom Basilio Ambito resold on credit the machineries, shall
have deposited in the rural banks their payments for those machineries;38(vii) the subject certificates of time deposit
issued to PSI were not ordinary certificates of time deposit but "CREDIT certificates of Time Deposit" because the
term "credit" indicates a "deferred or delayed nature of the payment," thus, signifying a promise to pay at a future
date;39 (viii) PSI was not defrauded as it gave discounts in its sales invoices if petitioners paid in full the value of the
certificates "on or before 180 days" from delivery. By giving discounts for early payment, it was thus aware of the
possibility that said certificates might not be funded when they fell due;40 (ix) the sales invoices issued by PSI gave it
the right to institute civil actions only and not criminal actions;41 and (x) petitioners had already performed their
obligations to PSI by way of the payment of the amount of P300,000.00 and the return of one unit Kubota
machinery valued at P 28,000.00.42
We are not persuaded. We find no reason to disturb the identical findings of the CA and the RTC regarding the
particular circumstances surrounding the petitioners conviction of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents because the same are adequately supported by the evidence on record.
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion.43
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment, are the following
(a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (b) That such false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. (c)
That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was
induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (d)
That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.44
In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,45 it is indispensable that the element of
deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least
simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.

The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which
induces the offended party to part with his money. In the absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the
accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under
the said provision.46
In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that they will pay the unpaid
balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI)
and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment to
RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay the amount of deposit stated thereon. The amounts stated in the CCTDs
correspond to the purchase cost of the machineries and equipment that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito bought from PSI
as evidenced by the Sales Invoices presented during the trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not apply for and
secure loans from RBBI and RBLI. In fine, PSI and co-petitioner Basilio Ambito were engaged in a vendorpurchaser business relationship while PSI and RBBI/RBLI were connected as depositor-depository. It is likewise
established that petitioners employed deceit when they were able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the
aforementioned machineries and equipment through down payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or
through the CCTDs with RBBI and RBLI issued in PSIs name with interest thereon. It was later found out that
petitioners never made any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI. In fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI
was not recorded in the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator appointed by the Central Bank of the
Philippines even corroborated this finding of anomalous bank transactions in her testimony during the trial. 47
As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is indubitable that petitioners representations were outright distortions
of the truth perpetrated by them for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and deliver to co-petitioner Basilio
Ambito machineries and equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits were ever made with RBBI and RBLI under
the name of PSI, as represented by the subject CCTDs, since they did not intend to deposit any amount to pay for the
machineries. PSI was an innocent victim of deceit, machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners which
resulted in its pecuniary damage and, thus, confirming the lower courts finding that petitioners are guilty of the
complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
The pronouncement by the appeals court that a complex crime had been committed by petitioners is proper because,
whenever a person carries out on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC48 as a necessary means to perpetrate another crime, like Estafa, Theft, or
Malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two crimes.
Under Article 48 of the RPC,49 a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave
felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for
committing the other (or others). Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are
committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other
(or others).50
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing Estafa, because
before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of Falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official
or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that
falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of Estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. 51

In the case before us, the issuance by petitioners of CCTDs which reflected amounts that were never deposited as
such in either RBBI or RBLI is Falsification under Articles 17152 and 17253 of the RPC. The particular criminal
undertaking consisted of petitioners, taking advantage of their position as owners of RBBI and RBLI, making
untruthful statements/representations with regard to the existence of time deposits in favor of PSI by issuing the
subject CCTDs without putting up the corresponding deposits in said banks.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC,54 the elements of falsification of public documents through an untruthful
narration of facts are: (1) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (3) the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false; and (4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure
a third person.55
As earlier discussed, the issuance of the falsified CCTDs for the sole purpose of obtaining or purchasing various
machinery and equipment from PSI amounts to the criminal offense of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
RPC.56 The petitioners falsified the subject CCTDs, which are commercial documents, to defraud PSI. Since the
falsification of the CCTDs was the necessary means for the commission of Estafa, the assailed judgment of the
appeals court convicting petitioners of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents
is correct.
Quite apart from the prosecutions successful discharge of its burden of proof, we find that the accused failed to
discharge their burden to prove their defense. To begin with, there appears to be no proof on record of the alleged
14-year financial arrangement between accused and PSI or the purported "consignment only" agreement between
them other than the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused. Moreover, we uphold the findings of
the CA and the court a quo as to the proper characterization of the CCTDs and the lack of credible, independent
evidence of the alleged payment of the accuseds obligations to PSI.
Finally, with respect to co-petitioner Crisanto Ambito, we find no reason to disturb the trial courts ruling that he is
liable for only the crime of Falsification of Commercial Documents in connection with CCTD Nos. 039 and 040 of
RBLI, there being no showing that the said CCTDs were used to purchase farm implements from PSI. 57
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 29, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with respect to petitioner spouses Basilio and
Liberata Ambitos conviction for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents (in Criminal Case Nos.
14563 to 14585) and with respect to co-petitioner Crisanto Ambitos conviction for Falsification of Commercial
Documents (in Criminal Case Nos. 14586 and 14587). However, the aforesaid Decision is REVERSED with respect
to co-petitioner Basilio Ambitos conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562),
who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the portion of the said Decision insofar as it directs Basilio Ambito to indemnify Pacific Star, Inc. the total
sum of P173,480.55, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the
Informations on May 10, 1982, until paid, and to pay the costs (also in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562) is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131714 November 16, 1998

EDUARDO R. VACA and FERNANDO NIETO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek a review of the decision, dated October 25, 1996, 1 and the resolution, dated December 2, 1997, 2 of the
Court of Appeals, affirming their conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100) for violation of B.P. Blg.
22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law."

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International, Inc. (Ervine), which is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment, while his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando Nieto, is the firm's
purchasing manager. On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the General Agency for
Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial payment of the security services rendered by
GARDS to Ervine. The check was drawn on the China Banking Corporation (CBC). When deposited in the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, the check was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

On March 29, 1988, GARDS wrote Ervine a letter in which it demanded payment in cash of the amount of the check
within seven days from notice. The letter was received by Ervine on the same day, but petitioners did not pay within
the time given.
On April 13, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P19,860.16 to GARDS. The check was drawn on the Associated
Bank. The voucher accompanying it stated that the check was to replace the dishonored check, the P9,860.16
balance being partial payment for Ervine's outstanding account. The check and the voucher were received by a
GARDS messenger, Nolan C. Pena, on April 15, 1988, but GARDS did not return the dishonored check.
On April 14, 1988, GARDS Operations Manager Jovito C. Cabusara filed a criminal complaint against petitioners
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After preliminary investigation, an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 97). However, the case was dismissed by the court on May 11, 1989, upon motion of the
prosecution, on the ground that Ervine had already paid the amount of the check.
On September 18, 1989, GARDS, through its Acting Operations Manager Eduardo B. Alindaya, filed another
complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 against petitioners. This resulted in the filing of an information against
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100). After trial, petitioners were found guilty of the
charge and each was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and the costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It subsequently denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
A. Respondent Court gravely erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to
prove petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
B. Respondent Court gravely erred in basing conviction on the alleged weakness
of the evidence of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution.
C. Respondent Court erred in not acquitting petitioners on grounds of "mistake
of fact" and "lack of knowledge."
Petitioners pray that the case against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the decision of the trial court be
modified by sentencing each to an increased fine but without imprisonment.
By supplemental petition, dated January 29, 1998, petitioners submitted an affidavit of desistance executed by
GARDS president Dominador R. Santiago which states that the case arose from a mere "accounting difference"
between petitioners and GARDS, that the latter had not really suffered any damage as a result of the issuance of the
check in question and, that GARDS was no longer interested in prosecuting the case.
On May 28, 1998, petitioners filed another supplemental petition, this time invoking the recent decision in Lao v.
Court of Appeals, 3 in which this Court reversed a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 upon a showing that the accused had
no knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.

The Solicitor General opposes the appeal. He contends that the facts of Lao v. Court of Appeals are different from
those of the case at bar and that the affidavit of desistance of Dominador Santiago is of no moment, such affidavit
having been made only after petitioners' conviction.

After due review of the decision in this case, we find that petitioners' conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is well
founded.
First. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check
to apply to account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the
check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop paymnent. 4 The
maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. 5 Thus, 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 expressly
provides:

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer
pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.
In this case, after being notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous check, petitioners gave GARDS
a check for P19,860.16. They claim that this check had been intended by them to replace the bad check they had
previously issued to the GARDS. Based on the testimony of a GARDS accountant, however, the Court of Appeals
found that the check was actually payment for two bills, one for the period of January 16 to January 31, 1988 in the
amount of P9,930.08 and another one for the period of March 16 to March 31, 1988 in the same amount. But even if
such check was intended to replace the bad one, its issuance on April 13, 1988 15 days after petitioners had been
notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous check cannot negate the presumption that petitioners
knew of the insufficiency of funds to cover the amount of their previous check. Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 requires that
such check be given within five (5) days from the notice of dishonor to them.
Petitioners contend that, in accordance with the ruling in Lao v. Court of Appeals, 6 they should be acquitted because the
preparation of checks is the responsibility of the company accountant and all they do is sign the checks. They claim that they rely
on the word of the accountant that there are sufficient funds in the bank to pay for the checks.

In the Lao case, the accused, as the Court found, had merely been made by her employer, Premiere Investment
House, to countersign checks in bank. The accused was a mere employee who did not have anything to do with the
issuance of checks for the company. She did not know to whom the checks would be paid as the names of payees
were written only later by the head of operations. Moreover, no notice of dishonor was given to her as required by
B.P. Blg. 22 2. It could thus rightly be concluded that the accused issued checks to apply to account not knowing
that at the time of issuance funds were insufficient to pay for the checks.
Petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of funds. While it may be true that it was the
company's accountant who actually prepared the rubber check, the fact remains that petitioners are the owners and
officers of the company. Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company,
or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
In fact, petitioner Nieto testified that after the check in question was dishonored, he instructed their company
accountant to prepare a replacement check. 7 This belies petitioners' claim that they had no hand in the preparation of
checks 8 and shows that petitioners were in control of the finances of the company.

Second. The affidavit of desistance of the GARDS president deserves no more than passing mention. The claim that
this case was simply the result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and petitioners and that the former did not
really suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check is flimsy. After prosecuting the case below with tenacity,
complainants going so far as to file another complaint after their first one had been dismissed, it is trifling with this
Court for complainants to now assert that the filing of their case was simply a mistake. It is for reasons such as this
the affidavit of desistance, like retractions, are generally disfavored. 9 The affidavit in this case, which was made after
petitioners' conviction, is nothing but a last-minute attempt to save them from punishment. Even if the payee suffered no damage
as a result of the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be denied. Damage to
the payee is not an element of the crime punished in B.P. Blg. 22.

Third. Petitioners pray that, in the alternative, the penalty be modified by deleting the sentence of imprisonment and,
in lieu thereof a fine in an increased amount be imposed on them. In support of their plea, they allege that they do
not have any record of prior conviction; that Eduardo Vaca is of advanced age (late 60s); and, that they come from
good families. Petitioners claim that "with their family background and social standing there is no reason why they,
will refuse to pay a due and demandable debt of only P10,000.00. It is precisely because of their founded belief that
the subject obligation has been paid that they refused to be intimidated by a criminal charge."
The Court of Appeals dismissed these allegations as irrelevant to the question of petitioners' guilt. We think so
ourselves. However, we believe that they can be considered in determining the appropriate penalty to impose on
petitioners.
B.P. Blg. 22, 1, par. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1)
year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
esceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court." Petitioners
are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy.
Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for
probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the
range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. 10 In this case we believe that a fine
in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that the sentence of
imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 equivalent to double the
amount of the check.
SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140665

November 13, 2000

VICTOR TING "SENG DEE" and EMILY CHAN-AZAJAR, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MELO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the February 12, 1999 decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Manila,
Branch 45) finding petitioners guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Petitioners' version of the background events is as follows:
From 1991 to 1992, Juliet Ting "Chan Sioc Hiu" obtained loans, in the aggregate amount of P2,750,000.00, from
private complainant Josefina K. Tagle for use in Juliet's furniture business. As payment thereof, Juliet issued eleven
(11) post-dated checks which, upon maturity, were dishonored for reasons of "Closed Account" or "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds." Juliet was subsequently prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Due to her financial difficulties, Juliet requested her husband Victor Ting "Seng Dee" and her sister Emily ChanAzajar (petitioners herein) to take over her furniture business, including the obligations appurtenant thereto.
Agreeing to Juliet's request, petitioners issued nineteen (19) checks in replacement of the eleven (11) checks earlier
issued by Juliet. The planned take-over, however, never materialized since the Naga Hope Christian School,
petitioner Emily Chan-Azajar's employer in Naga, refused to let her resign to attend to her sister's business. Since
the planned take-over did not take place, petitioners requested Juliet to reassume her obligation to private
complainant Tagle by replacing the checks they had previously issued to the latter. Thus, Juliet replaced the nineteen
(19) checks issued by petitioners with twenty-three (23) Far East Bank checks in favor of Tagle. Petitioners then
requested private complainant Tagle to return the nineteen (19) checks they had issued to her. Instead of returning
the checks, Tagle deposited seven of the checks with MetroBank where they were dishonored for being "Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds."
On the other hand, private complainant Tagle alleged that sometime in April 1993, petitioners obtained a loan of
P950,000.00 from her, issuing several post-dated checks in payment thereof. When the checks were deposited by
Tagle with MetroBank, they were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Tagle alleged that
despite verbal and written demands, petitioners failed to pay her the value of the dishonored checks.
Consequently, seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against petitioners. Said
informations are similarly worded except with respect to the check number, the amount involved, and the date the
check was issued. The information in Criminal Case No. 94-131945 (the other cases are Criminal Case No. 94131946, Criminal Case No. 94-131947, Criminal Case No. 94-131948, Criminal Case No. 94-131949, Criminal
Case No. 94-131950, and Criminal Case No. 94-131951) charged:
That sometime prior to May 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to JOSEPHINE K. TAGLE, to apply on account or for value Producers
Bank of the Philippines, Check No. 946072 dated May 27, 1993 payable to CASH in the amount of
P250,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue they did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said JOSEFINA K. TAGLE the amount of the check or to make arrangements for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
(p. 2, Original Records.)

Criminal Cases No. 94-131945 to 94-131951 were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned, petitioners,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented only one witness, the private
complainant, the testimony of Producer's Bank representative Ferdinand Lazo being dispensed with after counsel for
petitioners admitted the dishonor of the checks subject matter of the action.
On March 16, 1995, the trial court found petitioners guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in each of the seven
cases, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused VICTOR TING and EMILY CHAN AZAJAR are hereby
found "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges contained in Criminal Case Nos. 94-131945;
94-131946; 94-131947; 94-131948; 94-131949; 94-131950 and 94-131951 and for each count, they are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment; to pay Josefina K. Tagle the total
amount of P950,000.00; and to pay the cost.
(p. 294, Rollo.)
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No.
18054. However, the appellate court, on February 12, 1999, affirmed. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was,
likewise, denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court, given the absence of
proof beyond reasonable doubt or in the presence of facts creating reasonable doubt.
The petition has merit.
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, provides:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed
the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be committed, the following elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon is presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment (Sycip,
Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000).
An analysis of the evidence presented, however, shows that not all the aforementioned elements have been
established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
That the seven checks in question were issued by petitioners is beyond dispute. Not only were the dishonored checks
presented in court, but petitioners even admitted signing the checks and issuing them to private complainant. From
the evidence on record, it is clear that petitioners signed and issued the seven checks in question.
That the checks were dishonored is also clearly established. Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides that "the
introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written
thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the
same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or attached by the drawee on such dishonored
check." In the instant case, the fact of the checks' dishonor is sufficiently shown by the return slips issued by
MetroBank, the depository bank, stating that the checks had been returned for the reason "DAIF Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds." Not only are these check return slips prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the
checks, but the defense did not present any evidence to rebut these documents. In fact, counsel for petitioners even
admitted the fact of the checks' dishonor, agreeing to dispense with the presentation of the bank representative who
was supposed to prove the fact of dishonor of said checks (p. 162, Rollo.).
However, for liability to attach under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it is not enough that the prosecution establishes that a
check was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored. The prosecution must also prove the second
element, that is, it must further show that the issuer, at the time of the check's issuance, had knowledge that he did
not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. Since the second element
involves a state of mind which is difficult to verify, Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris
tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present
(Magno v. People, 210 SCRA 471 [1992]). Section 2 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing, and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee."
In truth, this Court declared in King v. People (G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999) that "the prima facie
presumption arises when the check is issued. But the law also provides that the presumption does not arise when the
issuer pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment 'within five banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.' Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the
amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution This opportunity, however, can be used only upon
receipt by the accused of a notice of dishonor." Thus, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of

dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for its payment.
King v. People, decided by this Division, involves a set of facts similar to the case at bar. In said case, the accused
therein was proven to have issued eleven checks, all of which were duly filled up and signed by her. It was also
clearly established that these eleven checks were dishonored, as shown by the checks themselves which were
stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and further supported by the return tickets issued by PCI Bank stating that the
checks had been dishonored. Yet, even if the prosecution had already established the issuance of the checks and
their subsequent dishonor, this Court still required the prosecution to show that the issuer knew of the insufficiency
of funds by proving that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to
satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment.
Moreover, in Lina Lim Lao v. CA (274 SCRA 572 [1997]), we emphasized that "the full payment of the amount
appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a 'complete defense.' The absence of a
notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a
right to demand and the basic postulate of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and
received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22."
To prove that petitioners received a notice of dishonor, the prosecution presented a copy of the demand letter
allegedly sent to petitioners through registered mail and its corresponding registry receipt. Private complainant
Josefina Tagle, the sole witness for the prosecution, testified thus:
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made to the demand letter by the prosecution. As can be
noticed from the above exchange, the prosecution alleged that the demand letter had been sent by mail. To prove
mailing, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry return receipt. However, no attempt was
made to show that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry
return receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the testimony of private complainant as to
who sent the demand letter and when the same was sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to have presumed that the
registry return receipt was proof enough that the demand letter was sent through registered mail and that the same
was actually received by petitioners or their agents.
As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove
that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person
alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, 45). The burden of
proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient
to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence,
for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when
service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the validity of such
service depends had existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service (C.J.S., Notice,
18). In the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent through registered mail,
relying as it did only on the registry return receipt. In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by
the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance
with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the registry
receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented, then with more
reason should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the instant
case, the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the
demand letter was sent.

Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the demand letter (p. 135, Rollo.). Given
petitioners' denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter
was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received by petitioners. This, the prosecution
miserably failed to do. Instead, it merely presented the demand letter and registry return receipt as if mere
presentation of the same was equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was received by petitioners. Receipts
for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to
serve as proof of receipt of the letters (Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580).
Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of
the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides that "[a] registered article must not be delivered to
anyone but the addressee, or upon the addressee's written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the
addressee's name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below it." In the case at bar, no effort
was made to show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is an
illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is
that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is
possible that petitioners or their authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot
replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their
checks had been dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.
As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000), "penal statutes must be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused." Likewise, the prosecution may not rely on the weakness of
the evidence for the defense to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an offense. Having failed to prove all the
elements of the offense, petitioners may not thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
That petitioners are civilly liable to private complainant is also doubtful. Private complainant claims that petitioners
borrowed Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand (P950,000.00) Pesos from her on or about the end of April 1993, in
payment of which petitioners issued several post-dated checks in her favor. The seven checks issued by petitioners
as payment for the amount borrowed add up to P950,000.00. If private complainant is the businesswoman that she
claims to be, she should be collecting interest on the loan she granted to petitioners. In other words, the amount to be
repaid by petitioners should be more than P950,000.00, to account for interest on the loan. The checks issued by
petitioners, however, do not provide for interest. It is thus more credible that the seven checks involved in this case
form part of nineteen checks issued to replace the checks issued by Juliet Ting to private complainant. This
conclusion is bolstered by private complainant's admission in her reply-affidavit that more than seven checks were
issued by petitioners (p. 11, Original Records). In said reply-affidavit, private complainant states that "respondents
issued and delivered to me in Manila several checks, which partially include their seven (7) bouncing checks herein.
I say 'partially' because I will have to file additional bouncing check cases against them, as these other checks
likewise bounced." Furthermore, in the same reply-affidavit, private complainant claims that the checks in question
were not replaced, allegedly because the replacement checks must first be cleared, which did not happen in this case.
By implication, had the 23 Far East Bank checks issued by Juliet Ting to replace the nineteen checks issued by
petitioners been cleared, then private complainant would have considered the checks in question as having been
replaced. This only supports our conclusion that it was Juliet Ting who owed money to private complainant, not
petitioners.
Moreover, the original debtor Juliet Ting was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Cases 93126581-91 for eleven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. These eleven bouncing check cases involved
the same obligation being sued upon by private complainant Tagle herein. The trial court expressly acknowledged in
said cases that nineteen (19) checks were issued by petitioners as payment for Juliet Ting's obligation. In its August
7, 1997 decision convicting Juliet Ting for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the trial court declared that "to

cover the additional loans, accused (Juliet Ting) delivered 19 post-dated checks issued by Victor Ting and Emily
Azajar (p. 55, Rollo.)." The trial court's decision further provides:
Since she could not fund the other checks (Exhs. B to K), she replaced the same with 19 post-dated checks
of her husband Victor Ting and her sister Emily Azajar totaling P2,450,000.00. They issued the checks as
they would take over her furniture business. The intended partnership of Victor and Emily was aborted as
the latter was not allowed to resign from her teaching post in Naga City. She then replaced the checks
issued by Victor and Emily with her own checks 23 FEB post-dated checks per list (Exh. 9) prepared by
Suzanne Azajar.
Despite receipt of the replacement checks, complainant refused to return the checks of Victor and Emily
and even filed cases against them.
(p. 56, Rollo.)
Not having borrowed the amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand (P950,000.00) from private complainant,
petitioners may not thus be held liable therefor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 12, 1999 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Victor Ting "Seng Dee" and Emily
Chan-Azajar are hereby ACQUITTED of the charges against them for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack
of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt. No special pronouncement is made as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149695

April 28, 2004

WILLY G. SIA, appellee,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On June 4, 1982, the Consolidated Orient Leasing and Finance Corporation (COLF), as Lessor, and Willy G. Sia, the
sole proprietor of WGS Construction Specialists, as Lessee, executed a Lease Agreement, 1 for a period of eighteen
(18) months, covering construction equipments described as follows:
Under the lease agreement, Sia was obliged to deposit with the COLF, upon the execution thereof, the amount
of P216,250.00 to guaranty the payment of, inter alia, the agreed rental of P44,980.00 a month payable in the COLF
office.3 On the custody and disposition of the guaranty deposit of P216,250.00, the parties agreed, as follows:
The Deposit shall be retained by the LESSOR as security for the faithful observance and performance
by the LESSEE of the terms and conditions and stipulations in this Agreement and any renewal thereof.
The Deposit shall be returned to the LESSEE at the termination of lease without any interest, less such
sums which may be due to the LESSOR under the terms of this Agreement without prejudice to whatever
cause of action the LESSOR may have against the LESSEE under this Agreement.
2. The provision of paragraph 1 of this Article notwithstanding, if the LESSEE is in default under any of
the provisions of this Agreement including the events of Article XV, then the LESSOR may, at its
option, apply the Deposit or any part thereof to claims for money or damages it may have against the
LESSEE, or to arrearages in the rents and/or the Stipulated Lost Value as the LESSOR may deem necessary
and, unless the LESSOR shall exercise its rights and terminate this lease hereby created under sub-

paragraph 1.3 of paragraph 1 of Article XV, the LESSEE shall on written demand by the LESSOR pay to
the LESSOR the full amount of the Deposit or such amount which shall cover the full amount referred to in
Item 6 of the Schedule which shall serve as security and be considered the Deposit in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. In case the LESSEE gives the LESSOR other collaterals or securities in addition to the Deposit all of
such securities or collaterals including the Deposit shall be deemed to secure all claims which are now or
may hereafter be owing to the LESSOR by the LESSEE.4
The parties further agreed that, in case Sia defaulted in the payment of the agreed rentals or failed to observe the
terms and conditions of the Agreement, the following provisions shall apply:
1. If the LESSEE fails to pay the rents as provided for in Article III hereof after the same becomes due and
payable or any other sums and moneys due and payable under this Agreement or if the LESSEE fails to
observe or perform any or all the provisions hereof, or if the LESSOR on reasonable grounds, considers the
LESSEE as financially incapable of meeting its obligations herein, then the LESSOR shall, without
prejudice to any pre-existing liability of the LESSEE to the LESSOR, have the right to avail of any or all of
the following remedies without giving any prior notice or demand to the LESSEE;
1.1 To declare a part or the total amount of the rents and all other moneys, costs and expenses
under this Agreement immediately due and payable by the LESSEE;
1.2 To take possession of the property or demand its return.
1.3 To terminate this lease and to demand from the LESSEE the full amount of the Stipulated Loss
Value and to claim from the LESSEE compensation for all losses and damages including but not
limited to loss of profits.
The remedies provided in sub-paragraph 1.1 and 1.2 of paragraph 1 of this Articles shall not relieve the
LESSEE from any other liability under this Agreement, including but not limited to liability for damages.
2. Upon the occurrence of any of the following events, the LESSOR may, without any prior notice or
demand to the LESSEE, avail of any or all of the remedies under paragraph 1 of this Article, and the effects
thereof will be the same as those provided for herein:
2.1 suspension of business, bankruptcy or dissolution of the LESSEE; or
2.2 levy or attachment of all or substantially all of the assets of the LESSEE, regardless of whether
or not the same affects the Property, or
2.3 assignment of or compromise affecting all or substantially all of the LESSEEs assets to or
with its creditor; or
2.4 If any judgment against the LESSEE shall remain unsatisfied for more than ten (10) days; or
2.5 If the LESSEE shall abandon the Property.5
Sia and his wife, Judy, executed a surety agreement in which they bound and obliged themselves, jointly and
severally, to insure the proper and due performance of Sias obligations to the COLF under the lease agreement. 6
Sia remitted to the COLF the agreed guaranty deposit of P216,250.00. He also issued and delivered to the COLF,
upon the execution of the lease agreement in 1982, eighteen (18) postdated checks in the amount of P44,980.00
each, payable to the COLT, drawn against his account with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).

Each check was to be encashed or deposited by the COLF in its account on their respective due dates in payment of
the monthly rental of the equipment.7 At the time, the bank had extended credit facilities to the petitioner.8
The COLF deposited the checks for the rentals of July to December 1992, and these checks were duly honored by
the drawee bank.9 The COLF thereafter deposited, in its account, Check No. 233533 postdated January 4, 1983 for
the amount of P44,980.00 in payment for the January 1983 rental of the equipment.10 This check was, however,
dishonored by the drawee bank for "insufficient funds." The COLF wrote Sia on January 5, 1983, informing the
latter of the dishonor of the check and requesting for the replacement thereof. 11
On March 4, 1983, COLF deposited in its account Check No. 233534 postdated March 4, 1983 in the amount
of P44,980.00 in payment for the March 1983 rental.12 However, the check was, again, dishonored by the drawee
bank, this time for the reason "account closed."13 On March 7, 1983, the COLF wrote Sia informing him of the
dishonor of the check.14 The COLF finally decided to terminate the lease and, on March 10, 1983, wrote Sia
informing him that it was terminating the lease agreement.15 Sia received the letter but did not respond.16
Despite the termination of the lease, the COLF still deposited Check No. 233535 in the amount of P44,980.00 on
April 4, 1983. The check, which was drawn by Sia against his account with the RCBC in payment for the April 1983
rental, was dishonored by the drawee bank, again for the reason "account closed." On April 6, 1983, COLF once
more wrote to Sia, informing him of the dishonor of the check and requesting for a replacement as soon as
possible.17 The COLF did not receive any reply.
On May 17, 1983, the COLF filed a complaint for replevin and damages against Sia with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 3958. It prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered against Sia in
its favor:
On June 2, 1983, the court issued an Order in Civil Case No. 3958 granting the plaintiffs plea for a writ of replevin.
The court thereafter issued a Writ of Seizure against the plaintiffs property with the requisite bond therefor. Sia
received the complaint and summons on October 21, 1983, but failed to file an answer. On motion of the plaintiff,
Sia was declared in default.19 The plaintiff adduced its evidence, ex parte, on February 8, 1984. The sheriff, however,
failed to locate the equipment declared in the complaint and failed to seize and take possession thereof. 20
In the meantime, the COLF charged Sia with violating Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 by reason of the dishonor of
the checks postdated January 4, 1983, March 4, 1983 and April 4, 1983, respectively. On August 3, 1984, three
Informations were filed with the RTC of Makati charging Sia with violating B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 11865, 11866, and 11867. The accusatory portions of the said Informations are as follows:
That on or about June 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make, draw and issue in favor of Consolidated Orient Leasing & Finance Corporation represented by
Eduardo R. Alvarez, a check numbered 233532, drawn against the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC), a duly established domestic banking institution, in the amount of P44,980.00 Philippine Currency,
dated January 4, 1983 in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue that he did not
have any sufficient funds in the drawee bank for the payment of such check; that upon presentation of said
check to the said bank for payment the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof accused
Willy G. Sia did not have sufficient funds therein and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Consolidated Orient Leasing & Finance Corporation is (sic) the aforesaid sum.
Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 11865
That on or about June 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, said accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

make, draw and issue in favor of Consolidated Orient Leasing & Finance Corporation represented by
Eduardo R. Alvarez, a check numbered 233534 drawn against the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC), a duly established banking institution, in the amount of P44,980.00 Philippine Currency, dated
March 4, 1983 in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue that he did not have any
funds in the drawee bank for the payment of said check, that upon presentation of said check to the drawee
bank the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof, accused Willy G. Sia did not have
funds therein and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to
redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the said Consolidated Orient Leasing &
Finance Corporation in the aforesaid sum.
Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 11866
That on or about June 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make, draw and issue in favor of Consolidated Orient Leasing & Finance Corporation represented by
Eduardo R. Alvarez, a check numbered 233535, drawn against the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC), a duly established domestic banking institution, in the amount of P44,980.00 Philippine Currency,
dated April 4, 1983 in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue that he did not have
any funds in the drawee bank for the payment of such check; that upon presentation of said check to said
bank for payment the same was dishonor (sic) for the reason that the drawee thereof, accused Willy G. Sia
did not have funds therein and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still fails
and refuses to redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the said Consolidated
Orient Leasing & Finance Corporation in the aforesaid sum.
Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 1186721
When arraigned, Sia, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
The Case for Petitioner Sia
Sia testified that, upon the execution of the lease agreement in 1982, he drew and delivered to COLF eighteen (18)
postdated checks drawn against his account with the RCBC, each check in the amount of P44,980.00 corresponding
to the rental for the leased property.22 Every month, as each check fell due, he informed the COLF whether to deposit
or encash the checks, or to apply the current deposit for the payment of the rental due. 23 He made good the first six
postdated checks but failed to fund the ensuing checks for January, March, and April 1983. He reasoned that his
financial condition was adversely affected by the implementation of his project in Nueva Vizcaya and the RCBC had
since then refused to give him credit.24 To facilitate payment of the checks, Sia then asked COLF, through its
assistant manager, Go Hong Ko, to apply his guaranty deposit for the postdated checks to cover the rentals from
January 1983. Go Hong Ko told Sia that there would be no problem as his guaranty deposit of P216.250.00 was still
intact and more than enough to answer for the said checks.25 Thus, Sia no longer funded his account with the drawee
bank, thinking that his guaranty deposit would answer for the checks.
Sia alleged that he never received the January 5, 1983, March 7, 1983 and April 6, 1983 letters of the COLF, and
that the latter never notified him that the checks postdated January 4, 1983, March 3, 1983 and April 4, 1983,
respectively, were deposited with the drawee bank, and that the same were subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank. He was surprised when he learned about the charges against him for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 when he
received a subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati, requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit
to the criminal complaint of the COLF.26 Furthermore, he was not informed why his guaranty deposit was not
applied to the payment of the three dishonored checks.27

In the meantime, on March 12, 1984, the RTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 3958, in favor of COLF, the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
(1) Ordering defendant WGS Construction Specialists to pay plaintiff:
a) P179,920.00, representing accrued rentals;
b) 3% of the above amount as penalty per month from January, 1983, up to May 17,
1983;
c) P5,000.00 as and for attorneys fees;
d) P494,780.00, representing the actual value of the leased property not recovered, plus
interest thereon at the legal rate computed from date hereof;
e) The costs of suit.
(2) The guaranty deposit of P216,250.00 made by said defendant shall be applied to the
satisfaction of the aforementioned amounts.
(3) Ordering defendants Willy G. Sia and Judy A. Sia, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
remaining unpaid balance of the judgment debt which defendant WGS Construction Specialists
should fail to satisfy.
SO ORDERED.28
The decision became final and executory, Sia having failed to appeal the decision.
After due trial, the trial court rendered judgment, on November 17, 1995, finding Sia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11865 and 11866 and acquitting him of the crime charged in Criminal
Case No. 11867. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused WILLY G. SIA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in Criminal Cases Nos.
11865 and 11866 and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year and; to pay a fine of P50,000.00
for each case; and to indemnify complainant the sum of P89,900.00 with legal interest from the filing of
these cases on August 31, 1984 until payment is made.
Anent Criminal Case No. 11867, for the reason aforementioned, judgment is hereby rendered
ACQUITTING accused WILLY G. SIA of the crime charged.
No costs.29
Sia filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision contending that:
I
THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3958 (REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BRANCH CXXXII) DATED MARCH 12, 1984 WHICH WAS RENDERED BEFORE THE
INFORMATIONS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASES WERE FILED IN COURT CLEARLY SHOW

THAT THE OBLIGATION OF THE ACCUSED WAS ALREADY SETTLED AND PAID THRU THE
SECURITY DEPOSIT ALREADY MADE AND IN THE POSSESSION OF THE ALLEGED PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II
THE OBLIGATION, IF ANY, OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CASES AT BAR WAS ALREADY PAID OR
EXTINGUISHED BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON COMPENSATION.
III
THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT REQUIRING THE ACCUSED TO PAY AGAIN THE
VALUE OF THE CHECKS DESPITE THE FINAL AND EXECUTED DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3958 IS TANTAMOUNT TO UNJUST ENRICHMENT ON
THE PART OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
IV
THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE
TWO (2) CRIMINAL CASES.30
On June 4, 1996 the Court partially granted the motion and modified its decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, in so far as that portion ordering accused
Willy G. Sia to indemnify the private complainant the sum of P89,900 with legal interest from the filing of
these cases on August 31, 1984 until payment is made, is concerned. The Decision of this Court dated
November 17, 1995 finding accused Willy G. Sia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 11865 and 11866 and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
one (1) year and to pay a fine of P50,000.00 for each case STANDS.
SO ORDERED.31
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Sia (the appellant therein), ascribed the following errors to the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDS DEPOSIT OF P216,250.00
IN THE POSSESSION OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS TO BE APPLIED OR COULD BE
APPLIED TO THE RENTALS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD TOLD THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT TO APPLY THE P216,250.00 TO THE PAYMENT OF THE RENTALS STARTING
WITH THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1983.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD ACTUALLY APPLIED
THE P216,250.00 TO THE PAYMENT OF THE RENTALS FOR JANUARY AND MARCH 1983.
IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO NOTICE OF
DISHONOR GIVEN TO THE ACCUSED.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF VIOLATING BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22.32
On May 31, 2001, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC, as amended, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision appealed from, as modified in
the order dated June 4, 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.33
The appellate court held that it was of no moment whether the COLF notified Sia of the dishonor of the checks by
letter, or if Sia failed to receive such notices. Sia admitted when he testified that he knew that his funds with the
drawee bank were insufficient when the subject checks fell due, and that he failed to fund the same. The court also
held that the application of Sias guaranty deposit to the amounts due under the subject checks was optional on the
part of the COLF.
Sia, now the petitioner, comes to this Court contending as follows:
I
NOTICE OF DISHONOR IS NECESSARY IN A CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22.
II
SUCH NOTICE OF DISHONOR IS ALL THE MORE NECESSARY IN THE INSTANT CASE
BECAUSE THE SUBJECT CHECKS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
III
THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
NOTICE OF DISHONOR HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE PETITIONER.
IV
THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.34
The petitioner asserts that a notice or letter informing him of the dishonor of the subject checks so as to give him a
period of five (5) banking days from receipt thereof to pay the amounts of the checks, or to make arrangements with
the drawee bank for the payment of the said checks are mandatory requirements. He argues that the notice or letter
informing him of the dishonor of the subject checks, as well as the lapse of the five-day period, are conditions
precedent, without which he cannot be convicted, much less charged under Section 1, first paragraph of B.P. Blg. 22.

The petitioner contends that the failure of the COLF or the drawee bank to notify him of the dishonor of the subject
checks deprived him of a chance to pay the amounts thereof. He asserts that his admission35 did not relieve the
prosecution of its burden to prove the following: (a) that the said checks were deposited by COLF in its account; (b)
that the said checks were dishonored by the drawee bank either for insufficiency of funds or that his account with
the said bank was already closed; (c) that the petitioner was notified in writing of the dishonor of the said checks;
and, (d) that five banking days from such notice of dishonor had already elapsed, without him paying the amounts
due or making arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the said checks. The petitioner avers that this
did not amount to an admission that when he issued and delivered the subject checks to the COLF, he did not have
sufficient funds in his account with the drawee bank to answer for the amounts of the checks and that he had
knowledge thereof.
The petitioner further avers that there was no factual basis for his indictment for violation of Section 1, first
paragraph of B.P. 22 because he and the COLF, thru Go Hong Ko, had agreed that the latter would apply his
guaranty deposit of P216,250.00 to the payment of the subject checks, amounting to only P99,960.00. The petitioner
cited the ruling of this Court in Ting v. Court of Appeals36 to support his plea for a reversal of the decisions of the
appellate court and the trial court.
In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that contrary to the petitioners contention,
the latters admission relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds in the drawee bank when he drew and issued the subject checks in 1982 to COLF. The
OSG also avers that under the lease agreement, it was optional on the part of COLF to apply the petitioners
guaranty deposit to the payment of his back rentals and the subject checks. It behooved the petitioner to fund the
subject checks on due dates thereof to avoid his indictment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22 under which the petitioner was charged in the RTC reads:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The act sought to be prevented by the law is the act of making and issuing a check with the knowledge that, at the
time of issue, the drawer issuing the check does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for payment and
the check was subsequently dishonored upon presentment. What the law punishes is the issuance of a worthless
check and not the purpose for which such check was issued nor the terms or conditions relating to its issuance. 37 The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation.38 The crime is one against public order and is malum prohibitum. The law is intended to safeguard the
interests of the banking system and the legitimate checking account user.39 It is not intended nor designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt,40 nor to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and
circumvention of the purpose of the law.41
This Court has held that in criminal cases involving violations of Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution is burdened
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value.

2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit; or it
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment.42
To hold a person liable, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew, at the time of issue, that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit for the full payment of such check upon its presentment. The prosecution must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. 43
Knowledge on the part of the drawer or maker of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the
payment of a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the offense. This element involves a state of the
mind of the drawer or maker of the check which is difficult for the prosecution to prove. To ease the burden of the
prosecution, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer or
maker of the check of the insufficiency of his fund in the drawee bank, thus:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.-The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
However, for the presumption to arise, the prosecution must adduce evidence to prove the factual basis for
its onset, namely, (a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the
drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the drawer; and, (c) the
drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawer. With the onset of the presumption, the burden of evidence is shifted on the
drawer/maker of the check to prove that, when he issued the subject check, he had no knowledge that he
had insufficient funds in the drawee bank to answer for the amount due. The notice of dishonor may be sent
to the drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the check, or the offended party, either by
personal delivery or by registered mail. The drawer or maker of a check has a right, under the law, to
demand that a written notice of dishonor be sent to and received by him to enable him to avoid indictment
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.44
Construing Section 2 of the said law, we held in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals, et al.45 that the notice of dishonor
of a check to the maker must be in writing. A mere oral notice to the drawer or maker of the dishonor of his check is
not enough:
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees.
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in
conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law. i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit
with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a
mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court
is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be
punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the
accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal
statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. 46
Unless and until the drawer or maker of the check receives a written notice of dishonor of the check, or where there
is no proof as to when such notice of dishonor was received by the drawer or maker, the five-day period within

which the drawer or maker has to pay the amount due or made arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment
of the check, cannot be determined. In such case, the prima facie presumption cannot arise.47
Emphasizing the intent of the State in providing a five-day banking period from notice of dishonor of a check within
which the maker or drawer may pay the amount due or make arrangements with the drawee bank for its payment,
the Court declared in Lao v. Court of Appeals:48
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator "a compromise by allowing him to
perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated."
This was also compared "to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender
the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability.49
If the maker or drawer pays, or makes arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the amount due within
the five-day period from notice of the dishonor given to the drawer, it is a complete defense; the accused may no
longer be indicted for violation of Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22. If he is so indicted, he may set up the payment of the
amount due as a complete defense.50
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the COLF or the drawee bank ever sent any written notice of
dishonor of the subject checks to the petitioner and that the latter received the same. The only witness presented by
the prosecution to prove its case against the petitioner was Eduardo R. Alvarez, who was in charge of the COLF
collection department. He testified that he signed the letters dated January 5, 198351 and July 7, 1983,52addressed to
the petitioner notifying the latter of the dishonor of the subject checks. However, Alvarez admitted that, after signing
the said letters, he had the same transmitted to the collection department and had no personal knowledge whether the
said letters were sent to and actually received by the petitioner. The collection department merely told him that the
letters were sent to the petitioner.
There is no evidence on record how the letters were, in fact, sent to the petitioner, whether by personal delivery or
by registered mail. The COLF did not adduce in evidence the complaint for replevin and damages in Civil Case No.
3958 against the petitioner. Furthermore, the trial court did not declare in its decision that the COLF sent notices of
dishonor of the subject checks to the petitioner, and that the latter received such notices of dishonor.
The trial court convicted the petitioner of the crime of violating Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22, relying principally on the
petitioners admission that, when Check No. 233533 became due, his funds in the drawee bank were insufficient to
pay for the amount of the check; that his account with the drawee bank had already been closed when COLF
deposited Check No. 233534; and, that he no longer funded his account to pay for the amounts of the ensuing
checks. The trial court concluded that on the basis of the said admission, there was no longer a need for the
prosecution to prove that the petitioner received notices or letters notifying him of the dishonor of the subject checks
after the dishonor thereof. The appellate court agreed with the trial court.
We do not agree.
Indeed, the petitioner admitted when he testified in his defense, that, on the due date of Check No. 233533, he was
aware that he did not have funds in the drawee bank for the payment of the said check, and that when Check No.
233534 fell due on March 4, 1983, the bank had already closed the said account. This, however, did not amount to
an admission that, when he issued the said checks in June 1982, he had known that he had no funds in the drawee
bank sufficient to pay for the amounts of the checks. In fact, the petitioner testified that in 1983, he was granted
credit facilities by the drawee bank and that the postdated checks he issued to the COLF for the rentals due from
June to December, 1982 had been duly honored. The drawee bank subsequently closed the petitioners account only
because the latter had suffered financial reverses.
Assuming that the petitioner had knowledge that he had insufficient funds in the drawee bank when he issued the
questioned checks, he could still have paid the checks or made arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment
of the said checks if he had been duly notified of their dishonor. In not sending a notice or letter of dishonor to the

petitioner as required by law, the COLF deprived the petitioner of his right to avoid prosecution for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
with modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 11865 and 11866
are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in said cases for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146424 November 18, 2005
ALBINO JOSEF, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES* and AGUSTIN ALARILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR no. 23234,2 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan convicting Albino Josef of 26 counts of
violation of BP 22, also known as the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law.3
By way of a preliminary clarification, this is a petition for review of the CAs decision affirming Albino Josefs
conviction for 26 counts of violation of BP 22. It is therefore a criminal case and the People of the Philippines
should be impleaded as a respondent in line with Section 2, Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.4Nonetheless, petitioner, in filing this petition, incorrectly entitled it Albino Josef v. Agustin Alarilla. In
accord with Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court,5 we have allowed petitioner Josef to subsequently implead the
People of the Philippines as respondent in this case.
Now, the facts.
From June to August, 1991, petitioner, a Marikina-based manufacturer and seller of shoes, purchased materials from
respondent Agustin Alarilla, a seller of leather products from Meycauayan, Bulacan, for which the former issued a
total of 26 postdated checks against his account with the Associated Bank and Far East Bank & Trust Company
(Marikina Branches). When private respondent presented these checks for encashment, they were dishonored

because the accounts against which they were drawn were closed. Private respondent informed petitioner of the
dishonor and demanded payment of their value. After some negotiations, petitioner drew and delivered a new set of
postdated checks in replacement of the dishonored ones. Private respondent, in turn, returned to petitioner the
originals of the dishonored postdated checks but retained photocopies thereof. When private respondent deposited
the replacement checks in his account with the Westmont Bank, these were also dishonored by the drawee bank. As
a result, the private respondent filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of BP 22 with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor filed 26
Informations against petitioner with the RTC of Bulacan for violation of BP 22, entitled People v. Josef, Criminal
Case Nos. 2113-M-93 to 2138-M-93, for the original 26 postdated checks.6
The trial court convicted petitioner on all counts and imposed the penalty of six months for each conviction. The
Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, affirmed the trial court.
Petitioner admits having issued the 26 dishonored checks. However, he claims the following defenses: 1) he has
already paid private respondent the amount of the checks in cash; 2) the trial court was incorrect to accept as
evidence photocopies of the original checks and 3) he acted in good faith. He likewise adopts the dissenting opinion
of CA Justice Martin Villarama, Jr.,7 which states that the penalty of imprisonment was incorrectly imposed on
petitioner in the light of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.8
The petition is without merit.
The elements of violation of BP 22 are:
1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value;
2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.9
All three elements are present here.
Petitioner categorically admits the fact of issuance of the checks and their dishonor,10 the first and third elements. He
has likewise failed to rebut the statutory presumption11 of knowledge of insufficient funds, the second element,
which attaches if the check is presented and dishonored within 90 days from its issuance. 12 While petitioner alleges
to have paid private respondent the amount of the checks, he failed to specify if he had done so within five banking
days from receiving notice of the checks dishonor and to present any evidence of such payment. In addition, his
unsubstantiated claim of cash payment contradicts his earlier defense that he had replaced the checks.
Moving onto the procedural aspects of the case, petitioner claims that, under the Best Evidence Rule, the trial court
should not have admitted in evidence the photocopies of the checks until after he had been given reasonable notice
to produce the originals. The Court of Appeals, in disposing of this contention, said:13
However, in the light of the factual milieu in the present recourse, (we) find and so declare that the Court a quo did
not commit any reversible error in admitting in evidence the photostatic copies of the subject checks in lieu of the
originals thereof in the possession of the [Petitioner]. It bears stressing that the raison detre of the proscription
against the admission of secondary evidence in lieu or in substitution of the original thereof is to prevent the

commission of fraud on the part of the offeror who is in possession of the best evidence but, in lieu thereof, adduced
secondary evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
When he testified in the Court a quo, the [Petitioner] brought out the originals of the checks and even marked the
same in evidence as Exhibits "1" to "21", except five (5) of the subject checks, which he claimed as missing and
the Prosecution even adopted the original checks as its evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
The [Petitioner] admitted, before the Court a quo, that the originals of the subject checks were in his
possession. The [Petitioner] never alleged that the photostatic copies of the checks marked and offered in
evidence by the Prosecution were not faithful copies of the originals of the checks. In point of fact, when he
testified in the Court a quo, he was shown, by his counsel, the photostatic copies of the subject checks and
admitted that the originals of said checks were in his possession on his claim that he had paid the Private
Complainant the amount of P600,000.00 in cash and the balance in the form of checks which he drew and issued to
the Private Complainant by way of replacement of the aforesaid other checks:
xxx xxx xxx
By his testimony, the [Petitioner] thereby admitted that the photostatic copies of the checks marked and
offered in evidence by the Prosecution were the faithful reproductions of the originals of the checks in his
possession. Hence, the Prosecution may mark and offer in evidence the photostatic copies of the checks.
xxx xxx xxx
Having admitted, albeit impliedly, that the photostatic copies of the checks admitted in evidence by the Court a quo
were the faithful reproduction of the original copies in his possession, the Petitioner was thus estopped from
invoking Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. By admitting that the originals were in his possession and even producing them
in open court, petitioner cured whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecutions evidence. The fact that these
originals were all stamped "account closed" merely confirmed the allegations of the respondent that the checks were
dishonored by reason of the account being closed. Because they were entirely consistent with its main theory, the
prosecution correctly adopted these originals as its own evidence. In addition, by petitioners own admission, five of
the original checks were lost, thus rendering the photocopies thereof admissible as exceptions to the Best Evidence
Rule.14
Regarding petitioners allegation of good faith, suffice it to say that such a claim is immaterial, the offense in
question being malum prohibitum.15 The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check and therefore,
whether or not malice and intent attended such issuance is unimportant.16
In invoking of A.C. No. 12-2000, petitioner adopts the interpretation of Justice Villarama to the effect that the
circular mandates judges to impose fines rather than imprisonment on violators of BP 22. In affirming the sentence
imposed by the trial court, the majority pointed out that it is only under certain conditions that trial court judges may
impose fines rather than imprisonment. The Circular provides, in part:

In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals the Supreme Court (Second Division) per Mr. Justice V.
Mendoza, modified the sentence imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and
imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court
said:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national
economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty
within the range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we
believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to
impose on each of the petitioners.
In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court en banc, applying Vaca also deleted
the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed by
B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded that "such would best serve the ends of criminal justice."
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing policy of the Supreme Court on the
matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Considerable confusion arose as a result of this circular. Like Justice Villarama, many came to believe that the
policy enunciated in this circular was to altogether remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violation of
BP 22. The circular created so much confusion, in fact, that less than three months later, we had to issue yet another
circular, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001,17 for the specific purpose of clarifying exactly what the implications
of A.C. No. 12-2000 were. In order to put all doubts to rest, the second circular provides:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Order No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22.
Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions
of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more
appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of
a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate
penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be deemed a hindrance (emphasis ours).
Clearly, the imposition of either a fine or imprisonment remains entirely within the sound discretion of the judge
trying the case, based on his assessment of the offender and the facts. Justice Villarama premised his dissent on the
absence of a distinction in A.C. No. 12-2000 between which offenders deserve the relatively lenient penalty of a fine
and which deserve imprisonment. As A.C. No. 13-2001 states, the application of the circular is selective and it is
entirely up to the trial court judge to make that distinction, given the circumstances obtaining. This brings us to the
factual issue of petitioners worthiness of the lighter penalty. On this, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the
trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23234 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145498

January 17, 2005

BENJAMIN LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner is now before us on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 30, 1999, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 79, Quezon City (RTC) convicting him of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. Q-9350094; and the Resolution2 dated October 11, 2000, denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On October 4, 1993, an Information was filed against petitioner Dr. Benjamin F. Lee and a certain Cesar Al.
Bautista, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, which reads:
That on or about the 24th day of July 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with, and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
or draw and issue to Rogelio G. Bergado to apply on account or for value United Coconut Planters Bank Check No.
168341 dated July 24, 1993 payable to the order of Rogelio G. Bergado in the amount of P980,000.00, Philippine
Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Rogelio G. Bergado the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Petitioner pleaded not guilty in his arraignment on February 1, 1995.4 Presiding Judge Godofredo L. Legaspi noted
in the assailed judgment that trial proceeded insofar only as petitioner is concerned, "since accused Cesar Bautista is
presently detained at Municipal Jail at Calapan, Mindoro where he has a pending case before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC), Calapan, Mindoro and despite several notices to the jail warden of Calapan, Mindoro, the latter failed
to bring the person of said accused to this Court for arraignment."5
For the prosecution, private complainant Rogelio Bergado testified that: on July 19, 1992, he loaned Unlad
Commercial Enterprises (Unlad for brevity), through its agent Norma Ilagan, the amount of P500,000.00 with an
interest of 4% a month; on September 10, 1992, he loaned another P400,000.00 through Ilagan for the same interest
rate; in exchange, he received a total of twenty-six checks, four of which were dishonored for the reason "drawn
against insufficient funds"; he went to Calapan, Mindoro and talked to Bautista and the latter replaced the
dishonored checks with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. ARA 168341, signed by Bautista and
herein petitioner dated July 24, 1993, in the amount of P980,000.00 representing the total amount loaned plus
interests; when Bergado deposited the check at UCPB, the same was dishonored due to "account closed"; through
his lawyer, he sent demand letters to Bautista and petitioner, who, despite having received the same still failed and
refused to make any payment. Upon cross-examination, Bergado admitted that he did not see or meet petitioner prior
to July 24, 1993 nor did he go to Calapan, Mindoro to check the existence of Unlad prior to lending it the amount
of P900,000.00.6
The prosecution also presented Zenaida7 Katigbak, Branch Operations Officer of UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon
City, who testified that Bautista and petitioner are the authorized signatories of Current Account No. 130-000406-2,
against which the check subject of the present criminal case was issued; and that the account was opened on August

22, 1988 and closed on January 31, 1992 due to mishandling of the account, i.e., a check was previously issued
against it without sufficient funds.8
The prosecution presented UCPB Check No. ARA 168341,9 UCPB Check Return Slip dated August 5, 1993 stating
that Check No. ARA 168341 was returned unpaid due to "account closed";10 a demand letter addressed to petitioner
dated August 9, 1993;11 registry return slip;12 a copy of the complaint affidavit of private complainant;13signature card
of the current account of petitioner and Bautista at UCPB; 14 and the bank statement of the current account of
petitioner and Bautista dated January 31, 1992 reflecting that said account has been closed on said date. 15
For the defense, petitioner testified that: it is Bautista who is the sole owner of Unlad; he knew Bautista and became
his "compadre" because of Bautistas wife who was his employee; he does not know anything about the check
issued by Bautista in favor of Bergado nor did he receive any amount from Bergado or any other person; he agreed
to open an account with Bautista in 1988 because Bautista promised to give him 5% interest from the proceeds of
loans that will be made in favor of other people from said account; before July of 1989, Bautista also asked him to
sign several checks in exchange for 2.5% interest a month from the proceeds of loan to be made in favor of other
people; after July 1989, he terminated his accommodation arrangement with Bautista after learning that Bautista was
also giving 5% interest to other investors without any accommodation agreement; he asked for the checks he
previously signed but Bautista refused to return them saying that he did not have them anymore; and inspite of these,
he continued investing in Bautistas business in the amount of more than P500,000.00.16
On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that he signed several checks in blank on different occasions; that he was
the one who asked and insisted that Bautista execute Exhs. "1" and "2", affidavits of Bautista stating that Unlad shall
be Bautistas sole responsibility; and that despite having severed his relationship with Bautista in July of 1989, he
did not inform UCPB Araneta, Quezon City branch of such fact and he continued investing in Unlad, from July
1989 to April 1994.17
To bolster his claim, petitioner presented: an affidavit executed by Bautista dated May 31, 1993 stating that Bautista
is the sole proprietor of Unlad and that any business transaction entered into by Unlad shall be Bautistas personal
responsibility;18 an affidavit executed by Bautista on June 4, 1990, stating that petitioner is no longer connected with
Unlad and that petitioner should not be held liable regarding any transaction entered into by Unlad after July 1989
since petitioner is no longer a signatory;19 a business permit issued by the Municipality of Calapan certifying that
Bautista has been granted a permit to operate a "general merchandise";20 a certification from the Department of Trade
and Industry, Oriental Mindoro Provincial Office stating that Unlad is registered in the name of Cesar Bautista
and/or Placer Bautista;21 orders of attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro on the
properties of Bautista and petitioner;22 and checks issued by Bautista in favor of petitioner and his wife Amelia Lee.23
On July 22, 1997, the RTC promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this case finding accused Benjamin Lee guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and accordingly sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of one (1)
year of prision correccional, and to pay the offended party P980,000.00 and to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and non-payment of the fine by the accused.
SO ORDERED.24
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial courts judgment, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Decision is hereby MODIFIED by imposing a penalty of one (1) year and for the accused to pay
the private party the sum of Nine Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P980,000.00) as civil indemnity.
With cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on October 11, 2000.
Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING PETITIONERS
DEFENSE THAT HE HAD ALREADY SEVERED, SINCE JULY 1989, HIS ACCOMODATION
ARRANGEMENT WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED BAUTISTA WHO WAS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE
TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO BY UNLAD COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND THEREFORE
PETITIONER HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUFFICIENCY OR INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS OF
UNLADS BANK ACCOUNT.
2. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED IN (A) WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW IN FAILING TO RULE
THAT THE SUBJECT CHECK, UCPB CHECK NO. ARA 168341, WAS NOT ISSUED BY PETITIONER TO
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON ACCOUNT OR FOR VALUE.
3. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT AT THE
TIME THE SUBJECT CHECK WAS ISSUED BY BAUTISTA IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, THE
LATTER WAS ALREADY AWARE THAT THE RESPECTIVE ESTATES OF THE ACCUSED WERE ALREADY
ATTACHED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALAPAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO.
4. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF FACT AND LAW IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
5. THE COURT A QUO AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN
THEY FAILED TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22 AGAINST THE ACCUSED
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.26
In support of his first assigned error, petitioner claims that: he had no actual knowledge of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the funds handled by his co-accused Bautista; while it is true that he opened a joint account with
Bautista at UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City and that he signed several UCPB checks in blank to accommodate
Bautista, he already severed his accommodation arrangement with Bautista as early as July of 1989; this is
evidenced by the affidavits executed by Bautista dated June 4, 1990 and May 31, 1993 which the court a
quo ignored; the Court of Appeals erroneously held that the affidavits of Bautista are "self-serving" since there was
no showing that Bautista was lying when he made the statements therein; also, the declarant in this case is Bautista
and not petitioner, thus the principle of self-serving statements cannot apply; the affidavits of Bautista are
declarations against the interest of the person making it, which are admissible notwithstanding their hearsay
character, since such declarations are relevant to the case and the declarant is not available as a witness despite
efforts of petitioner to present Bautista in court; the true test of the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was
made ante litem motam as in this case but whether the declaration was uttered under circumstances justifying the
conclusion that there was no probable motive to falsify; also, the affidavits of Bautista, having been acknowledged
before a notary public, should be given evidentiary weight.27

Petitioner also points out that in Lao vs. Court of Appeals 28 the Court held that if knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds is proven to be actually absent or non-existent, the accused should not be held liable for the offense defined
under Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22; in said case, petitioner was acquitted, even though she was still connected with the
corporation at the time of the issuance of the check, since she was not expected or obliged to possess under the
organizational structure of the corporation, knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; and that in the case at bar, the
court a quo affirmed the conviction of petitioner even though it was established that he had ceased to be connected
with co-accused Bautistas business for more than three years prior to the issuance of the subject check and even
though it was clear from the testimony of private complainant himself that he had dealt with Bautista and Ilagan
only.29
Anent the second and third assigned errors, petitioner argues that: in the case at bar, there was neither a pre-existing
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to
private complainant on July 24, 1993 since petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July
of 1989; when Bautista issued the subject check to Bergado on July 24, 1993, Bautista had no more authority to use
petitioners pre-signed checks thus there was no consideration to speak of; petitioner was deceived by Bautista into
believing that all the pre-signed checks were already used or issued as of 1989; the court a quo should not have
presumed that when petitioner signed the checks and handed the same to Bautista, petitioner had knowledge that
their account had no funds; in all criminal cases, suspicion, no matter how strong cannot sway judgment; even
assuming that petitioner had issued the subject check when he signed the same sometime before July 1989 and that
he had an undertaking to whoever would be the payee, still petitioner should be exempted from criminal liability
since petitioner could not comply with the said undertaking due to an insuperable cause, i.e., as early as June 18,
1993, all the properties of petitioner had already been attached/garnished by the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro.30
Petitioner further argues that: private complainant is not a holder in due course because he knew that the account of
Bautista and petitioner with UCPB Araneta branch had been closed at the time that he deposited UCPB Check No.
ARA 168341 on August 5, 1993; Check No. ARA 374058 in the amount of P500,000.00, which bounced earlier, was
drawn from the same UCPB account of Bautista and petitioner which had already been closed by the UCPB on
January 31, 1992;31 private complainant also had knowledge that the respective estates of both accused were already
attached by the RTC at the time the subject check was given to him by Bautista since the first order of attachment
was issued on June 18, 1993 and was recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on the same date;
applying the principle that registration of instrument is notice to the world, Bergado is presumed to know the various
orders of attachment/garnishment issued by the court.32
As to his fourth assigned error, petitioner argues that: the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; the prosecution failed to rebut the allegation of petitioner that he was not anymore connected with the
business of Bautista and therefore he had no knowledge of the insufficiency of the funds handled by Bautista; and
the prosecution and the trial court relied solely on the authenticity of petitioners signature on the subject check
which fact is not enough to convict petitioner of the offense charged.33
Finally, anent his fifth assigned error, petitioner claims that the Regional Trial Court which tried and convicted
petitioner had no jurisdiction over violations of B.P. Blg. 22 considering that the penalty therefor is imprisonment of
thirty days to one year and/or a fine not less than, and not more than double, the amount, but not to
exceed P200,000.00; and that at the time the Information was filed on October 4, 1993, violations of B.P. Blg. 22 fell
under the jurisdiction of the MTC in view of Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 which provides that the MTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than four years and two months or a
fine of not more than P4,000.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or

other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kin,
nature, value or amount thereof.34
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that: the mere fact that petitioner was a signatory to the check makes
him solidarily liable with his co-signatory; if it is true that petitioner severed his accommodation arrangement with
Bautista as early as July of 1989, he should have informed the UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City branch that any
check that would be issued bearing his signature and that of Bautista and drawn against their joint account after July
of 1989 should no longer be honored; the affidavit of Bautista to the effect that petitioner should not be held
answerable for any liability of Unlad after July 1989 is not admissible as Bautista was not presented in court nor the
prosecution afforded any opportunity to test the veracity of his allegations; having failed to convincingly establish
that petitioner has severed his accommodation arrangement with his co-accused Bautista, the presumption stands
that he was aware that they no longer had sufficient funds at the time the check was issued; the presumption also
stands that the check was issued on account or for value; petitioner also cannot claim that private complainant was
aware that petitioner and Bautistas joint account was already closed at the time the subject check was issued and
delivered to complainant since there is nothing on record to show that the reason for the non-payment of the checks
earlier issued to complainant was due to "account closed"; Bergado claims that the earlier checks were dishonored
due to lack of sufficient funds; there is also no merit to the argument of petitioner that private complainant was
already aware that petitioner together with Bautista could no longer make good the subject check in view of the
various writs of attachment issued by the court against their properties, which writs of attachment were duly
recorded with the Register of Deeds; the registration of the various writs of attachment affected only the real
properties of petitioner and such registration served as warning to those who may have or intend to have dealings
affecting such lands covered by the attachments; with regard to the attachment of their bank accounts, there was no
showing that private complainant was aware of the same; there is also no merit to the claim of petitioner that his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution was able to establish that petitioner, together with
Bautista, issued the subject check to the complainant in payment of the money loaned by the latter to Unlad; the
check bounced for the reason "account closed" and despite demand to make good the check, petitioner and his coaccused failed and refused to pay the complainant; and there is no merit to the claim of petitioner that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the present case following Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 where it is provided that in order that the
offense under the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, the imposable penalty must not exceed four years and two months or a fine of not more than P4,000.00 or
both such fine and imprisonment; in the case at bar, the imposable fine is way beyond the limit of P4,000.00 as the
amount of the check is P980,000.00 thus the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.35
Simply stated, the issues that need to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether the RTC, which tried and convicted
petitioner, has jurisdiction over the case; (2) whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of funds handled by his co-accused; (3) whether the check was issued on account or for value; (4)
whether the private complainant, at the time of issuance, had knowledge that the check had no sufficient funds; and
(5) whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First issue. Whether the RTC, which tried and convicted petitioner, had jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner claims that the RTC which tried and convicted him had no jurisdiction over violations of B.P. Blg.
22 since such jurisdiction is vested on the MTC in view of Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129.
We do not agree.
As clearly provided by Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, to wit:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases.---Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
.....
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and
two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does
not exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, OR, a fine of not more than four thousand pesos or both such fine and imprisonment.
The Information in this case was filed on October 4, 1993.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7691 took effect and amended Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 to read as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases. --- Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
.....
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the Information in the present case was filed prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 7691, the old rule governs
and therefore, considering that the imposable penalty for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 per Section 1, thereof is
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year OR by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment; and
inasmuch as the fine imposable in the present case is more than P4,000.00 as the subject amount of the check
is P980,000.00, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the present case. As we held in People vs.
Velasco :36
as a general rulethe jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its

enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a
case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having
retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivityAt
the time the case against the appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the Regional
Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
.....
In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law
then in force (R.A. No. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the
commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature. 37
Second issue. Whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
We have held that knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, thus the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the
time of the issuance and on the checks presentment for payment if he fails to pay the amount of the check within
five banking days from notice of dishonor.38
Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency
of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
As a rule, the prosecution has a duty to prove all the elements of the crime, including the acts that give rise to
the prima facie presumption. Petitioner, on the other hand, has a right to rebut such presumption. Thus, if such
knowledge of insufficiency of funds is proven to be actually absent or inexistent, the accused should not be held
liable for the offense defined under the first paragraph of Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22,39 thus:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit or to cover the

full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
....
In the present case, the prosecution has established the prima facie presumption of knowledge of petitioner of
insufficient funds through the demand letter sent to petitioner, Exhibit "C"40 which was duly received by petitioner as
shown by the registry return receipt, Exhibit "D".41
Petitioner tried to rebut the prima facie presumption by insisting that he is not an owner of Unlad and he has already
severed his accommodation arrangement with Bautista as early as 1989. He argues that the affidavits of Bautista
exonerating him from any responsibility as well as the private complainants own testimony that he never dealt with
petitioner, should be given weight.
We are not persuaded.
It is a hornbook doctrine that unless the affiant himself takes the witness stand to affirm the averments in his
affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay.42 The trial court
and the Court of Appeals were correct in considering the same as hearsay evidence and in not giving probative
weight to such affidavits.
Moreover, petitioner had admitted that he continued investing in Unlad until April 1994. Hence, he now cannot
claim that he has completely severed his ties with Bautista as of 1989. With nothing but his bare assertions, which
are ambiguous at best, petitioner has failed to rebut the prima facie presumption laid down by the statute and
established by the prosecution.
Petitioners insistence that since he is not an owner of Unlad, he could not have had any knowledge as to the
insufficiency of funds is devoid of merit. As clarified in Lao vs. Court of Appeals,43 the very case petitioner is
invoking, the doctrine that a mere employee tasked to sign checks in blanks may not be deemed to have knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds applies only to corporate checks and not to personal checks.44 In this case, what is
involved is a personal and not a corporate check.
Worth mentioning also is the fact that in the Lao case, the notice of dishonor was never personally received by
petitioner, thus the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds never arose. Here, as correctly
found by the RTC, petitioner was duly notified of the dishonor of the subject check as shown by Exh. "C," 45 a letter,
specifically mentioning that the subject check was dishonored for reason "Account Closed," with the corresponding
registry return receipt showing that petitioner received the notice on August 16, 1993 which petitioner did not
impugn.46
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration.47 Valuable consideration, in turn, may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or
indorser.48

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in
exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable
consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation
incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24,
1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit
since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or
Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.49
Fourth issue. Whether the private complainant, at the time of issuance, had knowledge that the checks had no
sufficient funds.
We have held that knowledge of the payee that the drawer did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank at the
time the check was issued is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22.50 This
is because the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance
thereof are inconsequential.51
In Yu Oh vs. Court of Appeals 52 the Court held that there is no violation of B.P. Blg. 22, if complainant was actually
told by the drawer that he has no sufficient funds in the bank.53 In the present case, since there is no evidence that a
categorical statement was given to private complainant when the subject check was issued to him, the above ruling
cannot apply.
Fifth issue. Whether the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner maintains that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since the prosecution
failed to rebut his allegation that he was not anymore connected with the business of Bautista and the trial court
relied solely on the authenticity of petitioners signature on the subject check to convict him of the offense charged.
We are not convinced.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty. Suffice it to say the law requires only moral
certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in a prejudiced mind.54
After reviewing the entire records of this case, we find that there is no reason to depart from the trial courts
judgment of conviction. The weight and quantum of evidence needed to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt were met and established by the prosecution and correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
However, in view of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular
No. 13-2001, establishing a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22; and the
recommendation of the Solicitor General in its Comment that the policy laid down in Vaca vs. Court of
Appeals ,55and Lim vs. People,56 of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness, be considered in favor of petitioner who is not shown to be a habitual
delinquent or a recidivist,57 we find that the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals should be modified by deleting
the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine of P200,000.00.

An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may
be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not.58 Considering that the civil aspect of the case
is deemed instituted with the criminal case and considering that the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to
award, in their respective judgments, the interest on the amount due to private complainant, it is incumbent upon us
to correct the patent error of the lower courts. Private complainant is entitled to a 12% legal interest per annum from
the date of finality of judgment.59
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: The
sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Instead, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00, subject to subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code; and petitioner is ordered to
pay the private complainant the amount of P980,000.00 with 12% legal interest per annum from the date of finality
of herein judgment.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151978

July 14, 2004

ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR. No.
23753, affirming the August 16, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, in
Criminal Case No. 98-1089. The RTC convicted petitioner Arturo Romera of frustrated homicide and sentenced him
to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to pay private
offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages and P10,000 as attorneys fee.
The Information against petitioner reads:
On October 4, 1998, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, at Sitio Puntod, Barangay Balagnan, Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Roy Mangaya-ay
with the use of a bolo, thus, inflicting a mortal wound on the abdomen of the latter; accused thereby
performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony of Homicide which was not
produced because of the timely and effective medical attendance administered on the said victim.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249, in relation with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 3
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued.
The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the records, are as follows:
In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera was with the victim, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five other
men namely, Eligario "Beboy" Acenas, Dennis "Bobong" Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta and
Franklin Generol. They were all headed for Biasong to play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was raining,
so they decided to while away time at the house of Ciriaca Capil. Franklin Generol hung a string made of cigarette
foil on Bebing Zuluetas pants and said, "Theres a monkey among us." Everybody laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay,
who got angry and chided Franklin Generol to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also got angry and pointed
a finger at Franklin Generol and said, "Even if you are stronger and older, if you will be hit by my fist, you will
crawl." Petitioner then stood up and warned everyone, "You all watch out in Balaguan." He pulled Franklin Generol
to join him and said, "Lets go, there are many boastful people here." Thereafter, petitioner and Franklin left the
group.
At six oclock in the evening, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way home, they passed by the
house of one Antonio Mangaya-ay. In said house, which is about one kilometer away from petitioners own, they
saw petitioner already carrying a bolo waiting for them.
Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered, "Here are the brave ones." Roy and his companions
ran away but Roy slipped on the muddy ground. Petitioner approached Roy and said, "Come here, brave one." He

held Roy up by the collar and stabbed him in the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke up, he found
himself at the provincial hospital where he underwent surgery and stayed for more than three weeks.
After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo Ramoso of the Citizens Armed Force
Geographical Unit (CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied petitioner to the Balingasay police station.
For his part, petitioner testified on what happened as follows:
Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around seven oclock in the evening. Thereafter, they
went to bed. While lying in bed, they heard Roy call petitioner and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for
sale. He did not answer Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner but when the
latters wife told him that petitioner was already asleep, he told her to wake her husband up. Petitioner went down
the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at him. He
successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would kill petitioner. Petitioner
tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall, petitioners wife
held the door to allow petitioner to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy
rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the
stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According to petitioner, he ceased harming Roy for fear
he might kill him.
The trial court discounted petitioners story of self-defense. It found that when petitioner got hold of the bolo, there
was no more danger to his life. Petitioner was convicted of frustrated homicide. The dispositive part of its decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused ARTURO ROMERA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense charged. Consequently, taking into consideration
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the provisions of the [I]ndeterminate Sentence Law,
he is hereby sentenced to a penalty ranging from One (1) year Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days of
Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to
pay the private offended party as actual damages, P19,361.15 and another sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys
fee without, however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning to the trial court the following assignments of error:
1. FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE.
2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPRECIATE SPECIAL PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE, ARTICLE 69, REVISED PENAL CODE
WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES.
3. FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPLY ARTICLE 62 (5) REVISED PENAL CODE,
WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY ONE DEGREE LOWER WITH THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR
MORE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.5
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. It pointed out that assuming arguendo that it was the
victim who was the aggressor at the start, the unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner took possession of
the bolo from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense becomes
unavailing.
The appellate court also ruled that Article 696 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application in this case. It
explained that there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful

aggression against the person defending himself. It held, however, that petitioner is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender as it was established during trial that after the incident he surrendered himself to
the CAFGU and later on to the police authorities.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals erroneously failed to apply Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, which lowers the imposable penalty
by one degree when two or more mitigating circumstances are present.
Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at
him without warning as petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his
house, and endangering the lives of his children, the victim also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes,
says the petitioner.
For public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the mitigating circumstances of
provocation and passion or obfuscation are unavailing to petitioner since it was he who initiated the attack. The OSG
insists that it was not the victim who went to petitioners house, but petitioner who went to where the victim was
resting.
We note that while both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not categorically state who started the attack, it can
be reasonably gleaned from their decisions that it was the victim who initiated the aggressive encounter. This finding
of fact is amply supported by the evidence on record.
Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in this case?
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view,
sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his
wife and children are in danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while petitioner
was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation
attended the commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Wellsettled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one
mitigating circumstance.7 From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the
same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.
Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also present, Article 64 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code should be applied, to wit:
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
...
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
...
The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 508 of the Revised Penal Code, is the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide. The penalty for consummated homicide is reclusion
temporal, hence the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor. There being two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the next lower penalty, prision
correccional, is the next statutory penalty. But following the Indeterminate Sentence Law herein applicable, the

minimum term of the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner for frustrated homicide should be within the
range of arresto mayor in any of its periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, while the
maximum term should be within the range of prision correccional in its medium period or two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, is MODIFIED as far as the penalty imposed is concerned. Petitioner
ARTURO ROMERA is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is also ORDERED to pay
the private offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages, and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170964

March 7, 2012

ELSA MACANDOG MAGTIRA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Petitioner Elsa Macandog Magtira seeks in this petition for review on certiorari (filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court) to reverse the decision1 and the resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27252. The CA
affirmed with modification the joint decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 148, that
found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of estafa penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The records show that seven criminal informations for estafa were filed against the petitioner. Except for the
amounts misappropriated and the private complainants4 involved, the informations were similarly worded, as
follows:
That on or about and sometime during the year of 2000, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused received in trust and for administration
from complainant x x x as contribution to a Paluwagan in the amount of x x x under [the] safekeeping of accused
[Elsa] Macandog Magtira, with the express and legal obligation on the part of the accused to return and/or account
for the same, but the accused far from complying with her obligation with intent to gain, abuse of confidence and to
defraud complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert
to her own personal use and benefit the said contribution (Paluwagan) and/or the proceeds thereof x x x and despite
repeated demands, the accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the complainant in the aforementioned amount.5
The petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges. 6 Thereafter, the seven cases were tried jointly. The
following facts were established: first, the petitioner was the custodian of the funds of the Paluwagan where the
private complainants were members;7 second, that demands were made against the petitioner by the private
complainants for the return of their contributions in the Paluwagan; and third, the petitioner failed to meet the
private complainants demand for the return of their contributions.
During trial, the petitioner denied misappropriating the contributions of the private complainants. She claimed that
she was robbed of the Paluwagan funds in the early afternoon of February 28, 2000. By way of corroboration, the
petitioner presented a copy of an entry in the police blotter dated February 28, 2000 and the affidavits of five
individuals attesting to the robbery.8
From the evidence adduced, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged and declared:
[I]t is clear to the Court that the accused is not disputing in all the cases that (a) sizeable amount of money belonging
to different persons were received by her in trust or for administration, involving the duty to make a delivery thereof
to the owners; (2) that there is a demand to her that same be returned but she cannot do so.9
The RTC explained that while the robbery of the entrusted money is a valid defense against estafa, the petitioners
evidence of the robbery was wanting. The RTC observed that the petitioners testimony was self-serving and
inconsistent on some of the material details of the robbery. The RTC also noted the petitioners failure to account for

and to deliver the contributions which were collected from the private complainants after the robbery. Finally, the
RTC found that the petitioners credibility affected by her own demeanor of indifference during trial showed no
"semblance of worry or [of] being concerned" 10 about the serious charges filed against her.
Dissatisfied with the RTCs decision, the petitioner elevated her conviction to the CA which affirmed the findings of
the RTC but modified the penalty of imprisonment imposed. The CA held:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-1766 where the amount of the fraud is P85,000.00, the incremental penalty is
six (6) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of
prision mayor minimum plus six (6) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 02-1767 where the amount of the fraud is P65,000.00, the incremental penalty is
four (4) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of
prision mayor minimum plus four (4) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as the maximum penalty.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-1768 where the amount of the fraud is P60,000.00, the incremental penalty is
three (3) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of
prision mayor minimum plus three (3) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence
is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to eleven
(11) years of prision mayor maximum, as the maximum penalty.
(4) In Criminal Case No. 02-1769 where the amount of the fraud is P34,000.00, the incremental penalty is
one (1) year to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of
prision mayor minimum plus one (1) year of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate penalty
should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to
nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as the maximum penalty.
(5) In Criminal Case No. 02-1770 where the amount of the fraud is P85,400.00, the incremental penalty is
six (6) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of
prision mayor minimum plus six (6) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
(6) In Criminal Case No. 02-1771 where the amount of the fraud is P100,000.00, the incremental penalty of
seven (7) years is to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years
of prision mayor minimum plus seven (7) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate
sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to
fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium, as the maximum penalty.
(7) In Criminal Case No. 02-1772 where the amount of the fraud is P153,000.00, the incremental penalty is
thirteen (13) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided by the law. The penalty
cannot go beyond twenty (20) years as the law provides that in no case shall the penalty be higher than
reclusion temporal regardless of the amount of the fraud. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4)

years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.11 (italics supplied)
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration;12 hence, the present petition.
The Issue
The ultimate issue for consideration is whether the petitioner should be held liable for the crimes of estafa. The
petitioner argues that the CA and the RTC erred in rejecting her argument that no misappropriation of the Paluwagan
funds was clearly established in the record.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of the petition. The OSG maintains
that the elements constituting the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence had been fully established by the
prosecutions evidence. The OSG insists that the petitioner failed to clearly prove by competent evidence her
affirmative defense of robbery. The OSG also insists that the petitioners conduct in failing to inform all the
members of the alleged robbery bolsters the circumstance of her misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds. Lastly,
the petitioners misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds was substantiated by her failure to deliver the Paluwagan
funds out of the contributions made by the private complainants after the robbery.
The petitioner subsequently filed a reply, reiterating the arguments in her petition.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Preliminary consideration
A preliminary matter we have to contend with in this case is the propriety of resolving one of the issues raised by the
petitioner who has appealed her judgment of conviction by way of a Rule 45 review. A reading of the petition shows
that the petitioner raises both errors of law and of fact allegedly committed by the CA and the RTC in their
decisions. First, we are called to determine whether a proper application of law and jurisprudence has been made in
the case. Second, we are also called to examine whether the CA and the RTC correctly appreciated the evidence to
which the two courts anchor their conclusions.
As a rule, a Rule 45 review is confined to the resolution of errors of law committed by the lower courts. Further, in a
Rule 45 review, the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally held binding and
conclusive on the Court.13 We emphasize that while jurisprudence has provided exceptions14 to this rule, the
petitioner carries the burden of proving that one or more exceptional circumstances are present in the case. The
petitioner must additionally show that the cited exceptional circumstances will have a bearing on the results of the
case.
The petitioner cites in this regard the alleged misappreciation of the evidence committed by the CA and the RTC.
The petitioner contends that both courts disregarded her evidence, namely: the affidavits of five individuals and the
police blotter. She argues that she should not be faulted for the non-presentation in court of the five individuals who
executed the affidavits which attested to the robbery since she was then represented by a counsel de oficio. She also
argues that both courts disregarded the evidence of her reputation of being a kind person of good moral character.
She asserts that she delivered to the private complainants their respective shares in the Paluwagan funds prior to the
robbery.

She further argues that the conclusions of the CA and the RTC were contrary to the Courts ruling in Lim v. Court of
Appeals15 where it held that estafa cannot be committed through negligence or, as in this case, where the explanation
by the accused raises reasonable doubt on whether the amount in question was misappropriated.
After a careful study of the records, we find that the petitioners cited exceptional circumstances are more imagined
than real. We find no compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings of the CA and the RTC in this regard.
Misappropriation as an element of the offense of estafa connotes an act of using, or disposing of, anothers property
as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.16 We have previously
held that the failure to account upon demand for funds or property held in trust without offering any satisfactory
explanation for the inability to account is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. 17 We have also held that the
demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account are similarly
circumstantial evidence that the courts can appreciate.18
As the CA and the RTC did, we find no clear evidence establishing that the petitioner was actually robbed of the
Paluwagan funds. In the first place, the five individuals who executed the affidavits were not presented in court.
While the petitioner faults the counsel de oficio for their non-presentation in court, we find no proof that her counsel
had been negligent in performing his legal duties. Incidentally, we also reject this line of argument for two other
reasons: first, it was raised only for the first time in the present appeal; and second, it involves a factual
determination of negligence which is inappropriate under a Rule 45 review.
We additionally note from a facial examination of the affidavits that the affiants were not even eyewitnesses to the
robbery; hence, their statements do not sufficiently prove the actual occurrence of the robbery. More importantly, the
affidavits do not also establish with reasonable certainty that the petitioner was actually robbed of the Paluwagan
funds.
Moreover, we cannot give much credence to the police blotter whose contents were mainly based on the statements
made by the petitioner to the police. If at all, it is evidence of what was entered, not of the truth or falsity of the entry
made. We give due respect to the evaluation made by the RTC in this regard:
Thus, there seems to be a discrepancy as to the time and number of persons (robbers) who entered the residence of
the accused. Further, the accused claims that there was a policeman who went to her house who was called by
her lessee (or lessor) but the accused cannot remember his name.
But then, the accused never testified as to whether the policeman investigated the scene of the crime and some
people in the vicinity. Surely at that hour, near such market, where there are people in the vicinity, people will notice
strangers or other persons who enter the house of another or who leave the same whether in a hurry or not.
The accused even admitted that she was hesitant to report the matter to the police[.] Why was the accused hesitant?
She claims that the robber warned her that he will harm her if she reports the incident. But immediately after the
incident, the accused reported the incident, but nothing happened to her up to the present.19(underscoring supplied)
Besides, the petitioner failed to explain her failure to account and to deliver the Paluwagan funds arising from
contributions made by the private complainants after the alleged robbery incident. On record are the positive and
unrefuted testimonies of the private complainants that they remitted contributions to the petitioner even after the
robbery. In other words, if the petitioner had in fact been robbed of Paluwagan funds, the robbery would not have
affected the accounting and the delivery of the Paluwagan funds arising from the contributions made by the private

complainants after the alleged robbery. As the records show, despite the continued receipt of contributions from the
private complainants, the petitioner failed to account for, and to deliver, the Paluwagan funds.
The Petitioners Conviction
We now go to the crux of the present appeal and determine whether the evidence adduced warrants the petitioners
conviction of the crime charged.
The offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence has the following elements under Article 315, paragraph
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.20
We find that all the above elements are present in the present case, having been established by the prosecutions
evidence and by the petitioners own admissions. The first element was established by the evidence showing that the
petitioner received various sums of money from the private complainants to be held in trust for them under the
Paluwagan operation. The petitioner admitted that she was under obligation, at a fixed date, to account for and to
deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private complainants in the sequential order agreed upon among them. The
second element was established by the evidence that the petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan
funds to the private complainants on the agreed time of delivery. The third and fourth elements of the offense were
proven by evidence showing that the petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the
private complainants despite several demands made upon her by the private complainants. Each of the private
complainants testified as to how they were prejudiced when they failed to receive their allotted Paluwagan funds.
Given the totality of evidence, we uphold the conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.
The Penalty
The decisive factor in determining the criminal and civil liability for the crime of estafa depends on the value of the
thing or the amount defrauded.21 With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the petitioner filed a
manifestation22which showed the satisfaction of her civil monetary liability with six (6) out of the seven (7) private
complainants.
1wphi1

Anent her criminal liability, the evidence shows that the amount of money remitted by the private complainants to
the petitioner all exceeded the amount of P22,000.00. In this regard, the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, provides the appropriate penalty if the value of the thing or the amount defrauded
exceeds P22,000.00:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. [italics ours]
As provided by law, the maximum indeterminate penalty when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 is pegged
at prision mayor in its minimum period or anywhere within the range of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years, plus one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 of the amount defrauded but not to exceed twenty
years. In turn, the minimum indeterminate penalty shall be one degree lower from the prescribed penalty
for estafa, which in this case is anywhere within the range of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.23 Applying this formula, we affirm
the penalty imposed by the CA as it is fully in accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision dated
November 10, 2005 and the resolution dated January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27252,
finding petitioner Elsa Macandog Magtira GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of estafa penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 113513-14 August 23, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JIMMY CONTE, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

A snake! That is how people call a person who bites the hand that feeds him or who commits a grievous wrong
against another to whom he owes a debt of gratitude. That is probably how Bernardo Crisostomo would call his farm
helper, accused-appellant Jimmy Conte, who allegedly raped the wife and kidnapped and illegally detained the two
children of the former.
Jimmy Conte was charged with serious illegal detention with rape in an information 1 in Criminal Case No. 9006 and
with kidnapping with serious illegal detention in an information 2 in Criminal Case No. 9007 which were filed on 3 October 1990
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan in Puerto Princesa City. However, upon prior leave of court, 3 the information in

Criminal Case No. 9006 was replaced by a complaint 4 only for rape, which was signed by the offended party, Gloria Crisostomo,
and was filed on 15 February 1991. The accusatory portion of the complaint reads as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1990, in the evening, at Barangay Jolo, Municipality of Roxas,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by
means of force, threat and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge for several times with one GLORIA CRISOSTOMO, against her will
and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the other hand, the following is the accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9007:
That on or about the 17th day of September 1990, in the evening, at Barangay Jolo, Municipality of Roxas,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by
means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and
detain MACRIS CRISOSTOMO and SARAH CRISOSTOMO, both minor children, by bringing them to
Barangay San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City and later transferred to a house at Baltan Street, Puerto Princesa
City for more than five (5) days thereby depriving them of their liberty until they were retrieved by police
authorities last September 24, 1990 at Baltan Street, Puerto Princesa.
The cases were assigned to Branch 52 of the court below.
The evidence for the prosecution consisting mainly of the testimonies of Bernardo, Gloria, and Macris Crisostomo
discloses that appellant Jimmy Conte was a prisoner committed to the Muntinglupa and later transferred to the
Iwahig Prison and Penal Farms in Palawan. Sometime after he was set free, or in July 1990, he went to see Bernardo
Crisostomo in New Buncag, Puerto Princesa City, and pleaded that he be given some employment. Then and there,
Bernardo hired him as a helper in the former's coconut plantation in Barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. He started
working in the plantation the following day, gathering coconuts and processing them into copra. He was made to
stay together with the other workers in a structure serving as a copra drier located about twenty meters away from
the house of the Crisostomos. 5
Most of the time, Bernardo was in New Buncag, as he was constructing a house there. Only his wife, Gloria, and
two of their seven children 7-year old Macris and 5-year old Sarah were left in their residence in Jolo. 6
On 17 September 1990 at around 11:00 p.m., Jimmy went to the house of the Crisostomos, sneaked into the room
where Gloria and her children were sleeping, and poked a home-made gun close to Gloria's mouth. He then forcibly
stripped off Gloria's dress and panty causing them to be torn. He pushed Gloria to the floor, threatened to shoot her
if she would make any outcry, and laid on top of her. Enveloped with fear, Gloria could do nothing but cry. Jimmy
then removed his brief and forcibly inserted his penis into her genitalia. After consummating his lustful desires, he
got up, sat down beside Gloria, and kept watch over her and the two children. Macris was then awake, while Sarah
was still asleep. Upon seeing and hearing Macris cry loudly, Jimmy slapped him and threatened to kill him should he
make any noise. 7
Jimmy repeated his savage act against Gloria at about 1:00 a.m. and at 4:00 a.m. the next day, 18 September 1990. 8
Later on that same day, Jimmy declared that somebody whom he had earlier contacted would come to buy the
carabao of the Crisostomos. He remained in the house from morning till afternoon waiting for the purported buyer.

The latter arrived at 4:00 p.m., paid the former the sum of P5,000.00, and took the carabao. All the while, Gloria just
kept on crying. At around 9:00 p.m., a cargo truck arrived. Jimmy took Sarah and threatened to kill her should
Gloria refuse to go with him. He then forced her and Macris to board the vehicle. With Sarah in his arms, he seated
himself beside the driver and made Gloria and Macris sit also in the front seat of the truck. 9
It was about 1:00 a.m. of 19 September 1990 when the truck reached Barangay San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City.
Upon Jimmy's order, Gloria and Macris alighted from the truck. Jimmy, who was carrying Sarah, brought the
Crisostomos to a place called Garcellano Picnic Ground. After negotiating with the person on duty therein, he took
the three to a cottage inside the compound. There, he sexually ravished Gloria once in the early morning, and again,
in the evening of that day.10
At dusk of 20 September 1990, Jimmy brought the Crisostomos to a house in Baltan Street, Puerto Princesa City.
During their three-day stay there, he had carnal knowledge with Gloria once in the evening and once at dawn of each
day. 11
For the whole period that they were in the hands of Jimmy, the Crisostomos were served with meals ordered by
him. 12 On 21 September 1990, Gloria managed to have the boy who had delivered the food bring to a certain Sgt. Pilapil a
letter 13 informing him of their situation and pleading for their rescue. She instructed the boy to send it to the CAFGU Detachment
in Roxas, Palawan, through a passenger jeepney going to that place. 14

In the early morning of 23 September 1990, Sgt. Pilapil went to see Bernardo in his house in New Buncag, Puerto
Princesa City, and gave to the latter the aforesaid letter. After reading the same, Bernardo proceeded to the City
Police Station. A certain Sgt. Crisanto Pantallano volunteered to help him look for his wife and children. Together,
the two went to Baltan Street, which was the address written in the letter. At about 12:00 noon, Bernardo caught
sight of Jimmy sitting at the stairs of a house at No. 40 Baltan Street. Sgt. Pantallano forthwith arrested Jimmy and
asked him where the Crisostomos were. Upon being told that the three were in a room at the upper story of the
house, he went to the room and found the Crisostomos there. 15
Appellant Jimmy Conte presented an entirely different version. He declared that he and Gloria were lovers and that
the latter planned their elopement. According to him, sometime after he was released from the Iwahig Prison and
Penal Farm, he worked as a helper in the coconut plantation of Bernardo Crisostomo at Roxas, Palawan. He and the
other workers stayed in the copra drier near the Crisostomo's house. Gloria visited him many times in the copra
drier. At first, he did not give any malicious meaning to those visits. One day, she sent away the three other helpers
from the copra drier. In the next instant, she approached him, undressed herself before him, and embraced him. This
culminated in carnal congress. They had since been doing it thrice each night for eight months. In the later part of
that period, they did it in the residence of the Crisostomos in the same bed where Gloria's two children were
sleeping, for then Gloria had already been abandoned by her husband. Sometime thereafter, Gloria told him that she
was pregnant and invited him to elope, as she was afraid of her husband. They then eloped bringing along with them
her two children. While waiting for a boat bound for Luzon, they stayed in the meantime at the Garcellano Picnic
Ground at San Pedro, Puerto Princesa, and later transferred to Baltan Street. They continued having sexual
intercourse in those places. Later, however, he was arrested by a certain Bong Amorao and his companions, and he
was then brought to the police station of Puerto Princesa. 16 While he was detained in jail, Gloria visited him. She even
wrote him a letter, 17 which was handed to him in jail by the daughter of the owner of the house in Baltan Street where they had
stayed. Since he did not know how to read, he let the jail warden read the letter for him, 18 the full text of which is as follows:

Dear Jimmy Conte,

Iniibig kita Jimmy kahit kailan man hindi kita hihiwalayan. Ikaw lang ang aking mahal pinabayaan kasi ako
ng asawa ko kaya nakagawa ako ng hindi maganda talagang gusto kong sumama sa iyo. Sana mahalin mo

rin ako tulad ng pagmamahal ko sa iyo, hindi ka kaya magsisisi sa katandaan kong ito? Mahal na mahal
kita Jimmy balikan mo ako dito sa Jolo Roxas talagang disidido na akong sumama sa iyo Jimmy dahil lang
sa asawa kong walanghiya pinabayaan kami.
Hanggang dito na lang Jimmy, I love you!
,
Gloria
Jimmy hindi ko sukat akalain na mahuhuli tayo sa ganong araw ngunit huwag kang mag-alala wala kang
kasalanan sa mga pangyayaring ito na naganap, dahil ito ay kagustuhan kong lahat ang nangyari sa ating
dalawa. Hindi naman kagustuhan mo ang pangyayari na ito kong di ako ang may kasalanan. Nagawa ko ito
dahil pinabayaan na kami ng aking asawa. Ano man ang mangyari ako ang bahalang managot sa batas at sa
mata ng maykapal.
P.S.
Kong tungkol naman sa kalabaw na binibintang sa iyo na ikaw ang nagpabili ay hindi totoo yon, hindi
naman ikaw ang nagbinta eh. Ako naman ang nagbinta ng kalabaw namin hindi naman ikaw. Ako ang
bahalang managot ng kalabaw na bininta ko tutal amin naman yon. At sa tutoo lang hindi mo alam iyon.
To boost his theory, Jimmy presented Ruben Ladines, the owner of the house at Baltan Street where he and Gloria
and her two children had stayed; Rolly Nicanor, a detainee at the provincial jail of Palawan and a former resident of
Jolo, Roxas, Palawan; and Cipriano Sumagaysay, the jail warden.
Ruben Ladines testified that sometime in September 1990, a woman, who had introduced herself as Mrs. Gloria
Conte, came to his house and asked for a room to rent. With her then were her two children and a man by the name
of Jimmy Conte. Upon being told that there was a vacant room at the upper story of his house, she offered to rent it
and paid a half-month advance rental. The family stayed there for about ten days. During that period, he observed
Jimmy and Gloria to be affectionate to each other. 19
Rolly Nicanor declared that prior to his arrest in Puerto Princesa on 18 March 1991, he was residing at a house about
ten to twenty meters away from that of the Crisostomos in Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. Sometime in 1986, he accidentally
killed a barriomate. After that incident, he went into hiding. But, for several times, he returned to Jolo, and during
those times he was there he could see Jimmy and Gloria going together to the coconut plantation, embracing and
kissing each other. This they did from 1987 to 1989. He also saw them elope at about 4:00 p.m. of 17 September
1990. 20
Cipriano Sumagaysay testified that on 27 September 1990, when he arrived at the Puerto Princesa Jail, he saw an old
woman who was just about to leave the jail. He then asked Jimmy who that woman was, and the latter replied that
she was his visitor, Gloria Crisostomo. About thirty minutes thereafter, a young lady came and gave Jimmy a letter.
Upon the latter's request, the jail warden read the letter and kept it so that it could be used as evidence. 21
After the conclusion of the joint trial of the two cases, the trial court rendered a joint decision convicting the
appellant in Criminal Case No. 9006 of the crime of rape on eleven counts and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua for each crime and to pay the complainant an indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, but acquitting him of
the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. 9007 on the ground that "the acts of

taking and holding the children hostage only form part of the threat and intimidation which the accused employed to
insure realization of his carnal designs against their mother." 22
In this appeal, the appellant faults the trial court for (1) giving weight and credence to the testimony of the private
complainant that she was forcibly raped several times by him and (2) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape.
It is doctrinally entrenched that the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is generally viewed as
correct and is accorded great weight on appeal, for that court had the advantage of observing the demeanor and
behavior of the witnesses while testifying. 23 In the present case, we find no compelling reason to depart from this rule, for
our own assessment of the testimony of the complainant, Gloria Crisostomo, discloses no fact of substance and value which the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied which, if considered, might affect the result of this case.

The appellant contends that the guilty verdict cannot be sustained because there is no clear and convincing proof that
he forced the complainant to have sexual intercourse with him for several times He further claims that the threat or
intimidation that he would kill the complainant and her two children was not sufficient to prevent the complainant
from putting up some resistance or struggle against his acts or from shouting in order to get the attention of her
neighbors.
We are not persuaded. Under Article 335(1) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation. The appellant's acts of poking a gun at the complainant,
ripping off her dress and underwear, and pushing her to the floor constitute force. These acts were followed by an
intimidation that he would shoot the complainant should she make any noise. Thus:
From the aforequoted testimony, there is no shred of doubt that the appellant did rape the private complainant in the
evening of 17 September 1990.
But was the trial court correct in convicting the appellant of eleven counts of rape?
Notably, the single complaint filed by Gloria Crisostomo charges the appellant with several crimes of rape, 25 in
violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a complaint or information must charge but one
offense. Under Sections 1 and 3(e) of Rule 117, the appellant, before entering his plea, should have moved to quash the complaint
for being duplicitous. For his failure to do so, he is deemed to have waived the defect. 26 Hence, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 120,
the court could convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every
one of them.

After examining the complainant's testimony in its entirety, our minds are at rest on the culpability of the appellant
for eleven counts of rape. On all the ten other occasions that he had carnal knowledge of the complainant, there was
admittedly neither physical force employed by the former nor resistance or struggle on the part of the latter. But, the
absence of resistance did not make voluntary the complaint's submission to the criminal acts of the appellant. 27
It must be recalled that at the outset, or in the first sexual assault, the appellant intimidated or threatened with death
the complainant, which necessary produced reasonable fear in her and deprived her of will and freedom. The
intimidation was a continuing one as shown by his possession of a gun and the threat to kill the children. Thus, the
complainant could not bring herself to scream or resist his sexual assaults. During the succeeding days, he kept her
and her children like virtual prisoners and effectively implanted fear in the complainant's mind by continually
carrying her youngest child, Sarah, thereby sending the message that if the complainant would escape or make any
outcry he would kill the complainant and Macris. This message was made louder and clearer when he told the
complainant that he had killed a whole family in his place in Pangasinan, which led to his conviction and service of

his sentence at the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm. These circumstances were enough to engender a well-founded
belief that the appellant was capable of making good his threats. Her fear was not imagined.
In People vs. Pamor, 28 this Court made this disquisition:
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated or governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the
mind of the victim and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that it produces fear fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment.
It includes the moral kind such as the fear caused by threatening the victim with a knife or pistol. Where
such intimidation exists and the victims cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering
resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all
her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then
offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's participation in the sexual
act voluntary.
The appellant also capitalizes on the admission of the private complainant during her cross-examination that she
could have escaped had she wanted to but she dared not. He then quotes the following testimony:
It is clear from the complainant's testimony that while she had the chance of running away, she did not grab
it because had she done so her daughter, who was then being carried by the appellant in his arms, could be
killed. She must have been caught in the twin horns of a wild dilemma. For, equally strong with, or even
stronger than her desire to escape and to protect herself and her honor was her love for or her inflexible
sense of duty to protect her child. She, like most mothers, was liable to put her child before everything else
in the end. Hence, she chose not to escape.
The theory of the appellant that the numerous occasions he had carnal knowledge of the complainant were
impelled by the electricity of mutual love and desire does not inspire belief. As the trial court observed:
The accused is an unlettered former inmate of the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farms. He is a helper
in the processing of copra in the coconut plantation of Bernardo Crisostomo and the complainant
in the latter's coconut plantation in barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. He has not appeared to the
court to be possessed of the physical attributes and charms which could make women swoon and
attracted to him in expectation of ecstasy in romance. It would therefore seem rather farfetched
that the complainant would be drawn to him in the manner he had vainly sought to show by
evidence for the defense.
The complainant, on the other hand, is a 43-year old mother of seven (7), and the lawfully-wedded
wife of Bernardo Crisostomo. For 30 years of her married life she had been living with her family
in their coconut plantation in barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. On the basis of her age, the number
of children she had brought up and is still bringing up; the rural environment which, for all those
years, must have shaped her norm of conduct in life, all but make the court skeptical about the
trustworthiness of the characterizations by the accused of the morality of complainant. Such
characterization run counter to the generally accepted trait of the common Filipino wife and
mother.
It was because of a letter surreptitiously sent by the complainant to the CAGFU Detachment
Commander that the police and her husband subsequently rescued her and her two children from

the accused. If it were true that the complainant had indeed chosen to forsake her marriage, her
children and the man she had been married to and lived for 30 years, she would not have thwarted
the realization of her fantasies by writing that letter thru which, he sought the assistance of the
CAGFU in rescuing her and her children from the accused.
Furthermore, the testimonies of the accused himself and that of Ruben Ladines with respect to the
other incidents of the case could hardly contribute to the probative worth of the evidence for the
defense. The accused declared that before they eloped to Puerto Princesa City he had been having
sexual conversation with the complainant three times nightly, for eight (8) months. Aside from the
improbability of his capacity for sexual performance with such frequency he could not have done
so for that length of time as he had been in Jolo, Roxas, Palawan, as helper of the Crisostomos, for
only about two months before they supposedly eloped to Puerto Princesa City.
For his part Ruben Ladines declared, among others, that the accused and Gloria Crisostomo and
her children stayed in the former's house in Baltan Street for almost two weeks. During that period
the couple were said to have comported themselves as husband and wife, and were observed to
have been affectionate to one another. The truth of what this witness asserted, though, is belied by
the impressive and convincing evidence that the complainant and her children were held hostage
in that boarding house for only three (3) days. 30
If it were true that the complainant loved the appellant and had illicit sexual relations with him while her
husband was away, then she would not have exerted any effort to contact Sgt. Pilapil in order to be rescued.
Neither would she execute an affidavit pointing to the appellant as her rapist nor would she file a complaint
for rape and thereafter undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and scandal of a public trial for rape.
On the contrary, she would have preserved the illicit union by whatever means to ensure endless
gratification of her biological needs. In exposing the evil deeds of the appellant and in facing the ordeal of a
public trial, the complainant showed an honest desire to seek justice.
The alleged letter of the complainant 31 purportedly sent to the appellant while he was detained in jail does not save
the day for him. The trial court "was not impressed by the integrity and trustworthiness" 32 thereof. Neither are we. Our
own examination of the signature "GLORIA" appearing therein readily discloses that it is conspicuously different from
the signature of complainant Gloria Crisostomo in her complaint and sworn statement. 33 That letter was not even
properly identified. Then too, the circumstances under which it was purportedly delivered to the appellant do not at all
inspire credence. According to witness Cipriano Sumagaysay, warden of the City Jail of Puerto Princesa City, the letter
was delivered by a 14-year old girl some thirty minutes after an old lady, who was claimed by the appellant to be the
complainant, had visited the appellant. If indeed the old lady was Gloria Crisostomo, we find neither reason nor rhyme
why she would still send a letter to the appellant a few minutes after she left. Moreover, Gloria who was then only 43
years of age cannot be said to be an "old lady." Finally, if Sumagaysay actually saw the "old lady," he could have, while
on the witness stand, pointed to the complainant as the "old lady" whom he had seen visiting the appellant.
Sumagaysay's testimony was not even corroborated by the visitor's logbook of the city jail.

All told, the trial court correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on
eleven counts and correctly sentenced him to eleven times of reclusion perpetua. The service of the said
penalties shall not, however, exceed forty years pursuant to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by C.A. No. 217.34
In view of such convictions, the appellant should, as well be ordered to pay civil indemnity in each case,
and not just a single indemnity of P50,000.00 in all the cases. We hold that, consistent with the current

policy of the Court, the appellant should be ordered to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P40,000.00
in each of the eleven counts of rape.
Whether the trial court correctly acquitted the appellant in Criminal Case No. 9007 is an entirely different
matter which is already beyond our reviewing authority, since a judgment of acquittal becomes final
immediately after promulgation. 35
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modification on the award of civil indemnity, the appealed decision of
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan (Puerto Princesa City) in Criminal Case No. 9006 is
hereby AFFIRMED with costs against appellant Jimmy Conte.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on
or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when
subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana. 1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, 2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily
waived his right to a pre-trial conference, 3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.

I
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the
police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto.
Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in
the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and

Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money from Bustamante, the team,
together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities
and barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to
Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the
affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed
to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez
then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in
on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought
by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial
investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator. 4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the
appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from
appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest
from the rest of the other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not
actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant after
the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter
was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right
to counsel. 6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant
signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro
likewise informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf
was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put
"two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were
personally and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's
apprehension, and the results were practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also
did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to
the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic
ulcer, which causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant
came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained
normal. 8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at
around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the members of his family in their house when three persons,
whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about
something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to
Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route. While on board, he was told that he was a
pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp,
he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt.
Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket

of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure
the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle,
Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a
quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca,
Pampanga where he was confined for three days. 9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga
after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering
from peptic ulcer even before the latter's arrest. 10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan
District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the
cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body. 11

On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant
for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government. 12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending in his
assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit
"G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. 13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually
sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently
from his possession, 14 the latter not being in any way connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered
four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves. 15 In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of
selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal
possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not charged herein. 16

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. 17 To sell
means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. 18 It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that
appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in
exchange for two twenty-peso bills.

After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able
to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his testimony was
amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of
Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and
is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible
to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. 19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in
the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the
team before the
buy-bust operation was effected. 20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to
have regularly performed their official duty. 21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the selfserving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed, 22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi.
To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not
appear to have plausibly done so.

When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist
therein, 23 confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant
were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. 24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved
with certainty and conclusiveness. 25

Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags
from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but
in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same. 26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since
such is not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the
marijuana was confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution
committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to
a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor
reflects on the witnesses' honesty. 27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant
that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he participated in the legalseizure or
confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit.

Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered
for finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations. 28 This omission has been
satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:

The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can
under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes
"any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." 30 The dusting of said
bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which identification can be
supplied by other species of evidence.

Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the
seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or
booked in the custody of any barangay official or police authorities. 31 These are absurd disputations. No law or
jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or
be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant inflagrante delicto, they
were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.

Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his
apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags
of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below
these remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned,
was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him. 33

However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's
conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They
were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense,
there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel. 34 Although appellant manifested during the
custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of
counsel, 35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not
allowable in evidence. 36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.

Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his
predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction 37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. 38 In the present case, and in light of the
preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.

Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger. 39 We take this
opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that
class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place. 40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to
sell to a total stranger, 41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the
acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. 42 While there may be instances where such sale could be
improbable, taking into consideration the diverse circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the
accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.

Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which
caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody. 43 This he asserts to support his
explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.

The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. 44 The evidence on record is bereft of any
support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution 45 and the other for the defense, 46testified
on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is
evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been suffering even before his arrest. 47 His
own brother even corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. 48

Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not
divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention
there.49 Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged
malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him. Such omissions
funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure fabrication.

These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated
for the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all costs. 51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the
culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in
the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659
effective December 31, 1993, 52 which supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional
questions of law which we shall now resolve.

II

The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds
or Instrument of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7,
8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
upon the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight
of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry
would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of
the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, 53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said
Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by
special laws. 54 The execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers
to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa
or falsification. 55

Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor
invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has
likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of
penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and
nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of
whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the
prescription of the crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659
has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and
pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief
under a writ of habeas corpus. 56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the
drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That
penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or
more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of
its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as
the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such
conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the
quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law
that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable
range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall
be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said second
paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional,prision
mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the
lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which
period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific
mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction. 59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the
quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each component

penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then
the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.

It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon
that, unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second
paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively the
bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof.
Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from
250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision
correccional is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three
periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is
whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision
correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability
should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special
laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be
applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because
the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which
penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then
provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to
determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of
penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter
were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be
invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special
law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When,
as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses
under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but differently from the
penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division
into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be
punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance,
Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section one of this
Act, shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or
laborer by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen,
paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the
same manner as therein provided. 63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties
as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700
(Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor to
death; 64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and
Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor,
reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.

Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539

(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not
more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things;
not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without
reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said
rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the
penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the
other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those
in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and
special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised
Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have

suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act

No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the
fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the
statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application
to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise
would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its
allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda, 65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the AntiCattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should
not apply to said special law. We said therein that

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely distinct from and
unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of
the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not
for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large
cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of
the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to
Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be
"supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the
court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the
application of the provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of
discretion to the Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the
court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the
application of penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of experience in the
administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.) 66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts
of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code on the
appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different
kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result
in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of
modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be
considered and applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in
accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64,
when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be
reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68,
can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should
not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially
provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when
the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty
next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If
this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor,destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which
must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal
penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the
seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be
adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged
from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us.
Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put
him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment. 68 The more
important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal
Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of the
section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is
without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that
the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws
was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or
contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the
illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only
to the first and last examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is
but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio. 69

We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects.
In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of
the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in
effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the
first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim
that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of
Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof
excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we
have held that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law, 70 and
that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life imprisonment".

What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles
of literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an
integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be
the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in
Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation. 71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in
favor of the accused. 72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of
right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute
the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That
minimum is only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may readily
be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the
minimum sentence.

It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum
range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the
law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an
overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against
accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he
hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.