Buddhism and Asian Politics

Author(s): Joseph M. Kitagawa

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 2, No. 5 (Jul., 1962), pp. 1-11
Published by: University of California Press
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BUDDHISM AND ASIAN POLITICS

JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA

In any part of the world, the relation of religion to politics

defies simple interpretation. This is certainly true in the case of Buddhism
and its role in regard to various Asian governments. Buddhism, like other
world religions, is concerned with the perennial problems of human
existence. It is inclined to view its relation to the socioeconomic and
political realms from the soteriological standpoint. In principle, the goal
set forth by Buddhism has always been, and always will be, the attainment
of Nirvana or Nibbana, however these terms are understood. Buddhism
has been aware of the necessity and desirability of peace, order, and
harmony in this world, as evidenced by the scattered references regarding

Gautama Buddha's attitude toward monarchs and principalities. In general, Buddhism accepted certain Indian concepts such as those of elective
kingship and conventional law while some Buddhist statesmen were
marked by their high moral attitudes and qualities. But Buddhism as

such has never articulated what might be termed a Buddhist social or

political philosophy. It could also be pointed out that, contrary to the
popular notion that Gautama was a social reformer, fighting for the cause
of the common man against the evils of the caste ridden society of his
time, there is no evidence that he attempted, directly at any rate, to change
the social order. To him, the transformation of society would come only
as a by-product of the religious transformation of individuals who constitute the social group.
From its inception, the Buddhist movement developed a fellowship of
monastics and laity that aspired to follow the path of the Buddha. The
central core of the Buddhist fellowship was the monastic order, which
soon formulated minute regulations to guide religious life in the cloister.
The rapid growth of monasticism, however, resulted in a sharp distinction
between the spiritual and secular domains of life. In this dualistic view
of society, the Vinaya, or the code of monastic discipline, was considered
normative for the religious sphere, while the Arthasastra, the traditional
Indian "science of politics," was regarded as appropriate for socio-political
affairs. Meanwhile, pious legends began to portray Gautama, who was
probably the son of a minor tribal chief in Northern India, as a mighty
prince who forsook luxury, wealth. and the power of his principality in
order to establish a spiritual kingdom on earth. Such a deification of a

religious leader, so common in the history of religions, made Gautama

a universal spiritual ruler (Cakravartin), whose law (the Dharma) underlies, inspires and maintains both the Vinaya and Arthasastra.

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ASIAN SURVEY / 2

This notion of the interpenetration of the religious and socio-political

realms, both under the supreme rule of the transcendental Buddha, found
an able spokesman in the person of King Asoka in the third century B.C.
Asoka found in the Dharma a universal principle, applicable both to
religious and secular domains, as well as to all men, Buddhist and nonBuddhist alike. His appointment of the Dharma-mahamata ("Ministers
of the Dharmna") meant that Buddhism, for the first time in its history, had
to shoulder the responsibility of guiding not only the believers but also
a complex society, nation and civilization. Under Asoka's leadership the
Buddhist Community, here using the term in its broadest sense, became
in effect the total empire and could develop, potentially at least, into a
world-wide community. It might be well to add that Asoka was fully aware
of the existence of three areas of different degrees of political controlthe domain of his imperial authority, the sphere of his influence, and

independent powers that existed beyond the first two. It was his pious
hope to spread the Dharma as the guiding principle and the bond of unity
within his empire and the sphere of his influence, and also as the means to
enlighten peoples who lived in distant lands. In short, he was a Buddhist
counterpart of the sage-king, and his vision of what Buddhism ought to be
greatly inspired later Buddhist historians and theorists. In fact, we may
go so far as to say that Asoka's policy provided the only tangible norm
for the relation of Buddhism to the socio-political order that was acceptable to many Buddhists until recent years.
The period between the first and tenth centuries, A.D., witnessed a
phenomenal expansion of Buddhism. Although Buddhism steadily lost its
ground in India during this period, it began to exert great influence on
the religious and cultural life of the peoples from Ceylon in the west to
Japan in the east, from central Asia in the north to Java in the south.
The expansion of Buddhism as a religion and civilization outside of India,
however, coincided with the development of internal divisions in the
Buddhist Community along doctrinal and practical lines. In this connection, the question has often been raised whether it was possible for
Buddhist missionaries to transplant the richness and wholeness of the
subtle and profound meaning of the Dharma to peoples of non-Indian
cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Many Buddhologists feel that Spengler overstated his case when he said: "Even though Indians and Chinese
in those days both felt as Buddhists, they were spiritually as far apart as
ever. The same words, the same rites, the same symbol-but two different
souls, each going its own way."' But it is true that Chinese and Japanese
forms of Buddhism show a marked difference, and even in the same country, in China for example, different sects and denominations do not agree
about the meaning of the Dharma, to say nothing about the doctrinal and
cultic variations that exist between the Theravada (Southern) tradition
and Mahayana (Northern) tradition of Buddhism.
' Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Vol. II (New York: A. A. Knopf,
1930), p. 57.

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3 / ASIAN SURVEY

The lack of unity within the Buddhist Community has often been

ascribed to the fact that Buddhism never established a rigid system of

doctrinal orthodoxy. Equally important perhaps is the historical factor
that the main stage of Buddhist activities for many centuries was con-

fined to Asia where the cultural pattern of "juxtaposition" has been taken

for granted. For example, the two great and self-contained civilizations of
India and China, both with a long history and literary tradition, have
never developed a continuous interpenetration or collaboration. "Thus in

precise contrast to Western nations," says William S. Haas, "those of the

East, though belonging to one great type of civilization, have developed
in relative insularity."72 Inevitably, when Buddhism was transplanted into
China, it had to be conditioned by the historical experiences and cultural
assumptions of the Chinese people. The same was true with Buddhist

development in other parts of the Far East, Central Asia, and Southeast
Asia. The result is that Buddhism from the tenth to the nineteenth cen-

tury developed and behaved very much as though it were a national or

local religion, each manifestation confined to a particular and insular

cultural or national region, thus developing a series of culturally oriented

religions, such as Burmese Buddhism, Thai Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism,
Japanese Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, etc.
One of the significant characteristics of this culturally oriented phase

of Buddhism is that it rarely demanded an "either/or decision" from

peoples of non-Buddhist background. When Buddhism entered a new area,
it usually presented itself more as a "supplement" than as a "contestant"

to existing religions and cultures.3 As such, Buddhism embraced Nat

Worship in Burma and the Bon Cult in Tibet; it cooperated with Confucianism and Taoism in China; and it amalgamated with Shinto in
Japan, to cite only a few examples. In so doing, Buddhism enriched the
local cultures and contributed rich symbols, rituals, and lofty philosophical
systems to the religious life of the peoples, but it approximated, rather
than challenged, the existing world-views and cultural assumptions in
various parts of Asia. Even in the Theravada countries, where Buddhism
came to dominate the religious and cultural scene, the tenacity of the
pre-Buddhist local tradition still persists, as evidenced in many of the folk
customs and village festivals.
The "indigenization" of Buddhism in countries outside India resulted
in its involvement in the political life of the nations. "The most salient

feature of Japanese Buddhism," says Sir Charles Eliot, "is its intimate
connection with the general condition of the nation, both political and
social."X4 This was equally true for Buddhism in other countries. His-

2 William S. Haas, The Destiny of the Mind-East and West (London: Faber and
Faber, 1956), p. 37.
3 Cf. William E. Hocking, "Livinog Religions and a World Faith," in Arthur E.
Christy, ed., The Asian Legacy and American Life (New York: John Day Co., 1945),
pp. 206-07.
4 Sir Charles Eliot, Japanese Buddhism (London: E. Arnold & Co., 1935), p. 179.

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ASIAN SURVEY / 4

torically, the establishment of Buddhism in many places depended heavily

on royal favor, sanction, and support, which necessitated that Buddhism
make peace with the temporal power. Even when a certain monarch had

serious moral faults, Buddhists tended to consider him virtuous and pious
so long as he supported the cause of the Dharina. While Buddhism never

lost its other-worldly qualities, it generally learned how to survive in this

world. Many Buddhist leaders and institutions gladly served the dominions
of the world, and received in turn recognition and reward. There were
some prophetic men who challenged the policies of the temporal rulers

in the name of religion, but such cases were rare. More often than not,
Buddhism accepted uncritically its assigned role, upholding the status quo,
even serving as a spiritual tranquilizer for the oppressed peasantry by
promising happiness in the world to come.

As Buddhist institutions gained wealth and prestige, their political

influence also increased. But very seldom did Buddhism alter the socio-

political structure of the nation. To be sure, Buddhism transformed Tibet

into a theocracy, so that, at least until recently, the Dalai Lama, believed
to be the incarnation of the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, enjoyed both
spiritual and temporal power. In Thailand, Buddhism developed what
amounts to an ecclesiastical "state" within the state with an elaborate

hierarchy under the Sacngaraja; but in this case, the Sangaraja, as the
head of the monastic orders, is subordinate to the king who is both the

head of the state and the protector of the faith. Also, in some countries,
monarchs on the throne or after abdication took the priestly habit. In

the main, however, Buddhism as such was not a threat to the state. It
only asked for protection. support and freedom, and never embarrassed the
state by voicing ethical judgments regarding political issues. Indeed, as
the patron and Religionspolizei, the state saw to it that Buddhism did not
step outside its boundaries.
In retrospect, two things become clear about the relation of Buddhism
to the political scene in Asia. Firstly, Buddhist communities in various
countries developed generally along the lines available within respective
national groups, at the expense of establishing a supra-national fellowship
for the Buddhist community. However, there were occasional visits of
monks and laymen from one nation to another, and there were instances
when doctrines, scriptures, and ecclesiastical orders were transmitted from
one region to another. Moreover, Buddhists of all nations had a sense

of kinship based on the universality of the Dharmna, and they all shared
in affirming belief in peace, fraternity, non-violence, and the essential
oneness of all sentient beings. However, Buddhism qua Buddhism lacked
a concrete means for implementing its unity across political boundaries.
Secondly, while Buddhism had lofty universal ethics as well as moral
teachings for individual life, it did not apply its ethical principles to interstate political relations. For example, as Dr. Bozeman points out, "A comparative review of China's international relations as they were conducted
before as well as after the introduction of Buddhism seems to support
the conclusion that Buddhism did not have a decisive impact on the making

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5 / ASIAN SURVEY

of foreign policy."5 In other so-called "Buddhist nations," too, there were

devout kings and ministers, but they conducted international affairs with

little reference to Buddhist principles. At best, they utilized monks as

emissaries, trying to restore peace without unnecessary bloodshed. Buddhism as such did not develop positive principles to guide nations in regard
to the baffling problems that inevitably arise in the area of international
relations. The fact that "Buddhist Asia" enj oyed relative peace and

tranquillity until the modern period was due largely to the geographical

and cultural insularity of these nations rather than to the religious

influence of Buddhism.

The introduction of Western colonial rule in Asia set in motion processes

that had far-reaching effects on the consciousness of Buddhists as members

of a cross-national religious community. Externally, the creation of new

territorial entities by colonial powers broke down the traditional Asian

pattern of juxtaposition of small national groups. Inevitably, new education, new values, new systems of government, law, and commerce disrupted old ways of life which had been sanctioned, nurtured, and upheld
by Buddhism for centuries. The majority of the Asian masses, like their
counterparts in other areas, paid little attention to intricacies of religious
doctrine, but that did not matter. "Their lives, like their villages, were
centered about a monastery, which gave their private lives and the life of
the village focus and rhythm."6
The adjustment of Buddhism to the modern world was not an easy
task. For too long Buddhism had been enslaved both to external authority

and to internal tradition. Within cloisters, the life of the monks was
characterized by daily meditation and the recitation of ancient scriptures.

The faithful, on the other hand, were taught to accumulate merit by piety
and good deeds with little encouragement to find meaning in their daily
activities in this world. Now suddenly, a small minority of iconoclastic
youths began to be attracted by the new language, new education, new
religion, and new culture introduced by alien rulers; whereas, those who
tried to uphold the old way of life could not understand the new situation
in which they were destined to live. In this dilemma, the initial impulse

of Buddhist leaders was to side with the residue of the old order, rejecting
anything novel or foreign, be it banking system, railroad, European dress,
Christianity or Western philosophy. The resentment of the old-time Buddhists was naturally directed against Westerners colonial officials, Christian missionaries, businessmen, and teachers but also against the Westernized Asian intelligentsia, who together with the Europeans, helped to
transform Asian societies according to the Western model.
The rapprochement between the Westernized intelligentsia and conservative Buddhists developed slowly in the ensuing years of their common

Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton, N.J.:

Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 159.

' World Federation for Mental Health, Cultural Patterns and Technical Ch1ange,
Margaret Mead, ed. (Paris: UNESCO, 1954), p. 24.

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ASIAN SURVEY / 6

struggle against the Western political and economic control of Asia. The
awakening of Buddhism was also greatly stimulated by the modernization

of Japan, the Chinese revolution under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen,

India's persistent effort for political independence, and the shift of political
balance caused by World War II. For example, in modern Japan, Buddhists managed to incorporate the insights and contribution of Western
philosophy and science into their attempt to reinterpret historic Buddhism.

In China, the Abbot T'ai-hsii and other leaders, both monks and laymen,
instilled new spirit and vitality into Buddhism by their educational,
political, and social service activities, and also by advocating the closer
cooperation of Buddhists in all lands. Many will remember the efforts
of the Chinese Buddhist Association in trying to alleviate military conflicts
between China and Japan during the late 1930's through an appeal to
Japanese Buddhists to influence the policy of the Japanese government.

Few words are necessary to cite Gandhi's influence on Buddhists because of

his success in combining the religious search for truth with socio-political
action for national independence. All these and many other factors stimulated the multi-dimensional revolution of Asia that was further accelerated
by the loosening of the colonial structure during World War II.
The impressive achievement of Buddhism in new and independent Asia

since World War II needs little documentation. The gigantic undertaking

of the Chattha Sangayana, commonly referred to as the Sixth Great Bud-

dhist Council, held in Burma, 1954-56, alone indicates the spiritual vitality
of contemporary Buddhism that is determined to come to terms with the
issues of the modern world by discovering the spiritual resources in its

own religious heritage. In Ceylon, the celebration of the Buddha Jayanti,

the commemoration of the twenty-five hundredth anniversary of the Bud-

dhist era, was marked by a new project for the editing of an encyclopedia
of Buddhism with the cooperation of Buddhist scholars in Ceylon as well
as elsewhere. By far the most significant development is the formation of

the World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB), which for the first time in
the history of Buddhism attempts to unite and coordinate all the important
Buddhist activities throughout the world. Conferences of the WFB have

been held thus far in Ceylon (1950), Japan (1952), Burma (1954),

Nepal (1956), Thailand (1958), and Cambodia (1961). Today, Buddhist

activities are not confined to the so-called Buddhist nations of Asia. There
are signs that Buddhist evangelism is gaining a measure of success in
Australia and in North and South America as well as in Europe. Dr. G. P.
Malalasekera, the chief architect and the first president of the WFB, even
goes so far as to say: "The Buddhist flag now flies in every country as the
emblem of World Buddhism."
It has often been pointed out that the contemporary resurgence of
Buddhism is closely related to that spirit of nationalism which is the
driving power of many Asian nations in our century. There is, no doubt,

some truth in this observation. However, it may be more accurate to say

that socio-economic and political developments in recent decades have
greatly aided Buddhism in rediscovering its own potentialities and genius,

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7 / ASIAN SURVEY

buried and forgotten for many centuries. In other words, revitalized

Buddhism should not be regarded as a new religion-as a sort of embodiment of the national ideologies and aspirations of present-day Asians with
the trappings of traditional Buddhist vocabulary and symbols. This is not

to deny, however, that there are marked differences between the traditional
forms of Buddhisr and contemporary Buddhism in ethos, attitudes and
external characteristics. In the main, Buddhism traditionally has been
characterized by a quietistic view of Ni7vana or Nibba7a, a static understanding of the giveness of the environment, and a negative attitude toward
life, world, and history. The leading motif of traditional Buddhism was its
emphasis upon the transiency and meaninglessness of everything in this

world, so that the path of the Buddha was sought in liberation from attachment to tangible forms and values in the phenomenal world.

In sharp contrast to this negativism in traditional Buddhism, its contemporary trend is toward an effort to find a positive meaning in human

existence and achievement, while remaining faithful to the historic

Buddhist rejection of an ontological reality in history. Thus, while not

affirming final liberation in this life, Buddhists today believe that they
have both the obligation and capacity "to work to-ether for the betterment
of human life and to seek. individually and collectively, the way of salvation which can be realized only through selfless service guided by wisdom
and insight."7
Today, the new spirit of Buddhism finds concrete manifestation in many
ways: in increased activities in evangelism, meditation movements, publications, education, programs for children, youth, adults, and for women,
as well as in medical, social, and other philanthropic works. In many
parts of Asia, Buddhism provides the symbol and inspiration for the
building and strengthening of national life. Even though the newly

created nation-states may adopt different political forms, such as

stitutional monarchies, parliamentary or presidential governments, they all
share a passion for independence, nationalism, self-government, and some
aspects of democracy. However, unlike India that tries to follow the

pattern of a "secular state," the new nations under the influence of Buddhism tend to harmonize the Buddhist way of life with the functions of

the state; for, according to a Ceylonese writer, "The task which the Buddha
left to His followers was to create on earth a polity in accordance with

His teaching. "8 To put it concretely, the Buddhist teaching of the anni
lation of greed (lobha) requires the cooperation of the state in protecting

her citizens from exploitation, external aggression and internal strife; the
Buddhist teaching of extinction of hatred (dosa) must be translated into
political justice in economic and legal spheres as well as in social welfare;

'Quoted from "Presidential Address" given by UJ Chan Htoon at the Sixth

Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB), November 1961.
s Revolt in the Temple (1953), p. 555.

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ASIAN SURVEY / 8

and the Buddhist teaching of liquidation of ignorance (moha) must be

implemented by the state in providing educational opportunities for her
citizens.9

One of the great questions that confronts the so-called Buddhist nations

in Asia is whether such broad, general principles, inspired by the ancient

example of King Asoka who tried to establish a "Buddhist state, can b

implemented by practical measures that will solve a seemingly insurmount-

able series of problems in the social, economic, and political domains.

It is one thing for a Bandaranaike or a U Nu to carry an election with the

support of the devout masses, but it is quite another to unite the nation an
lead it forward by reliance on Buddhist principles alone. Buddhist theore-

ticians are eager to assert that Buddhism is congenial to modern science,

technology, socialism, nationalism, existentialism, or even to Marxism.
The President of the Union of Burma voiced his pious conviction last year

that "Burma can be developed into a prosperous, democratic, modern

welfare state, only if it is based upon three factors, viz. nationalism,
scientific technology and Buddhism."10 But realists have every reason to

ask: "Can a convinced Buddhist, who knows that the things of this world
are insubstantial and worthless, bring to the hard and tedious task of
developing a still backward and war-ravaged country the energy and

perseverance the job will require?""

Buddhist politicians succeeded in passing a constitutional amendment
whereby Buddhism became the "state religion" of the Union of Burma in

1961. This step will have far-reaching effects on the future of the nation,
despite the fall of U Nu's regime, the government which was instrumental
in pushing the cause of Buddhism. Even though the Burmese constitution

officially recognizes the existence of other religions, such as Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Animism, there is some anxiety on the part of
non-Buddhists that their religious liberty may be curtailed in the future
by the pressure of Buddhists who have the power of the state on their side.
Recent religious policies in Burma do not seem to help the various ethnic
and religious groups in Burma to develop that sense of unity which the

country desperately needs. Meanwhile, some Singhalese Buddhists are

also advocating that Buddhism should be made the state religion of

Ceylon.'2 Such a move, if taken, might ignite further troubles in that

island, which has already witnessed a series of difficulties over ethnic,
linguistic, political, and religious issues. As a step toward supremacy, the
Singhalese Buddhists are now jubilant because of the recent appointment
of Mr. W. Gopallawa, the first Buddhist ever to hold the position of
Ceylon's Governor-General. These are but a few examples of the increasing
involvement of Buddhism in the political life of the nations in Asia.
9 Cf. Ibid., p. 553.

15 Quoted from the "Message from His Excellency U Win Maung, President of th
Union of Burma," read at the Sixth Conference of the WFB.

11 U Kyaw Thet, "Continuity in Burma," The Atlantic, 201, 3 (February 1958), 118.

12 Cf. World Buddhism, X, 3 (October 1961), 10.

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9 / ASIAN SURVEY

The current shift of accent in the thinking of many Buddhists from an

other-worldly outlook to a more active participation in the affairs of this

world inevitably brings Buddhism closer to the everyday life of men and
women who are outside the cloisters. Although the history of Buddhism
records many prominent laymen and laywomen who were dedicated to the

Dharrna, at no time did Buddhism depend so heavily on lay leadership

in its affairs as it does today. The list of lay Buddhist leaders includes

Dr. G. P. Malalasekera and Mrs. Sirima R. D. Bandaranaike of Ceylon,

U Nu, U Chan Htoon, and U Thant of Burma, Princess Poon Diskul and
Nai Sanya Dharmasakti of Thailand, Professors Hideki Yukawa and Hajime
Nakamura of Japan, to cite only the most obvious. This does not mean
that the age-old tradition of soteriological dualism has been overcome, but
there is a new accent on the cooperation and functional interaction between

the monastics and laity, seen as two different but necessary vocational
groups for the followers of the Buddha. Thus, as the Preamble of the Constitution of the WEB states, the laity as much as monastics accept the duty
to do their share for the common goal of Buddhism-"to make our utmost
endeavour to OBSERVE, and PRACTICE the TEACHINGS of the BUDDHA that
we may be RADIANT EXAMPLES OF THE LIVING PATH, and to strive with all
our might and main to MAKE KNOWN THE SUBLIME DOCTRINE OF THE
BUDDHA so that its BENIGN SPIRIT OF SERVICE AND SACRIFICE MAY PERVADE
THE ENTIRE WORLD, inspiring and influencing the PEOPLES OF THE EARTH
AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO LEAD THE BUDDHIST WAY OF LIFE which

is for all ages and times, so that there be PEACE AND HARMONY AMONGS
MEN and HAPPINESS FOR ALL BEINGS . .13

Such a lofty ideal notwithstanding, Buddhism, as is the case with the

other maj or religions, cannot escape its painful involvement in the web
of international politics today. In fact, the Buddhist Community itself
is divided not only along doctrinal, cultic, and ethnic lines but also along
political lines. The two issues that caused heated debates at the 1961 Sixth
Conference of the WFB in Cambodia may illustrate this point. The first
centered around the proposed resolution regarding the banning of nuclear

tests. Buddhist delegates from Mainland China, the USSR, North Vietnam
and Mongolia, insisted on total disarmament as a prerequisite to the
banning of nuclear explosions. After hours of discussion, the conference
adopted by a maj ority vote the original version of the resolution without
reference to total disarmament. It was evident throughout the discussion
that while Buddhists found agreement on such general principles as peace

and tolerance, they could not always agree on specific issues because there
was no one "Buddhist" approach to the problem of nuclear tests, for
example. What happened at the conference was that Buddhist delegates
voted more or less according to the policies of the nations that they
represented.

The second major issue at the Cambodian conference was the question as
to which Buddhist association-the one on the Mainland or the one in
13 Cited in The International Buddhist News Forul77n, I, 11 (November 1961), 41.

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ASIAN SURVEY / 10

Taiwan-should represent Buddhism in China. Each side claimed that

it alone represented Buddhism in the whole of China. In the previous

conferences, the host nations invited whichever "China" they wanted. T

in 1956, Nepal invited the Mainland delegation to the WFB conference,
while in 1958, Thailand invited the Taiwanese delegation to the WFB
conference in Bangkok. In 1961, Cambodia did not invite Taiwanese and
Thai delegations. Then, at the conference, the Ven. Shirob-Jaltso, leader
of the Mainland Buddhist delegation, publicly denounced the government
of Thailand for not inviting the Mainland delegation in 1958. "As it is

known to all," he said "we are a member of the World Fellowship of

Buddhists. It was entirely unreasonable and illegal to deprive us of our

legitimate rights to attend the Conference.":14 Furthermore, the Mai

delegation pressed the conference to repeal the 1958 (Bangkok) resolution

that Taiwan be a regional center of the WFB, thus in effect proposing to

throw Taiwanese Buddhists out of the WFB. Meanwhile, the Ven. Pai
Sheng, president of the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China
(Taiwan), sent a message to the conference, stressing that BAROC (Buddhist Association of the Republic of China) was one of the founding
members of the WFB and has been a full member ever since. His message
blamed the government of Nepal for inviting the Peking delegation to the

WFB conference in 1956. In his own words: ". . at the Fourth Conference which took place in Katmandu, Nepal, the host country accepted the
puppet Chinese Communist organization as representing China and insisted
that should BAROC send a delegation to Nepal, that delegation would be
considered to represent only an 'area.' To protest such an outrageous act,
BAROC withheld its representatives fronm attending the Conference."1-5
This controversy was temporarily terminated by the action of the conference which voted down the Peking resolution, so that in effect both
Taiwan and the Mainland have seats in the WFB. It is to be noted that
a recent Peking newspaper article suspects that the WFB conference at

Cambodia was manipulated by U.S. conspirators who wanted to create

two Chinas. ". . . those false 'U.S. Buddhists' wanted to fulfill the U.S.
imperialist purpose of prolonging its occupation of Taiwan indefinitely;
and, to do so, they went to the length of trying the underhanded method of

manipulating the Buddhist organization."1 Such attacks and counterattacks may be carried on for many years to come. Meanwhile, no one is
certain how future WFB conferences will handle the matter of Chinese
delegations as well as other problems open to debate and conflict.
Basically, what frustrates Buddhists in Asia today is the fact that their

political independence, for which they struggled so hard, was achieved

" Quoted from the Official English translation of the speech delivered by the Ven.
Shirob-Jaltso at the Sixth Conference of the WFB.

'" "A Stern Protest Made to The World Fellowship of Buddhists by The Buddhist

Association of the Republic of China" [mimeographed], Taipei, November 1961, p. 1.

16 Shih Wu-wei, "Guard Against U.S. Plots Carried Out in the Name of ReligionAn Account of the Sixth World Conference of Buddhists," Jen-mim Jih-pao, December
19, 1961.

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11 / ASIAN SURVEY

at a time when nation-states are no longer as important as they were before

the war. And yet, the only meaningful and practical framework for these
countries, in terms of the historic image of King Asoka and also in terms

of their recent exposure to the spirit of the modern West, is that of the
nation-state. In reality, Buddhism by itself does not seem to be a sufficient
driving force to develop a coherent structure for nationhood. All too

often, the notions of liberty, justice, and welfare, have been borrowed
from outside without full comprehension of their meaning in Buddhist

terms. Many sections of the platform of the Buddhist welfare state, for
example, are not derived from Buddhism itself, even though Buddhism
supplies the religio-ethical incentive to carry out the goals. Also, modern
nation-states, even in the Buddhist world, demand supreme loyalty from
their citizens, and they often regard religion as a means to this end. Does
Buddhism have inner resources to resist the resurgence of autocracy or
prevent communism? Does it have creative insight and vision sufficient

to foster a supra-national regional community with a sense of collective

responsibility? These and many other crucial problems are not unique for
Buddhism and Buddhists; nevertheless, Buddhists can ill afford to ignore
them at this juncture in history.

JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA is associate professor of history of religions at the University of Chicago.

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