1

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39537 March 19, 1985
IRENE REYES (alias IRENE RAMERO, alias IRENE
DELGADO), MOISES VILLANUEVA and GENOVEVA
RAMERO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PLACIDA DELGADO, DOMINGO
DELGADO, PAULA DELGADO and MAXIMINA
DELGADO, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the of the Court of
Appeals Special Division of Five dated October 7, 1974 in CAG.R. No. L-44964-R, reversing the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas Branch I, dated December 26, 1969
in Civil Case No. 1144 dismissing the action for reconveyance.
On January 29, 1967, private respondents as plaintiffs a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying
that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene Ramero or Irene
Delgado, be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in
favor of plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and
Paula Delgado over four parcels of land located in Tayabas,
Quezon, and one parcel of land located in Pagbilao, Quezon,
and another deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiff
Maximina Delgado over three parcels of land located in
Alitagtag, Batangas.
It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants thru abuse
of confidence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and other

falsifications succeed in registering in the offices of the

Register of Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of
self-adjudication (Exhibit "24"), wherein defendant Irene
Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of the deceased
Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands
described in the complaint; that as a result thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and
13489 were cancelled and new Transfer Certificates of Title
were issued in the name of Irene Delgado; that defendant
Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco
Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter
of Genoveva Ramero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida
Delgado, Domingo Delgado and Paula Delgado, sisters and
brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are the heirs
entitled to inherit from Francisco Delgado; and that Paula,
Placido and Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the
last illness and the funeral expenses of Francisco Delgado and
for the purpose they borrowed the sum of P 7,000.00 from
their niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and to pay Maximina
Delgado they conveyed to her the three parcels of land
described in subparagraphs (f) to (g) of paragraph 9 of the
complaint. They also alleged that the defendant spouses Irene
and Moises Villanueva borrowed from plaintiffs common fund
the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the purchase of a
parcel of land (pp. 1-14, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On or about March 2, 1967, defendant Irene Delgado, one of
the petitioners herein, filed an answer to the complaint and set
up the affirmative defense that she is the illegitimate daughter
of the defendant Genoveva Ramero and the deceased
Francisco Delgado; that for several years preceding the birth
of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero had
separated from her lawful husband Justino Reyes and never
reconciled since then; and that Irene was born during the
cohabitation of Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as

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common law husband and wife, and since her birth, lived with
Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and
treated her as their child, maintaining her and sending her
through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a
debt of P 23,000.00 from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for
the last illness and funeral of Francisco Delgado. Irene
Delgado likewise set up a counterclaim, alleging that, as the
illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she has the right to
represent her father to the inheritance left by her grandmother
(pp. 15-43, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On March 16, 1967, the plaintiffs thru counsel filed an answer
to the counterclaim denying that the defendant Irene Delgado
was the illegitimate child of Francisco Delgado, and hence has
no right to claim from the estate of Francisco's mother,
Benigna Castillo, and that the properties claimed by the
defendant Irene Delgado no longer formed part of the estate of
Benigna Castillo as she had previously disposed of them
during her lifetime (pp. 43-46, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On August 15, 1967, a pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1144 was
conducted.
On March 25, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a motion to admit an
amended answer to the counterclaim posed by defendant,
wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the counterclaim of the
defendant, in so far as it would have the effect of being an
indirect action for acknowledgment, has already prescribed
(pp. 50-55, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On April 14, 1969, the lower court admitted the amended
answer to the counterclaim over the objections of the
defendant (pp. 56-61, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
After trial on the merits, the Court rendered its decision on
December 26, 1969 dismissing the action for reconveyance

and declaring defendant Irene Delgado the lawful owner of the

eight parcels of land. The counterclaim of Irene Delgado was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (now IAC), the
plaintiffs with respect to their complaint and the defendants
with respect to their counterclaim.
The then Court of Appeals sitting as a Special Division of Five
rendered its decision on October 7, 1974, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, the decision of the court a quo is
hereby reversed. The deed of self-adjudication
executed by Irene Delgado is hereby declared
null and void and set aside. The transfer
certificates of title issued in the name of Irene
Delgado in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489
are hereby cancelled, and T.C.T. 9913, 10348,
14937, T-11747 and 13489 are reinstated in the
name of Francisco Delgado. Likewise, the
extrajudicial declaration executed by Irene
Delgado adjudicating to herself the 3 parcels of
land located in Alitagtag, Batangas, with Tax
Declaration Nos. 8625, 8626 and 8627 are
declared null and void. No costs (pp. 58-59,
rec.).
The then Court of Appeals in arriving at this decision found
that, although Irene Delgado was the spurious daughter of
Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot inherit from the
estate of the deceased Francisco Delgado because she was
not recognized either voluntarily or by court action (pp. 52-53,
rec.).

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The titles to the questioned lot however cannot be executed in
favor of the plaintiffs; because in so doing it will be in effect a
recognition by the court that the plaintiffs are the only heirs of
Francisco Delgado to the prejudice of other possible heirs or
creditors of the deceased.
As to alleged loan contracted by Irene from the plaintiffs, the
then Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that it
was without merit, because if it were true, the plaintiffs could
have demanded a receipt for such a big amount.
The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the
inheritance of Benigna Castillo, Francisco Delgado's mother,
and her alleged share in the expenses for the sickness and
funeral of Francisco Delgado which was advanced by the
plaintiffs, need not be ruled upon because of the findings that
Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado (pp. 57-58, rec.).
On December 2, 1974, defendants, petitioners herein, filed a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (pp.
2237, rec.).
On January 2, 1975, the plaintiffs, respondents herein,
submitted their comment on the petition for review filed by the
petitioner (pp. 67-71, rec.).
On January 15, 1975, the petition for review filed by petitioners
was denied in a resolution by the First Division of the Supreme
Court for lack of merit (p. 75, rec.).
On February 18, 1975, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration (pp. 86-113, rec.).
On April 5, 1975, respondents filed their comments on the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners (pp. 130-134,
rec.).

On April 23, 1975, petitioners filed their reply to respondents'

comment (pp. 118-125, rec.).
On May 23, 1975, the Supreme Court reconsidered its
resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration (p.
142, rec.).
In their petition, petitioners sought to reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals raising the following arguments:
1. There are strong and cogent reasons why
this Honorable Court must return to and even
enhance the doctrine in Zuzuarregui vs.
Zuzuarregui, considering serious flaws in the
reasoning of the currently prevailing doctrine, so
that as arguendo and pro hac vice that Irene
was not duly recognized or acknowledged as
illegitimate child, she is nevertheless entitled to
successional rights as sole heir of the late
Francisco Delgado, considering that her filiation
as illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado is
undisputed and beyond question (p. 12,
Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.).
2. Upon the other hand, this time
assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that under
the Civil Code recognition of an 'other
illegitimate' is a pre-requisite to enjoyment of
rights, Irene Delgado was legally acknowledged
by her father Francisco Delgado, specially by
his consent or advice to her marriage with
Moises Villanueva contrary to the erroneous
conclusions of the Court of Appeals (P. 39,
Petitioner's Brief, p. 164, rec.).
The petition is without merit.

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The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to
inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or by court action is
well settled in Our jurisprudence. (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128
SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307
[1976]; Clemea vs. Clemea, 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble vs.
Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1969]; Paulino vs.
Paulino, 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles vs. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil.
522 [1960]).
There is no reason to overturn this doctrine and revert to what
was enunciated in the case of Zuzuarregui vs.
Zuzuarregui (103 Phil. 346 [1958]); as suggested by herein
petitioners in their first assignment of errors.
It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil
Code as to the recognition of illegitimate children other than
natural, in contrast to natural children who are expressly
required to be recognized in order to inherit, only meant that
illegitimate children need not be recognized in order to inherit
from his or her alleged parent (p. 13, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164,
rec.). Petitioners also raised the argument that under Article
287 of the New Civil Code which reads: "Illegitimate children
other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other
than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and
such successional rights as are granted in this, code." The
term "other illegitimate children" refers not only to those who
are not natural or merely adulterous or incestuous but also
includes natural children who were not acknowledged or
recognized (p. 18, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). In other
words, unrecognized natural children can inherit not the share
of a natural child but the share of a spurious child so long as
his filiation shall be duly proved. So, in effect, illegitimate
children need only to prove his filiation to inherit and such
does not place him in a more advantageous position than
natural children, as they are placed in the same situation.

WE do not find these arguments persuasive.

Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious
children as to their recognition, this Court, in applying the rules
of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious
children, declared in Clemea vs. Clemea, supra, that:
The considerations of fairness and justice that
underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the
Civil Code for actions seeking compulsory
acknowledgment of natural children are fully
applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate
and declare the paternity of illegitimate children
that are not natural. The motive that led the
codifiers to restrict the period for bringing action
for compulsory recognition of natural children
were stated by this Court in Serrano vs. Aragon,
22 Phil. 18, to be as follows:
... the writers of the code no doubt had in mind
that there would arise instances where certain
illegitimate children, on account of the strong
temptation due to the large estates left by
deceased persons, would attempt to establish
that they were natural children of such persons
in order to get part of the property, and
furthermore, they considered that it is nothing
but just and right that alleged parents should
have a personal opportunity to be heard. It was
for these reasons and others equally as well
founded that Article 137 was enacted (p. 724).
There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children
or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock. They
may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the
incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined

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as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other (Article 269, New Civil Code).
On the other hand, spurious children are those born of
parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to
marry each other on account of certain impediment. Because
of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally
possible to classify unrecognized natural children under the
class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe
the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as
excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the
New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by
birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory
recognition (p. 276, An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, Vol. 1). They fag within the scope of the definition
of natural children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code
(p. 142, Civil Law Reviewer, D. Jurado, 1982 ed.). Lastly, to
follow petitioners' contention win not be in accordance with the
consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary
and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an
unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against
his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation
itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural
parent (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise vs.
Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes vs. CA, 95 Phil.
797 [1954]; Candles vs. Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda vs.
Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5
Phil. 1 [1905]).
As to the second assignment of error raised by petitioners, We
find that there was no sufficient legal recognition of petitioner
Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado.
It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the
name of the petitioner was Irene Ramero, and signed by
Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. This was

certified to by the treasurer of the municipality of Alitagtag

Batangas (Exhibits "L" and "L-1 "). Another certified copy of
another birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and
local civil registrar of the municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20")
stated therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and
the name of the father is "Francisco" and the mother
"Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot be
sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be
sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise
she may be penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo vs. De
Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or
doctor or registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of said
child (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Roces vs.
Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050 [1958]). Since
any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by
Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to
prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth
certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument.
(Pareja vs. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167[1954]).
Irene's certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as
proof of recognition (Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra; People vs.
Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA
434 [1968]; Vudaurrazaga vs. CA, 91 Phil. 492 [1952];
Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]). In the case of
Macadangdang vs. CA [100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this Court said
that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration
of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the
veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk.
Irene's secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12",
"13", "15" and "16") nor the written consent given by Irene to

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the operation of her alleged father (Exhibit "4") cannot be
taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing does not
have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it is genuine
and not a forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged
parent (Madredejo vs. De Leon, supra) unless the whole
instrument is in the handwriting of the alleged parent and the
facts mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts
(Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248 [1954]). Thus, Irene's
secondary student permanent record and her written consent
to the operation of her father, not being signed nor written in
the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an
authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father.
The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and
Moises Villanueva, wherein it was stated that Francisco
Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to
marry, and that he was her father cannot be also taken as
recognition in an authentic document because it was not
signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado It cannot
also be taken as recognition in a public instrument as held in
the case of Lim vs. CA, (65 SCRA 161, 164 [1975]) wherein
the Court said.
According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of
1889, Public documents 'are those
authenticated by a notary or by a competent
public official, with the formalities required by
law.' Thus, 'there are two classes of public
documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public
officials by reason of their office.' "The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of
the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class.

The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim

does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity
prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of
1889. Such contract is not a written act with the
intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument
executed in due form before a notary and
certified by him. The marriage contract is a
mere declaration by the contracting parties, in
the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that
they take each other as husband and wife,
signed by signature or mark by said contracting
parties and the said witnesses, and attested by
the person solemnizing the marriage. The
marriage contract does not possess the
requisites of a public document of recognition...
The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by
Irene, showing Irene posing with Francisco Delgado, cannot
be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of Bercilles vs.
GSIS, supra, it was held that pictures do not constitute proof of
filiation.
What Irene may have proved is that she had been in
continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who
is not natural. But such fact alone without a valid recognition in
a record of birth, will statement before a court of record, or
authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized illegitimate
child who is not natural. She nevertheless possesses the right
to compel judicial recognition and the action for this must be
brought within the proper prescriptive period (Clemea vs.
Clemea, supra). Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides
"that the action for the. recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except when the father or mother dies during the minority of
the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the

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age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the
mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child,
the action shag be brought within four years from the finding of
the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old)
when her alleged father died, and she had not presented any
discovered document wherein her presumed father recognized
her, the action to compel recognition is already barred
(Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).
WE affirm the findings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene
Reyes alias Irene Delgado is not an heir of the late Francisco
Delgado.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF
APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO, WITH COSTS
AGAINST PETITIONERS.

course, the presumption under article 255 of the Civil Code is

that Irene was Justino's child. Was that presumption rebutted?
Joaquin Reyes, Irene's elder brother, testified that his parents,
the Reyes spouses, separated in 1928 when his father
surprised Francisco Delgado in his house. On that occasion,
there was a commotion in the house which was investigated
by the police. Justino eventually decided to allow Genoveva to
go with Francisco. That testimony is sufficient to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy. It shows that Irene was not
Justino's child. Was Delgado her father?
Her birth certificate shows that she was born on September 1,
1931 as the child of Genoveva at Barrio Dalipit Alitagtag,
Batangas with an unknown (desconocido) father (Exh. L-2 or
22).

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ.,

concur.

Since 1928, Genoveva lived with Francisco Delgado and was

never reconciled to Justino who died in 1935. Irene was
educated at their expense.

Separate Opinions

Justino was not mentioned as the father of Irene in her record

of birth. Among the eight children of Genoveva, Irene's birth
was the only one registered in Alitagtag Francisco's native
town. Irene had always lived with Genoveva and Francisco up
to 1951, when she was 19 and she got married.

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The spouses Justino Reyes and Genoveva Rameo,
natives of Tayabas town, were married there in 1906. They
had seven children. An eighth child, named Irene, was born to
Genoveva, either on May 5, 1930 in Tayabas town, or on
September 1, 1931 in Barrio Dalipit Alitagtag, Batangas. Of

She was baptized in 1949, when she was 18. Francisco and
Genoveva were listed as her parents in the baptismal
certificate, Exhibit 1. In the certificate of marriage of Irene and
Moises Villanueva, Francisco Delgado was mentioned as her
father and as the one who gave consent to the marriage (Exh.
17).
Irene consented to the operation of Francisco when he was
submitted to an operation at the Family Clinic in 1966 (Exh. 2).

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She paid his hospital bills (Exh. 4). She used the surname
"Delgado" in her school records and Francisco Delgado was
indicated therein as her guardian (Exh. 12 to 16).

adduced to prove the spurious child's filiation, he or she should

be entitled to successional rights. This is justified by the liberal
policy of the Civil Code towards illegitimate children.

Francisco died intestate on October 28, 1966. On November

25, 1966 Irene adjudicated to herself the lands left by
Francisco (Exh. H or 9). On January 30, 1967, the brother, two
sisters and a niece of Francisco Delgado sued her for the
annulment of said adjudication. They sought a declaration that
they are the nearest legal heirs of Francisco.

The natural child needs acknowledgment because he may

become a legitimated child. The spurious child will never attain
the status of a legitimated child.

Judge Lorenzo Relova ruled that Irene's filiation was duly

proven. The Appellate Court disagreed because she was not
duly acknowledged within the meaning of articles 278 and 283
of the Civil Code. It held that the evidence submitted by her
does not amount to voluntary and compulsory recognition
required of natural children.
In my opinion the rule requiring voluntary or compulsory
recognition for the so-called spurious children or bastards is
not mandatory. Article 289 of the Civil Code does not make
such recognition mandatory.
Irene's status as an heir is governed by the Civil Code
pursuant to its article 2264. To enjoy successional rights, she
has to prove her filiation as required in article 887 of the Civil
Code.
To prove filiation, the rules on acknowledgment for natural
children may be applied to spurious children. But there may be
cases, where the filiation of an illegitimate child, other than
natural, has been duly proven and such proof does not satisfy
the requirements of recognition under articles 278 and 283.
In such exceptional cases, article 278 and 283 should not be
applied. If sufficient proof to satisfy the judicial mind has been

I agree with Judge Lorenzo Relova that Irene's filiation as

Francisco Delgado's child was duly proven within the meaning
of article 887. She is the nearest compulsory and legal heir of
Francisco. She excludes the brother, two sisters and niece of
Francisco (Art. 988, Civil Code).
I vote to reverse the decision of the Appellate Court and affirm
the decision of Judge Relova.

9
THIRD DIVISION

3762 and one-half by plaintiff in Civil Case No.

3763); and

G.R. No. L-50974-75 May 31, 1989

JUAN CASTRO and FELICIANA CASTRO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIPRIANO NAVAL and
BENITA C. NAVAL, respondents.
Luis R. Reyes for petitioners.
Marcelino U. Aganon for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 47262 and
47263-R, which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case Nos. 3762-3763. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of defendants and against plaintiffs in the
above-entitled cases:
1) Declaring defendant Benita Castro Naval a
duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child of Eustaquio Castro;
2) Awarding the sum of P2,000.00 to
defendants by way of attorney's fee and
expenses of litigation (one-half to be paid by
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in Civil Case No.

3) Pending the partition or distribution of the

properties involved herein in appropriate
proceedings or by mutual agreement, and so as
to preserve the status quo, the writ of
preliminary injunction of February 10, 1967 shall
continue to remain in full force and effect.
With costs against plaintiffs, one-half
chargeable to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3762
and the other half to plaintiff in Civil Case No.
3763. (Record on Appeal, pp. 137-138)
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother
and sister of the late Eustaquio Castro while respondent
Benita Castro Naval is the only child of Eustaquio. Respondent
Cipriano Naval is the husband of Benita Castro.
The Court of Appeals correctly summarized the facts of the
case as follows:
In Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and
Feliciana Castro v. Benita Castro, the plaintiffs
filed an action for partition of properties against
the defendant alleging, among other things that
they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who
died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on May 27, 1923 (p. 6,
Record on Appeal).
In Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina
Bautista also filed an action for partition of
properties against defendant Benita Castro
Naval alleging, among other things, that they
are also compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro

10
who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on August 24,
1961 and that they are entitled to the partition of
the properties of said deceased (p. 32, Record
on Appeal).
The defendants in their amended answer in
both cases allege that Benita Castro Naval is
the only child of the deceased Eustaquio and
that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro
Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition has
no cause of action (p. 25, Record on Appeal).
With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their
amended complaints whereby they converted
the original action for partition into an action for
quieting of title. Defendant's husband Cipriano
Naval was forthwith impleaded as partydefendant (p. 32, Record on Appeal).
In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a
petition for appointment as receiver and for
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 3762.
The trial court, however, denied said petition for
appointment of receiver, but granted the petition
for writ of preliminary injunction and also
adjudged Marcelina Bautista who is the plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 3762 guilty of contempt and
ordering her to pay a fine of P100. 00 (p. 97,
Record on Appeal).
Considering that evidence in these incidents of
appointing a receiver and preliminary injunction
as well as the motion for contempt were related
to the merits of the case, the parties stipulated
that evidence therein be considered as
evidence in the trial on the merits.

During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the

main issue to be resolved in this case is as to
whether or not defendant Benita Castro Naval is
the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio
Castro. In view of this stipulation, defendant
Benita Naval was allowed to introduce evidence
to show that she was indeed the acknowledged
natural child of Eustaquio Castro.
The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro
and Feliciana Castro, plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3762 and Eustaquio Castro who was already
dead were the children of the deceased
spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago.
Marcelina Bautista, one of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3763, is the surviving spouse of the
deceased Eustaquio Castro. Eustaquio Castro
died on August 23, 1961 and Pricola Maregmen
died on September 11, 1924.
It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval,
a child of Eustaquio Castro and Pricola
Maregmen, was born on March 27, 1919 in San
Bartolome, Tarlac (Exhibit A). Eustaquio Castro,
who caused the registration of said birth gave
the date indicated in the civil registry that he
was the father. Benita Castro was later baptized
in the Roman Catholic Church of Camiling,
Tarlac, wherein the baptismal certificate
appeared that her parents are deceased
Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen
(Exhibit C). When Eustaquio Castro died,
pictures were taken wherein the immediate
members of the family in mourning were
present, among whom was Benita Castro Naval
(Exhibits D and D-1). On this score, the

11
plaintiffs in their complaint in Civil Case No.
3762 admitted that defendant Benita C. Naval is
the forced heir of Eustaquio Castro and a
compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro in Civil
Case No. 3763.
The evidence further shows that Pricola
Maregmen, the natural mother of Benita C.
Naval who was a resident of Mayantoc, Tarlac,
was wedded to Felix de Maya of Anoling
Canaling, Tarlac against her wishes on May 23,
1913. While the celebration of the wedding in
Anong, Camiling, Tarlac was going on, the
guests soon found out that Pricola Maregmen
surreptitiously left the party and went to the
house of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan at
Barrio Malacampa, also in Anoling Camiling,
Tarlac, and there she cried that she did not want
to get married to Felix de Maya. That evening
Pricola proceeded to Barrio San Bartolome,
Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she united with her
real sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of
Benita Castro Naval.
Antonio Maregmen, the brother'. of Pricola
Maregmen who was then in the wedding party
learned of the disappearance of his sister. He
finally found her living with Eustaquio Castro. A
few days later Eustaquio Castro accompanied
by two persons went to the parents of Pricola
Maregmen at Mayantoc, Tarlac and informed
them that Pricola was already living with him as
husband and wife. Pricola's parents merely
submitted to their daughter's wishes, so
Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen lived

as husband and wife until the death of Pricola

on September 11, 1924.
There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the
time he lived with Pricola Maregmen, was a
widower, and was, therefore, free to marry
Pricola. As a result of their cohabitation Benita
Castro Naval, herein defendant, was born on
March 27, 1919. After the death of her mother,
when she was only five years old, she
continued to live with her father Eustaquio
Castro until his death on August 22, 1961
(Exhibit 11). Moreover, when Benita Castro
Naval got married to Cipriano Naval, it was
Eustaquio Castro who gave her away in
marriage. Even after Benita's marriage, she
was taken care of by her father. (Rollo, pp. 1113).
The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the
acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and
is, therefore, entitled to participate in the partition of the
properties left by him. These properties are the subject of the
civil cases. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision.
The main issue raised in this petition is whether or not
respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and
recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
The Court of Appeals justified its pronouncement that the
private respondent is an acknowledged and recognized child
of Eustaquio Castro in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx

12
. . . The recognition of Benita Castro as a
natural child of Eustaquio Castro appears in the
records of birth and partition. Recognition shall
be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or any
authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code). It was a
voluntary recognition already established which
did not need any judicial pronouncement (Gut,
68 Phil. 385; Root v. Root, (CA), 71 O.G. 3061).
In Javelona v. Onteclaro, 74 Phil. 393, the
Supreme Court clarified the distinction between
voluntary recognition and compulsory
recognition. In the first place, a voluntary
recognition is made in a public document,
whereas in the indubitable writing under Article
135 is a private document. (Manresa, Vol. 1, p.
579). The father would ordinarily be more
careful about what he said in a public document
than in a private writing, so that even an
incidental mention of the child as his in a public
document deserves full faith and credit. In the
second place, in an action on Article 131
(voluntary recognition) the natural child merely
asks for a share in the inheritance in virtue of
his having been acknowledged as such, and is
not trying to compel the father or his heirs to
make the acknowledgment, whereas the action
based on Article 135 is to compel the father or
his heirs to recognize the child. In the former
case, acknowledgment has been formally and
legally accomplished because the public
character of the document makes judicial
pronouncement unnecessary, while in the latter
case, recognition is yet to be ordered by the
courts because a private writing, lacking the
stronger guaranty and higher authenticity of a

public document is not self- executory. A

judgment in favor of the status of a natural child
according to Art. 135 must therefore be based
on an express recognition so found and
declared by the court after hearing. At this
juncture, it is to be noted that an action based
on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought
after the death of the father, but. not an action
to compel acknowledgment, as a general rule,
(Art. 137, Civil Code) which shows the liberality
of the law as to voluntary recognition, and its
strictness toward compulsory acknowledgment.
While it is true that Pricola Maregmen, Benita's
mother was married to Naval (sic), it is the rule,
however, that in case the recognition is made
by only one of the parents, it will be presumed
that the child is natural if the parents
recognizing it had the legal capacity to contract
marriage at the time of the conception (Art. 277,
Civil Code; Borres and Barza v. Municipality of
Panay, 42 Phil. 643; Capistrano v. Gabino, 8
Phil. 135). The presumption arises from the act
of recognition.
What is more is that plaintiffs in their amended
complaint admitted that Benita Castro was the
compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro. They
cannot now contradict their own allegations
(Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 232). (Rollo, pp.
14-15)
The Court of Appeals has correctly stated the principles but
the petitioners contend that it erred in applying these principles
to the facts of this case.

13
The law which now governs paternity and filiation is Title VI of
the Family Code of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209,
July 6,1987 as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17,
1987. We have to examine the earlier provisions, however,
because the Family Code provides in its Article 256 that:
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question that the private respondent is an
illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro. Her father Eustaquio
was a widower when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to
live with him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage
because when Pricola fled from her own wedding party on
May 23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already
been solemnized. In other words, the marriage was celebrated
although it could not be consummated because the bride
hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved.
Under the Civil Code, whether "new" or "old", illegitimate
children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock
were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether
actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock
of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. (Article
119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2)
Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those
born of parents who, at the time of conception, were
disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments.
Since Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was
conceived, Benita is Ms natural child. (See Borres and Barza
v. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643,647 [1922]). However,

from the viewpoint of the mother who had a subsisting

marriage to Felix de Maya, Benita was her spurious child.
Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural
to inherit, she must first be recognized voluntarily or by court
action. (Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System,
128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia v. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307
[1976]; Vda. de Clemena v. Clemena 24 SCRA 720 [1968];
Noble v. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1965]; Paulino v.
Paulino 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles, et al. v. Ponce Enrile, 109
Phil. 522 [1960]; and Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439 [1985]). This arises from the legal principle that an
unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights
from her parents or to their estate because her rights spring
not from the filiation or blood relationship but from the child's
acknowledgment by the parent. (Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat, 21
SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954];
Magallanes, et al.v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795
[1954]; Canales v. Arrogante, et al., 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda
v. Malonda, 61 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, et
al., 5 Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not
because she was the true or real child of her parents but
because under the law, she had been recognized or
acknowledged as such a child.
This brings us to the question whether or not the private
respondent is an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child of Eustaquio Castro.
Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment
voluntary and compulsory. The provisions on
acknowledgement are applied to natural as well as spurious
children (Clemena v. Clemena supra; Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, supra).

14
Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides for voluntary
acknowledgment by the father or mother, while Article 135 and
Article 136 of the same Code provide for the compulsory
acknowledgment by the father and mother respectively. Article
131 of the old Civil Code states that "The acknowledgment of
a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will or
in some other public document."
In these cases, the appellate court ruled that the private
respondent was voluntarily recognized by her father,
Eustaquio Castro through the record of birth, hence there was
no need for any judicial pronouncement.
The record of birth referred to by the appellate court is actually
the birth certificate of the private respondent. It appears in the
certificate that Eustaquio Castro is the respondent's father.
The petitioners take exception to the respondent court's ruling
on voluntary recognition.
Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes
of recognizing a child must be signed by the father and mother
jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone otherwise
she may be penalized. (Section 5, Article 3753; Madridejo v.
de Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]). What is signed is a loose form
whose contents are later transferred by a municipal employee
to the local registry book of births which is preserved. An
examination of Exhibition F, Birth Certificate of Benita Castro,
Folder of Exhibits, p. 112, shows that this "birth certificate" was
in turn copied on October 17, 1961 from Book page No. 28,
and Registry No. 47 of the book bound records where
"Eustaquio Castro" appears under the column "Remarks." This
is no question that Eustaquio himself reported the birth of his
daughter but this record is not determinative of whether or not
he also signed the easily lost looseleaf form of the certificate

from where the entry in book bound or logbook record was

taken in March, 1919.
The ruling in Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil.
1050 [1958]) and Berciles v. Government Service Insurance
System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]) that if the father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio
himself who went to the municipal building and gave all the
data about his daughter's birth. In Berciles we find no
participation whatsoever in the registration by Judge Pascual
Berciles, the alleged father.
We likewise see no application of the statement in Madridejo
v. de Leon (supra), that the father, apart from furnishing the
necessary data must also sign the certificate itself In that case,
Pedro Madridejo, the father was still alive when the 1930 case
was brought to court. Pedro himself testified that Melecio
Madridejo was conceived and born to him, a bachelor, and
Flaviana Perez, a widow. The two were validly maried when
Flaviana was about to die. If the situation of Benita Castro
Naval were similar, there would be no need to even discuss
whether or not the father signed the birth certificate. Under the
present law, the subsequent wedding of a man and woman
whose child was conceived when there were no legal
impediments to a valid marriage gives that child the lights of a
legitimate off-spring. The situation is different in the present
case.
We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family Code
considering the facts and equities of this case.
First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of
the late Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to legally marry
when she was conceived and born. From her birth on March

15
27, 1919 until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42
years, Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and
care that a parent bestows on an only child. The private
respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil
Case No. 3762 that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio
Castro.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the
illegitimate family is of no special relevance here because
Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only
immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate
children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of
Benita.
Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita
reported and registered. There is no indication in the records
that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from
reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the
certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or
that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial
action to establish her status as his recognized natural child
during the reglementary period to do so.
Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her
wedding to Cipriano Naval. The couple continued to live with
the father even after the wedding and until the latter's death.
Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro
family during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient
proof of recognition under the Civil Code (Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, supra; People v. Villeza. 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v.
Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Capistrano, et al. v. Gabino,
8 Phil. 135 [1907]) but they add to the equities of this case
favoring the petitioner.

To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the

findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provision of the Family Code
which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the
respondents have no clear vested rights in their favor.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation there are
only two classes of children legitimate and illegitimate. The
fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children
have been eliminated.
Article 175 provides that "Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children." (Emphasis supplied).
Articles 172 and 173 on establishing the filiation of legitimate
children provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. (265a, 266a; 267a)

16
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child
shall survive notwithstanding the death of either
or both of the parties. (268a)
There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending
her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim
legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan , C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

17
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-19872 December 3, 1974

EMILIANO B. RAMOS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA T. RAMOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Humberto V. Quisumbing and Maximino M. San Diego for
plaintiffs-appellants.
Hilado and Hilado for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:p
The parties appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint
and holding that the intestate estate of Martin Ramos was
settled in Civil Case No. 217, which was terminated on March
4,1914, and that the judgment therein is res judicata and bars
any litigation regarding the same estate (Civil Case no. 4522).
The documentary evidence reveals the following facts:
The spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died on
October 4, 1906 and October 26, 1888, respectively. They
were survived by their three legitimate children named Jose,
Agustin and Granada. Martin Ramos was also survived by his
seven natural children named Atanacia, Timoteo, Modesto,
Manuel, Emiliano, Maria and Federico.

On December 10, 1906 a special proceeding was instituted in

the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the said spouses. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 217 (itsexpediente is still
existing). Rafael O. Ramos, a brother of Martin, was appointed
administrator. The estate was administered for more than six
years (Exh. F, G, H, I and J).
A project of partition dated April 25, 1913 was submitted. It
was signed by the three legitimate children, Jose, Agustin and
Granada; by the two natural children, Atanacia and Timoteo,
and by Timoteo Zayco in representation of the other five
natural children who were minors. It was sworn to before the
justice of the peace (Exh. 3).
In the project of partition the conjugal hereditary estate was
appraised at P74,984.93. It consisted of eighteen parcels of
land, some head of cattle and the advances to the legitimate
children(Exh. 3).
Under that project of partition, the following adjudications were
made to the heirs:
Legitimate children: Value
1. To Jose Ramos: (a) Hacienda Calaza
with an area of 328 hectares,
(b) a one-hectare town lot, (c) a
23-hectare lot in Sitio Bingig, and
(d) some head of cattle P25,291.66
2. To Granada Ramos: (a) a
parcel of riceland with a capacity
of 16 cavans of seedlings, located
in Barrio Binicuel, Kabankalan,

18
Negros Occidental and (b) some
head of cattle 1,891.66
3. To Agustin Ramos: (a) the
remaining fourteen (14) lots out of
the eighteen lots described in the
inventory, which included the Hacienda
Ylaya with an area of 185 hectares and
(b) some head of cattle 36,291.68
Natural children:
4. To each of the seven (7) natural
children named Atanacia, Modesto,
Timoteo, Federico, Manuel, Emiliano
and Maria, were adjudicated personal
properties valued at P1,785.35 consisting
of (a) cash amounting to P1,760.35 and
(b) P25, representing a one-seventh (1/7)
of a one-sixth (1/6) portion in certain head
of cattle allegedly representing one-third
of the free portion of the estate of Martin
Ramos, with an aggregate value of 12,497.51
Total adjudications P75,972.51
It was agreed in the project of partition that Jose Ramos would
pay the cash adjudications to Atanacia, Timoteo and Manuel,
while Agustin Ramos would pay the cash adjudications to
Modesto, Federico, Emiliano and Maria. It was further agreed
that Jose Ramos and Agustin Ramos would pay their sister,
Granada, the sums of P3,302.36 and P14,273.78, respectively
(Exh. 3).
The record does not show whether assessed or market values
were used in appraising the eighteen parcels of land. By way
of explanation, it may be stated that, inasmuch as the

ganancial estate had an appraised value of P74,984.93, onehalf thereof or the sum of P37,492.46 represented the estate
of Martin Ramos. One-third thereof was the free portion or
P12,497.48. The shares of the seven natural children were to
be taken from that one-third free portion. Dividing P12,497.48
by seven gives a result of P1,783.35 which represented the
one-seventh share of each natural child in the free portion of
the estate of their putative father, Martin Ramos. The partition
was made in accordance with the old Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate
children or descendants, and also natural
children, legally acknowledged, each of the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the portion
pertaining to each of the legitimate children not
bettered, provided that it can be included within
the third for free disposal, from which it must
betaken, after deducting the burial and funeral
expenses.
The legitimate children may satisfy the portion
pertaining to the natural children in cash, or in
other property of the estate, at a fair valuation.
The sum of P1,785.35, as the legal share of each natural child,
was the amount which was indicated in the project of
partition(Exh. 3) and which was to be satisfied in cash. The
second paragraph of article 840 gives the legitimate children
the right to satisfy in cash the hereditary portions of the natural
children. (Article 840 was applied in the project of partition
when it stated that each natural child had "una septima
partede un sexto de semovientes" but the statement in the
project of partition that each legitimate child was entitled to "un
tercio delos cinco quintos de los semovientes" is erroneous. It
should be "un tercii de los cinco sextos de los semovientes").

19
Judge Richard Campbell, in his "decision" dated April 28,1913,
approved the project of partition as well as the intervention of
Timoteo Zayco as guardian of the five heirs, who were minors.
The court declared that the proceeding would be considered
closed and the record should be archived as soon as proof
was submitted that each heir had received the portion
adjudicated to him (Exh. 4).
In an order dated February 3, 1914 Judge V. Nepomuceno
asked the administrator to submit a report, complete with the
supporting evidence, showing that the shared of the heirs had
been delivered to them as required in the decision of April
28,1913 (Exh. 5). In a manifestation dated February 24, 1914,
which was signed by Jose, Agustin, Granada, Atanacia and
Timoteo all surnamed Ramos, and by Timoteo Zayco, the
guardian, and which was sworn to before the justice of the
peace on March 2 (not 4), 1914 and filed in court on March
5,1914, they acknowledged:
... hemos recibido del Administrador Judicial
Rafael O. Ramostodas y cada una de las
participaciones a que respectivamente tenemos
derecho en los bienes relictor de los finados
esposos Martin Ramos y Candida Tanate,
completo acuerto y conformidad con elproyecto
de reparticion que nosotros mismo sometemos
al Juzgado en 25 de Abril de 1913 ... . (Exh. 6).
Note that Granada Ramos and the natural children were
assumed to have received their shares from the administrator
although according to the object of partition, Jose Ramos and
Agustin Ramos (not the administrator) were supposed to pay
the cash adjudications to each of them. No receipts were
attached to the manifestation, Exhibit 6. Apparently, the
manifestation was not in strict conformity with the terms of

judge Nepomuceno's order and with the project of partition

itself.
Lots Nos. 1370, 1371, 1372, 1375, 2158, 2159, 2161 and
2163(eight lots) of the Himamaylan cadastre (page 8 of the
Record on Appeal does not mention Lot 1370), which are
involved in this case were registered (as of 1958) in equal
shares in the names of Gregoria Ramos and her daughter,
Granada Ramos, as shown below (Exh. 8):
Original
Lot No Registration Present title Date
1370 Aug. 29, 1923 TCT No. RT-2238 Dec. 1, 1933
1371 do TCT No. RT-2235 do
1372 do TCT No. RT-2237 do
1375 do TCT No. RT-2236 do
2158 Sept. 10, 1923 TCT No. RT-2230 do
2159 do TCT No. RT-2233 do
2161 do TCT No. RT-2232 do
2163 do TCT No. RT-2231 do
Plaintiffs' version of the case. A summary of plaintiffs' oral
evidence is found in pages 4 to 13 of their well-written brief. It
is reproduced below (omitting the citations of the transcript):
Martin Ramos, who died in 1906 in the municipality of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, left considerable real estate,
the most valuable of which were the Hacienda Calaza and
Hacienda Ylaya, both located in Himamaylay, Negros
Occidental. Hacienda Calaza consists of sugar land, palay
land and nipa groves with an area of 400 hectares and with a
sugar quota allotment of 10,000 piculs, more or less, and
having as its present actual value P500,000 more or less.
"All the children of martin Ramos, whether legitimate or
acknowledged natural, lived together in Hacienda Ylaya during

20
his lifetime and were under his care. Even defendant Gregoria
Ramos, widow of Jose Ramos, admitted that she dealt with
plaintiffs as family relations, especially seeing them during
Sundays in church as they lived with their father, and
maintained close and harmonious relations with them even
after the death of their father. All said children continued to live
in said house of their father for years even after his death.
"Upon their father's death, his properties were left under the
administration of Rafael Ramos, the younger brother of their
father and their uncle, Rafael Ramos continued to administer
those properties of their father, giving plaintiffs money as their
shares of the produce of said properties but plaintiffs not
receiving any property or piece of land however, until 1913
when Rafael Ramos gathered all the heirs, including plaintiffs,
in the house of their father, saying he would return the
administration of the properties. He turned over Hacienda
Ylaya to Agustin Ramos and Hacienda Calaza to Jose Ramos.
"All said children, defendants and plaintiffs alike, continued to
live in the same house of their father in Hacienda Ylaya, now
under the support of Agustin Ramos. Plaintiff Modesto Ramos
who 'could understand Spanish a little', only left said house in
1911; plaintiff Manuel stayed there for one year and lived later
with Jose Ramos for four years. Plaintiff Maria Ramos, who
herself testified that she has 'a very low educational
attainment', lived there until 1916 when she got married.
Plaintiff Emiliano lived there with Agustin, helping him
supervise the work in Hacienda Ylaya, until he transferred to
Hacienda Calaza where he helped Jose Ramos supervise the
work in said hacienda.
"Agustin Ramos supported plaintiffs, getting the money from
the produce of Hacienda Ylaya, the only source of income of
Agustin coming from said hacienda. Plaintiffs asked money
from Agustin pertaining to their share in the produce of

Hacienda Ylaya and received varied amounts, sometimes

around P50 at a time, getting more when needed, and
receiving P90 or P100 more or less a year.
"Jose Ramos gave plaintiffs also money as their shares from
the products of Hacienda Calaza. Even Maria Ramos who
upon her marriage in 1916 lived in La Cartota with her
husband was given money whenever she went to
Himamaylan. Plaintiffs received varied amounts or sums of
money from Jose as their shares in the produce of Hacienda
Ylaya more or less about P100 a year, mostly during the
milling season every year while he was alive up to his death in
1930. Emiliano Ramos, now deceased and substituted by his
widow, Rosario Tragico, moreover, received P300 from Jose
Ramos in 1918 taken from the products of Hacienda Calaza
when he went to the United States to study.
"Upon Jose Ramos death his widow Gregoria Ramos, herself,
his first cousin, their father and mother, respectively being
brother and sister, continued to give plaintiffs money pertaining
to their shares in the products of Hacienda Calaza. She
however stopped doing so in 1951, telling them that the lessee
Estanislao Lacson was not able to pay the lease rental.
"There was never any accounting made to plaintiffs by Jose
Ramos, plaintiffs reposing confidence in their elder brother,
Nor was any accounting made by his widow, defendant
Gregoria Ramos, upon his death, plaintiff Manuel Ramos
moreover having confidence in her.
"Before the survey of these properties by the Cadastral Court,
plaintiff Modesto Ramos was informed by the Surveying
Department that they were going to survey these properties.
Plaintiffs then went to see their elder brother Jose to inform
him that there was a card issued to them regarding the survey
and gave him 'a free hand to do something as an

21
administrator'. They therefore did not intervene in the said
cadastral proceedings because they were promised that
they(defendants Jose and Agustin) would 'be the ones
responsible to have it registered in the names of the heirs'.
Plaintiffs did not file and cadastral answer because defendants
Jose and Agustin told them 'not to worry about it as they have
to answer for all the heirs'. Plaintiffs were 'assured' by
defendants brothers.
"Plaintiffs did not know that intestate proceedings were
instituted for the distribution of the estate of their father.
Neither did plaintiffs Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano and Maria
know (that) Timoteo Zayco, their uncle and brother-in-law of
defendant widow Gregoria was appointed their guardian.
There was an express admission by defendant Gregoria
Ramos that Timoteo Zayco was her brother-in-law.
"Plaintiffs did not know of any proceedings of Civil Case No.
217. They never received any sum of money in cash the
alleged insignificant sum of P1,785.35 each from said
alleged guardian as their supposed share in the estate of their
father under any alleged project of partition.
"Neither did Atanacia Ramos nor her husband, Nestor
Olmedo, sign any project of partition or any receipt of share
in(the) inheritance of Martin Ramos in cash. Nestor Olmedo
did not sign any receipt allegedly containing the signatures of
Atanacia assisted by himself as husband, Timoteo Ramos,
and Timoteo Zayco as guardian ad-litem of the minors
Modesto, Manual, Federico, Emiliano and Maria. As a matter
of fact, plaintiffs Modesto and Manuel were in 1913 no longer
minors at the time of the alleged project of partition of the
estate being approved, both being of age at that time. No
guardian could in law act on their behalf.

"Plaintiffs only discovered later on that the property

administered by their elder brother Jose had a Torrens Title in
the name of his widow, Gregoria, and daughter, Candida,
when plaintiff Modesto's children insisted and inquired from the
Register of Deeds sometime in 1956 or 1957. Plaintiffs did not
intervene in the intestate proceedings for (the) settlement of
the estate of their brother Jose as they did not know of it.
"Plaintiffs were thus constrained to bring the present suit
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on
September 5, 1957 seeking for the reconveyance in their favor
by defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida and husband
Jose Bayot of their corresponding participations in said parcels
of land in accordance with article 840 of the old Civil Code and
attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000 plus costs and expenses
of this litigation". (4-13 Brief).
Proceedings in the lower court. The instant action was filed
on September 5, 1957 against defendants Agustin Ramos,
Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos for the purpose
of securing a reconveyance of the supposed participations of
plaintiffs Atanacia, Emiliano, Manuel, Maria and Modesto, all
surnamed Ramos, in the aforementioned eight (8) lots which
apparently form part of Hacienda Calaza. (The plaintiffs did not
specify that the said shares would amount to one-sixth of the
said eight cadastral lots. One-sixth represented the one-third
free portion of Martin Ramos' one-half shares in the said lots.
And the said one-sixth portion was the share of his seven
legally acknowledged natural children under article 840 of the
old Civil Code).
The action is really directed against the heirs of Jose Ramos,
namely, his wife Gregoria and his daughter Candida in whose
names the said eight lots are now registered as shown in
Exhibit 8 and in page 4 hereof. It is predicated on the theory

22
that plaintiffs' shares were held in trust by the defendants. No
deed of trust was alleged and proven.
The defendants denied the existence of a trust. They pleaded
the defenses of (a) release of claim as shown in the project of
partition, the decision and the receipt of shares forming part
of the expediente of Civil Case No. 217 (Exh. 3, 4 and 6), (b)
lack of cause of action, (c) res judicata and (d) prescription.
Timoteo Ramos, who was joined as a co-plaintiff, manifested
that he had already received his own share of the inheritance,
that he did not authorized anyone to include him as a plaintiff
and that he did not want to be a party in this case. He moved
that his name be stricken out of the complaint (44-45 Rec. or
Appeal; Exh. 7).
Emiliano Ramos, who died in 1958, was substituted by his
widow and their ten children (Exh. E, 61-64 Rec. on
Appeal).The complaint is silent as to the fate of Federico
Ramos, the seventh natural child of Martin Ramos.
As already noted, after trial, the lower court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of res judicata. The plaintiffs as well
as the defendants appealed.
Plaintiffs' appeal. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court
erred (1) in dismissing their complaint, (2) in denying their right
to share in their father's estate and (3) in holding that the
action was barred by res judicata or the prior judgment in the
special proceeding for the settlement of Martin Ramos'
intestate estate, Civil Case No. 217 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Abintesdado de los finados
esposos Martin Ramos y Candida Tanate(Exh. F to J and 1 to
6).

The plaintiffs vigorously press on this Court their theory that

the plaintiffs, as acknowledged natural children, were
grievously prejudiced by the partition and that the doctrine
of res judicata should not bar their action.
A preliminary issue, which should first be resolved, is the
correctness of the trial court's "inexorable conclusion" that the
plaintiffs were the legally acknowledged natural children of
Martin Ramos. Plaintiffs' action is anchored on that premise.
The defendants failed to impugn that conclusion in
their appellants' brief. Not having done so, it may be regarded
as conclusive against them. That is the proposition advanced
by the plaintiffs in their reply-brief.
The defendants in their appellees' brief assail that conclusion.
It is true that an appellee may make an assignment of error in
his brief but that rule refers to an appellee who is not an
appellant (Saenz vs. Mitchell, 60 Phil. 69, 80). However, since
an appellee is allowed to point out the errors committed by the
trial court against him (Relativo vs. Castro, 76 Phil. 563;
Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852), defendants' contention
that the plaintiffs were not legally acknowledged natural
children may just as well be passed upon.
The defendants, in contesting the lower court's finding that the
plaintiffs were legally acknowledged children, assume that the
legitimate children committed a mistake in conferring
successional rights on the plaintiffs.
We hold that the trial court's conclusion is correct. It is true that
the acknowledgment of the plaintiffs is not evidenced by a
record of birth, will or other public document (Art. 131, Old Civil
Code). But the record of Civil Case No. 217, which is relied
upon by the defendants to support their defense of res
judicata, indubitably shows that the plaintiffs were treated as

23
acknowledged natural children of Martin Ramos. The
reasonable inference is that they were in the continuous
possession of the status of natural children of Martin Ramos,
as evidenced by his direct acts and the acts of his family (Art.
135, Old Civil Code).
Unacknowledged natural children have no rights
whatsoever(Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1; Siguiong vs.
Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5, 11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil. 738;
Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862). The fact that the plaintiffs,
as natural children of Martin Ramos, received shares in his
estate implies that they were acknowledged. Obviously,
defendants Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the late
Jose Ramos accorded successional rights to the plaintiffs
because martin Ramos and members of his family had treated
them as his children. Presumably, that fact was well-known in
the community. Under the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and
Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos are estopped
from attacking plaintiffs' status as acknowledged natural
children (See Arts. 283[4] and 2266[3], New Civil Code).
Even the lower court, after treating the plaintiffs in 1913 in the
intestate proceeding as acknowledged natural children, had no
choice but to reaffirm that same holding in its 1961 decision in
this case.
The crucial issue is prescription. With it the question of res
judicata and the existence of a trust are inextricably
interwoven. Inasmuch as trust is the main thrust of plaintiffs'
action, it will be useful to make a brief disgression of the
nature of trusts (fideicomisos) and on the availability of
prescription and laches to bar the action for reconveyance of
property allegedly held in trust.
"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right,
enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of

property, the legal title to which is vested in another, but the

words 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties,
relations, and responsibilities which are not strictly technical
trusts." (89 C.J.S. 712).
"A person who establishes a trust is called the trust or; one in
whom confidence is reposed is known as the trustee; and the
person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred
to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a
fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que
trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money or
choses inaction (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505).
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are
created by the intention of the trust or of the parties. Implied
trusts come into being by operation of law." (Art. 1144, Civil
Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proven by oral evidence. An implied
trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid, Arts. 1443 and
1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended"
(Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981;
Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543,
546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct
and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or
will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an
intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 722).
"Implied trust are those which, without being expressed, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of
intent, or which are super induced on the transaction
by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are

24
ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89
C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or
created by the act or construction of law, but in its more
restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and
presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties,
the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their
transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of
conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are
found in article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla vs.
Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA
168,179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by
construction of law, or arising by operation of law". In a more
restricted sense and as contra distinguished from a resulting
trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words,
either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to
create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to
satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by agreement
or intention but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 7260727). "If a
person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment,
courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party." A
constructive trust is not a trust in the technical
sense(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See
Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the
ownership of property entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal,
77 Phil. 712), or that an action to compel a trustee to convey
property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of
the cestui qui trust does not prescribed (Manalang vs. Canlas,
94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the
defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to

recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of

another(Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that
property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary
regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil.
64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126 Juan vs. Zuniga,
62 O.g. 1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962.
See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the
rule is that the possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not
being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the
property held in trust. Thus, section 38 of Act 190 provides that
the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a
continuing and subsisting trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho and
Aguado, 103 Phil. 261,266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil.
566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos,
63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property
held in trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as
the trustee has not repudiated the trust (Heirs of Candelaria
vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Grano, 42 Phil.
35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive
trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil.
145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs. Fernandez and Bengzon,
105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403,
407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary
against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the
property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have

25
been made known to the cestui qui trustand(c) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs. Levantino, supra;
Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule
regarding co-owners found in the last paragraph of article 494,
Civil Code; Casanas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De
Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153,157).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The
prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on
constructive trust is now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De
Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales
vs. Jimenez, L-19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80;
Bonaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., vs.
Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84).
Prescription may supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs.
Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs.
Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its
enforcement may be barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54
Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, supra.
Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277).
The plaintiffs did not prove any express trust in this case.
The expediente of the intestate proceeding, Civil Case No.
217, particularly the project of partition, the decision and the
manifestation as to the receipt of shares (Exh. 3, 4 and
6)negatives the existence of an express trust. Those public
documents prove that the estate of Martin Ramos was settled
in that proceeding and that adjudications were made to his
seven natural children. A trust must be proven by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague
and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations (De Leon vs. Peckson, 62 O. G. 994). As already

noted, an express trust cannot be proven by parol

evidence(Pascual vs. Meneses, L-18838, May 25, 1967, 20
SCRA 219, 228; Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, L-21616, December
11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1192).
Neither have the plaintiffs specified the kind of implied trust
contemplated in their action. We have stated that whether it is
a resulting or constructive trust, its enforcement may be barred
by laches.
In the cadastral proceedings, which supervened after the
closure of the intestate proceeding, the eight lots involved
herein were claimed by the spouses Jose Ramos and
Gregoria T. Ramos to the exclusion of the plaintiffs (Exh. 8 to
19). After the death of Jose Ramos, the said lots were
adjudicated to his widow and daughter (Exh. 8). In 1932
Gregoria T. Ramos and Candida Ramos leased the said lots to
Felix Yulo (Exh. 20).Yulo in 1934 transferred his lease rights
over Hacienda Calazato Juan S. Bonin and Nestor Olmedo,
the husband of plaintiff Atanacia Ramos (Exh. 22). Bonin and
Olmedo in 1935 sold their lease rights over Hacienda Calaza
to Jesus S. Consing (Exh. 23).
Those transactions prove that the heirs of Jose Ramos had
repudiated any trust which was supposedly constituted over
Hacienda Calaza in favor of the plaintiffs.
Under Act 190, whose statute of limitations applies to this case
(Art. 116, Civil Code), the longest period of extinctive
prescription was only ten years Diaz vs. Gorricho and
Aguado, supra.).
Atanacia, Modesto and Manuel, all surnamed Ramos, were
already of age in 1914 (Exh. A to D). From that year, they
could have brought the action to annul the partition. Maria
Ramos and Emiliano Ramos were both born in 1896. They

26
reached the age of twenty-one years in 1917. They could have
brought the action from that year.
The instant action was filed only in 1957. As to Atanacia,
Modesto and Manuel, the action was filed forty-three years
after it accrued and, as to Maria and Emiliano, the action was
filed forty years after it accrued. The delay was inexcusable.
The instant action is unquestionably barred by prescription
and res judicata.
This case is similar to Go Chi Gun vs. Co, 96 Phil. 622, where
a partition judicially approved in 1916 was sought to be
annulled in 1948 on the ground of fraud. it was contended that
there was fraud because the real properties of the decedent
were all adjudicated to the eldest son, while the two daughters,
who were minors, were given only cash and shares of stocks.
This Court, in upholding the petition, said:
"In any case, the partition was given the stamp of judicial
approval, and as a matter of principle and policy we should
sustain its regularity, in the absence of such cause or reason
that the law itself fixes as a ground for invalidity" (on page
634). "As the administration proceedings ended in the year
1916, the guardianship proceedings in 1931, and the action
was brought only in the year 1948, more than 32 years from
the time of the distribution and 27 years from the termination of
guardianship proceedings", the action was barred by laches
(on page 637). See Lopez vs. Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31,
1964, 10 SCRA 167; Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, supra).
The leading case of Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343,
repeatedly cited by the plaintiffs, does not involve any issue of
prescription or laches. In that case, the action for
reconveyance was seasonably brought. The alleged trustee
was an overseer who secured title in his name for the land of
his brother which was under his administration. He could not

have acquired it by prescription because his possession was

not adverse. On certain occasions, he had admitted that he
was merely the administrator of the land and not its true
owner.
More in point is the Cuaycong case, supra, where the action
for the reconveyance of property held in trust accrued in 1936
and it was filed only in 1961 or after the lapse of twenty-five
years. That action was barred.
On its face, the partition agreement was theoretically correct
since the seven natural children were given their full legitime,
which under article 942 of the old Civil Code was their share
as legal heirs. But is was possible that the lands were
undervalued or were not properly appraised at their fair market
value and, therefore, the natural children were short-changed
in the computation of the value of their shares which the
legitimate children could pay in case as allowed in article 840
of the old Civil Code. It is of common knowledge that anyone
who received lands in the partition of a decedent's estate
would ultimately have an advantage over the one who
received cash because lands increase in value as time goes
by while money is easily spent.
As pointed out in the statement if facts, it was anomalous that
the manifestation, evidencing the alleged receipt by the natural
children of their shares, should recite that they received their
shares from the administrator, when in the project of partition
itself, as approved by the probate court (Exh. 3 to 6),it was
stipulated that Jose Ramos and Agustin Ramos would be the
ones to pay the cash settlement for their shares. No receipts
were submitted to the court to prove that Jose Ramos and
Agustin Ramos paid to the plaintiffs the cash adjudicated to
them in the project of partition.

27
The plaintiffs pinpoint certain alleged irregularities in the
intestate proceeding. The aver that Modesto Ramos and
Manuel Ramos were already of age in 1913 and could not
therefore have been represented by Timoteo Zayco as
guardian ad litem and that, consequently, the two were denied
due process. The plaintiffs accused Zayco of not having
competently protected the interests of the minors, Maria
Ramos and Emiliano Ramos. The allege that Atanacia Ramos
signed the project of partition and the "receipt" of share (Exh. 3
and 6)without understanding those documents which were in
Spanish. They assert that the lopsided and defective partition
was not implemented.
In short, the plaintiffs contend that the partition was not binding
on them (Note that their brother, Timoteo, considered himself
bound by that partition). They ask that the case be remanded
to the lower court for the determination and adjudication of
their rightful shares.
All those contentions would have a semblance of cogency and
would deserve serious consideration if the plaintiffs had not
slept on their rights. They allowed more than forty years to
elapse before they woke up and complained that they were
much aggrieved by the partition. Under the circumstances,
their claims can hardly evoke judicial compassion. Vigilantibus
et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. "If eternal vigilance is the
price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's right for more than a
tenth of a century and except it to be preserved in its pristine
purity" (Ozaeta, J. in Association Cooperativa de Credito
Agricola de Miagao vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 281, 283).
The plaintiffs have only themselves to blame if the courts at
this late hour can no longer afford them relief against the
inequities allegedly vitiating the partition of their father's estate.

In connection with the res judicata aspect of the case, it maybe

clarified that in the settlement of a decedent's estate it is not
de rigueur for the heirs to sign a partition agreement. "It is the
judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the
distributees" (Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu, L-17818, January
25,1967, 19 SCRA 85, 91) which in this case was Judge
Campbell's decision (Exh. 4).
A judgment in an intestate proceeding may be considered asa
judgment in rem (Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248, 267. See
Sec. 49[a], Rule 39, Rules of Court). There is a ruling that "if
that decree of distribution was erroneous or not in conformity
with law or the testament, the same should have been
corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final;
its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem,
unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud". A
partition approved by the court in 1939 could no longer be
contested in 1956 on the ground of fraud. The action had
already prescribed. "The fact that one of the distributees was a
minor at the time the court issued the decree of distribution
does not imply that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the
decree of distribution." (Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu, supra, citing
Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 742). "A final order of distribution
of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
the estate in the distributes" (Syllabus, Santos vs. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895, 900).
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the filing of the instant
case long after the death of Jose Ramos and other persons
involved in the intestate proceeding renders it difficult to
determine with certitude whether the plaintiffs had really been
defrauded. What Justice Street said in Sinco vs. Longa, 51
Phil. 507, 518-9 is relevant to this case.
In passing upon controversies of this character
experience teaches the danger of accepting

28
lightly charged of fraud made many years after
the transaction in question was accomplished,
when death may have sealed the lips of the
principal actors and changes effected by time
may have given a totally different color to the
cause of controversy. In the case before us the
guardia, Emilio Tevez, is dead. The same is true
of Trinidad Diago, mother of the defendant
Agueda Longa; while Agapito Longa is now
living in Spain. It will be borne in mind also that,
insofar as oral proof is concerned, the charge of
fraud rests principally on the testimony of a
single witness who, if fraud was committed, was
a participant therein and who naturally would
now be anxious, so far as practicable, to put the
blame on others. In this connection it is well to
bear in mind the following impressive language
of Mr. Justice Story:
... But length of time necessarily obscures all
human evidence; and as it thus removed from
the parties all the immediate means to verify the
nature of the original transactions, it operates
by way of presumption, in favor of innocence,
and against imputation of fraud. It would be
unreasonable, after a great length of time, to
require exact proof of all the minute
circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a
satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real
or apparent with which it may be incumbered.
The most that can fairly be expected, in such
cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of
memory, and human infirmity, is, that the
material facts can be given with certainty to a
common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and
the cases rest in confidence, and in parol

agreements, the most that we can hope is to

arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute
general presumption of law, for exact
knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not
lightly to be imputed to the living, for, the legal
presumption is the other way; as to the dead,
are not here to answer for themselves, it would
be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb
their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the
grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear,
beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz,
6 Wheat. [U.S.],481, 498).
Defendants' appeal. Defendants Granada Ramos, Gregoria
T. Ramos, Candida Ramos, Jose Bayor and Agustin Ramos
appealed from the lower court's decision insofar as it ignored
their counterclaim for P50,000 as moral damages and P10,000
as attorney's fees. In their brief the claim for attorney's fees
was increased to P20,000. They prayed for exemplary
damages.
The defendants argue that plaintiffs' action was baseless and
was filed in gross and evident bad faith. It is alleged that the
action caused defendants mental anguish, wounded feelings,
moral shock and serious anxiety and compelled them to hire
the service of counsel and incur litigation expenses.
Articles 2219 and 2220 (also 1764 and 2206) of the Civil Code
indicate the cases where morel damages may be recovered.
The instant litigation does not fall within any of the enumerated
cases. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the
cases mentioned in those articles. Hence, defendants' claim
for moral damages cannot be sustained (Ventanilla vs.
Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, 814). The worries and anxiety of a
defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are
not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis &

29
Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA
887).

1028; Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).

"The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral
damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral
damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it
erroneously." (Barretto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771, 779).

Inasmuch as some of the plaintiffs were minors when the

partition of their father's landed estate was made, and
considering that they were not allotted even a few square
meters out of the hundreds of hectares of lands, which
belonged to him, they had reason to feel aggrieved and to
seek redress for their grievances. Those circumstances as well
as the marked contrast between their indigence and the
affluence of the heirs of their half-brother, Jose Ramos, might
have impelled them to ask the courts to reexamine the
partition of their father's estate.

On the other hand, the award of reasonable attorney's fees is

governed by article 2208 of the Civil Code which lays down the
general rule that, in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees
and litigation expenses cannot be recovered. Article 2208
specifies eleven instances where attorney's fees may be
recovered. The defendants did not point out the specific
provision of article 2208 on which their counterclaim may be
predicated.
What may possibly apply to defendants' counterclaim are
paragraphs four and eleven which respectively provide that
attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
plaintiff"(defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any
other cases where the court deems it just and equitable" that
attorney's fees should be awarded.
We hold that, notwithstanding the dismissal of the action, no
attorney's fees should be granted to the defendants. Under the
facts of the case, it cannot be asseverated with dogmatic
finality that plaintiffs' action was manifestly unfounded or was
maliciously filed to harass and embarrass the defendants. All
indications point to the fact that the plaintiffs honestly thought
that they had a good cause of action. They acted in evident
good faith. (See Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020,

It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to

litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the
award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Herrera vs. Luy
Kim, supra; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O. G. 6959. Cf.
Lazatin vs. Twano and Castro, 112 Phil. 733, 741).
Since no compensatory and moral damages have been
awarded in this case, defendants' claim for exemplary
damages, which was ventilated for the first time in their
appellants' brief, may be as an afterthought, cannot be
granted(Art. 2229, Civil Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the
clarification that defendants' counterclaim is dismissed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

30
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her
individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors
ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES
ALBERTO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J.
ALBERTO, JR., assisted by his mother as his natural
guardian, ANDREA JONGCO, respondents.
Taada, Carreon & Taada for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R'*
entitled "Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural
guardian, Andrea Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del
Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her individual capacity and as
judicial guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio
Alberto, Jr., defendants-appellees", reversing the August 10,
1964. Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila.
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and
partition filed on September 8, 1960 with the then Court of
First Instance of Manila by the herein private respondent, a
minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea
Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein petitioners
(Record on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint, private
respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged
father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco,

lived together as husband and wife and as a result of which,

he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that
his alleged father and mother lived together as husband and
wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had
no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth,
his father and mother continued living together as husband
and wife, his father supporting them and introducing him to the
public as his natural child; that even the family of his father
recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his
father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father
married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result
of the marriage, two (2) children were born herein petitioners
Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that although his
father was separated from his mother, he continued to support
him and recognized him as his own child; that on July 3, 1949,
his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad
del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before
the then Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate
proceedings for the estate of his deceased father, docketed
therein as Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said
intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as
one of the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in having
the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and
partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate
proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his
father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as
a natural child of his father, he is entitles to at least
P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous
knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know
about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the
petitioners who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he
prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as
the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth
share be turned over to him; and that petitioners be sentenced
to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee and the cost
of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).

31
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the grounds that (1) the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment; and (2) that the cause of action is also barred by the
statute of limitation (Ibid, pp. 9-19). To this motion, private
respondents filed an opposition on October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp.
20-58).

deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said

plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5)
of the hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto;
and ordering the defendants to deliver to
plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5)
share in said estate, subject to the usufructuary
rights of defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda.
de Alberto pursuant to Articles 834 of the Old
Civil Code, and to pay the costs of suit.

On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying

the Motion to Dismiss (Ibid, pp. 97-98).

SO ORDERED.

On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the

Complaint (Ibid, pp. 98-102).
On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to
Defendants' counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102-104). On August 10,
1964, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104- 123). The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders
the dismissal of the complaint without
pronouncement as to the costs. The
counterclaim is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to
respondent Court, and in a Decision promulgated on August
31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision, reads:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside and another
rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto,
Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child of the

On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p. 77). Hence, the instant
petition.
This Court, in a resolution dated November 27,1968, resolved
to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 91).
Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT
CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF
ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.

32
III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT
CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF
ACTION HAD NOT YET PRESCRIBED.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD

JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT
CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE.
VII

IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT
CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN NOT
BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN
UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME, WAS GUILTY OF
LACHES.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD

JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT
CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED
ALBERTO AND IN DECLARING HIM OWNER PROINDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE HEREDITARY ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED.

I.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD

JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT
CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY
ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO AND OTHER
WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE
THE SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES
AND IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES AS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY
STATED IN ITS DECISION.

It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant

case was filed on September 8, 1960, almost five (5) years
after the enactment of R.A. No. 1401 creating the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, the questions of paternity and
acknowledgment fall beyond the jurisdictional pale of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and instead comes within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court. While petitioners admitted that this objection
to lack of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Manila
over the subject matter of the present action had not been
raised either in the said court or in the Court of Appeals and is
brought to this Court for resolution for the first time on appeal,
they contend that a party may object to the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action at any stage of the
proceedings, even for the first time on appeal since lack of

VI

33
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter cannot be
waived. Such contention is untenable.
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction
not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal
(Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA
243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had voluntarily participated
in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the
issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National
Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986];
Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470
[1984]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover,
there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been transferred
to the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143
SCRA 356 [1986]).
II.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the
settlement of estate of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto
(Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already been terminated
on November 9, 1953 by the order of distribution directing the
delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto and that in said proceedings the court also declared
who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant
case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J.
Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
in order to establish his rights to the inheritance is already
barred by prior judgment (Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite
private respondent's insistence that he had no knowledge or
notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged natural father
(Record on Appeal, p. 21).
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.

This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings

and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in
rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons
having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they
were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings
Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires
jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication
of the notice prescribed ... and any order that may be entered
therein is binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It
was ruled further that a final order of distribution of the estate
of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in
the distributees; and that the only instance where a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to
secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion
within the reglementary period, instead of an independent
action, the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the
instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision
or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties
long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramon vs.
Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva
Caceres 45 Phil. 895).
III.
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines
clearly provides:
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account
of lesion shall prescribe after four years from
the time the partition was made.

34
Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the
complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that said four years
prescriptive period expired on November 9,1957. Hence, the
present action filed on September 8, 1960 and which has for
one of its objects the rescission of the agreement of partition
among the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is
already barred by prescription.

While as a general rule the action for partition among coowners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is
expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code),
petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a coowner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently,
the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property
owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar.

That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case

of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of
alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested,
which is what the complaint in this case alleges in substance,
is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil Code as follows:

Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the

effects of prescription on the plea of minority under the New
Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of

any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was
bad faith or fraud on the part of the other
persons interested; ...
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period
provided in Article 1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of
the old Civil Code) should commence to run from the approval
of the agreement of partition by the Court (Samson vs.
Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the case at bar, it is evident
that the action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was
approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had already
prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at
bar on September 8, 1960.

Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and

extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and other
incapacitated persons who have parents,
guardians or other legal representatives:
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother,
Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at
bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision.
Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the
deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action for recognition of
natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parent. And if the presumed father or mother died
during the minority of the child, the latter may file the action
within four (4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285
[1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this case,
prescription runs against him even during minority (Wenzel
etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530
[1960]). In such case, the action for recognition must be
instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural
father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil.
795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on

35
July 3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and partition
was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960.
Hence, prescription had set in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in
substance one for recovery of property in order to avoid the
consequences of prescription, for as correctly stated by the
petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery of the property from
the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and
distribution approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise,
the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not
possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be
rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code
does not apply and there is an injury to the rights of plaintiff,
tills action would still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149
of the same Code which provide that the action must be
brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time
the right of action accrues.
IV
Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court
in its findings clearly and unmistakably declared that
respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of laches as follows:
About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of
Antonio Alberto's marriage to Natividad del
Rosario. Yet, she took no steps to protect the
interests of her child, Antonio, although she was
already confronted with the incontrovertible
proof of Antonio's infidelity and the hallowness
of his promises.

It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying

on Antonio Alberto's not denying that Alberto, Jr.
was his child, if such was the case. If this was
so, however, how can we explain her inaction
even after the death of Antonio Alberto in 1949,
or until September 8, 1960, when she filed this
action, Andrea kept silent, took no action to
have her child recognized as the son of the
alleged father. Her laches, as well as the
inherent improbabilities in her testimony
rendered it unworthy of belief.
... It is evident that the plaintiff's case is
adversely affected by his long delay in bringing
this action. 'Undue delay in the separate
enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of
lack of merit in this claim, since it is human
nature for a person to assert his rights most
strongly when they are threatened or invaded.
(Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440).
(Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109).
This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Corro vs. Lising, 137
SCRA 541 [1985]; Tendo vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985];
De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija vs. Patcho,
132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA,
120 SCRA 687 [1983]).

36
As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no
explanation for the surprising delay in the filing of the
complaint in the case at bar except perhaps, the fact that
during the lifetime of the deceased Antonio Alberto, private
respondents were receiving support until the latter died in
1949; but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to
elapse or until September 8, 1960 before they filed the present
action to assert their rights despite Andrea Jongco's allegation
that they stopped receiving support after Alberto, Sr.'s death.
On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that
such delay is prejudicial to them. Private respondents could
have filed the action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned of
the marriage of the deceased with petitioner Natividad del
Rosario instead of waiting for 16 years when the supposed
father's lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses
like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s mother had become too old to give
coherent testimony.

reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA 227

[1961]).
The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio
Alberto, Jr. at the time of his supposed father's death. But such
explanation as discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of
prescription under Article 1108 of the Civil Code where minority
does not stop the running of the prescriptive period for minors
who have parents, guardians or legal representatives.
Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are
vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law
requires them to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606,
610; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90
Phil. 154)." The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to
deserve the considerations of the courts, he... must show that
he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings (Samson vs.
Yateo, August 28,1958; 104 PMI. 378).

On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:

V.
The assertion of doubtful claims, after long
delay, cannot be favored by the courts. Time
inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from
the memory of witnesses, and even where the
recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true
clue to the solution of a case may be hopelessly
lost. These considerations constitute one of the
pillars of the doctrine long familiar in equity
jurisprudence to the effect that laches or
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in
seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive
of a want of merit but may, according to the
circumstances, be destructive of the right
itself.Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites
subvenit (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435,

Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this

Court review and reverse the conclusions of fact of the Court
of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a function this Court does
not undertake. The established principle is that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be
reviewed on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the
conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court in making its
findings went beyond the issues of the case, and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both the apellant and the
appellee; (6) when the findings of the Appellate Court are

37
contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A.,
139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA
593 [1986]).
It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the rule, specifically that the findings
of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court.
At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence
presented by the complainants is of the view that the
testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is sufficient to totally
discredit not only her testimony but also her entire case. Aside
from being inherently improbable and the merit of her claim
being adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay
in bringing action, her testimony is contradicted by the
testimonies of Jose, Zoilo and Pilar who are brothers and
sister of the deceased Antonio Alberto and who have no
pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome of the
controversy. They testified that during the period Andrea
Jongco claimed that Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived with her, the
deceased in fact lived with his mother and brothers at the
family residence except for his brief stint with the army
(Decision, Civil Case No. 44164; Record on appeal, pp. 111112).
More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea
Jongco has had five children (aside from her son Antonio) with
four different men. The assumption, therefore, is that she lived
with at least four different men without being married to any of
them. Thus, the trial court aptly ruled that his propensity to
promiscuous relationship with different men, render it unjust to
state with definiteness that any particular person is the father
of any one of her children." (Ibid, p. 121).

Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of

Antonio, the father, since the latter was a child and then of
Antonio, the alleged son, and Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged
former lessor of Andrea Jongco and Antonio Alberto. Their
testimonies were, however, found by the trial court to be
inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience
and deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of
Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave
more credence to the testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and
Encarnacion Peralta and declared that their testimonies have
sufficiently established the fact that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the
son of the late Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco which
finds further proof in the birth certificate and the baptismal
certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo, pp. 6-11).
In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985), this Court, citing
the cases of Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53; People vs.
Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA
434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano vs.
Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled that a birth certificate not signed by
the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is
not competent evidence of paternity.
In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's
testimony, the Court of Appeals pointed out her serious
inconsistency on material points such as her claim that she
was married to the deceased in 1941 and her later admission
in the answer that they were married in 1944.
The record shows, however, that both admissions were
correct, the first marriage was a secret civil marriage
celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second was a religious
ratification of the former. The lack of marriage certificate as

38
evidence was also considered by the Court of Appeals as an
impairment of credibility despite a certification to the effect that
all pre-war records in the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal were
destroyed during the last war. Said Appellate Court is of the
view that if they did plan to marry secretly at that time, they
could have chosen a city or municipality near Manila and that
Pililla must have been chosen as the place of the supposed
marriage so that petitioners could have an apparent good
reason for the non-presentation of the marriage certificate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is
Reinstated. No costs.

As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely

conjectural. Besides petitioners' reasons for the choice of that
place, the celebration of the marriage was positively confirmed
by Damaso Herrera, one of the sponsors thereof.

Footnotes

In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and

findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on
appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and
cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs. Pimentel,
147 SCRA 29, 30 [19871; People vs. Grefiel, 125 SCRA 108
[1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985]; People
vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 (1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I. of
Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A.,
129 SCRA 479 [1984]).
After a careful review of the records and the evidence
presented by the contending parties, no cogent reasons could
be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the trial court.
In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to
discuss the last two assignments of errors.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

** Penned by Justice Carmelino J. Alvendia and

concurred in by Justices Julio Villamor and
Ruperto G. Martin.
*** Penned by Judge Francisco Arca.

39
The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private
respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse
who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.
There is no controversy as to the facts.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A.
CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE,respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
R.M. Blanco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch
69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the
Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon Joseph
Alcala", raising a pure question of law.

On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the

Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents
spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph
Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition
was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province
of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive
weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin
A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of
America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at
Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam.
They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable
of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the
present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the
care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his
consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow,
likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability
to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to
conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended
the granting of the petition for adoption.

40
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law and that the
adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the
minor, respondent judge rendered a decision on June 20,
1990, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for
adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn
A. Clouse and decrees that the said minor be
considered as their child by adoption. To this effect, the
Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the
legitimate child of the petitioners. Henceforth, he shall
be known as SOLOMON ALCALA CLOUSE.
The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon
his natural parents and vests parental authority to the
herein petitioners and makes him their legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 36 of P.D. 603 as amended, the
decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date
when the petition was filed. In accordance with Article
53 of the same decree, let this decree of adoption be
recorded in the corresponding government agency,
particularly the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Merida, Leyte where the minor was born. The said
office of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby directed to
issue an amended certificate of live birth to the minor
adopted by the petitioners.
Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the
petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Merida, Leyte.
SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed

to us for relief, contending:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND EVELYN
CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO
ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
We rule for petitioner.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines",
private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from
adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209
expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt
a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions
may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on inter-country adoption as may be
provided by law.

41
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A.
Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under
any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In
the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural
born citizen of the United States of America. In the second
place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the
third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly
filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February
21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer
a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly

adopt if one of them is an alien. 5 It was so crafted to protect
Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code
reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must"
jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the
said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. 6 This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child, which is the ideal
situation. 7 As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of
a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses. 8

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may

appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of
E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to
adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband
and wife. It reads:

In a distinctly similar case, we held:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,

except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife,
a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. 3
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential
Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that
husband and wife "may" jointly adopt. 4 Executive Order No. 91
issued on December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D.

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential

Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both
the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an
alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of
the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible
uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity
for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two
instances
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the
Code, on the parental authority, can aptly find
governance.

42
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or
one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other,
jointly parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses in accordance with this Code. 9
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room
for its interpretation. There is only room for application. 10
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage
adoption and every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote that objective. 11 Adoption is geared more
towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life. 12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of
the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption
cases. 13 Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest
and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the
paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact
as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are
aliens.

3 Republic of the Philippines vs. The Honorable Court

of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993.
4 P.D. 603, Article 29. Husband and wife may jointly
adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be
exercised as if the child were their own by nature.
5 E.O. No. 91, Article 29, Husband and wife may jointly
adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be
exercised as if the child were their own by nature.
If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and
wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption shall
not be allowed.
6 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92326, 205
SCRA 356, January 24, 1992.
7 Sempio-Dy, Alicia V., Handbook on the Family Code
of the Philippines, 1991,
p. 262.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the

lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

8 Vitug, Jose C., J., Compendium of Civil Law and

Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition,
p. 234.

SO ORDERED.

9 Supra., pp. 4-5.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes
1 Honorable Rodolfo V. Toledano, Presiding Judge.
2 Rollo, RTC Decision, pp. 28-29.

10 Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of

Naga, Cebu, Nos. 24116-17, 24 SCRA 708, August 22,
1968.
11 Santos, et al., vs. Aranzanso, et al., No. L-23828, 16
SCRA 344, February 28, 1966.

43
12 Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, No. L-34568, 159 SCRA 369, March 28, 1988.
13 De Tavera vs. Cacdac, Jr., No. L-76290, 167 SCRA
636, November 23, 1988.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE
LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and
IRMA L. VELOSO, respondents.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose W. Diokno Law Office private respondents the Leons.
Arturo E. Balbastro for privates respondent Veloso.

TEEHANKEE, J.:1wph1.t
The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule
respondent judge's orders declaring that petitioner has failed
to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an

adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses and prays for

judgment of this Court "declaring as established the fact of
(his) adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him
to succeed in their estates as such." Respondent judge
correctly ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who had filed
a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of
the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her
estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed a motion to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of her pre-deceased
husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son), over the
opposition of private respondents, to introduce evidence that
he had "enjoyed ... the status of an adopted child of the
without his first producing competent and documentary that
there had been judicial proceedings for his by the said
spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent
court decreeing his adoption.
On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond
intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis,
and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon,
married to respondent Bernardo de Leon, and respondent
Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.
One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de
Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding before the Court of
First Instance of Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P.
Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted
illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen
Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also
intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child.
Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de
Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will executed on May
29, 1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a

44
granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son
of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta.
Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.
Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box
at the People's Bank and Trust Company, Roxas Boulevard
branch, which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could
open. Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de
Leon, accompanied by her husband, respondent Bernardo de
Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed its
contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and
those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry
belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de
Leon claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good
faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased
mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her
stock certificates and other small items deposited therein.
When she was to close the deposit box, the bank personnel
informed her that she needed an authority from the court to do
so, in view of her mother's death and so, she removed
everything from the box.
On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to
probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis, before docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of respondent Court, Days after
having learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened
this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara,
filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased
had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate
and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the
opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de
Leon admitted that she opened the box but there was no will
or any document resembling a will therein.

Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge

Arsenio B. Alcantara, the safety deposit box was opened on
November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty,
because prior thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already
removed its contents.
On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of
Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened for the first time in the
proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326- P), as an admitted illegitimate
(not natural) child.
Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son,
Ramon, filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita
de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the
safety deposit box, Whereupon, on January 31, 1975, the
probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver
the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of
Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No.
2326-P, Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were
transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos,
Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring
counsel for respondents Nora L. de Leon and Bernardo de
Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the
safety deposit box and to deliver the same to the custody of
the court within one week. Within the period ordered,
respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court,
not the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit
box which could only be opened upon order of the court.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato
Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita
de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an adopted child, on the
basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of

45
the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an
"illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him.
This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state
that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and
his wife Margarita de Asis.
On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent'
Nora L. de Leon guilty of contempt of court for not complying
with the orders of January 31, 1975 and May 29, 1975,
requiring her to produce and deliver to the court an the papers
and items removed from the safety deposit box. Her former
counsel was also found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay a
fine of P00.00 and suspended from appearing in the two cases
(Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp. Proc. No.
2341-P, Margarita de Asis), on her testimony that she, Nora L.
de Leon, acted upon his advice.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an
adopted son in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No.
2341-P, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of
adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove,
over private respondents' objections, that he had recognized
the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported
by them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato
Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta.
Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to
his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife
stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of
Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the
Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased
spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present.
Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner,
e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself
as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de
Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing
that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin." 1

Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private

respondents' objections to the admission of petitioner's
evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when petitioner could
not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal
adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave
the parties time to file memoranda on the question of the
admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioner.
On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of
petitioner's evidence because: t.hqw
All the evidence submitted by Renato and
Ramon Sta. Clara through their counsel do not
prove or have no tendency to prove the
existence of any judicial proceeding where the
adoption of the parties above named were
taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence
tend to establish the presence of any record of
a proceeding in court where the adoption of the
above named persons was held. The evidence,
however, tends to prove a status of a
recognized natural child which, however, is not
the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon
seek to intervene in this proceedings. In view
thereof, and taking into consideration the
evidence heretofore presented by the
petitioners, any further introduction of similar
evidence, documentary or oral, would not prove
or tend to prove the fact of their adoption but
rather of a recognized natural child.
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a
motion to declare as established the fact of adoption in view of
respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to comply with the orders
of respondent court to deposit the items she had removed

46
from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. As authority
therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29, Section 3
of the Rules of Court, since according to him, the order of the
court for the production of the items in the safety deposit box
can be considered as an order for production and inspection of
documents under Rule 27.
Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26,
1976, respondent court denied petitioner's motion. On April 26,
1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with respondent
court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box.
An inventory was conducted by respondent court, with notice
to the parties, and the items surrendered consisted only of
pieces of jewelry and stock certificates.
On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion
for definite resolution on his previous n declare as established
the fact of adoption, issued the f order: t.hqw
As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his
Petition to establish his status as an adopted
child, The Court has ruled that he has failed to
establish such status. The any motion for
reconsideration unless based on some
documentary proof.
Hence, the petition at bar.
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity
with law and jurisprudence.
1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 3 Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is

valid in this jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law at all, but is

wholly and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation, the
statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise,
the adoption is an absolute nullity. 6 The fact of adoption is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the
person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a
public building in which the adoption papers would have been
filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption
nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding
to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of
adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its nonexistence.7 Where, under the provisions of the statute, an
adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be
established. 8
2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead
us to any proof of judicial adoption. We can not pluck from his
chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court
decree of adoption in his favor. Petitioner's proofs do not show
or tend to show that at one time or another a specific court of
competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding
initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption
as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or
copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented.
Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that
he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932.
By what particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom
was the petition heard, petitioner does not even manifest,
much less show. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption
proceeding or to the adoption decree. Apparently on the
assumption that the adoption was commenced in Manila,
petitioner's counsel secured a certification from the Court of
first Instance of Manila which, however, negatively reported
"(T)hat among the salvaged records now available in this
Office, there has not been found, after a diligent search, any

47
record regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias
Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928
to 1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin and Margarita
de Asis Lazatin." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila "(T)hat our pre-war records relative to decisions of the
Court of First Instance were either destroyed or burned during
the Liberation of the City of Manila," does not furnish any legal
basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. This
is because there was no proof that petitioner was really
adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the
Court of first Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses,
where, after hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by
said court. Moreover, if there was really such adoption,
petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the
newpaper publication of the adoption as required under
Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4,
Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing house to that
effect. Petitioner's failure on this point is anotherer strong
indication of the non-existence of the one who gave the written
consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also
observed to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of Court),
whether the parents or orphanage, does not appear on this
point is not so difficult and such proof must be presented if
only to prove the real existence of the adoption. And of course,
if the war, the clear right and duty of petitioner was to duly
reconstitute the records as provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court,
as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol
evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent,
and has been treated as a child to establish such
adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased,
made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his
heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child
resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from
infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to

establish the fact of adoption. 10 Nor does the fact that the
deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and
referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, recognized
and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child,
necessarily establish adoption of the child. 11 Withal, the
attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and
declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of
petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his status as an
admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child which status of
an admitted illegitimate child was the very basis of his
petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late
Dr. Lazatin, as above stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof)
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to
pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that
they are natural expressions of persons who must know the
truth. 12 Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best
that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil
might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its
admission. 13 But, in proving an adoption, there is a better
proof available and it should be produced. The whereabouts of
the child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which
they resided and investigation in those courts where adoption
are usually granted would surely produce an adoption order, if
indeed there was an order. 14 Besides, since the point in favor
of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or
pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition
upon which such evidence is received that it emanate from a
source within the family. Pursuant to this view, before a
declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove
pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by
either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch
thereof, must ordinarily be established by competent
evidence. 15Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or outside of the

48
Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such actor declaration ..."
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the
records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or
destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence
of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may
be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 16 The
sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission
of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the
trial court under all the circumstances of the particular
case. 17 As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the
former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent
loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if
it has first beer. established that such adoption paper really
existed and was lost. This is indispensable. 18 Petitioner's
supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is
allegedly to be testified to a brother of the deceased Mariano
M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceased
spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really
made, the records thereof should have existed and the same
presented at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a
reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be
the case, adduced. 19
Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated
petitioner as their child does not justify the conclusion that
petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses
nor does it constitute admissible proof of adoption.

We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of

Rule 29 should be applied to consider as established the fact
of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. de
Leon to produce the document of adoption, because first, the
fact or real existence of petitioner's adoption had not been
established; second, there is no proof that such document of
adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. de
Leon; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora de
Leon to produce the items retrieved from the safety deposit
box cannot be treated as a mode of discovery of production
and inspection of documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the
items deposited in the safety deposit box have already been
surrendered by respondent Nora L. de Leon on April 26; 1976
and no document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed
as found in the safety deposit box.
5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin
alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly intervene in the
settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No.
2341-P as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof.
For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite
that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would
be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate like a creditor. 20 A child by adoption cannot inherit from
the parent creditor. by adoption unless the act of adoption has
been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is done, no
rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed
adopting parent or adopted child could be bound
thereby. 21 The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon
the person claiming such relationship. He must prove
compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the
jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori if no
hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant
who failed to submit proof thereof, whether the will is probated
or not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result
in unnecessary complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be

49
ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate
natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized
spurious child. 24
In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting
judicial admissions) which show that petitioner sought to
intervene on November 22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of
his alleged adoptive father Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc.
No. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not natural)
child, 25 while his intervention on August 20, 1975 in the estate
of Margarita de Asis, widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp.
Proc. No. 2341-P) was as her adopted child on the basis of the
affidavit of a brother of the deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin
Lazatin, executed August 19, 1975 (which affidavit modified a
first affidavit executed on May 31, 1975, which failed to estate
by "oversight" petitioner, but stated that affiant knew petitioner
to be "an illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin who later "legally
adopted (him) as a son before the Court of First Instance of
Manila sometime between the years 1928 and 1921") and
prescinding from the question of whether a natural or spurious
child may be legally adopted by the putative father, we hold
that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed
by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of March
4, 1976, March 26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's
petition "to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of
adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration unless
based on some documentary proof." The Court finds no basis
to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding by
petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as established
the fact of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased
spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such in
accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his
inheritance."
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16,
1976 a temporary restraining order; which as amended on July

21, 1976, restrained respondent judge "from proceeding with

the hearing scheduled on June 17, 1976 at 8:30 a.m.,
requiring the submission of evidence to establish heirship in
Special Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled 'Intestate Estate of
the Late Mariano M. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings No.
2341-P, entitled 'Testate Estate of the late Margarita de Asis
Vda. de Lazatin,' and from proceeding with the probate of the
alleged holographic will of the deceased Do;a Margarita de
Asis Vda. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29, 1976, August 10
and 12, 1976 and on any other dates." With the Court's
determination of the issues as herein set forth, there is no
longer any need for restraining the proceedings below and the
said restraining order shall be immediately lifted.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion
resolved to conditionally allow respondent judge "to take the
deposition of petitioner's witnesses to perpetuate their
testimonies pursuant to Rule 134, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the Court's ruling in due course on the
admissibility of such testimonies." The Court thereby permitted
in effect the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses,
principally among them Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L. Lazatin,
both brothers of the deceased Dr. Mariano L. Lazatin and as
stated in petitioner's motion of January 11, 1977: t.hqw
Substantially, the testimony of the above-named
witnesses will be on the fact that they had been
informed by the deceased spouses, Mariano
and Margarita Lazatin that your petitioner was
their [Mariano's and Margarita's] judicially
adopted son and to elicit further from them the
fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of
being their judicially adopted son in the Lazatin
family.

50
The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of
petitioner's witnesses was but in application of the Court's long
standing admonition to trial courts is reaffirmed in Lamagan
vs. De la Cruz, 26, "to be liberal in accepting proferred evidence
since even if they were to refuse to accept the evidence, the
affected party will nevertheless be allowed to spread the
excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal." The
Court therein once again stressed the established rule that "it
is beyond question that rulings of the trial court on procedural
questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of
the trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject
of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken
from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of
the case," 27 and that a party's recourse when proferred
evidence is rejected by the trial court is to make a offer stating
on the record what a party or witness would have testified to
were his testimony not excluded, as well as to attach to the
record any rejected exhibits.
At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of
heirship and for probate of the alleged holographic the
deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, pet who has
failed to establish his status as an alleged ;m child of Margarita
de Asis (unless, as reserved to him by the court below, he can
show some documentary proof),and whose intervention in the
estate of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted
illegitimate child, win have to decide whether he will pursue his
first theory of having the of such admitted illegitimate child of
said deceased. Whatever be his theory and his course of
action and whether or not he may be duly snowed to intervene
in the proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate
child, his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling against
him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded
evidence, oral and documentary, and seek a reversal on an
appeal in due course.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned

orders denying petitioner's petition below "to declare as
established in this proceeding the fact of [his] adoption" are
hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on
June 16, 1976 and amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted,
effective immediately. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t
De Castro, J., took no part.

#Footnotes
1 Annex 25, p. 1, Comment of respondents de
Leon.
2 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1,
1974 ed., at 657; Ellis v. Republic, L-16922, 7
SCRA 962; Van Matre v. Sankey, 36 NE 628.
3 Valverde 473; See Annotation in Hofilena v.
Republic, L- 26476, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA
550.
4 In re: Adoption of Resaba Santos Y;igo v.
Republic, 94 Phil 244 (1954).
5 Succession of Pizzari, 75 So. 498.

51
6 Succession of D' Asaro, 167 So. 2d 391;
Appeal of Ritchie, 53 NW 2d 753.
7 2 CJS 444.
8 Quinn v. Quinn, 58 NW 808; 2 CJS 444.
9 Coombs v. Cook, 129 P. 698.
10 Haworth v. Haworth, 100 SW 531.
11 Wohlgemuth v. Browning, 384 SW 2d. 820.
12 See Sec. 33, Rule 130 Revised Rules of
Court.
13 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1420.
14 In re: Estate of Helen M. Rigs, 328 NYS 2d.
138; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 5, 1970 ed., at 332, et seq.
15 29 Am Jur 2d 565.
16 Jones on Evidence, Vol. 1, 5th ed., at 458, 1
et seq.
17 Burns v. Goodrich, 382 SW 2d 501.
18 Francisco, Revised Rules of Court,
Evidence, 107.
19 See Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil 167
(1955).

20 Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, L-17091,

Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 116; Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, L-23135, Dec. 26, 1967, 21 SCRA
1369; Teotico v. del Val L-18753, March 26,
1965, 13 SCRA 410.
21 In re Estate of Schick, 274 NE 2d 291,
quoting McCollister v. Yard, 57 NW 447.
22 In re Estate of Helen M. Riggs, 328 NYS 2d
138.
23 Cacho v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1465, 13
SCRA 697.
24 See Cid v. Burnaman, L-24414, July 31,
1968, 24 SCRA 438-39.
25 Supra, at page 3 hereof In these cases
involving both estates of the deceased spouses,
petitioner asserts his claim of being an adopted
child, on the ground that respondent court had
"definitively ruled" that he "failed to establish
such status (adoption)." Petitioner's Reply,
Rollo, p. 241. In his Reply to other respondents,
petitioner asserts that "there is actually no issue
in the estate of Mariano Lazatin that your
petitioner was an acknowledged illegitimate son
of Mariano M. Lazatin" and "the only issue
really is ... whether (he) is also an adopted son
of the deceased spouses. " Rollo, pp. 248-249.
26 40 SCRA 101, 110 (1971).
27 Idem, at pages 106-107.

52
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this
Court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In
a resolution, dated 5 October 1987, the Court resolved to
issue the writ returnable to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Pasig at the hearing of 12 October 1987 at 8:30 a.m.
Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his
report and recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Pasig submitted to the Court his report and
recommendation, also dated 3 December 1987.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C.
CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA
CARREON CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO
FAJARDO, respondents.
Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.
Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:

It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to

respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are
common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child
for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the
herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson
Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child
when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of
Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was
also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B)
was filed by herein petitioners over the child before the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth Judicial District, Branch
67 which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a decision 2granting
the petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne
Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed from
parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on
shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie
Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of
inheriting their estate ." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein
petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter

53
from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out
at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her
"yaya" at the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the
pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother.
Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house in
Paraaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the
child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire
to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of
consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully
explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will,
however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the
amount of P150,000.00.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the
case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon to
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal in the adoption case, testified
on 27 October 1987 before the Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Pasig in connection with the present petition.
She declared that she had interviewed respondent Gina
Carreon on 24 June 1987 in connection with the contemplated
adoption of the child. During the interview, said respondent
manifested to the social worker her desire to have the child
adopted by the petitioners. 4
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property
of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that
no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years
of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons
to rule otherwise. 5 In all controversies regarding the custody of
minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
resources and moral as well as social standing of the

contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this

criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally
married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and
his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and
wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent
Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable
atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright
and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon
had previously given birth to another child by another married
man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who
eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie
Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is
not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and
values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are
legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and
socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future
better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina
Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit
relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners
with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree
of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child,
except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over
the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the
adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over him. 9
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Hon. Eutropio Migrino,
the Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor

54
Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to
whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if
they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners
immediately upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

4 TSN, 27 October 1987, p. 11; Rollo, p. 249.

5 Art. 363 of the New Civil Code, as amended
by Art. 17 of PD 603.
7 Art. 39, PD 603.
8 Art. 189, par. (2) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, Executive Order No. 209 as
amended by Executive Order No. 227,
promulgated on 6 June 1987.
9 Art 17, PD 603.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 113.
2 Rollo, pp. 108-110.
3 Rollo, P. 110.