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Documente Profesional
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*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Qualifying Circumstances; Evident
premeditation, proof of.There is evident premeditation
when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender,
when he prepared beforehand the means which he deemed
suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had
sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan. It
has also been held that evident premeditation requires proof
of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow
_______________
* EN BANC.
689
VOL. 115, JULY 30, 1982
689
People vs. Camano
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evident premeditation, not
present when killing was not a preconceived plan and not
proof of planning or preparation in the killing and persistence
to accomplish the plan.In the instant case, it cannot be
stated that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was a
preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when the
plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time
had elapsed before the plan was carried out.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery; Attack from behind by the
accused upon the victim is treachery.Amado Payago
categorically declared that Filomeno Camano attacked
Godofredo Pascua from behind, a method which has ensured
the accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to
the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may
put up.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of superior
strength, absorbed in treachery.The rule is already settled
that abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery.
Same; Same; Alternative Circumstances; Intoxication; When
drunkenness or intoxication mitigating and when
aggravating.Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if
accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating
if habitual or intentional. To be mitigating, it must be
indubitably proved. A habitual drunkard is one given to
intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit
should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a
matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to
evil thought and undermines will-power making its victim a
potential evildoer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intoxication considered mitigating
as intoxication was not habitual and accused was in a state of
intoxication at the time of commission of felony.The
intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and
considering that the said appellant was in a state of
intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the
alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered
as a mitigating circumstance.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Death penalty, not cruel,
unjust or excessive punishment.The death penalty is not
cruel, unjust or excessive.
690
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Camano
MANDATORY REVIEW from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Deogracias Eufemio for defendant-appellant.
691
People vs. Camano
Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a
kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his
head stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo,
first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the
ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he
lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave
him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the chest
above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side a
little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back, of
one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit B) causing instant death. The
victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained eight wounds, which
were specifically described by Dr. Tan in his Autopsy Report
(Exhibit B dated February 17, 1970, as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest
above the nipple, running to the right side a little posteriorly
and superiorly with an exit at the back of one (1) inch
opening. Penetrating the skin, subcutaneous tissues,
pericardium the suricles of the heart, the left lung towards
the right side of back.
2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches
deep three-fourth (3/4) inch long penetrating the skin and the
sternum.
3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long
one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep.
4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches
long.
5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting
skin and bone of anterior side.
6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.
7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at
the back near spinal column.
8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head
cutting skin and bone.
CAUSE OF DEATHWound number one (1) causing instant
death due to severe hemorrhage from the heart. Out of the
eight (8) wounds, two (2) are mortal wounds, namely, wound
Number one (1) and wound Number Three (3), (Exhibit B)
(t.s.n., pp. 18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The two
victims Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together
with the accused are neighbors, residing at the same street
of Barrio Nato, Sagay, Camarines Sur (t.s.n., pp. 31,
692
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Camano
Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident was not
preceded or precipitated by any altercation between the
victims and the accused (t.s.n. p. 60, Nov. 22, 1971).
Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this
incident, the two victims had a misundertanding with the
accused while fishing along Sagay River. During this
occasion it appears that the accused requested Godofredo
Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by
Mariano Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This
refusal greatly offended and embittered the accused against
the victims. From this time on, the accused begrudged the
two, and entertained personal resentment against them. And
although on several occasions, the accused was seen at the
same table with Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the
friendly attitude towards Pascua, seems to be merely artificial
than real, more so, with respect to Mariano Buenaflor whom
he openly detested. He consistently refused to associate
since then with the two victims, especially, Mariano
Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten attempts were made by
Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for
reconciliation with the victims but were refused. Instead,
defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge
Mariano Buenaflor to a fight, and announce his evil intention
to kill them. (t.s.n., pp. 50-53, Session November 22, 1971.)
Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or palas
belongs to the accused. That after killing the two victims, he
returned to his house, where he subsequently surrendered to
Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, and Erasmo Valencia,
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What was this altercation about?
A
It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his
boat was refused by Godofredo Pascua because that
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 408-409.
701
VOL. 115, JULY 30, 1982
701
People vs. Camano
boat used by Godofredo Pascua is owned by Mariano
Buenaflor.
Q
How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic)
this Buenaflor?
A
Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano
Buenaflor.
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
Q
Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink
liquor immediately prior to the incident?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Where?
A
In his house.
Q
When you saw him where were you?
A
I was also in my house because I can just see his house from
our window.
Q
About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno
Camano so that you can see from your house?
A
More or less 30 meters.
Q
With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?
A
Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons
(who) are living far from our house.
Q
According to your personal knowledge do you know whether
or not the accused was drunk when this incident happened?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
But the truth is that, you still affirm that you dont know of
any incident immediately prior that has precipitated this
stabbing incident between the accused and the victim
A
None, sir.
ATTY. TRIA:
Q
How about you, did you now drink that time?
No, sir.18
The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and
considering that the said appellant was in a state of
intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the
alternative cir_______________
18 pp. 51-53 and 60-61, t.s.n., taken by E. Nastor.
702
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
51
50
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lud Chu and Uy Se Tieng
11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a
quantity of dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated
amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo
approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who
was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows:
"Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not
going to answer them. The only thing I will say is that
whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such
a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those"
pointing towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had
obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to
order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from
P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20,
and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in
a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng,
furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and
the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng
went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if
Somson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after
he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the
name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000;
that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent
cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium
had already been loaded and the captain of the Kolambugan
refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived,
Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy
Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on
the night of December 14th, and proposed that he
participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy
Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000
when the opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu
went to Samson's house on the night of
and that they probably would not give him this position if
they learned that he was an opium
442
442
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Phelps.
smoker; that he again asked to have the Chinaman assist
him, and he (the accused) believing that he (Smith) was
acting in good faith and was really sick, told the Chinaman to
do so; that by agreement he and the witness Smith went to
the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the Chinaman
prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the
Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the
accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the
accused) was arrested about forty minutes later, and that he
called for the doctor to examine him about one and one-half
hours after he left the Chinaman's house.
The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on
every material point, stating that he, after repeated demands
made by Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it
to Smith.
The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States
Cavalry, who arrested the accused and the Chinaman,
testified that when he made these arrests the Chinaman and
the accused did not have an opportunity to talk together
before they went to the justice of the peace where the
preliminary investigation was held.
Doctor De Krafft, of the United States Army, was called by
the accused himself and made an examination of the
accused about an hour and a half or two hours after he left
the Chinaman's house. The doctor testified that the accused
was a strong, robust man, and a man presenting no
appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by the court
whether or not he could state positively if the accused had
used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I am
sure that he did not use any opium on that day."
The court below in its decision said:
"I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not
appear to be a person who uses daily a large amount of
opium. The accused is a strong, robust man, in good physical
condition, and from a casual examination of his person no
one would accuse him of being a habitual user of opium."
The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold
443
VOL. 16, AUGUST 11, 1910.
443
United States vs. Phelps.
or had in his possession any opium, neither does it contend
that he had in his possession any of the prohibited
paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged
with having smoked opium this one time in the house of the
Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the
testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in
Jolo.
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to
hide his true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for
the same purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having
visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose
of making arrangements for himself and the accused to
smoke opium. He stated to the accused that he (Smith) was
desirous of smoking. He urged the accused to have the
Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. He
went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and
paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1
for the preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means,
induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his
possession either opium or any of the prohibited
.paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable,
since the mere possession of the drug or any of the
prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused
had in his possession any of these things. According to the
statements made by the witness Smith, he not only
suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also
This court has repeatedly held that one who shares th guilty
purpose and aids and abets the commission of crime by his
presence at the time of its perpetration, eve though he may
not have taken an active part in its materi; execution, is
guilty as a principal. We have also held tha one who stands
as guard near the place where a crime committed to keep
others away or to warn his companion and fellow
conspirators of danger of discovery, takes direct part in the
commission of the crime and is therefore. guilty as a principal
under article 13 of the Penal Cod (U. S. vs. Reogilon and
Dingle, 22 Phil. Rep., 127; U. S. vs. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep.,
545; U. S. vs. Ramos, 4 Phil. Rep 555.)
137
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 17, 1913.
137
United States vs. Diris.
Under all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that
Siaga was properly convicted as a principal.
It appears that the trial court treated the stolen receipts for
P100 as being of that value. The actual money stolen
amounted to only P353.
While we have held that checks, warrants and similar
instruments, payable to order and evidencing an obligation to
pay money, may under certain circumstances be treated as
worth their face value in fixing the value of the stolen
property for the purpose of grading the crime and the penalty
to be imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the penalty
prescribed in the Code is made to depend on the value of the
property taken (U. S. vs. Raboy, 25 Phil. Rep., 1; U. S. vs.
Wickersham, 20 Phil. Rep., 440), we are of opinion that a
mere receipt such as that under consideration, especially in
the absence of any proof as to its value, cannot be held to
have anything more than a mere nominal value in fixing the
penalty and assessing the civil indemnity to be imposed on
one convicted of its theft.
The record further shows that Anselmo Diris is a recidivist,
having been previously convicted of the crime of robbery by
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in the case of the
the robbery, at the same time telling them the place where
they were to be found, does not constitute inducement to
210
210
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Indanan.
commit the robbery because the proposal to commit the
robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause of the
crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been
committed without it; nor was the indication of the place
where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to
induce the robbery."
The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose
of showing concrete cases in which the acts of the accused
were not sufficient, as matter of law, to constitute
inducement. They not only lay down the legal principles
which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also
illustrate in the most valuable way the application of those
principles to actual cases.
The following decisions of the same court present instances
in which the acts of the accused constitute inducement under
the law and illustrate the application of the principles to
concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by
the court were: "It appeared that Lulu, who was living with
Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the town of X, gave birth
to a child on the morning of the 28th of March, the offspring
of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously
agreed upon by the first three named to deliver the child to
William as soon as it was born, with instructions to deposit it
in some frequented place so that it might be found and taken
up; but Joe changed his mind and handed the child over to
the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it whatever
you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to/ which the
latter actually did." Under the facts the accused was held
guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22d of January, 1873, it
was held that "a woman who, living with a man in scandalous
voice to his sons who were fighting with others to kill those
with whom they were fighting before they were killed
themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big
thing as a little, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by
inducement by reason of the injuries inflicted under such
orders."
In a decision of the 22d day of December, 1883, the court
said, "that the inducement and the commission of a crime
whereby the inducer becomes a principal to the same extent
and effect as if he had physically committed the crime
212
212
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Indanan.
exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or
agreement for a consideration, or through influence so
effective that it alone determines the commission of the
crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid
down the proposition that the secretary of the ayuntamiento
who induced certain persons to form new lists of
compromisarios five days prior to the election of senators
was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists,
saying: "It appearing and it being a fact proved that the
secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio Dura,
induced the members of the council to commit the act
stated, his participation as principal in the commission of the
act is well established according to the provisions of
paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code, because such
inducement coming f from a person of such influence as the
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be
considered sufficiently dominant to turn the mind of those
induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was
held that a woman who was at enmity with an uncle for
having refused to renounce in her favor a donation which a
relative had given to him, who made frequent threats to kill
the uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum
little; it is better to kill this man and take his carabao and the
P40 which was received f from the sale of the house in town."
They having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of
the proposed victim and having returned and explained why
they had not been able to kill him, the accused said to them:
"Why did you eat my chickens if you are not going to do what
I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in Cambaguio
because I thought you were going to kill him." The Igorrotes
then spent three days clearing some land for another person
from whom they received P2.25. About noon of the third day
of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now
you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply with our
agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill
Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and conceal
yourselves in the same place you were concealed before."
The murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts
the court held that the accused was the instigator and
inducer of the crime, and that he was liable as principal.
(Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of
January, 1887, 12th of January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep.,
230) it appeared that the accused had a conversation with
Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked him if he
knew Antonio Gavato and his associates, to which he replied
in the negative. The defendant then said: "I
216
216
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Indanan.
wish to confer upon you a commission, which is as follows:
Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of Gavato, and when
you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was
reluctant to obey this order, but defendant gave him
something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and
then gave him a bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I
have ordered and in case you incur any responsibility I will be
responsible to the court, and as soon as you wound any
person or persons, return to me and I will defend you." The
220
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Montilla vs. Augustinian, Corporation.
that such commands may be considered the moving cause of
the crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the
representation that the accused had in his possession an
order from the Government commanding the death of Sariol
was also of material influence in effecting the death; and
where two fundamental causes work together for the
production of a single result and one of those causes would
lead to a conviction upon one theory and the other upon
another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as
murder. There were present, also, the aggravating
circumstances of despoblado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court
below is well founded, and we accordingly affirm the same,
with costs. United States vs. Indanan., 24 Phil. 203, No. 8187
January 29, 1913
614
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kiichi Omine
killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!",
it not appearing that he did anything more than say these
words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the
crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of
Spain said: "Considering that, although the phrases
pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were
not so to the extent that they may be considered the
principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as
inducement must precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that without it the
act' would not have been performed." Another decision cited
was that of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a
father who simply said to his son who was at the time
engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not
responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was
given.
Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code,
which has been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
without change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order
that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be
considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such
advice or such words have great dominance and great
influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that
they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or
moral coercion or as violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th
Edition.)
We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of
Eduardo Autor are not responsible for the injury inflicted by
him on Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and
location of the wound of the offended party, found that it was
the intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the
offended party, and accordingly found said defendant guilty
701
People vs. Montealegre
Same; Same: Same; Same; Contention that although there
was no evidence of a prior agreement between Capalad and
Montealegre, their subsequent acts proved the presence of
such conspiracy.The prosecution contends that although
there was no evidence of a prior agreement between Capalad
and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view,
which conforms to our consistent holding on this matter:
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can
be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that,
at the time the offense was committed, participants had the
same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be
inferred from the attendant circumstances.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the
accused, who is constitutionally presumed innocent, depends
upon the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of
the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in
authority, undoubtedly already strong, was made even
stronger by the defense itself.
As the trial court** which convicted him saw it, the crime
imputed to Napoleon Montealegre was committed as follows:
At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while
Edmundo Abadilla was eating at the Medings Restaurant in
Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table, Intending to call a policeman, he
quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his
car whom he hailed to report the matter. After parking his
vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and
soon thereafter the two smelled marijuana smoke from the
A.
While Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun
but Montealegre held his hand.
Q.
Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun?
A.
They slammed down on the floor and when they were already
on the floor, I ran away because I was already frightened.18
_______________
17 Id., pp. 111112.
18 Id., pp. 123424,
705
VOL. 161, MAY 31, 1988
705
People vs. Montealegre
The cause of the defense did not improve when on crossexamination, he insisted:
A.
When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre
suddenly held the hand of Camantigue,
Q.
And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of
Camantigue, what happened to Camantigue?
A.
He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was
holding his hand, Capalad was stabbing him at the back.19
And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as
follows:
Q.
So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while
Montealegre was holding the right hand of the policeman to
prevent him from drawing his gun?
A.
Yes, sir.20
The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only
succeeded in confirming his own guilt. He claimed he ran
away before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of
denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of ignorance and
forgetfulness and protestations of innocence, does not have
the ring of truth. The following excerpts are reflective of the
kind of defense he offered to exculpate himself from the
charge established against him by the prosecution.
Q.
Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad.
what happened if any?
A.
Camantigue pulled his gun.
Q.
What happened after that?
A.
Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened.21
xxx
A.
I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really
happened.
Q.
Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A.
I did not see.22
_______________
19 Id., pp. 137138.
20 Id., pp. 142143.
21 Id., Feb. 28,1984, p. 187.
22
706
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Montealegre
xxx
Q.
From whom did you come to know that Pfc. Camantigue shot
and killed Vicente Capalad?
A.
From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that
Camantigue killed Capalad.23
xxx
Q.
Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc. Camantigue was
holding both of you, did you notice that Vicente Capalad
stabbed Pfc. Camantigue?
A.
I did not see anything.24
xxx
Q.
And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue
while Capalad was on the left side?
A
I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the
left.
Q.
But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of
Camantigue?
A.
I am not sure if that is the right side.
Q.
But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster
were placed?
A.
I cannot remember.25
It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not
know what was happening on that evening of March 11,
1983. As one of the principal figures of the stabbing incident,
he could not have not known, nor could he later not
remember, that startling event that even more onlookers
could not forget. The evidence has established that the
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a coprincipal for having collaborated-with Capalad in the killing of
the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad
actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accusedappellant holding on to the victims hands to prevent him
from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true
that the accused-appellant did not himself commit the act of
stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for
having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack
against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the
Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are:
"(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is
either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention immediately before the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it would not
have been accomplished."28
The prosecution contends that although there was no evi_______________
26 Id., June 27,1983, p. 143; Id., July 29, 1983, p. 158; Id.,
March 5, 1984, pp. 231234.
27 Id., Feb. 28,1984, pp. 210211, 219220.
28 Luis B. Reyes, Criminal Law, 1977 ed., p. 506.
708
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Montealegre
dence of a prior agreement between Capalad and
Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy, The Court sustains this view,
which conforms to our consistent holding on this matter:
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can
be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that,
at the time the offense was committed, participants had the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
243
VOL. 117, SEPTEMBER 30. 1982
243
People vs. Simbra
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Butuan City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Actg. Solicitor
General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz
for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel V. Montilla for accused-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
Charged with rape committed according to the information,
as follows:
"That in or about the evening of May 24, 1972, in Langihan,
Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually, helping one another by
means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, and forcibly feloniously and successively have carnal
knowledge with the complainant, one Gresilda Gonzales, a
girl of 16 years old."
Sergio Tolibas was found guilty and sentenced "to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessories of the
law; to indemnify the offended party, Gresilda Gonzales, in
the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay
the costs. In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be
credited with the period of his preventive detention conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Rep. Act 6127, it appearing that on 6 June 1972 he signed a
voluntary agreement to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners."
home to his own house which was about 150 meters away.
The following morning, complainant spent the whole day in
Ernanita's house doing nothing except sat in the sala, ate and
slept. At about 8:30 in the evening, complainant was fetched
by her aunt and a policeman.
Thus, appellant admits that he had carnal knowledge with
complainant but claims that he did so with her consent.
The testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by
his sister Ernanita Tolibas Jusay.
The issue in this case is whether appellant had sexual
intercourse with complainant against the will of the latter and
through the use of force and intimidation. Appellant claims
that the court erred "in giving too much credence to the
testimony of the offended party Gresilda Gonzales."
The above pretentions of appellant are not true. Complainant
did not for a moment tolerate the indecent acts of appellant
and Simbra. She was going to the artesian well at the public
market in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water, when she
was seized by Berto Simbra and appellant. Simbra held her
arms and dragged her towards the "serin." Her mouth was
covered with a handkerchief by appellant. She struggled and
even kicked Berto Simbra and appellant. Upon reaching the
"serin," Simbra threw complainant on the ground while appellant held her arms as Simbra forcibly took-off her pants
and panties and had sexual intercourse with her, twice.
Thereafter, Simbra also held complainant when appellant had
sexual intercourse with her, thrice.
After she was raped, complainant was threatened by Simbra
and appellant with death if she would reveal what happened
to her. Appellant emphasized the threat by pretending to
choke her.
247
VOL. 117, SEPTEMBER 30, 1982
247
People vs. Simbra
Appellant contends that if violence was employed upon
complainant, there would be abrasions and contusions on her
body. While it is true that Dr. Tupaz found no injuries on her
body, except the lacerations on her hymen, the fact is, the
rapists did not really employ violence upon her but only used
force by holding her arms, covering her mouth, dragging and
throwing her to the ground and pinning her down. She was
not boxed, beaten or injured in any way. The force coming as
it did from two big men and applied on a 15-year old girl was
enough to overcome whatever resistance there was, without
necessity for violence. This explains the lack of contusions,
hematoma, and other injuries on complainant's body, except
the lacerations on her hymen.
Further, complainant denied the truth of the testimony of
appellant that she was the girlfriend of Simbra. She has seen
her rapists passing her house before the date of the incident
but the fact is, she came to know their names at the Police
Station only when she was investigated.
The version of the appellant is hard to believe. Complainant
was not a woman of loose morals that after her alleged
sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to have
sexual intercourse with appellant and with the blessings of
Simbra. Even a woman of loose morals would not agree to
allow two men to successively take, advantage of her in the
presence of the other. In the case of People vs. Soriano, 35
SCRA 633, this Court said:
"To begin with, their version is inherently incredible. Indeed,
no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse
with two men-or-three, according to Antonio Gallardoin the
presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as
morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us
contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year
high school student, can be so characterized. On the
contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and
candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not
even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute
to them the commission of the crime charged.
Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with
complainant against her will by employing force and
intimidation,
248
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simbra
the crime committed is rape through direct participation.
And, when he aided Berto Simbra and made it possible for
the latter to have carnal knowledge of complainant also
against her will and through force and intimidation, appellant
committed another crime of rape through indispensable
cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty of two crimes of
consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED but
modified in the sense that appellant Sergio Tolibas is hereby
sentenced twice to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. With
costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed with modification.
Notes.Conviction or acquittal of accused in rape depends
almost entirely on credibility of testimony of offended party.
(People vs. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513.)
The defense that complainant consented to the sexual act
with the accused on two occasions even if true cannot
exculpate the accused considering her testimony despite
intensive cross-examination, that rape as herein chartered
was actually committed. (People vs. Equac, 80 SCRA 665.)
Unless motivated by a desire to bring to justice the culprit
who had grievously wrong her, it is hard that a woman of unsullied reputation to publicly disclose that she has been
raped. (People vs. Gargoles, 83 SCRA 282.) People vs.
Simbra, 117 SCRA 242, No. L-39401 September 30, 1982
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front
of Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the
houses of Tony Desinorio and Francisco Desinorio, emerged
at the back of the Esso Gas Station, crossed the creek or
canal on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the gun
into the dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded
to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his mind
and returned to the beach near the victims house.
The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing
through the alley between the house of the victim and the
Desinorio houses, which alley separated the building of the
Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas
Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which
intersects Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia
resided. Their residence was about two hundred meters away
from the scene of the crime.
A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be
at the Villa Bus Terminal at around eight-thirty in the evening
of July 8, 1969, when the killing was perpetrated, testified
that she saw Paciano Nierra wearing an underwear and
striped T-short running from Saguing Street to Barrio Tinago.
About five minutes later, she saw Paciano crossing the
boulevard and running towards Saguing Street. He was
wearing long pants. The witness made a statement to the
police about what she had seen.
7
VOL. 96, FEBRUARY 12, 1980
7
People vs. Nierra
Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound
for Tupi and alighted near the municipal building. Paciano
Nierra arrived in that place and gave him four hundred pesos.
Misa returned to General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to
Rojas, and proceeded to the victims house where he mingled
with the persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil
there, staying there for four nights.
He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the
buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He received a commission
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Nierra
In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is
cumulative in character. As already stated, the crucial and
decisive evidence consists of Misas testimony and
confessions
Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted
at the preliminary investigation as counsel of appellant
Doblen, having been allegedly hired by the offended party,
Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he acted as counsel de
oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for
Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as
having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as already
noted, were convicted on the basis of Misas confessions and
testimony. The appellants have not successfully overthrown
or rebutted Misas evidence.
It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of
Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed as a friend on
Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no hand in the
assassination of Anicetos wife.
We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the night of the
The fact that the witness is related to the deceased does not
disqualify him from testifying nor does it render his testimony
utterly devoid of merit or belief, in the absence of an
improper motive actuating him to testify falsely against the
accused. (People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503).
A co-accused is merely an accomplice where his participation
was merely a show-off or expression of sympathy or feeling
of camaraderie. (People vs. Vicente, 28 SCRA 247).
Where the trauma inflicted by the appellant hastened the
death of the victim, she is also criminally liable as a principal.
(People vs. Gensola, 29 SCRA 483).
As accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor
cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with
knowledge of the commission of the crime. He subsequently
takes part in the three ways: (a) by profiting from the effects
of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or
instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery;
and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the
principal of the crime, provided he acts with of his public
functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive,
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
(People vs. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600.)
Positive identification of the accused by several eyewitness
that he killed the victim establishes accuseds guilty to a
moral certainty. (People vs. Cunanan, 75 SCRA 15). People vs.
Nierra, 96 SCRA 1, No. L-32624 February 12, 1980
real malefactors, who actually robbed the bank and killed and
injured several persons, including peace officers. The failure
to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a
crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the
outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose
participation has not been shown to be as abominable as
those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme
punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in meting
out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly
deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Teehankee, J.:
I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos.
Barredo, J.:
For the reasons given by Justice Abad Santos I vote that
Romaquin and Doble should be sentenced for robbery with
homicide as accomplices. As to Simeon Doble my conclusion
is that he is at least an accessory after the fact.
Aquino, J.:
Took no part.
Concepcion Jr., J.:
Previously voted to concur with the main opinion.
Abad Santos, J., concurring and dissenting.
Criminal Law; While Doble and Romaquin should be held as
accomplices, their liability should not be limited to robbery
only as they
136
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Doble
received guns showing they were prepared to kill also.For it
must be remembered that the principal malefactors were
each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines and
Kailan ka hinuli?
S
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Doble
tionality. It is only that portion in which is cited Simeons
statement made before the Navotas Police Department (Exh,
I pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that he has not yet received
his share that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor
Generals recommendation, for it gives the impression that
Simeon had given material or moral support or
encouragement to the malefactors (referring to those still at
Pagkatapos?
S
Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usapusap silang lahat at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at
nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi na ako na lamang ang
maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at
maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at mahuli lamang.
19. T
Wala na po.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house
having been used as the meeting place of the malefactors for
their final conference before proceeding to Navotas to rob the
Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them because
of a 5-year old foot injury which would make him only a
liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the
malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they met
at his house it was only because it was near the landing
place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while
waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his
house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling
them that he could not join them because of his foot injury,
and will just wait for them, evidently as a mere gesture of
politeness in not being
143
VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
143
People vs. Doble
able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not
be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid
being suspected that he was against their vicious plan for
which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a coconspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks
among the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable
participation of Simeon Doble in the commission of the crime,
for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he could not in
145
People vs. Doble
into revealing the names of their companions in the robbery,
again negating the claim of torture and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and
Cresencio virtually confirmed their extra-judicial statements
when they testified in court. By all the proofs as cited,
persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their
custodial statements plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson,
the only one named among the alleged torturers, that any
violence was practiced by the investigators, specifically, the
alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18,
t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged involuntariness of the
extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while
allegedly attempting to escape could have instilled fear in
the minds of the appellants which affected their freedom of
will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellants Brief).
This is a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the
giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after
their interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July
5, 1966 (Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin
pointed to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore,
took place long after appellants have given their main
statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had
only bothered to check the dates of the main statements of
both appellants which were given not later than just past the
middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary
statement of Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he would not
have probably come forth with this argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case,
Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the
inadmissibility of appellants custodial statements, for their
having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right
thereto during the interrogation. There might be merit in this
contention were the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation one of constitutional grant as is provided in our
1973 Constitution, before which the right was given only to
an accused, not to a mere suspect during in-custody police
coming down from the house, going towards the road where
they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several
638
638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Doctolero
times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also
struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening,
Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and
Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who
was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the
latters wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brotherin-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria
Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera).
Marcial Sagun and company were on their way home. (p. 8,
ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: Where have you been
cousin. (p. 8, ibid) He noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo
holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial
Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter
unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward
swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but
he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and
Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. They watched
each others step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de
Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with
a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were
towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo
(p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun
and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing
Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and
then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo
throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother,
Virgilio, participated as accomplices in the slaying of the
women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree
with its findings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General
with its evidentiary substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants
were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house of
Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women
thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back
at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146,
tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went
up the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both
appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not
know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was
brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo
inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature,
number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the
two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-l), it could not
have been possible for Ludovicos two brothers Virgilio and
Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not
to hear either the screams of pain of their brothers victims or
the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies
when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them
several times, x x x Under these circumstances, it is obvious
that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves
knew what was going on inside the room of the house at the
time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their
brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women
victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that
the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as
their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two
deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is
no question that the presence of these two appellants
upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother
_______________
21 Original Record, 228-229.
645
and to beg her to return each time she left the family abode
for the embrace of her lover
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
bra.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the
sentence of life imprisonment, with indemnity to the
offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag,
in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the
accused therein, namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma,
the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who,
because no certificate nor any other proof of their marriage
could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged
with parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night
of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and
their children, lived together in their house at Sobosob,
Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the
municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for
Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and
each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2)
different occasions, appellant Nemesio Talingdan had visited
Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and
during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12year old daughter living with them, go down the house and
leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit
relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and
during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged
the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not
be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed,
Teresa had again left their house
23
after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and
proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went
under an avocado tree nearby. As supper was tben ready, the
child called her parents to eat; Bernardo who was in
24
24
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Talingdan
the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his daughters
call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa
also excused herself by saying she would first put her small
baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as
she was through she again called her parents to eat. This
time, she informed her father about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He
proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near
the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that
moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of
the batalan. The four accused then climbed the stairs of the
batalan carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo
was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides
and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but
when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying
You call for help and I will kill you, so she kept silent. The
assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazons male
teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came out of her silid later;
she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when
Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers of her
father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to
reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she
ever did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and helped fix
and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy
on which was performed in his own house by the Municipal
Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours
after death; burial took place on the same day. The victims
brother who came from Manila arrived one day after the
burial, followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra
where she resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the
identities of the killers of her father because she was afraid
of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the
circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate
relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter
executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of
the information for murder against the herein five (5)
appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the
defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with Bernardo, was a
resident of
25
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
25
People vs. Talingdan
the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two
(2) brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said
brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending
her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she
was still single up to the time of her husbands violent death
on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they
moved to and resided in her husbands place in Sallapadan,
Abra, bringing with them three (3) carabaos and two (2)
horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of
land in said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of
land worked on by Bernardos parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which
was about 4-5 meters away from the house of her parents-inlaw. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and
her husband never maltreated her; although sometimes she
had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his own
mother who wanted that Bernardos earnings be given to her,
(the mother) which Bernardo never did, and at those times,
Bernardo would admonish Teresa You leave me alone. Her
in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not
get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of her other son,
Juanito, in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her
because she did not give him any of the carpentry tools
which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She
never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as
charged by her mother-in-law, and if she ever did leave the
house to go to other places they were only during those
times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar
checks with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips,
she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had
to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode
in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to Bangued
in the morning and always rode back with them to
Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the
weapons carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who
waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the
latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of
the carabaos and horses they brought from Manabo to
Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report
the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to
his policemen, one of whom is Tal26
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Talingdan
ingdan, so that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa
knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the latters
home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But
illicit relationship had never existed between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the
kitchen of their house cooking their food for supper. Two of
the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband,
Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a plow. He
had to make the plow at that time of the night because at
daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as
the food was ready, she and the children moved over to the
adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper,
and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the
two children were about to follow him to the kitchen when
suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive
gun shots coming from near their batalan. They were all so
terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did
not know yet at that precise time that her husband was shot,
as she and the children were still in the other room on their
way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from
Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain,
and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her
arms. She did not see the killers of her1 husband, as the
night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was in
her arms when the first group of people who responded to
their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of
police, some members of the municipal council and appellant
Tobias who even advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body
of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6) months
pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation
of the surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot
prints on the ground some meters away from the batalan.
He also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said
batalan and on the nothern waitings of the kitchen. Later,
Teresa requested some persons to relay the information
about the death of her husband to her relatives in Manabo,
Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardos
mother and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then
residing, as they have left their house in Sallapadan about
two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to
till there in a case with the natives called Tingians. Two
27
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
27
People vs. Talingdan
(2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and
after Bernardos remains was autopsied and he was buried
under their house, they conducted an investigation, but she
did not give them any information relative to the identity of
the persons who shot her husband because she did not really
see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, Juanito
Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz,
Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after the usual nine (9)
days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresas
children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her
29
People vs. Talingdan
approach. You tell your father we will kill him. If it were true
that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered
why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when
she again saw the said appellants on the very night in
question shortly before the shooting talking together in
subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms.
Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could
have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related
above and which We have carefully reviewed that appellants
Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and
Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as
charged, and that they committed the said offense in
conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and
in the dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it was
committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of
Corazon suffered from vital contradictions and
inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently
unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As
the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the
witness varied on cross-examination the exact time of some
of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was
before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot;
(2) whether it was before or after seeing her mothers
meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June
23, 1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or
not the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs
when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of
her having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and
coldbloodedly shooting her father to death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing
inherently unnatural in the circumstances related by her. We
agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:
time, he never saw the mayor until after they went home to
Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he
could have returned anytime on the evening of June 22 or
anytime before the commission of the offense to Sallapadan
and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then returned to
Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to
Sallapadan on the 26th.
34
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Talingdan
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was
alleged to have been accompanied by witness-accused is still
living and very much alive. As a matter of fact, Mayor
Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and
also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who
accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and
still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not the mayor and
the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the
testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia, Abra, and
a member of the Cursillo Movement, was presented as
rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the witness stand, he
stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of
Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to
23, 1966, at the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan, Abra,
and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact, Mayor
Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on
October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen in his Guide Book
where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears because
they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if
not in full, the testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp.
29A-30A, Annex of Appellants Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa
Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General has submitted a
recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as
her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting,
she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the
assailants of her father. When Corazon identified appellants
Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did
not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to
anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, Dont tell it
to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody. Later,
when the peace officers who repaired to their house to
investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the
information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no
suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual
shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her
attitude regarding her co-appellants conspiracy, known to
her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute concealing or assisting in
the escape of the principal in the crime which makes her
liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by
appellants was murder qualified by treachery. It being
obvious
36
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Talingdan
that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and
without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of
their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed
treachery to insure success in attaining their malevolent
objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted
with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill
Bernardo Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to
work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday
evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they
had motiveTalingdans taking up the cudgels for his
paramour, Teresaand enough time to meditate, and desist,
if they were not resolved to proceed with their objective.
owned by her father some 300 to 400 meters away from the
latters house near the creek where she was then washing
clothes; that she heard one of the conspirators say Could he
elude a bullet?; that when her mother noticed her presence,
her mother shoved her away saying, You tell your father that
we will kill him; that in the evening of the following day,
Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in
their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet
the other appellants in the yard about 3 to 4 meters from
where she was in the batalan; that she heard them
conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to recognize
all of them by the light coming from the kitchen lamp through
the open batalan; that she knows all of them very well as
they are all residents of their barrio and she used to see them
almost everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed
with long guns; that their meeting did not last long; that after
about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up the
house and proceed to her room while the other appellants hid
under an avocado tree nearby; that when supper was ready
she called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her
call but continued working on a plow while her mother
excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby
to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after which she again
called her parents to eat; that about this time she informed
her father about the presence of persons downstairs but her
father paid no heed to what she said; that her father
proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door
while Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at the that
moment her father was shot from below the stairs of the
batalan; that the four accused then went up the stairs of
the batalan with their long guns and, upon seeing that her
father was still alive, appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired at
him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help,
appellant Bides warned her saying You call for help and I will
kill you; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the
east.
39
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
39
People vs. Talingdan
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be
accorded belief in the same way that credence was given to
her statement that, upon her mothers inquiry immediately
after the shooting as to whether she recognized the
assailants of her father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother
that she identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and
Bides as the culprits; for which reason her mother warned her
Dont tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to
somebody.
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and
Teresa had a quarrel during which Bernardo slapped Teresa
several times by reason of which Teresa left the house and
sought the help of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant
Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come down. When
Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman
and was then armed, appellant Talingdan left after warning
Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active
cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against the life of her
husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa was a
paramour of appellant Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom
from her husband, the victim, so that she could enjoy the
company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral
compunction in deserting her family and her children for the
company of her lover. As heretofore stated, she did this
several times and continued to do so until the violent death
of her husband even as she was carrying a six-month old
baby in her womb, the paternity of which her husband
denied.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.An assail on the credibility of witnesses which gives
detailed reasons therefor with page references to the oral
evidence in the record deserves more consideration by the
trial court and may not simply be cast aside by a sweeping
statement of a general principle of evidence. (Tagoranao vs.
Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 490).
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vino vs. People
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having
been denied, he interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming
the judgment of the lower court.3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following
grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN
ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED
IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING
CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR
THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL TO BE
CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED
UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE
VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE
STATE AND THAT THE ESCAPE MUST BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL
OF THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS.4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals,
the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to the
civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He
was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial
Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In
a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988,
petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was
acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on
August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition.
The comment was submitted by the Solicitor General in
behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court
resolved to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to
sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
569
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
569
People vs. Simon
could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659
effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience
necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and
entails additional questions of law which we shall now
resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to
the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
SEC.13.Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx
SEC.4.Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
xxx
SEC.17.Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec.20.Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture
of the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime.The penalties
for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be
applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
following quantities:
xxx
5.750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx
_________________
52 Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides that it shall
take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation, and it was so
published in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila
Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal.
570
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional
to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
1.Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for
the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of
only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the
sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be
whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the
lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law,
albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the
previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it
has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code
the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and
shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by
special laws.54 The exception in said article would not apply
to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual
delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of
the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in
the present case, a corollary question would be whether this
court, at the present stage, can sua sponte apply the
578
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the
Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the
technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts
of the three scales of penalties in the Code,67 with much
more reason should the provisions of said Code on the
appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying
circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the
different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for
graduating such penalties by degrees should have
supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if
they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this
aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that
mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied
only if they affect theperiods and the degrees of the penalties
within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and
consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in
accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied
to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of
the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when
there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced
by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce
581
People vs. Simon
Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid
Section 1 which directs that in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. (Italics
ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of
context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that
qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court
has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act No.
4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus,
with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from
its coverage persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment, we have held that what
is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the
penalty imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law
states is life imprisonment.
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition,
therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of
literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law
and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in
the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated
scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall
have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act
No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws,
which is the best mode of interpretation.71
________________
70 People vs. Roque, et al., 90 Phil. 142 (1951); People vs.
Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239 (1952); People vs. Moises, et al., G.R.
L-32495, August 13, 1975, 66 SCRA 151.
71Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus
interpretandi modus (Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 953).
582
582
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social
measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in
favor of the accused.72 The minimum sentence is merely a
period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not
of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the
balance of his sentence outside of his confinement.73 It does
not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he
still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set
conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convicts eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his
release on parole may readily be denied if he is found
unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on
legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar,
appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next
lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we
have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of
the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court
may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
The difference, which could thereby even involve only one
day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in
the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against
accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No.
7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their
technical signification and effects, then what should govern is
the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for
in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized under
the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the
latter
584
584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
offenses would now be considered as punished under the
Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103,
as amended by Act No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also
provides that:
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by the same. (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should
be taken into account in the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal
Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special
laws). The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are
P5,000.00
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997
585
People vs. Gabres
DATE OF PAYMENT
NAME OF PAYOR
AMOUNT
1. April 26,1992
Oreta Nisperos
P5,000.00
Joel Panida
P5,000.00
Joel Panida
P5,000.00
Julius Aoay
P5,000.00
Oreta Nisperos
Q
The two accused?
A
Yes, maam.
Q
Now, when the two accused came to your residence on April
26, what happened?
A
My son paid an amount of P5,000.00.
Q
Who particularly paid for your son?
A
I paid for my son, maam.
Q
Aside from you and your son who else were present?
A
Also present were Joel Panida, Tarcisio Dacsig.
Q
How about Julius Aoay?
A
He was also present, maam.
Q
You said a while ago, Madam witness, that on April 26 you
paid P5,000.00 for your son, what is your basis in saying that
you paid P5,000.00 on that day?
A
They issued us a receipt, maam.
591
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997
591
People vs. Gabres
Q
Who received the payment?
A
It was Mona Gabres, maam.
Q
Who issued the receipt?
A
xxx
x x x.
I would like to show to you this receipt dated July 31, 1992
previously marked as Exhibit B-1' for Crim. Case No. 92-CR1803 and Exhibit I-1' in Crim. Case No. 92C R-1805, is this
the receipt you are referring to?
A
Yes, Maam.
Q
Now, who issued you this receipt?
A
Lito Gabres, Maam.
Q
Now, if this receipt was issued by Lito Gabres what was the
participation of Mona Gabres?
A
I handed this P25,000.00 to Lito Gabres, he counted it and
then handed it to Mona Gabres, Maam."12
________________
11 TSN, 05 April 1994, pp. 611.
12 TSN, 10 May 1994, pp. 56.
592
592
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
Testimony of Julius Aoay:
Q
I would like to show you a receipt dated June 7, 1992 which
has been previously marked as Exhibit A' in Criminal Case
1801, as Exhibit B' in Criminal Case 1805, as Exhibit B' in
Criminal Case 1800, as Exhibit C' in Criminal Case 1803 and
as Exhibit B' in Criminal Case 1802, is this the receipt issued
to you?
A
Yes, it is.
Q
Could you tell us who wrote this receipt?
A
It was Mona Gabres, maam.
Q
How about Lito Gabres what was his participation?
A
He was the one counting the money."13
In the scheduled meeting on 12 April 1992, it was only
accused-appellant who, in fact, showed up to meet with the
applicants for overseas work. Joel Panida testified:
Q
On April 12,1992 were you present in that meeting?
A
Yes, I was also there, maam.
Q
Who else were present on that day, April 12,1992?
A
Mrs. Nisperos, Tarcisio Dacsig, Ramil Nisperos and Julius Aoay.
Q
Who from the side of the accused came to see you?
A
It was Mona Gabres only, maam.
Q
How about Lito Gabres, was he also present?
A
He was not there, maam.
Q
On April 12,1992 what transpired in that meeting?
A
She introduced herself as a recruiter for workers going to
Korea. She also asked us that if we are interested then we
will give P5,000.00 each as down payment."14
The Court finds it hard to accept the claim that private
complainants have prevaricated the evidence to implicate
Mona Gabres only because the authorities have yet to
succeed in arresting her husband. It is, of course, unfortunate
that the husband, at least momentarily, is able to ward off
the long arm of the law; nevertheless, it should, in the end,
still catch up with him.
________________
13 TSN, 23 May 1994, p. 6.
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
"(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits.
16 Rollo, p. 49.
594
594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Gabres
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the
first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
x x x
xxx
x x x.
ART. 39. Penalties.(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage
as defined herein.
Quite appropriately, the trial court has observed:
"(T)here are two elements of the crime (of illegal
recruitment), namely: (1) that the offender is a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the
offender undertakes any of the recruitment activities defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same
code. (PEOPLE vs. CORAL, G.R. Nos. 9784954, March 1,
1994, 230 SCRA 499). Without any doubt, this Court finds the
two elements of the crime present in the case at bar. That
the accused are nonlicensees or non-holders of authority to
lawfully recruit is evident in the certification issued by Atty.
Justinian Lichnacban of the POEACAR Regional Extension
Office of Baguio City (Exhibit D', 93-CR1800). Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be;
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,
if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of
the following means.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term
of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the
________________
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense.19 The penalty next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime.20 The determination of the
minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the
court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided.21 The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence.22
from two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of from two (2)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
All other aspects of the dispositive portion of the decision
appealed from are AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.Illegal recruitment carries with it the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine which varies by degrees in
accordance with the enumeration made in Article 39 of the
Labor Code as amended. (People vs. Cabacang, 246 SCRA
530 [1995]) People vs. Gabres, 267 SCRA 581, G.R. Nos.
11895054 February 6, 1997
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
sudden accused came from behind her and twisted both her
arms. Then accused lifted her and brought her to a nipa hut
which was uninhabited. Victim struggled to set herself free,
to no avail despite kicking, shouting and struggling to be free
from the hold of the accused. (pp. 18-23, TSN, id.)
Accused dropped [the] victim to the floor of the nipa hut;
pinned both her legs including her right hand with [his] knees
[and took] off his pants. The accused ha[d] his bolo beside
him with which he threatened the victim. Victim testified that
accused raped her then, explaining in detail the commission
of the said act. (pp. 23-29, TSN, id.)
Witness informed her husband and her mother about the
rape that evening. (pp. 31-32, TSN, id.)
During cross-examination, defense counsel tried to impeach
the testimony of the witness by eliciting the information that
accused and victim were close neighbors; that during the
incident
119
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999
119
People vs. Lampaza
private offended party passed by accused who was cutting
bamboo poles, on her way to the grazing area of the farm lot.
(pp. 3-4, TSN, November 7, 1989) She described again the
force and intimidation emanating from the accused in
committing the act complained of. Private offended party
informed the Court of the great fear she felt that she was
trembling and almost speechless when the incident
happened. (pp. 5-7; 11-22, TSN, Ibid.)
Witness was never attracted to the accused as she testified
on cross[-]examination. (p. 19, TSN, id.)
When queried by the Court as to the length of the sexual
intercourse she stated that it lasted only three minutes,
although the acts of force, intimidation and the struggle
lasted for more than ten minutes. (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.)
During the hearing of January 4, 1990, prosecution
presented another witness in the person of the husband of
the offended party (p. 32), who testified that the latter
taking off his pants and shirt. They made love consensually.
He did not threaten complainant; neither did he use force [or]
violence in consummating the sexual act because the same
was with the consent of complainant (t.s.n., August 6, 1991).
Filomena Lampaza, the lawfully-wedded wife of the accused,
testified that complainant is the mistress of her husband, the
accused. Because of her husbands extra-marital relationship,
they were always quarreling. To avoid further trouble she
went to Iloilo to work as a housemaid for Judge Amelia K. Del
Rosario (pp. 49-50, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1991). The latter testified
that Filomena had worked for her family as a housemaid, and
during the course of her employment she had confided to her
employer that her (Filomenas) husband was maltreating her
and ha[d] a querida (t.s.n., Jan. 30, 1992).
Ruling of the RTC and the CA
Debunking the claim that the sexual intercourse was
consensual, the trial court held that appellant used force
against the victim by twisting her arm and bodily lifting her
from the farm lot to the nipa hut. He also threatened and
intimidated her by placing a bolo beside her during the actual
rape. The trial court ruled:14
Our assessment and appraisal of the facts of the case show
that there was force committed on the victim when her arms
were twisted and she was bodily lifted from the farm lot to
the nipa hut. She was intimidated or there was a threat to
intimidate her, when the bolo was placed beside her during
the rape.
___________________
14 RTC Decision, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 15-16.
121
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999
121
People vs. Lampaza
This court finds that the incident complained of which
occurred on March 20, 1988 was x x x done without the
consent [or] approval of the victim.
xxx
xxx
While you were being lifted by the accused and being carried
to the nipa hut, what did you do if you did anything?
A.
I struggled to set myself free.
Q.
Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you
struggled?
A.
(At this juncture, Julie Magbanua takes the place of the
accused while the witness takes the place of the victim and
from the position previously described, with the x x x arms
[of the accused] around the victim, the victim struggle[s] to
set herself free by moving her body towards the left and right
and trie[s] to push her head downward away from the arms
of the accused [who is] embracing her. The witness further
states that since her feet were off the ground, it [was] hard to
set herself free).
Q.
Now, aside from struggling hard to free yourself from the
clutches of the accused, what else did you do if any?
A.
I kicked both my legs. (Witness demonstrates a movement as
if she were pedalling an unseen bicycle).
Q.
Did you make any statement while you were trying to
struggle from the hold of the accused?
A.
I did not say anything. I only struggled.
Q.
Why did you not say anything?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A.
Because I was afraid, Sir.
125
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999
125
People vs. Lampaza
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q.
Was the accused able to reach the nipa hut with you?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
While you were already at the nipa hut, what did the accused
do, if any?
A.
He dumped me on the floor of the nipa hut.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
After the accused dumped you on the floor of the nipa hut,
what happened to you?
A.
The accused pinned both my legs as well as my right hand,
Sir, with both of his knees.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q.
Now, Madam Witness, while in this position, what next did
the accused do?
A.
The accused took off his pants.
Q.
While the accused was doing that, was the accused saying
anything?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
What did he say?
A.
If you do not allow me to have sexual intercourse with you, I
am going to kill you.
Q.
Did you notice if there was any weapon carried by the
accused with him?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
What was he carrying?
A.
He was carrying a bolo, Sir.
Q.
Where was the bolo of the accused at that time?
A.
It was beside me, Sir.
Appellant further argues that if there was any resistance [by
the victim], it was couched in general terms.21 The
argument is bereft of merit. We must stress that the law does
not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving
resistance.22 Indeed, physical resistance need not be
established when the
____________________
21 Appellants Brief, p. 10; rollo, p. 56.
22 People v. Penero, 276 SCRA 564, July 31, 1997.
126
126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
culprit employed intimidation,23 which, insofar as it was
directed at the mind of the victim, must be viewed in the
light of the latters perception and judgment at the time.24 In
the present case, the victim was terrified because the threat
of the appellant to kill her was substantiated by the bolo he
placed beside her. Furthermore, she could not have
successfully resisted because, according to her, he was husky
and strong.
Neither are we persuaded by his contention that complainant
did not undergo medical examination to show signs of
physical struggle or assault.25 The fact that the victim had
no visible signs of injury did not by itself disprove rape.26 We
reiterate that she was too intimidated to offer serious
resistance to the advances of appellant.
to her nephew when she saw him right after the incident;39
(b) she did not immediately tell her husband that she had
been raped;40 (c) she did not report the outrage to the police
or to the barangay officials.41
These arguments are puerile. Complainants testimony was
not weakened by her failure to immediately narrate the
incident to her nephew or to her husband. There is no code of
conduct prescribing the correct reaction of a rape victim to
the sexual assault. When placed under a great deal of
emotional stress, the workings of the human mind are
unpredictable.42 Some may immediately relay the incident
to authorities and close relatives, but others need time to
compose themselves before deciding on a course of
action.43 Although she did not immediately inform her
nephew about the incident, she told her husband about it
after he arrived from another town, when they were about to
sleep. That same night, she and her husband decided to
report the outrage to the authorities. In this light, her account
is far from incredible. Even assuming that there was a delay
in reporting the incident to the police, this fact is not
necessarily an indication of fabrication.44
Crime and Punishment
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is
committed when carnal knowledge of a woman is obtained
under any of the following circumstances: (1) force or
intimidation is used, (2) the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (3) the woman is under twelve
years of
_____________________
39 Ibid., p. 14; rollo, p. 60.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 17; rollo, p. 62.
42 People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713, April 4, 1997; People v.
San Juan, 270 SCRA 693, April 4, 1997; People v. Cabel, 282
SCRA 410, December 14, 1995.
43 People v. Malunes, 247 SCRA 317, August 14, 1995;
People v. Roncal, 272 SCRA 242, May 6, 1997.
P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T.
Oyanib.4
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V.
Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2)
separate
_______________
1 In Criminal Cases Nos. 11-6012 and 11-6018, Judge Maximo
B. Ratunil, presiding. Rollo, pp. 18-29.
2 Regretfully, the trial court judge did not know how to apply
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. He imposed indefinite
minimum and maximum penalties He must impose a specific
penalty in both the minimum and maximum periods (Cf.
People v. Herbias, 333 Phil. 422; 265 SCRA 571 [1996]).
3 In Criminal Case No. 11-6012.
4 In Criminal Case No. 11-6018.
198
198
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Oyanib
informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
with murder and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit:
a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill
and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby
inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
197910 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They
lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita
separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2)
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house
of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place
where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while
Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the sala located
at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan,
Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second
floor rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise, lasted for
quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs
to check.11
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and
sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus
Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latters
stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When
Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told
Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police.
Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She
died on the way to the hospital.12
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation
Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion,
Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of
September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an
information regarding a stab_______________
9 Ibid., p. 39.
10 TSN, April 17, 1996, p. 13.
11 TSN, April 10, 1996, p. 6.
12 Ibid., pp. 7-10.
200
200
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Oyanib
18 Ibid., p. 20.
19 Criminal Case No. 11-6018, RTC Record, Exhibit E, p. 6.
20 TSN, March 6, 1997, pp. 11-18.
201
VOL. 354, MARCH 12, 2001
201
People vs. Oyanib
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and
exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito.21 In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One
time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy.
Tambacan, Iligan City.22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus
about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she
was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even
threatened to kill him.23
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his
daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius
failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting
at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning
until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to
Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his
behalf.24
Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of
romance (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the
door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and
Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and
his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek.
Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 59
in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the
assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down.
Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed
Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito,
only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit
MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge28
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court
to the Supreme Court.29
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them
both under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to
the basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the
exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.30 He questioned the trial courts appreciation of the
facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored and
overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the
defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless
body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph
graphically showed that Jesus pants were wide open,
unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing
any underwear, lending credence
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 18-29, at p. 29.
29 Criminal Case No. II-6081, RTC Record, p. 112.
30 Rollo, pp. 56-57.
204
204
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Oyanib
to his defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor
General submitted that accused-appellant failed to discharge
the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that
he killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the trial court did not err in denying him the
exempting privilege under the Article.31
We find the appeal meritorious.
court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and
the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have
acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant
surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual
intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that
accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw
his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse.
Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his
wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support
of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the
police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording
the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of
Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People
v. Wagas:35
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the
scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so
severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful
spouse is caught in flagrante delicto, and it must be resorted
to only with great caution so much so that the law requires
that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal
Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4)
months of des_______________
35 People v. Wagas, supra, Note 33, at p. 74.
206
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Oyanib
tierro.36 He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor
within a radius, of one hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan
City.37
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed.
Notes.American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes
in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. (Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA
653 [1989])
Under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, the killing of the
wife by the husband (or vice versa) is justified if the husband
kills her while engaged in sexual intercourse with another
man or immediately thereafter. (People vs. Cabalhin, 231
SCRA 486 [1994])
The kind of attitude of a husband allegedly merely standing
still and endure the illicit sexual congress between his wife
and her supposed paramour from beginning to end, and of
just going after his wifes lover when the latter is through
with his lovemaking and only after he would have put on his
clothes and started to flee, defies human naturetruly, there
is no real test of truth in the testimony of a witness except
gauge it consonantly with human knowledge, observation,
and experience. (People vs. Velasco, 351 SCRA 539 [2001])
People vs. Oyanib, 354 SCRA 196, G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March
12, 2001
The penalty for the crime of murder, under article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, is reclusin temporal in its maximum
period to death. Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated
felony is the one next lower in degree to that prescribed for
the consummated felony, which in the present case is prisin
mayor in its maximum period to reclusin temporal in its
medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen
years and four months. The
114
114
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating
circumstance, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, fixes the penalty within the minimum period,
that is to say, from ten years and one day to twelve years,
leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to be
served within said range, i. e., not less than ten years and
one day nor more than.twelve years. The penalty imposed by
the trial judge being within this range is correct and therefore
is the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense which this accused has committed.
As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was
enacted after this appeal was lodged in this court, we are
now required to revise the sentence imposed upon the
appellant and to bring the same into conformity with Act No.
4103.
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court
must now, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two
penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as
the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must serve the
minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the
provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between
the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the
sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act,
-be released from serving said period in whole or in part. He
must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period
which is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the
imprisoned for not less than five years nor more than ten
years or for not less than seven years nor more than ten
years and eight months, etc."
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the
"maximum" is determined in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code. In the example given reference is
made to article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that the defendant shall suffer the penalty of
prisin mayor in its medium and maximum period. The
penalty is placed in the medium degree because of the
absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to
say, anywhere between nine years, four months and one day
and ten years and eight months in the discretion of the court.
In the case on appeal here the
116
116
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty
under the Revised Penal Code because of the plea of guilty,
that is to say, between ten years and one day and twelve
years in the discretion of the court. This discretion is in
nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in
conformity with the discretion conferred upon it by the
Revised Penal Code, might have assessed the penalty at, let
us say, eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act No.
4103 does not require this court to assess the said penalty at
12 years, which is the longest time of imprisonment within
the minimum degree.
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of
imprisonment conforms to the provisions and rules of the
Revised Penal Code and is therefore fixed and established as
the maximum of the sentence which shall be imposed upon
the appellant.
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment
period" referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act
provides that this "minimum which shall not be less than the
minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to
within the range from four years, two months and one day to
ten years of prisin correccional in its maximum period to
prisin mayor in its medium period. We repeat that Act No.
4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of
imprisonment in the minimum period of the degree next
lower to the maximum penalty.
The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent:
that the defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a
maximum penalty of ten years and one day of prisin mayor
in its maximum degree, and to a minimum imprisonment
period of seven years, and as thus modified, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed. With costs de oficio. People vs.
Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, No. 38332 December 14, 1933
person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which
clearly mandates that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction, nor Llamado v.
Court of Appeals12 which interprets the quoted provision,
offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application
of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of
petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not
bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit
may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this
interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence.
Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the
Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals
x x x we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal
statute. We, however, understand petitioners argument to
be really that any statutory language that appears to favor
the accused in a criminal case should be given a liberal
interpretation. Courts x x x have no authority to invoke
liberal interpretation or the spirit of the law where the
words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the
history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or
interpretation. We do not believe that the spirit of the law
may legitimately be invoked
_______________
10 34 Words and Phrases 111.
11 Bala v. Martinez, G.R. No. 67301, 29 January 1990, 181
SCRA 459.
12 G.R. No. 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566.
391
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
391
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
to set at naught words which have a clear and definite
meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The true
are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the
multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should
not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms
are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more
than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he
is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses
is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken
separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9,
par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum, not
total, when it says that [t]he benefits of this Decree shall not
be extended to those xxxx sentenced to serve a
maximumterm of imprisonment of more than six years.
Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties
imposed but to take each penalty separately and
_______________
14 No. L-35910, 21 July 1978, 84 SCRA 176, citing McGee v.
Republic, 94 Phil. 820 (1954).
393
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
393
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner
was supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year
and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced
to serve the prison term for each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s), and in
each of the four (4) informations, he was charged with having
defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4)
different, separate days, he was still eligible for probation, as
each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years
imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that
those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for
395
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
395
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times,
considering that the RTC merely affirmedthe MeTC as regards
the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases
and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed
therein. Thus
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by
the trial court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C.
Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the
above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in
each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law; and to pay the costs.17
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at
that the accused was acquitted or absolved in any of the four
(4) counts under each of the four (4) Informations, or that
any part of the judgment of conviction was reversed, or that
any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed.
Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other
penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that
the judgment of conviction rendered by the MeTC was
affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the
penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not
be summed up but taken separately as the totality of all the
penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately
filed an application for probation as he was already qualified
after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt
humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of
the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing
the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
x x x the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out
of time. The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended,
provides thus:
SEC.4. Grant of Probation.Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal x x x x
place the defendant on probation x x x x
399
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he
filed an application for probation outside the period for
perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for
probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384,
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
_____________
* THIRD DIVISION.
524
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cal vs. Court of Appeals
cancellation of his bail bond.Thus, in this case, the
petitioners application for probation had the effect of a final
determination of his case, and the cancellation of his bail
bond. Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals could not
have done otherwise than to affirm the trial courts order of
July 15, 1992 for petitioners immediate confinement after
promulgation of judgment, in view of the subsequent
application for probation which rendered the said judgment
final and immediately executory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A trial courts order
denying an accuseds motion to withdraw his application for
probation and rejecting his notice of appeal partakes of the
nature of an order granting probation, which is not
appealable.As for the second issue, although petitioner
insists on faulting the courts a quo for denying his motion to
withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice
of appeal, his position is nonetheless untenable. The
respondent Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial
courts order of November 20, 1992, denying the petitioners
motion to withdraw his application for probation and rejecting
his notice of appeal, partook of the nature of an order
granting probation, which is not appealable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Bengzon &
Jimenez for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
once and for all without suffering incarceration. But after his
employer induced him to appeal, helped him to post his
bailbond and perhaps even provided him with another
counsel, the accused changed his mind. He was fully aware
and he knew what he was doing. He was properly advised by
his lawyer who told him that if he will file his application for
probation, he would lost his right to appeal although of
course he was given contrary advice by his employer in
Manila. It would be a dangerous precedent to allow the
accused to make a mockery of the Probation Law. The case of
Yusi vs. Morales2 cannot apply to him.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
the appeal is DENIED. The convict Angelo Cal is directed to
make manifest
_______________
2 No. L-61958, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 853. The sole issue
in this case was, in the light of Sec. 4 of P.D. 968 as
amended, treating the application for probation as amounting
to a waiver of the right to appeal, whether such waiver is
irrevocable, and whether persons who have applied for the
benefits of the Probation Law may still withdraw their
application during the period for filing an appeal and ask that
their appeal from the judgment of conviction be given due
course. The Supreme Court in this case ruled that such
waiver is not irrevocable, given the peculiar circumstances of
this case, particularly the fact that petitioners counsel of
record was not present when petitioners applied for
probation. Although at that point in time they were
represented by counsel de oficio appointed by the court on
the spot, nevertheless the said counsel de oficio was not fully
acquainted with their case and could not have properly
evaluated the strength of a possible appeal when he advised
them about the effects of the application for probation. After
having filed for probation, the accused subsequently changed
their minds when they were advised by a relative who
happened to be an MTC judge to appeal instead.
527
And that is only right since the legal positions behind appeal
and probation, respectively, are diametrically opposed. This
is because an accused applying for probation is deemed to
have accepted the judgment. In fact, x x x the application
for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction and x x x the application for probation is
considered a waiver upon his part to
_____________
3 Bernardo vs. Balagot, G.R. No. 86561, November 10, 1992,
215 SCRA 526; J. Isagani A. Cruz, ponente. See also Salgado
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89606, August 30, 1990, 189
SCRA 304.
529
VOL. 251, DECEMBER 28, 1995
529
Cal vs. Court of Appeals
file an appeal, x x x4
Thus, in this case, the petitioners application for probation
had the effect of a final determination of his case, and the
cancellation of his bail bond. Therefore, the respondent Court
of Appeals could not have done otherwise than to affirm the
trial courts order of July 15, 1992 for petitioners immediate
confinement after promulgation of judgment, in view of the
subsequent application for probation which rendered the said
judgment final and immediately executory.
As for the second issue, although petitioner insists on faulting
the courts a quo for denying his motion to withdraw his
application for probation and rejecting his notice of appeal,
his position is nonetheless untenable. The respondent Court
of Appeals correctly held that the trial courts order of
November 20, 1992, denying the petitioners motion to
withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice
of appeal, partook of the nature of an order granting
probation, which is not appealable.
Inasmuch as (P)robation is a mere privilege and its grant
rests upon the discretion of the court x x x (and) the grant of
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Llamado vs. Court of Appeals
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted
the petitioner alone, since jurisdiction over the person of
Pascual, who had thoughtfully fled the country, had not been
obtained. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay a fine
of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Petitioner was also required to reimburse
respondent Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of
suit.
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was
read to him, petitioner through counsel orally manifested that
he was taking an appeal. Having been so notified, the trial
court on the same day ordered the forwarding of the records
of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July 1987, petitioner
through his counsel received from the Court of Appeals a
notice to file his Appellants Brief within thirty (30) days.
Petitioner managed to secure several extensions of time
within which to file his brief, the last extension expiring on 18
November 1987.1
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellants Brief was
being finalized by his then counsel of record, sought advice
from another counselor. On 30 November 1987, petitioner,
with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in the Regional
Trial Court a Petition for Probation invoking Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not, however,
accepted by the lower court, since the records of the case
had already been forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a
Manifestation and Petition for Probation dated 16
November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition for
Probation that he had submitted to the trial court. Petitioner
asked the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation
or, in the alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial
court, together with the records of the criminal case, for
consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
At the same time, petitioner prayed that the running of the
the probationer develop into a law-abiding and selfrespecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with
flexibility in their application and each case should be judged
on its own meritson the basis of the problems, needs and
capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the
probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to
stipulate instead unrealistic terms.
Same; Same; Court may not impose as a condition for grant
of probation that probationer should not continue her
teaching profession.Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is
the only profession she knows and as such she possesses
special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was designated as
District Guidance Coordinator and always designated as
District-in-Charge whenever the District Supervisor is out of
town. She is usually selected to represent her district in
seminars, meetings and conferences. She also excelled in her
study of Child Study and Development. It also appears that
she is an outstanding member of the Misamis Occidental Girl
Scout Council, having served as Physical Education & Girl
Scout Field Advisor of the District, Adviser of the District Girl
Scout Leaders Association, Adviser of the District Federated
Girl Scout Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource
person in District and Division Level Girl Scout encampments
and re-elected Board Member of the Misamis Occidental Girl
Scout Council. To order the petitioner to refrain from teaching
would deprive the students and the school in general the
benefits that may be derived from her training and expertise.
While it is true that probation is a mere privilege and its grant
rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Equal
regard to the demands of justice and public interest must be
observed. In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and
only calling and profession of petitioner. The law requires that
she devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation during
probation. Yet, to prohibit
150
150
________________
1 He has since been appointed as and is now the incumbent
City Fiscal of Oroquieta City.
151
VOL. 129, APRIL 30, 1984
151
Baclayon vs. Mutia
condition in granting probation to petitioner Florentina L.
Baclayon that she refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of
Serious Oral Defamation by the then Municipal Court of
Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, then presided by respondent
Pacito G. Mutia for having quarrelled with and uttered
insulting and defamatory words against Remedios Estillore,
principal of the Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate
Court) and the appellate court, taking into account the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of her rank and age and the fact
that the crime was committed in the office of the
complainant in the public school building of Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties during office hours, increased the
penalty imposed by respondent judge and sentenced
petitioner to one year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional in its minimum period.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981. On
the same date petitioner applied for probation with
respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation
Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation Report favorably
recommended the granting of petitioners probation for a
period of three (3) years.
On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order
granting petitioners probation, but modified the Probation
Officers recommendation by increasing the period of
Petition granted.
Notes.A preliminary investigation is necessary to determine
whether probation would serve the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public and the applicant. (Cabatingan vs.
Sandiganbayan, 102 SCRA 187).
Where the application for probation was denied below and on
petition for review in the Supreme Court, the petitioner was
granted parole, his petition for grant of probation becomes
moot and academic. (Sasi vs. People, 108 SCRA 725).
The grant or denial of application for probation does not rest
solely on offenders potentiality to reform, but also on the
observance of demands of justice and public interest.
(Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92).
Withdrawal of application for probation by accused and his
option instead to pursue his appeal from judgment of
conviction should be granted. Withdrawal or waiver of appeal
from conviction after an application for probation is not an
irrevocable matter. (Yusi vs. Morals, 121 SCRA 853).
Denial of probation to an offender for being allegedly not a
penitent offender for his protestation of innocence even after
his conviction by the trial court and the Court of Appeals is
not justified. (To vs. Cruz-Pao, 120 SCRA 8). Baclayon vs.
Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, No. L-59298 April 30, 1984
the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by the
court of an order of final discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such
issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed
terminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probation period may be
shortened or made longer but not to exceed the period set in
the law.The period of probation may either be shortened or
made longer, but not to exceed the period set in the law. This
is so because the period of probation, like the period of
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the
rehabilitation of the probationer. In the instant case, a review
of the records compels a revocation of the probation without
the need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after
all, would only be an exercise in futility. If we render justice
now, why should we allow the petitioner to further delay it.
Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible
society. Precisely he was granted probation in order to give
him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him
hope___hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately,
he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He
thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Revocation of Probation; An order
revoking probation or modifying the terms thereof is
unappealable.At any time during the probation, the court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for
violation of any of the conditions of proba-tion. The
probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately
be brought before the court for a hearing which may be
informal and summary, of the violation charged. x x x If the
violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his
probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the
court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence
originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of proba461
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
461
465
Bala vs. Martinez
tion.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1990, which amends section 4 of P.D. 968, clearly states that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D.
1990 which went in force on January 15, 1985 can not be
given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial to the
accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and
denied was the motion to dismiss and/or strike out the
motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the issue
of the petitioners transfer of residence. The motion did not
touch on the issue of the timeliness to revoke probation. The
respondent judge has not yet heard and received evidence,
much less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor
General submits that the present petition is premature.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the
probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioners
submission.
Section 16 of PD 9688 is clear on this score:
Sec. 16. Termination of Probation.After the period of
probation and upon consideration of the report and
recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order
the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he
has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and
thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not
automatically terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto
termination of probation found in the provisions of the
probation law. Probation is not co-terminous with its period.
There must first be issued by the court of an order of final
21 Rollo, 137.
471
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
471
Bala vs. Martinez
(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Pias and not to change said
address nor leave the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila
for more than twenty-four (24) hours without first securing
prior written approval of his Probation Officer.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the
expeditious administration of justice, we revoke the probation
of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his
probation, instead of remanding the case to the trial court
and having the parties start all over again in needless
protracted proceedings.22
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of
the petitioner is hereby REVOKED. Further, the trial court is
ORDERED to issue a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner
and for him to serve the sentence originally imposed without
any deduction. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Note.Grant or denial of an application for probation does
not rest solely on offenders potentiality to reform but also on
the observance of demands of justice and public interest.
(Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92.)
o0o Bala vs. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459, G.R. No. 67301
January 29, 1990
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salgado vs. Court of Appeals
On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order
granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was
denied on December 22, 1987. After the denial of his motion
for reconsideration, the petitioner filed directly with this
Court a petition for review of the trial courts order granting
the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. We referred
the petition to the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April
13, 1988 (p. 18, Rollo).
On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming the order of the trial court granting the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but respondent Court
of Appeals denied the motion in a resolution dated August 3,
1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review
which was filed on September 26, 1989 and raised the
following assignment of errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ORDER DATED APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE
DECISION OF OCTOBER 16, 1986 AS FAR AS THE CIVIL
ASPECT IS CONCERNED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONDITION IN THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR
ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE OFFENDER IS
UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. (p. 10,
Rollo)
In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting
private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, respondent Court of Appeals advanced three (3)
reasons: 1) that the decision dated October 16, 1986 had
become final and executory and the judge who rendered the
decision cannot lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear
245
People vs. Bayotas
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings
were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of
the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
x x x
xxx
xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its
only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before
final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Italics ours)
xxx
xxx
x x x.
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: Consequently, while the death
of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability
including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains.
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and
People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
249
In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made
the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor.
Hence, the Courts conclusion:
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued
on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
x x x
xxx
x x x.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Courts judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
252
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayotas
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil
256
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayotas
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
xxx
xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., On leave.
_______________
c)Quasi-contracts
d). . .
e)Quasi-delicts
xxx
There is no civil liability involved in violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.12 No private
offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to
civil liability in the decision of the trial court.
The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of
his criminal liability does not have any effect on his coaccused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. The
Rules on Criminal Procedure on the matter states:
RULE 122 Appeal
Section11.Effect of appeal by any of several accused.
(a)An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter; (emphasis ours)
xxx
The extinguishment of Brillantes criminal and pecuniary
liabilities is predicated on his death and not on his acquittal.
Following the provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and
subsequent extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable
to De la Cruz.
_______________
12 R.A. No. 9165.
395
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012
395
People vs. Brillantes
WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the
appeal of accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30897 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11557
and 11558 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC,
4 Ibid., p. 63.
5 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
6 Ibid., p. 89.
472
472
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pariarca, Jr.
shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for
personal ends.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for
their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations.7 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.8
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty,
which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
In the case of People vs. Casido,9 the difference between
pardon and amnesty is given:
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of
an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and wellestablished principle is considered that it is not within the
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of
legislative or executive action. Where therefore, discretionary
powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the
manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to
judicial review. The courts, therefore concern themselves only
with the question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and
executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases
their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public
or political policy. These considerations of public or political
policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate
constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise
authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute,
but, within these limits, they do permit the departments,
separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts
exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations,
together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not
be traversed in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution
of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).
xxx
xxx
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or
that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. x x x x x x Thus, the Legislature
may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or
submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people.
The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not
merely because they involve political question, but because
they are matters which the people have by the Constitution
delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the
powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as
he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power
conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not
not by the pardon which was void for having been extended
during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by
final judgment.Accordingly, while the pardon in this case
was void for having been extended during the pendency of
the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and,
therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for
which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid.
This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of
Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June
1994. The release then of accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but
not by the pardon.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bais
City, Br. 45.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellants.
362
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Casido
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our Resolution of 30 July 1996, we ruled that the
conditional pardons granted in this case to accusedappellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for
having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the
pendency of their instant appeal, and disposed of the
incident as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused-appellants Urgent Motion To
Withdraw Appeal is hereby DENIED and the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to effect, with the support and
assistance of the Philippine National Police, the re-arrest of
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin who
S.W., 52, 61; Burdick vs. United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267;
271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we- are of the opinion and so hold
that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine
qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense
with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a
defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation
of the benefits of amnesty is-in the nature of a plea of
648
648
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez et al.
confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not
confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by
the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the
benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested
by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the
witnesses both f or the complainants and the accused, on
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero
who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not,
in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as
well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should
take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the
benefits granted therein to cases coming within their
province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the
person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by theevidence presented, either by the complainant or
prosecution, or by the def ense, can not be waived, because
it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the
Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of a law, not only
as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had
never committed any punishable offense because of the
amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punished as a
criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person
who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not
punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty
thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person
considered by law not a criminal, but a patriot and, hero, for
having rendered invaluable services to the nation in
committing such an act.
649
VOL. 82, JANUARY 21, 1949
649
Barrioquinto et al vs. Fernandez et al
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense
charged was not against chastity and was committed in
furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for
otherwise, it is to be naturally presumed that it has been
committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true
that though the motive as a mental impulse is a state of mind
or subjective, it need not be testified to by the defendant
himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally
the motive for the commission of an offense is established by
the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of the
offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his
motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The
statement or testimony of a defendant at the time of
arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive,
can not generally be considered and relied on, specially if
there is evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of
the reason or motive he had at the time of committing the
offense. Because such statement or testimony may be an
allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the
action. It is a rank inconsistency for one to justify an act, or
seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is
not responsible. It is impossible for a court or commission to
verify the presence of the essential conditions which should
entitle the applicants to exemption from punishment, when
the accused and his witnesses say that he did not commit a
crime. In the nature of things, only the accused and his
witnesses could prove that the victim collaborated with the
enemy; that the killing was perpetrated in furtherance of the
resistance movements; that no personal motive intervened in
the commission of the murder, etc., etc. These, or some of
these, are matters of belief and intention which only the
accused and his witnesses could explain.
As a matter of procedure, certiorari or mandamus, whatever
the present proceeding may be, does not lie because there is
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The
decision of the Commission has not closed the avenue for the
petitioners to invoke the provisions of the Amnesty
Proclamation before the courts. I invite attention to the
provision of the proclamation which I have quoted. In the
case of Jimenez, he could ask for a new trial, as he in effect
would have the Commission grant him; and in the case of
Barrioquinto, he could set up the proclamation in his plea
when his trial comes up.
PABLO, M.: Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez et al., 82 Phil.
642, No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4
of the Election Code f or assuming office. We see no reason
for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial
interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief
Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action
and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concur.
444
444
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pelobello vs. Palatino
HORRILLENO, M., disidente:
A modo de preliminar, y para evitar que se me entienda
equivocadamente, es preciso hacer constar que no discuto la
prerrogativa constitucional del Jefe Ejecutivo de otorgar
indultos. Tal poder est para m fuera de toda discusin.
Los hechos en este asunto son como los expone la mayora
en su decision.
Parceme errnea la aplicacin del caso de Cristbal contra
Labrador y otros (R. G. No. 47941) al presente. No existe
paridad entre uno y otro. En el primero, el recurrido principal,
Tefilo C. Santos, obtuvo indulto condicional mucho antes de
las elecciones en que se inscribi como elector y se present
como candidato a un cargo municipal. Admitiendo como
buena la opinin de la mayora en dicho asunto, Santos, al
registrarse como elector, ya haba recobrado sus derechos
civiles y polticos; ya no estaba incapacitado para votar,
segn el artculo 94 del Cdigo Electoral. En el presente,
Gregorio Palatino, el apelado, cuando se inscribi como
elector, no posea las condiciones que requiere el
mencionado cdigo. Pues est admitido que l fu convicto
del delito de atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes, en
virtud de una sentencia firme y definitiva, el ao 1912; y que,
si bien consigui indulto del entonces Gobernador General de
128
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chua vs. Court of Appeals
employees of the petitioner in relation to certain activities
since they all worked either as masons, carpenters and fine
graders in petitioners various construction projects for at
least one year, and that their work was necessary and
desirable to petitioners business which involved the
construction of roads and bridges.27 It cited the case of
Mehitabel Furniture Company, Inc. v. NLRC,28 particularly the
ruling therein which states:
By petitioners own admission, the private respondents have
been hired to work on certain special orders that as a matter
of business policy it cannot decline. These projects are
necessary or desirable in its usual business or trade,
otherwise they would not have accepted . . . . Significantly,
such special orders are not really seasonal but more or less
regular, requiring the virtually continuous services of the
temporary workers. The NLRC also correctly observed that
if we were to accept respondents theory, it would have no
regular workers because all of its orders would be special
undertakings or projects. The petitioner could then hire all
its workers on a contract basis only and prevent them from
attaining permanent status. . . .
_______________
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except when the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph; Provided That, any
29 Id., at p. 605.
30 Rollo, p. 37, Sec. 22 (b) of the Social Security Act, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 22(b). The right to institute the necessary action against
the employer (for non-remittance of contributions) may be
commenced within 20 years from the time the delinquency is
known or the assessment is made by the SSS, as the case
may be.
31 Rollo, p. 37.
32 Id., at pp. 98-103.
33 Id., at p. 39; Resolution promulgated on 30 July 1996.
130
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chua vs. Court of Appeals
good faith, or his honest belief that project employees are
not regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Petitioners arguments are mere reiterations of his arguments
submitted before the SSC and the Court of Appeals. More
importantly, petitioner wants this Court to review factual
questions already passed upon by the SSC and the Court of
Appeals which are not cognizable by a petition for review
under Rule 45. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme
Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to
reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court, the findings of fact being generally
conclusive on the Court and it is not for the Court to weigh
evidence all over again.34
Stripped of the lengthy, if not repetitive, disquisition of the
private parties in the case, and also of the public
respondents, on the nature of private respondents
employment, the controversy boils down to one issue: the
entitlement of private respondents to compulsory SSS
coverage.
The Social Security Act was enacted pursuant to the policy of
the government to develop, establish gradually and perfect
a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chua vs. Court of Appeals
interruption.47 The Court likewise takes note of the fact that,
as cited by the SSC, even the National Labor Relations
Commission in a labor case involving the same parties, found
that private respondents were regular employees of the
petitioner.48
Another cogent factor militates against the allegations of the
petitioner. In the proceedings before the SSC and the Court of
Appeals, petitioner was unable to show that private
respondents were appraised of the project nature of their
employment, the specific projects themselves or any phase
thereof undertaken by petitioner and for which private
respondents were hired. He failed to show any document
such as private respondents employment contracts and
employment records that would indicate the dates of hiring
and termination in relation to the particular construction
project or phases in which they were employed.49 Moreover,
it is peculiar that petitioner did not show proof that he
submitted reports of termination after the completion of his
construction projects, considering that he alleges that private
respondents were hired and rehired for various projects or
phases of work therein.
Anent the issue of prescription, this Court rules that private
respondents right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at
the time of the filing of their petition, considering that a mere
eight (8) years had passed from the time delinquency was
discovered or the proper assessment was made. Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended, prescribes a period of twenty (20)
years, from the time the delinquency is known or assessment
is made by the SSS, within which to file a claim for nonremittance against employers.50
_______________
47 Ibid.
to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100
of the Revised Penal Code. In
7
VOL. 180, DECEMBER 5, 1989
7
Carpio vs. Doroja
no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary
liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for
the employees civil liability in the criminal action, it should
be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind
of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in
the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa
Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary
liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction
of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites
present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable
upon the employees conviction and upon proof of the latters
insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator
has been deprived of his day in court, because the case
before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a
primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the
subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employees criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.
Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the
employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to
the criminal case. Ergo, the employers subsidiary liability
may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part
of the execution proceedings against the employee. This
Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra,
that The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary
civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for
the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution
has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.
aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack
of merit on September 16, 1991.7 Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal8 on September 25, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for
Execution of the subsidiary civil liability9 of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders.
One denied due course and dismissed Basilios appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.10 The
other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him
for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil
indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari12 under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1)
the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated
February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the
petitioner was concerned,
_______________
6 Id. at 41-47.
7 Id. at 52-53.
8 Id. at 54.
9 Id. at 55-56.
10 Id. at 561.
11 Id. at 66-68.
12 Id. at 2-21.
346
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Basilio vs. Court of Appeals
and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance
of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the
appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not afforded due
process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
23 Id. at 13.
24 Id. at 28.
25 Rollo, pp. 101-109.
26 Records, pp. 253-254.
350
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Basilio vs. Court of Appeals
set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for
petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in
open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was
only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a
counter-manifestation27 that belatedly attempted to contest
the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the
civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the
Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary
liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree
with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of
law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for
sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the
enforcement of the employers subsidiary liability in the
same criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty, execution against the employer must not
issue as just a matter of courseit behooves the court, as a
measure of due process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employers liability. (Yonaha
vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 [1996]) Basilio vs. Court
of Appeals, 328 SCRA 341, G.R. No. 113433 March 17, 2000
only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but
also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise: x x x.
When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his
arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia
proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
457
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
457
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure]. x x x
Same; Same; Same; An accused who has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities is deemed to
have abandoned his appeal rendering the judgment against
him final and executory.As to when a judgment of
conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule
120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation. In the case before us, the accusedemployee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become
final and executory.
Same; Same; Independent Civil Actions; The 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its
notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April
29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners]
notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8,
1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority
to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal.
The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May
31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor
filed the instant motion to dismiss.6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied
the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense.
Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the
accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as
set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to
dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal
case against the accused-employee would be to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal
filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil
liability became final and executory. Included in the civil
liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
_______________
6 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 31-33.
7 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 24,
2002, upon this Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
512
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quinto vs. Andres
crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of
the private complainant against the accused for damages
and/or restitution.
Same; Same; Judgments; The civil action based on delict
shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist.The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in
a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission
from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A person committing a
felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intendednatural
refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life
or events, while logical means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting
injury or damage.A person committing a felony is criminally
liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. Natural refers to an occurrence in
the ordinary course of human life or events, while logical
means that there is a rational connection between the act of
the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting
injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that
521
Quinto vs. Andres
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the
felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active
force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the
felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the
victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a
manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a
consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature
or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes
cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim.28 A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to
crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:
. . . Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons
guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment. . .30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
. . . The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3,
1879, said in a case similar to the present, the following:
Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his
actand in this case, the physical condition and
temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil,
the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence
of the means employed, but by the result actually produced;
_______________
27
28
29
30
Q
So when the victim was submerged under water while
unconscious, it is possible that he might have taken in some
mud or what?
A
Yes, Sir.
Q
So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still
breathing?
A
Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also
would indicate that the victim was still alive when he was
placed under water.37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side
of the victims face could have been caused by rubbing
against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q
The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face,
would it be caused by the face rubbing against a concrete
wall or pavement?
_______________
37 TSN, 17 September 1997, pp. 10-11.
525
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
525
Quinto vs. Andres
A
Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a
rough surface.
Q
Rough surface?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
Q
When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were
there no signs that the victim was strangled?
A
245
People vs. Bayotas
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings
were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of
the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
x x x
xxx
xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its
only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before
final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Italics ours)
xxx
xxx
x x x.
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: Consequently, while the death
of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability
including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains.
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and
People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
249
In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made
the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor.
Hence, the Courts conclusion:
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued
on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
x x x
xxx
x x x.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Courts judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
252
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayotas
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil
256
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayotas
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
xxx
xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., On leave.
_______________