SEPARATE OPINION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By his Petition for Prohibition filed on June 17, 2004, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. prays for a judgment annulling the existence and proceedings of the
Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to canvass the votes for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections
following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004 and for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist
from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and VicePresidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections (Rules on Canvassing).
In support thereof, he argues that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the Joint
Committee of Congress [a]re [i]nvalid, [i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional [f]ollowing the
[a]djournment [s]ine [d]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of Congress [o]f [t]heir [r]egular
[s]essions on June 11, 2004."1
This is the second petition filed before this Court in as many weeks questioning the
conduct of the national canvass for President and Vice-President. Earlier, on June
2, 2004, Representative Ruy Elias C. Lopez of the 3rd Legislative District of Davao
City filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus questioning the constitutionality of
the Rules on Canvassing promulgated by Congress which was dismissed by
Resolution of this Court dated June 8, 2004.2
Coming as it does at the proverbial eleventh hour with the Joint Committee having,
in the meantime, completed its preliminary canvass and in the process of preparing
and transmitting its report to the joint session of Congress for approval, cynical
minds may be tempted to dismiss the instant petition as simply being a delaying
tactic, an exercise in political brinksmanship to further narrow partisan ambitions.
However, given petitioner's record of public service and the novelty of his petition, I
am more inclined to view the same as a legitimate resort to available legal remedies
in a sincere attempt to ascertain the finer boundaries of the duty to canvass
imposed on Congress by the Constitution itself.
And even if this were not the case, there is every reason to believe that the
framework of the law and the Constitution, like the towers of a suspension bridge
deeply planted in the bedrock of democracy, are sufficiently resilient to withstand the
momentary stresses laid on them by the ebb and flow of the political currents
holding aloft the very life of our nation without fear of buckling or breaking. It is with
this supreme confidence that I now proceed to consider the arguments raised by

petitioner as well as those presented in the Comments filed by the Solicitor General
and the Senate and House panels of respondent Joint Committee.
At bottom, petitioner's arguments rest on the premise that "[w]ith the
adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular
session, the term of the Twelfth Congress terminated and expired on the said day
and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal
existence." Thus, he claims, all pending matters and proceedings were
automatically terminated in accordance with "legislative procedure, precedent or
practice" as "borne by the rules of both Houses of Congress."3 From this, he
concludes that "[u]pon the adjournment sine die of the Twelfth Congress, its function
as a national board of canvassers for presidential and vice-presidential elections
has become functus officio [i.e. legally defunct]"; and as a result "[n]ecessarily, the
Joint Committee of Congress has likewise become functus officio because
obviously the spring cannot rise higher than its source."4
In sum, the petition presents two issues for resolution: (1) whether the term of
Congress ended upon the adjournment of the regular sessions of both its
Houses sine die; and (2) whether Congress, in its capacity as the National Board of
Canvassers, and consequently its creation - the respondent Joint Committee - has
become functus officio.
After a considered review of the applicable Constitutional provisions and the
relevant laws and jurisprudence, I find that both these issues must be resolved in
the negative for the reasons discussed hereunder.
First, petitioner's underlying premise that the term of the Twelfth Congress ended
with its adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 is without constitutional foundation.
Petitioner cites as basis for his assertion, Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution
which reads:
Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of
July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue
to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before
the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
The foregoing provision clearly does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to
its regular annuallegislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before
the opening of its next regular session, which itself is subject to the power of the
President to call a special (legislative) session at any time.
On the contrary, Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that
"[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of the
House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of threeyears which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election."
That the term of the present Congress ends on the same day when the term of the
next Congress begins, and not earlier, is highlighted by the following exchange
between then Commissioners Regalado Maambong (now a Justice of the Court of

Appeals) and Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now Chief Justice of this Court) during the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
More or less, that is a specific answer but I may be just engaging in wishful thinking
if I request the Committee to formulate probably a definitive statement that whatever
changes in the executive department, there should be no dissolution of a legislative
body which is composed of representatives of the people. But that is not for today,
probably some other time when the Committee will think about it.
In line with this question that I have posed is the matter of continuity of the
legislative body, be it unicameral or bicameral. There is a statement to the effect
that if we have an Upper House, considering the staggered terms of its members, at
any time there will always be a group of available and experienced men who can be
depended upon to continue the policies of the government, which is not true in the
unicameral system because when it adjourns or when there is a new election, no
member is left around. Will the Commissioner comment on the continuity?
MR. DAVIDE. I thank the Commissioner for asking that question because that
exactly is one of the evils in a bicameral system. It might happen that in a given
election, after the expiration of one-half term of the Senate members, a new
mandate from the people will actually be the outcome in the given election. For a
very hypothetical situation, let us assume that one-half of the Members of the
Senate belong to one particular party. This one-half will be the one to remain
because the term of the others may have expired at a given period. But at the
commencement of the term of the Members of the Lower House whose term now
may be coextensive with the term of the remaining Members of the Senate, we may
have a Lower House elected from another political party.
So we will have a National Assembly with an Upper House composed of people
belonging to one party and a Lower House composed of Members belonging to
another party. So how can we have unity in that legislature? It would be a chaotic
legislature. That situation alone is the best argument against maintaining a
bicameral system of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, the question is more on the continuity of a
legislative body as an argument for those who are in favor of the bicameral
system where at any given moment there is still a continuing legislative body.
MR. DAVIDE. Under our proposal there will always be a continuing legislative
body. because the election will be on the second Monday of May and they will
assume on the 30-day of June, which would also be the end of the term of the
previous National Assembly. So there is a continuing body - the National
Assembly.
MR. MAAMBONG. That answers my question.5 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30. 2004, the present
Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have
"passed out of legal existence."
Second, in contending that Congress, as the National Board of Canvassers, and by

necessary implication respondent Joint Committee, has become functus

officio upon the sine die adjournment of Congress, petitioner has apparently
confused the legislative and non-legislative functions of Congress, in contravention
of the letter and intent of the Constitution.
Although it is incontrovertible that the primary function of Congress is to legislate,6 it
is equally indisputable that the Constitution has conferred upon it non-legislative
powers7 as a part of the system of checks and balances which underpins our
republican form of government. As observed in the leading case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission: 8
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is
required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that
a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it,
by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special
session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates
as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of
treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme
Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for
their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence
to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, while the regular legislative functions of Congress may have come to a
close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions (subject to the power of the
President to call a special session at any time),10 this adjournment does not
necessarily affect its non-legislative functions. For while in some cases these
non-legislative functions are, by constitutional fiat, made dependent on the regular
session of Congress, 11 in other instances it is the Constitution itself which
commands that Congress convene to perform its duties.12 In the latter cases, the
members of Congress shall assemble automatically, without need of intervention by
the President.
This is clear from the following discussion during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on Section 18, Article VII on the power of Congress to
revoke or extend the declaration of Martial Law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus by the President:
MR. RAMA. Madam President, this is an amendment to line 4. After the words "The
Congress," I propose to insert the clause WHICH SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY

CONVENED IF NOT IN SESSION, and then continue with the phrase "by a vote
of at least a majority... " The reason for this, Madam President, is that there is
a period in a year during which the Congress is not in session. We talk about
Congress revoking a proclamation; we talk about some kind of checks on the
President, but during this 30-day period of the year, there is no Congress to
make such revocation. A scheming President could very well time his
declaration of martial law during the period when Congress is not in session.
This is a 30-day period and if his declaration of martial law is based upon
fabricated facts or rigged events, or is not in accordance with the provisions
in the Constitution, such President could get away with murder for 30 days
without the process of revocation. So, it is necessary that Congress shall be
able to convene automatically if not in session.
Another reason is that it is only the President who can call a special session.
So, a President who is hellbent on declaring martial law in order to militarize
the people could very well not call for the session and that is going to be a
legal issue. So, to avoid this confusion, it is necessary for clarity that we place this
amendment, to wit: "Congress, WHICH SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY CONVENED
IF NOT IN SESSION, by a vote of at least of all its Members. . ."
xxx
MR. SUAREZ. As I recall, in the Article on the Legislative, the Congress is
supposed to be in session the whole year except during that period of 30 days
before the next regular session.
MR. RAMA. That is correct.
MR. SUAREZ. So that would preclude the matter of automatic convening in the
case of a regular session. Let us take the case of a special session, because I
share the proponent's sentiment about this. Therefore, the special session could be
called within that interregnum period of 30 days.
MR. RAMA. That is correct.
MR. SUAREZ. That is prior to the next regular session. So the proponent is
speaking about that situation, Madam President.
MR. RAMA. This particular 30-day period when the Congress is not in session.
MR. SUAREZ. That is what the Gentleman has in mind.
MR. RAMA. That is what I have in mind.
MR. SUAREZ. That is not in connection with the regular session.
MR. RAMA. Not in connection with the regular session.
MR. SUAREZ. Will the proponent accept the suggestion to put the clause after the
words "special session"?
THE PRESIDENT. Will Commissioner Suarez read the provision?
MR. SUAREZ. ". . . in regular or special session WHICH SHALL BE

AUTOMATICALLY CONVENED."
THE PRESIDENT. Is the amendment acceptable to Commissioner Rama?
MR. RAMA. It might be a little awkward.
MR. SUAREZ. But that is the sense of what we had in mind.
MR. RAMA. That would be the sense, but for clarity and elegance, we should place
this after the word "Congress."
xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I just comment on the discussion about the special session. It is
not that the special session can be called only within the 30 days preceding the
commencement of a regular session. Under the proposal on the legislative power,
the law itself may also determine the length of the session, in between the
commencement on the fourth Monday of July and the beginning of the 30 days
preceding the next regular session. So special sessions can be convened at any
time between these two periods, not just the remaining 30 days.
I would propose that there should be a separate sentence to be inserted probably
between lines 8 and 9 to read as follows: THE CONGRESS, IF NOT IN SESSION,
SHALL WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS FOLLOWING SUCH PROCLAMATION
OR SUSPENSION, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUT
NEED OF A CALL. This would be consistent with what had earlier been approved in
the matter of a vacancy in the office of the President and the Vice-President, instead
of "automatic" it should be WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL.
THE PRESIDENT. Is that accepted?
MR. RAMA. We accept the amendment, Madam President.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Among the functions vested by the Constitution in Congress is its duty, as the
National Board of Canvassers, to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly
elected President and Vice-President under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of
the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of
June following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six
years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person
who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years
shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and VicePresident shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to
the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected,
but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one
of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
This duty has been characterized as being ministerial and executive14 and
therefore non-legislative in character. Furthermore, since it is the Constitution itself
which requires that the canvassing of votes be done by Congress in joint public
session, a call for a special session by the President is not necessary.15 Thus, in a
hypothetical situation where an administration candidate appears to have lost the
election and canvassing was not completed before the compulsory recess of
Congress, the incumbent President cannot subvert the will of the people by the
simple expedient of refusing to call a special session.
Significantly, these very points were stressed during the proceedings of respondent
Joint Committee (of which petitioner is also a member) as pointed out in the
Comment submitted by its Co-Chairman, Representative Raul M. Gonzalez,
<viz< span=""></viz<><:
24. Noted constitutionalist Rep. Antonio Nachura, a member of the House of
Representatives of the 12th Congress and also a member of the Joint Committee of
Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice President in the May
10, 2004 Elections, articulated the position of the Joint Committee in respon[se] to
the petitioner's submission as advanced by the minority in the [J]oint [C]ommittee
during its session on June 14, 2004, thus:
REP. NACHURA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may be allowed to submit my
opinion to the query...
THE CHAIRMAN (Deputy Speaker Gonzalez). Please proceed, Cong. Nachura.
REP. NACHURA. ... raised by the Honorable Senator Pimentel. First, Mr. Chairman,
it is my submission that the adjournment by Congress was an adjournment of its
regular session. Accordingly, what was adjourned was not Congress nor was there
a suspension of any of the other powers of [C]ongress, except that of its legislative
power in relation to the regular session of Congress. This is shown by Section 15 of
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.

So what was adjourned was the regular session of [C]ongress.

This adjournment does not in any way affect the possibility that Congress
may be called to a special session at any time before June 30 because June
30 is the expiration of the term of office of the Members of the House of
Representatives and half of the Members of the Senate.
Mr. [C]hairman, the adjournment of the regular session does not affect at all
Congress sitting as a national canvassing board, since after all, it is the
Constitution itself that has called [C]ongress to sit as a national canvassing
board. If after we adjourned our regular session it is possible for the President of
the Philippine[s] to call Congress to a special session, then I submit, Mr. Chairman,
that the Constitution, by its express mandate to Congress, calls Congress to this
special duty to canvass the [Presidential and [V]ice-[P]residential election results.
(TSN, Resumption of Committee Meeting, Monday June 14, 2004, Regodon-1,
pages 2-3, Santos-1, page 1)
XXX
REP. NACHURA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairmen, to underscore the fact
that Congress continues to exist as a Body, Congress may be called to a special
session by the President of the Philippines. If it is called to a special session, that is
recognition that [C]ongress is still existing all the way up to June 30. Now, is it
necessary for the President to call Congress to a special session in order that it may
sit as a national canvassing board? I submit, no, because the Constitution itself in
Section 4 of Article VII already calls Congress to sit at a special session. It would be
superfluous for us to ask the President of the Philippines to call Congress to a
special session since, after all, when the President calls Congress to a special
session, it is in order that the Congress may take up legislative matters. In this
particular instance, we have the Constitution itself calling Congress to sit as a
national canvassing board independently of any call for a special session by the
President. (TSN, Resumption of Committee Meeting, Monday, June 14, 2004,
Solomon-1, page 4, Vivero-1, page 1)
Moreover, the joint public session convened by express directive of the Constitution
to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and VicePresident cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions
is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority
as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. Directly in point is this Court's
definitive ruling in Pelayo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,16 viz:
But argument is here advanced that the proclamation made by the old board of
canvassers on January 13, 1968 is null and void. It is said that the term of office of
the elected city officials who by law are members thereof had expired, and,
consequently, also their substitutes.
This argument dwindles in strength on the face of the fact that the board of
canvassers is a body entirely different and distinct from the city council of
DavaoCity. The board of canvassers is created for a specific purpose: canvass
and proclamation, and no more. Its term of office does not coincide with the term
of office of the officials concerned. It terminates as soon as its functions are
finished. Only then does it adjourn sine die and thus become functus officio.
As a corollary thereto, it normally retains its authority as a board until it shall
have completed its functions and accomplished its purposes. They may be

public officers in another capacity. Yetthey are never functus officio as election
officers until they have totally discharged their duties. They cannot be
disrobed until then. Public policy and interest prop up this position. For, they
are agents of the State. They are purely and distinctly election officers. Thus, in
Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29, 1968, this Court
clarified the role of a city board of canvassers in the following language:
"The city board of canvassers is an entity that is entirely different and distinct from
the city board or city council of a chartered city. Similarly, a provincial board of
canvassers, or a municipal board of canvassers, is an entity entirely different and
distinct from the provincial board of a province, or the municipal council of a
municipality, as the case may be. While members of a city board (or city council), or
a provincial board or of a municipal council, are members also of a city board of
canvassers, or provincial board of canvassers, or of a municipal board of
canvassers, as the case may be, they do not act in the board of canvassers in the
capacity of city councilmen, or in the capacity of a member of the provincial board,
or in the capacity of a member of a municipal council, but as election officials to
perform functions specifically provided by law. The board of canvassers exist for a
specific function - that is, to canvass the results of the election as shown in the
election returns and to proclaim the winning candidates. Once this specific function
had been performed the existence of the board of canvassers is ended and
terminated."17 (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, contrary to petitioner's claim, there is no factual or legal precedent to support
his assertion that the duty and authority of Congress to act as the National Board of
Canvassers for the positions of President and Vice-President was automatically
terminated upon the sine die adjournment of both its Houses.
As noted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Comment, "[h]istory is
not on the side of the petitioner." Such a view is shared by former
Senate President Jovito Salonga who notes that in both the 1992 and 1998
Presidential elections, "the joint canvassing committee of Congress proceeded with
the canvass even though the sessions then had ... adjourned."18 Salonga adds that
"Congress ... eventually convened in joint session to receive the report of the
canvassing committee, and proclaimed Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada as the
winners of the 1992 and 1998 elections, respectively.19
Even under the pendency of the 1935 Constitution wherein the regular session of
Congress was limited to only 100 session days, exclusive of Sundays, beginning on
the fourth Monday of January,20the authority of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President21 was never questioned although Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 180, enacted on June 21, 1947, provided that:
Sec. 6. Regular elections for national offices. - (a) On the second Tuesday in
November, nineteen hundred and forty-nine, and upon the same day every four
years thereafter, the President and the Vice-President of the Philippines shall be
elected. The canvass by both Houses of the Congress of the Philippines shall
begin on the second Tuesday in the following December, for which purpose
said body shall meet in a special joint session. The President-elect and the
Vice-President-elect shall assume office at twelve o'clock noon on the thirtieth day
of December.

xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While petitioner may have forgotten his history, as an incumbent member of the
present Senate, he should be aware that, as observed by both respondent Joint
Committee's Senate panel and the OSG, the Rules adopted by that body expressly
provide for the convening of a joint session of both Houses of Congress to canvass
the votes for President and Vice-President even during a voluntary or compulsory
legislative recess. Section 42, Rule XIV of the Rules of the Senate states:
SEC. 42. The Senate shall convene once every year for its regular session. It shall
continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine in its
legislative calendar, subject only to such limitations as may be provided by the
Constitution: Provided, That the President of the Senate, in consultation with the
Majority and Minority Leaders and upon agreement with the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, may reconvene the Senate in session without need
of a call by the President of the Philippines, at any time during a recess as provided
in the legislative calendar, to consider urgent legislative matters; or in case of a
vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President, to confirm the nominee of the President
for the position in accordance with Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, or to
determine the inability of the President of the Philippines to discharge the powers
and duties of his office upon the written declaration of a majority of all the Members
of the Cabinet in accordance with Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, or
convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to:
(a) Canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty
days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution; and
(b) Determine the validity of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President of the Philippines, or to
revoke such proclamation or suspension, or extend the same if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
While a legislative or congressional "recess" is defined in Section 100, Rule XXV of
the same rules provides as follows:
SEC. 100. The Senate adjourns for a congressional recess:
(a)

In compliance with its legislative calendar.

(b) At the end of the regular session, thirty (30) days before the next
regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays.
(c) At the end of a special session of Congress.
(d) Upon the termination of the term of a Congress.
Recess includes:
(a)
(b)
(c)

The period of time between the adjournment of the regular

session and the convening of the next regular session of the
same Congress.
The intervening period of time between the adjournment of a
regular session, and the convening of the special session of the
same Congress.
The intervening period of time between the adjournment of a

(d)

special session, and the convening of the next regular session of

the same Congress.
The intervening period of time between the end of a session and
its resumption on a fixed date as provided in the legislative
calendar other than the adjournment of the annual regular
session.

Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, petitioner's construction would require

Congress to complete the canvass for President and Vice-President within the
period from 30 days after the date of the election to the start of the compulsory
legislative recess 30 days prior to the next regular session of Congress. As the
following tables show:
Crucial Dates

Date of Elections
(2ndMonday of May)
Deadline Set by the
Constitution to Open
Certificates in Joint
Public Session (30
days after date of
election)

Date Congress Convenes for its First

Regular Session
(4thMonday of July)

Date of Adjournment
(30 days prior to the
first regular session excluding Saturdays/
Sundays/ Legal
holidays)

Date of Opening of
Certificates

Date of Adjournment

Number of Days to
Finish Canvassing
from Date of Opening

1992

1998

2004

May 11, 1992

May 11, 1998

May 10, 2004

May 10, 2010

June 10, 1992

June 10,
1998

June 9, 2004

June 9, 2010

July 27, 1992

July 27, 1998

July 26, 2004

July 26, 2010

June 15, 1992

June 15,
1998

June 14,
2004

June 14,
2010

June 10, 1992

June 10,
1998

June 9, 2004

June 9, 2010

June 15, 1992

June 15,
1998

June 14,
2004

June 14,
2010

5 days

5 days

5 days

5 days

until Date of
Adjournment

such a construction could limit the canvassing period to only 5 days. Even going by
the principles of legal hermeneutics alone, such a construction must be rejected as
it flies in the face of the rule that a construction that would lead to absurd,
impossible or mischievous consequences should not be followed.22
In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner's arguments are bereft of legal
and constitutional bases. The petition must thus necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

Endnotes:
1 Rollo at 6.
2 Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004.
3 Rollo at 8.
4 En passant, it may be noted that "session" simply means the sitting of a court,
legislature, council, commission, etc. for the transaction of its proper business. It is
the period of time during which such body is assembled in form, and engaged in the
transaction of business, or, in a more extended sense, the whole space of time from
its first assembling to its prorogation or adjournment sine die [BLACK'S LAW
th
DICTIONARY (6 ed., 1991) 1371]. On the other hand, "adjournment" refers to the act
of a court, legislative body, public meeting, or officer, by which the session or
assembly is dissolved, either temporarily or finally, and the business in hand
dismissed from consideration, either definitely or for an interval. If the dissolution is
final, the adjournment is said to be sine die - literally, "without a day" [ BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY(6th ed., 1991) 42].
5 II Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates 66 (1986).
6 CONST, art. VI, sec. 1.
7 These include the power to revoke or extend the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law (Article VII, Section 18), the
power to approve presidential amnesties (Article VII, Section 19), the power to
confirm or reject certain appointments (Article VII, Sections 9 and 16), the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war (Article VI, Section 23, paragraph
1), the power to judge the President's ability to discharge the powers and duties of
his office (Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 4), the power of impeachment over the
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman (Article XI, Section 3), and the
power to propose amendments to the constitution (Article XVII, Section 1,
paragraph 1).

8 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

9 Id. at 156-157.
10 However, under Article VII, Section 10, the Congress shall convene without need
of a call on the third day after vacancies in the offices of the President and VicePresident occur to enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and
a Vice-President.
11 Under Article VI, Section 18, the Commission on Appointments may exercise its
functions only when Congress is in session since it is required to "act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days." In the same manner, the
impeachment power under Article XI, Section 3, may only be exercised while
Congress is in session.
12 These include the situation when the President transmits to the Senate President
and House Speaker his written declaration that no inability to discharge the powers
and duties of his office exists but majority of the members of his cabinet submits a
declaration to the contrary and Congress will decide the issue under Article VII,
Section 11; and the situation when the President proclaims martial law or suspends
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and Congress will vote whether it will
revoke or extend the period of proclamation or suspension under Article VII, Section
18.
13 II Records of the Constitutional Commission 502-503.
14 Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 769 (1966).
15 I.A. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 132-133 (2002 ed.).
16 23 SCRA 1374 (1968).
17 Id. at 1385-1386.
18 http://www.inq7.net/nat/2004/jun/20/text/nat_4-1-p.htm.
19 Ibid.
20 CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 9.
21 Id., art. VII, sec. 2.
22 Marcelino v. Cruz, Jr., 121 SCRA 51, 58 (1983) citing H.C. BLACK, CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS, Sec. 13 p. 28; vide: Soriano v. Offshore Shipping
and Manning Corporation, 177 SCRA 513, 519 (1989) citing Bello v. Court of
Appeals, 56 SCRA 518 (1974); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Esso
Standard Eastern, Inc., 172 SCRA 364, 370 (1989) citing People v. Rivera, 59 Phil
242 (1933); Verceles v. Araneta Diaz, 47 Phil 843, 847 (1925); Lamb v. Phipps, 22
Phil 456, 493 (1912).