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Australian Aircraft Stores Capabilities in a Network Enabled World


Malcolm G. Tutty
FIE(Aust), FRAeS, CPEng, BEng

Minor Thesis submitted

to the University of South Australia

for the Degree of


System Engineering and Evaluation Centre (SEEC)

School of Electrical and Information Engineering

Building F, Mawson Lakes Campus

University of South Australia

Mawson Lakes, South Australia 5095

31 January 2005


The future is not some place we are going to, but one we are creating. The paths to it are not found, but made.
The making of these paths changes both the maker and the destination. Peter Ellyard

In recent years there has been what has been tantamount to a revolutionary shift in the focus of the
profession of arms. The shift has occurred away from the platform-centric view popularised by the
politicians and media as to how many tanks, planes and boats are needed for the defence force, to
that of a capability management construct that is to be network-centric, interoperable and effects
based. This is achieved by treating the military capabilities to achieve those end-effects as families
of systems that need to be managed across the whole life cycle. The ability to undertake predictive
modelling and simulation of the capabilities options available to a joint force commander to achieve
the desired end-effects in the time available means that network-centricity is vital to capability
development, as it is to those undertaking the combat operations.

The level of interoperability of aircraft and stores is vital to Australia being able to fly and fight
with our allies. Interoperability is, without exception, given a very high priority early in aerospace
weapons programs in setting the standards required, but then seems to be left behind when fiscal
realities start hitting home to save costs to that specific program.

The level of interoperability for network enabled aircraft stores capabilities that are based on
aircraft stores configurations certified by nationally recognised airworthiness bodies needs to,
however, mature beyond such a technical emphasis to one of a people emphasis by addressing the
command and control, and organisational elements to achieve certification of interchangeable
aircraft stores capabilities at acceptable levels of risk during concept development, capability
definition, acquisition and in-service phases. The current initiatives of the Air Standardization
Coordinating Committee member nations, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and the
US, and several key commercial standardisation organisations that will affect how future aerospace
weapon systems will be integrated to achieve interoperability between joint, allied, and coalition
forces will be critically reviewed and options discussed to increase awareness of the challenges
facing us.

This thesis therefore has as its central premise the vision that Australias future joint defence force
will inevitably have key operational and support systems network enabled with sensor and
engagement platforms connected to it. The main questions resulting from this central premise are
therefore, how soon can we make the most important parts of our joint forces network enabled
whilst retaining the level of interoperability between all these families of systems at acceptable
levels of risk. The prosaic answer is for Australia to focus on providing the secure, tactical level

networks at the mission level for key aircraft stores capabilities in the short to medium term
cognizant of the reputed transformation in NCW for the strategic and interconnectedness of
everything at all levels that will occur in the longer term. Australia needs to implement an
experimentation program that includes the use of air armament to explore whether such concepts
are practicable. With such a bounded problem, systems engineering principles are most useful in
helping identify and implement with rationally derived cost, schedule and performance criteria to
help better manage the wider communities expectations. The antithesis of those expectations is
self-evident in the wider understanding of the latest family of systems being planned for use within
the next decade to make the network-centric warfare concept operationally effective. As a result of
the research undertaken, the author can now navigate his way through the many layers of nuances
and acronyms incorporated into the vision for network centric warfare, but does stand in awe as to
the sheer magnitude of the operational concept envisioned, the systems engineering involved, and
the resources that will be used to acquire and validate it in the timeframe being currently espoused
publicly and within the defence community.

Hopefully those having the occasion to read this minor thesis will also start to appreciate the
magnitude of the network enabled vision being undertaken and the discipline that will be required
to achieve it within the fragmented capability management and nascent systems engineering
frameworks we have used to date.


Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious. Sun Tzu (500 BCE)

This work relates to an Australian Department of Defence Study Bank sponsorship by the
Aerospace Operational Support Group, Royal Australian Air Force and also documents an Invited
Paper at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (or NATO) Research & Technology Organisations
Air Vehicles Technology Panel Symposium in June 2004 at Williamsburg, Virginia that was
funded by the Department of the Navy Grant N00014-14-1-4066 issued by the Office of Naval
Research International Field Office, London. The paper, the first by an Australian at this NATO
Panel, discussed Australias perspective on the extant development and agreement of better,
internationally recognised, technical standards addressing aircraft stores compatibility including:
structures, electrical interfaces, EMC/EMI/HERO, safe escape, flight termination systems, safety
templates, risk management and, most importantly, a method to verify the level of interoperability.
The Australian and US Governments have a royalty free license throughout the world in all
copyrightable material contained therein.

My thanks to Group Captains Lindsay Ward, AFC, Mark Skidmore and Stephen Fielder, AM, for
supporting the Defence Study Bank sponsorship so willingly. Perhaps they just wanted me to stop
being bored from recalibrating those neophytes with a death wish for those of us who choose to
make their theoretical dreams a reality and those who need to use such systems in combat.

I wish to acknowledge the extensive support of Anthony Pilgrim and the administrative staff of the
University of South Australia Systems Engineering and Evaluation Centre (SEEC) for the
assistance and encouragement given to me in the progression of this endeavour and for
overcoming the academic bureaucracy for me. It made my challenges seem less daunting.

I also wish to acknowledge the philosophic discussions and guidance from Drs Stephen Cook,
Viv Crouch, Carlo Kopp and especially Bill Filmer, AM. Without their mentoring on the many
and often wayward research threads of mine over the years this thesis would not have been as
comprehensive nor looked anything like the way it does now. Unbeknownst to them, their
mentoring has fundamentally changed the way Australia views the systems engineering
associated with changing the art of aircraft stores compatibility into more of a science.

Finally, thanks to my long suffering wife, Anne, who has gamely stuck by me during my
seemingly endless quest for knowledge and is certainly never, ever boring and the two greatest
delights of my life since marrying Anne: Samuel Colin Norman and Sarah Wendy Wally. May

they never see the fruits of this particular labour ever needing to be used in anger during their, or
their childrens, life times.


I declare that this material does not incorporate, without acknowledgement, any material
previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my
knowledge it does not contain any materials previously published or written by another person
except where due reference is made in the text.

Please note that this thesis is derived from research based on unclassified, open sources and are
those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the extant official views of the Royal
Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government. The thesis is
intended to promote awareness and discussion on the challenges being faced to improve the
understanding of network-centricity and interoperability with Australias joint forces, major
allies and coalition partners as we undertake the transformation to a network enabled, effects-
based defence force.
Any mistakes in trying to interpret and understand the context of some pretty mind blowing
concepts or in attributing their source, however, are those of the author alone.

Malcolm G. Tutty


Summary i
Acknowledgements iii
Authors Declaration iv
Table of Contents v
List of Figures vii
List of Tables viii
Glossary ix
Abbreviations xv
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction
1.0 Background 1
1.1 The Research Problem 4
1.2 Method 5
1.3 Delimitation and Assumptions 9
1.4 Structure of the Minor Thesis 9

CHAPTER 2 - Review of the Literature

2.0 Background 11
2.1 Aircraft Stores Compatibility 12
2.2 Aircraft Stores Capability 20
2.3 Defence Capability Management 25
2.4 Future Operational Concepts 34
2.5 A Seamless Force through Interoperability 35
2.6 Network Enabled Operations 38
CHAPTER 3 - Future Australian Aircraft Stores Capability Operational Concepts requiring
Network Enabling
3.0 Background 47
3.1 Currently Approved ADF Air Armament Acquisitions 49
3.2 The Longer Term Future 55
3.3 Network Enabled Acquisitions 60
3.4 ADF Air Power Capabilities End-States 62
CHAPTER 4 - Open System, Avionic and Network Enabled Architectures
4.0 Background on Australian Military Avionic Systems 68
4.1 So what is an OSA or an OSI? 71
4.2 The Future 82
4.3 Weapon Data Link Architecture 85
4.4 US network centric warfare 87
4.5 The Plug and Play Weapon 92
4.6 Networked systems the future 101

CHAPTER 5 - Standards and Risk Management
5.0 Background to Standardisation 105
5.1 Military Standardisation 107
5.2 Systems Modelling 111
5.3 Risk Management 115

CHAPTER 6 - Implementation of Best Practice

6.0 Background 124
6.1 How to fix a complex system 124
6.2 The Future 131
6.3 Test & Evaluation Evolution 138
CHAPTER 7 - Conclusions and Further Work
7.0 Background 140
7.1 Campaign / Theatre Level of Operations for air armament 142
7.2 Mission Level of Operations for network enabled aircraft stores capabilities 149
7.3 Engagement Level of Operations for network enables aircraft stores compatibility 154



1. Aircraft Stores Certification Functional Flow Block Diagram Overview

2. ADF Aircraft Stores Compatibility Systems Engineering Framework

3. Defence Capability System Life Cycle Model

4. AAP 7001.054 Section 2 Chapter 11 Excerpts on Systems Engineering Model

5. International Standardisation Programs

6. ADF Aircraft Stores Capabilities Summary

7. ASC Risk Assessment & Tracking Version 2.0


Figure 1-1 Cebrowskis prescient view of Network-centric Warfare 2

Figure 1-2 USAF NCW and Air Armament network centric vision 6
Figure 1-3 Knowledge Abstraction of Network Enabled and Military view of Operations 10
Figure 2-1 Aircraft Stores Configuration Operating Limitations 17
Figure 2-2 Australias Capability Management Life Cycle 26
Figure 2-3 Application of the Australian Illustrative Planning Scenarios to air weapons 31
Figure 2-4 ADF Network Centric Roadmap 34
Figure 2-5 Air Combat System Interoperability Assessment using US LISI Model 37
Figure 2-6 Network enabled information sharing between aircraft 41
Figure 2-7 Sensor, Engagement and Information Grids of US network-centric
information flow 43
Figure 2-8 Global Information Grid 44
Figure 3-1 Aircraft Stores Capabilities introduced into ADF Service 47
Figure 3-2 ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Certification Process linkage with 49
V&V T&E Activities
Figure 3-3 Proposed Hypothetical Roadmap for Aerospace Capability Domain 53
Figure 3-4 Proposed RAAF Force Restructure 57
Figure 3-5 Northwest Australia and aircraft operating radius 58
Figure 3-6 Woomera Test Range Concept of Operations for Network Enabling 67
Figure 4-1 Independent Avionics 68
Figure 4-2 Federated Avionics 68
Figure 4-3 Integrated Avionics 69
Figure 4-4 Advanced Integrated Avionics 69
Figure 4-5 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Proposed Open System Architecture 71
Figure 4-6 Aircraft Avionics Open System Architectures and Interconnection versus time to
obsolescence 72
Figure 4-7 SAE Miniature Munitions Standard, MIL-STD-3014 and MIL-STD-1760 75
Figure 4-8 OSA and MIL-STD-3014 76
Figure 4-9 MIL-STD-3014 Legacy Message Wrapper 77
Figure 4-10 NATO Fuze Interoperability 87
Figure 4-11 US Joint Vision 2010 Operational Concept 88
Figure 4-12 Weaponised UAV Concept 89
Figure 4-13 ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 4 94
Figure 4-14 ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 6 94
Figure 4-15a ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 7 96
Figure 4-15b ALW-2 (2004) Figure 13 96

Figure 4-16 ALWI-2 (2004) Store Operating Systems Roadmap 98
Figure 4-17 ALWI-2 Roadmap for Environment and certification interoperability 100
Figure 4-18 Levels of US Aircraft Network Enabling 100
Figure 5-1 Thamhain Program Conflict Level Tradeoffs 113
Figure 5-2 Effect of Experimentation of defence capabilities. 114
Figure 5-3 Sample ASC Flight Clearance Risk Assessment Model Result &
Recommended Method for determining Consequence 118
Figure 5-4 Proposed Risk Reduction Program 120
Figure 5-5 ASC Risk Assessment & Tracking Chart Output 121
Figure 5-6 Example of a more representative ASC RAT showing effect of prior analyses 122
and factors
Figure 5-7 Recommended Guidance for assessing program risk across a new systems 123
life cycle
Figure 6-1 ASC Engineering Data Package methods 126
Figure 6-2 ADF DEF (AUST) 5664 Project Work Breakdown Structure 127
Figure 6-3 US Acquisition System model changes 128
Figure 6-4 US Acquisition System response times 128
Figure 6-5 US Proposed Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Proposal 129
Figure 6-6 USAF AFRL/MN three node Weapons Networking Concept 132
Figure 6-7 US CJCS Capability Base Assessment summary 137


Table 1 DSTO Organisational Interoperability Levels & Attributes 36

Table 2 LISI and DSTO Organisational Interoperability Models 36
Table 3 ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Summary 48
Table 4 ADF DMO Project and Weapons Average Delivery Times 129
Table 5 US Major Projects cost projections 130
Table 6 Comparison of CMMI and Lean Aircraft Initiative 139


Aircraft. This includes fixed and rotary wing aircraft/aeroplanes both inhabited and uninhabited.
Aircraft Store. Any device intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft
suspension and release equipment, whether or not the item is intended to be separated in flight from
the aircraft. All terms are as defined in AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004)
unless noted otherwise.
Aircraft stores capability. The capability provided by specified aircraft stores configuration(s)
certified as meeting approved operational suitability, effectiveness and preparedness criteria.
Aircraft stores certification. An engineering, operational and logistics activity that results in the
documentation by the Technical and Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives that
specified aircraft stores configuration(s) are operationally suitable, effective and that the
preparedness status of the established integrated logistics support meets the endorsed Operational
Requirement for the aircraft stores capability. Formal approval for authorisation and Release to
Service of an aircraft stores configuration is accomplished through publication of appropriate
technical orders and manuals and the provision of training in use of the systems.
Aircraft stores clearance. Primarily a systems engineering activity that results in the
documentation of the extent of aircraft stores compatibility to safely prepare, load, carry, employ
and/or jettison specific aircraft stores configurations within specified ground and flight operating
Aircraft stores compatibility. The ability of each element of specified aircraft stores
configuration(s) to coexist without unacceptable effects on the physical, aerodynamic, structural,
electrical, electromagnetic or functional characteristics of each other under specified ground and
flight conditions.
Aircraft & Stores Compatibility Engineering Data Package (ASCEDP). A document that, for
specified aircraft stores combination, documents all stores and aircraft CEDPs covering all
engineering and operational aspects relevant to aircraft stores compatibility iaw ASCC AIRSTD
20/20 (1995) and MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military Handbook (1998) as a source for production of
technical orders. An ASCEDP is required for all Australian State aircraft stores combinations.
For Australia, AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) identifies the Stores and
Aircraft CEDPs provided by the stores and aircraft engineering authorities respectively. The
collated Aircraft & Stores CEDPs are maintained by ASCENG.
Aircraft Stores Compatibility Flight Clearance. A document issued by ASCENG that defines
the extent of aircraft stores compatibility to safely prepare, load, carry, employ and/or jettison
specific aircraft stores configurations within specified ground and flight operating envelopes.

Aircraft Stores Configuration. An aircraft stores configuration refers to an aerospace platform,
incorporating a stores management system(s), combined with specific suspension equipment and
aircraft store(s) loaded on the aircraft in a specific pattern. An aircraft stores configuration also
includes any downloads from that specific pattern resulting from the release of the store(s) in an
authorised employment or jettison sequence(s).
Analogy. A form of reasoning in which similarities are inferred from a similarity of two or more
things in certain particulars; or an agreement, likeness or correspondence between the relations of
things to one another. Macquarie Concise Dictionary (1988)
Armament. Force equipped for war, military weapons and equipment, process of equipping for
war. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964)
ASCENG. Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Agency. A tri-service agency reporting to
Air Force responsible for airworthiness and suitability standards, planning, conducting, approving
and supporting operations for all ADF State aircraft stores configurations.
Avionic architecture. An avionic architecture describes the form, fit, function, and interface
characteristics of the hardware and software elements that characterise the airborne mission system.
JAST (1994)
Capability. Ability to implement power. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964); a quality that
enables the achievement of an outcome. Commonwealth of Australia (2002a)
Commonality. A state achieved when groups of individuals, organisations or nations use the
same doctrine, procedures and equipment. ASCC (2005)
Compatibility. The suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific
conditions to fulfil relevant requirements without causing unacceptable interactions. The
capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the
same system or environment without mutual interference; or capable of orderly efficient integration
with other elements in a system. Concise Macquarie Dictionary
Concept. n. a thought, idea, or notion, often one deriving from a generalised mental operation.
Macquarie Concise Dictionary (1988)
Critical Operational Issue (COI). A key operational effectiveness or operational suitability issue
that must be examined during T&E to determine the system capability to perform its mission. A
COI is normally phrased as a question to be answered in evaluating a systems operational
Critical Technical Characteristic (CTI). A quantitative or qualitative parameter of system
performance whose measurement is a principal indicator of technical achievement. Critical
technical characteristics must be testable, measurable and verifiable.

Effects. Are the physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that results
from specific military of non-military actions. Ryan & Callan (2003)
Effects-based Operations. Coordinated sets of actions [in the cognitive domain] directed at
shaping the behaviour of friends, foes, neutral in peace, crisis and war. Smith (2002) The
application of military and non-military capabilities to realise specific and desired strategic and
operational outcomes in peace, tension, conflict and post conflict situations. Ryan & Callan (2003)
Experimentation. n. the act or practice of making experiments; the process of experimenting; a
product that is the result of a long experiment. Macquarie Concise Dictionary (1998) In the
scientific method, an experiment is a set of actions and observations, performed to verify or falsify
a hypothesis or identify a causal relationship between phenomena. The experiment is a
cornerstone in the empirical approach to knowledge. Wikipaedia (2005)
Fidelity The degree to which a model realistically represents the system or process it is
modelling not necessarily the level of granularity, detail or complexity of the model.
Function. A task, action, or activity expressed as a verb-noun combination (eg Brake Function:
stop vehicle) to achieve a defined outcome. Electronic Industries Association (1999)
Functional Requirement. A statement that identifies what a product or process must accomplish
to produce required behaviour and/or results. Electronic Industries Association (1999)
Interchangeability. The ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to
fulfil the same requirements. A condition which exists when two or more items possess such
functional and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in performance and durability, and are
capable of being exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items themselves, or of
adjoining items, except for adjustment, and without selection for fit and performance. ASCC
Interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide the services to and accept
services from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to
operate effectively together. The three levels of standardisation for interoperability as used by the
ASCC nations are: Common, Interchangeable and Compatible. ASCC (2005)
Level The typical differences in fidelity, intended use, types of resources and commitment, from
low to high are 1 : 0 - Math Constructs, 1 - Computer Simulations, 2 - Hybrid Models, 3 - Virtual
simulations, 4 - Distributed Model Networks, and 5 - Live Exercises.
Model Any representation of a function or process, be it mathematical, physical, or descriptive.
They are typically of two categories representations (employing some logical or mathematical
rule) and simulations (which mimic the detailed structure of the system and may include

1 See INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) Fig 4-64 for a more complete description.

representations of subsystems or components) that may be made up of one or several of: physical,
graphical, mathematical (deterministic) and statistical (probabilistic).
Network-centric warfare. A network-centric force has the capability to share and exchange
information among the geographically distributed elements of the force: sensors, regardless of
platform; shooters, regardless of service; and decision makers and supporting organizations,
regardless of location. In short, a network-centric force is an interoperable force, a force that has
global access to assured information whenever and wherever needed. After the seminal NCW
paper at Cebrowski & Garstka (1998) and Garstka (2000) which is also particularly relevant to
aerospace applications.
Network enabled operations. An information superiority-enabled concept of operation that
generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to
achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater
lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronisation. In essence, it translates
information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the
battlespace. The power of network enabling is derived from the effective linking or networking of
knowledgeable entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed. The networking of
knowledgeable entities enables them to share information and collaborate to develop shared
awareness, and also to collaborate with one another to achieve a degree of self-synchronisation.
After Kopp (2003) and Muir (2003). The state achieved when fighting units, sensors and decision
makers are linked in a robust, continuous way that increases situational awareness and the capacity
to act decisively that is superior to their adversaries. Tutty (2004)
Open Systems Architecture. A systems architecture that employs a modular design and, where
appropriate, defines key interfaces using widely supported, consensus-based standards that are
published and maintained by a recognized industrial standards organization. Interface standards
specify the physical, functional, and operational relationships between the various elements
(hardware and software), to permit interchangeability, interconnection, compatibility and/or
communication. The selection of the appropriate standards for system interfaces should be based
on sound market research of available standards and the application of a disciplined systems
engineering process. Key interfaces are interfaces between modules for which the preferred
implementation uses open standards. These interfaces are selected for ease of change based on a
detailed understanding of the maintenance concepts, affordability concerns, and where technologies
or requirements are intended to evolve. Key interfaces should utilize open standards in order to
produce the largest life cycle cost benefits. Interfaces at and above key interfaces are those that
should be designated for use of open interface standards. Standards for interfaces below this level
may also be open; however, selection is left to the supplier as part of detail design. MOSA (2004)

Plug & Play Weapons. A concept of interfacing systems that defines the level of standardisation
across system, software, electric, mechanical and environmental domains that enables an air vehicle
to exploit the operational capabilities of a weapon / store without the need to have modifications
embodied. ALWI-2 (2004)
Provenance. The place of origin, as of a work of art. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964)
Requirement. See functional requirement.
Risk. A measure of the uncertainty of attaining a goal, objective, or requirement pertaining to
technical performance, cost, and schedule. Risk has two components the likelihood of an
undesirable event will occur and the consequence of the event if it does occur. INCOSE SE
Handbook (2000 Section 4.20)
Risk Management the recognition, assessment, and control of uncertainties that may result in
schedule delays, cost overruns, performance problems, adverse environment impacts, or other
undesired consequences. Balances the level of acceptable risk with the potential rewards.
Addresses uncertainties in both products and processes. Program & Environmental risk
management have different objectives and require different methodologies. The framework must
be developed with processes and methodologies that suit the best practices of the industry involved
and the scale of the project or system being considered. An Acceptable Risk is the predetermined
criterion or standard for a maximum risk ceiling which permits the evaluation of cost, national
priority interests, and a number of tests to be conducted. Numbers of events and exposed numbers
of personnel are essential in deriving this. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000)
Similarity. State of being similar, a point of resemblance. In the ADF airworthiness parlance this
indicates that an acceptable Certification Basis has been established by another recognised
airworthiness agency.
Standard. A description of a process, material, or product meant for repeated use in one of more
applications covering: materials, processes, products and services. Commonwealth of Australia
Synchronisation. The ability of a well-informed force to organise and synchronise complex
warfare activities from the bottom up. Cebrowski & Garstka (1998)
Systems engineering. An interdisciplinary collaborative approach to derive, evolve, and verify a
life cycle balanced system solution that satisfies customer expectations and meets public
acceptability. An interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful
systems. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) It encompasses the system functionally from end to end
and in a temporal sense from conception to disposal concentrat[ing] on the creation of hardware
and software architectures and on the development and management of the interfaces between
subsystems. Electronic Industries Association (1999)

Simulation. A computer program that represents the operation of a function or process to the
degree of accuracy necessary to meet its purpose. Typically realistic or representative scenarios
are run in the time domain to simulate the behaviour(s) of the proposed or real system. INCOSE
SE Handbook (2000)
Validation. The process of evaluating a system or component during or at the end of the
development process to determine whether it satisfies specified requirements. The process of
determining the degree to which a model is an accurate representation of the real world from the
perspective of the intended uses of the model. American Institute for Aeronautic & Astronautics
(1998) Confirms that the system, as built, will satisfy the users needs ensures that you built
the right thing. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000)
Verification. The process of evaluating a system or component to determine whether the products
of a given development phase satisfy the conditions imposed at the start of that phase. The process
of determining that a model implementation accurately represents the developers conceptual
description of the model and the solution to the model. American Institute for Aeronautic &
Astronautics (1998) Addresses whether the system, its elements, its interfaces, and
incremental work products satisfy their requirements - ensures that you built it right.
INCOSE SE Handbook (2000)

AAP Australian Air Publication
ADF Australian Defence Force
ASC Aircraft stores capability
ASCC Air Standardization Coordinating Committee
ASCENG Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Agency, RAAF
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CEDP Compatibility Engineering Data Package
CF Canadian Forces
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf
DIE Defence Information Environment
DMO Defence Materiel Organisation
DoD (US) Department of Defense
DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation
FEG Force Element Group
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
JTeL JTRS Technology Laboratory
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System
LGB Laser Guided Bomb
LISI Levels of Information Systems Interoperability
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEO Network enabled operations
NCW Network-centric warfare
OSA Opens Systems Architecture
OSI Open System Interconnection
PGM Precision Guided Munition
RAF Royal Air Force
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force
RTO (NATO) Research and Technology Organisation
SAE Society of Automotive Engineering
SDB Small Diameter Bomb
T&E Test and Evaluation
UK United Kingdom
UAV Uninhabited Air Vehicle
UCAV Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle
USAF US Air Force

V&V Verification & Validation

WTR Woomera Test Range OU


We are, by all accounts, in the midst of another technological revolution an information age, a time of
near-infinite connectedness. Information storage and retrieval is the manifest purpose of the digital
revolution. Relationships in these systems are mutual: you influence your neighbours, and your neighbours
influence you. All emergent systems are built of this kind of feedback, the two way connections that foster
higher-level learning. But it is both the promise and the peril of swarm logic that the higher-level behaviour is
almost impossible to predict in advance. Johnson (2001) pp 113, 120 & 233

1.0 Background
The advances made in the 100 years of manned flight from the earth are simply incredible.
The scientific and engineering accomplishments in aerospace alone can be seen in the
aerodynamic, structures, propulsion, life support and aircraft electronic (i.e., avionic)
systems that are required to operate in the earths atmosphere as documented
comprehensively by Winter and van der Linden (2003). Stanton (2001) and Collinson
(2002) et al provide excellent overviews of the avionic systems that have been used for
military aircraft systems in the latter part of the twentieth century. Aircraft avionic
systems have typically been designed, until very recently, as stand alone systems that can
perform navigation functions but can rarely communicate with other platforms or
communicate in real time with the intelligence services that decide when and where they
are used. This highly hierarchical isolated systems perspective, which is not just
endemic in aircraft systems, is characterised by what is known as a platform-centric view.
With this view, the integrating contractor is typically given a often limited charter to
interface with other systems due to the plethora of system specifications involved, a lack of
standard interfaces and an acquisition cost of the specific system treated in isolation of
other like systems. These aircraft systems must be airworthy and be able to reliably
undertake the missions for which they were built. The Australian Air Publication (or
AAP) 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) builds on civilian and overseas
military airworthiness systems by codifying Australias technical airworthiness
requirements, including that required of air armament. The goal being aircraft stores
capabilities that are operationally effective, suitable and prepared to meet defined ADF
operational requirements into the future.

Figure 1-1. Cebrowskis Network Centric Warfare emerging architecture -
courtesy Cebrowski & Garstka (1998)

Recent articles in the open literature and press have continued to highlight the importance
of network-centric warfare (NCW) initiated by Cebrowski & Gartska (1998) 1 , Gartska
(2000) and more recently network enabled operations (NEO) to future Australian Defence
Force (ADF) warfighting concepts at Muir (2003), Kopp (2003) and, most importantly in
the ADFs doctrine at Commonwealth of Australia (2003b), (2003c) and (2003d). In
2004, the ADF finalised and published an agreed NEO doctrine at Commonwealth of
Australia (2004a) and a roadmap at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a) along with an
initial tranche of operational concepts. It is envisioned that these concepts will transform
Australias current aerospace combat and associated training capabilities to achieve
tailored end-effects during future NEO by acquiring a mix of advanced air armament and
new command and control systems under a number of major and minor acquisition
programs. These acquisition programs are typically cited as being fully interoperable
between the three ADF services operating aircraft, with our allies and coalition partners
principally via agreements and standards established by the Air Standardization
Coordinating Committee (ASCC). Capability management and systems engineering

1 See Figure 1-1 for Their prescient view of the sensor, command and control and shooter systems grids abd

techniques are also being introduced and applied across the majority of areas within the
Department of Defence in Australia in an endeavour for the ADF to be a seamless joint
force that is concept led and capability managed throughout its life. Therefore it is timely
to review the current state of play between what has traditionally been seen diametrically
opposite positions namely, airworthiness and information flow.

Research into the application of systems engineering to address network enabled

operations for future ADF aircraft stores capabilities being acquired by the Defence
Materiel Organisation (DMO) is timely, due to the number of these programs and the
considerable difficulties being experienced with numerous military aircraft integration
programs as described publicly (belatedly some would say) by Cook (2003), Kinnaird
(2003), Richards (2004), Lebihan (2002), Kopp (2003), et al. Such challenges are not
however unique to Australia as evidenced by other nations fervently seeking changes to
their acquisition systems as described by Hoyle (2004) et al. In Australia such acquisitions
include inter alia Project AIR 5400 which is concurrently procuring the UK AIM-132
ASRAAM and US AIM-120C AMRAAM for air to air operations from RAAF F/A-18
Hornet aircraft with upgraded avionics and a helmet mounted sight, the Project AIR 87
acquisition of the Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter and AIR 6000 / New Aircraft
Combat Capability with F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Similarly, several DMO Projects are
addressing air to ground capabilities including: Project AIR 5398 with the AGM-142E
Raptor Imaging IR guided missile with blast and penetrator warheads and the associated
AN/ASQ-55 Data Link Pod on the F-111C AUP aircraft. Moreover, AIR 5418 is
considering the acquisition of the Boeing SLAM-ER, Taurus KEPD 350 or AGM-158
JASSM missiles for AP-3C Orion and F/A-18, AIR 5409 which is considering GPS aided
weapons and Joint Project (JP) 2070 which is procuring the Eurotorp MU90 Light Weight
Torpedo for AP-3C and the ADFs maritime targets and submarines. Research into future
Australian and allied air armament and avionic software systems engineering best practices
is warranted to address the risk to future ADF operational needs to ensure the appropriate
and timely allocation of funds. Improved methods or techniques to streamline the
acquisition of operationally suitable and effective aircraft stores capabilities to meet
defined operational requirements across all three services in a NEO environment are to be

Preliminary research by Knight (2004) and Watts (2004) also explores the impact of

evolutionary systems and the science of networks have on the rate at which new
capabilities can be created to meet evolving operation concepts. Certainly the robustness
of the networks needs exploration when placed in the air armament context.

It soon became apparent during the research phase that the network enabling of air
armament may actually be the easier part of the Gordian Knot 2 of future joint and coalition
battlespace operations to address. Whilst this issue may be seen to be outside the original
scope of the research problem, fortunately the ADFs current NCW Roadmap envisions
truly joint NEO by 2020 with extensive experimentation to ensure operational concepts
appropriate to the Australian context are fully explored. The implications of future joint
and coalition battlespace for operations will need to be reviewed and assessed, mainly for
their direct impact and influence to ensure that air armament operation concepts do fit
within the wider context of the problem space. This involved considerably more research
and time than was originally envisioned by the author for a minor thesis! Hopefully it was
not in vain.

1.1 The Research Problem

The research will explore inter alia how national and international interoperability
initiatives are affecting national and international aircraft stores compatibility clearance
and certification practices. Moreover, the research will identify the systems engineering
that should be applied during acquisition of future aircraft stores combat capabilities. The
fundamental problem this research attempts to answer is:

What systems engineering standards and best practice are best suited to
reducing the risk of future avionics weapon systems acquisitions to achieve
interoperable, network enabled operations for future Australian air armament?

The sub-problems that stem from this research are:

1. What are the Australian aircraft stores capabilities that would be influenced by
network enabled operations?

2 The Gordian Knot is a metaphor for an intractable problem, solved by a bold stroke. The legend it refers to is
associated with Alexander the Great who simply cut the previously unsolvable Gordian Knot with his sword.

2. What are the current and proposed system engineering standards and practices for
avionic systems and network enabled systems development relevant to Australias
future air armament acquisitions?
3. How should such recommended standards and best practices be implemented and

1.2 Method
The ADF systems engineering framework of the Defence Capability Systems Life Cycle
Management Manual at Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) and ANSI/EIA STD 632 at
Electronic Industries Association (1999) needs to be reviewed to ensure requirements
traceability and applicability to ADF weapon systems. The recommended systems
engineering approach used by INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) and DMO should be

The proposed standards and best practice should also be suitable, with minimum tailoring,
for the development of mission and safety critical software for use with air armament.

The methodology to address each of the identified sub-problems is proposed below. The
distinguishing characteristics of the research proposed to collect the necessary data are that
successful outcomes are based on the criteria established by Leedy and Ormrod (2001,
Table 5-1, p.102).

Sub-Problem 1 What are the future Australian air armament requiring network

Purpose. Sub-problem needs to explore, interpret and build a theory.

Nature of the Process. Sub-problem has potentially unknown variables, an emergent
design that is probably context bound, in terms of avionic and network enabled systems.

Methods of data collection. Literature searches and a survey of companies and

individuals involved with air armament and NEO to ascertain if any unpublished open-
source standards or practices are applicable to the Australian context of air armament.
The researcher will also need to ensure experienced personnel are drawn from each of the
disciplines that will be engaged in NEO for air armament.

Form of reasoning used in analysis. Inductive reasoning will be required to draw

inferences from the literature and surveys.

Communicating findings. Narrative.

Constellation Net (Air & Space) Vision TODAY



C-5 C-37 E-4B Capabilities
Capabilities Integration
Integration Directorate
KC-10 VC-25/C-32/C-40
CV-22 E-6 Commercial (OSA/VIP/SAM)
V-22 TSAT C/Ku/Ka
(UHF) U HF C-17
MUOS AC/MC/HC-130 E-3 ETP Follow On

B-52 RC-135 MMP Tankers
Link 16 F/A-22 ABL
Weapons TUAV
AH-1Z Coalition UCAV MMA WGS
C-130J F-3 F-35 (JSF) SDB E-2C
P-3 F-16 Bk40/50 JASSM
F-15E ACS Nimrod U-2
KC-130 F-16 Bk30? TACTOM ISR Network WF
EA-6B A-10 MH-60
JCM HH-60 Nat


EPLRS Predator
Land Mobile Surface Mobile

Global Joint Ground C2 ASOC CAOC Teleport DCGS ISR Processing

Fixed Joint Ground Infostructure
= IP Dynamic Routing
Future Platforms: E-10 ABL UCAV CV-22
No Significant IP or Data Link Capability: = IP Data
C-5 C-130AMP KC-10 KC-135 CV-22 E-6 More Aircraft connected via Link 16 38
X = Decommissioned
C-40 AIP MH-53E SH60 HH-60H Forwarding/Gateway via ROBE, JTEP Green Text = Added Capability

Figure 1-2 USAF NCW and Air Armament network centric vision
courtesy Ruff (2004)

Sub-Problem 2 Standards and best practice for avionic and network enabled air
armament systems
Purpose. Sub-problem needs to explore, interpret and build a theory.
Nature of the Process. Sub-problem has potentially unknown variables, an emergent
design that is probably context bound, in terms of avionic and not yet context bound for
NEO systems.

Methods of data collection. Literature searches and surveys from companies and
individuals involved not only with the hardware and software portions of the avionics, but
also software engineering in other high risk applications need to be conducted to ascertain
if any unpublished open-source standards or practices are applicable to Australian context
such as the proposed US Weapon Data Link Architecture at WDLA (2004) for the US joint
force operations as shown at Figure 1-2. The sub-problem is also intended to draw on a
wide cross-section of stakeholders including the commercial software industry, users as

well as the avionic software engineers themselves, to assess risk management implications.
The researcher will also need to ensure experienced personnel are drawn from each of the
disciplines that will be engaged in the NEO for air armament. The process may be based
on changing or unknown variables 3 for high risk design applications that also has
fundamental, ever increasing and considerably more time critical, human interaction with
software based systems required. Assessing the personal views of the end users is
obviously fundamental to the acceptance of such NEO systems into the ADF.

Form of reasoning used in analysis. Inductive reasoning will be required to draw

inferences from the literature and surveys.

Communicating findings. Narrative.

Sub-Problem 3 Recommend Standards, Best Practice and Verification Approach

Purpose. To devise and implement a validation strategy for recommended standards and
best practices. This will need to be described and then confirmed, if time permits.

Nature of the Process. This sub-problem will be more focused, but will require in the
first instance some description and explanation of the preferred approach.

Methods of data collection. In parallel with the surveys and research for the other sub-
problems this issue requires that a recommended approach be drawn out of
surveys/interviews and, if time permits, observation of some quantifiable and reasonably
representative case studies or observation of a pilot study during an implementation phase
by an organisation with representative stakeholders and users. One issue worth exploring
is whether representative users and stakeholders can manage expectations based on
established and agreed operational requirements any better than current practices or
whether the late Senator Bobby Kennedys principle that, 25 percent of the people will be
unhappy all of the time needs to be factored into the risk management approaches! The
researcher will also need to ensure representative personnel are drawn from each of the

Form of reasoning used in analysis. Inductive and deductive reasoning will be required.

3 How anyone will get users (such as fighter pilots), technicians, engineers (some of which are designers and others are
involved in acquisition and certification), the command and control of physically remote Headquarters, commercial
software developers and other stakeholders and project managers to agree on the metrics and what they mean should
be interesting.

Communicating findings. Narrative to describe reaction to recommended standards and
best practices as well as how statistics will be gained and supporting statistics if the
validation phase or test cases can be implemented in the time available.

Research Design. This analysis clearly indicates a mix of qualitative and quantitative
methods are required for researching and collecting data for the problem and the sub-
problems posed as follows:

Sub-Problem 1. Qualitative surveys will be conducted with specific personnel

and groups of representative, experienced network enabling software personnel
and observation of operations with aircraft avionic software development to
determine suitability. Specifically support from Aerospace Development will
be solicited for the qualitative questionnaires. The limited number of
organisations available in Australia is the major area of concern with the
sample size.

Sub-Problem 2. Qualitative surveys will also be required with specific

personnel and groups of representative, experienced avionics and avionic
software personnel and observation of operations with avionic software
development to determine suitability. Specifically support from avionic
software support facilities, contractors and airworthiness authorities will be
solicited for the qualitative questionnaires. The limited number of
organisations available in Australia is the major area of concern with the
sample size. This sub-problem warrants the time to invest in asking key
overseas organizations the same questions in the hope answers will be received
to meet the schedule. Qualitative surveys will also be required with the
identified wider target audience (end users, DSTO, JEWOSU, key international
agencies and commercial software developers being most notable) and an
ethnography (based on more applications in recent years Leedy and Ormrod
(2001, p.151)) is recommended. This is to gain insight into the cultural
aspects of ADF users acceptance of the best practice options and metrics to
establish avionics suitability against agreed operational requirements of NEO
for air armament. The development and discussion on a hypothetical pilot/case
study will be useful to establish the practicality of quantifying best practice

and metrics for sub-problem 3.

Sub-Problem 3. Qualitative surveys will need to be conducted. Specifically,

groups of representative, experienced personnel and observation of operations
would need to be observed to determine suitability. The major concern is the
ability to gain statistically valid information with the limited industry base in

1.3 Delimitations & Assumptions

The research is to be based on unclassified, open-sourced literature, questionnaires and

interviews. A significant risk is whether feedback is able to be provided by personnel and
organisations in the time allocated for completion of a Masters program. The results and
conclusions provided from the research must also be unclassified and suitable for public
release. As this minor thesis is time limited, it will focus on the end-effects attainable
through the application of systems engineering principles to military strategy and actions
applicable to the application of interoperable air power capabilities and not on the
alternative non-military socio-economic or diplomatic options. This will limit the
discussion to the interface issues with the space, naval or land-based power also available
to achieve national objectives.

Unless noted otherwise the timeframes associated with the horizons discussed in the minor
thesis are: near or short term is from now to five years, medium term is five to ten years,
long term is 10 to 15 years and the far term is greater than 15 years.

1.4 Structure of the Minor Thesis

This minor thesis is composed of seven chapters. It makes extensive use of attributed
figures and tables to help amplify the text when the figure or table is constantly referenced.
The author believes that some readers will be suffering from a common ailment of those
who try and penetrate the defence communities assumed knowledge of acronyms and may
therefore be susceptible to acronym overload when it is not warranted. If any cases of
imagery can be found that are not covered by an acknowledgement the author apologises
for the oversight and will rectify it accordingly as it was not an act of commission.
Chapter One provides the background, delimitations and the approach taken for the thesis.

Chapter Two provides a review of the literature and provides an introduction to aircraft
stores capability and NEO in the Australian context. The approach taken follows the
authors journey from aircraft stores compatibility systems engineering at the engagement
level of Figure 1-3, through to understanding the family of systems that underpin current
defence aerospace combat capabilities. This forms the basis of the contemporary
understanding of capability management at the mission and theatre levels and hence air
power at the campaign level.
Chapter Three identifies Australias future aircraft stores capabilities that will need to be
used by our people during combat in a network enabled world.
Chapter Four discusses developments with avionic, open system and network enabled
architectures pertinent to future aircraft stores capabilities.
Chapter Five identifies the standards and risk management approaches needed to reduce
acquisition risks for Australian aircraft stores capabilities.
Chapter Six provides an overview for implementation of future aircraft stores capabilities
in a network enabled world.
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with a summary of the major themes and conclusions
along with recommendations for further work.

Representation of

Campaign Organisations of Teams Tactics

Theatre Teams of Teams Tactics

Team Tactics

Engagement Individual Tactics

Network Enabled

Figure 1-3 Knowledge Abstraction of Network Enabled and the Military

Representation of Operations - Graphic is courtesy Farrier, Appla & Chadwick (2004).

If you are thoroughly conversant with tactics, you will recognise the enemys intentions and have many opportunities to win.
Miyamoto Musashi, Samurai Swordsman

2.0 Background
Australia is an island nation the size of Europe or the Continental USA, with a population
of just over 20 million, a Gross Domestic Production of over $(US) 500 Billion, no nation
state enemies or a direct military threat to the sovereignty of the nation. Australia has
historically provided defence personnel and equipment for almost every UN peacekeeping
operation since the UNs inception and has been punching above its weight during the
War on Terror. With the strategic situation in mind, the Commonwealth Government has
maintained defence expenditure at just over 2% of GDP for the last 10 to 15 years. As part
of the 1997 Defence Reform Program, the Government decided that the ADF would be
composed of a uniformed force of 50 000 with some 13 500 Air Force personnel and a
greater involvement of Reserve forces.

This situation was continued by the ADF involvement and leadership during the UN
operations in East Timor in September 1999 and Australias relatively significant support
to the War on Terror resulting from 11 September 2001 and the Bali Bombing on 12
October 2002. Strong public support was expressed during the review prior to the Defence
White Paper (2000) being published and, with the subsequent War on Terror, funding
increases in the subsequent Federal Budgets have occurred. Significant changes are also
being proposed to the Defence Capability Systems Development and Management
framework to address initiatives such as Acquisition Reform, formation of the Defence
Materiel Organisation from the previously separate Defence Acquisition and Support
Command organisations, Governments requirement for increased engagement in the
capability development and approval process, and increasing Australian industries
involvement to achieve self-reliance though the whole of life for the capability.

Currently, Australia does not indigenously design, develop or manufacture complete

military aircraft or aerospace weapons, these activities are conducted overseas.
Traditionally much of the ADFs aircraft stores clearance work has been minimised in
many areas by information being provided by the original operators of the aircraft who
have previously certified weapons similar in type and role to those intended for use by the
ADF. This has provided a clear basis for approving aircraft stores clearances by

analogy 4 . This situation has changed significantly with the ADF introducing weapons
into all three services that are not currently operated by the original aircraft operators or
have not previously been cleared for use on other remotely similar3 aircraft 5 by other
competent military airworthiness authorities. Further details of the aircraft stores
combinations being acquired are covered in Chapter 3 and more extensively at Tutty

These imperatives require Australia to not only be self-reliant in undertaking aircraft stores
compatibility in support of Flight Clearances and the certification of aircraft stores
capabilities, but to be actively engaged in ensuring that international standards and
methods being used are suitable to the ADF, the Australian environment 6 and the levels of
interoperability identified with our allies and coalition partners. Historically, this has been
primarily conducted via a number of international standardisation fora (as per the summary
included in Appendix 5), the primary one being that of the ASCC between Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the US.

Chapter One highlighted that the approach to be taken in this chapter would be to follow
the authors own journey from aircraft stores compatibility through to aircraft stores
capability. This has been intentional as it parallels the ADF journey from a services /
platform centric view of capability management to an effects based defence force. The
chapter will culminate with a discussion as to how the ADF network centric warfare
initiatives are currently impacting aircraft stores capability.

2.1 Aircraft Stores Compatibility

Whilst these definitions are covered in the Glossary, they are so fundamental that they are
reiterated here to help fully appreciate what the functional and physical allocation used in
the ADF aircraft stores capability certification process are:

Aircraft Stores Compatibility. The ability of each element of specified aircraft

stores configuration(s) to coexist without unacceptable effects on the physical,
aerodynamic, structural, electrical, electromagnetic or functional characteristics of

4 See the Glossary for the context in which this and other key terms are used.
5 The prime example is the RAAF being the sole operator of the F-111 aircraft since 1997 and the need to integrate
standoff weapons to increase the aircrafts survivability due to the cost to incorporate low observable technology.
6 One should envisage Middle Eastern temperature extremes and conditions in Central Australia with high humidity
thrown in as well for good measure in the Northern Territory Australia.

each other under specified ground and flight conditions at the Engagement or
subsystem level. This specialised discipline of science and engineering was born
during the Vietnam era. At this time combat aircraft purposely designed for a
nuclear attack mission against Soviet Forces blundering through the Fulda Gap in
Europe to use of the same aircraft in multiple fighter and attack roles using
conventional weapon in numerous mixed loads or configurations. These mixed
loads of aircraft stores configurations were, anecdotely, in the main effectively
cleared by the air forces in the theatre of operations by trial and error with the
operating envelopes and china graph marks on the windshield for aim point
offsets! In the era of applying mass production techniques from industry, the US
forces suffered significant reliability problems with aircraft structures and the new
electronic systems failing repeatedly with abysmal weapons accuracy and
effectiveness compared to the promises and/or expectations of the designers and
contractors. While the accuracy had increased from World War II and the
Korean War performance, tens of weapons were still required to service the
desired mean point of impact. This meant repeated aircraft sorties into what was
becoming a very hostile electronic warfare environment and losses increased
commensurately. It took until 1984, however, for a standard to be agreed to by
the all the US services as each undertook its own aircraft stores certification
programs, often for the same aircraft and stores. Eventually Captain Charlie
Epstein (USN Retd), serving in the USAF Armament Research Laboratory at
Eglin AFB, FL, succeeded in having the minimum acceptable certification
requirements and test methods agreed to by all the Services published as
MIL-STD-1763, Aircraft/Stores Certification Procedures. During the US
Secretary of Defence Bill Perrys anti-standards crusade of the mid-1990s this
document was updated with considerable ASCC and Australian input prior to
being published as MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military Handbook (1998).
Aircraft Stores Clearance. Primarily a systems engineering activity used in
Australia that documents in a Flight Clearance approved by ASCENG the extent
of aircraft stores compatibility within specified ground and flight operating
Aircraft Stores Compatibility Flight Clearance. A document issued by
ASCENG that defines the extent of aircraft stores compatibility to safely prepare,

load, carry, employ and/or jettison specific aircraft stores configurations within
specified ground and flight operating envelopes. This document is a mandatory
basis required by Commonwealth of Australia (2001) for release to service of the
aircraft stores capability.
Analogy. A form of reasoning in which similarities are inferred from a similarity
of two or more things in certain particulars.
Similarity. State of being similar, a point of resemblance.
What is known as the systems engineering process is basically an iterative process of
deriving/defining requirements at each level of the system, beginning at the top (the system
level) and propagating those requirements through a series of steps which eventually leads
to a preferred system concept, INCOSE SE Handbook (2000). Further iteration and design
refinement leads successively to preliminary design, detail design, and finally, the
approved design. At each successive level there are supporting, lower-level design
iterations which are necessary to gain confidence for the decisions taken. During each
iteration, many concept alternatives are postulated, analysed, and evaluated in trade-off
studies. Systems engineering is involved in all steps and leads during the Mission
Analysis, Requirements Analysis, Concept Analysis, and Conceptual Design phases down
into the subsystem level, and integrates many other activities including design, design
changes and upgrades; Goals & Objectives for element iteration; customer feedback, and
operational support. The basic engine for systems engineering is an iterative process that
expands on the common sense strategy of:

1. understanding a problem before you attempt to solve it,

2. examining alternative solutions (do not jump to a point design), and
3. verify that the selected solution is correct before continuing the definition
activities or proceeding to the next problem.
The basic steps in the systems engineering process are:

Define the System Objectives (User's Needs from the systems level OCD and
subsystem level ORD);
Establish Performance Requirements (Requirements Analysis);
Establish the Functionality (Functional Analysis);
Evolve Design and Operations Concepts (Architecture Synthesis);
Select a Baseline (Through Cost/Benefit Trades);
Verify the Baseline Meets Requirements (User's Needs); and

Iterate the Process Through Lower Level Trades (Decomposition)
The context of systems engineering applied at ASCENG in support of major acquisitions,
introduction into service and supporting in-service operations, is summarised in the
functional flow block diagram (FFBD) at Appendix 1 and the systems engineering process
at Appendix 2 (both derived by the author from AAP 001.067 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2004)). Some of the ADF Major Projects ARDU support the DMO with Test
and Engineering support can involve over a billion dollars for the acquisition phase.
However, even these Major Projects are typically broken down with all the myriad of
agencies involved using the systems engineering process into manageable elements to
become small sized projects 7 . Compared to the wide scope and applicability of
ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) to major US acquisitions
where $USD100 billion can be easily spent for a major systems life cycle, a small sized
project that ADF acquisition agencies handle the engineering for is typically of the $AUD
100K to 10 Billion size where the support team of Commonwealth and contractor
personnel rarely exceeds 10 to 50 personnel (who may all be assigned to multiple projects,
of course). The issue of project size is particularly relevant to weapons where each
aircraft stores combination has, to date rightly or wrongly, been effectively treated
individually on a case by case basis and integrated to a common avionics and aircraft
structure. The attributes used to tailor the systems engineering process will therefore be
derived from experience with such an iterative approach.

AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) ensures that all the authorised
engineering organisations with a stake in meeting the Operational Concept have a top-level
engineering management system framework based on ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and
Blanchard and Fabrycki (1998) that can be easily tailored to the scope of the aircraft stores
certification effort being proposed. As shown graphically at Appendix 1, ASCENG and
ARDU, upon receiving any tasking scopes the range of technical and flying support
expected and tailors the project planning activities according to the amount of expected
work. It also conducts a Risk Assessment Model review using all the technical, cost and

7 Note that the ADF has yet to formally agree on a common Systems Engineering framework for the whole of defence
and DMO especially. The SE discussed here is based on Blanchard (1998) and is being developed in concert with
ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and ISO 15288 (2002). AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003) and AAP
7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004), whilst being primarily airworthiness regulatory in nature, provides
the benchmark engineering framework of guidance for Project Design Acceptance Strategy, Type/Technical
Certification Plan and Engineering Management Plans which identifies the tailored systems engineering processes to
be used.

schedule criteria (developed from the software industry). The establishment of these
business rules are vital to all the potential organisations involved being able to quickly
scope out the level of support required in the timeframe and anticipated budget available.
The ADF has been successfully halting projects in recent years when the allocated funds
patently do not match the performance requested with the expected budget allocations and
the level of (im)maturity of the contending systems.

Then involvement by all parties, including representatives of the ultimate User, in the
Conceptual/Functional Design Review will commit to an architecture (which may already
exist hopefully and be properly systems engineered to an Operational Concept that is
analogous to the ADFs already), the Preliminary Design Review is the design-to baseline
where we commit to Configuration Item functionality and the Critical Design Review is
our build-to baseline that commits us to manufacture. The degree of formality used in the
design reviews and studies needs to be agreed in the project-specific Engineering
Management Plans especially for all safety critical items (ie, anything with explosives in it
and/or slim margins of safety in the structures), based on the experience levels and stability
of the organisations involved in the subsystems and similar sized projects. Much is based
on the trust between the organisations involved to keep the Operational Concept for the
system and its associated measures of performance. If considerable personnel turnover is
expected over the life of the projects implementation then more formality is usually put in
place to address such risks.

Significant Changes. The assessment of aircraft stores compatibility includes a review

called a Judgement of Significance by qualified Design Engineers to determine what
impact it will have on the following engineering disciplines for each aircraft stores
combination required to determine if a significant change as defined in Regulations at
AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003) Section 2 Chapter 3 Annex C and
MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military Handbook (1998) is made to an aircraft stores configuration:

Fit & Function

Structural & Environmental;
Captive Compatibility, Flying Qualities & Performance;
Employment & Jettison; and
Ballistics and OFP Validation & Verification, Safe Escape & Safety Templates.

Depending on the maturity of the stores and/or aircraft, there are four separate
compatibility situations involved when authorisation of a store on an aircraft is required.
The four situations, in order of increasing risk, are:

1. Adding old inservice stores to the authorised stores list of old aircraft.
2. Adding old stores to the authorised stores list of a new aircraft.
3. Adding new 8 stores to the authorised stores list of an old aircraft.
4. Adding new or modified stores to the authorised stores list of new or modified



20,000 300 KCAS

400 KCAS

500 KCAS

10,000 600 KCAS


0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2


Figure 2-1. An Aircraft Stores Configuration Operating Limitation

The assessment of aircraft stores compatibility will determine the operating limitations that
will then be used by the aircrew in their Flight Manuals as shown at Figure 2-1. The
aircraft stores configurations and expected operating limitations are always included in the
OCD and/or ORD as they may not need to be the maximum that the aircraft with that
weight and shape can achieve. For more mature aircraft and/or stores, and consequently
those with less risk, the process at AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) is
specifically tailored against the OCD and ORD such that only those phases required to be
conducted by the ADF to introduce the store into service need to be undertaken. For
example, if all the aircraft stores configurations have been successfully demonstrated or

certified by known T&E and airworthiness certification agencies to operating limits that
satisfy the ADF Operational Requirement, an aircraft stores combination could be
introduced directly into service with minimal risk. While this strategy has been extremely
successful in minimising the work with a specific aircraft stores configuration in an
acquisition process that is platform-centric, it is less successful in the authors view when
viewed in the context of designing interchangeable stores on fewer platform types. This
observation will be discussed further in Chapter Five in regards to what best practices are
suited for the future.

Using well established significant change criteria and the maturity of the aircraft stores
combination, engineering personnel can now integrate the operational requirements against
the current Engineering Management Plans for key system segments and predict the
sequence of organisational interactions necessary to optimise the schedule. This will
enable the capability to be entered into service and minimise the programmatic risk whilst
ensuring the required levels of operational suitability and effectiveness. Although, this is
not formalised until after the Critical Design Review in an ASC Similarity Survey,
experienced personnel realise that selecting more mature aircraft and stores is fundamental
to minimising the risk to cost, schedule and performance and the amount of systems
engineering required to make configuration management, drawings and publications are
made available with the equipment. One key strategy for defence acquisition in future, is
for smaller steps to be taken in capability improvement through Pre-Planned Product
Improvements and a spiralling concept throughout the systems life to meet changing needs
and OCDs, especially for avionic systems where computing power improvements clearly
outstrip the timeliness of the traditional defence acquisition processes.

The success of such a strategy to establish clear baselines with tolerances for significant
changes to control the update and amendment of extant ASC Engineering Data Packages
and the associated ASC Flight Clearances, is fundamental to the order of magnitude
increase in new aircraft stores combination being cleared by the ADF as a result of the
ADF deciding to update aircraft OFPs and the acquisition of ADF unique aircraft stores
configurations. During this process it is important to ensure adequate integration between
aircraft and store in-service Authorised Engineering Organisations is undertaken by DMO,
to ensure a whole of system approach is maintained and DMO short sightedness is

8 Or adding new aircraft stores configurations and/or expanding the flight operating envelope.

tempered appropriately to support the sustainment phase. This will ensure that either the
aircraft or weapon sub systems are not traded off or compromised without input from all
parties. If it is required, ASCENG will conduct such reviews if not planned in the ADF
Project Design Acceptance Strategy already to ensure the whole of systems approach is
maintained throughout the life-cycle.

As engineered systems became more complex and include multiple software and personnel
interactions, the engineering disciplines and organisations involved sometimes became
fragmented and specialised in order to cope with this increasing complexity. Some
organisations focused on the optimisation of their products and have lost sight of the
overall system. Each organisation perceived that their part must be optimal, using their
own disciplinary criteria, and may fail to recognise that all parts of a system do not have to
be optimal for the system to perform optimally. This inability to recognise that system
requirements can differ from disciplinary requirements is a constant problem in major
systems development in Australia. The systems engineering process can be viewed as a
major effort in communication and management of complex teams of experts that lack a
common paradigm and a common language. Two of the vital tools that a systems engineer
doing aircraft stores compatibility needs therefore, is to be able to conduct appropriate:
Experimentation & systems modelling at the necessary level of fidelity across
the broad range of engineering and programmatic disciplines, and
Risk management of all the constituent elements of the system.
Not only are these tools vital to the ultimate systems performance and safety in its use but
they are two of the most commonly misused terms 9 and sources of activity traps if used
inappropriately or in the place of positive management and active decision making for the
system, its subsystems and for the super-system that it belongs to. The tailoring of these
tools to reduce the risks associated with aircraft stores capabilities will be discussed further
in Chapter 5.

Fast forward now to 1996 and the Defence Reform Program investigated ARDU and the
ADFs weapons certification process and reaffirmed the philosophy used for clearing
compatible aircraft stores configurations and the formal certification of the aircraft stores

9 Probably even more so than systems engineering itself!

2.2 Aircraft Stores Capability

The critical definitions to this related, but distinct activity are:

Aircraft stores certification. An engineering, operational and logistics activity

that results in the Technical and Operational Airworthiness Authority
Representatives and the Weapon System Manager approving a document called
an Aircraft Stores Capability Certificate, that specified aircraft stores
configuration(s) are operationally suitable, effective and that the preparedness
status of the established integrated logistics support meets the endorsed
Operational Requirement for the aircraft stores capability at the Mission or
Platform level. Formal approval for authorisation and Release to Service of an
aircraft stores configuration is accomplished through publication of appropriate
technical orders and manuals and the provision of training in use of the systems.
Hence, the certification of the aircraft stores capability tied together the People,
Product and Process characteristics of the system being used in a single, concise
document that is signed by the position responsible for the Operational Requirement.

Aircraft stores capability. The capability provided by specified aircraft stores

configuration(s) certified as meeting approved operational suitability,
effectiveness and preparedness criteria. AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2004) provided specific guidance as to the operational suitability,
effectiveness and preparedness issues to ensure that the ADF was certifying a
capability and not just an airworthy configuration that could perform operationally
during missions.
Until the mid 1990s, Australia, like all other western nations at this time, certified aircraft
stores configurations based on the aircraft platform at the Engagement or subsystem level
of the representation at Figure 1-3. MIL-STD-1763, in particular, was very specific in
tying aircraft stores certification to the promulgation of the appropriate Technical Orders
etc, but the actual process relied on a Flight Clearance Recommendation (for T&E) or a
Certification Recommendation (for service/fleet release) being issued by an organisation
undertaking the aircraft stores compatibility assessment and little, or no, formal paperwork
from the airworthiness or operational authority. In Australia, this was slightly different
with the airworthiness organisation issuing what was called at the time an Aircraft Stores

Clearance Certificate. This document was based on an ARDU Test Report and a very
long checklist of engineering issues that required over 50 signatures from each of the
engineering discipline specialists; a sign-off process that took normally six to twelve
months, unless the operational authority personally intervened with the Senior Logistics
Engineer Officer (SLENGO) responsible for the checklist! A very interesting process as
the more operationally relevant aircraft stores configurations with far greater risks, gave
the engineers little to no time to do any engineering before SLENGO wanted to know why
he hadnt signed the certificate. Anecdotally the UK system, from which the old
Australian one was indubitably drawn, is still like this. The impact of Ground Test
Equipment and Mission Planning Equipment was reviewed, but as quite distinct systems
that were always the responsibility of separate organisations, they were simply a check box
that had in reality a human interface before flying the particular configuration. With
todays integrated systems that are being updated significantly every six to twelve months
at least, such a process would clearly be untenable with no chance of self-synchronisation
and thus would be a clear safety risk as it would fail to draw the correct implications from
other safety critical systems.

Australia changed the thrust of this process in the early 1990s as part of the development
of the technical and operational airworthiness systems embodied now in AAP 7001.053 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2003) and AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia
(2003a). They retained the need to certify a baseline for an aircraft store, but by
separating the Flight Clearance (ie, aircraft stores compatibility done by ASCENG) and the
certification of the capability by the Technical and Operational Acceptance agencies
embodied at the platform or Mission level for the representation at Figure 1-3.

An overview of the integrated methods by which endorsed operational requirements for an

aircraft stores capability are satisfied and the relationship with aircraft stores compatibility
is provided in AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) in the form of a
functional flow block diagram and framework for a project involving certification of a
new 10 stores capability on a new aircraft diagrams (as shown at Appendix 1). The
flowcharts of AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) are then specifically
tailored to suit the risk mitigation strategy and the maturity of the aircraft stores
combination being acquired so that analyses and review of existing technical information

prevents any duplication of ground qualification or flight tests by the ADF to meet ADF
airworthiness and Type Certification needs iaw DI(G) OPS 2-2 [at Commonwealth of
Australia (2001)]. However, to certify we need to clearly establish a certification basis,
ie an Operational Concept

Initiation of Operational Needs. Any ADF Unit or Element seeking an aircraft stores
capability, for either a new aircraft stores configuration, an expanded carriage or
employment operating limitations, is able to raise a request for the aircraft stores capability
to be certified by preparing an Operational Concept Document (OCD) iaw
Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) and the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (1992) 11 . This is shown at Appendices 1, 2 and 3 with respect to the resulting
systems engineering activities and the typical capability system life cycle timeline
currently expected by the acquisition system for a major new capability respectively.

Such requests are recommended for approval and prioritisation by the appropriate Force
Elements Group (ie Air Combat, Surveillance and Response, Army Aviation, Naval
Aviation, Aerospace Operational Support, etc) and Commands (ie the HQs for Air,
Maritime & Land Commands), and endorsed by Director General Aerospace
Development 12 through the normal chain of command.

The request for a new or enhanced/modified aircraft stores capability then results in the
Acquisition Authority (typically DMO) performing a Requirements Analyses as per
ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and the INCOSE SE Handbook (2000). These requirements
are included in the detailed Operational Requirement Document covering such information
as described at AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) to establish the
specific essential and desirable aircraft stores configurations, operating limits 13 and the
associated Critical Operational and/or Technical Issues (COI/CTI) and Measures Of
Effectiveness (MOE) required for the capability being sought. Further information may

10 In the context of this thesis a new store or aircraft constitutes one that the ADF has had no previous design
disclosure for or has not operated inservice or one that has undergone significant modification.
11 There is an important principle to be noted here in citing American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(1992) for preparing an OCD. The OCDs prepared for Major aircraft acquisitions (ie over $AUD 20 M) may
not have sufficient granularity for the air armament being proposed to identify the details required. OCDs for
Major aircraft acquisitions will typically refer to subordinate subsystem OCDs that will include the specific
air armament needs.
12 If a significantly enhanced capabilities are being sought in the view of HQAC or AFHQ.
13 See Figure 2-1for an example of an operating envelope respectively showing the carriage and employment
limits that will eventually be promulgated in the Aircraft Flight Manual or Dash 1 during Aircraft Stores

be required than that indicated to justify specific acquisition requirements, however, AAP
7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) identifies those issues that historically
have substantially affected the airworthiness and the operational suitability, effectiveness
and preparedness of the proposed aircraft stores capability. Should particular information
not be available, then the introduction of the capability into service may be delayed
depending on the cost implications associated with the level of capability being sought.

Even at the early stages of certifying a capability the various agencies (ie the Users in the
FEG, DSTO, Joint Ammunition Logistics Organisation (JALO) (the ADFs Explosive
Ordnance maintenance and major EO Storage Facility managers), ARDU, ASCENG, etc)
should be actively engaged by the Originator to assist in trade-off studies as described in
more detail in AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004). ASCENG formally
addresses this trade-off by providing assistance in the preparation of the Operational
Requirements Document and by preparing a Provisional ASC Similarity Survey 14 for the
Originator and User of the proposed OCD and ORD. The Provisional ASC Similarity
Survey provides an assessment of the certification basis and airworthiness impact in a
format that ensures all necessary issues required for the ASC Similarity Survey and ASC
Flight Clearance are addressed as early as practical to reduce the overall cost, schedule and
performance risks to the Commonwealth and Contractor. Note that the Provisional ASC
Similarity Survey does not constitute design certification (from a formal engineering
perspective), as it need not be based on full design disclosure of the actual aircraft or store
that is introduced into service. During the early stages of developing aircraft and
weapons, limited technical information may be finalised depending on the maturity of the
aircraft and/or stores. However, the technical information that is available is used by
ASCENG to ensure that the capability certification process is tailored and based on the risk
management strategy and the maturity of the aircraft stores combination and the approved
Operational Requirement. This has repeatedly ensured that the total cost of the
certification effort is minimised and that a qualitative edge over our potential adversaries is

14 A document summarising the technical review of the aircraft and store documentation to determine if sufficient
engineering and test data is available to support an Aircraft Stores Compatibility Flight Clearance by similarity or
analogy. If insufficient technical information is available or the data does not support a clearance to the limits
requested in the ASC Operational Requirement then the Similarity Survey shall identify the information and testing
necessary. The format and content of a Similarity Survey is the same as for an ASC Flight Clearance.

All ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Certificates are based on having an approved
Stores/EO Design Certificate, a Safety Case (covering the Safety & Suitability for Service
(S3) for EO), an ASCENG Flight Clearance and an ILS Plan. Aircraft Stores Capability
Certificates are reviewed and re-issued/amended when a significant change, as defined at
AAP 7001.053, is made to an aircraft stores configuration.

The AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) functional flow block diagram
(FFBD) summarised at Appendix 1 identifies the interactions necessary from all ADF and
Contractor activities to achieve an operationally sustainable aircraft stores capability to
meet the endorsed Operational Requirement. The efficient progress of the Aircraft Stores
Certification effort, be it for the purpose of a concept demonstration, an OT&E or for
combat operations, relies on the appropriate agencies undertaking the action(s) required of
their organisation and proactively communicating progress and intentions when necessary.
These activities are documented in a number of organisations processes that have been
repeatedly accredited against ISO 9000 (2000) 15 for their suitability as a quality
management system. All ADF and supporting contractors involved in aerospace
engineering activities are required by the regulations in AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth
of Australia (2003a) to meet and be independently accredited against the latest ISO 9001
(2000) standard for quality management. ASCENG provides detailed systems engineering
support to the acquisition during Requirements Elicitation/Definition, Concept/Functional
Design Review, Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review during the ADFs
Systems Engineering & Test Requirements Determination phases, as shown graphically at
Appendices 1 and 2) to reduce risk. ADF capability management and fiscal processes are
being reviewed against Capability Maturity Models such as CMMi (2000) at the Level 3:
Defined level as a minima. Verifying that the effectiveness of the aircraft stores capability
meets the approved Operational Requirement is primarily the responsibility of the
appropriate FEG with funding and resources provided by the DMO. Before an Aircraft
Stores Capability Certificate for particular aircraft stores configurations is accepted for use
by a FEG, the FEG certifies that safety, engineering, operational, configuration
management and logistic support processes, and all training requirements for all personnel
involved have been satisfied. The Aircraft Stores Capability Certificate addresses all these
issues in a single document for the FEG Commanders endorsement. The identification of

15 See Appendix 5 for a more complete explanation of the ISO agencies and what ISO means.

acceptable ILS arrangements to meet preparedness requirements is the responsibility of the
cognizant aircraft and store System Program Offices involved in DMO. It should be noted
that the Aircraft Stores Capability Certificate declares the FEG Commander and
Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives acceptance that the ILS Plan
committing to the capability is adequate to satisfy the effectiveness and preparedness (ie
readiness and sustainability) criteria in the Operational Requirement. This is most
appropriate as it is the FEG Commander who approves the Operational Requirement
Document which should have established the need in the first place.

Independently of this, and based on strategic imperatives, the ADF was restructured as a
result of the Defence Reform Project in 1997. One of the major thrusts was to transform
the platform-centric single service acquisition organisations into the Defence Material
Organisation and with the strategic foresight of the ilk of AVM John Blackburn in joint
HQ positions, the Senior Leadership Teams and the extant higher defence committees were
transformed to focus on future joint defence capabilities and to also provide better
oversight to government. This change is supposed to be more realistic, fully costed, along
with options for acquisition and in-service as a life cycle, not as a year to year financial
crisis at budgeting time. This has not been an easy transition as Defence down-sized by
about 40% and out-sourced the majority of logistics and support functions in a lot of areas
to industry. One of the complications for achieving a NCW capable force is how to
baseline your existing peacetime force structure (with limited to no networked
communications) against future proposals using staff that only understand hard copy orders
via their chain of command!

2.3 Defence Capability Management

The ADF of the future is to be: concept led, capability based Joint Vision 2020, ADDP-D.2

A capability in the profession of arms is the power to achieve a particular operational effect.

Defences ability to achieve particular operational effects is delivered by families of

systems of systems based on an operational concept that consist of people, organisation,
doctrine, training, materiel, facilities, support and information. These inputs are
collectively known as the fundamental inputs to capability. All systems have life cycles
that begin with the identification of a need. This must be translated into a working
physical system which is then introduced into service and eventually withdrawn from use

for disposal. Capabilities must therefore be managed with both a system and a life cycle
perspective. The challenge of life cycle management is to bring capability systems that
meet a specific requirement into being and subsequently support them in the most cost
effective way.








Operations DESIGN

Figure 2-2 Australias Capability Management Life Cycle

courtesy Commonwealth of Australia (2002a)

The capability life cycle begins with the identification of a need, usually in the form of a
current or prospective capability shortfall or gap as shown at Figure 2-2. Operational
concepts that describe how capability systems are to be employed are essential to both the
capability definition and acquisition stages. These concepts are largely descriptive in
nature, but they are critical to a clear understanding of the tasks for which capability
system will be used, how it will realise the desired effects and the operational environment
in which they must be achieved. Systems are typically only as good as the concepts that
underpin them, which reinforces the authors adage that any such dead cats usually do not
smell any better with age! Poor conceptual development will always translate into
operationally poor, or logistically expensive, in-service operations.

First we need to consider some of the concepts presently being used to help understand
how strategic guidance from government translates into military capabilities. In doing this,
the author will summarise the fundamentals behind how defence is transforming the

current service and platform centric force structure into an effects centric organization by
the translation of agreed government military strategies into the Future Joint Warfighting
Concepts, the Australian Illustrative Planning Scenarios (AIPS) and the all important
Defence Capability Plan (DCP) at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a).

Australias Military Strategy 16

Australias Military Strategy 17 (AMS) is Defences key military strategic planning

document. It details the military strategic objectives, effects and options required to
achieve the Governments strategic objectives, acts as a guide to deliberate planning at the
strategic and operational level, and provides a link to capability development. In short, the
AMS describes how the ADF could be employed to achieve the Governments military
strategic tasks in order to defend Australia and its national interests. The strategy does not
comprehend a specific adversary or scenario and is, therefore, generic in its approach.

The philosophy is to create an enduring strategy that is responsive to changes in strategic

guidance and strategic circumstances. The AMS informs a broad spectrum of activities
undertaken by Defence, and expresses the Government required effects. The AMS
considers the military strategic objectives, effects and response options within a whole-of-
Government approach. The term whole-of-Government approach describes the
considered and coordinated use of all resources available to Government when dealing
with a specific issue or crisis.

AMS describes Defences contribution and ability to protect Australia from external
threats and aggression. However, the physical defence of continental Australia and a
secure homeland is not the only prerequisite. Defence advances national security through
contributions that shape the strategic environment and, when our strategic situation
deteriorates, by responding throughout the spectrum of conflict to achieve the military
objectives sought by Government. Within this continuum of shaping and responding,
Defence, through the ADFs posture of readily deployable joint forces and offensive
capabilities, contributes to the deterrence of outbreaks of conflict or the further escalation
of crises in the region. The strategy framework in which defence capability development,

16 This section is drawn from the authors work at Commonwealth of Australia (2004d) Section 2 Chapter 1.
17 Military strategy is defined by the ADF as th
he art and science of coordinating the development, deployment, and
employment of military forces to achieve national security objectives.

activities and operations will be undertaken or committed to is identified as: Shape, Deter
and Respond.

The AMS employs six strategic concepts from within the operating framework of shape,
deter and respond to provide focal points to consider the options best suited to achieve the
military objectives. The concepts articulate the ways military force will be applied to
achieve the desired strategic ends. These strategic concepts and the tasks, provide the
framework within which to develop military options for Government. The military tasks

Defending Australia,

Contributing to the Security of the Immediate Neighbourhood,

Supporting Wider Interests, and

Peacetime National Tasks.

It is in the terms of these strategic concepts that all capability development proposals must
be argued and justified to seek government support for major capability development.

The AMS not only informs the employment of the current force, it must also inform the
future capability requirements of the force. Capability development is the process which
provides the ADF with the military capabilities necessary to conduct the principal defence
roles and tasks within the framework of the Governments defence policy. Capability
development addresses the totality of personnel, platforms, assets, sensors, weapons and
facilities required to meet national strategic objectives. It typically involves the
examination of each defence role, capability analysis, development of capability options,
development of acquisition options and, ultimately, Government approval of materiel
solutions that determine the force-in-being as described in the ADFs Air Power Manual at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004f).

When defining capability requirements in the past, there was a gap or disconnection
between strategic policy and force structure concepts, where functional concepts were
developed and used to inform how Defence might perform operational roles. This gap
between the purposes for which Government is prepared to apply armed force and broad
priorities; and how the defence functional roles were performed carried significant risk,
particularly in terms of the credibility of any proposal for a capability to perform those

operational roles.

In the past, some of the references to capability havent been very helpful. The Defence
Output Structure recognizes that we have four types of output: operations, policy,
intelligence and capabilities. These dont convey any idea of what the capabilities
actually are. It tends to group them by service, and tends to break them down by
operations (at the sub output level), or by force elements, which are actually inputs!
Whilst the Defence White Paper (2000) infers that these and other combat elements are
capabilities, they are not. They are in fact major combat elements and are inputs to

So what is a capability? The Defence Capability Systems Life Cycle Management

Manual at Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) refers to defence capabilities as the
achieving of military effects. Some examples at various levels of operations given are:
rifle firing, land attack, defend Australia The key to a capability is the verb, the doing
word. With these basics lets consider some more advanced concepts.

The capability construct used in the DCP at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a) and the
subordinate Defence Capability Planning Guide (DCPG) is hierarchical. It employs the
concept that all fighting forces either attack or defend. The major building blocks of the
construct, that is the major collections of capabilities, are called domains. The current
list of domains relevant to air armament are broadly derived from the ADOs Output
Structure and the US Joint Staffs Joint Warfare Capability Assessment framework (which
is also currently permeating the ASCC and NATO as well). These capability domains are
as follows:

Maritime - are the capabilities to achieve operational effects on hostile

submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and maritime patrol craft. Australias
capabilities in this area include:

o Surface ships and their helicopters, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft,

F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft.
o Anti-ship missiles and attack by hostile aircraft are increasingly important
to us as regional countries improve their capabilities. One of the most
important weapons Australia has is the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile
which is interchangeable on F-111C AUP, F/A-18 and AP-3C aircraft,

ships and submarine platforms.
Land and Littoral - land-to-land attack, land and littoral defence, air to ground
attack, bombardment, amphibious assault, littoral defence, command and control.

Aerospace. The aerospace domain is to ensure that we can destroy hostile aircraft
and shipping approaching Australia or operating in our maritime approaches.
Currently this capability is based on our 71 F/A-18 aircraft, which was the most
sophisticated combat aircraft in the Asia-Pacific in the 1980s. But Australia is
beginning to lose parity with the best aircraft types in regional air forces. The
White Paper has committed to Upgrade the Hornets avionics and the missile
upgrades to address this.

Strategic Strike. The ability to destroy a hostile adversarys forces and

infrastructure, in their own territory and on their approach to Australia. Our strike
capability is provided by our 33 F-111 long-range bombers. We must examine
how we can maintain this capability beyond 2020 and the starting of Project AIR
6000 relatively early compared to the past.

Information & Support to Operations. Information technology gives Australia

a critical military edge. The ADFs combat power is not just the product of its
size, quality and diversity of its military capabilities. It depends critically on how
well they are drawn together, integrated and applied. Our ability to do that
depends on a set of attributes we call the knowledge edge. Information will be
important to our approach to defence, because this is where our comparative
advantage over potential adversaries is likely to last the longest. In the future,
Australia will find it harder to match regional numbers of platforms such as ships
and aircraft, but we are well placed to keep a lead in our ability to use what we
have to the best effect.

The DCP at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a) is intended to provide a coherent,

description of overall defence capability: its current state, developmental path, and
intended future. The plan does not however direct a sequence of activities to take
defence capability from where it is now to where it should be. Instead, it should guide all
decisions affecting capability. This important difference means that decisions are made at
the most appropriate time by the most appropriate people.

The time horizon of DCP at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a) will extend from the
present to around the time for implementation of decisions now under consideration. In
considering aerospace platforms, the long-term planning horizon extends out at least 20 to
30 years, but for Information Technology matters the long term planning horizon may only
be two to five years. Developing the DCP is an on-going challenge. It requires:

New understanding of what capabilities are, (qualities which enable the

achievement of effects: force structure and preparedness)

Acceptance of a classification of defence capabilities,

Increased levels of organisational interaction, (agreement to the content requires a new

level of cross functional agreement between output executives).

Context Structural
Defence 2000 Analysis
Australia's Military Operational
Strategy Effects

2012 What will they do

MSE to stop you?

Critical Targets
Strategic Guidance Adversary
Targets Systems

What are the potential mission Feedback


objectives for air delivered

weapons in Australia's Military Tactical effects required
Capability mission
(Role for Air Weapons)
Strategy? AL 0 ASCPOL 2.1 43

Figure 2-3 Application of the Australian Illustrative Planning Scenarios to air

weapons by DGAD staff in 2002

Australian Illustrative Planning Scenarios (AIPS). The AIPS have been formulated for
assessing the suitability of future operational concepts and defence capabilities against
various agreed classified scenarios that can be accessed by the Defence Secret Network.

These are an extremely important and valuable tool to assess concepts that are force
structure determinants or have joint service implications in choosing which Mission
Packages can achieve the required or desired operational effect. They are also important
during experimentation and with modelling and simulation tools by providing agreed
scenarios to predict likely outcomes and hence reduce some of the variability between the
competing response options available in the timeframes outlined at Figure 2.3. It is still an
imperfect process, as one cannot completely predict future conflict scenarios, but in the
real world one has to start somewhere.

The Capability Definition Process.

The key outcome sought from the Capability Definition Process, is Government Approval
of the Acquisition Business Case. The key activities involved in the Capability Definition
process are: the production of an Operation Concept Document, Function and
Performance Specification, and Testing Concept Document for each realistic option;
obtaining input from industry; production of a Capability Options Document; production
of an appropriate Acquisition and Contracting Strategy and Risk Management approach;
and production of the Acquisition Business Case for the Defence Capability & Investment
Committee endorsement and Government approval.

Operational Concepts.
Requirements and Roadmaps are driven by Concepts of Operation
operators are responsible for CONOPS, programmers are responsible for roadmaps.
General John Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff

The most critical element of the Capability Definition Process is production of an

Operational Concept Document (OCD). This document should be developed at the start
of the Capability Definition Phase of a project, and provides the basis for the subsequent
requirements analysis. The OCD is to be developed in accordance with American
Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics (1992) 18 . Projects with a significant impact on
the Defence Information Environment will need to include an Operational Architectural
View as part of the OCD.

18 The various Systems Engineering standards in use by various parts of the ADF such as ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999)
and IEEE STD 1220 also provide formal direction to use this Guide. Other contemporary Systems Engineering
Handbook such as those used by NASA and INCOSE use this Guide. For software and information technology
focused systems IEEE STD 1362-1998 should also be consulted.

Since OCDs are used to aid communications throughout the Capability Definition phase,
they should be considered living documents and updated as the system solution evolves.
This updating should be conducted by a configuration management process.

The OCD acts as a catalyst to stimulate the development of a complete, consistent, testable
requirement with emphasis upon those attributes that shape the user-related elements of the
system. As such, it provides guidance for the development of the subsequent Function and
Performance Specification (FPS). The OCD and FPS are supported by a draft Testing
Concept Document and a draft Acquisition and Contracting Strategy. These four
documents form the basis for solicitation of industry.

OCDs must be written in terms that will not only be understood by the acquisition system,
the system designers and contractors, but it needs to be reiterated that it must be written so
that the end user can understand and agree with it. Current ADF OCDs have been written
at many levels of operations and care should be taken to make sure systems that are
intended to be interfaced adequately document these requirements. For example, you will
note from the discussion on strategic guidance that Governments focus would seem to be
on how many ships/tanks/planes and total number of people there are in the Defence Force
and not necessarily on how these system inputs interact during operations. Consequently,
most current ADF Capability Option Documents (CODs) and OCDs are written at the
mission or platform levels and may be very general with respect to air armament
equipment and concepts! Consequently, AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia
(2004) requires that an Operational Requirements Document at the engagement or platform
subsystem level be written to outline how an aircraft stores capability will be used. The
AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) also recommends use of the
American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics (1992) OCD Guide as the basis for
the subsequent ASCORD. This requirement has been in vogue in its current form since
1997 and in an ab initio form since 1994. Some ADF Capability Development CODs and
OCDs may however be extremely detailed if the capability being sought is mature and
would include or address the requirements of the ASCORD for review and acceptance
accordingly. More typically the capability being sought is more unclear and the Aircraft
System Program Office responsible will generate an Operational Requirements Document
based on the System level OCD during the Requirements Analyses phase, to address all
Critical Operational Issues that the Weapon System Manager will want answered and all

the Critical Technical Parameters/Characteristics that DGTA would wish answered. The
ASCORD is staffed/coordinated with DGAD, HQAC, AFHQ, DSTO, JALO, ASCENG,
ARDU, et al, but is approved by the respective FEG Commander.

The details of the current aircraft stores capabilities being sought by the ADF are discussed
at Chapter Three. One last thought for those of you that thought this jointery and
capability stuff is purely a 21st century phenomenon.
The development of Defence capability is a much more complicated procedure than was once the case; we need
the professional military advice of our most senior officers; we need the best possible political and military
intelligence; we need the best possible scientific and technical input; we need procedures for assessing the
requirements for complicated equipments; we need to be able to probe and question effectively to make sure that
the best possible solution to a particular military need is achieved. We need planning and preparations for the
development of our forces based on joint concepts and plans to meet the various situations that may confront us.
We need to ensure that each of the services prepares for the same kind of conflicts, in the same places and in
the same time scale.
Hon Malcolm Fraser MP,
Statement [to Parliament] as Minister for Defence, 10 Mar 1970

Strategic Guidance


Joint Warfighting Concept EFFECTS Future Warfighting

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Develop Architecture Connect Create the
Functional Networks Seamless Force

Objective Force 2020

Characteristics of
Command and Management
Force in Being

Collective Training
AWD Major Systems
Supplies and Support

2005 2008 2013 2018

New Capability
Legacy Capability
Underpinning Capability

Figure 2-4 ADF NCW Roadmap - courtesy Wilson (2004)

2.4 Future Operational Concepts

As the ADF transforms itself into a truly integrated joint defence force the level of
interoperability between system, units, and forces becomes ever more important. This
level of integration wherein system of systems are able to work together is extremely
difficult to plan for and implement successfully. Therefore an integrated defence
architecture framework is being developed to address this as shown in the major phases of

the NCW Roadmap at Figure 2-3.

The Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDPs) outline the joint vision of the ADF
as developed by the ADF Warfare Centre and approved by the Defence Forces Chief and
Secretary. ADDPD provides the foundations of our military doctrine while ADDP-D1 to
4 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003b) to (2003d) expand on our approach to warfare,
the Force 2020, Future and Joint Warfighting Concepts respectively.

The lead concept Force 2020, Commonwealth of Australia (2003c), articulates a joint
vision for the ADF for the 2020 timeframe, and informs all subordinate concepts. The
key concepts are:

A Seamless Force Beyond Joint

Network-Enabled Operations

2.5 A Seamless Force through Interoperability

Australia has also been exploring the wider ramifications of interoperability based on the
ASCC nations experiences in recent coalition operations. Clark & Moon (2000) et al have
highlighted in studies of C2 support that there are two major aspects of interoperability:
planned (or technological) and flexible (extemporaneous). The technical level of systems
interoperability required must be planned well in advance (which is where ASCC WP 20
has been focused to date). Where the interoperability focus is on processes rather than
systems, the interoperability achieved can be more flexible. Clark & Moon (2000) then
explore use of the US DOD Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) model
included in the Glossary which has been used extensively for capability development and
force structure planning activities.

The US LISI model has been used and extended to develop an Organisational
Interoperability Maturity Model by DSTO to explore five layers of support for C2 as
elaborated on at Tables 1 and 2:

C2 frameworks
C2 processes
Information Management
Information Technology &

This model has been extremely useful for assessing operations with coalition partners at
differing levels of technical interoperability and is strongly recommended for further
reading. It should be noted that the ASCC WP 45 on Air Operations and Doctrine are
also exploring some of these wider issues of interoperability and are producing documents
that are fundamental to air armament and are well worth following up 19 .

Table 1 DSTO Organisational Interoperability Levels & Attributes

from Clark & Moon (2000)

Table 2. US LISI and Organisational Interoperability models

from Clark & Moon (2000)

19 See ASCC AIR STD 45/3 on Joint Air & Space Operations Doctrine et al for example. ASCC ADVPUB 85-XX is
also particularly noteworthy.

J o in t S y stem s B r a n ch

E n h an ced A ir C o m b at S ystem (E A C S ) J o in t S y ste m s B r a n ch

R efin em en t fo r A ssessin g A C S s
S u rv e illa n ce
a irc ra ft F o r ass essin g th e in te ro p era b ility o f A ir C o m b a t S y ste m s
sa te llites th e fo llo w in g refin em en t to L evel 1 o f th e in frastru ctu re
C om bat attrib u te o f th e L IS I m o d el is su g g ested :
a ircra ft
? 1d . B asic n e tw o rked d ata-lin k w ith p e er-to -p e er
in terco n n ectivity (eg . L in k-11).
? 1c. H u b an d sp o ke d ata-lin k (e g . L in k-4A ).
L in k -1 6
? 1b . C o m m u n ica tio n s b y vo ice o n ly (tw o -w ay).
sh ip s ? 1a. B ro a d cast o r te lem etry (o n e-w ay).

A ir D efe n ce 6 /0 4 /0 4 11
M issiles
Concept M ilita ry O p era tio n s C e n tre ra d a rs

J o in t S y stem s B r a n ch
G ro u n d -b ase d lin k s U A V d a ta-lin k
L in k -1 6 S atellite d ata -lin k L evels o f O rg an isatio n al In tero p erab ility
L e ve l 0 In d ep e nd e n t. In te ra ctio n b etw ee n in de p e nd e nt o rg a nisa tio n s.
6 /0 4 /0 4 13
L e ve l 1 C oo p e rativ e. O nly lim ited orga n isatio n a l fra m ew o rks a re in
J o in t S y ste m s B r a n ch p lace w ith gu id eline s fo r in te ro p e ra bility.
L e ve l 2 C olla b o ra tive . F ra m e w orks w h e re g o als a re re co gn ise d,

A ssessin g In tero p erab ility re sp o ns ib ilitie s are a llo ca te d.

L e ve l 3 In te g rated . S h a re d va lu e s a n d go a ls, a com m o n
u n de rsta nd ing an d p re p ared n es s to in te ro p e ra te (e .g. e sta b lish e d
LEVEL In tero p erab ility attrib u te s d o ctrin e )
(en v iro n m en t) P ro ce d u res A p p licatio n s In frastru ctu re D ata L e ve l 4 U nified . O rga n is atio n a l go a ls, v alu e system s, go a ls, com m a n d
c M ulti-n ational C ross- stru ctu re /style an d kn o w le d g e ba se s a re sha red .
M ulti-
E n terprise b Intra-go vernm en t
In teractive enterprise
Increasing interoperability

(u n iv ersal)
4 dim ensional
m odels
a D efen ce O b ject cut & E nterprise 7 /04 /0 4 17
departm ent pas te m odels
c S h ared data DBMS
D om ain 3 b D om ain G rp collabora tion W AN D om ain
(in teg ra ted ) a T xt cut & pa ste m odels
c C om m on W eb brow se r P rogram
F u nctio nal 2 b
O pera ting
E nvironm ent O ffice softw a re LA N m odels &
advanc ed
(d istrib u ted )
a P rog ram A dv. m essag ing NET data fo rm ats
d S tan dards B asic m essag ing
C o nnected 1 c com p liant D ata file transfer T w o w ay B asic data
b form ats
(p e er-to -p eer) S ecurity profile S im p le interaction
O ne w ay
M edia e xchange
d R em ovable m edia M edia fo rm ats
Isolate d c
procedu res
(m an u a l)
0 b
P ersonn el access
ap plicab le M anual re -entry P rivate data
6 /0 4 /0 4 8
Com ba t
S u rv l
M OC UAV s sh ip s ADM s ra d a rs

Com ba t
a ircra ft
P a tro l
a ircra ft
sh ip s ADM s Co m b a t
a ircra ft
L l
a irc ra ft

a irc ra ft E2
Com ba t
a ircra ft E1c
P a tro l
UAV s E1d E0
a ircra ft E0 E1b
S u rvl
sh ip s E1d E1b E1d a irc ra ft E2 E2 E0
ADM s E1d E0 E0 E0 sh ip s E2 E2 E0 E2
ra d a rs E1d E0 E0 E0 E0 ADM s E1d E0 E0 E0 E0
ra d a rs E1d E0 E0 E0 E0 E0
Another Systems Assessment sa te llite s E1d E0 E0 E1d E0 E0 E0

Figure 2-5 Air Combat System Interoperability Assessment using US LISI Model

Experimentation through The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) and Joint Warrior
Interoperability Demonstrations (JWID) between the five ASCC nations, are also
fundamentally affecting the equipment Australia is intended to procure for future
command and control of the operational elements of the ADF. This will improve the
communications to achieve higher organisational interoperability of joint and coalition
forces. The JWID in 2002, replayed the UN operation in East Timor with different
communications options to achieve higher interoperability levels than that noted by Clark

& Moon (2000) for the actual operation. McKenna (2003) also provides details of the
2003 Coalition C4 Tests to determine how all the technologies might work in action. The
JWID exercises are strongly supported by the ASCC nations and are certainly providing
the foundations for Australia to experiment with technologies as part of a system rather
than acquiring bit parts and then finding the operational concept is fundamentally flawed
when used with our allies.

The development of interoperability assessments as shown at Figure 2-5 are extremely

important for visualising the flow for a relatively simple system after the operational
concepts and specific communication links have been identified. The operational
concepts of the future must include a clear understanding of the level of interoperability
being assumed in accordance with the LISI or DSTO model attributes.

2.6 Network Enabled Operations

To enable these core concepts to become a reality, the interoperability of future
communications systems is vital so that we can communicate effectively between the
services and with our critical allies and coalition partners.

The Australian Perspective.

Commonwealth of Australia (2004b) provides the foundation and conceptual approach to
exploring the opportunities of network centric warfare while Commonwealth of Australia
(2004c) establishes the ADFs Roadmap for what is now known as NCW 20 . In being fully
aware of the machinations behind the scenes with Commonwealth of Australia (2004b),
what has been promulgated early in 2004 for release to the public is prima facie standard
fare for NCW in the early stages. It reflects the current conventional simplistic wisdom
and paradigms of the US while justifying the effort to enable warfighters, 21 to employ the
future warfighting concept of Multidimensional Manoeuvre. The NCW Roadmap is
another such animal. All in all, these documents say nothing new that will require
significant change as the Allies change direction(s) over the forthcoming years. Certainly
they have no technical depth or vision as to how the standardisation and the operational

20 Note the difference in terminology here between network enabled operations and network centric warfare used in
Commonwealth of Australia (2003c) and (2004b) how a year makes a difference. The latter document originally
used NEO but reverted to the NCW nomenclature to better integrate with US terminology: thereby highlighting the
significance of interoperability with the US. The author agrees with the Commonwealth of Australia (2003c)
terminology as being more appropriate.
21 The authors even went as far as use of this Americanism in the opening paragraph of the doctrine!

concept levels and differences are actually going to be resolved. Figure 2-4 showed the
timescales envisaged, but it is unlikely they are derived from a knowledge of what funding
and engineering is to be undertaken.

NCW Roadmap. This initial NCW Roadmap is currently more like a street directory at
the moment as it very comprehensively identifies all the issues and options, but since most
of the changes are still to be and are hence unknown at the moment, many people who
want to know the answer before the question has been posed correctly, have expressed
dissatisfaction. The authors view is that it is one of the most comprehensive roadmaps for
such a difficult subject to cover. The originators are to be highly commended for its
quality so soon after the Doctrine was finalised (considerably more information is relevant
to the discussion at Chapter Three and will be left until then). Wilson (2004) highlighted
to DSTO and industry that not much has changed in the NCW Roadmap per se since it was
promulgated earlier in the year and had several main points 22 :
Australias NCW initiative was relatively mature in comparison to other medium
sized forces. The ADF has already implemented and is using secure networks
throughout the operational forces (human in the case of Army and good
technical ones for Air Forces and Navies) and is doing so in conjunction with our
allies during real operations and exercises. It is also important to remember also
that the principle NCW advocates, the US and UK (with her Network Enabled
Capability (NEC)) have also committed to significant networking (more on this
later) that is as yet to be in the same timelines both nationally and also for
coalition via numerous NATO STANAGs and ASCC Advisory Publications and
Air Standards.
A learn by doing strategy was proposed to be the best method to move through
the phases identified in the above figure. Whilst there are critics of this approach,
if done logically, this strategy assumes significantly less risk than doing nothing
and then having to rush one huge project reminiscent of the big bang as we go it
alone theory which is the de rigeur Australia way of buying major systems in
recent years (as has been sadly happening with EW for instance). The experience
with experimentation and the likes of JWID, see incremental improvements in a

22 Note that the figures in the presentation made in support of this thesis are drawn from his briefing

lot of areas that can be operationally relevant immediately and saves a disastrous
white elephant that may well be incompatible with our allies.
The key milestones are shown in the figures on the right: Developing the
Architecture by 2005, Connect Functional Networks by 2013 and Create a
Seamless Force by 2018. Wilson believes that number of nodes that are
expected for what is presumably one of the AIPS in Defending Australia with a
joint force are: Navy dozens, Army hundreds, Air Forces and interagency
partners - dozens.
The key actions are seen as not just building a network, but exploring the Human
Dimensions of NCW and establish an environment that will better readily accept
change. For it is seen as the organisation and culture that are the main challenges
to the NEO opportunities.
The challenges are expressed as: geographic dispersion of operational assets,
bandwidth and frequency allocations, what elements really need to be connected,
interagency connectivity, and optimum balance of sensors versus engagement
versus C2 support systems.
The networking of armament system does not appear at all. This does seem
somewhat surprising for the network enabling of a military force, but neither does
the US equivalent either according to Ruff (2004).

The integration of such networks across even a defence force as small as Australias
becomes non-trivial very quickly with the defence acquisition system trying to buy and put
into service the various sub-systems as separate entities. Also of importance is the
conceptualising required for these systems to work together in a campaign or actual
operations with other joint forces, as will be shown in Chapter 4.

Network enabled operations. Kopp (2003) and Watts (2002) have some interesting
insights into how smooth the information revolution was for the commercial/business
world in grappling with the complex, rapidly changing technology and how to influence
the thinking processes of a great many people. The keys issues which are well
summarised by Kopp (2003) are:

Security of information.
Robustness of transmission.
Transmission Capacity.

Message and signal routing.
Signal Format and communications protocol compatibility.

Kopp (2003) also notes that the US Marine Corps were much better able to integrate in this
particular NCW environment with USAF, USN, RAAF and RAF fighters than were US
Army units present due to a service culture which aims to break down distinctions
between specialisations and a training regime [which] centres on closely integrated all-
arms operations 23 . He has expressed concerns with the growing gap between the US
military and the EU [European] military with the perceived reluctance to invest in
digitising their combat platforms. He expresses graver concerns with the headlong rush
of India and especially China to digitize key elements of their forces and to conduct
information operations.
Figure 4: Information Sharing with Network-Centric Operations

Figure 2: 4 vs. 4 Air-to-Air Engagement Shared Awareness

Human 1 Human 2

Cognitive Domain Cognitive Domain Heads-up Display with


Voice 1

Voice 1
View 1

View 1
Data 1

Data 1
08 09 10
400 1500

Aircraft 450
5 5 1000

5 X 5

10 10

Blue Aircrafts Digital Shared Digital

Info Info
Organic Sensor Domain Information Domain TARGET

X Com: Voice Com: Voice

Com: Data Com: Data Warfighter View

X which results
Blue Aircraft
Organic Organic from sharing info
Sensors Sensors via voice and data
Physical Domain

Figure 2-6 Network enabled information sharing between aircraft showing additional
adversary aircraft These excellent graphics courtesy of Gartska (2000)

The US perspective.

Gartska (2000) notes that A network-centric force has the capability to share and
exchange information among the geographically distributed elements of the force: sensors,
regardless of platform; shooters, regardless of service; and decision makers and supporting
organizations, regardless of location. In short, a network-centric force is an
interoperable force, a force that has global access to assured information whenever

and wherever needed 24 . Portions of Gartska (2000) are worth noting here further in part
due to its applicability to air armament:

Continued exploration of the relationships between information and combat power

requires both new analytic tools and new mental models. Ongoing activities to
develop metrics for the information domain are hacking through dense conceptual
underbrush in an attempt to identify a path that can be navigated. A conceptual
model currently being developed collaboratively by an Information Superiority
Metrics Working Group is focused on characterizing the relationships between
shared information, shared situational awareness, and the processes of
collaboration and synchronization. A key element of the model is a focus on three
domains: the physical domain, the cognitive domain, and the information domain. 25
This conceptual model builds upon a construct proposed initially by Fuller [(1926)],
and refined by Cebrowski 26 [and interestingly Alberts & Hayes (2002) p 10]:
Physical Domain: The physical domain is the traditional domain of warfare. It is
domain where strike, protect and maneuver take place across the environments of
ground, sea, air and space. Comparatively, the elements of this domain are the
easiest to measure, and consequently, combat power has traditionally been
measured primarily in this domain. Two important metrics for measuring combat
power in this domain, lethality and survivability, have been and continue to be
cornerstones of military operations research.
Information Domain: The information domain is the domain where information is
created, manipulated, and shared. This domain is where the C2 will occur. The
force has the capability to collect, share, access and protect information. The force
has the capability to collaborate. This becomes the most sensitive of the domains to
protect and defend.
Cognitive Domain: The cognitive domain is the domain of the mind of the warfighter
and the supporting populous. This is the domain where battles and wars are won and
lost. This is the domain of intangibles: leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of
training and experience, situational awareness, and public opinion. This is the
domain where tactics, techniques and procedures reside. Much has been written
about this domain, and key attributes of this domain have remained relatively
constant since Sun Tzu [(500 BCE)]. The attributes of this domain are extremely
difficult to measure, and each sub-domain (each individual mind), is unique.
Consequently, explicit treatment of this domain in analytic models of warfare is rare.
However, a methodology that begins to address key attributes and relationships of
this domain has been proposed by Harmon in the context of entropy based warfare.
With network-centric operations a fourth input is added, digital information that is
exchanged from external sources, such as other fighter aircraft, or airborne
surveillance and C aircraft, over a network [see Figures 2-6 and 2-7]. Harmon
The issue then really becomes one of data fusion and confidence in the provenance of the data
shared and presented to the required User.

23 Note that Garstka (2000) also supports this view a force with these capabilities is not known to currently exist in
any of the US Military services or in the armed forces any our Allied or Coalition partners. Which is still true
today according to Kopp (2003).
24 Garstka (2000) notes that a force with these capabilities is not known to currently exist in any of the US Military
services or in the armed forces any our Allied or Coalition partners. Which is still true today.
25 The Information Superiority Metrics Working Group is a community of interest, sponsored by ASD(C3I), JCS/J6,
and JFCOM/J9. Information at this open source website is well worth visiting for the
aficionados as well as the neophyte.
26 VADM Arthur K. Cebrowki, USN, Written testimony to hearing on Defense Information Superiority and
Information Assurance Entering the 21st Century, held by the [US] House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Military Procurement, February 23, 1999.

Figure 2-7. Logical Model of Sensor, Decision maker and Shooter
Information Grids of US network-centric information flow
Graphics courtesy JCS J6 (2003)

The Global Information Grid (GIG). The US Government Accounting Offices report
to Congress at GAO-04-858 (2004) advises that For the last two decades, DOD has been
seeking to improve interoperability and information sharing across its business and
warfighting operations. One of the key initiatives is the Global Information Grid [or
GIG]. The GIG represents a collection of programs and initiatives aimed at building a
secure network and set of information capabilities modelled after the Internet. The key
acquisitions underway to build the GIG are:

1) Transformational Satellite (TSAT): a new constellation of communications
2) Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS): a new family of interoperable radio systems,
3) GIG Bandwidth Expansion which includes state of the art optical network
technologies for greater voice, data and video transmissions [from 0.15Gbits/s to
4) Network centric Enterprise Services (NCES) for a common set of services and
applications to manage the network and help users locate and share information,
5) cryptographic transformation initiative [to, in part, attain the needed level of
Information Assurance],
6) horizontal fusion. . The financial investment begins in 2004 by each of the [US]
military services with the expenditure expecting to be ultimately greater than
$US 21 Billion. There was ample evidence of this from the open literature. 27

Figure 2-8 Global Information Grid

from JCS J6 (2004) and US Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations.

In such a GIG as shown at Figure 2-8, Leopold (2004) reports that the US DoD, in
determining that there will be insufficient IP addresses for the internet of the future, has

27 PRNews (2005) notes that Caspian Networks has signed up with Northrup Grumman a multiyear contract to develop
the space hardened IP router design for TSAT as part of a Risk Reduction & System definition Contract from the US
DoD. Colaizzi (2004) reports that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has partnered with DISA and US Space
Command to workshop the NCES program. This reference to JFCOM is mentioned specifically here as they are the
lynch pin to numerous test and training network initiatives that are relevant to the Australian / US Joint Combined

embraced the industry IPv6 (2004) standard and plans to spend $USD 28 Billion for
implementation by 2008 28 .

As part of the GIG development by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) the
following contributions to the initiatives are underway:

Upgrades to the routine for official use only information network (called
NIPRNET) that used the Internet and the secure network (called SIPRNET), CRS
Report to Congress (2004).

The US Army is creating Landwarnet to replace the current army and army
reserve/national guard systems, Koch (2004).

The USN is creating FORCEnet by the Space & Naval Warfare System Command
(and called SPAWAR) and the Marine Corps Integrated Architecture Picture in
conjunction with the USN Naval Network Warfare Command that will hopefully
address the IT versus acquisition challenges with immature standards and
knowledge management for the USN and Marine Corps. The system will
incorporate a common set of software standards called RAPIDS (Reusable
Application Integration & Development Standards) that seem to be vapourware at
the moment. This is claimed to being done in conjunction with the USAFs
C2ERA (C2 Enterprise Reference Architecture under an initiative called Net-
centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI), Roche (2003) and
Bauman (2004). The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system links
Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular area into a single, integrated air-
defense network, CRS Report to Congress (2004).

The USAF has the Air Force C2 Constellation. Using this existing system as a
basis, the Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) developed with
DARPA was tested during JFEX 2004 to form up nodes with an on-demand
system that can connect aircraft from about 100 to 300 miles apart at 10MBits/s.
Such a system would replace the new Tactical Digital Information Link

Training Centre. Wirbel (2004) notes that IBM chips and networking subsystems with Honeywells Defense &
Space Electronic Systems in support of this over ten years.
28 CRS Report to Congress (2004) reports that $US 26B will be spent by 2007, which is amazingly similar. Note that
this amount is more than what Australia will send on defence over the same period. Gagnon (2004) claims the total
cost of the Internet in the Sky will be over $US200B.

(TADIL) 29 Link 16 30 systems currently being integrated into US and most Allied
aircraft. Link 16 is seen as already being dated, in that it relies on Internet
Protocol Version 4 (IPv4), a limited bandwidth and a push architecture, Grant
(2004) and Wynne (2004).

Creation of a Joint Task Force Global Network Operations on 19 Nov 2004

under Lt Gen H Raduege, Tiboni (2004)

The European Perspective

The European and UK philosophy is currently being labelled, Network Enabled Capability
with some nations such as Sweden using the term Network-Based Defense. The European
positions being expressed in open forums are typified in a paper provided to the author by
Schulz and Thiele (2003) from the German Air Force. The paper rightly asserts that the
US lead in armaments (please see the Glossary definition for the context of the term,
particularly in Europe) technology is often considered to amount to ten years. The major
concern of the Europeans highlighted in this paper is the ability to keep up with the US
transformation and recognise the significance of the Multinational Interoperability Council
(which is described at Appendix 5), for the multinational cooperation in areas such as
Concept Development and Experimentation. NATO is currently building a capability for
dynamic interoperability with the US developments via the NATO Network Enabled
Capability (NNEC), CRS report to Congress (2004). Further information is provided in
Chapter 4. Crouch (2004) also notes the European concerns with the RF spectrum that
will be available for network enabled communications across all the Regions identified in
the world and the need to identify spectrum required at the World Radio Council in 2007.
Crouch (2004a) also discusses the research and strategies being used to try and improve the
use of bandwidth and new frequencies underway by the Europeans and others.

29 Tactical data links involve transmissions of bit-oriented digital information which are exchanged via data links. The
TADIL Program applies to all bit oriented message formats used in support of joint and combined operations for US
Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems and facilitates information exchange between the
US and Allied commands. The Army uses TADIL messages to exchange information with other services and
agencies and with other Allied users. It is a JCS approved standardized communication link suitable for
transmission of machine-readable, digital information. The United States Navy uses the NATO designation, Link-16,
which is synonymous with TADIL J. The latter term is employed only by United States Joint Services. Similarly,
Link-11 is synonymous with TADIL A and Link-4A with TADIL C, FAS (2004). Further information on the
standards involved in the range of TADILs in US and Allied use is provided in Chapter 4.
30 Link-16 is the US DoD and Allied primary tactical data link for command, control, and intelligence, providing
critical joint interpretability and situation awareness information. Link 16 uses a Time Demand Multiple Access
architecture and the "J" message format standard. The "J" series of message standards are designated as the US and
Allied Department of Defense's primary tactical data link.

Leadership is the art of accomplishing more than the science of management says is possible.
Former US Secretary of State and Chairman of the JCS Colin Powell
Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads
that gains the victory. Col. George S. Patton, Jr, Cavalry Journal, 1933

3.0 Background

The ADF has seen a profound renaissance in air armament capabilities since the retirement of
the Mirage and the introduction into service of the F-111C, P-3C and F/A-18 aircraft
platforms in the 1970s and 1980s. This can be readily seen graphically at Figure 3-1.
Since that time, the extant air armament has been integrated onto these platforms and the
Hawk 127 and Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter have also been brought into service.

Figure 3-1. Aircraft Stores Capabilities introduced into ADF Service

(shown in Green) Courtesy ASCENG AOSG.

The ADF is currently operating 17 different aircraft types with over 25 variants that are
capable today of carrying and employing over 100 different types of aircraft stores and some
170 significant variants as shown in Appendix 6 and summarised in Table 3 resulting in over
350 aircraft stores capabilities. This unclassified version of the Table was developed by the
author in 2004 using the ADF capability domain construct and a new taxonomy based on this
course of study as shown at Appendix 6. Appendix 6 can also be used to identify the
Representation of Operations level and force element focus on the level of interoperability
and network enabling. The classified version of the Appendix is being included as a part of

AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) with the specific details of the level of
interoperability shown in the right hand side and should therefore be a helpful tool for
networking abstraction and resource allocations at ASCENG, ARDU and Capability
Development Group. An authoritative reference for unclassified descriptions of the aircraft
stores Australia currently has in service would be exhaustingly, but gratifyingly, lengthy and
is available at ASCENG Air Armament File (2002).
ADF Force Element & Aircraft

Level of Interoperability

NRH-90 AIR 9000 Troop Lift

B737 AEW&C & A330 AAR

MK50 Seaking + Kalkarra


HAWK 127 LIF Trainer
F/RF-111C Aardvark

C-130H/J + Caribou
PC-9A FAC Trainer
Tiger ARH AIR 87

S-70A Blackhawk
CH-47D Chinook

SH-2G Seasprite
S-70B Seahawk

UH-1H Iroquois
F-111G Trainer
F/A-18 Hornet

AIR 7000 ???

Space Based

Supersystem Network
AP-3C Orion

Interface / MACS
Munitions Effect
M&S Available


Aircraft Stores 0 75 63 36 14 5 0 12 16 16 13 13 12 0 16 0 35 0 0 25 0
Capability Totals

193 Army 44 Navy 38 ALG 16 SRG 35 AOSG / AMAFTU Test 25

ADF Certified
Capabilities 351

Table 3 ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Summary see Appendix 6 for further details

In fact, the Minister for Defence at McLachlan (2000) has stated that The ADF has a strong
precision strike capability with its F-111, F/A-18 and P-3C aircraft. Each of these aircraft is
undergoing a program to enhance its precision strike effectiveness, either through a systems
upgrade or new weapons buys, or both. This triad of strike aircraft is the foundation for the
ADFs capability to undertake proactive operations in the defence of Australia, air superiority
and maritime operations. In the Australian Strategic Review, issued by the present
Government in 1997, the following was included for guidance to Canberra defence planners:

all weapons and sensor systems need to include an upgrade or development path so that system
capabilities can be enhanced as part of an ongoing evolution path, or adapted quickly during military
operations to counter an unexpected threat.

This situation and guidance has not substantially changed today, however, the DCP at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004a) is now projecting that the withdrawal of the F-111C
aircraft may occur in the 2010 timeframe and has accordingly increased the long range strike
potential of the F/A-18 and P-3C aircraft until the New Aerospace Combat Capability, which
is most likely to be the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, comes on line. This accurately reflects the
Australian view that military aerospace avionics technology seems to be turning over not
altogether slower than the commercial information systems turnover of systems every 18

months, yet we will continue to have 30 year or even 100 year old aeroplanes as correctly
recognised by Crawford (2000). This applies to aircraft systems that have typically taken 15
years to be fielded and be made fully operationally capable in the life cycle depicted at Figure
3-2. A troubling trend internationally (which has been the sine qua non in Australia) is the
lack of long term aerospace and avionics R&D investment by industry. The challenge for
Australia has been that the majority of aircraft and weapon systems are conceived and
developed overseas and that our Operational Requirements have typically had Initial
Operational Capability dates within five years of the need being identified. Consequently,
the majority of extant Operational Requirements are officially slated to be introduced into
service within the next five years and will undoubtedly occur within the next decade.

ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Certification

Lust to Dust Methodology




0 5
1&2 6



2.1- 98

Figure 3-2 ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Certification Process linkage with
V&V T&E Activities see also Appendices 1, 2 and 3

3.1 Currently Approved ADF Air Armament Acquisitions

Unlike the NCW Roadmap at Commonwealth of Australia (2004b) noted in Chapter 2, there
is somewhat surprisingly no agreed, holistic roadmap for Australian armament as yet,
Meredith (2004). Aerospace Development have been working on an Air Armament
Roadmap with all the other services since the mid 1990s and have drafted a classified Air
Armament Roadmap that remains unapproved as yet. In 2004 Air Force Headquarters has

drafted a classified Offensive Combat Plan that uses the new capability management
construct that identifies inter alia how Air Force air armament progress in the near to medium
term. The author concurs with Meredith (2004) that the current state of play is so
fragmented between each of the services requirements for armament and each force element
group within the services primarily due to the changes to the ADFs logistic support system
within the context of the new capability management system. This can be seen at Appendix
6, by noting that since the defacto level of interoperability included in extant Operational
Requirements Documents is in the main only that of compatible, most ADF air armament is
not interchangeable between the platforms without significant modifications. Director
General Aerospace Development, Air Commodore Chris Deeble, is very keen to rationalise
the ADF weapons inventory and ensure that all future weapons acquired by the ADF are at
least interchangeable between the platforms. Each Force Element Group Commander
currently identifies to their higher HQ, their air armament requirements and Director General
Aerospace Development rides shot-gun on the associated major capabilities. The ever
optimistic WGCDR Meredith believes that such a Roadmap will be made available by
Capability Development Group this calendar year. The current methods by which
prioritisation of air armament is determined must be completely reviewed and implemented
immediately. Whilst the shenanigans over the last few decades in determining how to do this
has been entertaining the impact that this has on changes to operational requirements needing
to be introduced and maintained in service is untenable in the current fiscal environment.

Notwithstanding the lack of a holistic roadmap or even a street directory for Australias
armament in general, the significant unclassified and publicly announced aerospace
acquisitions affecting Australias combat and training aircraft stores capabilities currently
include 1 :

a. Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters with a range of air to ground guided (the US
AGM-114 2 Laser Guided Hellfire missiles), ballistic stores (a 30mm Cannon and
68mm 3 rockets), air to air 4 and EW self-protection capabilities. The Joint Common
Missile (JCM) is being slatted, should its US funding be reinstated, to replace the
AGM-114, when the US brings the JCM into service with the USA and USN. The

1 The specific Initial Operational Capability dates for these aircraft stores capabilities are classified but can be inferred
from review of the DCP at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a). Note that the platform-centric view predominates
based on the current DMO acquisition strategies. Responses to the Sub-problem Questionnaire 1 are also annotated.
2 See the ASCENG Air Armament File (2002) for further details.
3 Vice the 70 mm rockets in use on RAAF F/A-18 and Army Aviations UH-1H aircrafts.

Tiger uses a Eurocopter unique mission planning system. The Hellfires are only
planned to be employed and controlled solely by the Shooter aircraft. Use of
Buddy tactics for in-flight control and targeting is yet to be considered, should it be
found to be technically possible. Unfortunately the Tiger also uses the proprietary
Eurogrid based navigation and mission planning system, that is incompatible with
Link 16 or secure encryption systems and is therefore not currently planned to be
networked with any other ADF C4ISR 5 or engagement grid elements. This is a
significant deficiency in the authors view.

b. Ongoing indigenous software upgrades of the F-111C Avionics Update Program

aircraft with AGM-142 Raptor stand-off weapon with an ASQ-55 Data Link Pod for
control and data linking during flight, AGM-84J Harpoon, MK82 LDGP, MK82
Snakeye, MK82 AIR, MK84 LDGP, GBU-24, GBU-10, GBU-12, AIM-9M, and
(finally) an ALE-47 countermeasure dispensers with a wide range of cool flares and
chaff. The protracted acquisition of the Follow-on Stand-Off Weapon under AIR
5418 is now not being integrated on F-111C aircraft. The AGM-142 is networked
with the launching aircraft and should be compatible with an F-111C AUP Buddy
aircraft providing the control, and targeting, in-flight at longer standoff ranges. Of
the precision guided weapons, the AGM-84 and AIM-9M are launch and leave
weapons and the laser guided weapons aim point may be independently targeted by
any Buddy aircraft or ground based laser designator compliant with ASCC Air
Standards. No other networking of the proposed aircraft stores capabilities is

c. Hawk 127 lead-in fighter aircraft with 15 different stores combinations and EW self-
protection capabilities for lead in training for F/A-18 and F-111C/G aircraft. Very
limited network interfaces are available, nor are any planned apart from the EW
Training System Pod. The Hawk may employ GBU-12 laser guided bombs, but
relies on a Buddy aircraft or a ground based designator for provision of the aim

d. The AP-3C Refurbishment with extant Harpoon AGM-84J, MK46 Mod 5 / MU 90

Eurotorp torpedo and an endless range of Sonobuoys and SUS, new EW self-
protection capabilities and the Verey pistol. The AP-3C platform is the most

4 This would be the ballistically unoptimised 30mm Cannon now - as the air to air missile is now a fitted for, but not
with option that was consciously traded off by the Project Director of the time based on this assumption!
5 Acronym for Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

network capable platform currently in the inventory for C4ISR. Unfortunately
during the AP-3C update, Aerospace Development was unable to gain support for
the upgrade of the independent avionics system used for the armament. The
AGM-84J ARMORD system was upgraded to enable avionics data to be fed to the
Harpoon Control System. The AGM-84 and Torpedoes are launch and leave
systems that are not networked. Therefore the AP-3C has no network capability
with air armament.

e. Boeing 737 Airborne Early Warning & Control & C-130H/J aircrafts with EW self-
protection systems. The AEW&C will be extensively networked with C4ISR and
other compatible players. The C-130H/J is having trouble even getting a SATCOM
system funded for use on the aircraft, Hards (2004).

f. SH-2G Sea Sprite helicopters with AGM-119 Penguin, MK46/Mu90 torpedoes,

MAG-58 door gun and EW self-protection capabilities. The AGM-119 missiles are
planned to be employed and controlled solely by the Shooter aircraft. Use of Buddy
tactics for in-flight control and targeting is yet to be considered, should it be found to
be technically possible. These helicopters perform a forward sensor and intercept
role for a ship which, with the reduce crew can easily be overload. Real
consideration of real-time, sensor-fused feeds to the ship should be made, Joiner

g. F/A-18 Hornet upgrade from 15C to 17C and 19C OFPs, including APG-73 Radar,
ALE-47 EW, Joint Helmet Mounted Sight and BOL EW self-protection capabilities.
Upgrades will include fixes to the deficiencies in interoperability with
communications and Nighthawk FLIR and targeting pod found in the use of the
RAAF F/A-18s during Operation FALCONER / IRAQI FREEDOM.

h. New air to air missiles under AIR 5400 include AIM-120C AMRAAMs for the F/A-
18 ejection and rail launchers and AIM-132 ASRAAMs for F/A-18 wing tip and
underwing rail launchers to replace AIM-9M, and proposals for carriage and
employment from F-111C, AP-3C and Hawk 127 aircrafts. AIM-132 is a launch
and leave missile while the AMRAAM has a data link with the shooter aircraft. It
should be noted that the unclassified road map for these upgrades is included at
Figure 3-3.

Capability Management Combat Enablers - Air

2010 GOALS 2020 GOALS 2025 GOALS

2015 GOALS Fast CMs
Subsonic CMs Low Obs CMs
3rd Party Targeting Low Obs aircraft
Subsonic UAVs (all W x)
Reduced RCS Subsonic UAVs
Lower RCS aircraft aircraft ( all W x) (all Wx)

2030 GOALS
Low Obs A/C
(all W x)
AIR 5400 ASRAAM AIM-132 & A

AIR 54000 AMRAAM Aim-120B & C




AIR 6K F-35A

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030



Figure 3-3 Proposed Hypothetical Roadmap for Aerospace Capability Domain -

developed by the author and Aerospace Development staff in 2002

i. Metric AN/ASQ T-38D TSPI pods for Woomera Test Range using F-111C/G,
F/A-18, AP-3C, C-130H/J, and all helicopters.

j. Mobile anti-radiation, penetration and area denial long range capability under AIR
5418 indicates that one of SLAMER, AGM-158 JASSM or KEPD 350 will be
acquired this decade for F/A-18 and AP-3C. These weapons will all require data
links to be fully capable. The degree of networking is yet to be determined.
BLU-109 penetrator bombs and FMU-152 fuzes for the GBU-24 PAVE WAY III
LGB kits for use from F-111C AUP and F/A-18 aircraft platforms are also be

k. Eurotorp MU 90 replacement light weight torpedoes for AP-3C, S-70B and SH-2G
that is to be interoperable with RAN ships and submarines.

l. Bomb Improvement Programme under AIR 5409 with JDAM and/or Enhanced
PAVE WAY II for F/A-18.

m. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the preferred candidate for the AIR 6000 New Aerospace
Combat Capability. The weapons fit is still to be determined, but it is likely to be
integrated with AGM-158 or KEPD 350, AIM-120C, AIM-9X & AIM-132

ASRAAM, GBU-32 and GBU-38 JDAM, GBU-39 SDB, etc to replace F-111 and
F/A-18 aircraft. An unidentified UCAV is funded to the tune of $ 3.5B AUD in the
DCP at Commonwealth of Australia at (2004a) under Phase 2C. The F-35 is
expected to be a sensor as well as a shooter, and as a battlefield interdiction aircraft
with fully networked capabilities. It is not slatted in the US for primary use in the
air defence and counter air roles.

n. Under AIR 7000 the Boeing 767 MMA has been recently selected by the USN and is
therefore now likely to be the preferred long range maritime patrol aircraft to replace
the AP-3C aircraft and it is expected that an as yet unidentified UAV (such as Global
Hawk) may be within scope. The weapons fit for both aircraft types have not yet
been agreed. Networking can be expected to be extensive.

o. Under AIR 9000, the ADF is replacing the S-70A/B aircraft variants with the
Eurocopter MH-90. The networking is expected to be limited to navigation and
aircrew communication reporting.

p. Under Joint 129 a Tactical UAV is being procured for ISR and possible weapon
payloads for operation by Army, Spencer (2004). The Tactical UAV is expected to
be extensively networked for ISR.

q. JP 66 seeks to buy an air target replacement for the JP7 Kalkarra MQM-107E
operated by the RAN.

Based on these approved acquisitions and platform mid-life updates, DSTO, JALO, ARDU
and ASCENG will need to continue to have the capacity to issue between 40 and 50
Similarity Survey and Flight Clearances per year for Experimental T&E, an ever increasing
number of Operational T&E and in support of the introduction into service of verified and
validated (V&Ved) capabilities 6 .

Until AIR 6000 and 7000 Operational Concepts are finalised in the near future, there is
therefore currently little interoperable network enabling of air armament formally identified
for use in the short and medium term. These Operational Concepts must therefore clearly
identify the upgrade or development path planned for the evolution of these capabilities for

6 This explains why ASCENG has been averaging between 40 and 60 Flight Clearances for over a decade and this
obviously doesnt add up to the 350 aircraft stores capabilities currently certified and in service. This is primarily due to
the variants of aircraft and the stores changing. A new Flight Clearance is issued whenever there is a significant change
which a change in variant nomenclature is usually a good indicator somethings different. For example, there have
been three significantly different F-111 aircraft variants (the primarily analogue F-111C and the digital F-111G both
using independent avionics (see Chapter 4), and the F-111C Avionics Updated Aircraft using federated avionics) for

them to remain relevant for use of the Follow-on standoff weapon, GBU-39 Small Diameter
Bomb and other future miniature munitions undergoing concept demonstration programs.

3.2 The Longer Term Future

I confess that in 1901, I said to Orville that man would not fly for 50 years
Ever since, I have distrusted myself and avoided all predictions. Wilbur Wright

As General Mike Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff and former exchange pilot with the RAAF,
stated at the RAAF Air Power Conference in 2000 at Ryan (2000) air and space power is
increasingly capable and increasingly preferred. Our ability to rapidly employ with precision,
while applying asymmetric strategies has increased significantly in this decade. We know
we can get inside an adversaries decision cycle and force to fight on our terms. To that end,
we submit that we will be able to find, fix, track, target and engage anything of significance
in near real time early in the 21st century. With information superiority and precision
engagement, opportunities for creating and exploring option to force rapid compliance have
been and will continue to be increased. Although this is the USAF perspective and only the
USAF has the resources to be able to speak of full spectrum dominance 7 , this state is what
all the other air forces aspire to in some form, to coin a phrase used by an erudite Allison
(2000). Notwithstanding the force size difference, smaller air forces can still bring the
enemy under parallel attack as conceptualised by Ryan (2000) et al to put them in a position
from which they cannot react effectively putting their system into shock, Warden (2000).
Political concerns in Australia also demand that we minimise casualties amongst both
civilians and our own troops with the application of force being made with precision to
minimise collateral damage. Where are these imperatives leading us?

Although there will almost certainly be manned military aircraft needed for a considerable
number of years for the supply and sustainment of deployed forces by transport aircraft for
example, there will remain for some time yet, the need for manned aircraft to perform some
combat air power roles. Many contemporary defence analysts believe, however, that for
most technologically advanced nations capable of using information warfare 8 then the
penchant for UAVs will translate into Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) for the

which Flight Clearances and Capability Certificates have been issued and in the case of the analogue F-111C withdrawn
with the successful V&V of the upgrades.
7 Erbschloe (2003) has stated that the attributes of the [USAF] 21st Aerospace Force are not just battlefield dominance but:
omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence!

8 This is subject to the Holy Grail of reliable, secure high bandwidth communications being available to provide
sufficient situational awareness.

carriage and delivery of air armament in the air to air and air to ground roles 9 . For high risk
missions that carry a high potential for the loss of a flight crew, UCAVs will eventually
become the weapon system of choice 10 . For Australia, the previous Defence Minister has
stated that he has not prejudged whether the Hornet replacement will be a piloted aircraft
and has initiated a discussion paper with industry so that the replacement aircraft can remain
in service until 2050. The author will go further than this, as documented originally at Tutty
(2000), and shown diagrammatically at Figure 3-3, Australia still has a rare opportunity with
the demise of the F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft platforms to re-enter the aerospace industry and
not be continually beholden to overseas oligarchies, if it takes up the Evolved F-111
concept raised by Australian industry or more importantly the UAV and UCAV challenge. If
Australia can take charge of a program like this and not let it turn into the traditional UK and
US cash-cow based programs that need billions of dollars to feed all the national agendas
and hangers on, it is possible. The ADF and DSTO are sponsoring numerous
experimentation programs with uninhabited vehicles, including UAVs, that Dr Anthony Finn
amongst others are collaborating with industry and academia to explore the mature of
numerous operating concepts. To whit, DSTO recently conducted a successful integrated air
to ground trial at the Woomera Test Range approved by the author during which the UAVs
were controlled by operators at Tinton Falls, NJ, USA via the Iridium satellite network,
Nandagopol (2004). This is a very significant milestone in the maturity of truly global low
cost UAV command and control. Numerous other autonomous trials of uninhabited vehicles
are underway for demonstration at the Woomera Test Range over the forthcoming years that
should continue to be monitored to ascertain the level of maturity involved in the more
advanced concepts being explored.

Figure 3-4 graphically shows some of the many options for the manned aerospace combat
capability that are being postulated. It should be noted that Kopp (2004) and other defence
analysts now predict that the preferred F-35 solution for the AIR 6000 NACC will not be
available until at least 2018. Such a roadmap, with incorporation of the anticipated
acquisition of an Australian indigenous UCAV would be extremely enlightening. Such a
solution, if tied to our national capability needs with the evolution of the F-111, is capable of
delivering in the 2025 timescale, a Jindivik sized and styled aircraft manufactured in

9 Some defence analysts have gone as far as to say that the US/UK F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may well be the last manned
US strike aircraft to go into service for the attack/strike roles. Similarly some European commentators believe that the
Rafale, Gripen and Eurofighter/Typhoon may well be the last manned European strike aircraft.
10 Note that Wynne (2004) provides one recent note of caution from the US Office of the Secretary of Defence in expressing
concern with the current US penchant for increasing the size and hence the cost of such aircraft in the last year or two.

Australia at significantly less cost than buying one of the traditionally accepted overseas
solutions. We can then fix any problems that arise in our own time and not be held ransom
by the other national agendas, that always seem to cost us more in terms of time or additional

Figure 3-4 Proposed RAAF Force Restructure - from Kopp (2004)

The continued evolution of the F-111, would enable developments in the key areas of
engines, structures, avionics and networking with a relatively known baseline of aircraft that
could see cooperation amongst Australian Industry. As a remote sovereign nation, Australia
needs to be in control of its own destiny in at least one area of aerospace. This capability has
the most potential for a potent self reliance in the longer term. If the Operational Concept
were limited initially to an unmanned platform designed to carry two 1000 class warheads,
with two AIM-120 or GBU-39 SDB missiles internally and optional AIM-132 missiles
externally for a 500nm combat radius, then why cant it be done? As shown at Figure 3-5 an
unrefuelled combat radius of 500nm gives the required flexibility over the oil and gas rich
north-west shelf. The significance of this is that strategically most international tensions are
a result of the control of water and the worlds remaining stocks of oil 11 . Significant shifts in

11 See Barnett (2004) for an interesting treatise on the implications of fossil based fuels.

power by 2025 are expected if the alternatives to shortages of drinkable water or alternative
fuel technologies are not found 12 , particularly in regard to the expansion of India and China.

Figure 3-5 Northwest Australia and aircraft operating radius courtesy Kopp (2004)

However, the ADF and defence leadership, has been so adverse to any lateral thinking in
aerospace since the helicopters and UAVs were so dramatically handed over to an ill prepared
Army 13 and the government closed the Government Aircraft Factory. Defence and the
government has become so risk adverse on setting a true vision for the nascent aerospace
industry (such that numerous allies comment repeatedly on it) with a cultural cringe mentality
worse than that evidenced in the arts, the author sees little chance of such an opportunity
being seized by government or by industry. The author would like to see some vision and
leadership for a modest aerospace industry and the ADF being directed to support Australian
industry with actual work rather than the current offerings based on the extant Australian
Industry Involvement policy.

12 Of course, If Barnett and other are right this raises fundamental questions about buying a fighter based on fossil
based fuels that will not go into service until 2018 and may supposedly be in service for 30 to 50 years but
well leave that for future research and options analyses.
13 Who, I might add, are doing just as well with them in most areas as the RAAF would have done and a lot better than
Navy with the Kalkarra system they are expected to operate.

What should the ADFs UCAV look like? There is obviously a lot of speculation on the
tradeoffs for low observability, survivability, manouvreability, agility, interoperability with
existing legacy systems and the total cost of the UCAV platform 14 . The only givens for
UCAVs are that they will still need to be able to carry and employ/jettison stores for attacking
targets at extended ranges (with respect to the launch of the aircraft and the employment of
the stores from the aircraft) using secure data links from the UCAV to a separate 15 C2
Facility and they will probably need self protection, be it flares/chaff or, preferably in the
authors estimation, active systems. UCAVs will undoubtedly be using some measures of
affordable low observable technology for all of the electromagnetic spectrum.

The major challenge will be attaining the level of reliability and security in the command
links before weapons arming and employment is made, Tutty (2004). If the shift to an all
UCAV aerospace force were to eventually occur, there may be problems in what may become
groundcrew flying the UCAV and their appreciating the air environment and the subtler
airmanship skills. There may also well be a problem with the public coming to grips with
armed UCAVs. Notwithstanding any possible airmanship problems 16 with UCAVs carrying
weapons, the Command & Control of UAVs has not yet represented such problems, which
may only become realised when there are no strike or fighter pilots, as we currently know
them, some time in the longer term.

The many lessons learned over the last 50 years with the use of secure communications links
need be utilised with this next family of weapons to ensure that not only the current aircraft
stores capabilities meet agreed Operational Requirements, but that we plan for the next
generation. For example, the author would suggest that while we have a pilot with the ability
to prevent inadvertent weapons releases we should be experimenting with advanced data link
concepts for the operational use of weapons such as the AGM-142E. A Concept
Demonstration should be instituted when the weapon has been introduced into service as part
of the ADF NCW experimentation whereby a C2 Facility mentioned above, rather than an
F-111C, controls the weapon via a secure data link on a test range throughout its flight, but
with an F-111C crew ready to control or override should the data link to the aircraft fail. To
that end, secure and reliable flight termination systems should be factored into all stand-off

14 See Bird (2003) for some graduate level research done by ADFA for the author last year. There will be significantly
more research to be done in this area given the stated importance of UAVS in the Aerospace Sector Plan of 2004.
15 Be it airborne, shipborne or land based, just to avoid being tarred with the parochialism charge here, of course.
16 We should not be offended by such problems especially for autonomously operated UAVs flying in the presence of
manned aircraft. This is a non-trivial exercise to satisfy the Chicago Convention (See Appendix 5 for an explanation of

weapons designed for test and training purposes and should even be considered for combat
operations with the next generation of smart, miniature munitions.

Meyer (2003) is a very interesting paper that documents the implications of US experience
with UAVs in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Joint Uninhabited Combat Air System (J-UCAS)
developments being lead by DARPA for use by the USAF (currently experimenting with
DARPA with Boeings X-45A and planning a huge X-45C), USA (with a range of tactical
UAV systems, and the USN (currently experimenting with DARPA and the Northrup
Grumman X-47). The main US technology thrust with UAVs are in mission control, vehicle
autonomy, air vehicle deconfliction, force wide connectivity, bandwidth expansion and
spectrum management. Some of the solutions are not to build bigger data pipes but to
incorporate greater processing capabilities into the UCAV with miniaturised electronics to
automate more of the sensor, exploitation and dissemination processes. Meyer (2003)
concludes with the prosaic thought that what can be technically achieved generally exceeds
what is operationally desirable and potentially affordable. Experimentation will hopefully
see the development of networked UCAV systems that support future joint warfighting
concepts. Interestingly, the ultimate winner of such a joint UCAV competition may well be
a very large UCAV if the USAFs current philosophies for the proposed X-45C enable that
vehicle to operate on carriers. Such a solution may not suit an ADF UCAV concept of
operations due to the high per unit cost and the extensive logistic support arrangements
required for the US styled systems.

3.3 ADF Network Enabled Acquisitions

The NCW Roadmap at Commonwealth of Australia (2004b) noted in Chapter 2 identifies the
following acquisition programs that should affect air armament operations using the JWCA
based NCW construct as follows:

a. Sensor Grid. Collection and distribution of ISR data remains a resource intensive
requirement that requires development in the context of an overall ADF information
infrastructure. A range of initiatives such as AIR 5333 (Vigilare), AIR 5077
(AEW&C), JP 2025 (JORN), JP 7013 (JISS) and JP 2044 (Space-based Surveillance)
are addressing identified intelligence deficiencies.

b. Information Grid. JP 2072 (Battlespace Communications Land/Air), JP 2089

(Tactical Information Environment (TIE) Domain) and SEA 1442 (maritime
Communications are addressing identified deficiencies in the ADFs tactical


c. Command & Control Grid. The ADF can provide effective C4 on secure systems
around the world to support geographically separated small-scale ADF deployments.
JP 2030 (Joint Command Support System/Maritime Command Support System/Air
Command Support System) and LAND 75 (Battlefield Command Support System) are
addressing identified deficiencies in the ADFs C2 capabilities. JP 2077 (Improved
Logistics Information Systems) are addressing identified logistics systems capability

d. Engagement Grid. JP 2089 is providing tactical data links to network the ADFs
engagement systems. The DCP at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a) is also
planning to address other deficiencies in the ADFs Engagement Systems. As noted
earlier in this Chapter, elements of the identified projects include an interface here.
Some deficiencies will need to be addressed until the prototype networks is used and
discovers new methods of distributing effects in the battlespace by experimentation
to determine the optimum balance of sensors to engagement systems required to
generate the right effects at the correct location and time in the battlespace.
Unfortunately, all the extant networks involving air armament are proprietary and
typically limited to point to point communications offering little in the way of true
networking opportunities. Similarly, the mission planning and munitions
effectiveness tools have traditionally been proprietary and do not communicate
directly with the C4ISR networks. The Theatre Battle Management Control System
has been acquired by HQAC which provides a great degree of Air Tasking Order
connectivity throughout Air Command and also enables Munitions Effectiveness
planning using the somewhat dated JMEMs (1994) software to be used on the JP 2030
ACSS network. HQAC is seeking further updates of JMEMs to better match current
aircraft performance.

The Office of the Chief Information Officer (now lead by AVM John Monaghan, an Air
Force engineer) is responsible for the Defence Information Environment (DIE). The
Information Systems Division in Corporate Support Group provides information technology
and telecommunication infrastructure, networks and systems to the ADO. The OCIO plans
to have the Next Generation Network for the DIE in 2010 and the Network after Next by
2015. The key to the Next Generation Network are JP 2072, JP 2089, SEA 1442, JP 2043
(HF Modernisation), JP 2047 (Defence Wide Area Communications Network), JP 2008

(MILSATCOM), JP 2068 (Defence Network Operations Centre), JP 2069 (High Grade
Cryptographic Equipment) and JP 2090 (Combined Information Environment which will
deliver the capacity for the ADF to collaborate with the US, UK, Canada and NZ),
Commonwealth of Australia (2004b) Section 4.

Commonwealth of Australia (2004b) also provides a comprehensive assessment of the

interoperability, organisational and cultural issues that will be endemic in achieving this.
Canale (2004) also documents the fundamental changes being implemented to address the
funding for the DIE, definition of the corporate governance structure of the DIE and the
Enterprise Architecture Program based on concerns from the Inspector general, and the
authority to encompass all the current and future direction of the DIE as mandated by the
Defence Committee in August 2004.

To address concerns raised at the ministerial level with the interoperability of Australia with
US and NATO forces during recent coalition operations a Director General for
Interoperability was created early in 2004. This office, headed by Air Commodore Dave
Pietsch (Retd), and staffed with senior officers from all three services is planning to work
closely with the ASCC, ABCA and CCEB agencies to address the specific concerns raised
and to also better identify the level of interoperability being implemented by the DMO is
support of the services. One particular issue for the future will be the interoperability of the
DIE with the US and coalition architectures.

3.4 ADF Air Power Capabilities End-States

In November the author was fortunate enough to attend the ADFs Defence College for
participation in several weeks of levels on capability management, futures, preparedness and
discussing the grand strategic levels of wars in general. With that sort of motivation, the
following end-states were predicted at Tutty (2000) 17 :

Tactical UAVs IOC 18 2005 - two squadrons with approximately 25 expendable

$ 1 M/platforms 19 such a vehicle and software constantly need to be updated every
five years, one OCU squadron which converts to Extended Range ISR UAVs for all

17 Note that the IOC dates intentionally skewed left by 24 months so that DMO might react quicker and achieve what the
author considered to be actual IOC dates!
18 IOC = Initial Operational Capability, FOC = Follow-on Capability, PWD = Planned Withdrawal Date.
19 That is about the final cost of the Kalkarra Target Drone after DMO was finished with their processes. Note also that the
figures cited are in real US dollars of 2000 and not the AUD pesos of the day.

UAV training 20 .

Extended Range ISR UAV by IOC 2007 21 - two squadrons of approximately 20 long
range & time surveillance/reconnaissance & AEW&C by 2010 and communications
relay to UCAV and AEW&C, long lifed, $ 30M/platform and an extra 50M for

Last Manned dual roled fighter/attack aircraft 22 IOC 2010 - two squadrons and one
OCU (also doing F-111 & UCAV training) with 40 $ 100M aircraft for air defence &
long range precision strike requiring man in the loop at the target.

UCAVs tri roled (strike, air defence & surveillance/reconnaissance) IOC 2012 23 -
IOC of two squadrons and FOC of four squadrons with 60 indigenously designed and
manufactured expendable $ 8-10 M/platforms for high risk, tailored missions,

Hawk 127 Attack capability FOC 2010 - three squadrons with 50 indigenously
redesigned aircraft and accurate and precise interdiction and air defence roles
formalised with new podded gun to match LMFA ammunition.

AEW&C should be cancelled until NCW technology is mature at 2015 - but expect
IOC of 2007 with four mature aircraft and update software every five years and updated
in 2015 with self protection and controlling UAV and UCAVs

Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters IOC 2005 - one Sqn (of 15 Mature
aircraft) and upgrade standardised helicopter with common Precision Guided Munitions
& 30 mm gun - retire all other helicopters!

F-111C long range precision strike & recon & air defence to PWD of UCAV
+ 2 Yrs - one squadron (15 aircraft) fully deployable and refuellable - inability to make
a decision countered by cost of ownership

20 This is being progressed under JP 129.

21 This one was not difficult at the time as this is what the Defence Minister had just publicly announced the interest in the
RQ-4 Global Hawk. This capability is still be progressed in conjunction with AIR 7000.
22 The [so-called] Last Manned Fighter Aircraft [remember that after the McLachlan (2000) announcement at the Air Power
Symposium it was certainly not guaranteed that an F-111 or F/A-18 aircraft replacement would necessarily be manned]
has to be a mature aircraft of true deterrence and its expected sales limited to potential adversaries - meaning the F-22
with an air to ground role by this IOC [and still be possible by the PWD of the F/A-18 today] would be the sole choice!
Fights on. [The author still stands by this fine-print assertion that the F-22 should have been the prime aircraft of
choice! The F-35 is an close air support and battlefield air interdiction aircraft with an air defence role playing at
being a fighter, while the F-22 will have an air to air second to none and an internal air to ground capability before, and
the equal of in terms of Australias weapon needs. There is no capability that the F-35 will have that the F-22 cant or
will not have already. The F-35 will NOT have the stealth, range, agility and speed of the F/A-22, nor will it have any
real combat capability for Australia before 2018 at the very earliest! An assertion supported by Goon & Kopp (2004)].

F/A-18s with dual role to PWD of LMFA + 5 Years - two squadrons and one OCU
(50 aircraft OCU also training on four F-111), no major hardware/software updates
after HMS & HUG Ph 2 are completed.

Maritime Patrol aircraft extended to PWD of 2025 with one squadron ASW, RLWT,
air defence & interoperable weapons for UCAV & LMFA.

Boeing 707 Air to Air Refuelling Retired Immediately and Replaced 24 .

Replacement should by another common, more modern aircraft and a Buddy aircraft
refuelling pod capability also acquired to reduce reliance on such limited numbers of

Note - If the US doesnt pursue Miniaturised Munitions in place of a lot of air to ground
ordnance, and High Energy Lasers in place of guns, Australia must consider these for
all the above scenarios as priority R&D efforts.

Four years on and the author is not doing so badly given the changes in strategic situation
since 2000. It will be interesting to see how these predictions pan out now that some of the
activities are through several of the Committee milestones and are already underway in

The ADF also needs to put in place a whole of life munitions effectiveness program for
armament to ensure that the latest effectiveness information is available on C4 networks to
enable enhanced mission planning by C2 squadron personnel and the reachback to DSTO
and AOSG.

Mission Planning Systems. Spencer (2004) notes that the current aircraft mission planning
tools, which are being replaced with the Portable Flight Planning System and Joint Mission
Planning Systems, also need to be better factored into the acquisition program. To date such
acquisitions have been fragmentary and ad hoc and show little interoperability between stand-
alone packages. In future such systems will use Ipv4 or Ipv6 to move data around between
systems more easily, Hards (2004). These systems need to be fully integrated into the like of
the Theatre Battle Management Core System and the ADFs future ATO processes to provide
better options analyses and need to be seamlessly integrated with munitions effectiveness
modules to better optimise weapons delivery for the aircrew. This will require the V&V of

23 Introduction of a meaningful UCAV is to drive F-111 PWD and F/A-18 A-G PWD, not the other way
around. A UCAV would still be achievable under existing funding approved for AIR 6000.
24 This change has now been progressed with an IOC date of approximately 2009.

the aerodynamics and weapons performance figures involved, potentially using the CDGs
Aerospace Battlelab Capability proposal for operation by DSTO.

Aerospace Battlelab Capability. Farrier, Appla & Chadwick (2004) provides a detailed
insight into the development of the Aerospace Battlelab Capability (or ABC). This
capability is central to the ADFs ability for aerospace experimentation and a whole of life
M&S capability to be V&Ved and managed properly to enable crews to conceptualise a
proposed Mission and practice its implementation to determine its feasibility. As combat
operations will hinge on such simulations, the models need to have far better fidelity and be
part of an ongoing V&V process. It is proposed that the ADF Aerospace Operational
Support Group will play a central role in coordinating the application of the ABC to flight
tests including use of the Woomera Test Range using information from and injecting artificial
entities, into flying operations as shown at Figure 2-6. The general concept id that not only
will instrumented data come off the ranges for analysis and interaction with distributed
systems, but that the shared awareness can have other entities that will enhance the
experiment and/or training value. This is a particularly exciting initiative and one that will
serve to significantly reduce the risk of integrating such complex systems and operating
concepts at least at the mission level. Extensive use of Distributed Information Systems and
the High Level Architecture of ANSI/IEEE 1278.1-1995 and ANSI/IEEE 1516.3-2003 have
been made to determine the ability of such widely distributed systems to simulate flying
operations. ANSI/IEEE 1278.4-1997 also provides guidance as to the V&V associated with
such implementations. It is also planned for the ABC to be connected to the Woomera Test
Range for live interaction into and out of the Test Range during test and or instrumented
training operations.

Test and Training Range network enabling.

The US has been aggressively pursuing improvements to the test and training ranges for a
number of years. Based on funding from the Central Test & Evaluation Investment Program
run by the Office of the Secretary of Defense numerous GPS and range data links have been
conceptualised, prototyped, demonstrated and developed. Of particular interest is the Joint
Advanced Missile Instrumentation project to implement modular instrumentation packages
that will dramatically reduce the size and improve the interoperability of flight termination,
TSPI and vector-scoring of future weapons on US and Allied ranges, Bock, McDonald, Merts
and Fayman (2004). Such systems are now in the prototype stages of development and,
when used in conjunction with the proposed US Weapon Data Link Architecture (see Chapter

4) this will be a potent improvement to test and instrumented training operations for air
armament. The Foundation Initiative 2010 was established by the U.S. Department of
Defense to create a new infrastructure for DoD Range interoperability. The Foundation
Initiative 2010 organization, in partnership with the user community, created an advanced
middleware product called TENA (Test and Training Enabling Architecture). TENA directly
targets the interoperability and reuse needs of networked aerospace
applications by defining:
A standard mechanism for efficiently communicating structured
data (objects) over networks

Pre-engineered vendor-neutral interfaces for common aerospace objects as well as a

powerful extension mechanism for creating new interfaces.

TENA defines general-purpose objects that represent telemetry - and range - related entities
such as radar systems, telemetry feeds, aircraft and other moving objects, and time/space
coordinates. For example, a complex operation such as retrieving the real-time coordinates of
an aircraft becomes a call to a TENA function such as aircraft time and spatial position
information. TENA middleware communicates over any IP network, initial applications are
now starting on US test ranges and will be available for use by Australia shortly. A more
complete description of TENA (and the graphic in great detail) is available at Cannon (2004)
and the distributed object computing middleware at Noseworthy (2002).

Of equal importance to TENA is the Next Generation Range Instrumentation (called NexRI)
and the instrumentation NETwork (called iNET) initiatives of the USAF. Range
Instrumentation Systems, Air Combat Support, Air Armament Center, at Eglin AFB, Fl, plans
to award a sole source contract to Rockwell Collins (who has also won a contract for the
Weapon data Link Architecture Concept Demonstration phase) for the follow-on phases to
the current Next Generation Range Instrumentation Tactical Targeting Network
Technology 25 -to-Range Instrumentation Waveform running through FY07 where each phase
builds upon the previous phase. A sole source contract was identified as the only way to
ensure the P5 Combat Training Systems 26 proposed for all US ranges and F-35 JSF will meet
schedule requirements to begin integration for JTRS compliance by 2007. JTRS compliance
is the first step to permit interoperability of test and training range systems by FY09. The
iNET study seeks to incorporate developments in network operation into the telemetry

25 See Chapter 4 for further detail.

26 See for a description of this.

networks available at US ranges to ensure that test and training ranges are able to collect the
data needed during network enabled testing.

The preliminary concept of operations for the network enabling of the Woomera Test Range
with other actors and the DSTO Aerospace Battlelab Capability is also provided at Figure
3-6. It is envisioned that this will available in line with the ADF NCW Roadmap in 2018
timeframe and will enable information to be communicated into and out of the range on a
near real time basis.

Horizon 3 Concept of Operations

Network enabled
Satellites Surveillance

Targets RSO / Chase

Tester & XX

FTS Woomera
Range Control Centre

Kine R1 / MPS-36 HQ JOC
Kine R2 Surveillance
Ground-based links Target data-link
Link-16 Satellite data-link
SETE 2004 Adelaide 19
AFHQ & Govt

Figure 3-6 Woomera Test Range Concept of Operations for Network Enabling
in the medium to long term courtesy of the author at Impett & Tutty (2004)

The future of warfare - its only about the networking of the platforms and the personnel using them, most
people in defence cant or wont understand this paradigm shift. Layton (2004)

4.0 Background on Australian Military Avionic Systems

An avionic architecture describes the form, fit, function, and interface characteristics of the
hardware and software elements that characterise the airborne mission system. The
evolution of avionic systems include, from JAST (1994) and Filmer (2003) 27 :

Independent. Separate and independent functions with dedicated sensors

connected by point-to-point wiring.

Figure 4-1

Federated. Each function (eg the radar, stores management system or flight
control system) has dedicated hardware and software for signal and data processing
and is physically set apart within the air vehicle. The individual system data
processors and the mission computers are connected via time division multiplex
busses that reduce the amount of wiring within the airframe and permit the sharing
of key information. The aircraft Operational Flight Program, usually hosted on the
main aircraft Mission Computers, provides the control and coordination of the
federated systems and functions in support of the operational role of the aircraft.

Figure 4-2

27 The graphics are very illustrative and are included courtesy of Filmer (2003).

Integrated. Common hardware and software modules could be utilised in a
building block approach and have been implemented to reduce life cycle costs and
take advantage of the advances were being made in data fusion digital signal
processors that allowed complex processing of radio frequency and electro-optic
sensors and display symbol generators.

Figure 4-3

Advanced-integrated. An Open Systems Architecture (OSA) is

implemented with an extensive use of commercial of the shelf (COTS)
hardware and software, further digitisation and grouping of radio frequency
and electro-optic sensor processing functions and an increased focus on

Figure 4-4

OSA plays a major part in meeting the US DoDs goal of modernising weapon systems,
developing and deploying new systems required for 21st century warfare, and supporting
these systems over their total life cycle, Open Systems Joint Taskforce (2001). Of interest,
is that while the mission systems are being tightly coupled, the flight control system and the
stores management system were left loosely coupled to the core processing system, Filmer
(2003). This reflects the differences in proposed life cycle changes for different functions and
the corresponding issues relating to aircraft certification and acceptance for flight and safety
critical systems.

The OSA utilises well-supported commercial interface standards in developing systems,
using modular design concepts. The OSA approach aims to reduce acquisition and life
cycle costs, readily include new technology, focus on common equipment and re-use
hardware and software. Winter (2002) concludes that the concept therefore supports
evolutionary acquisition, due to the shorter life cycle of the equipment, this can mean
hardware can be modified to operate with extant software and vice versa.

Australian experience with the design, operation and support of military avionic systems has
predominantly been with:

independent avionics architectures with the DHC4 Caribou transport, UH-1H

Iroquois helicopter, and the MB-326 Macchi trainer aircraft; and
federated avionics architectures with the F/A-18 Hornet, post Avionics Update
Programme F-111 and AP-3C aircrafts, Hawk 127 jet trainer and SH-2G helicopter.

Although the three ADF services, DSTO and Australia-based contractors such as Boeing and
British Aerospace Systems are conducting some research and engineering development,
DSTO at Filmer (2003), have recognised that such work is focused on optimising the systems
already in-service. Overseas research and development has been primarily focused within
the USA and Europe, although the extensive aircraft industry restructuring of the 1990s has
seen research funding curtailed such that major developments have been focused into the
following areas:

Integrated avionics architectures in aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor, Eurofighter and
the Eurocopter Tiger 28 to reduce life-cycle costs and take advantage of the advances
were being made in data fusion digital signal processors that allowed complex
processing of radio frequency and electro-optic sensors and display symbol

Advanced-integrated avionics architectures are now being implemented and tested

on the aircraft such as the US and UK F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as shown at Figure
4-5 29 .

28 The Australian Government has committed to purchasing the Tiger as the primary basis of AIR 87 for an
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter capability by 2007. The aircraft recently officially met its Initial In-
Service Date on 15 December 2004 with flights in Australia on the date that was contracted for - using test pilots
from AOSG.
29 This aircraft has been proposed by the Australian Government for replacing the F-111 and F/A-18 as the basis of
the AIR 6000 for a New Aerospace Combat Capability aircraft, currently postulated to be in the 2012

Figure 4-5. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Proposed Open System Architecture
courtesy JAST (1994)

4.1 So what is an OSA or an OSI?

MOSA (2004) provides the best straight explanation in current terminology of the OSA and
its importance. As shown in the Glossary, the definition of the key interfaces by the use of
open, consensus based standards, is vital. Open standards allow programs to leverage
commercially funded or developed technologies and take advantage of increased competition,
MOSA (2004) p 4. This policy has been explicitly approved by the US DoD in regulation
DOD 5000.2R since June of 2000. The time is now right to start levering off the computing
industry development in having interoperable computing and networks in the military

= interfaces
= uses open standards
= key interfaces


OS Key Interfaces Courtesy MOSA (2004) Figure 1

Figure 4-6 Aircraft Avionic Open Systems Architecture and Interconnection

versus time to obsolescence courtesy Winter (2002) and ALWI-2 (2004)

Meanwhile, OSI stands for Open System Interconnection, an ISO standard 30 for worldwide
communications that defines a networking framework for implementing protocols in seven

30 See for a list of all

the standards.

layers. Control is passed from one layer to the next, starting at the application layer in one
station, proceeding to the bottom layer, over the channel to the next station and back up the
hierarchy. At one time, most vendors agreed to support OSI in one form or another, but OSI
was too loosely defined and proprietary standards were too entrenched. Except for the OSI-
compliant X.400 and X.500 e-mail and directory standards, which are widely used, what was
once thought to become the universal communications standard now serves as the teaching
model for all other protocols.

The Webopedia (2004) identifies the seven layers, as shown above, as follows (with dynamic
links to the website retained):

This layer supports application and end-user processes. Communication partners are identified, quality of service is
identified, user authentication and privacy are considered, and any constraints on data syntax are identified. Everything
Application at this layer is application-specific. This layer provides application services for file transfers, e-mail, and other network
(Layer 7) software services. Telnet and FTP are applications that exist entirely in the application level. Tiered application
architectures are part of this layer.

This layer provides independence from differences in data representation (e.g., encryption) by translating from
Presentation application to network format, and vice versa. The presentation layer works to transform data into the form that the
(Layer 6) application layer can accept. This layer formats and encrypts data to be sent across a network, providing freedom from
compatibility problems. It is sometimes called the syntax layer.

This layer establishes, manages and terminates connections between applications. The session layer sets up, coordinates,
Session and terminates conversations, exchanges, and dialogues between the applications at each end. It deals with session and
(Layer 5) connection coordination.

Transport This layer provides transparent transfer of data between end systems, or hosts, and is responsible for end-to-end error
(Layer 4) recovery and flow control. It ensures complete data transfer.

This layer provides switching and routing technologies, creating logical paths, known as virtual circuits, for transmitting
Network data from node to node. Routing and forwarding are functions of this layer, as well as addressing, internetworking, error
(Layer 3) handling, congestion control and packet sequencing.

At this layer, data packets are encoded and decoded into bits. It furnishes transmission protocol knowledge and
management and handles errors in the physical layer, flow control and frame synchronization. The data link layer is
Data Link divided into two sublayers: The Media Access Control (MAC) layer and the Logical Link Control (LLC) layer. The
(Layer 2) MAC sublayer controls how a computer on the network gains access to the data and permission to transmit it. The LLC
layer controls frame synchronization, flow control and error checking.

This layer conveys the bit stream - electrical impulse, light or radio signal -- through the network at the electrical and
Physical mechanical level. It provides the hardware means of sending and receiving data on a carrier, including defining cables,
(Layer 1) cards and physical aspects. Fast Ethernet, RS232, and ATM are protocols with physical layer components.

Logan (2003), Filmer (2003), Winter (2002), Azani (2001) et al all provide details of the
benefits to total life cycle costs that such a strategy is now bringing to Defence across all
platforms, not just a single platform. One of the main reasons this has become so important
today, is that the platforms and software code / programming language chosen are both being
used for extended periods of time, but the avionics hardware the software is hosted on, is
being subjected to replacement cycles of 18 months per Moores Law as shown in Figure
4-6 from Filmer (2003) and Winter (2002). Filmer (2003) provides the best discussion of the
implications this affect has on airworthiness and type certification for aerospace. It is
absolutely vital that the software applications become independent of the hardware it is
hosted on. Except for the most dire of extremely high speed processing applications, the use

of OSA techniques means that hardware may be future be upgraded independently based on
sound commercial principles. Filmer (2003) also discusses the need for this hardware to be
form, fit and functionally independent of the platform. He notes that the environment that the
hardware is qualified to, is vital to ensure that the reliability and interchangeability between
the platforms is possible. Given that an aircraft must communicate with its stores, how is
this planned in a digital aircraft? As mentioned already the primary future mechanisms are
an enhanced MIL-STD-1553 at Military Standard (1996), MIL-STD-3014 Military Standard
(2004) and MIL-STD-1760D at Military Standard (2004a).

Digital Interconnection of Aircraft and Stores - MIL-STD-1760. In the mid-1970s it

became apparent that the electrical interconnection of digital communication system would be
vital to the future interoperability of smart weapons. The standard at Military Standard
(2004a) and the MIL-HDBK-1760 directs the use of MIL-STD-1553 Military Standard
(1996) compatible waveforms and data structures and establishes the shape, pin-out and
location of the connectors. After 30 years, however, we are yet to see a fully MIL-STD-
1760B or MIL-STD-1760C 31 aircraft weapon system. This is not through any lack of will,
but is endemic with legacy aircraft and weapon systems when use of agreed standards is not
clearly mandated in the operational concept across the life cycle. Note that the actual data
being transmitted via a MIL-STD-1760 connection has been left intentionally up to the
aircraft stores integrator to design and implement. This has, not surprisingly perhaps,
resulted in the proliferation of weapon specific/proprietary OFP modules in the Aircraft OFP.
The cost of this outcome and the resulting poor interoperability in the cost of such a
fragmented approach to aircraft OFP software management has now also become untenable.
The socalled Miniature Munitions Standard Interface at shown at Figure 4-7 is a subset of the
MIL-STD-1760 at Military Standard (2004a) with a reduced form factor. Needless to say,
this standard and the MMSI are extremely vital links in the networking for the future Plug &
Play Weapon. This will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

31 The F-35 JSF is incorporating MIL-STD-1760C and use of the MIL-STD-3014 data formats.



Our Model - MIL STD 1760

One Hardware/Electrical Interface for all Jets & Weapons!

B-5 A
B B2
B- 1
B lk 1 35
6 F- 8E/F /D
F-1 - 1 /C
F/A 18A/B

Without MIL-STD-1760, our connectors would be an expensive,

complex mess!
Across DoD, our mission data transfer is complex today
We just dont see it, since theres no hardware


SAE Miniature Munition/Store Interface

Aircraft wing Launcher

(with type II connector)

MIL-STD 1553
MIL-STD 1760 Store
Hard Point
Umbilical Pylon
Store ASI
A/C Store
Interface Dispenser Store
CSI Carriage Store
Carriage Store
Interface DSI
Dispenser Station
Miniature Interface
CSSI Mission Mission
Carriage Store Station Store Store
Interface Umbilicals Miniature Mission
Store Interface
Mission Store Mission Mission
Store Store

Figure 4-7 SAE MMSI, MIL-STD-3014 and MIL-STD-1760 Implementations

Mission Data Exchange Format - MIL-STD- 3014. This USN lead initiative is critical to
establishing agreed data transfers between aircraft and stores that is compliant with the open
system architecture concept as shown at Figure 4-7 to 9 (which are courtesy of Millet (2003).
DSTO are investigating for the author whether this technique could be used to improve the
interoperability of M&S tools across the whole of life of a weapon system. DSTO have
already made impressive advances with interoperability of M&S tools with the UK dstl and
USAF Research Laboratory at Eglin AFB via the use of the MSTARs 32 .


3014 and the OSI Comms Model

Where We Fit in the Seven Layer Cake
Mission Planning
Sending Functional Data Transmission Path Autonomous
Process Data System
S/W Process
MIL-STD-3014 Defines the Format of This File
Application Application
Layer Application Protocol Ap Hdr Data Layer
Presentation Presentation
sentation Protocol Pr Hdr Data
Layer Layer
Session Session
Layer Session ProtPlatform
ocol SeChannel-Driven
Software, Hdr Data Layer
Transport Transport
Transport Protocol Tr Hdr Data
Layer ) Layer
Network 16 Network
Network Nw Hdr nk Data
Layer Protocol , Li Layer
Data Link 60 Data Link
DL Hdr ( 17 Data
Layer el Layer
Physical ann Physical
Layer Ch Bits Layer
Actual Data Transmission Path


Figure 4-8 OSI and MIL-STD-3014

32 The Weapons Systems Division (WSD) within DSTO has developed MSTARS as its weapon simulation system based
on Simulink software from The MathWorks. MSTARS is currently being used in an international cooperative effort
involving Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom to look at problems common to multiple
environments. Designed for the rapid prototyping of new guided bomb and missile concepts, and for the evaluation of
new technology performance, MSTARS includes libraries of munitions subsystems representing the accelerometer, rate
gyro, autopilot, seeker, inertial navigation system, control surfaces, and air vehicles, with complete six-degrees-of-
freedom flight dynamics. Simplified models of a launch aircraft and threatening targets are also incorporated in the
component library. The flexible design and open architecture of MSTARS allows the interfacing of component models
with other simulation environments including other units within DSTO, industry and international partners. MSTARS

Figure 4-9 MIL-STD-3014 Legacy Message Wrapper

Tactical Digital Information Links.

Millet (2003) notes that Link-16, which uses MIL-STD-6016 33 , and VMF has the following

(Almost) all messages on Tactical Data Links are heavily specified, down to the bit
level of every single word
Tactical Data Links are designed for platforms and pilots
For navigation, command & control, Situational Awareness
Not designed for subordinate systems
Not designed as general-purpose bit-pipes like the Internet
It took almost 10 years to improve Link-16 coordinate resolution from navigation
quality to weapon quality
Thats just adding 4 bits to existing latitude & longitude!
So why is this so important, and what are the interoperability issues here? The following
description from the Federation of American Scientists at is the most succinct available:

33 This standard was hard to investigate as MIL-STD-6016A, The TACTICAL DIGITAL INFORMATION LINK (TADIL)
J MESSAGE STANDARD, is listed as a "Controlled Distribution Document" on the STINET DTIC Military web site.

Link 1. Link 1 is a duplex digital data link primarily used by NATOs Air Defence Ground
Environment (NADGE). It was designed in the late 1950s to cater for point-to-point data
communication. Link 1 mainly provides for exchange of air surveillance data between Control and
Reporting Centres and Combined Air Operation Centers (CAOCs) / Sector Operation Centers and
has a data rate of 1200/2400 bit per second (bps). It is not crypto secure and has a message set (S-
series) limited to air surveillance and link management data. Within NATO, Link 1 is used by NADGE
system. Most mobile CRCs are also equipped with Link 1 capabilities. Additionally most NATO
Nations employ receive-only equipment at air bases and SHORAD centers for Early Warning
purposes. Message standards are defined in STANAG 5501.

Link-4A, Link 4 is a non-secure data link used for providing vector commands to fighters. It is a
netted, time division link operating in the UHF band at 5,000 bits per second. There are 2 separate
"Link 4s": Link 4A and Link 4C. Link 4A TADIL C is one of several tactical data links now in operation
in the United States Armed Services and forces of NATO. Link-4A plays an important role by
providing digital surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and air-to-air tactical communications. Originally
designated Link-4, this link was designed to replace voice communications for the control of tactical
aircraft. The use of Link-4 has since been expanded to include communication of digital data
between surface and airborne platforms. First installed in the late 1950s, Link-4A has achieved a
reputation for being reliable. But Link-4A's transmissions are not secure, nor are they jam-resistant.
However, Link-4A is easy to operate and maintain without serious or long-term connectivity problems.
Link 4C is a fighter-to-fighter data link which is intended to complement Link 4A although the two links
do not communicate directly with each other. Link 4C uses F-series messages and provides some
measure of ECM resistance. Link 4C is fitted to the F-14 only and the F-14 cannot communicate on
Link 4A and 4C simultaneously. Up to 4 fighters may participate in a single Link 4C net. It is planned
that Link 16 will assume Link 4A's role in AIC and ATC operations and Link 4C's role in fighter-to-
fighter operations. However Link 16 is not currently capable of replacing Link 4A's ACLS function and
it is likely that controlled aircraft will remain equipped with Link 4A to perform carrier landings.
Message standards are defined in STANAG 5504.

Link-11 - employs netted communication techniques and a standard message format for exchanging
digital information among airborne TADIL-A as well as land-based and shipboard TADIL-B tactical
data systems. Link-11 data communications must be capable of operation in either the HF or UHF
bands. TADIL-A/B is used by a number of intelligence platforms such as the RC-135 RIVET JOINT
that conduct signal intelligence data collection, including communications intelligence and electronic
intelligence. Link 11 provides high speed computer-to-computer digital radio communications in the
HF and UHF bands among Tactical Data System equipped ships, aircraft and shore sites. Currently
the Fleet is using a number of different data terminal sets to provide Link 11 functionality, these
include the AN/USQ-74, AN/USQ83, AN/USQ-120, AN/USQ-125 and other Data Terminal Sets. The
new Common Shipboard Data Terminal Set card set provides all of the capabilities of the older Link-
11 data terminal sets including Kineplex, Single Tone, and Satellite transmission capabilities. It also
incorporates multi-frequency Link 11 enhancements, allowing the operation of up to four parallel
channels among participating units. The CSDTS card set will be included in the Common Data Link
Management System, described below.

Link-16 Link-16 is a relatively new tactical data link which is being employed by the United States
Navy, the Joint Services, some nations of the NATO and Japan. Link-16 uses the JTIDS which is the
communications component of Link-16. The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(Joint STARS) data links such as TADIL-J as well as the Surveillance Control Data Link to pass
information to the Ground Station Modules, which are the Army component for the Joint STARS. Link-
16 does not significantly change the basic concepts of tactical data link information exchange
supported for many years by Link-11 and Link-4A. Rather, Link-16 provides certain technical and
operational improvements to existing tactical data link capabilities and provides some data exchange
elements which the other data links lack. It provides significant improvements as well, such as jam
resistance; improved security; increased data rate (throughput); increased amounts/granularity of
information exchange; reduced data terminal size, which allows installation in fighter and attack
aircraft; digitised, jam-resistant, secure voice capability; relative navigation; precise participant location
and identification and increased numbers of participants. The JTIDS terminal is one of two terminals
providing LINK-16 capability to the soldiers, sailors, and servicemen in the field. The other LINK-16
terminal is the Multifunctional Information Distribution System terminal--a joint / international ACAT-1D
program. The Fleet is currently using AN/URC-107 (V) JTIDS terminals to provide ships, aircraft and
shore sites with Link 16 capability. JTIDS is an advanced radio system that provides information
distribution, position location, and identification capabilities in an integrated form. JTIDS distributes
information at high rates, in an encrypted and jam-resistant format. JTIDS is a multi-service and
multi-national system. US participation includes Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

The TADIL J Range Extension (JRE) program addresses the requirement to pass secure/anti-jam
data and voice via a common means in a timely manner beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) without the use
of a dedicated airborne relay. Two reasons for this requirement. First, the current method for
extending the range of a JTIDS network BLOS is to employ airborne assets as relays between zones.
This allows deployment of a very large (geographically), integrated JTIDS network that provides
interconnectivity between all the elements in a theater. However, use of airborne relays is wasteful of
theater assets and consumes network capacity that could be used for reporting additional information.
Second, studies show that JTIDS has the technical capacity to support the TMD communications
requirements, but load mitigation strategies should be explored to improve network performance.
The concept envisions JRE as a gateway between existing JTIDS and satellite terminals. The
gateways physical configuration would be determined by individual service requirements. It could
either be fully integrated into an existing host system, a separate processor sharing common
hardware and software, or a stand alone system. The JTIDS terminal would be linked to the JRE
gateway for transmitting and receiving TADIL J messages from a particular JTIDS zone. Linked at the
other end of the gateway will be the satellite terminal whose function is to transmit and receive
messages via satellite.

Current studies have focused on two employment applications of the JRE gateway: 1. In-theater
Reachback: This application is used to transmit the air surveillance and ballistic missile information
from a forward area of a theater to a remote command center located beyond line-of-sight of the
forward JTIDS elements. 2. Inter-zone Connectivity: This application is used to transfer air
surveillance and ballistic missile information between localized areas of a theater operations. The

Air Force is pursuing a prototype capability using both Ku and SHF bands. Current planning calls for
the AF Prototype to be a COTS workstation with the appropriate hooks to allow it to interact with a
JTIDS terminal and a satellite terminal. The main prototype development will be the gateway software
which will reside in the workstation. The software to be developed includes message forwarding,
buffering, prioritization, protocols, etc. that would allow the gateway to perform the JRE functions. Two
gateways will be procured so that the system can be tested and demonstrated in a zone-to-zone

Link 14 Link 14 is a broadcast HF teletype link for maritime units designed to transfer surveillance
information from ships with a tactical data processing capability to non-tactical data processing ships.
The design of the teletype transmission allows reception over very long ranges. Link 14 provides the
capability to broadcast picture compilation and status information for use in units unable to receive
Link 11 transmissions either direct or via an interface, e.g. non-Tactical Data System (TDS) units.
The Link can be either HF, VHF or UHF dependent on unit-communication fits. More than one Link
14 net, with or without separate transmitting units, may be set up if desired, e.g. to split air and
surface/sub-surface data. However, some units will be limited by communications fits in their
capability to receive two nets. Few units will have the capability to transmit on two separate Link 14
channels at the same time. Selection of the Link 14 transmitting unit will depend on force disposition
stationing of non-TDS units, Link 14 frequency, etc. Message protocol is defined in STANAG 5514.

Link 22 Link 22 is the next-generation NATO Tactical Data Link, and is also referred to as the NATO
Improved Link Eleven. Link 22 is a multi-national development program that will produce a "J" series
message standard in a Time Domain Multiple Access architecture over extended ranges.

There are numerous other efforts to standardise the next generation link. A draft of the
proposed Common Data Link (2004), which is in coordination with ASCC and NATO
countries, is expected to play a large part in promoting joint and coalition operations.

Network enabling Flight and Safety-Critical Software & impact on Aircraft

Certification in Australia. Despite the postulation of Weir (2000) that aviation safety and
associated airworthiness regulations only get changed as a result of the loss of life in
accidents, ADF policy for airworthiness and the risk management to be applied to military
aviation operations to meet AS/NZ 4360 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999), has been
updated and published as DI(G) OPS 2-2 at Commonwealth of Australia (2001) and DI(AF)
OPS 1-19 at Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) respectively. DI(G) OPS 2-2 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2001) requires that the technical airworthiness certification and
type acceptance of all ADF military aerospace vehicles is to be managed on behalf of the
ADF Airworthiness Authority through the office of Director-General Technical
Airworthiness (DGTA). Requirements on the application of airworthiness design standards
for ADF design acceptance are identified by DGTA in AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2003a). The ADFs preferred standard for aircraft certification is

DEFSTAN 00-970 at UK Defence Standardisation Agency (1999) and for system safety is
the use of MIL-STD-882C at Military Standard (2002). The key to aircraft and weapons
integration into the future is the recently approved MIL-STD-3014 at Military Standard
(2004)which has been recently approved by the US DOD as described earlier and in more
depth at Millet (2003).

The ability to certify avionic software changes and major upgrades in interoperable open
system architectures, is the single most important issue for ADF capability management
planners in achieving the vision of integrated system of systems. The preferred standard for
achieving safety assurance for software is also identified in AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth
of Australia (2003a). The attractiveness of COTS software is that the market could supply a
range of applications from different vendors, thus offering a choice of solutions for defence
applications. In reality, the safety and mission critical nature of the end use of software in a
military application, places stringent criteria on the certification of the product. Further to the
AAP 7001.054 approaches for avionic software, Craig and Jaskiel (2002) typify a plethora of
software engineering texts used within the industry for recommended approaches to software
V&V. For safety-critical or trusted systems software the DSTO developed DEF (AUST)
5679 at Commonwealth of Australia (1998) uses formal methods to assess the Level of
Trust required for computer based systems. Despite the rigour espoused by this standard, to
date the standard has not been used for aircraft systems due to its unique approach and limited
use. In order to reach agreement on the technical requirements, the ADF requires that a
Plan for Software Aspects of Certification address the AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2003a) Sect 2 Chap 7, AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) and
DI(AF) OPS 1-19 at Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) aviation risk management criteria.
DGTAs preferred standard for achieving software safety assurance is RTCA/DO-178B at
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (1992) and the guidance of ARP 4761 at
Society of Automotive Engineers (1992). If an OSA framework allows more frequent
updates to follow the technical advances with the COTS hardware and software
developments, what are the potential airworthiness issues with respect to these standards?
Research by Ould (1999) and Hunter and Thayer (2003) would indicate that current military
avionic system processes would have room for improvement. The proposed F-35 systems
architecture that future avionic systems development in Australia will have to be ready to
address is shown at Figure 4-5. Finally, avionic software needs to be independent of the
hardware it is loaded onto and increasingly has to be interoperable with external systems such
as automatic test equipment and mission planning and support systems.

As Australia does not currently, nor will in the foreseeable future, design or manufacture any
military aircraft indigenously, DGTA uses the prior certification basis by recognised
airworthiness authorities to minimise any Australian unique redesign of aircraft and the
associated avionics. A major concern in meeting AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2003a) design standards with any hardware installed in aircraft, is the systems
ability to cope with the induced environment and the applicability of military-standard
environmental qualification testing. For COTS hardware, commercial aviation
recommended practices of ARP 4754 at Society of Automotive Engineers (1992-11) and
ARP 4761 at Society of Automotive Engineers (1992-12) have been preferred. Results from
tests for COTS equipment being considered for military aircraft use prove, they can meet
many environmental qualification tests and satisfy reliability issues. Extensive durability
analysis and testing performed for F-22 components using US commercial airworthiness
standards and safety margins against end-of-life probabilities, highlighted concerns with the
severe military aircraft environment that the hardware needed to be qualified against MIL-
STD-810 at Military Standard (2000). The F-22 program test results and experience have
been shared with industry Lane (2000). As a result, the commercial sector is better informed
in the methodology of environmental analysis and qualification testing which should flow
back into the design of COTS hardware for aerospace and industrial use. The relative
maturity of implementing hardware designs in aircraft is such, that future designs need be
transparent to the aircraft types and missions as the ability to requalify such hardware is a not
a significant contributor to risk, if such lessons re-learned are applied.

4.2 The Future

The Process Versus Product Debate

The essence of the problems with acquisition world wide seems to be in the detail needed to
capture the complexity of Users Operational Needs versus the Sponsors wants. Who hasnt
been trapped in interminable integration meetings with seemingly multitudinous software
engineers who havent been appraised of the Operational Need and may not even be domain
specialists in industries such as aerospace? With the pervasive use of ISO 9000 (2000)
quality management processes and Capability Maturity Models, it has been noted by Mackey
(2000) that product and process engineers seem to have postures, assumptions and behaviours
reflecting the planetary divide between gender based cultures. According to Gray (1992)

men are most like product engineers34 and act as if they are from Mars, and women are most
like process engineers 35 and act as though they are from Venus.

With this in mind, who hasnt heard the following during a Preliminary Design Review
Weve already started coding the easy stuff and we can design the rest as we go or I know
this is short notice, but can we schedule an ISO audit next week! Whilst all companies may
depend on contributions from both groups, most companies cannot exist without products.
The contribution of process engineers is not usually as self evident. However, the process
engineer will not typically just fix the flawed product, but will also fix the process that
allowed the flaws into the product so you wont have to keep fixing such problems in future
products. The proactive process engineer who wants to contribute meaningfully to achieving
a companys outcomes needs to focus on improving areas that have real significance to the
developers as opposed to instituting more bureaucracy.

Teams with good leadership and management with a highly disciplined engineering process
such as that discussed in Filmer (2003) will not only improve product quality but will actually
improve their time to market. Filmer (2003) provides a seminal discussion of the Systems
Engineering processes instituted at ARDU using Blanchard & Fabrycki (1998) for developing
and approving ARDU Non-Standard Modifications. The examples cited in Filmer (2003)
exemplifies how a highly disciplined engineering process can successfully deliver high
integrated technology products in the aerospace environment. The shorter time to market
characteristic has also been found to be applicable to aircraft stores compatibility.

The belief of Jumper (2000) that The product is more important than the process is almost
an axiom at ASCENG. If you can get the operational requirement, product and methods
right, suitably tailored processes will then usually follow.

Australia is committed to implementing a fully integrated framework in AAP 7001.067 at

Commonwealth of Australia (2004) that encompasses requirements definition, acquisition,
Explosive Ordnance, experimentation, T&E, systems safety, weaponeers and in-service
logistic cultures that focuses on communication of agreed products. This is no small ask
when no aircraft or air delivered weapons are designed or manufactured in Australia.

Each nation in ASCC have also been collaborating on their products to identify equivalence
of acceptable airworthiness, T&E methods and safety systems with respect to aircraft stores
clearance and certification: the USAF with Certification / Clearance Recommendations, USN

34 This includes software developers and development managers

Flight Clearances, UK Military Aircraft Release, etc. The application of clearly identified
national joint processes amongst the allies has however been far more problematic. All three
services in the ADF have been directed to use joint airworthiness processes that establish a
common framework that can now be used to gather performance information as to the success
of tailoring the process based on the maturity of the aircraft stores configuration, so as the
right product is delivered by all the required agencies in a co-ordinated fashion.

EIA Interim STD 632 has been cited for use by AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2003a) since 1995 and it has been agreed in principle that ANSI/EIA STD 632
(1999) should be used as the ADF SE framework. All future Originators seeking new or
significantly enhanced aircraft stores capabilities are to have an Operational Concept
generating an Aircraft Stores Capability Operational Requirement which, as a minimum, will
provide the information iaw AAP 7001.053/068 and its successor AAP 7001.067 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004). To refine the Operational Concept, before finalising the
ORD, more Concept Demonstrations are being conducted by the ADF, often with support by
DSTO. In recent years, ARDU has been conducting Concept Demonstrations including:
flight trials of Raytheons EO Sensor in the UK DB-110 pod (a Tornado fuel tank with a $US
6 Million seeker relying on a hardback designed for UK stores suspension equipment which
does not comply with MIL-A-8591H at Military Standard (1995)) on F-111C aircraft during
exercises in Northern Australia, Python IV and an ASRAAM prototype from the F/A-18 (in
support of Project AIR 5400), the US MK65 mine from the P-3C Orion with a new Target
Detecting Device, the Leigh Aerospace LONGSHOT Long Range Extension Kit from F/A-18
aircraft (both in support of JP 2045), as well as flying the Australian designed INGARA
Synthetic Aperture Radar and APG-73 Hornet Radar, and the US Small Smart Bomb from F-
111G weapons bay (now the GBU-39 SDB), et al. Further details of ARDU capabilities are
beyond the scope of this thesis, but are documented at the unclassified level at Tutty (2004).

To rectify the previous deficiencies in providing the ASC Engineering Data Package
information, full Design Disclosure of all issues affecting Technical and Operational
Airworthiness is to be made in accordance with AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2004) documenting the maturity of the aircraft and/or weapon and all testing that
has already been undertaken. Although a Risk Based Approach is being developed for
applying this, the contractor should expect to be held liable for conduct of any requalification

35 This includes software quality engineers, process improvement specialists and change agents

if it is subsequently found that the weapon/stores system fails criteria that were agreed to in
the OCD and ORD.

How can one avoid the current aircraft integration nexus and black hole in funding? One
solution highlighted at Tutty (2004) in the shorter term is to not integrate the weapons system
via the aircraft avionics at all. ARDU has conducted successful flight trials of the Leigh
Aerospace LONGSHOT Long Range Extension Kit where an electronic knee pad could be
used to control programming of weapons via an RF data link. This would avoid the aircraft
avionics integration black hole in the short term. If the RF link is of short distance and
limited spatial orientation then there should not be any operational impact. This also has
relevancy to the limitations on the aircraft Bus Traffic and memory available in the aircraft
avionics. The aircraft OFP and bus can handle a finite amount of data transfers.

With the down sizing of the aircraft avionics industry to one or two players, the strategy of
MIL-STD-1760D at Military Standard (2004) needs to be reassessed to also ensure that these
players are not establishing a monopoly and that ruggedised commercial interface standards
would not be more appropriate. The collaboration of the ASCC and NATO Air Armament
Panel with the SAE to develop some of these open standards is therefore an outstanding
initiative to help prevent such a monopoly for the interface designers from the weapons
perspective. One needs to remember that many of the weapons we are testing today have
significantly greater processing and computing power than the host aircraft. Therefore there
needs to be greater consideration to where processing needs to be performed and whether that
processing is safety critical and hence the interface design requirements.

4.3 Weapon Data Link Architecture (WDLA).

It is evident from Ruff (2004), whose brief at the US National Defense Industry Association
was formally released just in time to be included in this thesis, the US has still not included
the networking of weapons in its NCW Roadmap. The weapons were in fact added to
Figure 1-2 by him to highlight the issue. The situation is expected to soon change if the
vision of Figure 1-2 is to be realised in the medium term as indicated during the brief.

WDLA (2004) has publicly announced that The USAF has awarded Rockwell Collins a
contract to lead a WDLA program. The contracts $23.4 million ceiling is for the
development of networked in-flight communication for precision guided weapons, using
Software Communication Architecture (SCA) that is compliant with the [US] DoD Joint
Tactical Radio System policy. The first delivery order under this contract is valued at $5.35
million. Rockwell Collins will be the prime contractor leading an integrated product team to

develop a scalable architecture. The program, previously known as BANSHEE 36 , is under
development for the USAF Research Laboratory. The WDLA implementation will enable
secure, mission-specific communication protocols and parameters to be reprogrammed in
minutes. The first delivery order of the program includes development of requirements,
architecture design and validation for a scalable 50-cubic-inch weapon datalink. Future
delivery orders will include a complete architecture design and verification of a 10-cubic-
inch, multi-channel weapon datalink, using SCA-compliant waveforms and integrated in
precision guided weapons. The program will utilize and expand upon design elements
leveraged from ongoing Rockwell Collins development activities, including Tactical
Targeting Network Technology, Crypto-modernization and JTRS. The development of the
WDLA will be completed in close collaboration with ASCC and NATO standardisation

In a presentation to an International T&E Association meeting at Eglin AFB, Rutledge (2004)

was able to provide one of the first unclassified insights into the planning for the inclusion of
a common weapons network infrastructure in to the broader US NCW plans. Ongoing
technology demonstrations will see some of the principal concepts with a 10 cubic inch
communications system explored in a Kingair in late 2005, to investigate the integration,
network lag effects and the accuracy of the network with IOCs for some existing weapons
(claimed to be AGM-154 JSOW, AGM-158 JASSM and ultimately GBU-39 SDB as
highlighted by Ruff (2004) at Figure 1-2) as early as FY 2010 with existing JTRS and JTeL
(2004) waveforms. The longer term plans presented by Rutledge would see a one cubic
inch communications system with the to be JTRS and JTeL waveforms ready for use with
the GBU-39 SDB and with the GIG in 2020. The presentation noted that discipline in
applying the consensus based open standards is vital to achieving interoperability between
systems. Rutledge (2004) indicated that the first implementations will be at the tactical
(presumably mission level at per Figure 1-3) level with three nodes and that the Major US
Test and Training Ranges were being brought on line with investigations into the impact on

36 Very interesting project name now used in the open literature by IDR, Janes, et al. The banshee, from ban (bean), a
woman, and shee (from sidhe, a fairie), is an attendant fairy that follows the old families, and none but them, and wails
before a death. Many have seen her as she goes wailing and clapping her hands. The keen (caoine), the funeral cry of
the peasantry, is said to be an imitation of her cry. When more than one banshee is present, and they wail and sing in
chorus, it is for the death of some holy or great one.

NATO Air Armament Panel and SAE Fuze Interoperability Studies. In an initiative that
will also serve to address the lessons re-learnt from Figure 4-10, the US Society of
Automotive Engineers, NATO AAWP and ASCC WP 20 are collaborating on better fuzing
architectures as shown at Figure 4-10.

Seeking consensus of ASCC and TTCP nations to national approaches to implement the
above in applying methods especially for M&S environment would be a major break through
in interoperability.

Figure 4-10. NATO Fuze Interoperability courtesy ASCC (2005)

4.4 US Network centric warfare

The US vision for Future Joint Warfighting as described in Joint Vision 2010 introduces
some new concepts at shown at Figure 4-11. In fact, the Information Paper at JCS J6 (2004)
from which this figure is drawn, provides one of the few lucid discussions of the US view of
NCW applicable to air armament. As with most grandiose US initiatives such as this it is
extremely difficult to penetrate the hyperbole to arrive at some nuance of the science or
engineering involved.

Figure 4-11 US Joint Vision 2010 Operational Concept courtesy JCS J6 (2004).

One of the concepts that Figures 4-11 highlights is the importance of the information grid
between all the players involved to enable information superiority. Further to the Logical
Model at Figure 2-7, Figure 4-11 highlights the importance such a global information system
will need over and above the current level with the Global C2 System (GCCS) used by the

As always in the US, there are numerous detractors and sceptics when such a complex and
widely distributed system needs so much money and when national security is potentially
impacted. Some of the more articulate were CRS to Congress (2004), Barnett (1999) 37 ,
Weiner (2004), Thompson (2003), Smith ( 2001) 38 , Woodcock (2003) and, closer to home,
Borgu (2003). In the main the traditional concerns over cost, schedule and performance for
a US defence acquisition are very common throughout the literature.

Numerous contractors have established NCW related areas. Raytheon, Northrup Grumman
for example have developed centre which are cited elsewhere. For example Boeing is
committed to their Strategic Architecture Reference Model that remains compatible with the
standards recommended by the newly formed, US based Network Centric Operations
Industry Consortium as recently announced by Gething (2005) for application of the COmbat

37 Gagnon (2004) also comments on his new book The Pentagons New Map at Barnett (2004) which is a more
controversial view of US future with Leviathian and System Administrators populating a US joint force that is
focussing on the protection of oil
38 This makes particularly good reading as he is also the author of Smith and Hayes (2002), the authoritative text on
effects based operations.

NEtwork Communications Technology (CONECT) to the B-52H to enable new tacticval data
links to be added and will allow the aircrew to re-tack missions and weapons during flight.

Figure 4-12 Weaponised UAV Concept courtesy Tutty (2004)

Barnett (1999) is an entertaining, must read with some of the most telling unique insights

Is the US longing for an enemy worthy of its technological prowess?

Is the US connecting to itself or to the world?

Is the US force of the future going to bring the few and the costly to the next war
rather than the cheap and the many out of proportion to the actual threat? NCWs
bottomline must be that no node (which may be an aircraft carrier worth tens of US
Billions) can be worth more than the connectivity it provides as the loss of such a
significant asset causes an escalate or withdrawal mentality.

The USs bomb-damage assessment capabilities are nowhere near capable enough to
measure the massed effects of NCWs souped up brand of information warfare.

Is the US decision making processes so fast that an enemy may not be able to
assimilate the message being sent in time to respond as predicted?

The temptation of information gluttony always will be with NCW. Salvation lies in
the concept of information sufficiency by level of command.

At the tactical level, an extremely insightful paper by the USAF F-111 (and F-16) pilot
Woodcock (2003) while at the Naval War College in 2001 one may draw some valuable
insights from. NCW may be able to address some of the shortfalls of the current [US] joint
air component system. It will not, however, change the fundamental nature of war, nor can it
solve the C2 problems with joint forces of itself. The Air Operations Center (AOC) has
concentrated tasks into one critical and vulnerable node that has a staff of roughly 1 300
people that makes it a land-locked, cumbersome and very difficult to move, all under the
command of a single commander. By centralising this function, keeping the air operations
centre staff trained for its wartime functions, has proven itself to be a mammoth task. He
notes that there are also processes that have been reasonably effective in the past that are no
longer able to meet modern needs. The first is the Air Tasking Order which currently takes
the US Forces 36 to 48 hours to produce by the time targets are recognised and identification
is confirmed (to prevent fratricide etc). NCW should allow the principle of reachback to
enable the AOC size to be reduced such that it may be placed on a ship, moved more quickly
and require considerably less training of personnel. Such reachback into identified,
specialised agencies such as the Joint Warfare Analysis Centre would be a major cost and
scheduling saving. Suitable training of the organisations involved will need to be conducted
so that prior knowledge of a Commanders expectations of personnel in reachback
organisations, are still team players. Woodcock (2003) p 131 also asserts that current levels
of skills in the C2 of [US] aerospace power is inadequate, that M&S fidelity is a major
deficiency and that the NCW architecture would allow higher fidelity training by connecting
existing systems so as to replicate an actual battlespace. He concludes that NCW can offer a
more responsive and less burdensome approach than the current US implementation(s) and
that the necessary advance more responsive tasking of ISR assets; rapid sharing and
analysis of the raw information; and transmission of high-fidelity, targetable data to a
weapon platform in time to use it, will be hallmarks of NCW, Agencies and commands
specializing in moving ground targets and TMD [Theatre Missile Defence], respectively, can
collaborate not only in analysis but in selecting the best means to strike the target.
However, he also reaffirms the adage that NCW of itself cannot replace the people required to
provide the human judgement in the planning and execution of operations in wartime: NCW
can aid in the decision-making process, but not replace a decision maker who has experience,
intuition and leadership insight. The inherent desire of commanders to micromanage
operations also needs to be strongly avoided, by educating people in the doctrine through
collective training. He recommends that advantage be taken of NCW to make air operations
lighter, less centralisation and more flexible. Commanders must train their people at all

levels of command in his expectations as to what they are to understand of the common air
picture. NCW should be used to train JFACC and staff jointly. The ATO process needs to
be replaced and the moving surface target problem solved. NCW is found to be a useful tool,
if it has a defined purpose and doctrine.

Borgu (2003) provides some relevant insights as to the current thinking at the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute on the challenges (read limitations) of the NCW developments as
they could apply to Australia that were found to be the most insightful of a mixed-bag of
Australian commentary (for example the recent RAAF sponsored Air Power Symposium in
late 2004 did not generate any new insights at all from the presenters chosen). Apart from
the normal litany of NCW issues discussed elsewhere here already, Borgu (2003) notes the
following issues of worth:

Whilst NCW is supposed to generate greater priority to ADF interoperability, it may

well just promote the individual service interoperability with the US equivalent
service. The author has observed this phenomenon already with the Operation
FALCONER / IRAQI FREEDOM which enabled the RAAF to work with US Marine
Corp and USN aviation and even USAF much easier than with the ADFs Special Air
Service or RAN.

Despite the rhetoric, the human dimension in warfare is more likely to be ignored at
the expense of the network. Therefore we are most likely to see a further reduction
in even our small forces to pay for such connectivity. Given that the current
operational tempo with the amount of ADF personnel deployed overseas is not likely
to decrease and the impact the current level of operations is having on deferred leave
and increased levels of substance abuse (as reported by the popular media) in some
areas of defence, the rate at which we encompass wholeheartedly a network enabled
force needs to be critically questioned.

Reinforces the idea that the NEO originally espoused in Force 2020 to link different
elements of the organisation to conduct warfare more effectively, vice the US NCW,
is more appropriate. His noting the UK NEC is (typically perhaps) focused on the
limited resources available and that they will focus not on wholesale transformation
of the forces but on the key enablers of operational effectiveness. The UK
approach is rather to start with the weapons, the command centres, the sensors and
they attempt to link them together rather than the all enthusiastic approach to an all-
embracing technology for everyone.

The adoption of US terminology underlines the pitfalls of benchmarking ourselves
against the US and that we should be looking at smaller countries like the UK as
better examples to follow.

Whilst the applicability of NCW to the Army has the potential for the greatest
impact across any the services of the ADF. Land forces have the prospect of every
individual soldier being part of the network, this is not a situation that air or maritime
forces have to consider. . That is why NCW is particularly relevant [to them] and
somewhat easier to implement. But Army is different. Army is far more people
centric and the land environment is far more demanding and complicated.

A fundamental tenet of network-enabled capability is that there can only be one

network of operation. . We need to work out whether that [a US network and the
time to identify what that is and procure it] will be desirable or not.

Dont get me wrong. I dont so much have a problem with the theory of NCW
concept but I dont believe that a lot of it is realisable and more importantly its
the likely application of that theory that holds considerable risks. NCW seems to be
most useful as a tactical concept. Reference to NEO seemed to accept this, vice the
[US] NCW view of the ubiquitous shared operational picture. The author
wholeheartedly endorses this perspective, as such a focused approach will see a major
saving of money, significantly reduce the risk of operational security being
compromised (ie, why should the logistics clerks supporting meals provisioning out
of the operational theatre need to see real time weapons video on his computer) and
will prevent politicians and policy makers at the strategic level less likely to interfere
in current operations 39 .

4.5 The Plug and Play Weapon.

Over the years the concept of a Plug and Play Weapon has been tantalisingly just beyond the
current major aircraft or stores development. Visibility of the primarily NATO efforts in this
area were shown with the maturity of the various technologies at Knowles (2002), Gregory
(2004) and their work with the SAE and NATO in some of the key standardisation areas to
streamline aircraft weapon integration. Through the ASCC WP 20 forum Australia has been
noting for a number of years the Air Launched Weapon Integration Studies being undertaken

39 Woodcock (2003) for example describes the Commander of the USAF Forces in Europe seeking to actively interfere in
tactical operations in Afghanistan based on a live video feed from a C2 asset available to him.

by the NATO Air Force Advisory Group 2 and NATO Air Armament Panel. The results of
the latest study at ALWI (2004) are probably the most comprehensive and detailed study of
the area ever accomplished and have profound implications for future aircraft stores
integration initiatives. Australia gaining access to this study via the ASCC fora proves the
value of the ASCC WP 20 investment by Australia alone.

The ALWI-2 (2004) study was undertaken by NAFAG with significant input by the US SAE
AS-1 Committee which had been deeply involved with the development of the latter versions
of MIL-STD-1760 at Military Standard (2004a). The ALWI-2 (2004) study was seen as very
timely with the focus of numerous NATO nations being to transform their platform centric
forces as long term goals 40 . It was also thought that with the progress being already made
with the USAF initiatives for the Universal Armament Interface (UAI) 41 and MIL-STD-3014
at Military Standard (2004) that some of the initiatives may actually be accelerated. In 2000,
SAE AS-1 embarked on a programme to develop data/software standards and to promote the
concept of the socalled Plug and Play Weapon. The value of the SAE contribution with
heavy involvement of NATO industry is self-evident in the document. Figure 4-13 and 4-14

40 Stated by ALWI-2 (2004) and ALWI-3 (2004) to be 15 to 20 years.

41 The initiative was started by the USAF in 2002 with the Spiral 1 being development of an Interface Control
Document and a Common Launch Acceptability Region Approach for MIL-STD-1760 Precision Guided
Munitions. Funded work for Spiral 1 began in US FY 2004.

highlight the information flow expected within NCW.

Figure 4-13 ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 4

Figure 4-14 ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 6

Four teams studied the interoperability issues from the following perspectives:

Team 1 on Avionics Architecture had a platform-centric viewpoint.
Team 2 on system of systems had a network-centric perspective.
Team 3 looked at Physical Interfaces and associated standards, and
Team 4 studied broadly the standards perspective of the Team 1 and 2.

Avionics Architectures. A Plug & Play Weapons concept was developed that would be
compatible with many existing avionic infrastructures and with existing MIL-STD-1760
interface standards. ALWI-2 (2004) p 13 also notes that Both the performance
requirements and resource constraints tend to be system dependent. Traditionally, these
characteristics have resulted in hardware and software that is highly interdependent and
purpose-designed for the aircraft. The Plug & Play Weapons concept still needs design-
time activity, however the time/cost is expected to be much less than with traditional
approaches and all avionic architectures are expected to be able to support the layered
approach proposed. The SAE Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) is
proposed to also enable Simulation Object Models to be developed based on ANSI/IEEE-
1516.3 (2003) High Level Architecture for example that can be built into full operational
simulations to support Simulation Based Acquisitions. The Plug & Play Store components
will provide a standardised interface or API to the store user, that is consistent with
emerging open system or socalled Model Driven Architecture to separate the functionality
of a system from its underlying infrastructure. The Plug & Play approach relies on the store
being self-describing by using a store description file in a format such as XML or
MIL-STD-3014 at Military Standard (2004). This data would be uploaded at store
initialisation based on a hierarchy of Standard Store Classes that will have a behavioural
model based on a generic store lifetime model (which describes the aggregate behaviour of
the store from loading, employment or jettison through to the effects event or safe return and
is shown at Figure 4-15 and 16.

A Technical Reference Model was developed to define a common conceptual framework and
language around which the Technical and System Architectures can be developed using OSA
and OSI based on SAEs generic Open Architecture (GOA) Framework of AS4893 / SAE
AIR 5315 and Basic Reference Model to implement the application-oriented protocols of
ISO/IEC 7498-1 respectively. SAE AIR 5532 is proposed as a Generic Aircraft-Store
Interface Framework (GASIF) along with use of ISO/IEC 9945: Information technology -
Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) in the short term and ISO 8648 OSI Internal
Organisation of the network Layer. MIL-STD-1760 at Military Standard (2004a) was found
not to be explicitly organised into these layers and poses an obstacle to Plug & Play Weapons

over the longer term. Australia must become involved with the studies proposed to validate
the TRMs, APIs and Store Class hierarchies proposed.

Figure 4-15a ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 7

Figure 4-15b ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 13

System of systems network-centric perspective. The system of systems considered

included C2, mission-planning systems, tactical data links and the aircraft/captive-weapon
system and the weapon in free flight. This is to be achieved by the standardisation of system

models, interfaces and protocols such as MIL-STD-3014 at Military Standard (2004).
NATO sees the NATO Network Enabled Capability as one of the key components of
NATOs transformation and is needed to fulfil the Prague Capability Commitment on
Information Superiority since it was signed in November 2003. The NATO C3 Technical
Architecture will be required to implement this as supported by the NATO C3 System
Architecture Framework, which is largely based on the US DoD C4ISR Architecture
Framework. ALWI-2 (2004) Para 5.2.2 notes that interest in using web services technology
to present vehicle effects services to remote subscribers in network enabled operations.
What this means is that the most privileged or highest priority subscriber requesting this
service would gain an ad hoc dynamic connection with the vehicle and use it to assign a
mission/target, send mission data files, and even control weapon release/employment.
Whilst distributed systems in NEO tend to be highly dynamic, and cannot be analysed as
closed systems, the Plug & Play Weapon recommended approach is self describing and is
hence extendable to such applications given that the subscriber has the weapon service
description available. It only remains to exchange information on the specific
aircraft/mission service limitations, quality of service and access limitations. The
publisher/subscriber and service-broker mechanisms that might be associated with NNEC are
obviously central to the Plug & Play Weapon working for all capabilities. The
MIL-STD-3014 at Military Standard (2004) mission data exchange format will need to be
integrated into future mission planning tools such as TAMPs and JUMPs 42 . See Chapter
Three for further discussion. The MIL-STD-3014 file can be transported straight to the
aircraft on the ground or in flight and it is possible to send reports back from the weapon in
flight. The MIL-STD-3014 file is a Presentation Layer protocol in the context of the GASIF
Technical Reference Model. Link 16 is seen as having limited potential, an enhanced logical
interface is required to enable post-launch weapon control. Numerous STANAGs that have
few ASCC equivalents are also identified for information exchange via networks that need to
be investigated for applicability. The publish/subscribe concept is an evolving description
for information transfer, but needs further experimentation to see if the claims here are
warranted in time critical targeting scenarios.

42 See Chapter 3 discussion

Figure 4-16 ALWI-2 (2004) Store Operating Systems Roadmap

Physical Interfaces and associated standards. Air to air and air to ground applications
were considered. Mechanical interoperability was addressed from a Technical Architecture
view as well as consideration of the SAE Interface Control Document Format Standard.
Major shortcomings were found with the definition of the interface aspects of the electrical,
arming and fuzing components of ejected stores 43 , and with the substantial lack of
mechanical interface standards for rail launched stores and associated store carriage systems.
The physical interoperability of stores were reviewed to determine if the set of physical
features were addressed from a functional basis, rather than from a lessons learned, lets add
another restriction to a standard so we wont do that again basis. ALWI-2 (2004)
recommended that the knowledge and awareness about the present level of interoperability
within the inventories of the allied aircraft, launchers and weapons, needed to be raised. A
database was recommended based on the extant AOP-11 Aircraft Stores Interface Manuals 44 .

43 As most of the socalled standards have, in the main, been derived from national specifications in terms of the current
definition of a standard is.
44 The Capability Model at Chapter 2 and Appendix 6 has been recommended by the author through the ASCC WP 20 as a
better structure/taxonomy to achieve this objective. This proposal has been accepted by ASCC and NATO AAP and
will be progressed as Information Exchange by all subscribing nations.

MIL-A-8591H at Military Standard (1995) needs to be extended, particularly in the case of
rail launched weapons (which currently need unique launchers due to be inability of NATO to
agree on launcher classes). The LAU-7 launcher interface is recommended with a change to
the electrical connections in favour of the MIL-STD-1760 connector (see Figure 4-7). New
standards are recommended for the Miniature Munitions Stores Interface and a
collapsible/submerged lug. The location of the interface connector should also be defined.
The preference is for a blind mating connection with wide positioning tolerances and a
connector retract mechanism specified. In the longer term, standards need to address the
next generation of weapons which are expected to be eject launched, small, light, low
observable, intended for internal carriage et al.

Avionics and network-centric standards. The Technical Architecture views of logical

interoperability were considered by this team. Standards and roadmaps were considered in
the areas of electrical/optical interfaces, logical, software, environment and certification
processes. For weapons, the desired outcome is weapon for weapon interchangeability and
weapon to environment compatibility, which accords with the brief at Tutty (2004). Most
importantly the development of a common set of aircraft stores certification processes needed
be proposed that satisfies the needs of all NATO nations. This will be a major exercise as
NATO has always failed to agree even on the limited MIL-STD-1763 aircraft stores
certification and test criteria. Interestingly, the author has been separately invited (based in
part on the NATO AVT presentation done in support of this thesis), to assist with the writing
of a Code of Best Practice for Aircraft Stores Certification for the NATO AVT Flight Test
Panel in conjunction with Mr Neal Siegel of USN Patuxent River (another long term stalwart
of change in the US DoD). It is currently thought that this thesis along with the approach of
AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) will be used with refocused ASCPOL
& ASCTECH Handbooks at Commonwealth of Australia (2004d) and (2004e) to form the
basis of researching what will be acceptable to NATO nations. Not surprisingly, this will be
an attempt to implement again a consensus based open standard that should take about 10 to
15 years to accomplish (even given the use of AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia
(2004) etc). The Logical Interfaces indicates that a restructure of MIL-STD-1760 at Military
Standard (2004a) may be required to better align it with GASIF such that, the existing
requirements will be decomposed into a suite of related documents at differing levels of
abstraction. The TRM of earlier teams were supported. Standardisation of the compatible
environments must be considered and a new STANAG written.

Access to the ALWI-2 (2004) is limited to ASCC and NATO member nations only.

Figure 4-17 ALWI-2 Roadmap for Environment and certification interoperability

Levels of Aircraft Network Enabling

Level Computer Equivalent Example What You Get
JTRS Legacy Using Computer as Link 16 Ground Legacy IER
a Word Processor Track from Link 16 JTRS Policy
Air Picture from Compliance
Legacy Data Link
Level Computer Equivalent Example What You Get
1* Send/Receive Word Link 16 Ground Legacy IER
JTRS Legacy Documents from Track from GIG M2M GIG
Net Connected
Air Picture from Legacy
Legacy Net Air Picture from Net
Level Computer Equivalent Example What You Get
JTRS Legacy Internet Explorer on Desktop Capability Man-in-the-
Desktop (e.g. E-mail, NIPR/ loop GIG
Air Picture from Legacy SIPR, etc.) Connected
Legacy Net Non-integrated Data/
Imagery/Video from Net
Level Computer Equivalent Example What You Get
JTRS Legacy Sharing a Word AT3 Target Integrated M2M
Net Document with your Geo-location targeting
Air Picture from Legacy workgroup collaboration
Legacy Net
Networked Target Collation
Kneeboard Level Computer Equivalent Example What You Get
Fully integrated
Some Level of Bill Target Video
Gates House
M2M Network
enabled data
Integrated Data/
Legacy Net exchange
Imagery/Video 17
* Requires additional ancillary equipment to integrate networking on platform

Figure 4-18 Proposed Levels of US Aircraft Network Enabling

The next important step is to get a Plug & Play Weapon concept based on the open system

architectures for aircraft and stores that can take care of the higher levels of information
available from networks being connected to the carriage aircraft. Appendix 6 highlights
some important issues for what has been called Aircraft Stores Capability Level in the
explanatory notes which progress from the use of the Mark 1 eyeball and on aircraft stored
ballistic calculations for dumb bombs and ammunition to off-board sourced networked
information that is useful for determining the class of store to be integrated into the ALWI-2
(2004) proposed Plug & Play Weapon. Currently, the later information as noted by Millet
(2003) is not of sufficient accuracy for weapons targeting, but this will change even with use
of Link 16. In the interim, there are issues in transitioning that have been addressed by the
US at Figure 4-18. The obvious issue that this Figure draws ones attention to is the previous
noted significance of the JTRS. One should also read carefully the Computer Equivalent
analogies the author drew here. The degree to which this very recent concept to address the
problem is in NATO has not been determined. The levels should be used in the ADF Air
Armament Roadmap to help highlight the network interoperability issues.

4.6 Networked systems the future

Cebrowski & Gartska (1998) support the Metcalfe Law assertion that the power of the
network is proportional to the square of the number of nodes in the network. The power or
payoff comes from information intensive interactions between very large numbers of
heterogenous computational nodes in the network. Which affects the:

Speed of command. The Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act paradigm (or OODA Loop)

beloved by US fighter pilots of the 1980s and 1990s of Boyd (1987) may now
disappear as networked organisations maintain awareness when sensors are connected
to people who understand the context of what they are observing and what it means to
the operations.
Self-synchronisation ability in such a large network becomes an important issue with
the command and control ability to prevent information overload and control their
important assets to achieve the end effect in ever shortening duty cycles.
As the networking of weapons moves on from point to point and basic three node networks
then the developments in the science of networks will start to become a major player. Watts
(2003) provides a very readable entre to this and the small world phenomena and introduces
many concepts that will be relevant to future research for NEO and in networking of
weapons. In fact in very large networks, every random link is likely to connect individuals
who were previously widely separated and this is how the so called small world phenomenon

where every person is only separated by a maximum of six links to every other person in the
world! As long as there is a means to generate clustering and a way of allowing short-cuts
then there will always be a small-world network. In developing models of such networks it
is also of note that the degree distribution of large networks are best viewed as a power law as
they demonstrate scale free characteristics wherein most nodes will be relatively poorly
connected, while a select minority will be highly connected. Such network modelling is
strikingly different to assumptions that the network will be normally or have a Poisson
distribution. This becomes important when designing networks and decisions need to be
made as to whether the links are to be peer to peer with all available data being stored on a
known central server (which are expensive to set-up and maintain) or information accessed in
broadcast searches to all likely repositories (which generates huge amounts of traffic)
resulting in algorithm that only require local network information to be of very practical
interest - especially for time sensitive or use of data that needs to be assured. An interesting
insight on page 268 is that when people embark on a new project, they often dont know how
they are going to do it and that in fast moving industries the designs are rarely final before
production begins and that each person starts with a general notion of what is required of him
or her and refines that notion by interacting with other problem solvers. This has interesting
implications for the training of personnel to use networks to ensure that the general notions
are in accord with higher direction. He also notes individuals that are in tight knit teams (ie
clusters) engage in problem solving searches that connect themselves to previously random
parts of the organisation (a random shortcut) thus enhancing the coordination capability as a
whole (reduced path length). Thus whilst most of the problem solving is on the local scale
(hence why some teams should be collocated) there needs to be links available to other parties
for timeliness. Care needs to be taken in such activities that unlike computers people are not
generally scaleable and hence can become overloaded especially in hierarchical structures
(such as the military) and perform even worse under conditions of failure. The solution to
this is the development of meta teams wherein approval by the hierarchy is given for direct
liaison so that information processing can occur when required across multiple scales. The
key to surviving a disaster in the short term is for the network to retain connectivity while not
incurring any more failures. Therefore multiscale connectivity is vital to robustness of high
risk operations and organisations. Routine problem solving also serves to teach the
organisation (especially if they are rewarded in doing so) how to balance the information
processing burdens and sets up the conditions under which exceptional problems can be
resolved p 287. The author has witnessed this repeatedly in the conduct of aircraft stores

comaptibility over the years wherein the peacetime processes can be accelerated in wartime
when there are personnel experienced in what options are available from peacetime.

Moffat (2003) has also introduced complexity theory to the ever burgeoning research into
aspects of NCW by looking at the evolving studies from a number of areas including fractal
structures, non-linear dynamical systems, and models of self organisation and self-organised
criticality. This and other works by this author have been found to be cited repeatedly in the
literature and his techniques are being used extensively to explored complex systems

Similarly, Ilachinski (2004) comprehensively reviews the work over the last decade that
completely transformed the operational analysis and wargaming fields such as described at
Allen (1987) with complex adaptive systems and the use of multiagents. To that end Moffat
(2003), Watts (2003) and Ilachanski (2004) all document the progress made in analysing
behaviour that can be ordered and/or chaotic in nature. Ilachinskis work here and his
ongoing involvement with USN NCW efforts are currently being explored in a number of
joint force research applications by the US Joint Forces Command in collaboration with the
Old Dominion Universitys Virginia Modelling, Simulation and Analysis Centre (VMASC),
Phillips (2004). The ADF and NCW community need to especially watch the developments
with VMASC with the applications to joint warfare command and control of forces using
agents as well as doing V&V using real entities on US test ranges and in the not to distant
future on training ranges under the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC). When used in
such exercises, the agent-based philosophy can be extremely powerful and is being explored
by the ADF for use with linking the Woomera Test Range and the US / Australian Joint
Combined Training Centre in northern Australia over the next decade. Examples of over
recent and current research applicable to aircraft stores capabilities include that by Gaver and
Jacobs (2002) to look at a high-level modelling methodology (using some techniques from
Ilachanski (2004) too) for the analysis of the effectiveness of a Blue systems of systems
operating in a battlespace based on a deterministic/expected value model that analytically can
represent time-dependent stochastic features such as system saturability. The model has
been used to explore shooter latency, the imperfection of sensor surveillance and
reconnaissance as well as probabilities with correct Bomb Damage assessment.

Ilachinski (2004), and ever more articles typified by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2004), also
highlights the research being conducted in new applications of swarming tactics. The current
applications looked at techniques for small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units to coalesce
rapidly and attack it and then redisperse immediately to recombine for a new attack. The

structured and coordinated attack can effectively overcome an enemys defences. The tactic
is particularly interesting when autonomous systems using artificial intelligence is used.
When tied to the weapon data link architecture and miniature munition initiatives discussed in
Chapter 2, these tactics will pose significant challenges to the control system but enormous
advantages for battlefield control. Further research in these areas are under way by DSTO
and should be investigated by other Australian academic institutions to examine not just the
technological issues but also the policy implications of autonomous weapons as well as
methods to counter the use of such tactics. Significant research efforts should expect to be
continued in these areas with major opportunities to influence ADF operations in a network-
enabled force.

The nice things about standards is there is so many to choose from! Hards (2004)

A first-rate theory predicts, a second-rate theory forbids and a third-rate theory explains after the event Alex Kitiagorodski

Now, there are two ways of learning to ride a flying machine; if you are looking for perfect safety, you will do well to sit on
a fence and watch the birds; but if you wish to learn you must mount a machine and become acquainted with its tricks by
actual trial. Wilbur Wright, Miracle at Kitty Hawk

5.0 Background to Standardisation

Brunson et al (2002) provides an excellent introduction to the international standardisation
world in which the use of consensus standards is becoming extremely important. Consensus
standards have been developed by national regulatory bodies in conjunction with industry to
agree on common descriptions on things of interest. To do this on an international basis is
extremely difficult and time consuming (see Figure 1 at Appendix 5 to trace the chronology
of the current standards related to systems engineering), however, the potential benefits in this
era of globalisation and a shrinking world due to communications is vital to most developed
and developing nations seeking wider market places or to militaries seeking to operate more
seamlessly with allies. Some of the most interesting developments in systems engineering
are seeing consensus being achieved on ISO/IEC 15288 (2002) 1 , ISO/IEC 17025 (1999) 2 ,
ISO 12207 (1995) 3 , and ISO/IEC 15504 (1998) 4 and the very active discussion on the

1 ISO/IEC 15288 encompasses the life cycle of man-made systems, spanning the conception of the ideas through to the
retirement of the system. It provides the processes for acquiring and supplying system products and services that are
configured from one or more of the following types of system components: hardware, software, and human interfaces.
This framework also provides for the assessment and improvement of the project life cycle. See also ISO/IEC 19760 is a
technical report intended to be used as a companion document to ISO/IEC 15288 (2002) and give guidelines for the
application of the International Standard. The Guide is applicable to large and small systems, systems requiring large
and small project teams, and new and legacy systems. From ISO/IEC 15288 (2002).
2 ISO/IEC 17025 replaces ISO/IEC Guide 25:1990 & EN 45001:1989 as the contemporary standard to be adhered to by all
testing & calibration laboratories. It integrates the requirements of ISO 9001 & 9002: 1994 & embodies the extensive
experience gained over a time span of 10 years of lab systems implementation. The new standard not only contains
specifications for quality systems requirements but also those based on technical competency & the ability to generate
technically valid results. From ISO/IEC 17025 (1999)
3 ISO/IEC 12207 describes the major component processes of a complete software life cycle and the high-level relations
that govern their interactions. This standard covers the life cycle of software from conceptualisation of ideas through
retirement. ISO/IEC 12207 describes the following life-cycle processes: Primary Processes: Acquisition, Supply,
Development, Operation, and Maintenance; Supporting Processes: Documentation, Configuration Management, Quality
Assurance, Verification, Validation, Joint Review, Audit, and Problem Resolution; and Organization Processes:
Management, Infrastructure, Improvement, and Training. A major revision of ISO/IEC 12207 and 15288 is beginning in
2002. Presently, the intent is to harmonize ISO/IEC 12207 (software life cycle process), ISO/IEC 15288 (systems life
cycle process), the replacements for ISO 9000-3 (application of ISO9000:2000 to software) and ISO/IEC 15504
(assessment). Other standards and documents are considered for the concept exploration phase. See ISO/IEC 15504
4 ISO/IEC 15504 (1998) is an emerging international standard for process assessment that has been under development
since June 1993. The Technical Report version was approved for publication by ISO in 1998 (ISO/IEC TR 15504:1998)
and is available for purchase from ISO or ANSI; this is the version which is software specific and which has a set of
process definitions embedded within it. Work to move 15504 towards full international standardization is well underway.
The full international Standard version of 15504 will consist of five documents. 15504-2 (Performing an Assessment)
was published in late 2003 and 15504-3 (Guidance on Performing an Assessment) was published in early 2004. It is
expected that 15504-4 (Guidance on use for Process Improvement and Process Capability Determination) will be

application of ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) 5 as in ISO/IEC standard for example. The process
of setting national standards and then seeking international support is very common. If this
is done in parallel then agreement can be reached when the national documents are
harmonised as there is rarely complete agreement on the scope of the thing of interest. The
link provided at ISO/IEC 17025 (1999) gives some sense of the order of magnitude when one
sees the number of organisations involved internationally. The standardisation of military
based systems has normally been through the forums of international alliances such as NATO
AAP and the ASCC.

Commonwealth of Australia (2002b) has revitalised the contemporary understanding as to the

rationale and the potency of a well managed standardisation program. In the early 1990s the
US DoD under the leadership of the Secretary William Perry sought to divest itself of the
plethora of specifications and standards that were in fact, becoming a recipe book for often
conflicting requirements and implemented a policy to rely solely on commercially available
standards. In essence, the US had stopped thinking about what operating concept they
wanted in a lot of costly cases as they had left it up to the engineers of government and
industry to specify any and every standard they could think of as a risk reduction mechanism,
even if they were contradictory. In fact only a handful of standards survived this purge (as
there were then no civilian equivalents) including: MIL-STD-810 at Military Standard
(2000), MIL-STD-882C at Military Standard (2002), MIL-A-8591H at Military Standard
(1995), MIL-STD-1553B at Military Standard (1996) and MIL-STD-1760 at Military
Standard (2004). Numerous standards that had a lot of industry support were republished as
Handbooks such as MIL-HDBK-1763 and others were significantly rewritten such as
MIL-STD-882D based on commercially available texts. Others were incorporated into
ASCC and NATO STANAGs such as MIL-STD-1289C (published as an ASCC AIR
STANDARD 20/21C). MIL-STD-1763 survived as MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military
Handbook (1998) only because of US industry and ASCC intervention (one needs to
understand that in the proliferation of US specifications and standards in the 1970s and 1980s
that some of these documents were mislabelled in terms of the current understanding of the

published late in 2004 with 15504-1 (Concepts and Vocabulary) following in 2005. The final part, 15504-5 (An
exemplar Process Assessment Model) is expected in 2006. The purpose of 15504 is to harmonize a number of different
models [in the above diagram] (including the Software CMM, CMMi, ISO 9001, ISO 12207, Trillium, Software
Technology Diagnostic, and Bootstrap) and assessment methods (including CBA IPI, SCE 3.0, Bootstrap, and SCAMPI).
From ISO/IEC 15504 (2004)
5 This ANSI/EIA standard derived from a military standard of the middle 1990s defines a total system approach for the
development of systems. The standard requires: establishing and implementing a structured, disciplined, and documented
systems engineering effort incorporating the systems engineering process; multidisciplinary teamwork; and the
simultaneous development of the products and processes needed to satisfy user needs.

differences between a specification and a standard the US MIL-A-8591 specification on the
structure and physical location of stores suspension equipment and aircraft stores for example
has been recognised as one of the most influential standards in military aviation history, yet
the US Military Standardisation programs lethargy in correcting such things is an
interestingly (poor) benchmark). This intervention was the result of these organisations
having been actively involved in achieving consensus based standards in the key areas where
these documents had no commercial equivalent. This consensus had been achieved for these
documents by proactively engaging US, NATO and ASCC nations and industry in the US
Joint Ordnance Commanders Group fora which produced these standards in the 1980s and
1990s. The author was actively involved with, and in some cases lead, the rewriting of
numerous US standards whilst on exchange with the USAF. Active industry involvement
and consensus with the US Joint Ordnance Commanders Group fora standards was the prime
reason for there unilateral success and survival through the Perry era purges. Whilst official
US Government support of standardisation has been varied, the restructuring of the US
acquisition system (which will be discussed in detail later) and a refocus on consensus based
standards indicates a recognition of the failure of the Perry initiative when there were no
agreed commercial standards in place at the time.

5.1 Military Standardisation

The last decade has seen significant changes to the structures and activities of military forces
and the environment in which they must operate. In response to the changing international
operational environment, the ASCC continues to evolve its activities to facilitate coalition air
operations for the participants: Australia, Canada, NZ, UK and each of the three US services.
The ASCC has been implementing a more forward-looking focus in pursuit of coalition
effectiveness. In doing so it is taking account of the following factors:

a. The full spectrum of conflict in which Coalition operations occur - from military
operations other than war to major theatre war.
b. The requirement to integrate air, space, naval and land components into an effective
Joint Force with little lead-time.
c. The need to facilitate rapid decision and execution cycles for expeditionary operations
that may include non-ASCC nations.
d. The likely deployment of smaller coalition forces, where individual National
contributions may comprise only a few aircraft or a small support element.

e. The preferred use of non-government and commercial off-the-shelf technology, in place
of military specific standards and equipment.
f. The rapid development cycles of new or improved technologies.

Further information may be found at the ASCC website currently at a publicly accessible
website at and via the secure website at

ASCC Objective.
Through collective agreements, and in cooperation with other international standardisation
organisations, members will strive to ensure there will be no doctrinal, operational, technical,
or materiel obstacle to full cooperation between the forces of the member nations, and to
ensure the greatest possible economy of effort. Interoperability in the broadest of terms is
the ability of coalition forces to train, exercise, and operate effectively together, in the
execution of assigned missions and tasks. Within available resources, the ASCC objective
of interoperability is achieved through:
Economical Use of Resources
Exchange of Information

Standardisation Principles. Standardization is not an end in itself, but is a tool for

increasing the operational effectiveness of coalition military forces. Its primary purpose is
to achieve specified operational standardisation requirements. International standardization
agreements are implemented through national documents that should cross-reference the
international agreement.

So what does this mean? Standardisation of design principles, hardware, software, and
support systems has the potential for substantially enhancing operational and logistic
effectiveness. Standards can promote interoperability, reduce the likelihood of dependence
on specific vendors, and promote industrial efficiency through variety control. Consequently,
these activities have the potential to be conducted overseas against a plethora of potentially
unique and even dubious standards and specifications that would require significant redesign
and/or qualification to meet an Australian Operational Requirement and expected operating
environment. Australia is therefore an active participant in developing and approving
standards with our major allies, that will significantly reduce such risks before the
acquisition of specific technical equipment. Once acquisition is proposed or commenced,
all aerospace weapons or stores will be assessed against the agreed standards specified in

AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a). Therefore for the majority of
aircraft stores, AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) is currently the
principle Australian implementing document for aerospace including air armament.

Validation. Validation assesses the extent to which ASCC member nations have achieved the
specified operational standardisation requirements and focuses on assessing the capability for
combined air operations. Validation is conducted through the following activities:
analysing the lessons identified/learned during operations and exercises
assessing the relevance, adequacy and effectiveness of existing standards
confirming that national implementing documents reflect ratified Air Standards
testing interoperability during exercises or operations

Economical Use of Resources. The ASCC provides opportunities for both formal and
informal collaboration on issues of common interest to air forces, thereby sharing successes
and avoiding duplication of effort. The following activities may be conducted where they
improve national or coalition capabilities, while reducing overall costs:
the loan of equipment through the Test Project Agreement (TPA) program
collaborative activities not covered by other organizations
standardisation of equipment or procedures not directly related to combat operations,
where this is expected to result in significant savings and/or improvements to flight

Exchange of Information. Formal and informal exchanges of information improve the

operational effectiveness of national forces, which in turn enhances the capability of coalition
forces. The exchanges also contribute toward ASCC goals by:
enhancing interoperability where standardisation is inappropriate or where individual
national requirements preclude standardisation

determining the viability of proposed standardisation projects

ASCC Products. The essence of ASCC endeavours are summarised in the main tangible
products of:

Air Standards (AIR STDs) and Advisory Publications (ADV PUBs). The Working
Parties develop internationally agreed AIR STDs that are incorporated into each
nation's operating procedures. If a document is more of a guide to interoperability, an
ADV PUB is produced. The ASCC has some 340 published documents.

Information Publications (INFO PUBs). INFO PUBs are documents that contain
information for the prime purpose of exchange between members of a Working Party.
The information contained in this publication may be used to support further Working
Party activity, but is not of a nature that requires it to be formally distributed as an
Advisory Publication.

Test Project Agreements. Part of the ASCC Charter allows for the free exchange of
equipment between member nations. These loans are for research, development, test
and evaluation, potentially leading to standardisation or purchase.

ASCC Working Party 20 on Air Armament

In support of these initiatives, Working Party 20 (WP20) currently has over ten publications
in draft on such subjects as: standardisation of stores clearance and test and evaluation
procedures; hazards of EMP and lightning; standardisation of air armament flight termination
systems; safety criteria for air weapons ranges; and verification of stores interoperability.
WP20 delegates have also initiated several new proposals to pursue its standardisation
mandate, as defined in the latest ASCC Air Tasking Orders at Holdsworth (2002). Their
work on aircraft stores self-damage analysis methods will be expanded to include the air-air
role. An Advisory Publication will be developed under an existing project to resolve
disparities in terminology used to describe the modelling and simulation of aircraft stores
clearance and certification. A new project is being proposed to standardise interface
requirements for miniature munitions as shown at Figure 4-7. Such a project will greatly
facilitate armament interoperability as these new munitions come into service amongst
member nations. A new project is also being proposed to standardise on the design
requirements for pneumatic ejector racks. Although these racks will see increased use
amongst member nations, there are currently no standardisation agreements to ensure
interoperability. This relatively new technology holds the potential for tremendous savings in
the logistical tail associated with air armament.

In addition to these formal initiatives, WP20 is also expanding its area of interest to include
UCAVs, common launcher/carriage systems, a risk management strategy (for armament
carriage and employment), interchangeability of chaff/flare consumables and insensitive
munitions, weapon effectiveness and the Plug & Play Weapon interfacing and
standardisation. WP20 will strive to validate these and other efforts through military
exercises, where practicable. A complete list of the of ASCC AIR STDs is provided at
ASCC (2005).

In the main, the extant aircraft stores compatibility standards will not significantly change in
this process although there will lots of angst expressed with such changes undoubtedly.
Developments in composite technologies and the development of a common environment
will be welcomed development, but are not revolutionary. The standards associated with
functionality can be expected to undergo significant changes as described in the thesis as we
achieve a Plug & Play Weapon. The ability to rapidly certify avionic changes is vital to get
OSA, OSI and a common environment standard right for the hardware technology being
qualified for independent use of the software. To this end particular care must be taken that
safety critical functionality can be divorced from information exchange that is less critical so
that the avionics certification process can be adequately risk managed.

One of the latest ASCC WP 20 & TTCP initiatives is the use of experimentation techniques
such as Alberts and Hayes (2002) and the use of Modelling and Simulation to better identify
technical and operational risks during combat operations.

5.2 Systems modelling

One flight test is usually worth about a thousand contractor promises and analyses. SQNLDR M.G. Tutty, USAF TPS 1990
All models are wrong, some are useful. Engineering Axiom

What is it? By constructing a model at any level of fidelity 6 or accuracy, one hopes to gain
sufficient confidence in the success (or lack of failure for the safety of all the people and
property that may be involved), of the initiative by obtaining timely information about the
proposed or current system before committing significantly greater resources to the systems
development, design, integration, qualification test, manufacture, operation and disposal.
The information sought necessarily must cover the breadth of cost, schedule and performance
issues - which in turn should determine the thoroughness and completeness required of the
requisite models. Models are especially important in simulating performance of novel
systems in harsh or hazardous environments that may affect user and/or public safety for
example. They are also vital for understanding system performance when non-linearities,
time critical or counter-intuitive behaviours are known to be present.

Models and the simulation of representative scenarios are one of the most significant and
comprehensively used risk reduction tools available when used judiciously (with more detail
being discussed in this Chapter). This is not only important to fellow scientists and

6 The fundamental terms and the major issues affecting the valid modelling of a system INCOSE SE Handbook (2000)
Sect, that support the extensive recent literature such as at Blanchard & Fabrycki (1998), Cloud & Rainey
(1998) are provided in the Glossary.

engineers, but also to non-technical project managers and end-users to answer their key
questions on Critical Operational/Technical Issues and impact on cost/schedules.

In practice, the most powerful models are those that can evolve with the system and can then
be reused with greater confidence and lower risk on future systems. Some models can in fact
become stand-alone products of themselves. This is particularly relevant in the higher level
models. One side benefit of the latter situation when the model becomes the product, is the
reductions in cost of having multiple versions of software that need to be configuration
managed and undertake V&V when modified. Today, there are numerous examples of
software code models being developed becoming one of the final product deliverables.

Application during the systems life cycle. Systems modelling and simulation for complex
or safety critical systems must be established and maintained throughout the whole of life
from lust to dust 7 as shown in Appendix 1 during the typical life cycle of n aircraft stores
capability, up until disposal. In the pre-acquisition phase, the efforts will be focused on
understanding a current system and any reported deficiencies in performance or may be on
exploring new concepts and trade-offs between technology that may be in or under
development. If one is particularly lucky, there may be validated and verified models that
can confidently address all the areas of the cost, performance and schedule of the existing
system or one that is very similar that can provide meaningful (and reliable) data and/or
information that is compatible and of the correct granularity with the modelling environment
being used for the proposed system. The models must recognise adequately the scope of
affected systems and subsystems and anticipate sensitivity to cost or schedule overruns on the

As Thamhain (1992) notes in his excellent text, this strategy may engender considerable
conflict early in the project as shown in Figure 5-1. However, if adequate funds and
schedule are not forecasted by the models based on contemporary projects of similar
magnitude and safety criticality and then not implemented then the proposed system or
project is almost certainly doomed to failure; even before conception is consummated. In
fact, the risk consideration by program phase of INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) Figure 4-33
graphically illustrates the risks that the system models should be considered for modelling as
a project progresses from earliest planning through to disposal with less surprises. The
author is a very keen advocate of integrated project teams who can argue knowledgeably
about what a system must and should be able to do while the Operational Concept is being

formulated. Members returning from meetings at this stage who indicate that all is good
are either complacent or naive: which are all bad signs for the success of the system and the
operational concept. For there to be consensus in a truly novel operational concept, there
must be typically blood on the floor and someone crying foul otherwise the team hasnt
really thrashed out the organisational interfaces. In the authors experience if there are not
three organisations deeply concerned about a new operational system or integrated process
implementation, then it probably isnt truly a system or a process! This integrated project
team must also be held together until the Functional and Performance Specific and Test
Concepts Document are similarly thrashed out with the winning (lowest bidding) contractor.

Figure 5-1 Thamhains Program Conflict Level Tradeoffs

Finally, Elliot (2000) has come to make the conclusion that there are:

Simple decisions where you know what it is you are trying to achieve and the
difficulty is in achieving it, which have two sorts of errors (ie efficiency or
effectiveness - where you can almost choose which error you prefer), whether you can
actually analyse the problem and whether it is worth it to do so;

complicated decisions where it is not even obvious what a good solution looks like;

complex decisions where the perverse behaviour of systems means that your
decisions can only be made in light of other decisions.

The implication of Elliott (2000) is most pertinent to any systems modelling when there are
assumptions, metrics and values of the Originator and Users Operational Concept that may

7 The Cradle to Grave concept so beloved by the logistics fraternity starts too late (conception has already
occurred!) and finishes too early (the environmental impact may not be over yet!).

well be open to interpretation. Even simple decisions and solutions are often difficult
enough to a large acquisition organisation and you still have an acquisition system with a
myriad of personalities and agendas to address and help with the complex decisions. It
doesnt sound like a cunning plan to not have any guiding document from which to derive
Operational Requirements from and ensure the acquisition system pays for! Therefore
systems modelling can also explore the assumptions, metric, values and the sensitivity of the
Operational Concept to potential weaknesses and thereby simplify the decision making
process. In doing so one must not forget that rigorous systems modelling can be one of the
fundamental analysis methods available to help shape the future with some greater confidence
and rigour.

Knight (2004) provides an extremely interesting new look at modelling the impact on
capability that experimentation can have rather than allowing systems to develop as a results
of infrequent wars. As shown in Figure 5-2 his work shows not only the impact of
experimentation, but also the potential for extinction if too many capability changes are made
too rapidly without an end state clearly in mind. This modelling and simulation should
investigate some aircraft stores capability operational requirements in conjunction with the
model at AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) to determine if changes are
required to the capability development and management processes. Similarly, the use of
tools such as STELLA should be explored to determine the suitability of the aircraft stores
certification process at AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) and determine
whether any roadblock(s) can be identified through V&V exercises against historic
activities and where network enabling may reduce or perhaps introduce negative changes to
these impediments.

Capability replacement time

These capabilities, which

worked in the past, are no

longer suited to their environ-
ment, leading to extinction.

War War War

replacement time Experimentation Experimentation is a way of
time reducing the time required for
testing an idea, and of keeping

up with a changing environment.

War War War114

Figure 5-2 Effect of Experimentation on evolving defence capabilities
courtesy Knight (2004)
Increasingly as modelling and simulation goes beyond the applications at the engagement
level where simple physical models are simulated to mission level representations of system
behaviour that can be V&Ved through testing and experimentation. The work by Watts
(2003) and Ilachinski (2004) highlight some of the new techniques and tools available.
Research by DSTO using the Aerospace Battlelab Capability should also be focused at the
mission level in which personnel can participate by immersing themselves into the scenario
and hone there skills and or tactics to be employed.

Baron & Pate-Cornell (1999) further concludes in a paper that uses an excellent aerospace
case study that balancing productivity and safety is an essential objective for the designers,
managers, and regulators of safety-critical production systems such as nuclear power plants,
offshore oil platforms, or simply a car. Without explicit recognition of the potential tradeoff
and a structured framework for evaluating the long-term effects of operations policies,
decision makers can inadvertently jeopardize safety for improvements in short-term
productivity. The management of critical systems operations, both in terms of productivity
and safety, involves decisions regarding design robustness, maintenance strategies, choice of
operator skill level, attitude toward the regulatory authorities, and ultimately system
decommissioning. A complete RMS [risk management system] must be evaluated in terms of
the combined effects of these strategic elements on both productivity and safety. Which
leads us nicely into risk management.

5.3 Risk Management

A ship in harbour is safe - but that is not what ships are for. John A. Shedd

What is it? Risk is potential harm to the project or system under development. Although
there are numerous related standards and texts in the literature such as AS/NZS 4360 (1999),
Cook (2002), MIL-STD-882 at US Military Standard (2002) and Blanchard & Fabrycki
(1998) et al, the fundamental terms and major issues affecting the risk management of a
system as per INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) Sect 4.2 are included in the Glossary. For
Australia, AS/NZS STD 4360 (1999) identifies the iterative process designed to support
better decision-making. This standard recommends a six-step management process that
parallels INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) to quantify the cost of doing business in the broadest
of contexts rather than having risky management as cited at HB 142-1999. Furthermore,
the Commonwealths Occupational Health and Safety Act: 2004 Sections 18 and 19
specifically refers to the duties of Manufacturers and Suppliers in relation to Plant and

Substances, to ensure that all goods and written instructions are provided in such a condition
as to be safe and fit for use in Australia.

Within defence and related industries, MIL-STD-882C at Military Stardard (2002) has for
some considerable time established the benchmark framework for assessment and
management of risk from a systems safety perspective during all acquisition and in-service
operations for ground, sea, air and space operations. It provides a consistent means of
evaluating identified mishap risks so that they can be evaluated, and mitigated to a level
acceptable (as defined by the system user or customer) to the appropriate authority. System
integrity levels are established using MIL-STD-882 as a basis for System Safety Programs
involving safety critical systems. The acceptance levels for the identified risks are usually
assigned for through life for T&E and in-service/combat operations, based on the
significance and the consequence of a probable event to streamline the decision making
process. Tailoring of the MIL-STD-882 Safety Program is undertaken to balance the cost
incurred and the benefits to be gained from establishing a tailored version of the standard to
suit the specific needs of the program. Design Assurance Levels (DAL) 8 (see Appendix 4
for details of this application of RTCA DO-178B at Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics (1992)) need to be identified to establish regression testing (unless demonstrated
competence from a contractor on a similar type of system complexity & criticality) warrants
the lowering of the DAL and hence the cost incurred to the project. The research conducted
also identified IEC 615508 (2004) which is use in Europe to assess the functional safety of
electrical, electronic or programmable safety-related systems. This standard will be assessed
for its suitability for future use and or equivalency value.
As risk is the potential harm to the project or system under development, all stakeholders in
the system or processes delivering the system must all be deeply concerned with the potential
adverse impact of the technical, cost, schedule and programmatic sources of risk. Risk
management strategies need to be developed and approved to support the assessment and
positive management of risk and support a rationale decision making especially for complex
or safety critical systems. Although ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) Section Note 2
highlights that risk management requires discipline, risk management is useful only to the
degree that it highlights the need for action, and that that such action leads to the problem(s)
being addressed quickly and thoroughly.

8 The UK using a similar system in DEF STAN 00-55 by the use of System Integrity Levels that must be met for systems
which are identified as having safety criticality. The subtle differences of the DEF STAN and MIL-STD-882 approaches
are documented in AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) as shown at Appendix 4.

Application during the systems life cycle.

Risk management needs to be continuously conducted throughout the system life cycle. As
noted in ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999), things can go wrong right up until the last phase of the
project is completed. Since the last phase of a project should be its disposal, failure to
address the risks may have long lasting dire environmental or remediation consequences.
The major challenge of risk management though is not to just focus on failures, but to attain a
proper balance between risk and the benefits or reward. Without a reward, the identified and
implicit risks 9 should be ameliorated, avoided or transferred appropriately. All personnel
involved in the operations of the project/system which may be hazardous, must be fully
engaged and understand the informed hazards and need to be in agreement with who is
accepting what degree of risk to achieve the reputed reward.

The Risk Management Plan for the Project being implemented needs to describe the project
aspects of risk identification (sources and causes), risk characterisation (effects, probabilities,
choices, time frame and coupling), risk prioritisation (greatest harm, effect and time urgency)
and risk aversion (mitigation, avoidance, transfer, and acceptance). It identifies the risk
management functions to be performed by assigned teams and supporting personnel. The
acceptable levels of risk for a particular life cycle phase need to be included and then updated
as the life cycle matures and the identified level of risk change. In some cases this may
involve funding to be redirected to improve other areas and in some cases to address changed
circumstances or indeed to rectify new hazards. One must remember after all that systems
comprise various assignments of products, processes and people. All three of these are
continuously changing, so too must the risk management framework. The only time to really
worry is when it is reported or alleged that no changes are warranted to the system. It has
probably then become complacent or inefficient and this warrants application of risk
management. In the authors experience the most successful projects have identified and then
aggressively addressed the risks and not avoided them. Joiner (2004) agrees, especially in
the case of the T&E programs. He cites AIR 5400s use of M&S, sub-system an on aircraft
testing before flight trials as a major reason for the projects success with a developmental as
well as a US missile with questionable US integration vice AIR 5398 and AIR 5395 which,
due to the acquisition strategy approved have been forced into all or nothing T&E phases

9 Those risks that result of undertaking a potentially hazardous operation/activity which may not have been identified

which have not significantly reduce the risk in one case and has lead to the latters

To address this situation the ASCENG Risk Assessment Model at ASCENG RAM V1.0
(2002) was developed for the author with the University of SA based on the work for the
software industry by Say-Wei Foo and Arumugam Muruganantham (2000). This was
tailored to aircraft stores clearance activities covering seven contributing project risk elements
all considered to be major factors for the success of any ASC flight clearance task. A risk
model based on the software industry was intentionally selected as software now poses the
highest risk to cost, schedule and performance of all the systems engineering activities. The
project risk elements recommended by Savvides & Fitzgerald (2002) have been developed
and are shown at Figure 5-3. This figure also provides an example of the results from
questions that are posed to establish the risk profile under each of these elements. (The
complete questionnaire is at Tutty (2004) as Enclosure 6.) As this is an initial quick look
risk model, a straight forward three level response system was devised to keep it as straight
forward as possible until greater fidelity can be established later in the project. Several DMO
Projects have assessed using the model (such as the result at Figure 5-3) and an electronic

questionnaire that will be investigated further for usefulness and utility 10 . Comments are
invited on the methodology and the scope of the questions at Tutty (2004) Enclosure 6.

Figure 5-3. Sample ASC Flight Clearance Risk Assessment Model result &
Recommended method for determining Consequence
courtesy Tutty (2004) Enclosure 6 and Donnelly (2000)

10 Of interest is that the ASC RAM example in Figure 5-3 was completed for the aerospace component of JP 2070 which
involved mines being purchased for air, surface and sub-surface delivery. The model correctly predicted medium levels
of risk for the complexity of the air delivered segment of the Project as the aircraft stores capability Detailed

However, useful the ASCENG RAM V1.0 (2002) has been, and will continue to be, for
working with DMO and the FEGs, ASCENG needs a simple tool to be able to better compare
and contrast the different maturity states of aircraft and stores. Such a tool needs to be able
to visualise the risk reduction by the acquisition of prior testing information during the
project, especially during the T&E phase obviously, to better determine schedule drivers
against relative risks.

Aircraft Stores Compatibility Risk Assessment and Tracking Model

The ASC Risk Assessment & Tracking (RAT) V2.0 model has been written by the author in
Excel to provide a simple risk assessment and tracking tool that can be used by
engineers to address all the aircraft stores compatibility disciplines in AAP 7001.067 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004) as well as track the MIL-HDBK-1763 tests conducted to
reduce risk and gain confidence in performance levels. As shown by Tutty (2004), Ben-
Asher, Zack & Prinz (2000) and Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company (LMAC) et al has
developed a tool that was the genesis of applying the concept to replace the extant ASCENG
process in determining the Judgement of Significance; but more on this later. The LMAC
version at Figure 5-4 shows the risk reduction and milestones proposed for a simple program
involving a limited number of major events from the Aircraft Critical Design Review and the
conduct of separations testing in accordance with MIL-HDBK-1763 four to five years later.

The ASC RAT V2.0 (included at Appendix 7) has the following major attributes going from
left to right on the ASC Input Risk Assessment Page. Each of the seven major ASC
engineering disciplines are identified and are then broken down according to AAP 7001.067
at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) to the supporting discipline. Invariably a project
moves from the fit and function disciplines to inflight ballistics testing as a matter of course
to significantly reduce safety and costs. This sequence is based on the authors experience
with successfully leading the US revisions of MIL-HDBK-1763 and clearing over 750
aircraft stores combination with 20 different aircraft types (and 50 models/variants) and over
175 stores/weapons types (and some 400 model/variants). It should also be noted that
Procedures V&V has six supporting disciplines identified which are the major publication
required for certification, namely the 1 Aircraft Flight Manual, -32 Weapons Preparation
Procedures, the 33 Weapons Loading Manual, -34 Aircrew Weapons Preflight & Inflight
Procedures, -1-2, the Aircraft Preflight Checkout Procedures and 2-11 Aircraft. These are

Operational Requirements Document was adequately quantified. JP 2070 is on indefinite hold however until a more
mature mine that meets all the air, surface and subsurface delivery methods is available at more reasonable cost.

identified separately to give additional weight to the risks associated with not getting
publications to train and qualify people in the use of the equipment properly and safely.

The Consequence of the identified risks are then addressed with Criticality, Design
Assurance Levels, Performance, Cost and Schedule factors having default typical values that
may be changed to suit the maturity of the aircraft stores configurations before a Maximum
Result is flagged as shown earlier at Figure 5-3.

Future Aircraft Stores Compatibility

Risk Reduction - as of Jul 2003


Test 270 / 280


1 2

Test 250
3 4

5 6


Test 110



1. Complete Detail Design in Aircraft CDR

2. Perform ASC Similarity Survey of Aircraft & Stores CEDPs / Tests & Analyses
3. Assess Operation Of Arming Systems Wires, Etc. During Operation
4. Perform MIL-T-7743 & 1763 Test 110 Static Ejections w/ New S&RE
5. Perform 1763 Test 110 or Ground Pit Ejection Tests To Determine/verify Dynamic Response Of Aircraft
6. Conduct M&S of 1763 Test 110, 140 WTTs & CFD analyses
7. Conduct 1763 Test 200 Series Instrumented Flights / 250 Captive Carriage Flight Tests
8. Conduct 1763 Test 270 & 280 Weapon Separation Flight Testing

Figure 5-4. Proposed Risk Reduction Programs - courtesy LMAC

Probability has the probability of failure coming from Failure Modes & Effects Analyses
and the like being modified with Maturity, Complexity and Dependency Factors before
an overall resulting Risk Factor is calculated. Note that the guidance at Figure 5-7 should
also be used to further adjust the maturity of the development program to ensure the
Maturity Factor is correctly weighted. This is an additional criteria not originally
identified in the model which should correct for the inherent optimism of the participants
which has tended to skew the results of most analyses to date. One may note the INCOSE
SE HDBK (2000) criteria have been used as discussed in depth by Tutty (2004). In the
columns for Maturity, Complexity and Dependency an aid for the user has been added for
them to select values from 0 to 1 for systems going from old to new, simple to complex
criteria respectively as these were found to be very useful.

The Risk Factor is then calculated for each discipline and is hence a 0 to 1 based value. As
a project moves through its major systems engineering phases, analyses and testing at the
system and subsystem levels will be conducted. MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military Handbook
(1998) has a standardised series of ground and flight tests that are used to enhance the

interoperability of test data between services and nations. These are used in addition to
newly identified Modelling and Simulation analyses (numbers with the leading 0 which
are being implemented and trialled at ASCENG & ARDU over the next three to five years as
part of AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) before recommending changes
to MIL-HDBK-1763) to reduce the identified Risk Factor for that discipline. As noted in
the ASC RAT User Guide Page, the assumption has been made that for each discipline
which typically has an analyses by M&S (numbers with the leading 0), a ground test
(numbers with the leading 1) and a flight test (numbers with leading 2) identified that the
risk reduction factor is equally spread between these items. If the specific analyses or testing
has already been conducted and reported then the Probability columns should reflect
commensurately high scores for maturity and complexity and extremely low probabilities of
risk. Then, most importantly, the date that the analyses and testing is completed and a test
report is provided is then identified.

Some straight forward calculations are also provide on Risk Factor to indicate average and
maximum values. This method, which is similar to use of Figure 5-5 and Technology
Readiness Levels gives extremely high Risk Factors due to the use of the probability rules
associated with so many sub-disciplines in this model. For the Risk Assessment to not be
EXTREME for most aircraft stores compatibility project required use of existing technology
or there being no risks in technology and schedule, which is unrealistic.

Figure 5-5. ASC Risk Assessment & Tracking Chart Output

As shown at Figure 5-5 the normalised risk profile for what starts off as an extremely high
risk exercise for those with no prior analogous engineering or test work with a tight schedule
of all activities is illustrated. For the purpose of this exercise a linear timeline has been
assumed. Note the addition of a red Trend-line (an Excel 6th Order Polynomial fit is
shown in these figures) and error bars (an Excel standard error band) are automated. Note

that the final V2.0 uses AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) test
designations and the model has the Trend-line included as a Moving Average of Period 2
as a better representation of more typical projects that would be of utility to users. There are
also other cosmetic colour differences incorporated to enhance the input table and the output
Tracking Charts as well.

Figure 5-6. Example of a more representative ASC RAT showing effect of prior
analyses and testing having been conducted for a Medium Risk project 11 .

The example as Figure 5-6 is probably therefore a more representative profile as prior
engineering and testing have been completed already and the Australian analyses and testing
are being carried out in quite distinct (and obviously non-linear) phases. This more closely
approximates the LMAC risk reduction tracking chart with some sixty five risk factors now
being covered in the tool.

The concerns expressed by Conrow (2003) in general and by the author in Tutty (2004) about
the use of normalised curves is particularly applicable here. Furthermore, some risk profiles
are hidden in the number of major issues being addressed: and all of them with some risk.
Note that the typical drop-off feature at the tail-end of the plot is not present as in all the
other examples provided, due to all the required Procedures being assumed to have been
available in this case at low risk. The provision of Procedures has been modelled to be
almost 20% of the normal traditional risk.

11 Now isnt this one cool for showing risk reduction through testing

Figure 5-7 Recommended Guidance for assessing program risk across a
new systems life cycle from Donnelly (2000)

It is a shameful thing to be weary of inquiry when what we search for is excellence. Cicero

Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command. Napoleon Bonaparte, Maxims of War, 1831

6.0 Background
Hopefully the ongoing aggregation of DMO into one agency, the Senate Inquiry resulting
from Cook (2003) and outcomes of the Kinnaird (2003) review will see greater synergies to
future ADF acquisitions and life cycle support, otherwise the overhead for the capability
development processes that are still-born in DMOs new processes is counterproductive and
the DMO staff should be reassigned to organisations that can met the Users needs.
Consistent leadership must also be found however to establish the commitment to satisfying
Originator and User Needs and be persistent and not continue the extant institutionalised
helplessness culture driven all to often by the fiscal calendar and by a lack of domain
experience. Therefore the critical element needed to fix the acquisition quagmire is the
setting of a robust systems engineering process that is supportive of the capability
management policy in Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) that reflects outcomes that are
properly balanced in the total costs and schedule to achieve the performance needed to attain
an operationally suitable and effective capability. How should we do this?

6.1 How to Fix a Complex System.

The impact of trying to get complex decisions made in a government bureaucracy has long
been a bete noire in most western defence forces due to a platform-based obsessiveness to the
point that it might even be considered by some to be a fetish. The complexity of the decision
making process for Australian aircraft stores capabilities is being addressed by instigating a
system focusing on a succinctly written and focussed Operational Concept at the Mission
level as shown at Figure 1-3 and establishing User Operational Requirements at the
Engagement level with meaningful Critical Operational/Technical Issues, Measures of
Effectiveness and making it so plain and simple that the acquisition behemoth cannot
misunderstand the game or where the goal posts are located 12 . Substantial amendments to
extant Air Force Aircraft Stores Certification policy and publications are being implemented

12 The football metaphor is actually a very good one in that a number of analogies can be elucidated. For example, one
needs to know which code of football is required, there are standards involved, there is a team selected and there is a
coach, there are simple COI and MOEs and perhaps the best is that the author is sure that the fence around the perimeter
constrains the acquisition system in the distance from goal post to goal post then can then only be times as much as the
straight distance!

in AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) to achieve this. AAP 7001.067 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004) identifies the following guidance:

a. The ADF is to maintain a core capability to certify the operational suitability and
effectiveness of Australian Aircraft Stores Capabilities.

b. The compatibility of all State Aircraft stores configurations shall be certified in an

ASCENG Flight Clearance.

c. New or significant variations to existing State Operational Concepts and Requirements

shall be endorsed by Capability Development Group.

d. Introduction into service of all State Aircraft Stores Capabilities shall be coordinated by
the FEG Commander using the Weapon System Plan and prioritised by Chief of Air Force
as the Aerospace Capability Manager.

e. All Aircraft Stores Capabilities shall be declared by the FEG Commander when the
associated ILS meets the preparedness criteria in the approved Operational Concept
Requirement in an Aircraft Stores Capability Certificate.

As noted earlier, the AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) documents

Australias Technical Airworthiness requirements which includes inter alia ratification of
ASCC AIRSTD 20/20 (1995) which implements use of MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military
Handbook (1998) for Aircraft Stores Compatibility Design Requirements and Testing
Methods and the use of System Engineering techniques during performance of aircraft stores
compatibility as per ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and MIL-STD-1521B at Military Standard
(1985) (and the system safety principles of MIL-STD-882 at Military Standard (2002) 13 .

As previously highlighted, the Defence Capability Management processes in Commonwealth

of Australia (2002a) are the result of at least five major reviews since 1996 with the Defence
Reform Program led by Sir Malcolm McIntosh. McKinnie (2003) 14 highlights the
significance of DMOs operation in which 8 500 personnel consume in excess of 30% of the
Defence budget by spending just under $ 3Billion on more than 290 capital equipment
projects with a further $1Billion on maintenance for military equipment on capital
investments valued at $ 9 Billion, hold over $3 Billion of inventory and oversee more than 60

13 One intriguing equivalent that will be investigated further is the applicability of IEC 615508 for functional safety
of electronic equipment which has never been identified before in Australia.

14 The author fully expects some comment with the inclusion of this material in this chapter, however, the DMO
processes are the result of numerous ongoing reviews and is in effect the defacto benchmark for future
development whether we agree or not.

percent of Defences asset base. The extant Manual states that all new ADF capabilities are
to have an Operational Concepts Document (OCD) prior to initiation of detailed project
activity. Such OCDs are to be prepared iaw the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (1992) 15 . From this starting point the new processes have the proposed new
Capability enter the Standard Acquisition Management System (or SAMS). The Project

Figure 6-1 ADF ASC Engineering Data Package and V&V T&E Activities

Office will then use the Australian Defence Contracting Template for Strategic Material at
Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) to establish an systems engineering management system
(using EIA/ANSI STD 632 (1999)) to prepare a Functional Performance Specification and
Mandated System reviews and a V&V plan for the capability. To date the mandated reviews
follow MIL-STD-1521B at Military Standard (1985) and the V&V incorporates the T&E
program. McKinnie (2003) states that the Project Management Institutes PMI (2000)
principles, Defence Acquisition University and Best Manufacturing Practices web site are
also used and the Work Breakdown Structure of DEF (AUST) 5664 at Commonwealth of
Australia (1995) is to be used. Figure 6-2 provides the detail of the recommended project
WBS activities.
McKinnie (2003) believes a DMO Systems Engineering Manual is being developed (but not
seen by the author as yet) that will provide all the links to systems engineering policies,
procedures and guidance. She also discussed the poor results of a CMMi (2000) assessment
of several (unprepared) Defence organisations, however, she believe that Defence and

15 This is fortuitous as American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (1992) has been the benchmark required
by ASCENG in AAP 7001.053 Sect 2 Chap 22 and AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) since

industry has improved and will continue to do so as performance monitoring information
starts to identify the key issues for resolution. DMO intend to have an integrated training
and mentoring program which will be the cornerstone for the DMO system becoming best

Figure 6-2 ADF DEF (AUST) 5664 Project Work Breakdown Structure

Note that Crouch (2004a) highlights the major problem with the extant top down driven
systems engineering wherein they require agreed future scenarios and mission level MOEs in
the operational concepts as inputs to commence the process. The author agrees that this state
of nirvana is the exception rather than the rule to date. The level of mastery of the capability
development, systems engineering and T&E is extremely rare given the junior, enthusiastic
and well intentioned neophytes who typically populate DMO.

US DoD Acquisition System Developments

The US DoD has also completely revamped the 5000 series acquisition process to address
some of the inflexibility affecting the majority of US acquisition programs as the US DoD
tries to also commence use of capability management principles. These changes are shown
graphically at Figure 6-3. The magnitude of the issues associated with the transition to a
capability based system cannot be understated. If the transition is rigorously implemented
with a systems engineering focus and an experimental program with meaningful performance
measuring such changes may help remove the much vaunted politically motivated

interference and issue with what Americans call pork-barrelling being provided to the rice-
bowls of invested interests.

Figure 6-4, from the USAF Air Armament Summit III in 2003, highlights the significant
changes the US is hoping to see from the initiative. Note the similarity in times required for
acquisition systems to field capabilities to the previous ADF figures from Layton (2001) in
Table 4 and US acquisition programs ability to meet schedule in Table 5.

Figure 6-3 US Acquisition System Model Changes

Figure 6-4 US Typical Acquisition Response Times

Further to these changes the USAF are also instituting a rapid acquisition process which is
shown in Figure 6-5. The ADF is yet to reach a situation for identifying the equivalent in
Commonwealth of Australia (2002a). AAP 7001.067, however, identifies level of authority
and the action allowed by Operational Commanders in support of Declared Contingency and
Emergency Operations, but the acquisition equivalent has not yet been addressed. Apparently
the ADF acquisition system wishes to continue to act as though contingency operations must
be treated as a complete surprise.

Figure 6-5 US Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Proposal from Tutty (2004).


Projects Involving Modifications
YOD to ISD YOD to FOC 14.00
16.00 12.00
14.00 10.00
10.36 yrs 8.00
Averages 6.00
8.00 To ISD
8.47 yrs 4.00

4.00 2.00
2.00 0.00
0.00 JP 2070 Air 5398 Air 5400 Air 5400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ASRAAM AMRAAM

Table 4 ADF DMO Project Average Delivery Times from Layton (2001)

Table 5 US Major Projects - see Crouch (2001)

US Lean Aircraft Intitiative. In the mid-1990s the majority of US aircraft manufacturers

and subcontractors teamed to develop the Lean Aircraft Initiative (LAI) to seek ways to
reduce the cost of producing aircraft. The concept can be applied to most product
development processes and might also be used, in modified form, in the delivery of services.
LAI considers the entire enterprise, including all the functions that are involved in production
such as manufacturing, finance, inventory management and scheduling. LAI was initially
intended for internal use only and specifically discourages its use for comparison with other
organizations. Recently, the Lean Enterprise Self-Assessment Tool [LESAT] was been
developed for organizations that have embraced LAI. While similar to the CMM and CMMI
(2000) assessment methods in that there are 5 levels defined, there is no published, publicly
reviewed model against which to compare. There are now signs that some procurement /
acquisition organizations are considering using LESAT to compare contractors that have
initiated LAI, even though the LAI techniques were created solely for internal assessment and
there is no integral process for comparison of internal initiatives that are often unique to one
organization, LAI (2004). The LAI measures of effectiveness are extremely powerful for
aerospace based organisations and are strongly recommended for development of Key
Performance Parameters for DMO and contractors in parallel with the CMMi (2000)
assessment criteria. Table 6 provides a comparison of CMMi and LAI from LAI (2004).

Australian scientific and research activities. There has been considerable criticism by the

ANAO of the ability of DSTO (but less criticism than that handed out to DMO on this issue)
to undertake defence research at ANAO (2002) and of ADF EO S3 at ANAO (2003). ANAO
(2003a) provides specific guidance for Australia science and research organisations to
improve the management of their project activities. The guide also utilises PMI (2000) to
provide some discipline to the R&D planning process. The author has some reservations
about the potential for the stifling of R&D through such methods, as few of the truly great
inventions or scientific breakthroughs have been reliably generated by similar systems with
the sense of confidence generated by ANAO. Given research needs to be conducted in
established bureaucracies anyway, ANAOs work is plausible and rational, even if it may be
wrong or inappropriate to true R&D initiative where the outcomes cannot be so easily
justified in such a business sense. The ANAO principles of themselves are potentially
sound for comparing the risks and opportunities with various competing strategies and would
serve to improve the project management abilities of the organisation so that others know
when funding is required, when V&V activities are and when research results can expect to
be reported.

Application to Air Stores Capabilities. The success of the strategy of AAP 7001.053
instituted since the establishment of ASCENG in Sept 1992 to address previous ADF
operational concepts (as they are called now) can be seen at Figure 3-1. The ability to
update and amend extant Compatibility Engineering Data Packages and the associated ASC
Flight Clearances is fundamental to the order of magnitude of aircraft stores combination
being cleared by the ADF as a result of the ADF deciding to update aircraft OFPs and the
acquisition of ADF unique aircraft stores configurations. The old way of doing business
would not have worked or would have most likely killed or injured commensurately more

6.2 The Future

Notwithstanding the changes to the higher level Defence Committee structures resulting from
the reviews of DMO, more definitive Operational Analyses is urgently required at the stage
the Operational Concept is being defined. With the greater rigour being applied to all
Operational Requirements (that are written independent of some particular solution) when
personnel change and communicating endorsed changes to the Operational Requirements.
This rigour was heartily endorsed by ADHQ Aerospace Development, AFHQ, FEG and
DSTO staffs during the ARDU review in Aug 1997 of the ADFs Weapons Clearance &
Certification Process.

The subordinate ORD is generated using systems engineering principles. ANSI/EIA IS 632
has been cited for use by AAP 7001.053 since 1995 and it has been agreed that ANSI/EIA
STD 632 (1999) should be used as the ADF SE framework. All future Originators seeking
new or significantly enhanced aircraft stores capabilities are to have an Operational Concept
generating an Aircraft Stores Capability Operational Requirement which, as a minimum, will
provide the information in accordance with AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of Australia
(2003a) and its successor AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) 16 . To refine
the Operational Concept, before finalising the ORD, more Concept Demonstrations are being
conducted by the ADF, often with support by DSTO. In recent years ASCENG and ARDU
have conducted increasing more Concept Demonstrations including: flight trials of
Raytheons EO Sensor in the DB-110 pod on F-111C aircraft during exercises, Python IV and
ASRAAM from the F/A-18 (in support of Project AIR 5400), the MK65 mine from the P-3C
Orion, the Leigh Aerospace LONGSHOT Long Range Extension Kit from F/A-18 aircraft
(both in support of JP 2045), as well as flying the Australian designed INGARA Synthetic
Aperture Radar and APG-73 Hornet Radar, et al. Further details of ARDU T&E capabilities
are beyond the scope of this thesis but are documented at the unclassified level at Tutty
(2004). One of the major redevelopments since than has been the RAAF taking over the
capability manager responsibilities for the Woomera Test Range which should see the
capability as shown at Figure 3-6 in the medium to longer term depending on the level of
funding that can be attracted.

Capabilities Integration
Integration Directorate

1 Multiple
Multiple Sensors
Sensors Execute
Execute Fused
Fused Track
Track of
of Identified
Identified Target

4 Weapon Release 3 Periodic Target Track Updates

5 Continuous Data Exchange Between

C2 Node/Weapon

6 Weapon Acquires & Guides to Target; BIA

2 C2 Node Tasking Pairs Shooter / Weapon To Target

Weapon Grids
Grids Collaboratively
Collaboratively Address
Address Find,
Find, Fix,
Track, Target,
Target, Engage
Engage and
and Assess
Assess Kill
Kill Chain
Approved For Public Release

Figure 6-6 USAF AFRL/MN Three Node Weapons Networking Concept

courtesy Ruff (2004)

16 See AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) Section 1 Chapter 3 Defining Operational Requirements

As the networking of aircraft stores/weapon principles start to emerge, such OCD/ORDs must
start to formally address the network links and the level of interoperability as shown in the
example at Figure 2-5 and the concept of operations Figure 3-6. Based on the concept of
operations then a decent Functional Performance Specification outlining the respective
standards and interfaces can be better implemented at the sub-system level.

To rectify the previous deficiencies in providing the Aircraft and Stores Compatibility
Engineering Data Package information, full Design Disclosure of all issues affecting
Technical and Operational Airworthiness is to be made in accordance with AAP 7001.053 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) and AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia
(2004) documenting the maturity of the aircraft and/or weapon and all testing that has already
been undertaken. Although a Risk Based Approach is being developed for applying this, the
contractor should expect to be held liable for conduct of any requalification if it is
subsequently found that the weapon/stores system fails criteria that was agreed. In future the
Aircraft & Store CEDPs will be provided at the level of maturity at the C/FDR, PDR and at
the CDRs described at Appendix 2. AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004)
has dramatically changed the Aircraft and Stores CEDP arrangements to provide a better
Physical Architecture fit and provides additional guidance on the process to be used. One
major advantage for contractors who already have a mature CEDP will be able to clearly
demonstrate the significantly less risk there system offers the Commonwealth. In the case of
a major acquisition of an aircraft with multiple weapons or a weapon with multiple aircraft
fit, the Systems Engineering Management Plan needs to identify the format of the CEDP
Parts to ensure that they can be updated seamlessly during the systems life cycle. If for
example an aircraft is bought wherein the initial aircraft weapons fit is expected to remain
basically unchanged then a description of each weapon would be included in each of the
CEDP Parts. If additional weapons are expected to be added then the aircraft CEDP should
be structured accordingly with treatment of each weapon broken into the CEDP Parts.

How can one avoid the current aircraft integration nexus and black hole in funding for the
short term? One solution is to not integrate the weapons system via the aircraft avionics at
all. ARDU has conducted successful flight trials of the Leigh Aerospace LONGSHOT Long
Range Extension Kit where a knee pad could be used to control programming of weapons via
an RF data link - thereby avoiding the aircraft avionics integration black hole. If the RF
link is of short distance and limited spatial orientation then there should not be any
operational impact. This also has relevancy to the limitations on the aircraft Bus Traffic and
memory available in the aircraft avionics. The aircraft OFP and bus can handle a finite

amount of data transfers. Smarter weapons will probably mean that simultaneous operations
of weapons may be needed, eg Anti-radiation Missiles and AGM-142E, exacerbating this

Conduct of joint integration of weapons onto one aircraft simultaneously

Similar to what F-111C AUP did under Project AIR 5225 where multiple weapon types were
integrated at the same time, the F-111C AUP Project Office, in conjunction with Strike
Reconnaissance Group has similarly proposed such a mechanism under the Block Concept
of aircraft upgrades. Care still needs to be taken on contractor promises about being MIL-
STD-1760 compliant. Life Cycle costs need to be considered to determine the cost of
making the F/A-18 and even the F-111C compliant with OSA and OSI principles and being at
least MIL-STD-1760C at Military Standard (2004a) and MIL-STD-3014 Military Standard
(2004) compliant with all future advanced weapons versus the current system of unique MIL-
STD-1553B at Military Standard (1996) implementations. Maybe then well get some true
interoperability and greater interchangeability of weapons between aircraft platforms and be
ready for the AIR 6000 New Aerospace Combat Capability.

Over the last few years with the major changes in DMO the rest of the ADF has been
repeatedly hearing of the momentus changes about to occur with the new acquisition
processes which includes application of sound systems engineering principles. They have
been a long time coming, lets hope McKinnie (2003) is right.

Notwithstanding the good intentions of a considerable number of people, the current ADF
capability management and fiscal processes being developed could at best be characterised,
due to their nascent status, by CMMi (2000) as Level 0: Initial and (perhaps optimistically)
as Level 1: Incomplete processes. There is no consistent defence framework for training of
personnel in systems engineering or T&E principles, ANAO (2002). Organisations like
ARDU, and even DMO itself, are left to rely on commercially available training such as
Technology Australasia and University of SA. Consequently ADF and industry staff are
trained to varying extents on the principles and not necessarily how the ADF intends to
implement systems engineering that is tailored to Australias needs and not implementing
carte blanche a US or UK system. This is a serious deficiency until the ADF formalises and
implements a decent system engineering framework that these institutions can tailor training
to. A number of good DMO staff have also lead the Australian involvement in CMMi
(2000) within defence and industry, but will be hamstrung until the overarching
Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) process through the higher committees is finally agreed
and being implemented in DMO and defence processes. DMO have championed the

investigation into how best the ADF can apply the CMMi (2000) intelligently and have been
involved with Australia making meaningful input into the CMMi (2000) products and
methods. DMO need to incorporate reference to AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2004) into the proposed DMO Systems Engineering Manual to better address
aircraft stores capabilities.

On-going Systems Engineering Initiatives affecting aircraft stores compatibility

ASCENG has also instituted a number of measures to address the lack of a systems
engineering framework during acquisition. These include:

a. Be actively involved in the operational and capability options analysis in the

capability definition phases of Capability Development Groups work as indicated
in AAP 7001.067.

b. Revamping the training being provided by ASCENG in the Commonwealth of

Australia (2004d) and (2004e) Handbooks with introductory lectures on Systems
Engineering and Safety to better describe the requirements prescribed by AAP
7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004).

c. Consistently promoting the use of logical decision making milestones to ensure

that engineering activities are tied with experimentation, T&E and capability
milestones so that all the myriad agencies involved understand better their
criticality and involvement.

d. Mandating complete air armament system design reviews in AAP 7001.067 at

Commonwealth of Australia (2004) in accordance with ANSI/EIA STD 632
(1999) and MIL-STD-1521B at Military Standard (1995) 17 and instigating such
Design Reviews under ASCENGs auspices if the complete system has not been
adequately addressed. AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) has
also established a new framework for the incorporation of M&S into the aircraft
stores certification processes. AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia
(2004) needs to be published as soon as practicable and efforts focused on
developing the M&S principles and criteria similar in principle to that already
devised for ground and flight test to be included in the next amendment.

17 Despite the letter being tailored more to just Software Engineering products, this standard is still cited/preferred
due to absence of any Australian or more Systems Engineering consistent documentation to achieve the same
purpose as yet.

e. The ADF should continue to monitor development of IEC/ISO 15288 (2002) and
12207 (1995) and participate in, or even contribute to preferably, the development
of ISO version of ANSI/EIA STD 632 Systems Engineering Standard for its
applicability to aerospace operations.

f. Setting a vision of ASCENG being compliant with CMMi (2000) Continuous

Model Capability Level 3: Defined by being ultimately compliant with
Capability Level 5: Optimising and assisting with other ARDU improvements to
be Capability Level 4: Quantitatively Managed by 2007. This should ensure
ASCENG is prepared in its own time for when such a requirement is probably
eventually made internal to defence mandatory (at Level 3 we suspect at least) as
DMO is insisting its external customers are similarly compliant (as occurred with
implementation of ISO 9001 (2000). ASCENG also intends to monitor the
commercial standard on CMMi (2000) as it potentially transitions to being an ISO
standard to determine suitability of compliance for future development of ARDU
and ADF/ASCC capabilities. DMO should also continue to develop procedures
that would be compliant with CMMi (2000) Level 3: Defined when the
Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) is published.

g. Developing and implementing a physics based scientific method for armament

test and Woomera Test Range safety activities to be written in accordance with
ISO/IEC 17025 (1999), Bock (2001), RCC STD 321-00 and especially Alberts
and Hayes (2002).

h. Investigate why ASCENG cannot provide network sourced flight manual inserts
online as a safety critical service for aircraft stores configurations and operating

i. Interoperability of UAVs has an IPT formed which will address the CONOPS for
activities such as at Figure 4-12. Dr Anthony Finns recent comment at the DSTO
Automation of the Battlespace Workshop about this is most relevant:

A US styled UAV system that needs over 70 personnel to operate it, is not Unmanned!

j. Better ways to visualising and understand risks are required. The AAP 7001.067
at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) risk matrix at Appendix 4, the ASC RAM
and AS RAT tools are example of initiatives already underway. There are
plethora of examples, however, the one shown at Figure 6-7 from Ruff (2004), is
tailored to air armament and has a lot of potential. This particularly true at the
capability domain level as per Scott (2004) in trying to populate the overview of

the capability based assessments summaries as mandated by CJCSI 3170D (2004)
as shown at Figure 6-7. The inclusion of the results from experimentation and
the M&S of multiple scenarios and graphically showing the Capability Roadmap
and Resource Strategy are immensely powerful.


The Original JCIDS Vision

Concepts Potential Capability Integrating Framework

Improvement Areas
- Integrated Priority Lists
- Joint Quarterly Readiness
Joint Operating
- Lessons Learned
- Service Programs Architectures
Joint Functional - Strategic Planning Guidance
Concepts - Joint Experimentation

Putting it together

SecDef Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Requirements Oversight Council

Resource Strategy Capability Roadmap Capability Assessment

Sys 1 Sys 3
Map Systems to Functions
Sys 2 New Sys 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Capability
capability CapabilityCapability
Capability capability Capability
Block SLEP capability capability
End of Svc Life FOC

b b

dd dd

function g
function a

cc cc

e ee

f f
function b

g g
function a

f f









task a

task a










Capability Based Assessments (FNA)s 2014 2012
2010 2008 2006 2004
task a
task b
task c

1 1
system 2

2 system
32 3

3 system 4

system 3

Concepts Integrating
system 5
system 5
Field New Training system 4 4
system 6
Organization Change system 6
system 5 75
system 7

system 6 6
system SV-5

Framework Secretary of Defense Joint Staff and OSD Joint Requirements Oversight Council
1st Order
Concepts ASW
Operations Analysis
Monitor Understand
Direct Apply
the Battle the Force

Space Situation
Operations Force
Protect Vital Interests from
Launched TMs
modeling across
Collect Develop
Destroy TM Platforms
multiple scenarios
Issue Protect US deployed forces,

Conduct Conduct Develop Decideon Sustain
Manage Battle Shared Plans Manuever Engage Survive Deploy 9 allies, and important countries

Combat Mission Courses aCourse Forces
Collection Space Situational and Forces Enemy Forces 8
Assessment Analysis of Action of Action Prevent launch Protect vital Reduce probability Provide integrated
Data Awareness Orders of theater m issiles interests from amd minimize ettects com bat operations
7 10 Destroy TM Support

launched TMs of TM attack damage

Concepts 8

Destroy Boost phase Reduce enemy target Conduct Intelligence


TM platforms acquistion capability Preparation of the

Joint 4
TM support facilities


Reduce vulnerability
of critical forces
& infrastructure

Provide force
Provide tim ely
warning & assessm ent
of threat

Dissem inate warning

missile stocks phase reconstitution & assessment of threat

6 capability

Functional 0

Disrupt & destroy Long-range Provide rapid response
0 0.2 0.4 4 0.6 0.8 1 C4ISR nodes Phase for counter-attacks

0 20
PK (Prob
2 of40 Kill)
60 80 100 Point defense
Task US and allied

Joint % TM Platforms
0 Destroyed
0 50 100
Conduct Battle
Damage Assessment

% TM Support Facilities
Destroyed Analysis
Concepts Joint
Concepts Joint
Concepts Robust engage


Concept Effective

subs Characterize
Insufficient match

Catastrophic Extensive Major Substantial Modest Minor

Resource Strategy
Capability Roadmap
Sys 1 Sys 3
Sys 2 New Sys
Block SLEP 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Value, Cost,
End of Svc Life FOC
Upgrade Risk Trades

task a
capability task b Warfighting
2014 2012 2010 2008 2006 2004 capabilities resources
task c

Field New Training

Organization Change

Past: Armament Focused

Capabilities Based Planning Capabilities
Capabilities Integration
Integration Directorate

Figure 6-7 US CJCS Capability Base Assessment summary - from Scott (2004)

6.3 Test & Evaluation Evolution

The tying of Test & Evaluation to capability management framework using a systems
engineering framework is still being pursued by DTRIALs. A paper from Hall (2002) has
elegantly tied the traditional systems engineering V diagram to capability management and
has progressed the intellectual argument on getting capability management tied to milestones
that can be measured and controlled better. This needs to be refined and implemented to
address the concerns of ANAO (2002) with respect to T&E and ANAO (2003) for EO and to
measurably improve the acquisition processes and establish logical milestones that are
consistent with our allies and tailored to an Australian legislative and fiscal framework. The
ongoing DSTO and ADF use of wider experimentation methods of Alberts and Hayes (2002)
is also a welcome development that enables M&S at higher levels of operations and
abstractions with operational personnel being able to experiment with possible actions that
can be explored with confidence if the representations are able to under realistic V&V and be
evolved with experience in there use.

Numerous respondents to the questionnaires highlighted the importance of early planning for
the T&E approach to be used. Alberts & Hayes (2002) identifies the following validation

Agent based distillations

Closed Loop Models/Simulations

Seminar wargames

Hardware in the Loop synthetic environments

Human in the Loop wargames

Human in the Loop synthetic environments

Field Training or Command Post exercises

Field trials

The continued use of techniques such as these are growing. V&V of such simulations
against actual combat operations is urgently required to improve the confidence in the use of
such activities by operational commanders: this will not happen quickly but when the right
strategy is used it will come.



Organizational Process Focus

Organizational Process Definition
Organizational Training LEADERSHIP
Organizational Process Performance
Organizational Innovation and Deployment
Strategic integration
Leadership and commitment*
PROJECT MANAGEMENT Value stream analysis and balancing
Change management*
Structure and systems*
Project Planning
Lean transformation planning, execution and
Project Monitoring and Control monitoring
Supplier Agreement Management
Integrated Project Management II. Life Cycle Processes
Risk Management
Quantitative Project Management
Enterprise level core processes
o Acquisition*
ENGINEERING o Program Management*
o Requirements Definition*
o Product/Process Development*
Requirements Management o Supply Chain Management
Requirements Development o Production*
Technical Solution o Distribution and Support
Product Integration Key integrative practices
Validation III. Enabling Infrastructure
Information Technology
Human Resources
Configuration Management
Environmental Health & Safety
Process and Product Quality Assurance
Measurement and Analysis
Decision Analysis and Resolution Legend:
Causal Analysis and Resolution * = Lean elements that directly relate to CMMI Process Areas
Organizational Environment for Integration

Table 6. Comparison of CMMi and Lean Aircraft Initiative

For they learned that true safety was to be found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when
they were going into action. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars, v, c. 404 BC

7.0 Introduction
As part of the research process, students are to provide presentations on their work to the
faculty and are encouraged to present papers to other learned institutions based on the
research involved, if possible. The author was fortunate to be invited and funded by the
USN to present an invited paper at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Research and
Technology Organisations (RTO) Air Vehicles Technology (AVT) Panel Symposium on the
Functional and Mechanical Integration of Weapons with Land and Air Vehicles in June
2004 at Williamsburg, Virginia. The paper at Tutty (2004), the first ever by an Australian at
this NATO RTO AVT Panel, discussed Australias perspective on the extant development
and agreement of better, internationally recognised, technical standards addressing aircraft
stores compatibility including: structures, electrical interfaces, EMC/EMI/HERO, safe
escape, flight termination systems, safety templates, risk management and, most importantly,
a method to verify the level of interoperability. This paper was finalised during the Research
Proposal phase of the course of study and was actually thought to be the primary basis of this
Minor Thesis. Unfortunately, as one can see from the thesis, the research clearly indicated
that to truly answer the problem posed a paradigm shift was required and substantially more
research had to be undertaken and documented.

Although the research proposal involved the use of literature searches and voluntary
questionnaires for the sub-problems, the delay in getting HREC approval to do the research
phase resulted in the selected 130 subject matter experts from defence and industry in
Australia and overseas being expected to provide input over the Christmas holidays period.
Based on the short time available for a Masters program and the unclassified nature of the
research that would require releaseability via the respondents intellectual property and
security branches and/or the US International Trade in Arms Regulations, only a limited
number of responses were received for Sub-problem 1 (just over 10%), providing limited (but
in several cases highly valuable) comments on the recommended standards and the best
practices for acquisition in DMO at Sub-problem 2 and no respondents were in a position to
be able to comprehensively address the Sub-problem 3 issue as to how such recommended
standards and best practice are to be implemented and verified. The responses to the latter
sub-problem were limited to little more than saying by a comprehensive T&E program and

this problem had to be addressed in more depth via a more extensive literature search.

Over 75% respondents indicated that they are professionally very interested in the subject and
would have liked to have had more time to provide considered responses and are very
interested in the topical nature and the implications of the research for Australia and our
alliances. Notwithstanding, the respondents who were able to provide responses did so with
information that provided extremely valuable research threads so that the author could
explore what was available in the open literature. On this note, one of the interesting
findings is that while the internet searches provide lots of topical, interesting articles and
references about the implications of a certain issue, it does not typically provide the actual
details of the standards or agreements which are typically proprietary, classified and/or
subject to releaseability issues. Hence, with the observed strategic shift underway from
military standards to commercial standards the penalty is that these commercial
standardisation organisations usually want to not only be paid for the standard but also for
providing training in the best use of that standard. Furthermore, government has become
more reticent about providing subject matter experts to the development for a, when they may
be expected to have to pay for the resulting document(s) or specialist training.

The conclusions and future work that can be drawn from the research undertaken are
addressed generally in the order discussed in the thesis using the following themes:

Capability, Systems Engineering and Risk/Safety Management

Interoperability and standardisation
Experimentation, Research and Development and Modelling and Simulation
The big picture implications of these to network enabled aircraft stores capabilities
for Australia
This approach was taken to see what conclusions can also be drawn about the network
enabling of aircraft stores capabilities rather than just summarising each of the chapters pewr
se. These themes will be addressed as they affect what seem to be the main levels of
operation for the knowledge abstraction of Figure 1-3 relevant to air armament and the thesis.
The three levels addressed are:

application of air power requiring air armament at Campaign and Theatre levels,

aircraft stores capabilities at the Mission level, and

aircraft stores compatibility at the Engagement level.

As the author has alluded through the minor thesis, all too often the current group of decision

makers may be, subconsciously perhaps, influenced in trying to address the Campaign and
Theatre levels relevant to the grand strategy of nation states using air power and armament
to achieve the desired national end-effects/states. For this is typically at this level where the
careers of such decision makers are going to be decided and their legacy for Australia
determined. The authors experience had been that such decision makers try to make value
judgements based on their personal experience which has been gained in the platform centric,
paper-based and supposedly rational world that we have lived in to date. Whilst these
assumptions are perhaps important for traditional nation state conflicts, it is ultimately at the
engagement level that far more junior people will be required to put their lives on the line
using operational concepts developed by people in organisations focused mainly on the
engagement level or mission level (at best). Unfortunately the true validation process is then
played out in combat as often as not, in front of a sceptical media in almost real time without
the nation states necessarily having formally declared war. Compounding the problem for
the decision makers is the fact that the new world order is clearly going to be a secure, near
real time, network based construct that only a few people have any direct experience in using
at any level. Therefore the use of experimentation and comprehensive V&V will be core to
people being connected to the degree anticipated and being able to conduct combat operations

7.1 Campaign / Theatre Level of Operations for air armament

As this minor thesis was also time limited, it focused on the end-effects attainable through the
application of systems engineering principles to military strategy and actions applicable to the
application of interoperable air power capabilities and not on the alternative non-military
socio-economic or diplomatic options such as might be expected at these levels. The thesis
limits the discussion to the interface issues with the space, naval or land-based power also
available to achieve national objectives at the Campaign or Theatre levels.

Capability, Systems Engineering and Risk/Safety Management.

In recent years there has been what has been tantamount to a revolutionary shift in the focus
of the profession of arms away from the platform-centric view popularised by the politicians
and media as to how many tanks, planes and boats are needed for the defence force to that of
a capability management construct that is to be network-centric, interoperable and effects
based by treating the military capabilities to achieve those end-effects as family of systems
that need to be managed across the whole life cycle. The ability to experiment and provide
predictive modelling and simulation of the capability options available to a joint force

commander that he trusts to achieve the desired end-effects in the time available to him
means that network-centricity is vital to capability development as it is to those undertaking
the combat operations. In a networked world the store will be connected to the network, just
like the platform. This will take a significant paradigm shift for the platform-centric brigade
as rarely do aircraft, of themselves, produce any end-effects.

The ADF framework for the management of capability throughout a systems life cycle has
recently been promulgated in the Capability Systems Life Cycle Management Manual at
Commonwealth of Australia (2002a). In support of this manual, a system engineering
framework is being implemented for a myriad of new processes in DMO and Defence,
whereby systems engineering is used to address clearly enunciated operational concepts using
test and evaluation techniques to validate and verify that the capability is performing as
intended. Hall (2002) has elegantly summarised the introduction of a major new capability
into the ADF using the systems engineering, V diagram with T&E frameworks that is being
successfully implemented in the DMO process development. The challenge of acquiring
capable equipment that will be operationally effective and suitable as well as being
interoperable with our allies by the time the acquisition system delivers it in eight to ten
years, is central to senior defence planners as identified at Layton (2001) when Australias
schedules can be no better than those of the US since a preponderance of aircraft research and
systems are generated on behalf and for the US DoD. The US DoD has also completely
revamped their acquisition process using systems engineering principles to address some of
the Congressionally mandated inflexibility affecting the majority of US acquisition programs.
The basic steps in the systems engineering process relevant to air armament have been
identified at Appendices 1 and 2. As the ADF moves to the new approach to defence
acquisition, it has also been increasingly involved in international peace keeping and other
combat operations where these system interfaces have had to be with Allied and Coalition
forces who are also struggling with similar issues. Consequently, the development of agreed
international standards for not just the equipment we use, but also for the interfacing of this
equipment and the people and processes to be interoperable are vital.

The validation and verification of flight and safety-critical systems is central to safe systems
and minimising risk through the use of test and evaluation principles. Further to the
approaches for avionic software, a plethora of software engineering texts used within the
industry for recommended approaches to software V&V have been identified. For safety-
critical or trusted systems software DEF (AUST) 5679 at Commonwealth of Australia (1992)
uses formal methods to assess the Level of Trust required for computer based systems.

Despite the rigour espoused, the standard has not been used for aircraft systems to date due to
its unique approach and limited use. AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a)
identifies requirements and criticality for aircraft systems that impacts on appropriate risk
management measures being applied, that are suitable for wider application to cost,
performance and schedule risk management, Tutty (2004). The MIL-STD-882 at US Military
Standard (2002) criteria have been tailored for use in AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2003a) as per Appendix 4 and have been in successful use for air armament and
project planning activities for over five years. The potential for recognition of IEC 615508
(2004) as an equivalent standard needs to be investigated further.

Both of the preferred standards of AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) and
AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) for armament and associated aircraft
hardware and software refer to the safety assessment that is made to the functions of the
aircraft to meet airworthiness requirements. Increasingly, the interoperability of avionic
systems with other defence planning systems is dependant on the ability to be less hardware
reliant and the ability to change and certify software. The certification authority approves
the use of a component to satisfy the performance, safety and reliability of each function.
Clear and unambiguous identification of functions and relationship to the super-system is
vital to defence capabilities having an integrated system of systems. Standardisation within
the aviation and software industries on safety assessment methods, criteria and testing
benchmarks stand to greatly streamline the acceptance of such COTS equipment. The
commercial consensus based, open standards and best practices needed to develop the
software used in future avionic systems, need to be better established and be implemented in
the Australian context of systems engineering. The increased use of commercial standards
such as ANSI/EIA STD 632 at Electronic Industries Association (1999) should be the basis of
developing such risk management tools to future internationally agreed standards and the
impact on Australia should be established in future editions of the Defence Capability
Systems Life Cycle Management Manual, to ensure network enabled operations are
adequately planned for meeting the ADFs operational needs. The ADF and DMO also need
to be actively involved in the development of ANSI/EIA STD 632 at Electronic Industries
Association (1999) (as Australia and Defence Quality Assurance Organisation did with the
development of what is now ISO 9000: (2000)), as an ISO standard either as part of ISO/IEC
15288 (2002) or as a new standard.

System engineering must be used throughout a systems life-cycle to ensure that agreed cost,
performance and schedules can be met with some measure of quantifiable confidence. Risk

management is an essential part of determining the maturity of the systems being
development to determine if a significant change has occurred which will enable the tailoring
of the amount of redesign, testing (V&V), publication changes that are required. The
essential basic steps in the systems engineering process are:

Define the System Objectives the OCD and ORD is pivotal, in small projects focus
on what is different from an similar existing mature system; establish a framework for
systems engineering, risk management and project management that enables all
parties to adapt the expected Products with schedule on a case by case basis:

Establish Performance Requirements that are phased and cannot be misinterpreted by

the user and engineers;

Establish the Functionality ensure that all subsystem managers have agreed
functions and interfaces agreed;

Evolve Design and Operations Concepts limit scope to ensure that existing (mature)
System Elements / Configuration Items are used to maximum advantage over the life
cycle expected;

Select a Baseline maturity of the system elements and the organisation managing
them is vital and planning for P3I or spiral development;

Verify the Baseline Meets Requirements recognising past similar testing and V&V;

Iterate the Process Through Lower Level Trades

Having experienced personnel and a company knowledgeable of systems engineering similar

projects, is vital to reducing the formality of some of the steps and the trade-off studies. To
undertake small sized projects, organisations need to establish a system engineering
management system that can tailor the process and expected product deliverables, depending
on the safety criticality, and agreed measures for significant changes to keep it as small as
practicable with cognisance of the organisations maturity and expected changes in key
people. With simple systems or ones with extensive and rigorous systems engineered
products and system elements, the key milestones for progressing a new small sized project
can be readily tailored while still meeting risk and performance measures. The bottomline is
that all key system elements with significant changes need to be properly systems engineered
so that drawings and publications are available to affected personnel so they can safely and
efficiently operate the system. The dispersed nature of Australian management of capabilities,

engineering, T&E infrastructure and operators for aircraft stores capabilities warrants far
better command and control to communicate an agreed end state.

A logical milestone methodology based on systems engineering principles has been

introduced within the technical and operational airworthiness and quality management
frameworks and is in the formative stages of use with several organisations within all the
ADF services. The recent changes to AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004)
for the ADF air armament affecting capability management and systems engineering practices
need to be addressed for all acquisition projects to improve how we introduce new aerospace
combat capabilities.

The ADF should immediately implement a common system across all three services to
identify and prioritise all aircraft stores capabilities that:

Meets the new capability domain construct.

Recognises all ADF armament and extant NCW Roadmap priorities.

Provides realistic joint training on ranges.

From this starting point, CDG should immediately promulgate an ADF Armament Roadmap
that includes air armament and then update the NCW Roadmap with a fully integrated, effects
based framework.

In the shorter term, if the development of the ADF Armament Roadmap itself continues to be
protracted and a way ahead unclear, an ADF Air Armament Roadmap should be finalised by
CDG Aerospace Development and at least that path envisioned included in the ADF NCW
Roadmap. As it is at this level that most of the operational concepts are being currently
formulated in OCD and both Roadmaps need to establish the level of commitment the ADF
wishes for air armament and weapons data links and the longer term interface interface issues
with the ADF DIE and US GIG. The DIE Architecture needs to formally establish this way
ahead, cognizant of the agreed air armament roadmap.

The approval of future ADF OCDs iaw American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(1992) and the subordinate ORDs must be generated using sound systems engineering
principles. These future concepts need to focus first on the development of the tactical
networks for use of air armament and institute process for controlling the potential gluttony of
hopefully assured information going into and equally hopefully the timely delivery to the
right people out of such a tactical network. The development of such systems, in conjunction
with focused C2 networks between the AOC and essential reachback and HQ elements, is

critical to reducing the size of coalition AOCs and improving the deployability of the AOC.
Comprehensive performance measures need to be instituted and used not only for operational
concepts employed in combat but also for DMO and the DIE.

The ANSI/EIA STD 632 systems engineering framework at Electronic Industries Association
(1999) and ISO/IEC 15288 (2002) should be used as the basis for development of a common
ADF, DMO and contractor systems engineering framework when used in conjunction with
the critical standards identified in AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) and
AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) being used for aerospace best practice
for air armament.

The ADF must institute a formal rapid acquisition process in DMO with an OCD and
performance measures that clearly identify essential and desirable aircraft stores
configurations, operating limitations and that authorises direction liaison in such specific

Interoperability & Standardisation

Standardisation can occur within the areas of doctrine, procedures and material at three
possible levels of standardisation, to achieve the required level of interoperability:
compatibility, interchangeability and commonality. In summary, the three levels of
standardisation sought by the ASCC member nations for interoperability can be thought of as:

Compatibility - no unacceptable interactions

Interchangeability - used in place of

Commonality exactly the same doctrine, procedures, or equipment

The level of interoperability of aircraft and stores is vital to Australia being able to fly and
fight with our allies. Interoperability is, without exception, given a very high priority early
in aerospace weapons programs in setting the standards required and then seems to be left
behind, when fiscal realities start hitting home to save costs to that specific program.

The new Director General for Interoperability is addressing interoperability concerns such as
that raised by Borgu (2002). His assertion that aviation itself is fairly well connected, it is
when one looks at the C2 and individual connectivity of the three service operating
environments that it is very expensive to acquire and continue to maintain the high level of
preparedness for interoperability throughout the a defence organisation, even that of a defence
force the size of Australia. The level of interoperability chosen for network enabled aircraft
stores capabilities that are based on aircraft stores configurations certified by nationally

recognised airworthiness bodies needs to, however, mature beyond such a technical
airworthiness emphasis, to one of a people emphasis by addressing the command and control
and organisational elements to achieve certification of interchangeable aircraft stores
capabilities at acceptable levels of risk during concept development, capability definition,
acquisition and in-service phases. Determining the level of interoperability of a system
using the LISI and DSTO type models is vital in the OCD. The current initiatives of
organisations such as the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee, the NATO Military
Agency for Standardization and commercial standardisation organisations that will affect how
future aerospace weapon systems will be integrated to achieve interoperability between joint,
allied, and coalition forces, will be critically reviewed and options discussed to increase
awareness of the challenges facing us. Consequently, the pragmatic view of Wilson (2004)
that selected capabilities and or units will be initially brought to higher level of
interoperability would seem to be the right focus in the short to medium terms, until the US,
ASCC and NATO standardisation and equipment initiatives are more mature.

The ASCC WP 20 on Air Armament is spearheading initiatives to improve member nation

interoperability and understanding for the allies to conduct joint and coalition operations.
The ASCC needs to complete the recent initiatives on standardising the understanding of each
nations technical and operational frameworks for systems engineering, safety, T&E,
airworthiness, clearance, S3, air armament design requirements to reduce national duplication.

For Australia to be interoperable at this level of operations with our Allies for future
campaigns, a commitment at this level will require significant funding. It would seem that
this may be the case with the changes noted at Canali (2004). We shall see how the ADFs
new CIO goes in securing the funding to achieve this.

Similarly, the implementation of HLA/DIS and TENA standards and middleware concepts in
the DSTO Simulation centre such as the Aerospace Battlelab Capability and at the Woomera
Test Range at this level are vital to the interoperability of distributed real time operational
analysis and mission rehearsal.

Experimentation, Research & Development and Modelling & Simulation

The Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations by the ASCC & TTCP nations are
contributing immensely to this implementation by improving the Command and Control and
secure communication needed to achieve higher organisational interoperability and not just
technical interoperability. These Joint exercises need to be continued to explore the NCW
concepts being developed before too much money is expended and the operators have even

seen conceptually how such a family of systems will work.

The ADF and DSTO focus on experimentation activities have and will continue to be a major
success story given the focus on exploring the issues with future operational concepts and
operational analysis continues. DSTOs development of simulation centres such as the
proposed Aerospace Battlelab Capability that will be able to communicate with the other
space, land and maritime domain simulators is a major issue at this level. Whilst the use of
the ABC may well focus on the connectivity of aerospace assets at the Mission level, the
simulation framework and the connectivity with other services and test/training ranges is vital
to ensuring the accuracy of predictive M&S can be improved. Ensuring that there is a whole
of life focus on the experimentation, R&D and M&S involving aircraft stores capability
implementation that is consist with all ADF armament experimentation and M&S. Future
R&D involving aircraft stores capabilities needs to ensure the levels of fidelity, accuracy and
validation attained can be documented and maintained. The developments associated with
use of intelligent agent based simulations to distributed air armament M&S also needs to be
explored further.

The future of an Australian UAV that could be developed indigenously and alternatives to
combat aircraft that rely on fossil fuels requires consideration and further research &

The big picture for network enabled air power.

The ADF needs to urgently publish the systems engineering framework, the DIE framework,
the Australian Air Armament Roadmap with NCW requirements identified to move ahead in
the application of systems engineering principles to aircraft stores capabilities and should
actively monitor Woomera Test Range development activities for use with advanced
uninhabited vehicle and weapons networking concepts. ADF and DMO participation in
international standardisation developments is vital at this level to ensure that we are a smart
customer with the many changes in distributed computing protocols and networking
constructs affecting ADF operations. At this level the ADF and DMO need to urgently to
seek ways to capture better capability management and project management performance
measures to commence the learn by doing with some bench-marks.

7.2 Mission Level of Operations for network enabled aircraft

stores capabilities
At this level of operations one can expect to see individual aircraft stores capabilities flying as

a single entity or as a team of aircraft stores capabilities.

Capability, Systems Engineering and Risk/Safety Management

At this level one would expect to see smaller acquisitions to improve or enhance a current
major capability.
Currently, existing operational concepts are predominantly platform based and little cross
platform and no mission level concepts of operation for networking of multiple platforms
have been formally established. The ADF Air Armament Roadmap, when issued, should
identify these synergies by expressing the operational concept in term of the network and not
the platform as well as exploring how the ADF fits into the US model at Figure 1-2. The
operational applicability of the use of tactics such as swarming should also continue to be
explored by CDG and DSTO. The attributes and flexibilities espoused by Layton (2001),
Layton (2004), Woodcock (2003) and Borgu (2003) should be carefully explored as a clean
sheet of paper exercise and initial plans focus at the tactical and mission level for the network
in the medium term. Individual platform managers then need to implement the level of
interoperability that comes from this study. Use of the AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2004) framework and guidance should engender greater discipline and uniformity
in ensuring that OCD and ORDs are tailored and rigorously identify the COIs and have
relevant MOPs/MOEs. These criteria must be measurable and should improve with
experience and training if lessons at this level are captured and CDG and DMO wish to
become learning organisations. Without such rigour, capability development is then doomed
to being just another fad that wasted all our time. All networked concepts must include an
assessment of the links interoperability as per Figure 2-5 and the interface with the example
at Figure 3-6.

The links to concept exploration, mission rehearsal and improved training for operational
forces through the DSTO and ADFs Aerospace Battlelab Capability in the short to medium
term must be pursued relentlessly and as a priority. The connectivity to other research
organisations, ARDU and the Woomera Test Range in the medium term and to the JCTC /
JNTC in the longer term is required for the ADF to explore V&V and options to achieve the
operational level end effects levels expected by the Joint Force Commander. The CDG and
DSTO efforts in this area to provide a mission level simulation that will be linked to the other
environments for land and naval operations are strongly supported. ARDU must become
more involved in the use of the other experimental tools and methods available for concept
exploration and mission rehearsal earlier in the acquisition life cycle. ASCENG and DSTO
could help in this if tasks were raised that bounded the specific experimental concepts being

explored. The experience of the people typically available at ARDU would help mature
these tools and help progress the Aerospace Battlelab Capability along with its fidelity and
operational utility immensely.

Increasing use of software risk assessment tools such as Savvides & Fitzgerald (2002) should
be reviewed against the model used by AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004)
and tailored accordingly, to address future prediction of software developers ability to meet
performance, cost and schedules for certification of aircraft stores capability specifically (vice
the engagement level aircraft stores compatibility perspective at the moment).

Project and Risk management activities must continue to improve with the tailoring of the
best practice principles of PMI (2000) and AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia
(2004) to the new DMO acquisition processes. Once established, the key performance, cost
and schedule performance metrics need to be collected and then tracked to determine the
health of the acquisition effort at least at this level. This will enable the AAP 7001.067 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004) framework to be evolved based on scientific and
engineering principles, rather than what seems to be by an outsider to be a very ad hoc and
hardly independent process.

Interoperability and standardisation

Currently, there is little or no commonality with weapons types across ADF platforms.
Weapon types in the main are platform specific and are certified as being compatible. Even
within air armament this is the case. The ADF Air Armament Roadmap, when issued,
should be recommending that the interchangeability of future weapons between platforms be
improved and the advances with smart fuzes, even with existing armament, be explored to
ensure that sufficient preparedness and operational flexibility is available. If necessary, the
modification of extant aircraft OFPs may need to be sought to achieve this.

The ADF needs to immediately implement an integrated project team consisting of JALO,
AIR 6000, AIR 7000, FEG and AOSG engineering and operational staffs, DSTO (AOD,
AED & WSD), the CIO staff responsible for the DIE and Australian Industry to review the
ALWI-2 (2004) study and to assess the implications of the Plug & Play Weapons networking
concept proposed for future aircraft and stores. Then an implementation plan should be
established accordingly within the DMO and affected agencies. The recommended focus
areas are:

Support and understanding of the principles behind the OSA / OSI applications

needs to be improved, along with MIL-STD-1760 at Military Standard (2004a),
MIL-STD-3014 at Military Standard (2004a) and the SAE Miniature Munitions
Standardised Interface being progressed.

Participation in the NATO environmental study for interchangeability of weapons

should be strongly supported in the short to medium term.

WDLA implementation acknowledged in ADF Air Armament and NCW Roadmaps


A common certification basis with NATO should be actively sought in the short to
medium term by Australia through the ASCC.

One issue raised by several questionnaire respondents was whether there was any reason one
couldnt network enabled stores operating limitations in the flight manuals and mission
planning tools be provided and updated online (and in the future networked with mission
planning systems) by ASCENG with the operational airworthiness authority approving the
update and release; also online!

Experimentation, Research & Development and Modelling & Simulation

This level is currently (and still should be), one of the most exciting for the organisations and
personnel involved in experimentation, R&D and M&S. The ADF seems to be collectively
embracing the learn by doing strategies that seem to be the de rigeur approach in future for
the to be technologies. Better tools are constantly being developed that can improve the
fidelity and accuracy of the M&S, not just for design development, but also for application in
real time simulations. At this level, the use of the ABC will be central to exploring the
validity of future operational concepts and undertaking mission and mission package
rehearsals by operational crews. At this point, the accuracy of the armament effectiveness
models becomes critical to the validity of the results. Better mechanisms for identifying the
validity and confidence in such simulations needs to be found for disclosing this to mission
participants. The primary area that DSTO needs to focus on is the V&V of the JMEMs for
air to ground and air to air and the seamless and timely integration of these open system
designed tools with future Mission Planning tools.

The use of tools such as Stella should be explored to determine the suitability of the aircraft
stores certification process at AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) and
determine whether any roadblock(s) can be identified through V&V exercises against
historic activities and where network enabling may reduce or perhaps introduce negative
changes to these impediments. If training is provided in the use of tools such as Stella are

provided at the undergraduate level, this application would seem appropriate at this level.

The work at Knight (2004) should also be explored with aircraft stores capabilities as a
research exercise to determine the applicability of his modelling to historical aircraft stores
certification activities probably at the post-graduate level. Then it may be possible to
determine if efficiencies can be identified in capability development and management for
inclusion in the ADF Air Armament Roadmap or to processes and interfaces used in AAP
7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004).

The big picture for aircraft stores capabilities

The success with tailoring of the Commonwealth of Australia (2004d) and (2004e)
Handbooks to the final AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) and with AAP
7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) is being actively observed by the other
ASCC and NATO nations. These documents may well form the basis for a Code of Best
Practice accordingly. The guidance provided by these handbooks should continue to be used
to improve the objectivity and the development of meaningful COIs/MOPs/MOEs in the
OCD; otherwise the testers will be left to their own devices to scope the amount of testing.

A clear consistent vision of Australian Air Armament needs should flow into future OCDs
that address the subsystem ORD requirements of the AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2004), prior to the contract signature. Such ORDs must include aircraft stores
configurations and essential/desirable operating limitations. Capability Development Group
must implement an incremental capability development approach needs to be used with P3I
walk before you run, but know where youre headed at least. DMO must identify and
follow-up the significant risk identified rather than being so risk adverse and ignoring such
problems: the truth will come out eventually and the staff who believe that they will not be
blamed because issues identified in last moment T&E will not be remembered, will be a thing
of the past if DMO do implement a true learn by doing philosophy.

The ability to sense, predict and advise realistic, risk managed options consist with national
doctrine and warfighting principle is the key. If an enemy suspects that one knows already
what he is up to and believes that you have the capability and the will to act on that
knowledge it is a really serious deterrent in todays almost instantaneously connected world
which can be positively influenced by the media. Australia should be aggressively using the
media positively rather than the current policy of an under-informed public-relations officer
doing his best efforts to explain complex operational and technical issues. It is clear from the
research that even the US does not expect to have interoperable network enabled weapons

integrated into networked enabled aircraft in the aerospace, land or maritime capabilities until
the medium term as clearly identified by Hobbins (2004) and Rutledge (2004). Such
domains will not be integrated with the information and operational support domain until the
far term in the US, therefore one should not expect Australia to be able to do so (as the US
will be spending a much on just this as Australia will spend on the whole of defence in the
same period). The Plug & Play Weapon concept needs to be integrated into the ADF
Armament and NCW Roadmaps cognizant of this reality and an OCD finalised that is
platform independent.

7.3 Engagement Level of Operations for network enabled aircraft

stores compatibility
This is the level at which most acquisitions are currently being implemented by most nations,
including the ADF and DMO.

Capability, Systems Engineering and Risk/Safety Management

At this level, all OCDs should address the specific ORD requirements of AAP 7001.067 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004) as a matter of course for FEG Commander approval,
prior to contract signature. The traceability of trade-offs made against the OCD and ORD
should start being tracked.

The F/A-18 AMRAAM and F-111 AGM-142 standoff weapon capability are the only
networkable weapons in the short term. In the medium term, the AIR 5418 FOSOW offers
some networking options depending on the weapon selected and the degree of WDLA
incorporated as an essential P3I. Consideration as to use of the GBU-39 SDB, with or
without the planned WDLA P3I, is still in its infancy and will be subject to the AIR 6000 and
AIR 7000 deliberations.

The use of JDAM and GBU-38 JDAM-ER with improved mission planning may be the
closest option to a network enabled weapon otherwise in the medium term.

Finally, the aircraft stores compatibility training provided to all personnel in defence and
industry needs to be streamlined and improved to ensure the right aircraft stores capabilities
are provided when needed by the Users. This involves practitioners understanding and
having experience with:

A Safety Case for Explosive Ordnance addresses the Manufacture to Disposal Life

Certifying aircraft stores configurations against an Operational Requirement

involves the operational, engineering and logistics elements issuing the products and
the procedures

Clearance of aircraft stores configurations addresses the key disciplines of

Fit & Function;

Structural & Environmental;


Captive Compatibility, Flying Qualities & Performance;

Employment & Jettison; and

Ballistics and OFP Validation & Verification, Safe Escape & Safety
The use of Significant Change tolerances and Modelling and Simulation to add
T&E and minimise needless rework by the managers of the aircraft and stores.
Moreover, to maximise the flexibility for in-service operational, engineering and
logistics managers

The use of agreed Risk Management criteria and approval levels to identify
problems early and make responsible (and traceable) decisions that are followed up
to ensure the remediation strategy was successful.

AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) and AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth

of Australia (2004) should stand as the reference standard in the short term. The certification
standard of AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) and AAP 7001.067 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004) should be continually reassessed in line with the
activities undertaken by the ADF with the NATO / ASCC plan of NAFAG 2 in the medium
term. Developments in composite technologies and the development of a common
environment will be developed, but are not revolutionary. In the main the extant aircraft
stores compatibility standards will not significantly change in this process although there will
lots of angst expressed with any minor changes. The standards associated with functionality
can be expected to undergo significant changes as described in the thesis. The ability to
rapidly certify avionic changes is vital to get OSA, OSI and a common environment standard
right for the hardware technology being qualified for independent use of the software to apply
the principles of Filmer (2003).

DMOs capability and network centric based PDASs and EMPs need to address and actually

implement the agreed risk management plans and provide detail accordingly (ie, projects with
more experienced staff and less risk should be using tighter margins as per Figure 5-7).
ARDU and ASCENG must be formally involved in the selection / PDR / CDR / PDAS
implementation plans of DMO.

The Aircraft Stores Clearance Risk Assessment Tracking model at Appendix 7 should be
further developed and used to better apply risk management principles to establish cost,
schedule and performance for aircraft stores compatibility tasks. Further investigation of the
ASC RAT V2.0 at Appendix 7 against completed programs to confirm risk level
applicability, needs to be undertaken and made consist with the development of M&S test
criteria. Similarly, the risk assessment tool questionnaire of Savvides & Fitzgerald (2002)
needs to be considered to enable the future prediction of software developers ability to meet
performance, cost and schedules for clearing aircraft stores compatibility. This application
should retain consistency, and even be dynamically linked, with the Mission level aircraft
stores capability assessment at Section 7.2.

Interoperability and standardisation

The ASCC and NATO environmental and certification studies are vital to the improvement of
interoperability between nations. Whilst this is very important this is still a long term goal.
In the first instance the ASCC nations should agree on a common certification framework in
the short term and agree to recognise other nations certifying in accordance with this
philosophy. Groundcrew and aircrew training and proficiency will then become the driving
issues, not the technical interoperability in the medium to longer term.

The RTCA DO 160 and DO 178B at Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (1992)
use with AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003) and AAP 7001.067 at
Commonwealth of Australia (2004) should continue to be used and developed for military

The involvement with the development of and the use of MIL-STD-1760 at Military Standard
(2004a), MIL-STD-3014 at Military Standard (2004) as per the ALWI-2 (2004)
recommendations are vital for implementation of the Plug & Play Weapon and to improve the
interoperability of the next generation of air armaments.

To improve the visibility of agreed interoperability measures a public website with all the
above agreed standards should be established.

Experimentation, Research & Development and Modelling & Simulation

The DSTO ABC and a whole of life aircraft stores M&S capability must be implemented as a
priority for DSTO and AOSG (ie ARDU and the Woomera Test Range Measurements &
Operations Branch).

ASCENG and DSTO should become more involved with M&S V&V in a whole of life
approach that is consistent with reuse of simulations with the ABC and Woomera Test Range.

Experimentation with WDLA advances needs to be pursued for demonstration in the medium

The Big Picture for network enabled aircraft stores compatibility

A clear consistent vision of Australian air armament needs should flow into OCDs that
address the subsystem ORD requirements of the AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of
Australia (2004) at a time prior to the contractor signature.

The project and risk management by the DMO and ADF needs to at this level be given the
time to ensure that the adage of plan the work and work the plan is the rule and not the
exception and lessons learned start to be captured to enable the organisation to learn and
evolve accordingly.

This thesis has had as its central premise the notion that Australias future joint defence force
will inevitably have key operational and support systems network enabled with sensor and
engagement platforms connected to the command and control elements. The main questions
resulting from this central premise are therefore: How soon can we make the most important
parts of our joint combat forces network enabled while retaining the level of interoperability
between all these family of systems? Where can systems engineering principles be used to
positively influence this? The research problem and selected sub-problems sought to bound
these issues. Given that currently, weapons, let alone aircraft stores, do not formally factor
in the ADF (and the USAFs let alone coalition) NCW Roadmaps at the level they are
currently written, this will not be occurring in the short term. The prosaic answer from the
research undertaken, is that with the time available before a network enabled world exists, the
best strategy for Australia is to focus the ADF Air Armament and NCW Roadmaps on
providing the secure, tactical level networks at the Mission Level for key aircraft stores
capabilities in the short to medium term cognizant of the reputed transformation in NCW for
the strategic and interconnectedness of everything that will occur in the longer term.
Australia needs to embrace the ASCC standardisation program for certifying the next

generation of networked Plug & Play Weapons and implement an experimentation program
that includes the use of air armament to explore with the people that will have to use such
systems whether such concepts are practicable. With such a bounded problem, the systems
engineering principles identified in this thesis will be most useful in helping identify and
implement with rationally derived cost, schedule and performance criteria to deliver such a
system and help better manage the wider communities expectations.

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a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one
that relies more heavily on stealthy precision weaponry, and information technologies President George W. Bush
We are focused always on programs, always on platforms. We are going to change that
Not only with ourselves but how we join with the other Services, with coalition partners.
General John Jumper, Chief of Staff of the Air Force,

As cited by Hobbins (2004)

What is the use of running when you are on the wrong road. Bible Proverbs

Weapons should be hardy rather than decorative. Miyamoto Musashi

Organization doesnt really accomplish anything.

Plans dont accomplish anything, either.
Theories of management dont much matter.
Endeavours succeed or fail because of the people involved.
Only by attracting the best people will you accomplish great deeds.
Admiral Hyman G Rickover, USN (Retd) Father of the US Nuclear Submarine as cited by Colin Powell


This Minor Thesis hopefully demonstrates that the author has now been cleansed of
any vestiges of platform-centricity.

The author is honoured to have been cited by both Layton and Spencer (2004) as a
high-flying, weapons wielding, network enabling theologist
based on the research questionnaires used let alone the thesis itself.

How long it will take the wider defence force and the provision of the tactical
networks to enable core Australian and Allied aircraft stores capabilities to be
network enabled is the wider challenge.

It will be very interesting to observe the implementation and validation process over
the next two decades: as that will be the minimum length of time it will take to
achieve such a far-reaching, grand vision.
Minor Thesis Tutty 2005
Appendix 1
AAP 7001.067 Minor Thesis Tutty 2005
Appendix 2

Project Initiation / Approval Functional Analysis List Design Requirements Manufacture Physical Configuration Audit
Operational Concept (OCD) (The Whats) Technical Performance Installation Stores Design Certificate
Requirements Elicitation Allocation of Requirements Measures Calibration ARDU Non-Standard Mod
Operational Requirement (ORD) - Aircraft & Suspension Equip Assign Design Activities for Requirements Verification Orders & Aircraft Config
Source/Technical Requirements - Stores Aircraft & Stores Acceptance Testing Certificate (AACC)
-COIs / CTIs & MOEs identified - Mixed Loads? Design Env. Qualification Testing ASC Clearance T&E
Systems Eng Mgt System & Trade-off & Optimisation Prototype Development Fit & Function Testing Test Plan - Safety of Flight &
Logistics Considerations Hazard Assessment Drawing Production EMI/EMC/HERO Testing Airborne System Test
Technical Certification Plan Synthesis Functional Configuration Collection & Analysis
Pjt Design Acceptance Strategy Audit (FCA) ASC Clearance ISD
Risk Analysis ASCCERT Service Release
Aircraft & Stores Covered Aircraft & Stores Covered Aircraft & Stores Covered Aircraft & Stores Covered (FEG T&E, ISD & IOC)



Project Approval Conceptual Preliminary Critical Systems

DMO, Design Review Design Review Design Review Certification Review(s)
JALO & ARDU ASC 1.3 & ASC 1.3 & Phase 1.3 & ASC Phases 2 3 4 5 6
ASC Phase 1 Systems Requirements System Requirements Verify Adequacy & Product Validation
Verification Validation Producibility of Design Lessons Learned
Baseline Functional Baseline 'Design-to' Baseline 'Build-to' Baseline Product Baseline

Functional Performance Spec System Design Review (SDR) Design Reports NSM & Mod Orders
Statement of Requirement Technical Specification Stress Analysis Sub System Test Reports
Document Design Dependent Parameters Design Proposals Electrical Loads Analysis Configuration Audit(s)
Impact Identified Test Plans developed Design Drawings Design Certificate(s)
DMO Project EMP Update TEMP Update Acft & Stores CEDPs System Test Reports
Test Concepts & Requirements Calibration Procedures Finalise Test Plans & TEMP Finalise Acft & Stores CEDP
Verification Plan Acft & Stores CEDPs - Late
Update ORD (if required) Start

Adverse Effect Review Ftnl Hazard Assessment Safety Analysis

Figure C1 ADF Aerospace Systems Engineering, Safety & Testing Framework AAP 7001.054 Section2 Chapter 12 Annex C
(see ANSI/EIA 632, MIL-STD-882C, MIL-STD-1521B and AAP 7001.068 Section 3 Chapter 5 for ASC Phases)
AAP 7001.067 Minor Thesis Tutty 2005
Appendix 2

Blank Page
Note: The time to complete second pass documentation can
vary with the complexity of the project. This time is
specified in the First Pass Approval.
DCSLCM Timelines
For simple projects: a four-six month PDS giving a YOD
one year earlier than indicated may be practical

For most projects: the RFP route as indicated

For complex projects: a longer IDA phase may be necessary

May May May
00 +02 30 May 2003 +05
Budget Budget Budget
DCPG 01/02 05/06
Recived 01
Sep 2003
First Pass Approval Second Pass Approval
New Project Project proceed to
included in MCI and acquisition Phase
if necessary DCP

Jan +yrs Jan +2 Jan +3 Jan +4 Jan +5 Jan +6


Jan +1
Appendix 3
Minor Thesis Tutty 2005
Minor Thesis Tutty 2005 Appendix 4
AAP 7001.067 Annex B to
Part 2 Chap 2



System or Supporting Criticality DAL MILHDBK Mode Events

Discipline Discipline Note 1 Note 2 1763 Test Note 3
Fit & Function Fit II - 101 I,S,A,T
Note 4
Function I - 102 I,S,A,T

Proc Validation - II - 102 I, T

Structural & Loads I - 131 / 141 / 200 / I, S, A, T
Environmental 253
Vibrations II - 151 / 221 S, A, T
Aeroacoustic II - 152 / 222 S, A, T
HERO I - 153 I, S, A, T
EMI/EMC I - 154 / 224 I, S, A, T
Temperature I - 155 / 223 S, A, T
Carrier Suitability I - 132 / 260 S, A, T
Aeroelasticity Aeroelastic I - 120 / 143 / 210 S, A, T
Captive Flying & I B 142 / 230 / 251 S, A, T
Carriage, Flying Handling
Qualities & Qualities
Performance Performance & III B 240 I, S, A, T
Employment Release / Firing I A 110 / 144 / 271 / S, A, T
and Jettison Dispense 274
Note 5 and 6 Launch I A 110 / 161 / 272 S, A, T
Gun Firing I A 162 / 273 S, A, T
Jettison I A 110 / 280 S, A, T
Ballistic & OFP Freestream I A 141 / 291 / 292 / I, S, A, T
V&V Coefficients & Note 7 293
Envelope V & V
Note 1 See Categories of Mishap Severity later in this annex
Note 2 Design Assurance Levels are iaw RTCA/DO-178 and RTCA/DO-254. See application principles of
SAE ARP 4754.
Note 3 S = Similarity, A = Analysis, I = Inspection, T = Test
Note 4 Shall be completed prior to Source Selection, unless waivered by DASCENG & DGTA.
Note 5 Sufficient analyses and testing shall be accomplished such that the safety of the employment and
selective jettison system presents an improbable hazard to the releasing aircraft and ground based personnel and
facilities during the life of the aircraft stores capability.
Note 6 Sufficient analyses and testing shall be accomplished such that the safety of the emergency jettison
system presents an improbable hazard to the releasing aircraft and ground based personnel and facilities during
the mission.
Note 7 Traceability of models, wind tunnel, ground and flight test to Minimum Safe Separation, Minimum Safe
Release Height and Safety Templates is required.

AAP 7001.067 Annex B to
Part 2 Chap 2

Compile a list of air armament systems to determine if they are CONCEPTUAL/FUNCTIONAL

essential or non-essential to safe operations.
Functional Baseline

Does the operation of the

installed equipment Yes
adversely affect equipment Unacceptable
essential to safe operation?


Does the operation of the Does a means exist to inform the

installed equipment Yes users of the effect via visual
adversely affect non- (flags, lights, displays) or aural
essential equipment? methods (horns, bells, voice)?

No Yes



Design-to Baseline
Will any probable failure or
Yes malfunction result in a
Design Change

Will any probable failure or

malfunction result in a
MAJOR failure condition?
Design Change


Yes Is system No
complexity HIGH?


have experience with this



These failure consequences will impose design constraints

Build-to Baseline
Qualitative & Qualitative
Quantitative Analyses *



DO-178 Design Assurance Levels - based on failure levels = levels of engineering rigour
* See also Hazard Matrix and Approval Levels at Tables B1 and B2

Figure 12B1 Air Armament System Safety Assessment Program

Minor Thesis Tutty 2005 Appendix 4
AAP 7001.067 Annex B to
Part 2 Chap 2

Mishap Severity Categories

Description Category Environmental, Safety, CostNote 1 and Health Result Criteria
Effect on Aircraft & Occupants of failure condition
Catastrophic I Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss exceeding $10M, or irreversible
severe environmental damage that violates law or regulation.
Prevention of continued safe flight or landing of the aircraft
Loss of aircraft and/or fatalities
Critical II Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness that may
result in hospitalisation of at least three personnel, loss exceeding $1M but less than
(Hazardous) $10M, or reversible environmental damage causing a violation of law or regulation.
Reduction of aircraft or crew ability to cope with adverse operating conditions
Large reduction in safety margins
Physical distress or workload such that the flight crew can not be relied upon to perform
its tasks accurately or completely
Serious injury or death of a relatively small proportion of the occupants
Marginal III Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day(s),
loss exceeding $50K but less than $1M, or mitigatible environmental damage without
(Major) violation of law or regulation where restoration activities can be accomplished.
Reduction of aircraft or crew ability to cope with adverse operating conditions
Significant reduction in safety margins
Reduction in the ability of the flight crew to cope with adverse operating conditions
impairing their efficiency
Injury to occupants
Negligible IV Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost work day, loss exceeding $10K
but less than $50K, or minimal environmental damage not violating law or regulation.
No significant degradation of aircraft or crew ability
Slight reduction in safety margins
Slight increase in crew workload
Physical effects but no injury to occupants
Mishap Probability Levels
Description Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or Inventory
Frequent A Likely to occur often in the life of an item, with a probability of Continuously
occurrence greater than 10-1 in that life. experienced.
Probable B Will occur several times in the life of an item, with a probability Will occur frequently.
of occurrence less than 10-1 but greater that 10-2 in that life.
Occasional C Likely to occur some time in the life of an item, with a Will occur several
probability of occurrence less that 10-2 but greater than 10-3 in times.
that life.
Remote D Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item, with a Unlikely, but can
probability of occurrence less than 10-3 but greater than 10-6 in reasonably be expected
that life. to occur.
Improbable E So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be Unlikely to occur, but
experienced, with a probability of occurrence less than 10-6 in possible.
that life.
Extremely - Unlikely to occur with a probability of occurrence is less than Unlikely to occur.
Improbable 10-9 in that life
Note 1 The cost figures are based on MIL-STD-882D and are therefore indicative values for planning purposes.

AAP 7001.067 Annex B to
Part 2 Chap 2

Table 12B1 Air Armament Hazard MatrixNote 1


Critical Marginal Negligible

Probability Catastrophic
Hazardous Major Minor






Table 12B2 Assumed Approval Levels Based on Consequence of a Probable Event

Risk Level Description Approval Level

Unacceptable Risk.
EXTREME Imperative to suppress risk AA
to an acceptable level.
Acceptable with Acquisition / D/AT&ENote 2 - Head ASD
risk mitigation strategy. D/A/OT&E - CDR AOSG (via Test Plan)
Operation requires written, OT&E / In-service - WSMGR / OAAR / TAR
time limited waiver. (via ASCCERT)Note 3
OT&E / In-service DASCENG / OAAR DelegateNote 4 /
Acceptable with
MEDIUM (via ASC Flight Clearance, Safety Case & ASCCERT)
risk mitigation strategy.
(via ASC Flight Clearance & Test Plan)
Routine in-service Approval based on Design Engineer
operations. Judgement of Significance
Note 1 Further guidance with respect to Aviation Risk Management is at DI(G) OPS 40-2 and
DI (AF) OPS 1-19.
Note 2. For uncertified aircraft store combinations (ie before formal certification in the Aircraft Stores
Capability Certificate (ASCCERT)) an Issues Paper would seek authority acceptance of DMO engineering
and operational risk mitigation strategy during systems development.
Note 3. The level of risk and associated mitigation strategy is accepted on behalf of the Commonwealth
in the ASCCERT and staffed to WSMGR or CDR AOSG for endorsement or acceptance if the risk is
assessed as High.
Note 4. OAA Representatives Delegate is as approved by OAAs and WSMGRs iaw DI(G) OPS 2-2 -
WGCDROPS typically. CO FT = CO Flight Test ARDU

Minor Thesis Tutty 2005

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Appendix 5


Figure 1 International standardization efforts for

commercial and military affecting systems engineering.

Preferred Standards
Used Popular Popular
Market Acceptance

Closed Open
Standards Standards

Closed Standards Open Standards

With Little Market With Little Market
Narrowly Support Support
Proprietary Non-Proprietary

Standard Type

Standards Selection - Courtesy MOSA (2004) Figure 2

Minor Thesis Tutty 2005

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The more significant international standardisation programs in which Australia participates or has an
interest relevant to aerospace weapons and stores includes:
Air Standardization Coordinating Committee. The ASCC is supported by Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States Air Force, Navy & Army. Its
principle objective is to ensure member nations are able to fight side-by-side
as airmen in joint and combined operations. The ASCC objective is achieved
by the standardisation of doctrine, operational procedures, materiel and
equipment. The ASCC also resolves interoperability issues affecting
joint/combined air operations (see DI(AF) ADMIN 02-8). ASCC also
exchanges technical information and arranges the free loan of equipment
between member nations for test and evaluation purposes. The results of these
tests are usually distributed to all nations. ASCC Standards (standardisation
agreements), applicable to the member Air Forces, are known as ASCC AIR

The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP). The TTCP is an International Scientific & technology
based cooperation program where member nations share resource effort and information derived from
extant national scientific R&D tasks concerned with (longer term) future non-atomic military concepts
and research and development. The purpose of TTCP is to enhance national
defence at a reduced cost and includes representation from Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States (which are the same as the
ASCC for most panels). TTCP Groups are appointed by the Principals to
investigate activities that are concerned with predominantly blue sky R&D.
The Group will, with the approval of the Principals, establish and manage a
limited substructure of Technical Panels (TPs) and Action Groups (AGs) in key
areas, as may be required to fulfill its mandate, reviewing them from time to
time, terminating them as they complete their work and establishing new ones in other areas as required
by National Programs. Of the Groups noted in the following table, Aeronautic systems R&D activities
are covered under the AER subgroup via Chief Air Operations Division of DSTO and Conventional
Weapons R&D is via the Chief Weapon Systems Division of DSTO.
AER Aerospace Systems Group
C3I Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems Group
CBD Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defence Group
EWS Electronic Warfare Systems Group
HUM Human Resources and Performance Group
JSA Joint Systems and Analysis Group
MAR Maritime Systems Group
MAT Materials and Processing Technology Group
SEN Sensors Group
WPN Conventional Weapons Technology Group

A Technical Panel (TP) is a body tasked by a Group to address an important manageable

subdivision within the technology area assigned to the Group. Its TORs may be broad but
the TP is required to place bounds on the scope of subject matter it considers during a given
Minor Thesis Tutty 2005

Page 3

period. A TP may be short term or continuing, but normally holds meetings, exchanges
information, reviews the joint efforts in its defined area from a strictly technical point of
view and recommends to its Group actions that will improve the effectiveness of the research
program as a whole. A TP is expected to establish and monitor major collaborative projects
in priority areas of defined mutual national interest.
Panel 1: Terminal Effects
Panel 2: Launch and Flight Dynamics
Panel 4: Energetic Materials & Propulsion Technology
Panel 7: Guidance, Control and Fuzing Technology

Action Group 17: Non-Lethal Weapons

Action Group 19: Land Mines Disposal Technologies
Action Group 20: Weapons for Littoral Operations
Action Group 21: Novel Energetic Materials
Action Group 22: Defeat of Hardened Underground Facilities

The WTP-2 panel for example investigates Weapons Launch and Flight Dynamics. The
WTP-2 National Leader is usually a member of Air Vehicles Division of DSTO. Director
ASCENG is the RAAF representative for WTP-2. The TTCP interfaces with Defence
standardisation through the ASCC National Secretariats and some Program groups via the
TTCP National Principal and Policies, Organisations and Procedures in Non-Atomic R&D
(POPNAMRAD). See for further information.

ABCA Armies. The ABCA army agreements addresses interoperability issues affecting allied armies
in the field. Their mission is to ensure that the ABCA armies achieve agreed
levels of standardisation necessary for two or more ABCA armies to operate
effectively together within the coalition. The ABCA Armies program is
supported by American, British, Canadian and Australian Armies. ABCA Armies
Quadripartite Standards are known as QSTAGS.
AUSCANUKUS Navies. ABC Navies Tripartite Standards represent the interests of American, British
and Canadian (ABC) Navies and are known as ABC NAVY STANDARDS.
American National Standards Institute (ANSI). The ANSI is a private, non-
profit organization that administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary
standardization and conformity assessment system. Founded in 1918, the Institute's
mission is to enhance both the global competitiveness of U.S. business and the
U.S. quality of life by promoting and facilitating voluntary consensus standards
and conformity assessment systems, and safeguarding their integrity. ANSI is the
official U.S. representative to the International Accreditation Forum (IAF), the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and, via the U.S. National
Committee, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). ANSI is also the U.S.
member of the Pacific Area Standards Congress (PASC) and the Pan American Standards
Commission (COPANT). See http:/// for further information.
NATO Military Agency for Standardization. The Military Interoperability Council (MIC)
and Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) formulates standards for NATO operations
and procedures known as NATO Standardisation Agreements or STANAGS. The set of
NATO STANAGS are identified as follows:
1000 series - NAVY;
2000 series - ARMY;
3000 series - AIR FORCE;
4000 series - Armaments Committee (Groups of Experts) Standards; and
5000 series - Communications/Electronics Committee (CEC) Standards.
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Although Australia, by its geographical location, is not a contributing member of NATO, Defence often
adopts NATO standards in preference to duplicating their intent. NATO STANAGs have up until the
mid 1990s been one of the unprecedented international standardisation efforts in history to have
combined and coalition forces working together. With so many nations now becoming members or
partners with varying levels of commitment to interoperability and standardisation, the development,
approval and implementation of STANAGs has reportedly become an extremely difficult coordination
and releasability exercise. This has significantly raised the importance of ASCC to ensure that
members nations have ASCC AIR STANDARDS that are responsive to coalition operations and reflect
current national best practice. See for details of STANAGs.

Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute. The SEI is the

powerhouse behind a lot of the Software Engineering research and the Capability
Maturity Model Integrated (CMMi) models. See for
further information.

Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB). The CCEB, originally established in World
War II between the UK and US, comprises the heads of the five respective national military
communications-electronics organisations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United
Kingdom and the United States. The Board examines and coordinates military
communications and electronics issues including the content, format and release policy of
allied communication publications referred to it by participating nations. See for further information.
Defence Acquisition University. A very handy US website for guiding your way around US DoD
standards and specifications. See for further information.
Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA). The EIA is a partnership of predominantly US based electronic
and high-tech associations and companies whose mission is promoting the market development and
competitiveness of the U.S. high-tech industry through domestic and international policy efforts. EIA,
headquartered in Arlington, Va., comprises more than 2,500 member companies whose products and
services range from the smallest electronic components to the most complex systems used by defense,
space and industry, including the full range
of consumer electronic products. Although
not of direct relevance to military
standardisation per se, the EIA in
conjunction with ANSI have published the
ANSI/EIA 632 standard for Systems Engineering. The EIA also publish a lot of standards with ISO
and IEEE. See for further information.
International Council on Systems Engineering. INCOSE is an international organisation formed to
develop, nurture and enhance the system engineering approach to multi-disciplinary system product
development including: A Systematic Approach to End Product Development, Balancing Cost,
Schedule & Performance; Systems Architecture; Concurrent/Simultaneous Engineering; Total Quality
Management; Life Cycle Analysis; and to
Streamline Operations for Cost and
Efficiency. INCOSE shall foster the
definition, understanding, and practice of
World Class Systems Engineering in
Minor Thesis Tutty 2005

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industry, academia, and government. INCOSE mission is to foster the definition, understanding, and
practice of World Class Systems Engineering in industry, academia, and government. Most
importantly, INCOSE provides the System Engineering Handbook that is cited by AAP 7001.054 for
use as the How to Guide with ANSI/EIA 632. See for further information.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc (IEEE). The IEEE (popularly known and
referred to as the Eye-triple-E) is a non-profit, technical professional association of more than 377,000
individual members in 150 countries. Through its members, the IEEE is a
leading authority in technical areas ranging from computer engineering,
biomedical technology and telecommunications, to electric power,
aerospace and consumer electronics, among others. Through its technical
publishing, conferences and consensus-based standards activities, the IEEE: produces 30 percent of the
world's published literature in electrical engineering, computers and control technology, holds annually
more than 300 major conferences, and has nearly 900 active standards with another 700 under
development. AAP 7001.054 identified several IEEE documents for use. See for
further general information.
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The ICAO is, as its name implies, a civilian
organisation which examines and coordinates international civilian air traffic issues. The aims and
objectives of ICAO are to develop the principles and techniques of international
air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air
transport so as to: a) ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil
aviation throughout the world; b) encourage the arts of aircraft design and
operation for peaceful purposes; c) encourage the development of airways,
airports, and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation; d) meet the
needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport; e) prevent
economic waste caused by unreasonable competition; f) ensure that the rights of Contracting States are
fully respected and that every Contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines;
g) avoid discrimination between Contracting States; h) promote safety of flight in international air
navigation; i) promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics. The
Second World War had a major effect upon the technical development of the aeroplane, telescoping a
quarter-century of normal peace-time development into six years. A vast network of passenger and
freight carriage was set up but there were many problems, both political and technical, to which
solutions had to be found to benefit and support a world at peace. There was the question of
commercial rights - what arrangements would be made for airlines of one country to fly into and
through the territories of another. There were other concerns with regard to the legal and economic
conflicts that might come with peace-time flying across national borders such as how to maintain
existing air navigation facilities, many of which were located in sparsely settled areas. For these
reasons the Government of the United States conducted exploratory discussions with other allied
nations during the early months of 1944. On the basis of the talks invitations were sent to 55 allied and
neutral States to meet in Chicago in November 1944. The outcome was the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. The 96 articles of the Chicago Convention establish the privileges and
restrictions of all Contracting States, provide for the adoption of International Standards and
Recommended Practices regulating air navigation, recommend the installation of navigation facilities
by Contracting States and suggest the facilitation of air transport by the reduction of customs and
immigration formalities. The Convention accepts the principle that every State has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and provides that no scheduled international
air service may operate over or into the territory of a Contracting State without its previous consent.
The continued use of ICAO protocols and articles by Australia under the Chicago Convention is
covered under Federal legislation. See for further information.
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The IEC is the leading global organization that
prepares and publishes international standards for all commercial
electrical, electronic and related technologies. These serve as a
basis for national standardization and as references when drafting
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international tenders and contracts. Through its members, the IEC promotes international cooperation
on all questions of electrotechnical standardization and related matters, such as the assessment of
conformity to standards, in the fields of electricity, electronics and related technologies. The IEC
charter embraces all electrotechnologies including electronics, magnetics and electromagnetics,
electroacoustics, multimedia, telecommunication, and energy production and distribution, as well as
associated general disciplines such as terminology and symbols, electromagnetic compatibility,
measurement and performance, dependability, design and development, safety and the environment.
IEC's standards are vital since they also represent the core of the World Trade Organization's (WTO)
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), whose 100-plus central government members
explicitly recognize that international standards play a critical role in improving industrial efficiency
and developing world trade. The number of standardization bodies which have accepted the Code of
Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards presented in Annex 3 to the
WTO TBT Agreement underlines the global importance and reach of this accord. See for further information
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). The International Organization for
Standardization (ISO - "ISO" is a actually a word not an acronym, derived
from the Greek isos, meaning "equal", which is the root of the prefix "iso-"
that occurs in a host of terms, such as "isometric" (of equal measure or
dimensions)) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies from
more than 140 countries, one from each country. ISO is a non-
governmental organization established in 1947. The mission of ISO is to promote the development of
standardization and related activities in the world with a view to facilitating the international exchange
of goods and services, and to developing cooperation in the spheres of intellectual, scientific,
technological and economic activity. ISO's work results in international agreements which are
published as International Standards. The scope of ISO is not limited to any particular branch and the
ISO 9000 series of quality management standards; it covers all technical fields (it is quite an amazing
list of fields and it is well worth a visit to
except electrical and electronic engineering standards, which is the responsibility of IEC. The work in
the field of information technology is carried out by a joint ISO/IEC technical committee (JTC 1). See
http;// for further details.
Federation of American Scientists. The Federation of American Scientists provides an interesting and
broad ranging look into the future of US science and R&D. Founded in 1945 as the Federation of
Atomic Scientists the original founders were members of the Manhattan Project, creators of the atom
bomb and deeply concerned about the implications of its use for the future of humankind. Known in
its early years as the "scientists lobby," FAS combines the scholarly resources of its member
scientists and informed citizens with knowledge of practical politics. Endorsed by the nearly
60 Nobel Laureates in biology, chemistry, economics, medicine, and physics as sponsors,
FAS is uniquely qualified to bring the scientific perspective to public policy. FAS'
strategies include advocacy, briefings with policy makers and the press, public education
and outreach, collaboration with civil rights, human rights, and arms control groups, and grassroots
organising. So whilst not standardisation per se, the FAS plays an important part in such
development, see for very interesting open source insights into science, engineering
and defence as such systems are being proposed and developed. The Conventional Weapons page et
al is quite often the most current information one can find in the open literature.

Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA). The RTCA is a US civilian organisation
which as RTCA, Inc. is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops
consensus-based recommendations regarding communications, navigation,
surveillance, and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) system issues. RTCA also
functions as a federal advisory committee. Its recommendations are used by the
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as the basis for policy, program, and regulatory decisions and
by the private sector as the basis for development, investment, and other business decisions.
Organized in 1935 as the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA today includes over
280 government, industry, and academic organizations from the United States and around the world.
Member organizations represent all facets of the aviation community, including government
organizations, major airlines, airspace user associations, airline pilot and air traffic controller labor
unions, airports plus aviation service and equipment suppliers. AAP 7001.054 cites the use of several
RTCA documents as the preferred standards for airborne electronic hardware and software. See for further information.
Range Commanders Council. The US RCC has been established to improve interoperability and
safety on US test ranges. Australia uses RCC STD 321-00 for determination of range safety templates
and RCC 319-99 for armament Flight Termination Systems. for
further information and access to unclassified standards.
Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization. The Simulation Interoperability
Standards Organization (SISO) focuses on facilitating simulation interoperability and
component reuse across the US DoD, other government, and non-government applications.
Society of Automotive Engineers. So what would he
US based Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) have
to do with the aviation industry? Well as their vision
statement highlights the SAE is The Engineering Society For Advancing Mobility in Land Sea Air
and Space. Therefore SAE sees itself as the one-stop resource for technical information and
expertise used in designing, building, maintaining, and operating self-propelled vehicles for use on land
or sea, in air or space 1 . According to SAEs website Over 83,000 engineers, business executives,
educators, and students from more than 97 countries form our network of membership who share
information and exchange ideas for advancing the engineering of mobility
systems. More than 16,000 volunteer leaders serve on our Board of Directors
and our many other boards, councils and committees. Our technical committees
write more new aerospace and automotive engineering standards than any other
standards-writing organization in the world. We publish thousands of technical
papers and books each year, and leading-edge periodicals and Internet and CD-
ROM products too. Our Cooperative Research Program helps facilitate projects
that benefit the mobility industry as a whole. Numerous meetings and
exhibitions provide worldwide opportunities to network and share information. We also offer a full
complement of professional development activities such as seminars, technical symposia, and e-
learning products. The meetings and activities of local sections provide an opportunity to network with
colleagues near you. Interesting, but what has this got to do with air armament and Australia. Well
the SAE are one of the few civilian societies involved with development of standards and best practices
for military equipment, AAP 7001.054 cites use of Aerospace Recommended Practices that are based
on SAE documents which include ARP 4754 (Certification Considerations for High-integrated or
Complex Aircraft Systems) and ARP 4761 (Safety Assessment Practices for Airborne Systems and
Equipment). Various SAE technical committees are also heavily involved with digital interface
standards and are one of the US DoDs mechanisms for formally coordinating with industry for such
standards as MIL-STD-1553 and development of MIL-STD-1760 interface standards, amongst others,
others that we will be seeing more of in future: for access to SAE Standards see
The SAE was founded in 1916 as a new society representing engineers in all types of mobility-related professions. SAE folk
lore has it that member Elmer Sperry actually created the term automotive from Greek autos (self), and Latin motivus (of
motion) origins to represent any form of self powered vehicle. The Society of Automobile Engineers became the Society of
Automotive Engineers, and the most important chapter in the SAE saga was underway.
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Page 8 See for further information the history of SAE is actually very interesting and will be
more so in the future as defence makes more use of commercial interface standards for communications
and software development,


ADF aerospace activities in Air Force, Army & Navy contribute to the Western Alliance
standardisation program primarily through membership and involvement in the Air Standardization
Coordinating Committee (ASCC). Through the ASCC medium, the ADF and other Member
Countries (MC):
Promote international military air standardisation to:
ensure that the conduct of combined operations is accomplished with maximum effect and
economy of force;
provide essential cross-servicing of MC aircraft;
increase the economy of international production and logistics; and
increase the capability for the interchange of units, personnel, equipment and supplies of
national air forces.
Support and participate in international standardisation efforts of the Army and Navy that have
a bearing on RAAF operations or support.
Apply international standardisation to the maximum extent possible with established staff and
command structures.
Invite representatives of civilian agencies (when security permits) interested in or affected by
military standardisation studies to offer advice on proposed standardisation agreements.
Provide advice regarding RAAF standardisation requirements (when requested and security
permits) to qualified Australian civilian standardisation organisations participating in
international programs.

International standardisation of military equipment and procedures among allied forces is desirable
to ensure minimal operational, logistic, technical and procedural obstacles when two or more allies
act together to accomplish a common mission. The ADFs contribution to the program is achieved
through membership and involvement in the International Military Standardisation Programs of the
Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee (ASCC). Member Nations of the ASCC are Australia,
United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.