Property Cases Easements

Different Kinds of Easements- Concept of Easement
Calimoso vs Roullo
1.
The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016

HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO AND LIBY P.
CALIMOSO, Petitioners, v. AXEL D. ROULLO, Respondent.
2.
There is payment of proper indemnity;
Facts:
In his Complaint4 for Easement of Right of Way, the respondent mainly
alleged: that he is the owner of Lot 1462-C-15 situated in Brgy. Sambag,
Jaro, Iloilo City; that his lot is isolated by several surrounding estates owned
by petitioners that he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a
public road; and that the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest
public road, passes through the petioners lot. The petitioners objected to
the establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial
damage to the two (2) houses already standing on their property. Due to the
respondent's allegedly malicious and groundless suit, the petitioners claimed
entitlement to damages. RTC granted the respondent's complaint and
ordered the petitioners to provide the respondent an easement of right-ofway (42sqm) and ordered the respondent to pay the petitioners proper
indemnity in the amount of Php1,500.00 per square meter of the portion of
the lot subject of the easement. CA affirmed in toto the RTC's decision and
held that all the requisites for the establishment of a legal or compulsory
easement of right-of-way were present in the respondent's case. The
petitioners moved to reconsider the CA's decision arguing that, while the
establishment of the easement through their lot provided for the shortest
route, the adjudged right-of-way would cause severe damage on their
property (damage to the nipa hut and bedroom of the concrete house) but
was denied.
Issues:
1. W/N the respondent has met all the requisites for the establishment
of a legal easement of right-of-way
Held:
No. To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites
should be met:
Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem
3.
The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; and
4.
The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners' lot
would cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners'
property.10 Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public
road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out,
and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage,
albeit longer, is available. Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the
easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement
where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the
least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and
least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past
that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance
criterion.
Additional Information:
The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the property subject to the easement is called the
servient estate.8 Here, the respondent's lot is the dominant estate and the
petitioners' lot is the servient estate
Three options were then available to the respondent for the demanded rightof-way: the first option is to traverse directly through the petitioners'
property, which route has an approximate distance of fourteen (14) meters
from the respondent's lot to the Fajardo Subdivision Road; the second
option is to pass through two vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-l and 1461-B-2)
located on the southwest of the respondent's lot, which route has an
approximate distance of forty-three (43) meters to another public highway,
the Diversion Road; and the third option is to construct a concrete bridge
over Sipac Creek and ask for a right-of-way on the property of a certain Mr.
Basa in order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision Road
Different Kinds of Easements- Concept of Easement
LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND PABLO B.

FRANCISCO, Petitioners, v. STA.
LUCIA
REALTY
&
DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015
Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way. Under the law, an
easement of right-of-way may only be demanded by the owner of an
immovable property or by any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate
or
use
the
same.
FACTS:
Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way
against respondent. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for
more than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Pagasa, Binangonan, Rizal. A few years back, however, respondent acquired
the lands surrounding the subject property, developed the same into a
residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built
a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were
denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice
versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis
East in order for them to have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road.
Respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its subdivision
owned by petitioners and Liza. At any rate, it pointed out that petitioners
and Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the existence of the
requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way.
According to Pablo, he and his co-plaintiffs are still in possession of the
subject property. He clarified that the easement of right-of-way that they are
asking from respondent would traverse the latter's subdivision for about 50
meters from the subject property all the way to another subdivision that he
co-owns, Victoria Village, which in turn, leads to Col. Guido Street.
Liwayway testified next. According to her, she and her children Ronnie and
Liza are the surviving heirs of the late Carlos who owned the subject
property. Carlos acquired ownership over the same after he had been in
continuous, public and peaceful possession thereof for 50 years, the
circumstances of which he narrated in a Sinumpaang Salaysay that he
executed while he was still alive. Carlos stated therein that even before he
was born in 1939, his father was already in possession and working on the
subject property; that in 1948, he started to help his father in tilling the land;
that when his father became weak and eventually died, he took over the
land; and, that he already sought to register his ownership of the property
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and to
declare
the
same
for
taxation
purposes.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court - said court concluded that petitioners
and Liza are entitled
to an easement of right-of-way
It observed that petitioners and Liza's allegation in their Complaint that they
were in possession of the subject property for more than 50 years was not
denied by respondent in its Answer. Thus, the same is deemed to have been
impliedly admitted by the latter. It then ratiocinated that based on Article
1137 of the Civil Code, petitioners and Liza are considered owners of the
subject property through extraordinary prescription. Having real right over
the same, therefore, they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
under
Article
649redof
the
Civil
Code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals - concluded that petitioners and Liza have
no right to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent.
On appeal, respondent argued mat petitioners and Liza were neither able to
prove that they were owners nor that they have any real right over the
subject property intended to be the dominant estate. Hence, they are not
entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way. At any rate, they likewise
failed to establish that the only route available from their property to Col.
Guido
Street
is
through
respondent's
subdivision.
CA held that the evidence adduced by petitioners and Liza failed to
sufficiently establish their asserted ownership and possession of the subject
property. Moreover, it held that contrary to the RTC's observation,
respondent in fact denied in its Answer the allegation of petitioners and
Liza that they have been in possession of subject property for more than 50
years.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-ofway from respondent.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners are NOT entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
from respondent.
Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be
demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of

a
real
right
may
cultivate
or
use
the
same.
It must be stressed at the outset that contrary to petitioners' allegations, there

is no showing that Carlos filed a claim of ownership over the subject
property with the DENR. His April 13, 1998 letter 35to the said office which
petitioners assert to be an application for the registration of such claim is
actually just a request for the issuance of certain documents and nothing
more. Moreover, while Carlos indeed attempted to declare the subject
property for taxation purposes, his application, as previously mentioned,
was denied because a tax declaration was already issued to the Blancos.
Anent petitioners' invocation of ordinary acquisitive prescription, the Court
notes that the same was raised for the first time on appeal. Before the RTC,
petitioners based their claim of ownership on extraordinary acquisitive
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code36 such that the said court
declared them owners of the subject property by virtue thereof in its May
22, 2006 Decision.37 Also with the CA, petitioners initially asserted
ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.38It was only later
in their Motion for Reconsideration39 therein that they averred that their
ownership
could
also
be
based
on
ordinary
acquisitive
40
prescription. "Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time
at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule."41cralawrednad
Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners, as well as with respect
to extraordinary acquisitive prescription, fails. "Prescription is one of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code." 42 There are two
modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired ordinary acquisitive prescription which requires possession in good faith
and just title for 10 years and, extraordinary prescription wherein ownership
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of
good faith.43 However, it was clarified in the Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic of the Philippines,44 that only lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of
public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.45 And if the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must first
be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership
prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period. Otherwise, Article
1113 of the Civil Code, which provides that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription,
applies.46cralawrednad
Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the subject property is
an unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public
domain, petitioners, in order to validly claim acquisition thereof through
prescription, must first be able to show that the State has - expressly
declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued
by the President that the subject [property] is no longer retained for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express
declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public
dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of
prescription.47
In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of
ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily
crumbles. Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way
from
respondent
for
lack
of
personality.
Different Kinds of Easements- Elements

Ernest Godfrey Tejada
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioner,
vs.
LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 147957
July 22, 2009
FACTS: Caruff Development Corporation owned several parcels of land
along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Sometime in December
1975, Caruff obtained a loan from PNB to finance the construction of a 21storey condominium along Roxas Blvd. The loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage over 3 parcels of land where Caruff planned to erect the
condominium.
In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on the
mortgaged parcels of land. Along with the other appurtenances of the
building constructed by Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating set) and
two sump pumps in the adjacent lot.
After the completion of the condominium project, it was constituted
pursuant to the Condominium Act (Republic Act No. 4726), as the Legaspi
Towers 300, Inc.
However, for Caruffs failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter
foreclosed the mortgage. Thereafter, Proclamation no. 50 was issued which
provided for the creation of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
By virtue of A.O. No. 14 and the Deed of Transfer executed by PNB, the
National Government became the assignee and transferee of all its rights
and titles to and interests in its receivables with Caruff, including the
properties it acquired from the foreclosure of Caruffs mortgage.
Meanwhile, Caruff filed a case against PNB before the RTC, whereby
Caruff sought the nullification of PNBs foreclosure of its properties.
A Compromise Agreement was later entered into by Caruff, PNB, and
the National Government thru APT. The parties agreed, among other things,
that Caruff would transfer and convey in favor of the National Government
the lot where it built the generating set and sump pumps. The RTC rendered
a Decision approving the Compromise Agreement.
On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for Declaration of the existence

of an easement before the RTC. Respondent alleged that the act of Caruff of
constructing the powerhouse and sump pumps on its property constituted a
voluntary easement in favor of the respondent.
APT alleged that it acquired absolute ownership thereof by virtue of the
Compromise Agreement free from any liens and/or encumbrances. It was
not a privy to any transaction or agreement entered into by and between
Caruff, respondent, and the bank. It further alleged that the continued use of
the subject property by respondent and the condominium owners without its
consent was an encroachment upon its rights as absolute owner and for
which it should be properly compensated.
The RTC rendered a Decision declaring the existence of an easement
over the portion of the land occupied at present [by the] powerhouse and
sump pumps nos. 1 and 2 only, of Legaspi Towers 300, in favor of Legaspi
Towers 300, Incorporated.
Aggrieved, APT sought recourse before the CA. The petitioner,
Privatization and Management Office (PMO) substituted APT in its appeal.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of a generator set and 2 sump
pumps constitutes as easement of the property.
HELD: NO. An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on
anothers property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner
of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person."
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the
dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two sources of easements: by law or by the will of the owners.
Article 619 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
In the present case, neither type of easement was constituted over the
subject property.
In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff constituted a voluntary
easement when it constructed the generating set and sump pumps over the
disputed portion of the subject property for its benefit. However, it should
be noted that when the appurtenances were constructed on the subject
property, the lands where the condominium was being erected and the
subject property where the generating set and sump pumps were constructed
belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the Civil Code does not apply,
since no true easement was constituted or existed, because both
properties were owned by Caruff.
Different Kinds of Easements- Intransmisibility

VELASCO v. CUSI and CITY OF DAVAO
105 SCRA 616
Easements
Art. 617 Intransmissibility (mere accessories to the real property)
FACTS:
Fe Velasco is the owner of a parcel of land in Davao City. She filed in the
CFI of Davao City an action against public respondent, City of Davao for
the quieting of her title over Lot 77-B-2, a portion of which she claims to
have been occupied illegally by Bolton Street, Davao City.
The court, presided over by Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. dismissed the case on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, filed by the City of
Davao.
The allegations in the complaint that the Bolton Street encroached on the lot
of the plaintiff and that the defendant had continuously occupied the portion
so encroached upon do not, contrary to the conclusion of the plaintiff found
in the complaint, cast '. . a cloud of doubt on the title of the plaintiff over
said portion which would justify this action.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Bolton Street is an easement and a legal encumbrance on

petitioners lot?
Whether the encroachment casts a cloud of doubt over the title of Velasco?
Different Kinds of Easements- Intransmissibility
HELD:
YES. Bolton Street, a public highway, was already subsisting when the
OCT over the parcel of land of Velasco was issued. It has been where it is
since time immemorial. Bolton Street constituted an easement of public
highway on subject Lot No. 77, from which petitioners lot was taken, when
such bigger lot was originally registered. It remained as such legal
encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly noted, notwithstanding
the lack of annotation, on the certificate of title, by virtue of the clear and
express provision of Section 39 of Act 496, which states:
(I focused on the subject matter based in the outline/syllabus, but I suggest

that you read the full text for some other interesting legal aspects discussed
in the case. The case is relatively short anyway. Good luck guys!)
Section 39 of Act 496

Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree or
registration, and every subsequent purchasers of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrances, except those noted on said certificate, and any of the
following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way, private way, or any government
irrigation.
XX
This fact erases whatever cause of action petitioner may have to bring the
complaint she filed in the court a quo for quieting of title on a portion of the
street which she claims to be part of her lot, free from encumbrance of any
kind.
The case was dismissed.
Valisno vs Adriano, 161 SCRA 398
FACTS:
On June 20, 1960, 'the plaintiff-appellant file against the defendant-appellee
an action for damages.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
possessor of a 557,949-square-meter parcel of land in La Fuente, Santa
Rosa, Nueva Ecija
The plaintiff-appellant Valisno bought the land from the defendantappellees sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco, on June 6,1959.
The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and
other vegetables adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of
the Pampanga River.
At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by
water from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters
long, traversing the appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation
canal so that the appellant was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
The appellant filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a
complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered on
March 22, 1960 ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal,

"otherwise judicial action shall be taken against him under the provisions of
Section 47 of Act 2152 (the Irrigation Act).
are the irrigation law and the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
specifically Article 122 thereof.
RULING:
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was
urgent.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer
of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's
property.
On June 20, 1960, he filed a complaint for damages.

On October 25, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing a final resolution dismissing
Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights
which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or
1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right
since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by
operation of law, hence the water rights did not form part of his hereditary
estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Valisno, as vendee of
the land which Honorata received from her father's estate did not acquire
any water rights with the land purchased.
In a decision dated April 21, 1966, the trial court held that the plaintiff had
no right to pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the
Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law,
controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are
within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and his decision on
the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty
days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public
Works Secretary collaterally.
ISSUE: The principal issue involved in this case falls under the subject
of servitude of waters which are governed by Article 648 of the new
Civil Code and the suppletory laws mentioned in the cases of Lunod vs.
Meneses 11 Phil. 128) and Osmena vs. Camara (C.A. 380 62773) which
According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration
for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation
purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by
a third person.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he
is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is set aside, and a new one is entered
ordering the appellee to grant the appellant continued and unimpeded use of
the irrigation ditch traversing his land in order to obtain water from the
Pampanga River to irrigate appellant's land. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the court a quo for the reception of evidence on the appellant's
claim for damages.
SO ORDERED.
Manner in which easements establishedLa Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was part of a land
owned by the Tuasons which was sold to Philippine Building Corporation
by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph three (3) of the deed
provides that ". . .the boundary line between the property herein sold and
the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters
wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the
VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the
VENDORS." The land was later sold to Ateneo de Manila University with
the consent of the Tuasons. The Tuasons later developed its 7.5 meter
share of the Mangyan road, while Ateneo erected an adobe wall on the
entire length of the boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter wide
roadway which was later removed due to an amicable settlement. Ateneo
sold 16 hectares of its property along Mangyan road to Solid Homes, Inc.
and the deed of sale provided among others that the vendor passes unto the
vendee the privileges of such right-of-way. Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc.
developed the Loyola Grand Villas. La Vista, a residential village developed
by the Tuasons, prohibited the agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc.
and residents of Loyola from traversing the Mangyan Road. Solid
Homes Inc. then instituted an action, and prayed that LA VISTA be enjoined
from preventing and obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA residents
through Mangyan Road. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction in
favor of Solid Homes, Inc. which was nullified and set aside by the
Appellate Court. In a petition for review on certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court, Solid Homes, Inc. assailed the nullification and setting
aside of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a

decision on the merits affirming and recognizing the easement of right-ofway
along
Mangyan
Road
in
favor of Solid
Homes, Inc. LA VISTA appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the easement is a voluntary one
Held:
Yes.
A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law
for public use or for private interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and
650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or
compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the existence of four
(4) requisites, namely: (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the
proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts;
and (d) the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. A voluntary easement
on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties
and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both
as dominant and servient estates. This is quite evident when: (a) the
Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949 stipulated in par.
3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between the
property herein sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a
road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the
property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion
adjoining belonging to the vendors"; (b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly
agreed and consented to the assignment of the land to, and the
assumption of all the rights and obligations by ATENEO, including the
obligation to contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to
form part of the 15-meter wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a
complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for breach of contract and

the enforcement of the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and
demanded that MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to
its original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in
the middle of the 15 meter wide roadway; (d) LA VISTA President Manuel
J. Gonzales admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to ATENEO President
Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide,
one half of which is taken from your property and the other half from
the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7
1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of rightof-way was created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor";
(e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO
property in 1976, acknowledged the existence of the contractual right ofway as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de
Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association would be
extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus
become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and,
(f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice, received by this Court on 26 March 1997, acknowledged that "'onehalf of the whole length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc.
The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in equal
portions". These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned
had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan
Road and, like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes
to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the least. The
opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The
fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property
right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
Continuous non apparent easements
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE,

INC. (BAPCI) vs. OBIAS, et al.
Facts:
The Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was
established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same
year, BISUDECO constructed a road ("the disputed road")
measuring approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers
long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling
and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site
(Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its sugar
milling operations.
Respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed
road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones
across it, preventing petitioners and the other sugar
planters vehicles from passing through the disputed road,
thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to
petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the
disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners of
the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides
that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of
the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road
on their properties. Petitioner contends that through
prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road,
BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of
the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by
it when it bought BISUDECOs assets. Petitioner prayed that
respondents be permanently ordered to restrain from
barricading the disputed road and from obstructing its free

passage.
Respondents denied having entered into an
agreement with BISUDECO regarding the construction and
the use of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO,
surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent,
constructed the disputed road on their properties and has
since then intermittently and discontinuously used the
disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated
protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in
the construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO
was a government-owned and controlled corporation, and
the entire country was then under Martial Law.
Respondents likewise denied that the road has become a
public road, since no public funds were used for its
construction and maintenance.
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any
concrete evidence to prove that there was an agreement
between BISUDECO and respondents for the construction
of the disputed road. Moreover, it held that petitioner did
not acquire the same by prescription.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there
was no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the
existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and
respondents regarding the construction of the disputed
road. Moreover, the CA also declared that an easement of
right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be
acquired by prescription.
Issue:
10
1. Whether or not there is an existing agreement

between BISUDECO and Respondents
discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be

acquired only by virtue of a title.
2. Whether or not the principles of prescription,

laches and estoppels is applicable in this case
It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any

concrete evidence to prove that there was such an
agreement between BISUDECO and defendants.
Held:
1. No. In order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road
as an easement of right-of-way, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to show its right by title or by an agreement with
the owners of the lands that said road traversed.
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is
established either by law (in which case it is a legal
easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement).
In terms of use, easement may either be continuous or
discontinuous. The easement of right of way the
privilege of persons or a particular class of persons to
pass over anothers land, usually through one
particular path or linen is characterized as a
discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals
and depends on the act of man. Because of this
character, an easement of a right of way may only be
acquired by virtue of a title.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in
the case at bar, viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and
The lower court correctly disbelieved the plaintiffsappellants contention that an agreement existed because
there is simply no direct evidence to support this allegation.
BAPCI submitted purely circumstantial evidence that are
not sufficiently adequate as basis for the inference than an
agreement existed. By themselves, the circumstances the
plaintiffs-appellants cited i.e., the employment of sixteen
(16) relatives of the defendants-appellants; the defendantsappellants unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of
the agreement is known to everyone, etc. are events
susceptible of diverse interpretations and do not
necessarily lead to BAPCIs desired conclusion.
2. No. , "It is already well-established that a right of way is
discontinuous and, as such, cannot be acquired by
prescription."
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements
are either continuous or discontinuous according to the
manner they are exercised, not according to the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications of
the existence of such easements. Thus, easement is
11
continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the

intervention of any act of man, like the easement of
drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals
and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of
way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous
because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot
on somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of
vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad
tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if
and when a train operated by a person passes over
another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the
servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man
which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an
easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road
(which reveals a right of way) and a window (which
evidences a right to light and view) are apparent
easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
certain height is non-apparent.
It has been held that the existence of a permanent railway
does not make the right of way a continuous one; it is only
apparent. Therefore, it cannot be acquired by prescription.
It was also been held that a right of passage over another's
land cannot be claimed by prescription because this
easement is discontinuous and can be established only by
title.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for
the passage of petitioners trains denotes the existence

of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of
way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only
by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never acquired
any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether
by law, donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its
use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its
acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622, the
discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only
be acquired by title and not by prescription.
Easements are either continuous or discontinuous
according to the manner they are exercised, not according to
the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of
the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road in
dispute has been improved and maintained over a number
of years, it will not change its discontinuous nature but
simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of
the New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements,
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of
a title.
The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court and each case must be decided
according to its particular circumstances.
Philippines, which provides:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and
discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
12
acquired only by virtue of a title.

The eminent jurist, former Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino, opines that this provision seeks to prevent the
imposition of a burden on a tenement based purely on the
generosity, tolerance and spirit of neighborliness of the
owners thereof.
show an admission, representation or conduct by

respondents that will give rise to estoppel.
Existence of apparent sign of easement
We applied the cited provision to the case in

ruling that no easement of right of way was acquired;
based on the evidence presented, the plaintiffappellant failed to satisfactorily prove the existence of
an agreement evidencing any right or title to use the
disputed road. We additionally rejected the plaintiffappellants position that it had acquired the easement
of right of way through acquisitive prescription, as
settled jurisprudence states that an easement of right
of way cannot be acquired by prescription.
We find that the positive mandate of Article 622
of the Civil Code the statutory provision requiring
title as basis for the acquisition of an easement of a
right of way precludes the application of the
equitable principle of laches.
This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law
is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be
acquired by prescription militates against petitioners claim
of laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can only be
acquired by title. On the other hand, as to the issue of
estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with the finding of the
CA that petitioner did not present any evidence that would
VALISNO V. ADRIANO- Doctrine of Apparent Sign

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of
land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the
grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is
supplied by a third person.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a
land in Nueva Ecija, with TCT No. NT-16281. He bought the
land from the respondents sister, Honorata Adriano
Francisco. The land which is planted with watermelon,
peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of
the respondent Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River.
Both parcels of land had been inherited by Honorata and
Felipe from their father. At the time of the sale of the land
to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the
Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters
long,
traversing
the
Respondent's
land.
13
In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation

canal so that Plaintiff was deprived of the irrigation water
and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and
Communications a complaint for deprivation of water
rights.
A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct
the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the irrigation
canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by
the Bureau of Public Works and Communications. A
reinvestigation
was
granted.
In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his
own expense because his need for water to irrigate his
watermelon
fields
was
urgent.
Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming
that he suffered damages when he failed to plant his fields
that yearfor lack of irrigation water, and when he
reconstructed
the
canal.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing
a final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The
Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights which had
been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936
or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of
the water right since then for a period of more than five
years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence the
water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate
which his heirs partitioned among themselves.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the easement of
water over Respondents land.

RULING: Yes.
The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondents land
for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to
Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of
Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for
the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in
Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of Apparent Sign):
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established or maintained by the
owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue
actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of
the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided
in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the
deed.
The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the
"conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's property.
According to the Plaintiff, the water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for
without it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of
land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the
14
grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is

supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by
grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity
does detract from its permanency as property right, which
survives the determination of the necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been
established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the appellee's
act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use
of water from the Pampanga River.
Upon turnover, it was discovered that certain common

areas has pertaining to Cypress were occupied and
encroached upon by Goldcrest
Cypress filed a complaint before the HLURB to compel
Goldcrest to remove the doors built between 8 & 9th
floor, 9F elevator lobby, cyclone wire fence on the
roofdeck, and building structure on the roofdeck
Goldcrest averred that it was granted exclusive use of
the roofdecks limited common area while the doors
were constructed for privacy purposes
Courts were in favor of Cypress
Issue: May Goldcrest build structures on the limited common areas

on the ground that they were granted exclusive use for the same?
Rights and obligations of ownsers of dominant and servient estates- non
impairment of servitude
Gold Crest Realty vs. Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation

Facts
-
Goldcrest is the Developer of Cypress Gardens- a 10storey building in Makati

It incorporated Cypress Gardens Condominium
Corporation to manage the condominium project and to
hold title to the common areas
Title of the Land were transferred to Cypress
Cypress retained ownership of penthouse unit on level
9 and 10
Goldcrest controlled management and administration
of the Condo until 1995
Held: No. Such will impair subject easement granted to GoldCrest.

The impairment of an easement is a question of fact. There is no
reason to overturn the findings of the HLURB, OP, and CA that
Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the limited
common area despite its exclusive right to use of the same. Not only
did Goldcrest impair the easement, it also illegally altered the
condominium plan.
The owner of a dominant estate cannot violate any of the following
prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1)
it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement; (2)
it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable
originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any
other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot
15
construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and

preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the
easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate
owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient
estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and
manner to build the said works so as to cause the least burden to
the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above
constitutes impairment of the easement
Construction was not necessary for the use or preservation of the
easement. Weight of the structure increased strain on the condos
foundation making the easement more burdensome and adding
unnecessary safety risk on the condo owners. Construction clearly
went beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally
altered the approved condominium project plan and violated
section 4 of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.
Rights and obligations of ownsers of dominant and servient estates- non

impairment of servitude
Javellana vs IAC
ESTER JAVELLANA, ROLANDO DEMAFILES, CESAR CRUZADA and

ANTONlO
SISON, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
4th CIVIL CASES DIVISION, MARSAL & CO., INC., and MARCELINO
FLORETE, SR., respondents
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the
present owner of the land adjoining the Iloilo River up to the
adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is located. There
existed a main canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the
Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the school property
going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and
later on demolished the portions of the main dike connecting the
main canal to the canal running thru the school grounds. This
closure caused flooding in the premises of the school and its vicinity
because the canal serves as outlet of rain or flood water that
empties into the river. This prompted the school and barangay
officials to complain to higher authorities about the closure of the
canal. When Florete was about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open
canal, he was prevented from doing so by the district supervisor,
Javellana, thus he instituted a complaint for recovery of damages
for allegedly denying his access to the use of the canal to his
property. The RTC ruled in favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed
to the IAC which reversed the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement was established in favor of the
school property
RULING:
YES. A positive easement of water-right-of-way was
constituted on the property of Florete as the servient estate in favor
of the L. Borres Elementary School and the nearby lands as
dominant estates since it has been in continuous use for no less
than 15 years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby
adjacent lands.
As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate
16
the use of the canal without violating Art. 629 of the CC which
provides that The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in
any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Nevertheless if by
reason of the place originally assigned or of the manner established
for the use of the easement, the same should become very
inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent
him from making any important works, repairs or improvements
thereon, it may be charged at his expense, provided he offers
another place or manner equally convenient and in such a way that
no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or
to those who may have a right to the use of the easement.
o for the 1st 100 meters = 3 meters wide

o 200 meters = 2 meters
> depth of canal:
o high tide or rainy season = main canal = meter; canal that
traverses school = 2 meters
o ordinary days = no water
> Florete only caused the canal to be deeper
Easement in favor of higher estates
When Florete closed the entrance of the canal and

demolished portions of the main dike it impaired the use of the
servitude by the dominant estates.
SPS.
FERNANDO
VERGARA
VERGARA, Petitioners, v. ERLINDA
SONKIN, Respondent.
Additional Facts:
> One witness almost drowned
> One witness saved a woman, who while picking shells fell into the
canal
> 2 witnesses took a bath in the canal, 1 when he was still a child,
the other when he was still single
> Canal is used by residents for salt-making using plastic bags, which
is in competition with Marsal & Co. in the production of salt
> the canal is a source of salt water, it is fresh and clean since the
tide changes from the Iloilo River while the fishpond is stagnant and
polluted
> before the closure of the dikes, there were no floods in the vicinity
> tube to be buried: 10-inch rubber tube
> canal:
FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Fernando Vergara and Herminia Vergara

(Sps. Vergara) and Spouses Ronald Mark Sonkin and Erlinda
Torrecampo Sonkin (Sps. Sonkin) are adjoining landowners in
Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan. In view of the geographical
configuration of the adjoining properties, the property owned by
Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that
owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara Property). When Sps. Sonkin
bought the Sonkin Property sometime in 1999, they raised the
height of the partition wall and caused the construction of their
house thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall
such that a portion thereof became part of the wall of the master's
bedroom and bathroom. Sometime in 2001, Sps. Vergara levelled
the uneven portion of the Vergara Property by filling it with gravel,
earth, and soil. As a result, the level of the Vergara Property became
AND
HERMINIA
TORRECAMPO
17
even higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a third of a meter.

Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming from
the Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom through the
partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and
the wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly demanded that
Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall on their property in order to
contain the landfill that they had dumped thereon, but the same
went unheeded.
Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and issuance of a
temporary restraining order against Sps. Vergara, as well as Sps.
Rowena Santiago and Harold Santiago, Dolores Vergara-Orbistondo,
and Rosario Vergara-Payumo, the other possessors of the Vergara
Property. In defense, Sps. Vergara, in their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim,9 claimed that Sps. Sonkin's act of raising the partition
wall made the same susceptible to breakage, which therefore
cannot be attributed to them (Sps. Vergara). They likewise claimed
that when they levelled their own property by filling it with gravel
and soil, they left a distance of one (1) meter from the partition wall
such that the edge of the landfill did not breach it, asserting further
that there was no valid and legal reason why they should be
enjoined from exercising their proprietary rights.
During the trial, Sps. Sonkin presented the testimony of Engineer
Ma. Victoria Mendoza, considered an expert witness, who
categorically declared that in view of the sloping terrain and the
Sonkin Property being lower in elevation than that of the Vergara
Property, the Sps. Vergara were then duty bound to provide a
retaining wall because they were the ones who caused the landfill,
citing Section 120211 of Presidential Decree No. 1096,12 otherwise
known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines" (National
Building Code). She explained that it was Sps. Vergara's duty to
provide safety requirements for the landfill they made on their
property to prevent any danger to life or property. Moreover, Sps.

Vergara failed to provide a sewerage line to divert the flow of the
water into the adjoining property, in violation of Section 90114of the
National Building Code.
RTC RULING: The RTC found Sps. Vergara civilly liable to Sps. Sonkin
for damages. The RTC found that the earth dumped on the Vergara
Property pushed back the perimeter wall, causing cracks on Sps.
Sonkin's bedroom wall and water to seep through the floor of the
house. Moreover, the water seepage could only have come from
the Vergara Property which was higher in elevation, as Sps. Vergara
have failed to provide any drainage to divert the flow of water.
Given the foregoing, the RTC concluded that Sps. Vergara's act of
dumping earth, soil, and other materials in their property directly
caused the damage to the house of Sps. Sonkin and, thus, they
should be held liable for damages in favor of the latter.
CA RULING: While the CA concurred with the finding of the RTC that
the cause of the water seepage into the Sonkin Property was the act
of Sps. Vergara in elevating their own property by filling it with
gravel and soil, it ascribed error upon the RTC in not fmding that
Sps. Sonkin were likewise guilty of contributory negligence in
building their house directly abutting the perimeter wall.25 The CA
explained that despite the fact that under Article 637 of the Civil
Code, the Sonkin Property is legally obliged to receive any water
from higher estates such as the Vergara Property, it being the lower
estate, the Sps. Sonkin still built their house with parts thereof
directly abutting the perimeter wall and, in the process, violated the
two (2)-meter setback rule under Section 70826 of the National
Building Code.27 Thus, the CA deduced that had Sps. Sonkin followed
such rule, then their house would not have sustained any damage
from water coming from the Vergara property.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA should have ordered the demolition of
the portion of the Sps. Sonkin's house that adjoins the partition
18
wall.
HELD: YES.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the plaintiffs own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the
Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and
thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the
latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers
to the legal easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands,
which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates
water which naturally and without the intervention of man
descends from the latter, i.e., not those collected artificially in
reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by the waters,
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with
them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate
make works which will increase the burden. In this light, Sps. Sonkin
should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly,
made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to minimize
the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so,
they disregarded the easement and constructed their house directly

against the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property,
thereby violating the National Building Code in the process,
specifically Section 708 (a) thereof which reads: Minimum
Requirements
for
Group
A
Dwellings:
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety
percent of a corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot,
and subject to the provisions on Easement on Light and
View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2
meters from the property line.
Hence, the CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps.
Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus,
pushing the perimeter wall back and causing cracks thereon, as well
as water seepage, the former is nevertheless guilty of contributory
negligence for not only failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback
rule under the National Building Code, but also for disregarding the
legal easement constituted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin
must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
Finally, in view of Sps. Sonkin's undisputed failure to observe the
two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, and in
light of the order of the courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to
provide an adequate drainage system within their property, the
Court likewise deems it proper, equitable, and necessary to order
Erlinda, who is solely impleaded as respondent before the Court, to
comply with the aforesaid rule by the removal of the portion of her
house directly abutting the partition wall. The underlying precept on
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible
for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
19
defendant must therefore be held liable only for the damages

actually
caused
by
his
negligence.
in the deed, petitioners, through their

representative, reported the matter to the barangay for
mediation and conciliation. Respondents failed to
attend the conferences scheduled by the barangay, however,
drawing petitioners to file in April 1999 or
more than six years after the execution of the deed
a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Easement of Right of Way

Valdez vs Tabisula (From Internet)
G.R. No. 175510
Damages against respondents before the RTC of San Fernando

City, La Union. In their complaint,
July 28, 2008
petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject property on

the strength of respondents assurance of
VALDEZ V. TABISULA
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a
January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute
Sale from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and
Caridad Tabisula a 200 square meter (sq.m.)
portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land
located in San Fernando, La Union. The deed
stated that the petitioners shall be provided a 2
meters wide road right-of-way on the western
side
1/2
of their lot but which is not included in this sale.
providing them a road right of way. They thus prayed that

respondents be ordered to provide the subject
property with a 2-meter wide easement and to
remove the concrete wall blocking the same.
Respondents, in their Answer averred that the 2 -meter
easement should be taken from the western
portion of the subject property and not from theirs; and
petitioners and their family are also the owners of
two properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining
properties have access to two public roads
or highways. RTC dismissed petitioners complaint. CA
affirmed. The CA held that the deed only
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western

side of the subject property. Believing
that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned
conveyed ownership of the subject property to petitioners, and

that the reference therein to an easement in
favor of petitioners is not a definite grant-basis of a voluntary
20
easement of right of way.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to a right of way

considering that the right of way is included in the
deed of absolute sale executed by the parties
HELD: No.
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real
property must be in writing. The stipulation harped upon by
petitioners that they shall be provided a 2
meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their
lotbut which is not included in this sale is not
a disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended
grant of right of way is not included in this
sale could only mean that the parties would have to enter into
a separate and distinct agreement for the
purpose. The use of the word shall, which is
imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification,
should be construed as merely permissive where, as in the case
at bar, no public benefit
An easement or servitude is a real right constituted on

anothers property, corporeal and immovable,
by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from
doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing or
person. The statutory basis of this right is
Article 613 of the Civil Code. There are two kinds of
easements according to source by law or by
the will of the owners as provided in Article 619 of the Civil
Code. Petitioners are neither entitled to
a legal or compulsory easement of right of way. For to be
entitled to such kind of easement, the
preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code
must be established.
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under

Article 649, the following requisites
must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3)
the isolation is not the result of the owner of
or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.

Besides, a document stipulating a
the dominant estates own acts; (4) the right of way

claimed is at the point least prejudicial to
voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of

Property in order not to prejudice third
theservient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the

foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant
parties under Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil Code.
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The onus of
21
proving the existence of these prerequisites
subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to link the two phases.
lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein petitioners. As

found, however, by the trial court, which
As found by the appellate court, petitioners' properties sit right in the

middle of several estates: Phase I of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the north,
a creek in the east and Green Valley Subdivision the farther east, a road
within Soldiers Hills Subdivision IV which leads to the Marcos Alvarez
Avenue in the west and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the south.
is supported by the Sketch of the location of the lots of the

parties and those adjoining them, a common
evidence of the parties, petitioners and their family are also the
owners of two properties adjoining the
subject property which have access to two public roads or
highways. Since petitioners then have more
than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no right
to demand the grant by respondents
Initially, petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for the use of
the road. Adamant, ARB refused the offer and fenced the perimeter of the
road fronting the properties of petitioners. By doing so, ARB effectively cut
off petitioners' access to and from the public highway.
of an easement on the western side of [respondents] lot.
After failing to settle the matter amicably, petitioners jointly filed a

complaint in the RTC of Imus, Cavite to enjoin ARB from depriving them of
the use of the disputed subdivision road and to seek a compulsory right of
way after payment of proper indemnity.
WOODRIDGE SCHOOL, INC., vs ARB CONSTRUCTION CO., INC
RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. States that The

questioned road is part and parcel of the road network of Soldiers Hills IV,
Phase II. This road was constructed pursuant to the approved subdivision
plan of Soldiers Hills IV, Phase II. As such, the road has already been
withdrawn from the commerce of men as the ownership of which was
automatically vested in the government without need of any
compensation. Thus, the subdivision owner can no longer sell or alienate
the roads for they are already owned by the government
FACTS:
Woodridge is the usufructuary of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-363902 in the name of spouses Ernesto T.
Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its co-petitioner, Miguela JimenezJavier, is the registered owner of the adjacent lot under TCT No. T-330688.
On the other hand, ARB is the owner and developer of Soldiers Hills
Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is composed of four phases. Phase I of
the subdivision was already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To
provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the
CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court went on to rule
that a compulsory right of way exists in favor of petitioners as "[t]here is
no other existing adequate outlet to and from [petitioners'] properties to
the Marcos Alvarez Avenue other than the subject existing road lot
designated as Lot No. 5827-F-1 belonging to [ARB].In addition, it
awarded P500,000 to ARB as reasonable indemnity for the use of the road
22
lot.
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners filed this
petition for review on certiorari insisting that ARB is not entitled to be paid
any indemnity.
dominion over the subdivision roads. Therefore, until and unless the roads
17
18
are donated, ownership remains with the owner-developer.
Since no donation has been made in favor of any local government and the
title to the road lot is still registered in the name of ARB, the disputed
property remains private
ISSUE:
2) YES
Whether or not the subject road is public property?
Whether or not there is a need for a payment of indemnity?
To be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites

must concur: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper
indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
RULING:
1)NO
Likewise, we hold the trial court in error when it ruled that the subject
road is public property pursuant to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1216.The pertinent portion of the provision reads:
All told, the only requisite left unsatisfied is the payment of proper
indemnity.
In the case of a legal easement, Article 649 of the Civil Code prescribes the
parameters by which the proper indemnity may be fixed. Since the
intention of petitioners is to establish a permanent passage, the second
paragraph of Article 649 of the Civil Code particularly applies:
Section 2. xxx xxx xxx

Art 649.
Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the roads, alleys,
sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the owner or developer to
the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local
governments to accept them provided, however, that the parks and
playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the
project with the consent of the city or municipality concerned
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
The law is clear. The transfer of ownership from the subdivision ownerdeveloper to the local government is not automatic but requires a positive
act from the owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire
23
In its Answer, NPC claimed that its obligation towards the

spouses Bongbong had already been extinguished when it paid the
amount of P33,582.15 for the damaged improvements on April 22,
1996, and the easement fee pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6395, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 938, in the
amount ofP163,150.00 on October 28, 1997.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. BONGBONG

520 SCRA 290
FACTS:
Spouses Antero and Rosario Bongbong are the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Sambulawan,
Villaba, Leyte. As early as 1996, the National Power Corporation
(NPC) negotiated with the spouses Bongbong to use a portion of the
property for the construction of TWR SITE for the Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection Project. When the spouses Bongbong agreed, NPC
occupied a portion of the property.
NPC paid the spouses Bongbong the amount of P33,582.00
representing the value of the improvements that were damaged by
the construction of the project. The voucher for the payment of
easement fee was prepared. However, when NPC offered a check
for P163,150.00 (representing 10% of the total market value of the
area affected) as payment for the easement fee, Antero refused to
accept the amount and demanded that NPC pay the full value of the
portion it had occupied. On October 28, 1997, the spouses
.
Bongbong received the P163,150.00 under protest
On October 3, 1997, the spouses Bongbong demanded that
the NPC pay P8,748,448.00 which they alleged to be the just and
reasonable value for their land and improvements. The refusal of
NPC to heed their demands prompted the spouses Bongbong to file
a complaint for just compensation before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Palompon, Leyte.
In the complaint, the spouses Bongbong alleged that NPC
was given the authority to enter the property due to its assurances
and promises that it would pay just compensation, but it never did.
On May 21, 1999, the spouses Bongbong filed a Motion to

Admit as Supplement to the Amended Complaint the New
Reappraisal of Plaintiffs Real Property and Improvements,
dated February 8, 1999. In the said Reappraisal, which was issued
by the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Leyte (Resolution
No. 03-99), the lot was valued at P300.00 per sq m.
NPC opposed the motion, alleging that the payment of just
compensation should be based on the market value of the property
at the time of its taking in 1997; pursuant to its charter, it paid only an
easement fee.
RTC RULING - The trial court stressed that just compensation
should be reckoned from 1997 when the taking took place. It noted
that, in 1997, NPC consistently paid P300.00 per square meter to the
other owner spouses Felipe and Mercedes Larrazabal, Melchor
Larrazabal, Fedelina Tuazon, Aznar Enterprises, Inc., Yolinda
Beduya, and Trinidad Palanas for the properties it acquired for its
transmission lines. It held that NPC should not discriminate against
the spouses Bongbong, who should thus be paid the same rate.
COURT OF APPEAL RULING - The CA found no cogent reason to
reverse the finding of the trial court. It agreed with the trial court that
the spouses Bongbong should not be discriminated against in the
determination of just compensation. Considering therefore that NPC
had paid P300.00 per square meter for properties belonging to other
landowners in the Province of Leyte for the construction of its
transmission line, it should pay respondents the same amount. The
appellate court stressed that the value of the property at the time the
government took possession of the land, not the increased value
resulting from the passage of time, represents the true value to be
paid as just compensation for the property taken.
24
Petitioner further contends that it should only pay an

easement fee and not the full value of the property since it acquired
only a simple right-of-way easement for the passage of its overhead
transmission lines; respondents retained the full ownership and right
to use the land. It points out that under Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as
amended by P.D. No. 938, it is only authorized to acquire a right-ofway easement where a portion of a land will be traversed by
transmission lines, and to pay only an easement fee 10% of the
.
market value of the land
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property
taken or easement fee only;
RULING:
YES. Petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property taken.
Petitioner insists that if any amount should be paid to respondents, it
should only be an easement fee of 10% the value of the property, not
the full value, since it acquired only a simple right-of-way easement
for the passage of its overhead transmission lines. It points out that
its charter authorizes the acquisition only of a right-of-way easement
for its transmission lines and the payment of an easement fee.
The Court do not agree with the contention of the petitioner. The
Court has consistently held that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. No statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
courts findings.
In National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation, petitioner (also the NPC) likewise sought
the expropriation of certain properties which would be traversed by
its
transmission lines. In the said case, petitioner similarly argued that
only an easement fee should be paid to respondent since the
construction of the transmission lines would be a mere encumbrance
on the property, and respondent would not be deprived of its

beneficial enjoyment. It posited that respondent should be
compensated only for what it would actually lose, that is, a portion of
the aerial domain above its property. The Court noted, however, that
petitioner sought, and was later granted, authority to enter the
property and demolish all the improvements thereon. It, therefore,
concluded that the expropriation would, in fact, not be limited to an
easement of a right of way only.
Similarly, the expropriation by petitioner in the present case
does not amount to a mere encumbrance on the property. The
records in this case show that petitioner has occupied a 25,100-sq-m
area of respondents property. This was not disputed by
respondents. Further, the Court ruled in the Manubay case that:
Granting arguendo that
what
petitioner
acquired over respondents property was purely an
easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain
its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and
not the full value of the property. The acquisition of
such an easement falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds
support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court
sustained the award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use. Republic v.
PLDT held, thus:
x x x. Normally, of course, the power of
eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon
the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way.
True, an easement of a right of way
25
transmits no rights except the easement itself, and

respondent retains full ownership of the property.
The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless,
not gratis.
As
correctly observed
by the
CA, considering the nature and the effect of the
installation power lines, the limitations on the
use of the land for an indefinite period would
deprive respondent of normal use of the
property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to
payment of just compensation, which must be
neither more nor less than the monetary
equivalent of the land.
Ernest Godfrey L. Tejada

EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63996
September 15, 1989
FACTS: The co-owners Dilas of Lot 860 executed a deed by which an

undivided 1/3 portion of the land (Lot 860-B) was donated to a
niece, Epifania Dila, and another undivided 1/3 portion (Lot 860-D)
to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the
remaining portion (Lots 860-A and 860-C), was declared to pertain
exclusively to and would be retained by Cornelia Dila.
After this, the co-owners signed a partition agreement. The
former co-owners evidently overlooked the fact that, by reason of
the subdivision, Lot 860-B of Epifania came to include the entire
frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and thus
effectively isolated from said road the other lots.

Cornelia sold Lot 860-A to the sisters Eugenio. Then Eugenio
Sisters sold the land to Ramos. After having set up a piggery on his
newly acquired property, Ramos had his lawyer write to Francisco,
owner of the adjoining lot (Lot 266), to ask for a right of way
through the latter's land. Negotiations thereafter had however
failed to bring about a satisfactory arrangement.
Later that year, Ramos succeeded, through the intercession of
Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela, in obtaining a 3-meter wide
passageway through Lot 860-B of Epifania. Yet in August 1973, he
inexplicably put up a 10-foot high concrete wall on his lot and
thereby closed the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860B. It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage
precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more
convenient to him.
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing
the barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone
wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco was served with summons and a
copy of the complaint in CFI instituted by Ramos as well as a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction directing him to remove his stone
fence and keep his lot open for Ramos' use.
The CFI handed down its verdict, adversely to Francisco. The CA
affirmed the Trial Courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos is entitled to an easement of right of
way through the land belonging to petitioner Francisco
26
RULING: The SC held that a compulsory easement of way cannot be

obtained without the presence of four (4) requisites provided for in
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, which the owner of the
dominant tenement must establish, to wit:
(1)
That the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway
(Art. 649, par. 1);
(2)
After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1,
end);
(3)
That the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; and
(4)
That the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest. (Art. 650)
What clearly the appealed Decision overlooked or failed to
accord the significance due it is the fact already adverted to and
which has never been disputed that respondent Ramos, having
already been granted access to the public road (Parada Road)
through the other adjoining Lot 860-B owned by Epifania
inexplicably gave up that right of access by walling off his property
from the passageway thus established.
If at the time he filed suit against the petitioner, such access
could no longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it off
by erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where the
passageway began for no reason to which the record can attest

except to demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in his
complaint. But the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot,
as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a
public highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant
of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his
property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually
brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his
claim to such an easement.
It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot
860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the
contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a
truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim
for a similar easement in an alternative location.
G.R. No. L-57641 October 23, 1982

ANTOLIN A. JARIOL, and PAULO S. RODRIGUEZ, In
their capacities as Joint Executors of the Estate of
Humiliano Rodriguez, deceased, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINO JAGDON, in his
Capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Timoteo
Rodriguez, deceased, CLEMENTE RODRIGUEZ,
TERESITA
RODRIGUEZ,
JULIA
RODRIGUEZ,
AMPARO RODRIGUEZ, FAUSTA RODRIGUEZ,
27
FRANCISCA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, INES VDA. DE

RODRIGUEZ, ADDULA RODRIGUEZ, DOLORES
RODRIGUEZ and JUANITA RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
Facts:
The deceased Quirino Rodriguez left four children:
Humiliano, Timoteo, Jose, all surnamed Rodriguez, and
Ines Rodriguez de Pages. On November 25, 1951, these
heirs, entered into an extrajudicial partition to divide a
parcel of land in Cebu covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title in the name of the deceased. In this agreement, Lot
"F" was adjudicated to Humiliano, and Lot "G" to
Timoteo. Lot "G" has no egress to the public roads. On
May 22, 1956, Timoteo died and his son, Clemente
Rodriguez, was appointed executor of the estate, but was
later replaced by Dominino Jagdon and after Humiliano's
death in 1961 or 1962, petitioners Antolin A. Jariol, his
son-in- law, and Paulo S. Rodriguez, his son, were
appointed executors of his estate. On June 27, 1960, the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was registered by
Clemente Rodriguez, in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Cebu. To be noted from the partition agreement
is the fact that four heirs were to contribute for the
easement of right-of-way three meters each, while
Humiliano, to whom Lot "F" appertained, was to give six
meters. Upon the contention that they had discovered the
annotations only in 1964, petitioners together with Ines
Rodriguez de Pages, filed an action with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu against respondents seeking to
declare the nullity of the annotations and insertions for
having been surreptitiously and maliciously added long
after the execution of the principal document, and the
cancellation of the easements of right of way noted as
encumbrances on the Certificates of Title issued for the

subdivided lots, particularly on "Lot F". It was alleged that
the initials of Humiliano and Ines Rodriguez de Pages
affixed to the insertions were forged. Defendantsrespondents, on the other hand, sustained the
genuineness and due execution of the annotations or
additions and presented their own handwriting expert.
They averred that the agreement merely confirmed the
existing right of way.
RTC - signatures of Ines and Humilano were forged
hence alleged agreement creating the easement is of no
force and legal effect upon the heirs of Quirino Rodriguez
and declared the alterations or annotations complained of
illegal and unlawful and without any legal force and
effect; ordered the Register of Deeds of Cebu to cancel
the easement of right of way noted as encumbrances on
the title.
CA - reversed judgment; on the ground that the right-ofway involved, which was a pre-existing one, even prior to
the extra judicial partition, sprang not from any voluntary
concession but from law.
Issue:
W/N Appellate Court erred in skirting the issue on the
genuineness and/or binding effect of the forged
alterations and insertions on the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition; and in holding that a legal easement of right-ofway automatically attaches to Lot "F" adjudicated to
Humiliano, as the servient estate
Held:
28
CA did not entirely disregard the matter of the questioned

alterations and insertions. It summarized the conflicting
evidence thereon observing that "unrebutted was the
testimony of Mrs. Casafranca that her father Humiliano
Rodriguez favored the maintaining of a right-of-way. If
Humiliano himself favored the right-of-way, petitioners, as
his successors-in-interest, should be held bound by it.
Respondent Court added that the Notary Public, Atty.
Bernardo Solotan, who authenticated the document, also
declared that the initials of Humiliano and Ines R. de
Pages were authentic, and that the insertions were made
at the instance of Humiliano.
In point of fact, a road right of way providing access to
the public road from "Lot G" existed long before the
execution of the extrajudicial partition even during the
lifetime of Quirino Rodriguez. The Deed of Partition
merely sought to legalize and give stability to the access
road already existing. As a matter of law, considering that
"Lot G " has no access to the public road, the easement
is explicitly provided for in Article 652 of the Civil Code 7 ,
its width being determined by the needs of the servient
estate pursuant to Article 651 8 of the same law. The
annotations did not "create" a right-of-way, contrary to
the opinion of the Trial Court. They merely confirmed an
existing one. Petition for review denied.
29

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Different Kinds of Easements- Concept of Easement

G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Different Kinds of Easements- Concept of Easement

LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND PABLO B.

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of

It must be stressed at the outset that contrary to petitioners' allegations, there

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Different Kinds of Easements- Elements

On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for Declaration of the existence

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Different Kinds of Easements- Intransmisibility

Whether or not Bolton Street is an easement and a legal encumbrance on

Different Kinds of Easements- Intransmissibility

(I focused on the subject matter based in the outline/syllabus, but I suggest

Section 39 of Act 496

Valisno vs Adriano, 161 SCRA 398

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

March 22, 1960 ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal,

On June 20, 1960, he filed a complaint for damages.

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Manner in which easements establishedLa Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a

complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for breach of contract and

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Continuous non apparent easements

BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE,

barricading the disputed road and from obstructing its free

1. Whether or not there is an existing agreement

discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be

2. Whether or not the principles of prescription,

It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any

continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the

the passage of petitioners trains denotes the existence

acquired only by virtue of a title.

show an admission, representation or conduct by

Existence of apparent sign of easement

We applied the cited provision to the case in

VALISNO V. ADRIANO- Doctrine of Apparent Sign

In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation

water over Respondents land.

grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is

Upon turnover, it was discovered that certain common

Issue: May Goldcrest build structures on the limited common areas

Gold Crest Realty vs. Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation

Goldcrest is the Developer of Cypress Gardens- a 10storey building in Makati

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Held: No. Such will impair subject easement granted to GoldCrest.

construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and

Rights and obligations of ownsers of dominant and servient estates- non

ESTER JAVELLANA, ROLANDO DEMAFILES, CESAR CRUZADA and

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

o for the 1st 100 meters = 3 meters wide

Easement in favor of higher estates

When Florete closed the entrance of the canal and

FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Fernando Vergara and Herminia Vergara

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

even higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a third of a meter.

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

property to prevent any danger to life or property. Moreover, Sps.

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem