Public Officers

1.FELIXBERTO C. STA. MARIA vs.

SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-30773
Facts:
Petitioner, a professor of English and Comparative Literature (formerly Dean of the UP
College in Baguio), was elected Dean of the College of Education on May 5, 1967 by
the Board of Regents, on nomination of the UP President. His appointment as such
Dean was for a five year term, "effective May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless
sooner terminated, with all the rights and privileges as well as the duties and
obligations attached to the position in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the University and the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines. But the
students were not to be appeased. For, Dean Sta. Maria, according to them, did not
act on some of their demands.
The students threatened to boycott their classes the next day, July 17. President Lopez
asked that they desist, suggested that they instead attend a student-faculty meeting
the next day in his office.
The faculty members of the College of Education convened in the afternoon of July 22.
They resolved, amongst others, to recognize the right of a college dean to his position
from which he cannot be removed unless for cause (44 in favor, 2 abstained), and not
to endorse the students' demand for the forced resignation of Sta. Maria (36 in favor,
5 against, 3 abstained).
President Lopez appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean of
the College of Education, without additional compensation, "the complete shut-down
of classes in the Diliman campus has compelled" him to "transfer Dean Sta. Maria to
other duties".
Issue:
Whether or not Sta. Maria removed?
Ruling:
A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank,
level or salary, without break in service." To be stressed at this point, however, is that
the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of "Dean, College of Education, University of the
Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the university". His appointment is to a
specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific station. A line of distinction must
be drawn between the office of dean and that of professor, say, of English and
Comparative Literature. A professor in the latter capacity may be assigned to handle
classes from one college to another or to any other unit in the university where
English is offered. He may even be transferred from graduate school to undergraduate
classes. He cannot complain if such was done without his consent. He has no fixed
station. But a college dean holding an appointment with a fixed term stands on a
different plane. He cannot, without his consent, be transferred before the end of his
term. He cannot be asked to give up his post. Nor may he be appointed as dean of
another college. Much less can he be transferred to another position even if it be
dignified with a dean's rank.

The transfer was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a university,

being an academic position which requires learning, ability and scholarship, is more
exalted than that of a special assistant who merely assists the President, as the title
indicates. The special assistant does not make authoritative decisions. Second. The
position of dean is a line position where the holder makes authoritative decisions in
his own name and responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level of
staff position. Third. The position of dean is created by law, the university charter, and
cannot be abolished even by the Board of Regents. That of special assistant, upon the
other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a creation of the university president.
It will not avail respondents any to say that Sta. Maria retained "the rank of Dean". In
actual administrative practice, the terms "with rank of" dean is meaningless. He is no
dean at all. He of course, basks, in the trappings of the dean. A palliative it could have
been intended to be. But actually he is a dean without a college.
The students demanded Sta. Maria's ouster. The President of the university acceded
to their demand. But Sta. Maria's right to be removed only, in the words of the law,
"after due process" was disregarded. Nor may it be assumed that emergency could
justify disregard of constitutional rights.
The transfer of petitioner Felixberto C. Sta. Maria from his position as Dean of the
College of Education, University of the Philippines, to the position of Special Assistant
to the President, University of the Philippines, as well as the ad interim appointment of
Prof. Nemesio Ceralde "as acting Dean" of the College of Education, University of the
Philippines, are hereby set aside and declared null and void, the President and the
Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines are hereby ordered to restore
said petitioner Felixberto C. Sta. Maria to his position of Dean, College of Education.

2.
Maceda vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 102781
Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that
all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90
days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth
and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and
10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged

that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Ruling:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally
liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC
that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer
the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
3.
GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSOvs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 86899-903
Facts:
That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused AMOR D. DELOSO, a public
officer being then the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales,
taking advantage of his public and official position, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest
partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to
him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the
Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any
agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby
causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.
A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G.R. Nos. 69963-67) to annul the
Sandiganbayan's resolutions denying the petitioner's motion to quash and motion for
reconsideration.

In a resolution dated July 28,1988, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
resolution became final and executory on October 17, 1988.
The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He
pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner
pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be
suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An
extended suspension is a distinct possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan
denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that
there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority.
Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period of 60 days,
provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act 2260) is illegal
and void.

Ruling:
The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an
unreasonable period of time applies with greater force to elective officials and
especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. The interests of the
sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the
heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan and of this Court.
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the
highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an
indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire
term simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder,
malversation of public finds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and
resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited
determination of his innocence or guilt.
The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period
can not be sanctioned. We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective
public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety
(90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree,
which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this
case.
The instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner
Amor D. Deloso by virtue of the February 10, 1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan
should be limited to only ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume once again
the functions of governor of Zambales, without prejudice to the continuation of the
trial of the pending cases against him in the Sandiganbayan.

4.
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan
GR. 126055
Facts;
On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the
stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith
and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of
disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be
disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this
information, Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of
Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering
from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court
battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the
suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office.
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from
office for 90 days.
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019
provides : SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be

entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an
erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from
the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the Senate.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can
she still be suspended as a senator?
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered
to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which
the SC has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability
against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his
continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in
decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due
preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific
crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set
out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

5.
MALALUAN V. COMELEC
Facts:
Luis Malaluan and Jose Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates on the
municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Evangelista was proclaimed by the
Municipal Board off Canvassers as duly elected mayor. Malaluan filed an election
protest with the RTC. RTC declared Malaluan as the duly elected mayor. Evangelista
appealed the decision to the COMELEC. Malaluan filed a motion for execution pending
appeal which was granted by the RTC. Thus, Malaluan assumed the office of municipal
mayor 1st Division COMELEC ordered Malaluan to vacate the office having found that
Evangelista was the duly elected mayor. COMELEC en banc affirmed. Malaluan filed
this petition. The term expired June 30,1995. Petition has become moot. However,
question as to damages is ripe for adjudication. Claimed as part of the damages to
which Evangelista is allegedly entitled to the salary that would have accrued to him
had there been no execution of the RTCs decision pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Malaluan is a usurper and should pay the damages and salaries to
Evangelista.
Ruling:
NO. Malaluan is not a usurper because a usurper is one who undertakes to act
officially w/o and color of right, while Malaluan exercised the duties of an elective
office under color of election thereto. Malaluan is a de facto officer who in good faith
has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto and
is therefore legally entitled to the emoluments of the office. The long-standing rule is
that notwithstanding subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective
official who has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as into the performance of the
duties of that office is entitled to the compensation legally provided for the position.
This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events. The emolument must go to the
person who rendered the service unless the contrary is proved. Criterion for a
justifiable award of election protest expenses ans salaries remains to be the existence
of a pertinent breach of obligations arising from k, quasi-k, tortious acts, crimes, or a
specific legal provision authorizing the money claim. The 1st Division COMELEC
reasoned that Evangelista was the one elected, he was ousted not by final judgment
but by an order of execution pending appeal which was groundless; that Malaluan
occupied the position in an illegal manner as a usurper and that he had no right to the
salaries of the office. However, there is no pertinent breach of obligations arising from
k, quasi-k, tortious acts, crimes that can be attributed to Malaluan nor did Evangelista
point out a specific legal provision authorizing the money claim that Malaluan was
proclaimed winner by the RTC and not by COMELEC is of no moment since it is a wellsettled rule that as much recognition should be given to the value of the decision of a
judicial body as a basis for the right to assume office as that given by law to the
proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers. The damage may be said to be
damnum absque injuria= damage inflicted without injustice or without violation of a
legal right for which the law provides no remedy.

6.
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES v CA
284 SCRA 276
Facts:
Antonio, priate respondent, was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay
Catanduanes on March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of

Barangay Council(ABC) for the Municiplity of San Andres Catanduanes. Pursuant to the
Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as Member of the
Sanguniang Bayan of the sid municipality. Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the election
for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Council(FABC) void
for lack of quorum. As a result, the provincial council was reorganized. DILG Sec then
designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan of Catanduanes effective on 15 June 1990. Because of his designation,
private respondent tendered his resignation as a member of the Sanguniang Bayan
dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his letters
were also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer.
Subsequently, Aquino then the Vice President of ABC was appointed by the provincial
governor as member of the Sanguniang Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino
assumed office on 18 July 1980 after taking his oath. Subsequently, the ruling of the
DILG annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the Supreme Court
and declared the appointment of private respondent void for lacking the essential
qualification of being the president of FABC. On 31 March 1992, private respondent
wrote to the Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San Andres regarding his re-assumption of his
original position. SB refused.
Issue:
1. Whether Antonios resignation was complete.
2. Whether or not the respondent abandoned his membership in the SB.
Ruling:
1. The resignation was not complete for lack of acceptance thereof of the proper
authority however, an office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary
abandonment which needs no acceptance. In Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined
as the act of giving up of an ifficer by which he declines his office andrenounces the
further right to use it. It can be express or implied. To constitute a complete and
operative resignation the folloving must be present. (1) an intention to relinquish a
part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper
authority. In the case at bar, there was no evidence that the private respondents
resignation was accepted by the proper authority. Although the Local Government
Code of 1983 was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation it
provides that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of
resignation and should be acted upon by the Sangunian concerned. The resignation
letter was tendered to the mayor and copies were sent to the governor, DILG and the
municipal treasurer but none of them expressly acted on it. Furthermore, under
established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to
whom it should be submitted, should be submitted to the appointing power. Therefore,
the resignation should have been submitted to the president or to the DILG as the
presidents alter ego.
2. Abandonment has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and contro thereof. It is a
species of resignation. While resignation is the formal relinquishment, abandonment is
the voluntary relinquishment by non-user. There are 2 essential elements of
abandonment : (1) an intention to abandon and (2) an overt act by which intention is
carried on. In the case at bar, the first element was manifested on the following
instances: (1) private respondents failure to perform his function as SB; (2) his failure
to collect the corresponding renumeration for the position, (3)his failure to object to
the appointment of Aquino as his replacement to SB and (4) his prolonged failure to
initiate any act to reassume his post in the SB after SC had nullified his designation as

member of Sanguniang Panlalawigan. The second element was demonstrated by the

following: (1) his letter of resignation, (2) his assumption of office as member of the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions of SP
and (4) his recept of renumeration for such post.

7.
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS
306 SCRA 287
FACTS
Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school
teachers. Some time in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes,
they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged with
1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty;
4) refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive
suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was
dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal
to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their
reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the
period of their suspension and pending appeal before the CA exonerated them.
Issue:

Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if
they are subsequently exonerated.
Ruling:
Yes, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back
wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be
unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually
considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision
finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the
respondent shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency
of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the
period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.
In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of
suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive
suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and
their suspension was unjustified. They are still entitled to back salaries even if they
were still reprimanded.

8.
LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126183
These consolidated petitions are among several petitions filed with this Court arising
from the much-publicized public school teachers' mass actions of September/October
1990.
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October
1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cario of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS).
The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). In 1993 the CSC found petitioners guilty of "conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service" for having participated in the mass
actions and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six (6) months' suspension.
However, in view of the length of time that petitioners had been out of the service by
reason of the immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario,
the CSC likewise ordered petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the service
without back wages.

Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decision. They initially filed petitions for
certiorari.
On 29 November 1995 the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals 6 rendered a
joint decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37619-20 dismissing the petitions for lack of merit. 7
The appellate court ruled that the questioned resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service were based on reasonable and justifiable grounds; that petitioners' perceived
grievances were no excuse for them not to conduct classes and defy the return-towork order issued by their superiors; that the immediate execution of the dismissal
orders of Secretary Cario was sanctioned by Sec. 47, par. (2), of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292) as well as Sec. 37, par. (b), Art. IX of PD No. 807, and Sec.
32, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E. O. No. 292. Their motion
for reconsideration having been denied on 15 May 1997, petitioners then appealed by
certiorari.
On 24 April 1998 the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a joint decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37784 and Nos. 37808-14 likewise dismissing the petitions for lack of
merit. The appellate court rejected petitioners' contention that they should not have
been penalized for participating in the September/October 1990 mass actions because
they were merely exercising their constitutional right to free assembly. In so ruling the
Court of Appeals cited Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr. wherein
this Court ruled that the public school teachers' mass actions of September/October
1990 were "to all intents and purposes a strike . . . constituting a concealed and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons." Petitioners' contention.that
secretary Cario's decision to dismiss them was not supported by evidence was
likewise rejected in view of petitioners' admissions and/or failure to refute the factual
finding that petitioners actually joined the mass actions based on the report of
absences submitted by their respective school principals.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied in the resolution of 20 August
1996, 13 petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend
that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in affirming the CSC resolutions finding
them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when their only
"offense" was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition
the government for redress of their grievances. Moreover petitioners insist that the
mass actions of September/October 1990 were not "strikes" as there was no actual
disruption of classes. Petitioners therefore ask for exoneration or, in the alternative,
award of back wages for the period of three (3) years when they were not allowed to
work while awaiting resolution of their appeals by the MSPB and CSC, deducting the
period of six (6) months' suspension eventually meted them.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the CSC resolutions
Ruling:
Considering the foregoing, we find that respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the CSC resolutions finding petitioners guilty, the teachers were neither
exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, 2 circumstances necessary for the grant of
back wages in administrative disciplinary cases. Like herein petitioners, those in
Bangalisan were also teachers who participated in the 1990 mass actions for which
they were dismissed by Secretary Cario but ordered merely suspended for 6 months
by the Civil Service Commission. On a plea that the immediate implementation of the

dismissal orders of Secretary Cario was unjustified, thus warranting an award of back
wages the Court said
As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against
petitioners, the same is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive
Order No. 292, thus: "The Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decision shall be final in case the
penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same shall be executory
except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory
only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
And since it was already the final dismissal orders of Secretary Cario which
were being carried out, immediate implementation even pending appeal was
clearly sanctioned by the aforequoted provision of the Administrative Code of
1987. 26 Hence, being legal, the immediate execution of the dismissal orders
could not be considered unjustified.
Petitioners do not deny, nay they even admit, having participated in the 1990 mass
actions. Thus having given cause for their supension, their prayer for backwages must
be denied conformably with settled rulings of this Court.
Petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 1995 and 24 April 1996 are AFFIRMED.

Compare case of Gloria vs CA & Dela Cruz vs CA:

In Gloria vs CA the asking for back wages during the period of their suspension and
pending appeal before the CA exonerated them were granted because the respondent
was exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension
pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the
respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension.
Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent shall be
considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the
event he wins.
In Dela Cruz cs CA the petition for back wages was denied because the teachers
participated in the mass action/illegal strike in Sept. 19-21, 1990 and subsequently
defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990 issued by this Office, which
acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform
official duty, gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree
807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners do not
deny, nay they even admit, having participated in the 1990 mass actions. Thus having
given cause for their suspension, their prayer for back wages must be denied.

9.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
G.R. No. 108072
Facts:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor
Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by
Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated
R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170
(falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the
Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of
Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M
without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the
administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative
sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension,
had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO
against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain
him from enforcing suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been
divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective
official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.
Ruling:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not
removed by LG Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The
two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well
settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference
of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have
known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should
be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive

suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon
the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the
extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in
fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only
in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of
the President.