Narra

Nickel
Mining
vs
Redmont
Case Digest GR 185590, Apr 21 2014
Facts:
Redmont is a domestic corporation interested in the mining and exploration of some areas in Palawan. Upon learning
that those areas were covered by MPSA applications of other three (allegedly Filipino) corporations Narra, Tesoro, and
MacArthur, it filed a petition before the Panel of Arbitrators of DENR seeking to deny their permits on the ground that
these corporations are in reality foreign-owned. MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 40% of the shares of PLMC
(which owns 5,997 shares of Narra), 40% of the shares of MMC (which owns 5,997 shares of McArthur) and 40% of the
shares of SLMC (which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of Tesoro).
Aside from the MPSA, the three corporations also applied for FTAA with the Office of the President. In their answer, they
countered that (1) the liberal Control Test must be used in determining the nationality of a corporation as based on Sec 3
of the Foreign Investment Act which as they claimed admits of corporate layering schemes, and that (2) the nationality
question is no longer material because of their subsequent application for FTAA.
Commercial / Political Law
Hide
Issue 1: W/N the Grandfather Rule must be applied in this case
Yes. It is the intention of the framers of the Constitution to apply the Grandfather Rule in cases where corporate layering
is present.
First, as a rule in statutory construction, when there is conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution
will prevail. In this instance, specifically pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the Constitution on National
Economy and Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA will have no place of application. Corporate layering is admittedly allowed by
the FIA, but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and other pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal.
Second, under the SEC Rule1 and DOJ Opinion2 , the Grandfather Rule must be applied when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign
equity ownership is in doubt. Doubt is present in the Filipino equity ownership of Narra, Tesoro, and MacArthur since
their common investor, the 100% Canadian-owned corporation MBMI, funded them.
Under the Grandfather Rule, it is not enough that the corporation does have the required 60% Filipino stockholdings at
face value. To determine the percentage of the ultimate Filipino ownership, it must first be traced to the level of the
investing corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the investee corporation. Applying this rule, it turns out
that the Canadian corporation owns more than 60% of the equity interests of Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur. Hence, the
latter are disqualified to participate in the exploration, development and utilization of the Philippines natural resources.
1 DOJ Opinion No. 020 Series of 2005 (paragraph 7)
2 SEC Opinion May 13, 1990
Remedial Law
Hide
Issue 2: W/N the case has become moot as a result of the MPSA conversion to FTAA
No. There are certain exceptions to mootness principle and the mere raising of an issue of mootness will not deter
the courts from trying a case when there is a valid reason to do so.
The SC noted that a grave violation of the Constitution is being committed by a foreign corporation through a myriad of
corporate layering under different, allegedly, Filipino corporations. The intricate corporate layering utilized by the
Canadian company, MBMI, is of exceptional character and involves paramount public interest since it undeniably affects
the exploitation of our Countrys natural resources. The corresponding actions of petitioners during the lifetime and
existence of the instant case raise questions as what principle is to be applied to cases with similar issues. No definite
ruling on such principle has been pronounced by the Court; hence, the disposition of the issues or errors in the instant
case will serve as a guide to the bench, the bar and the public. Finally, the instant case is capable of repetition yet
evading review, since the Canadian company, MBMI, can keep on utilizing dummy Filipino corporations through various
schemes of corporate layering and conversion of applications to skirt the constitutional prohibition against foreign mining
in Philippine soil.

Espina vs. Zamora, Jr. Digest

G.R. No. 143855: September 21, 2010
REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S.
BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI AND FRANKLIN BAUTISTA,
Petitioners, v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), HON. MAR ROXAS (SECRETARY OF
TRADE AND INDUSTRY), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA (SECRETARY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY), GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND HON. LILIA BAUTISTA
(CHAIRMAN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION), Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from
engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories.
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to
engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national
economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full
employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.
The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien
dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy selfemployment, and bring about more unemployment.
The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a
condition for the release of certain loans.
There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura,
and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762
does not involve the disbursement of public funds.
The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II
of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to
Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so
dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It does

not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762
Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional
POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such
a challenge.
HELD:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More
particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a
result of the passage of that law.
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or
inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the public interest so requires or the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state policies in the Constitution are not self-executing.
As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of
principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause
of action in the courts.
Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering
our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos
certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact
laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this
case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving
them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates
the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate.
The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade
business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has
provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only nationals
from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to
engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing
activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales
representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

Gamboa v. Teves etal., GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012

Facts:
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million shares of
the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacifics common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of
foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation
of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the
capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence
this new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term capital in its 2011 decision?
Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitutions Preamble want to achieve, that is to
conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled economy. In the 2011 decision,
the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term capital which refers to the shares with voting rights, as well as
with full beneficial ownership (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled
with benefits, is tantamount to an effective control. Therefore, the Courts interpretation of the term capital was not
erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and
furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the
holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a
TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under
a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation
under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged
violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping
with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility
of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7
Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature,
subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by
the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an
expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to
the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous
region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted,
the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and
submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any
third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most
she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent
powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to
identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros as traditionally
understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that
the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition
and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed
consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction
of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out
the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and
amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way
to independence.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal
directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA
6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of
the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7

and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups
petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples
initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature
and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the
third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the
legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be
a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

DECISION
(En Banc)
BUENA, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by thenPresident Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion,
and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions
are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the
Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25,
Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.
xxx

xxx

xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this
case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict
meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should
be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the
elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the
United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of
America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the
treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution

HELMA P. GAMINDE, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC.
FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, Respondent.
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On
September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment.
However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of
her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998. Opined
that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory
opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon
Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her
co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the term of Commissioner
Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated inher appointment conformably with the constitutional
intent.Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff,
effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit Enbanc.
On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioners appeal.
The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of office
may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February
02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied
acquiescence of the Office of the President.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion.
ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment
paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
RULING: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an
appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02, 1999.However,
she served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such
salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff. ACCORDINGLY, The Court REVERSED the
decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until February 02,
2000.