[G.R. No. 1511. July 26, 1905.

]
MIGUEL PASCUAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MACARIO ANGELES, Defendant-Appellee.
FACTS:
In 1903, Pascual filed an action for recovery of possession of a certain tract of land unlawfully
occupied by Angeles, and for the payment of rent due, damages, and costs. The disputed land
formerly belonged to Ciriaca Pascual, his sister, from whom he inherited it. Angeles was a former
lessee who continuously failed to pay rentals in 1899, 1900, and 1901.
TAGALOG LEASE CONTRACT:
1.

Ciriaca Pascual thereby leased to Macario Angeles a tract of land 15 yards square in the barrio
of Uaua, San Jose de Navotas, for the sum of 10 pesos per annum, from January to December

2.

that the lessee could built thereon a nipa but not a stone house, and could not devote the
land to any but residential purposes nor inclose the same with a stone wall without the
written consent of the owner;

3.

that the lessee could neither sell, mortgage, sublet, nor make any alterations of
improvements upon a lot; that the wife and children of the lessee could not succeed him in
the occupation of the land under the lease;

4.

and that if the lessee failed to comply with any of the provisions stipulated in the lease he
should forthwith return the land and in case of litigation pay the expenses thereof.

Upon demand for payment for the 1 st 2 years, Angeles requested & was granted for an
extension. Despite the extension & demand for payment & possession, he refused to do either.
Angeles denied the allegations & assailed the genuineness & due execution of the lease
contract. As special defense, he averred that he was the actual occupant of the land claimed,
and had been in adverse, quiet, peaceful, public, and uninterrupted possession of the same for
more than thirty years, having during that period built houses and planted trees thereon.
The court ruled in favor of Angeles. Pascual filed a motion for new trial as it was necessary to
show that he inherited the land from his sister, as also acknowledged by Angeles. - MOTION
DENIED.
ISSUE:
W/N PASCUAL HAS THE RIGHT TO SUE ANGELES
RULING: YES
Those in the actual possession of the land under a claim of ownership, right of usufruct, or
any other right entitling them to the use of the same, can maintain an action for the ejectment of
the person wrongfully in possession.
Miguel Pascual, as testamentary heir of his sister, was in the actual and adverse possession
of a tract of land in Uaua, Navotas, of which the land inquestion was a part. His possession dated
from the death of the testatrix who must have died prior to April 7, 1894, when her executor
asked for and obtained a copy of her will executed in January of the same year. The plaintiff was
recognized by the lessee, Macario Angeles, as such owner and lawful possessor and as heir and
successor to the deceased Ciriaca Pascual. Angeles paid him rent for the land from the time of
death of the former lessor until the year 1898, as shown by the record. It was not until the year
1901, when he decided to keep the land, that defendant refused to pay rent for that and the two
preceding years, 1899 and 1900.
In an action for ejectment it is presumed that the plaintiff is the owner of the property, or that
he has a right to the possession of the same, and he can not accordingly be compelled to show
his title thereto. The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

[G.R. No. 4452. October 1, 1908. ]

JUANA PICHAY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EULALIO QUEROL, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS:
In 1905, Juana Pichay, conveyed to the defendants an undivided one-third interest in twentyfive parcels of land situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, as payment of a debt of P1,500 which
she owed them. The contract of conveyance has the following clause:
"Third. The one-third part of these lands belongs to me, it being my share in the inheritance
left by my deceased parents; but I have requested my said creditors to allow me to enjoy the
usufruct of the same until my death, notwithstanding the fact that I have conveyed the said
lands to them in payment of my debt, and I bind myself not to sell. mortgage, or leave the said
lands as inheritance to any person."
In 1907, Pichay filed an action asking that it be declared that she had a right of usufruct in a
third of the twenty-five parcels of land; that she had the right to the administration of all of the
land, and that the appellees pay to her the rents which they had received during the time of her
dispossession.
Querol, et al claim that this clause above quoted gave plaintiff no right of usufruct in the
land, saying that it appears that she only asked for this right and it does not appear that the
defendants gave it to her.
The court ruled in favor of Pichay: right of usufruct, partition did not affect such.
ISSUES:
W/N PICHAY ACQUIRED USUFRUCT RIGHTS
W/N THE PARTITION AFFECTED PICHAYS RIGHTS
RULING: YES & YES
1. She is entitled to the right of usufruct in the lands assigned to the defendants by the partition
of August 10, 1905.
The only reason for inserting the clause in the contract was for the purpose of securing to the
plaintiff the right which is therein set out. The form of the words used is not sufficient to
defeat this purpose.
2. A partition made by the owners of land is binding upon a person who has a usufructuary right
in an undivided part of the land, although the latter took no part in the partition of the
property.
ART. 490. The usufructuary of part of a thing held in common shall exercise all the rights
corresponding to the owner thereof with regard to the administration and collection of fruits
or interests. Should the community cease by reason of the division of the thing possessed in
common, the usufruct of the part awarded to the owner or coowner shall appertain to the
usufructuary.

[G.R. No. 6969. December 20, 1911.]

VICENTE REYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSE GREY ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
FACTS:
Vicentes wife, Remedios Grey, died intestate in 1905 leaving his surviving husband, 1 sis & 3
bros. Under the law, the sisters and brothers are called to inherit all of the estate of the
deceased, subject only to the right of the surviving husband, the plaintiff, to a usufructuary
interest in one-half thereof.
1907 admin proceedings: Jose Grey was appointed as adminr. Each one of the defendants
was entitled yo 1/4 part of the estate subject to Vicentes right to the usufruct.
Prior to this, there was a case filed against Vicente & as a result, Vicentes usufructuary
interest in the estate of his wife was sold under execution & deeds issued to Jose Grey
(purchaser).
Vicente now sues his wifes sis & bros for payment of his usufructuary rights. Two grounds:
1. The execution sale & deeds did not divest him of his usufructuary interest &
defendants still remained charged w/ its payment
2. The order of the probate courts order issued 3 years after the attempt to sell his
usufructuary rights had become final upon their failure to appeal - settled Vicentes
right to a usufructuary interest
Vicentes counsel insists that a usufructuary interest in a real property cannot be sold under
execution.
ISSUE: W/N A USUFRUCTUARY INTEREST CAN BE SOLD UNDER EXECUTION
RULING: YES
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: SEC. 450. Property liable to execution. All goods, chattels, moneys,
and other property, both real and personal, or any interest therein of the judgment debtor, not exempt by
law, and all property and rights of property seized and held under attachment in the action, shall be liable
to execution. Shares and interests in any corporation or company, and debts, credits, and all other
property, both real and personal, or any interest in either real or personal property, and all other property
not capable of manual delivery, may be attached on execution, in like manner as upon writs of
attachment.

The term "property" as here applied to lands comprehends every species of title, inchoate or
complete; legal or equitable. This statute authorizes the sale under execution of very kind of
property, and every interest in property which is, or may be, the subject of private ownership and
transfer. It deals with equitable rights and interests as it deals with legal, without anywhere
expressly recognizing or making any distinction between them.
Article 480 of the Civil Code: The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct,
lease it to another person, or alienate his right to the usufruct even for a good consideration.
If the usufructuary right is one which may be leased or sold, it must logically and necessarily
follow that such a right is an "interest" in real property within the meaning of section 450 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, above quoted. It was the plaintiffs usufructuary right in real property
which was sold under execution. This right was conferred upon him at the death of his wife by
operation of law, and by virtue of such a right he was entitled to receive all the natural,
industrial, and civil fruits of said real property in usufruct. He was entitled to hold the actual,
material possession of such property during his lifetime, and was obligated only to preserve its
form and substance. In other words, he was entitled, subject to this restriction, to use the
property as his own.

***AS TO THE 2ND GROUND: Vicente had no interest in this property at the time the probate court
issued this order.The order only set out the fact that under the law the plaintiff was entitled to a
usufructuary interest in one-half of the estate of his deceased wife. It was not a finding that in
the meantime the plaintiff had not sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of or lost such right of
participation. This order merely fixed the legal status of the plaintiff and did not have the effect
of canceling or annuling the sale made by the sheriff.

G.R. No. L-3691

November 21, 1951

JACINTO DEL SAZ OROZCO y MORTERA and MARIA PAZ ALCANTARA, plaintiffsappellants, vs. SALVADOR ARANETA, FRANCISCO DEL SAZ OROZCO Y LOPEZ, DOLORES
DEL SAZ OROZCO Y LOPEZ, and the minors FELISA, EUGENIO, ANTONIO, JOSE, MARIA Y
CARLOS, all surnamed DEL SAZ OROZCO Y LOPEZ whose natural guardian is DOA
CONCEPCION LOPEZ VDA. DE DEL SAZ OROZCO, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Eugenio del Saz Orozco died in 1972. He had a will (executed in 1921, duly admitted to
probate). It has a clause stating that certain properties should be given in life usufruct to his son
Jacinto (petitioner), w/ the obli on his part to preserve said properties in favor of the other heirs
(naked owners). Among these properties were 5,714 shares of stock of Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company.
In 1934, the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company declared and distributed stock dividends
out of its surplus profits, the plaintiff receiving his proportionate portion of 11,428 shares. On
November 17, 1939, said Mining Company again declared stock dividends out of its surplus
profits, of which the plaintiff received 17,142 shares, making a total of 28,570 shares.
ISSUE:
W/N The stock dividend is part of the capital which should be preserved in favor of the owners
or an income of fruits of the capital which should be given to and enjoyed by the life
usufructuary, the plaintiff herein, as his own exclusive property
RULING: INCOME OF FRUITS
SAME ISSUE RAISED IN IN RE TESTATE OF EMIL MAURICE BACHRACH:
Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, or is it capital or part of
the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the remainderman.

A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should go to
the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can
be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for it were declared out of the capital it would
be a serious violation of the law.

G.R. No. L-9865 December 24, 1915

VERGO D. TUFEXIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. FRANCISCO OLAGUERA and THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF GUINOBATAN, represented by its president, Agapito Paulate, DefendantsAppellees.
FACTS:
Tufexis filed a petition praying that he be declared to be entitled to the possesion & use of the land in
conformity w/ the terms of govt concession & that Olaguera be ordered to remove from the said land all
the stores, sheds, billiard tables, and other obstructions thereon, so that plaintiff might reconstruct the
public market building on the said land.
By virtue of a concession granted by Spanish govt to Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas constructed a frame
bldg of strong materials w/ a galvanized-iron roof erected on a parcel of land belonging to the municipality
of Guinobatan & intended for public market.
In 1912, Tufexis (creditor) acquired at a public sale held in execn of a judgt rendered v. Ricardo Pardo
y Pujol (son). In July 1913, Pujol (public instrument) renounced his right to redeem the property & conveyed
it to Tufexis. However, in Jan 1913, the said bldg was totally destroyed by an accidental fire. Tufexis
negotiated w/ the municipal council to purchase the property but allegedly, it deceitfully prevented him
from doing so & authorized Olaguera to take possession of all land from March 1912.
The provincial fiscal alleged as a ground for the demurrer that in no part of the instrument of
concession did it appear that the privilege granted to Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas had likewise been granted
to his successors or assignees, and that therefore such rights and actions as might have appertained to
the assignee, Pardo y Cabaas, could not be conveyed to nor could they be acquired by any other person.
Terminated na daw yung right the moment na nagdisappear yung bldg.
ISSUE:
W/N THE SAID PROPERTY CAN BE attached and sold for the payment of a certain debt owed by Ricardo
Pardo y Pujol to a third person who had obtained a final judgment
RULING: NO. USUFRUCT (PARDO Y CABAAS)
The land on which the building was erected and which is referred to in the foregoing articles, contained
in the franchise granted by the Government of the former sovereignty, belongs to the municipality of
Guinobatan. Although the building was constructed at the expense and with the money of the grantee,
Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, it is, nevertheless, the property of the state or of the said municipality, and was
temporarily transferred to the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, in order that he might enjoy the usufruct of its
floor space for forty years, but on the termination of this period the said right of usufruct was to cease and
the building was to belong finally and absolutely to the state or the municipality in representation thereof.
For these reasons, then, there is no question that the building and the land on which it was erected,
since they did not belong to the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, nor do they belong to his son and heir, Ricardo
Pardo y Pujol, could not be attached or sold for the payment of a debt contracted by the latter.
The concession granted by the former Spanish Government is personal and transferable only by
inheritance, and in no manner could it be conveyed as a special personal privilege to another and a third
person unless were an hereditary successor of the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, without knowledge and
consent of the administrative authorities under whose control the special right of usufruct in the floor
space of the said market building was enjoyed and exercised.

Even though it is unquestionable that the creditor has a right to collect the money due him, out of his
debtor's property, yet when among such property is included the right of usufruct in a public-service
building and this right is closely related to a service of a public character, the right that lies in behalf of the
creditor for the collection of a debt from the person who enjoys the said special privilege of right of
usufruct in the floor space of a building intended for a public market is not absolute and may be exercised
only through the action of a court of justice with respect to the profits or revenues obtained under the
special right of usufruct granted to the debtor.
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, as the successor and heir of the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, is bound to pay his
debts and his property can be attached on petition of his creditors. However, his personal privilege of
usufruct in the floor space of the public market building of Guinobatan cannot be attached like any
ordinary right, because that would mean that a person who has contracted with the state or with the
Governmental authorities to furnish a service of a public character would be substituted, for another
person who took no part in the contract, and that the regular course of a public service would be disturbed
by the more or less legal action of the creditors of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the public
interests.
Without the consent of the proper administrative official, a grantee, or one charged with conducting a
public service such as a market of the municipality of Guinobatan, cannot be permitted to be substituted
by any other person, though this latter be a creditor of the usufructuary grantee. Hence, we hold that the
attachment of the right of usufruct in the said building and of collecting the revenue obtained from the
floor space of the said public market of Guinobatan, was illegal, because, were this right susceptible of
attachment, a third person, as a creditor or a purchaser, might exercise such right, notwithstanding his
personal status, instead of the grantee contractor. This theory does not bar the creditor from collecting the
money owed him by the grantee, inasmuch as he has the right to petition the courts to allow him through
proper legal proceedings to collect his money out of the revenues produced by the usufruct conferred by
the Government on the grantee of the said service.
The only right to which the creditor was entitled was to petition for the attachment of the income and
proceeds obtained from the use of the floor space of the market; but he did not avail himself of this right,
nor were the receipts therefrom attached, nor were they adjudicated either to the creditor or to the plaintiff
Tufexis.

G.R. No. L-3485

June 30, 1950

THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAOAY, ILOCOS NORTE, petitioner, vs. TEODORO MANAOIS and
EULOGIO F. DE GUZMAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
respondents.
FACTS:
Teodoro Manaois obtained a favorable judgment against the municipality (writ of execn). In
compliance w/ the writ, the sheriff levied upon & attached the ff properties:
(1) The amount of One thousand seven hundred twelve pesos and one centavo (P1,712.01) in
the Municipal Treasury of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, representing the rental paid by Mr.
Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the defendant municipality;
(2) About forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five different persons by the Municipality.
In 1949, the Provincial Fiscal (in behalf of mun) filed a petition asking for the dissolution of
that attachment of levy of the properties above-mentioned. - denied. MR denied. Instead of
appealing from that order the municipality of Paoay has filed the present petition for certiorari
with the writ of preliminary injunction asking that the denial be reversed. The petitioner goes on
the theory that the properties attached by the sheriff for purposes of execution are not subject to
levy because they are properties for public use.
It is therefore necessary to ascertain the nature and status back a few years, specifically, to
the year 1937.
It seems that the municipality of Paoay is and for many years has been operating or rather
leasing fishery lots on municipal waters. These waters have been parceled out in lots, either
singly or in groups and let out or rented after public bidding to the highest bidders, ordinarily, for
a year, but sometimes, for a longer period of time. On April 4, 1937, the municipality of Paoay
entered into a contract with one Francisco V. Duque for the lease of fishery lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and
8 at a rental of P1,218.79 per annum, for a period of four years from January 1, 1937 to
December 31, 1940. In 1938, the municipal council of Paoay approved a resolution confiscating
said fishery lots on the ground that Duque had failed to comply with the terms of the lease
contract.
PUBLIC BIDDING: Teodoro Manaois being the highest bidder for said lots 3 to 8, was awarded
the lease & paid rentals. However, when Manaois and his men tried to enter the property in order

to exercise his rights as lessee and to catch fish, particularly bagos fry, he found therein Duque
and his men who claimed that he (Duque) was still the lessee, and despite the appeal of Manaois
to the Municipality of Paoay to put him in possession and the efforts of the municipality to oust
Duque, the latter succeeded in continuing in his possession and keeping Manaois and his men
out.
Manaois brought an action against the Municipality of Paoay to recover not only the sum paid
by him for the lease of the fishery lots but also damages. He obtained judgment in his favor in
June, 1940 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, civil case No. 8026, which decision has
long become final. The writ of execution and the attachment and levy mentioned at the
beginning of this decision were issued and effected to enforce the judgment just mentioned.
ISSUE:
W/N SAID properties held by municipal corporation are subject to levy and execution
RULING: NO.
There can be no question that properties for public use held by municipal corporation are not
subject to levy and execution. Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by
municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated by great weight of authority as the private asset
of the town and may be levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule applies
to municipal funds derived from patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been held that shares
of stocks held by municipal corporations are subject to execution. If this is true, with more reason
should income or revenue coming from these shares of stock, in the form of interest or dividends,
be subject to execution?
The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, which had been parceled
out or divided into lots and later let out to private persons for fishing purposes at an annual
rental are clearly not subject to execution. In the first place, they do not belong to the
municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State. What the municipality of Paoay
hold is merely what may be considered the usufruct or the right to use said municipal waters,
granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Now, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of Paoay over its municipal waters, subject
to execution to enforce a judgment against the town? We are not prepared to answer this
question in the affirmative because there are powerful reasons against its propriety and legality.
In the first place, it is not a usufruct based on or derived from an inherent right of the town. It is
based merely on a grant, more or less temporary, made by the Legislature. Take the right of
fishery over the sea or marine waters bordering a certain municipality. These marine waters are
ordinarily for public use, open to navigation and fishing by the people.
All this only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right
of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be
taken away from it as its property through execution.
Another reason against subjecting this usufruct or right of fishery over municipal waters, to
execution, is that, if this were to be allowed and this right sold on execution, the buyer would
immediately step into the shoes of the judgment-debtor municipality. Such buyer presumably
buys only the right of the municipality. He does not buy the fishery itself nor the municipal
waters because that belongs to the State.
All that the buyer might do would be to let out or rent to private individuals the fishery rights
over the lots into which the municipal waters had been parceled out or divided, and that is, after
public bidding. This, he must do because that is the only right granted to the municipality by the
Legislature, a right to be exercised in the manner provided by law, namely, to rent said fishery
lots after public bidding.
But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the renting of these fishery lots is
certainly subject to execution. It may be profitable, if not necessary, to distinguish this kind of
revenue from that derived from taxes, municipal licenses and market fees are provided for and
imposed by the law, they are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of municipal corporations. In fact, the real estate taxes
collected by a municipality do not all go to it.

G.R. No. L-123

December 12, 1945

JOSEFA FABIE, petitioner, vs. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of Manila,
NGO BOO SOO and JUAN GREY, respondents.
FACTS:
Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372-376 Santo
Cristo, Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the ninth clause of the will of the
deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The owner of Santo Cristo property abovementioned is the
respondent Juan Grey, while those of the Ongpin property are other person not concern herein.