Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
SEMINARI
E CONVEGNI
Universals in
Ancient Philosophy
edited by
Riccardo Chiaradonna
Gabriele Galluzzo
Table of contents
Introduction
Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzzo
23
41
87
113
185
209
255
299
329
353
381
425
Bibliography
471
Index locorum
509
Index of names
537
According to Aristotelian cosmological theory, the sun is quite literally one of a kind. We now think of it as merely the nearest of many
similar stars. But suppose that the sun really is unique. In that case,
according to Aristotelian logical theory, the sun is the only particular that falls under the universal, sun. The same thing is true of the
moon and the cosmos itself: these are entities we might call unique
instantiations. The existence of unique instantiations may seem rather trivial. But they pose problems above and beyond those presented
by universals, like horse, which are instantiated by many particulars.
These problems were recognized already by Aristotle, by his Peripatetic followers, like Alexander of Aphrodisias, and by Neoplatonists
starting with Plotinus. Porphyry, heir to both the Neoplatonism of
Plotinus and to Aristotelian logical theory, appropriately enough discusses unique instantiations both when commenting on Plato and
when commenting on Aristotle.
From an Aristotelian point of view, one might expect the main difficulty with unique instantiation to be this: we cannot derive a universal
from only one particular. So we would never be able to get hold of a universal for something like the sun. But this is to assume that Aristotelian
epagg requires encounters with numerous instances, which is not obvious. Perhaps one can, in principle at least, grasp the universal horse
on the basis of an encounter with only one horse. If so the same should
be possible in the case of the sun1. Rather, the problem is that the whole
point of a universal is to explain similar features in more than one object. If there is only one sun, it seems otiose to posit a universal sun. A
On this process in Aristotle see Hamlyn 1976; Engberg-Pedersen 1979; Hintikka 1980. Proclus insists (at Procl., In Prm., IV, 896, 22-23) that the case of unique
instantiations is indeed a problem for Aristotles epistemology. On this see Helmig
2010, p. 44 and Helmig 2012, p. 116. The latter also touches on unique instantiations
at p. 162 and p. 327.
1
universal is, after all, a one over many not a one over one. For Aristotle, though, knowledge (epistm) is always universal, and applies to the
particular only insofar as it is subsumed under the relevant universal.
So it looks as though we have an epistemic problem after all. If there is
no universal sun, the sun will not be a possible object of knowledge.
Further problems arise for Platonists like Plotinus or Porphyry. For
them, a sensible object is an imperfect copy of a Form. As we will see,
Plotinus likes to emphasize the copys inevitably partial and imperfect
status. But a unique instantiation is a case where the sensible copy is
the only copy there is, or will ever be2. We might well believe that each
individual man is incomplete relative to the Form of Man (see for instance VI 7 [38] 2, 51-56). But why should we think that the sun is
incomplete relative to the Form of Sun? Even more perplexing is the
question of why some Forms should have a single physical copy, while
others have an indefinitely large number of copies. Why are there many men, but only one sun, one moon, one cosmos? Notice furthermore
that (on the assumption that each heavenly body has its own Form or
species) all Forms or universals have either an indefinitely large number of instantiations, or a single instantiation. There are no Forms with
just two copies, no universals which have fourteen instances; uniqueness and infinity are the only options. This too would seem to call out
for an explanation.
In what follows, then, I will look at the problem of unique instantiation in Plotinus and Porphyry. I hope to show that this issue, despite its
seemingly pedantic and technical nature, in fact proves to be surprisingly revealing in the context of these two authors. For as we will see,
unique instantiations are not really marginal, problematic cases for
Plotinus and Porphyry, even though they typically arise as exceptions
to various metaphysical and logical rules. Rather, even though Forms
or universals normally have indefinitely many instantiations, the normative case is for instantiation to be unique. Unique instantiations
thus serve as transitional entities. They are the best sensible objects,
and share some features with intelligible objects despite their physical
status. To reach this conclusion, I will first need to provide a brief overview of what Plotinus and Porphyry have to say about universals in
general. Then, I will examine in detail their treatment of unique instantiation, against the background provided by Aristotle and Alexander.
Here I simply assume that there are indeed Forms for such objects. For Neoplatonic discussions of the range of Forms, see dHoine 2011.
2
cally distinct from the white in another part (VI 4 [22] 1, 17-29)14. He
contrasts this to the way an immaterial entity, such as the soul, can be
wholly present to every part of a body (see VI 4 [22] 4, 32-34 and 8,
15-17; VI 5 [23] 6, 13-15).
This has important implications for Plotinus stance on the problem
of universals. In his most explicit engagement with the Aristotelian
doctrine of universals, VI 3 [44] 915, Plotinus contents himself with arguing that the universal, which Aristotle calls secondary substance,
would in fact be prior to its particular instances. For example grammatical knowledge as such is prior to a certain instance of grammatical
knowledge (like white, the example is of course from Arist., Cat. 2). But
Plotinus critique of Aristotle goes further than just inverting the relation of priority between so-called primary and secondary substances.
For him anything received into matter is divided up such that its unity is
destroyed. So in matter we find not immanent universals, but only images of the Form of Man, like stamps in wax made from the same seal:
From the one man according to the Form, the man in the matter made many
men, all the same, and the same thing is one in the many in a way like that in
which there is one seal-imprint in many things. But Man-in-itself, and each
thing itself [autoekaston], and the [intellegible] universe as a whole [holon to
pan] are not in many in this way, but the many are in the thing itself, or rather
around it. For there is a difference between the way in which the white is everywhere and the way in which the soul of each individual is in every part of
the body the same (Plot., Enn. VI 5 [23] 6, 7-15, trans. Armstrong, modified).
This goes hand-in-hand with Plotinus insistence that sensible substances are not truly beings (ousiai). Rather, being is said more appropriately of the intelligibles (see e.g. VI 6 [34] 13, 27-35). Plotinus
has various ways of supporting this claim, but one rationale he gives is
that sensibles are divided (both temporally and spatially) whereas nous
is entirely present to itself. When a Form is reflected in the sensible
realm, the result is no longer a true whole, since the parts of the universe
are separated from one another (VI 6 [34] 7, 1-4). And Plotinus cautions us against supposing that the parts scattered through a sensible
thing can just be identified with the whole which has been so divided:
Compare the discussion of the whiteness in milk at Plot., Enn. IV 3 [27] 2, 1519. On the example see Chiaradonna 2011a, p. 128.
15
On which see Chiaradonna 2004.
14
For both our authors, the opposition between sensible objects and
Forms or universals is of course an opposition of many and one.
Plotinus stresses that Forms are instantiated by copies that are divided
from one another, as well as divided in themselves because they are
extended, bodily things. (On both counts, even soul achieves a kind of
unity impossible for sensible objects: all particular souls are in a way
unified with one another, in addition to being immaterial.) Porphyry
in turn stresses that universals are drawn from, and apply to, many
sensible objects. Indeed this is how he normally defines the universal. In the Categories commentary (75, 9-11), he explains that man is
universal because it is said of a particular man as of a subject, and is
not something particular or individual [ ], but is
said of many things that differ in number22. Conversely, the individual and particular always divides the one into the many (
, Isag. 6, 20-21, my
emphasis). Already we can see how unique instantiations might pose
a puzzle for Plotinian and Porphyrian metaphysics. But to appreciate
the puzzle more fully, we will first need to turn as promised to Aristotle
and Alexander.
Aristotle and Alexander on unique instantiation
To my knowledge, the first ancient author who explicitly draws attention to unique instantiation is Aristotle (even though, as we will
see, there are relevant passages already in Plato). He does so in Met.
Z 15, in the context of his polemic against Platos Forms. The polemic
exploits the fact that Forms cannot comfortably be construed as either universal or particular. On the one hand, each Form is meant to
be a one over many, like one of Aristotles universals. On the other
hand, Forms can plausibly be presented as super-particulars. Thus at
Met., Z 14, 1039a30-31, Aristotle describes the Form of man as a thissomething which is separate ( ). Then, in
(more knowable), but that doesnt make them primary in respect of how things really are (en tois pragmasi).
22
In his translation of the commentary Steven Strange points out that Porphyry is
here following Arist., Int., 7, 17a39-40, where the universal is defined as that which
is by nature such as to be predicated of several things. See Strange 1992, p. 58 note
94.
may seem to contradict the position of I.3, we could try to bring the
views together as follows. Alexander is putting forth a realist position
according to which there are eternal natures in the world28. The natures are in themselves suitable for being instantiated by many things,
as Aristotle holds in Z 15 regarding the nature of the sun. But if there
is only one instantiation of the nature, we might hesitate to call that
nature common, or a genus29. Simplicius, however, took Alexander to be saying that the common (koinon) is actually dependent on
the individual (atomon) but not vice-versa as shown by the cases of
sun, moon, and universe, where there is an individual but no common
thing. Simplicius criticizes this, arguing that it is only because of some
chance (di alln suntuchian) that matter turned out to instantiate the
common thing only once; but the logos itself is suitable (pareskeusamenos) to be given to many things (In Cat., 85, 13-17). As we will now
see, Plotinus and Porphyry likewise emphasized the role of matter in
determining whether there are one or more instantiations of a Form
or universal.
Plotinus on unique instantiation
If we look at the passages from Aristotle, Alexander, and Simplicius,
we will see that two sorts of examples are given to illustrate unique
instantiation. First, we have actual, cosmological examples, namely the
sun, moon and cosmos presumably other heavenly bodies would also
qualify but these are rarely if ever mentioned in this context. Second,
counterfactual examples of things in the sublunary world, where we
suppose for the sake of argument that there is only one man, as Alexander does. In contemplating the prospect of there being only one man,
we are entertaining an impossible situation much like imagining that
there is more than one sun30. An examination of actual cases of unique
I find very persuasive the comments to this effect at Rashed 2007, p. 259.
At Alex. Aphr., In Top., 355, 18-24, Alexander similarly remarks that a genus is
removed qua genus if only one member remains. Barnes 2003, p. 102 remarks: this
seems footling, or worse and speculates that it would force Alexander to say that sun
is an individual predicate rather than a species.
30
One might object that this is not actually impossible, since all that an Aristotelian
would be committed to is that every species is instantiated at all times one human
would be enough. But since humans are mortal, and it takes two humans to reproduce,
28
29
the cosmos and heavenly bodies would also explain their uniqueness.
Admittedly, the two issues do not coincide completely. For instance,
Plotinus considers whether the cosmos might be eternal because there
is nothing outside it that could destroy it (II 1 [40] 1, 12-21). This, of
course, would presuppose the uniqueness of the cosmos and use this to
argue for its eternity. But in fact Plotinus rejects this solution anyway:
it bears only on the whole of the cosmos and not its parts, that is,
the heavenly bodies, and it would not prove numerical as opposed to
formal persistence.
Plotinus preferred solution is twofold (II 1 [40] 4, 6-11). First, the
heavens are made of a pure kind of matter (better versions of the same
elements found in the sublunary realm). Second, this matter is completely dominated or mastered by its forming principles, and in particular soul. Here in the sublunary realm, things are different:
Since this sort of soul [i.e. the one operative in the sublunary world] imitates
the celestial soul but lacks power (because it uses worse bodies for its making
and is in a worse place while the elements that it has received for composition
are not willing to persist), the living things down here are not able to persist
forever, and the sublunar bodies are not mastered in the same way they would
be if another soul ruled over them directly (Plot., Enn. II 1 [40] 5, 8-14, trans.
Wilberding, modified).
35
Starting with the Aristotelian context, we have already seen that Porphyry routinely defines such items as species and genus by saying that they are predicated of many things. Like Alexander, he thus
needs to say something about the cases where a universal has only one
instance. He allows the questioner to wonder about it in the extant
Categories commentary:
Q. You earlier defined the differentia as something that is predicated of several
species [ ]. Did you intend this claim to hold [always]42?
A. No, only for the most part [ ]. Sometimes there are the same
number of differentiae as there are species, for instance lightness and heaviness, the former belonging only to fire, the latter only to earth43.
Q. You also gave the species as predicated of several enumerable things
[ ]. Does this hold in general?
A. No, only for the most part. The bird species phoenix is not said to belong
to several things differing in number, if indeed only one phoenix ever comes
to be. If it is said of several things, they differ by succession, not in number [
,
, ,
] (Porph., In Cat., 82, 29-34, trans. Strange, modified).
Still, Porphyry could maintain, with Aristotle, that even in the rare
cases where there is only one species for a given differentia, or one
individual for a given species, the differentia and species are in themselves predicable of many. Indeed, there is evidence that Porphyry was
more inclined than Alexander to think of universals as indifferent to
the number of individuals instantiating them. In an interesting report
from Ammonius, Porphyry is said to have held that a universal would
be unaffected even if there were no instantiations of it although this
is applied to the case of a genus surviving in the case where all the species are eliminated44. Ammonius adds that Porphyry doubtless had in
mind intelligible genera and species, not those in the many. Even
more on point is a passage in Simplicius, which mentions the cases of
the sun, moon, and phoenix (In Cat., 55, 29 ff.). Like the questioner in
Porphyrys commentary, he then wonders how the existence of these
individual instantiations is compatible with the definition of species as
predicated of many.
In answering, Simplicius differentiates between the sun and moon
case and the phoenix case. The phoenix is easier to deal with: there
are many phoenixes, its just that they exist one at a time and successively, rather than at the same time like men or horses. But Simplicius
seems doubtful whether there are any phoenixes anyway, saying noncommittally that they tell of a bird called phoenix ( ,
, 55, 31). Notice that Porphyry similarly brought up
the phoenix case without committing to its reality: if indeed [ei ge]
only one phoenix ever comes to be (In Cat., 82, 36-37). I suspect that
for both Porphyry and Simplicius the phoenix case actually falls into
the same class as the case where we imagine only one man existing. It
is a thought-provoking counterfactual situation, but has no bearing
on our metaphysics, since there are no phoenixes. Even if there were,
of course, phoenixes would not have the same status as the sun, moon
and cosmos, since they would not be eternal. But I think it is worth
emphasizing that in fact there are no successive unique instantiations,
only eternal ones because for Porphyry, as for Plotinus, the unique
instantiations that actually exist have the important role of mediating
between the intelligible and the sensible.
Simplicius alludes to this in the passage we have just been examin Ammon., In Cat., 41, 7-8. Oddly he cites the Isagoge for this claim, even though
Porphyry does not seem to say this in the Isagoge as noted by Barnes 2003, p. 259
note 9.
44
ing. He says first that the issue of (eternal) unique instantiation arises
only for allocated, not for unallocated universals. As we have seen this
is Porphyrian language, and the passage may even draw on Porphyrys
lost commentary on the Categories to Gedalius (which of course is a
major source for Simplicius commentary). If so, Porphyry used his
distinction in explaining how a nature remains predicable of many
even when it is in fact predicated only of one thing. Sun, for instance,
is in itself predicable of many objects, but as allocated (katatetagmenon) it is predicated only of one object, the sun. That would raise the
question of the metaphysical status of the unallocated natures, which
later Neoplatonists assimilated to intelligible Forms. But it is not clear
whether Porphyry assigned any particular metaphysical status to unallocated natures. In any case, Simplicius concludes our passage by adding that the universals which have been allocated only to one object,
like sun and moon, seem to be intermediary between individuals
and forms in the proper sense of the term: they surpass individuals by
virtue of their monadic nature, but are inferior to Forms properly so
called by the fact that they have come to be within matter45.
Here Simplicius makes explicit the transitional or mediating status
of the unique instantiations. Weve already seen that Plotinus granted
them this status. That Porphyry did so as well emerges from the last
passage Id like to examine, a testimony found in Proclus commentary
on the Timaeus46. The context is the passage in Plato which is most
directly relevant to the issue of unique instantiation: Ti. 31a. Here Timaeus raises the question of whether one should posit a single cosmos
(or heaven: ouranos) or indefinitely many ( )47,
and answers by saying a single one, if it is to be made by the Demiurge
in accordance with the paradigm (,
, 31a3-4). But isnt everything made in accordance with a Form? Why then should the cosmos be unique, whereas
man for example is not?
Proclus initial suggestion for solving the aporia is that the paradigm
,
,
(Simpl., In Cat., 56, 4-6, trans. Chase).
46
The passage is included in Runia, Share 2008.
47
I take Plato to be presenting only two options, but Proclus (Procl., In Ti., I, 437,
32-438, 1), following Porphyry and Iamblichus, thinks there are three: one cosmos,
many cosmoi, or an indefinite number.
45
many [perishable things] participated the same logos, and there was just one
[of them], the species [to eidos] would cease to exist once that [individual]
perished; and the cosmos must always be an aggregate of all the species [
] (Procl., In Ti., I, 440, 9-15,
trans. Share, modified).
Here Porphyry makes an unprecedented move. As we saw, Plotinus implied a close connection between uniqueness and eternity, and
seemed to explain both by appealing to the same factors. But Porphyry
begins from the eternity of the sun and moon, and argues on this basis towards their uniqueness51. Like Aristotle and Alexander, he assumes the need for every species to be instantiated at all times. Because
the sun is eternal, it can satisfy this requirement all by itself, whereas
things like men that are generated and destroyed can preserve the species only collectively. Notice that the passage is in some tension with
Ammonius claim that Porphyry thought universals survive whether
or not they are instantiated. For here, he says explicitly that the species would not survive the destruction of its only member. Porphyry
seems to have brought us full circle here, back to a concern we find in
Aristotelian logical works: the preservation of species via their eternal
exemplification.
Also striking especially when reading Porphyry in the context of a
commentary by Proclus is his relatively mundane account of unique
instantiation. He appeals not to the nature of the intelligible realm, but
to such factors as the amount of matter available to form each individual, and the requirement that the cosmos contain all forms immanently, that is, as instantiated in matter. This is in stark contrast to the way
Iamblichus responds to the same problem. He thinks Porphyrys solution is a failure, apparently because by assuming the eternity of the sun
and moon Porphyry has begged the question, effectively smuggling in
their monadic nature. Instead, Iamblichus proposes that some intelligible Forms delight in sameness while others prefer motion and
otherness. The former produce unique instantiations like the sun, the
latter plural instantiations like man (Procl., In Ti., I, 440, 23-26). This
account is very much to Proclus taste (
, I 440, 26-27), but he thinks it needs further supple This strategy is the reverse of the one we saw Plotinus toying with at Plot., Enn.
II 1 [40] 1: explain the eternity of the cosmos by saying there is nothing outside it
which could destroy it.
51
For instance Barnes 2003, p. 102: Why the universe must always contain examples of all species is no doubt a theological question. But the theology does not
raise any logical problems. For a critique of this tendency in Barnes commentary see
Chiaradonna 2008.
53
Compare the recent discussion of nature as a transitional hypostasis in Martijn 2010, p. 30.
52
Bibliography
472 Bibliography
Andrenacci, Palpacelli 2003: E. Andrenacci, L. Palpacelli, Una possible soluzione del rebus di Metafisica, I 10, 1058b26-29, Rivista di
filosofia neoscolastica, 45, 2003, pp. 615-25.
Annas 1974: J. Annas, Individuals in Aristotles Categories: Two Queries,
Phronesis, 19, 1974, pp. 146-52.
Anscombe 1953: G.E.M. Anscombe, The Principle of Individuation,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 27, 1953, pp.
83-96.
Armstrong 1978a: D.M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism.
Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press 1978.
Armstrong 1978b: D.M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism.
Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press 1978.
Armstrong 1989: D.M. Armstrong, Universals. An Opinionated
Introduction, Boulder (CO), Westview Press 1989.
Armstrong 1997: D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Asmis 1984: E. Asmis, Epicurus Scientific Method, Ithaca (NY)-London,
Cornell University Press 1984.
Aubenque 1962: P. Aubenque, Le problme de ltre chez Aristote, Paris,
PUF 1962.
Auffret 2011: Th. Auffret, Aristote, Mtaphysique 1-2: Un texte
minemment platonicien?, Elenchos, 22, 2011, pp. 263-85.
Ayres 2002: L. Ayres, Not Three People: The Fundamental Themes of
Gregory of Nyssas Trinitarian Theology as Seen in To Ablabius: On
Not Three Gods, Modern Theology, 18, 2002, pp. 44574.
Baltes, Lakmann 2005: M. Baltes, M.-L. Lakmann, Idea (dottrina delle
idee), in Eidos-Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica, a
cura di F. Fronterotta e W. Leszl, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag
2005, pp. 1-23.
Barnes 1979: J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, London, Routledge
1979.
Barnes 1984: The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford
Translation, ed. by J. Barnes, 2 vols., Princeton (NJ), Princeton
University Press 1984.
473 Bibliography
474 Bibliography
475 Bibliography
476 Bibliography
477 Bibliography
478 Bibliography
479 Bibliography
480 Bibliography
Dalmais 1952: I.-H. Dalmais, La thorie des logoi des cratures chez
saint Maxime le Confesseur, Revue des sciences philosophiques et
thologiques, 36, 1952, pp. 2449.
Dancy 1975: R.M. Dancy, On Some of Aristotles First Thoughts about
Substances, The Philosophical Review, 84, 1975, pp. 338-73.
Dancy 1978: R. Dancy, On Some of Aristotles Second Thoughts about
Substances, The Philosophical Review, 87, 1978, pp. 372-413.
Dancy 2004: R.M. Dancy, Platos Introduction of Forms, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press 2004.
Danilou 1953: J. Danilou, Akolouthia chez Grgoire de Nysse, Revue
des sciences religieuses, 27, 1953, pp. 219-49.
Decleva Caizzi 1996: F. Decleva Caizzi, Lo sfondo ontologico
dellEutidemo di Platone, in Odoi dizesios. Le vie della ricerca. Studi
in onore di Francesco Adorno, a cura di M.S. Funghi, Firenze, Olschki
1996, pp. 161-7.
Decleva Caizzi 1999: F. Decleva Caizzi, Prodicus 3T (?), in Corpus dei
papiri filosofici greci e latini (CPF) I***, Firenze, Olschki 1999, pp.
656-62.
de Haas, Fleet 2001: Simplicius: On Aristotles Categories 5-6, trans.
and notes by F.A.J. de Haas and B. Fleet, London-Ithaca (NY),
Duckworth-Cornell University Press 2001.
Deichgrber 1930: K. Deichgrber, Die griechische Empirikerschule.
Sammlung der Fragmente und Darstellung der Lehre, Berlin,
Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1930.
Deichgrber 1957: K. Deichgrber, Galen als Erforscher des menschlichen Pulses: ein Beitrag zur Selbstdarstellung des Wissenschaftlers (De
dignotione pulsuum I 1), Sitzungsberichte der Deutschen Akademie
der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Klasse fr Sprachen, Literatur und
Kunst, 3, 1957.
De Libera 1996: A. De Libera, La querelle des universaux de Platon la fin
du Moyen ge, Paris, Seuil 1996.
De Libera 1999: A. De Libera, Entre Aristote et Plotin: lIsagoge de
Porphyre et le problme des catgories, in Mtaphysiques mdivales:
tudes en honneur dAndr de Muralt, d. par C. Chiesa et L. Freuler,
Facult de Thologie Lausanne, Geneva-Lausanne-Nechtel, 1999,
pp. 7-27.
481 Bibliography
482 Bibliography
483 Bibliography
484 Bibliography
485 Bibliography
486 Bibliography
487 Bibliography
488 Bibliography
489 Bibliography
490 Bibliography
491 Bibliography
492 Bibliography
493 Bibliography
494 Bibliography
495 Bibliography
496 Bibliography
497 Bibliography
Owen 1966a: G.E.L. Owen, Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present,
in G.E.L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in
Greek Philosophy, London-New York, Duckworth 1986, pp. 2744.
Owen 1966b: G.E.L. Owen, The Platonism of Aristotle, Proceedings of the
British Academy, 51, 1966, pp. 125-50 (repr. in G.E.L. Owen, Logic,
Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, LondonNew York, Duckworth 1986, pp. 200-20).
Owen 1968: G.E.L. Owen, Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of Forms,
in G.E.L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in
Greek Philosophy, London-New York, Duckworth 1986, pp. 22138.
Owen 1978-9: G.E.L. Owen, Particular and General, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, n.s. 79, 1978-79, pp. 1-21.
Pacius 1597: Aristotelis Stagiritae Peripateticorum Principis Organum, ed.
I. Pacius, Francofurti 15972.
Page 1985: C. Page, Predicating Forms of Matter in Aristotles Metaphysics,
Review of Metaphysics, 39, 1985, pp. 57-82.
Palmer 2007: J. Palmer, review of S.C. Rickless, Platos Forms in
Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press 2007, Notre Dame Philosophical Review,
20.11.2007
<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23258-plato-s-forms-intransition-a-reading-of-the-parmenides/> (May 2013; last accessed
September 2013).
Paparazzo 2011: E. Paparazzo, Why Five Worlds? Platos Timaeus 55CD, Apeiron, 44, 2011, pp. 147-62.
Parenti 1994: A. Parenti, Su alcuni composti greci con -, in Studi in
onore di Carlo Alberto Mastrelli, a cura di G. Del Lungo Camiciotti, F.
Granucci, M.P. Marchese e R. Stefanelli, Padova, Edizione Unipress
1994, pp. 187200.
Parry 1979: R.D. Parry, The Unique World of the Timaeus, Journal of
the History of Philosophy, 17, 1979, pp. 1-10.
Parry 1991: R.D. Parry, The Intelligible World-Animal in Platos Timaeus,
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29, 1991, pp. 13-32.
Patterson 1981: R. Patterson, The Unique Worlds of the Timaeus,
Phoenix, 35, 1981, pp. 105-19.
Penner 1987: T. Penner, The Ascent from Nominalism. Some Existence
Arguments in Platos Middle Dialogues, Dordrecht, Reidel 1987.
498 Bibliography
Perrin 1984: Plutarchs Lives. Vol. 3: Pericles and Fabius Maximus, Nicias
and Crassus, ed. with trans. and notes by B. Perrin, Cambridge (MA),
Harvard University Press 1984.
Pradeau 2005: J.-F. Pradeau, Le forme e le realt intelligibili. Luso platonico del termine EIDOS, in Eidos-Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica, a cura di F. Fronterotta e W. Leszl, Sankt Augustin,
Academia Verlag 2005, pp. 75-89.
Prior 1985: W.J. Prior, Unity and Development in Platos Metaphysics,
London-Sydney, Croom Helm 1985.
Quine 1948: W.V.O. Quine, On What There Is, Review of Metaphysics,
2, 1948, pp. 21-38 (repr. in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of
View, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press 1953).
Quine 1960: W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge (MA), MIT
Press 1960.
Quine 1987: W.V.O. Quine, Quiddities: An Intermittent Philosophical
Dictionary, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press 1987.
Rashed 2004: M. Rashed, Priorit de l ou du entre Andronicos
et Alexandre. Vestiges arabes et grecs indits, Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy, 14, 2004, pp. 9-63.
Rashed 2005: Aristote: De la gnration et la corruption, d. par M. Rashed
etc., Paris, Les Belles Lettres 2005.
Rashed 2007: M. Rashed, Essentialisme: Alexandre dAphrodise entre
logique, physique et cosmologie, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter 2007.
Rashed 2011: M. Rashed, Alexandre dAphrodise. Commentaire perdu
la Physique dAristote (Livres IV- VIII): les scholies byzantines, BerlinNew York, De Gruyter 2011.
Rashed 2013a: M. Rashed, Boethus Aristotelian Ontology, in Plato,
Aristotle and Pythagoras in the first century BC, ed. by M. Schofield,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp. 53-77.
Rashed 2013b: M. Rashed, Platon et les mathmatiques, in Lectures de
Platon, d par A. Castel-Bouchouchi, M. Dixsaut et G. Kevorkian,
Paris, Ellipses, pp. 215-31.
Raven 1923: Ch.E. Raven, Apollinarianism. An Essay on the Christology
of the Early Church, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1923.
Regis 1976: E. Regis, Aristotles Principle of Individuation, Phronesis,
21, 1976, pp. 157-66.
499 Bibliography
500 Bibliography
501 Bibliography
502 Bibliography
503 Bibliography
504 Bibliography
505 Bibliography
506 Bibliography
507 Bibliography