PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

JACOB QUITORIO, accused-appellants

FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with rape with homicide in an amended information filed on 16 April 1993 (and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 129) before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial Region, sitting in Dolores, Eastern
Samar. The accusatory portion thereof read as follows:
On September 6, 1992 at about 12:00 oclock midnight in Poblacion Dolores, E. Samar and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused unlawfully conspired and helped one another and by means of force and
intimidation have [sic] carnal knowledge with one Elena Dacutanan y Gabane and with the use of deadly weapons
inflicted injuries upon said victim which caused the death of the latter.
Contrary to law.

On September 6, 1992, Elena Gabane, a singer-guitarist of the United Pentecostal Church of Dolores, Eastern Samar, told the family of Benjamin Donsal, a brother
pastor with whom Gabane had been staying, that she was going home later that night to Cadayao, Jiabong, Samar. She was supposed to ride the Roureyjay bus bound
for Catbalogan which normally leaves at midnight.
At about midnight, Yolanda Caspe was on her way home from the house of her friend Tilde, where they were having a drink. At the corner of Tegio St. and the
provincial road, she saw three male persons carrying or dragging a woman with long hair and wearing a white jacket and short skirt. She was not able to see the face of
the woman who was partly covered but she was able to recognize the three men. The area was well lighted by the fluorescent lamp in the street and by the
moonlight. Pacificador Campomanes was holding the woman by her left armpit while Jacob Quitorio was supporting her by her right armpit. Jason Pomida was
destroying the wire fence of the school. Upon seeing her, Campomanes beckoned to her. Afraid, Caspe ran way using a different route to her house. morning of 7
September 1992, the police found, within the premises of the Dolores Elementary School, the corpse of a woman who was later identified as Elena Gabane, the victim;
The following morning, a woman, who turned out to be Elena Gabane, was found dead in the grounds of the Dolores Elementary
School. She was raped and her body bore several fatal stab wounds. Caspe was able to identify the body of the victim as the same
woman she saw the night before in the company of the appellants because of her long hair and attire. She easily identified the
appellants in a line-up of ten men. Victim suffered 8 stab wounds
At the arraignment, each accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses for its evidence in chief: Benjamin Dongsal, Yolanda Caspe, Dr. Yolanda N.
Bacsal of the Dolores Community Hospital, Gil Sobremonte of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Dolores, Eastern Samar, and
Rodrigo Gabane; while PNP Investigator Albert Donceras testified on rebuttal.
On their part, accused-appellants took the witness stand and each raised the defenses of denial and alibi. To corroborate their alibi,
the following were presented: Gregorio Bantilan, for accused-appellant Jayson Pomida; Basilio Pomarejo, for accused-appellant
Pacificador Campomanes; and Lito Librella, for accused-appellant Jacob Quitorio.
Accused-appellants likewise presented Romeo Campomanes, then Chief of Police of Dolores, Eastern Samar and the brother of
accused-appellant Pacificador Campomanes, Matilde Cardona, Mrs. Patricia Almazan, Artemio Almasan and Engineer Agrifino Senubio.
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the prosecutions evidence, and finding that the People established
accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, promulgated its decision on 14 July 1994, decreeing as follows:
Accordingly, this court do hereby sentence accused Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida each to Two [terms of] Reclusion
Perpetua and each to an additional imprisonment [term] of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
If reclusion perpetua (though not synonimous [sic] [with] but distinct from life imprisonment and an [being] indivisible penalty) is to be computed at thirty
(30) years, then the total penalty for each of the two accused, Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida would be as it is hereby ordered to be seventy (70) years as
minimum to seventy-seven (77) years and four (4) months, as maximum. The third accused, Pacificador Campomanes, who at the time of the commission of
the crime was only 16 years, 9 months and 9 days having been born only on November 27, 1975, as evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth found on page
327 and Certification found on page 49 of the records, is a Youthful Offender.
Considering therefore his age of about 17 years only at the time of the commission of the crime, he shall be entitled to a penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law.
The law provides that: When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. (Last par. of Art. 335, Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 2638, approved June 18, 1960, and RA 411, approved June 20, 1964).
in the case of People vs. Narit, G.R. No. 77087, May 23, 1991:
The Supreme Court considered the death penalty as no longer impossible in consonance with the provision of Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, hence,
the death sentence imposed on the accused-appellant has been automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua.
As a consequence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua which should have been imposed on the third accused,
Pacificador Campomanes, is hereby reduced to one degree lower pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code. That is, to reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day to 10 years.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the accused Pacificador Campomanes for one count and that is for himself alone is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
But having conspired with the other two accused, Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida in raping and killing the victim Elena Gabane, he is further sentence[d] to two
more [terms of] 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The total penalty therefore of accused Pacificador Campomanes is thirty (30) years, as minimum to fifty-two (52) years, as maximum.
This court further orders the three accused herein to indemnify joint and several [sic] the heirs of the victim Elena Gabane, the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages for
the death of the said victim; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00, as exemplary damages; P7,100.00 also representing the total actual expenses in connection with
the death of the victim Elena Gabane; and to pay the cost [sic], also joint and several [sic], without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency .
. In criminal cases, trial judges must strictly observe Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Second, the trial court erroneously ruled that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was to be computecd at thirty (30) years, and that accused-appellants Jacob Quitorio and Jason Pomida, each sentenced to teo terms of reclusion
perpetua and to an additional penalty of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, should each serve a total
of 70 years as minimum to 77 years and 4 months as maximum. Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of reclusion perpetua is a from 20 years and 1
day to 40 years. The thirty-year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of sentence under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. Third,
assuming that the trial court was correct in holding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, for which reason eacch accused was liable for three

offenses, viz: that committed bu him and those committed by each of his two-accused, then the penalty of accused-appellants Jacob Quitorio and Jason Pomida should
each be reclusion perpetua for that committed by Pacificador Campomanes, and not the penalty imposed on the latter for the crime he committed since his reduced
penalty was due to the mitigating circumstances of minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Mitigating circumstances are personal to an accused in
whose favor they are determined to exist and cannot be enjoyed by his co-conspirators or co-accused. Fourth, while the trial court was correct in ruling that the
prescribed penalty for rape was death, but that could not, however, be imposed in view of the prohibition in Section 19(1) of Article III of the Constitution, the RTC
nevertheless erred in reasoning that the prescribed penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua, hence, the penalty next lower in degree was reclusion temporal. In People
v. Muoz, we ruled that the constitutional prohibition did not alter the periods for the penalty for murder for purposes of determining the proper imposable penalty, i.e.,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was merely to consider the death penalty automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua. The same thing may be said as
regards rape with homicide. The penalty of death provided under the governing law then was deemed reduced to reclusion perpetua; however, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death was still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty of accused Campomanes should have beenreclusion perpetua. In any event, this matter has been rendered moot by the passage of R.A. No. 7659,
entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for the Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws,
and For Other Purposes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 129 of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court, Eighth Judicial Region, sitting in Dolores, Eastern
Samar, is hereby REVERSED on ground of reasonable doubt, and accused-appellants JACOB QUITORIO and JAYSON POMIDA are hereby ACQUITTED and their
immediate release from detention is ORDERED, unless their further detention is warranted for any other lawful cause.

PEOPLE Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.

On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape3 committed against AAA,4 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing
the death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral
damages. The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAAs father filed a
complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at
Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.6 The Information7 dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologos house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAAs cousin]
followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAAs] shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her
back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe
pain inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed appellants dastardly act. Horrified, [AAAs cousin] instinctively rushed to
the house of [AAAs] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still
very young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAAs cousin]
approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any further question and just accompanied
her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she
felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came to their house and told [AAAs] mother again that appellant
had earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAAs mother], however did not say anything. At that time, [AAAs] father was working in Manila. On
the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doa Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAAs] parents, because
sometimes they go to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his
mother worked as an agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings
and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is
from barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Doa Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be
an agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when they
transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine
was at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he would usually play basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doa Tomasa
about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting
other girls ... and was most surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the latters place which is more than half kilometer to their
house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder
under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the docile cooperation of [AAAs] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAAs]
rape charge against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and
two (2) months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of

Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally
got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have the child examine to prove
he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAAs] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA mothers] father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced
it is not the lending of money by his father to the AAAs family as the motive for the latter to file the rape case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.

Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,13 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated
September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court," the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was docketed as CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction
pronounced by the trial court. We quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim,
[AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.

However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CAs conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be
deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) 33 of
the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years
of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the
exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing
the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several
cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age. 34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed,
but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the
penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in
accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code 46 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law.47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and
transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this
Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this
said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was
below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the
time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment,
then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or
by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be
a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics
supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the
maximum age of 21, thus:

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with
the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program,
the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the
application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order
of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the
penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00
andP30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case
shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners, VS PEOPLE

On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder
through the following information, to wit:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Boga, Municipality of Castilla, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, armed with handguns,
attack, assault and shot one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious
wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona
(Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia).
Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in
Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva),
a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of Desders house, she heard thundering steps as if people were running and then two successive gunshots; that
she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, thats enough!; that while aiding
Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and
simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito
Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead. [5]
The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon
drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners had been implicated
only because of their being employed by their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.
As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby
sentences each of the accused to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand ( P50,000.00)
Pesos, Philippines currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the
amount of P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the cost.
Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate release from
the provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of other lawful cause or causes.
Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in the service of their sentence.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer
the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P30,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal
and of the Civil Damages
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying
circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC. [26] But reclusion
perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreals minority
at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counteraffidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of age.[27] Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the
time of his arrest on May 18, 1994.[28]Thirdly, Villafes affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident. [29] Fourthly, as
RTCs minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999showed,[30] Monreal was 22 years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,[31] which meant that he
was not over 18 years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at the time of the incident. [32]

The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,[33] viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of
a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the childs birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the
child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of
the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a
summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the
appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine
the age of the child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the
age of the child in conflict with the law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, [34] when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is
imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum
period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision
mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreals
detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, [35] the revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate
release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor
offenders through programs and services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their development,
are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the
time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or
other applicable laws.
Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs of Llona. Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission of the crime
stands,[36] despite the reduction of Monreals penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA granted
onlyP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity and moral damages
should each be raised to P75,000.00 to accord with prevailing case law;[37] and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the attendance of treachery should be
further awarded.
People v. Catubig,[39] to wit:
The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.
The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following
modifications:
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;
(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty
imposed on him, unless he is being held for other lawful causes; and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger L. Llona P75,000.00 as death indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service.
The Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on this decision within five days from service.
SO ORDERED.