Vicky Moster Case

1
VICKY MOSTER,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 167461

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
February 19, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the Decision [1] dated October 29, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27595, affirming with modification the
Decision[2] datedAugust 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan City, Branch 124. The Court of Appeals found petitioner Vicky
L. Moster guilty on two counts for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg.
22),[3] otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. She was sentenced to pay,
in addition to the fines imposed with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, P273,345, representing the two unpaid checks subject of this
case. Also assailed is the Resolution [4] dated March 16, 2005 of the appellate
court denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the findings of the trial and appellate
courts, are as follows:
According to complainant Adriana Presas, who is engaged in the
rediscounting business, on or about August 1995, petitioner obtained from her a
loan ofP450,000, for which the petitioner issued as payment three
postdated PhilBank checks, as follows:
Check No. 026137 dated October 31, 1995 amounting to
P94,257.00;
Check No. 026138 dated October 31, 1995 amounting to P188,514.00;
Check No. 026124 dated December 31, 1995 amounting to P84,831.00.
[5]
The three checks were all payable to cash. Presas testified she did not
deposit the checks on their due dates upon petitioners request and assurance that
they would be replaced with cash. When she could not wait any
longer, Presas deposited Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 in her Westmont Bank
account, sometime in January 1996 and March 1996, respectively, only to be
notified later that the checks were dishonored because the account had been
closed. Presas said she did not deposit Check No. 026137 after she agreed to
petitioners request to withhold its deposit as it had not yet been funded. After
receiving notice that Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 had been
dishonored, Presas immediately informed petitioner thereof and demanded
payment for the value of the checks. This demand, however, went unheeded.
In a letter dated January 14, 1997, Presas through counsel, demanded
from petitioner the settlement of P367,602, representing the total value of the
three checks, within five days from receipt. Petitioner, however, did not
comply. Thus, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 178240, 178241 and 178242, were filed against petitioner in
Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Caloocan City. The Informations were
similarly worded except with respect to the check numbers, the dates and
amounts of the checks,[6] as follows:
That sometime in the month of August 1995
in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and
issue Check No. 026138 drawn against PHILBANK in the amount
of P188,514.00 dated October 31, 1995 to apply for value in
favor of ADRIANA PRESAS well knowing at the time of issue that
she has no sufficient fund in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check was subsequently dishonored for the reason ACCOUNT
CLOSED and with intent to defraud, failed and still fails to pay
the said complainant the amount of P188,514.00 despite receipt
of notice from the drawee bank that said check has been
dishonored and had not been paid.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, Alfredo S. Daza, Branch Manager of PhilBank, identified the
three subject checks as PhilBank checks drawn against the account of
petitioner. He also testified that only Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 were
presented to the bank for clearing, and that these were dishonored for the
reason Account Closed. Dazashowed a certified true copy of a computer
printout, showing that petitioners account under Account Number 1053-0463-2
had a temporary overdraft or negative balance of P3,301.04 as of November 22,
2
1995, for which reason the account was closed. Daza explained that issuing a
check without sufficient funds was against bank policy, and when an account
holder issues an unfunded check, the bank has the prerogative to close the
account.
Petitioner, for her part, testified that sometime in August 1994, she got
from Presas, by way of checks rediscounting, her first loan for P60,000, secured
by her Isuzu vehicle. After obtaining additional loan, her total loan amounted
to P150,000, but because of the interest, it ballooned to P375,345. According to
petitioner, the three PhilBank checks she issued were the payment for the
aforementioned loan. After Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 bounced, she
replaced them with Asiatrust Bank Check No. 0446323 dated February 8,
1996 for P273,345, the value of the two bounced checks. Presas did
not encash the first check, Check No. 026137. When she tried to retrieve the
initial three subject checks, Presas refused, claiming petitioner still owed
interest.
SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC affirmed in toto the MeTCs decision and subsequently denied
the motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the RTCs decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the assailed decision of the
RTC with the modification that the accused-petitioner is
ordered to pay, in addition to the fines imposed, the
amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Three Thousand, Three
Hundred Forty-Five Pesos (P273,345.00), representing
the value of the two PhilBank Checks that are yet unpaid,
with interest thereon at 12% per annum from February 1996
until the amount is fully paid, and to pay the cost of these suits.
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)
On December 27, 2000, the MeTC rendered its decision, convicting petitioner as
follows:
One of the essential elements of the offense of violation
of the Anti-Bouncing Check Law is that upon its presentment, the
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit. As admittedly, PhilBank Check
No. 026137 in the amount of P94,257.00 dated Oct. 31, 1995
was not presented to the drawee bank and therefore could not
have been dishonored for insufficiency of fund or credit, the
crime of issuing a bum check of which the accused is charged
in Crim. Case No. 178241 does not exist and accused
VickyMoster y Libarnes is hereby [a]cquitted of the charge.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, upon a careful consideration of the
foregoing evidence, the Court finds the same to be sufficient to
support a conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of violation of B.P. [Blg.] 22 on two counts and
hereby sentences accused Vicky Moster Y Libarnes to pay a fine
of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in Crim. Case
No. 178240 and a fine of eighty-five thousand pesos
(P85,000.00) in Crim. Case No. 178242, with subsidiary
imprisonment in both cases in case of insolvency.
Accused is further ordered to pay complainant
Adriana Presas the amount of three hundred sixty-seven thousand
six hundred two pesos (P367,602.00) representing the value of
the three PhilBank [c]hecks that are yet unpaid with
interest thereon at 12% per annum from February, 1996 until the
amount is fully paid and to pay the cost of these suits.
Petitioner sought reconsideration, but her motion was denied. Hence, this
petition, anchored on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS GUILT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT RULED IN A
MANNER THAT DISREGARDED THE PRECEDENTS LAID DOWN IN
MAGNO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 210 SCRA 471 [1992]; CABRERA
VS. PEOPLE[,] 407 SCRA 247 [2003]; RICO VS. PEOPLE[,] 392
SCRA 61 [2002]; KING VS. PEOPLE[,] 319 SCRA 654 [1999];
LLAMAD[O] VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 270 SCRA 423 [1997] AND
LAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 274 SCRA 572 [1997].
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR, AND MISINTERPRETED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RTC WITH THE MODIFICATION
THAT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER IS ORDERED TO PAY IN
ADDITION TO THE FINES IMPOSED THE AMOUNT OF TWO
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY
FIVE PESOS (Ps.273,345.00) REPRESENTING THE VALUE OF THE
TWO PHILBANK CHECKS THAT ARE YET UNPAID. WITH INTEREST
THEREON AT 12% PER ANNUM FROM FEBRUARY 1996 UNTIL THE
AMOUNT IS FULLY PAID AND TO PAY THE COST OF THESE SUITS.
[10]
3
Simply, the two issues for our resolution are (1) Was petitioners guilt proven
beyond reasonable doubt? and (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding
petitioner liable for the value of the two PhilBank checks, with 12% interest?
Petitioner admits she issued the three subject checks but insists that she
is not liable under B.P. Blg. 22 because the prosecution failed to prove
the element of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds as it had not established
that she actually received a notice of dishonor. She adds that she had already
settled her obligation with Presas when she replaced the two bounced checks
with Asiatrust Bank Check No. 0446323.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that
petitioner was duly notified of the dishonor of the checks when petitioner
received PresassJanuary 14, 1997 letter[11] on January 29, 1997. Respondent
claims it presented not only the registry receipt [12] but also the registry return
card[13] to prove mailing and receipt of the notice of dishonor. In fact, as
respondent argues, petitioner herself admitted she had replaced the dishonored
checks with an Asiatrust Bank Check No. 0446323 dated February 8, 1996.
We find merit in the petition.
B.P. Blg. 22 punishes as malum prohibitum the mere issuance of a
worthless check, provided the other elements of the offense are proved. Section
1[14]enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22, as follows: (1) the making, drawing,
and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.[15]
Upon careful examination of the records, however, we found that only
the first and third elements have been established by the prosecution. By her
own admission, petitioner issued the three subject checks, two of which were
presented to PhilBank but were dishonored and stamped for the reason Account
Closed.Under Section 3[16] of B.P. Blg. 22, the introduction in evidence of the
dishonored check, having the drawees refusal to pay stamped or written
thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall
be prima facie evidence of the making or issuing of the said checks and the due
presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the
same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached
thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks.[17]
As to the second element, Section 2 [18] of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the
presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds
when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. [19] This presumption,
however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice
of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the
amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.[20]
Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. But in
criminal cases, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
[21]
In the instant case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand
letter allegedly sent to petitioner through registered mail and the registry return
card. There was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the
registry return card. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the
registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this
signature is that of petitioner or her authorized agent remains a mystery. We
stress that as we have held in Rico v. People,[22] receipts for registered letters
and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of
dishonor.
Unfortunately, the prosecution presented only the testimony of Presas to
prove mailing and receipt of the demand letter, to wit:
Q: When you were informed by the bank that the checks
bounced and you informed the accused about it, what
was her answer?
A: Accused told me to wait and she will settle the matter.
Q: What happen to her promises that she will settle the checks?
A: When the accused failed to comply with her promise I filed the
case in court.
xxxx
Q: Aside from your oral demand, what other demand did you
make on the accused?
A: I went to my lawyer to file the case in court.
Q: Aside from filing the complaint what did Atty. Galope do?
xxxx
A: my lawyer Atty. Galope sent a demand letter to the accused.
xxxx
Q: There is here attached to the demand letter the registry
return card?
A: Yes sir, that is the proof that the demand letter was sent to
Vicky Moster.[23]
4
In Cabrera v. People, we ruled that it is not enough for the prosecution to
prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The
prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice because the fact of
service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor
by the drawee of the check.[24] We even held in Ting v. Court of Appeals that
possibilities cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. When there is
insufficient proof of receipt of notice of dishonor, as in this case, the presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise. [25] A notice of dishonor
personally sent to and received by the accused is necessary before one can be
held liable under B.P. Blg. 22.[26] The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt
by petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that she was given at
least five banking days within which to settle her account constitutes sufficient
ground for her acquittal. We must emphasize, as we held in King v. People, the
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of
the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence. [27] Any
doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused.[28]
Nonetheless, while petitioner must be acquitted for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 for lack of proof of the second element of the offense, she should be ordered
to pay the face value of the three checks less the six thousand pesos she had
already paid, plus legal interest, conformably with our ruling in Rico v. People,
[29]
where we held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not
preclude the award of civil damages. As admitted by petitioner herself in the
following testimony, she has not paid her obligation, to wit:
Q: So in other words, Check No. 026137 dated October 31 in
the amount of P94,000.00, the original of which is in the
possession of the complainant and which is the basis of
this case, the same is still not paid Mrs. Witness?
A: Not yet sir.
Q: Likewise, Check No. 026138 dated Oct. 31, 1995 in the
amount of One hundred eighty eight five hundred
thousand pesos [sic] which is also in the possession of
the complainant and is also the basis of this case is not
paid. Is that correct?
A: That P188,514.00, that is the check I am referring to that I
wanted to be returned to me because I have already
paid for that check.
Q: Likewise, because the complainant was in the possession of
the original of [C]heck No. 0261124 [sic] dated Dec.
13, the same is yet unpaid. Is that correct?
A: I have already issued a check regarding that amount.
Q: Are you implying that all these checks are replaced by
another check?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you have the check now?

A: The check I earlier presented. The check in the amount
of P273,000[.]
Q: But the check is not encashed by the bank, there was no
endorsement by the bank?
A: Yes, because we agreed not to deposit the check.
xxxx
Q: So in other words, these checks marked as Exhs. 4 to 13 were
already in your possession at the time when you were
investigated by the fiscal when you were required to
submit the counter affidavit?
A: Yes.
Q: And despite that, you could have presented that whatever
[complaint] affidavit just to dismiss these subject cases?
A: Yes.
Q: And you failed to do so?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you admit that not a single money was paid with
respect to these checks?
A: I was able to pay her six thousand pesos.
Q: Is it correct to say that six thousand pesos cannot
clearly cover the amount of three hundred sixty
six thousand pesos?
A: The check previously marked as Exh. 4 to 13 are the
replacement for the checks.
xxxx
Q: Yes Ms. Witness. What I am asking you is whether those
checks, Exhs. 4 to 13 were presented and encashed and
you said No Your Honor, so why do you think that
those checks were your payment when the same
were not encashed?
A: Because our previous agreement is that before she
handed to me the cash loan, she told me to issue
several checks but everytime I was able to pay
her, for example, one check in the amount of ten
thousand pesos, she would return to me one
check in the amount of ten thousand pesos, Your
Honor.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
5
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 29, 2004 and Resolution dated March 16,
2005 of the Court of
Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No.
27595 are
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Petitioner Vicky Moster is acquitted of the charge
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on the ground of reasonable doubt. She is,
however, DIRECTED to pay private complainant the total amount of P367,602
corresponding to the three PhilBank checks that are yet unpaid with interest thereon
at 12% per annum from the filing of the information until the finality of this decision,
the sum of which, inclusive of interest, shall be subject thereafter to 12% per annum
interest until the amount due is fully paid.
Check No. : 165476

Drawn against : Associated Bank, Tarlac Branch
In the Amount of : P500,000.00
Dated : February 16, 1990
Payable to : Rural Bank of San Juan
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 144887. November 17, 2004]

ALFREDO
RIGOR, petitioner,
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 18855, which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163, in Criminal Case No. 86025, convicting
petitioner Alfredo Rigor of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing
Checks Law), and imposing upon him the penalty of imprisonment for six (6)
months and ordering him to restitute to the Rural Bank of San Juan the sum
of P500,000 and to pay the costs.
The Information[1] against petitioner reads:
That on or about the 16th day of November 1989 in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make or draw and issue to Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc. thru its loan officer Carlos
N. Garcia, a postdated check to apply on account or for value the check
described below:
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue on 16 November 1989, he
has already insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in
full of the face amount of such check and that as of 2 February 1990 his bank
accounts were already closed and that check when presented for payment from
and after the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored for the reason Account
Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay
said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment thereof during the period of not less than five (5) banking days after
receiving notice.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The facts, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The prosecution evidence was furnished by witnesses Edmarcos Basangan of
Rural Bank of San Juan (RBSJ) and Esteban Pasion, employee of the Associated
Bank. It was shown that on November 16, 1989, appellant (petitioner herein)
applied for a commercial loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., at N.
Domingo St., San Juan, Metro Manila in the sum of P500,000.00 (Exh. A). He
signed a promissory note stating that an interest of 24% per annum from its
date will be charged on the loan (Exh. B). The loan was approved by RBSJs Bank
Manager Melquecedes de Guzman and Controller Agustin Uy. A cashiers check
with RBSJ No. 2023424 in the amount of P487,000.00, net proceeds of the loan,
was issued to appellant (Exh. C). Appellant endorsed, then encashed the check
with RBSJ Teller Eleneth Cruz, who stamped thereon the word paid (Exh. C-4).
After appellant received the proceeds, he issued an undated check, Associated
Bank Check No. 165476, Tarlac Branch, in the amount of P500,000, payable to
RBSJ (Exh. D).
6
It was not the bank policy for a borrower to apply for a loan, obtain its approval
and its proceeds on the same day. Appellants case was a special one considering
that he is the kumpare of the President of RBSJ and he is well-known to all the
banks directors since he, like them, comes from Tarlac.
Appellant failed to pay his loan upon its maturity on December 16, 1989. He
personally asked de Guzman for a two-month extension and advised RBSJ to
date to February 16, 1990 his Associated Bank check no. 165476. Failing anew
to pay, he asked for another two-month extension or up to April 16, 1990. Both
requests de Guzman granted. On April 16, 1990, appellant still failed to pay his
loan. Basangan and his co-employee, Carlos Garcia, went to Tarlac to collect
from appellant the amount of the loan. Appellants written request for another
30-day extension was denied by de Guzman who instead, sent him a formal
demand letter dated April 25, 1990.
On May 25, 1990, Associated Bank check no. 165476 was deposited with PS
Bank, San Juan Branch. The check was later returned with the words closed
account stamped on its face. Associated Bank employee PASION declared that
appellants Current Account No. 1022-001197-9 with Associated Bank had
been closed since February 2, 1990. Appellants balance under the banks
statement of account as of November 16, 1989 was only P859. The most
appellant had on his account was P40,000 recorded on November 19, 1989 (Exh.
K).
Basangan and Garcia, in Tarlac, advised appellant of the dishonor of his check.
Appellant wrote Atty. Joselito Lim, RBSJ Chairman of the Board, about the loan
and arrangements as to the schedule of his payment. His letter was referred to
de Guzman, who, in turn, sent to him another demand letter dated September
17, 1990. The letter informed him of the dishonor of his check. De Guzman
required him to take the necessary step for the early settlement of his
obligation. He still refused to pay.
Appellant denied the charge. He claimed that on November 16, 1989, Agapito
Uy and his sister Agnes Angeles proposed to him that he secure a loan from the
RBSJ for P500,000. P200,000 of it will be for him and the P300,000 will go to Uy
and to his sister to pay unpaid loans of borrowers in their side banking activities.
For the approval of his loan, Uy told him that appellant can put up his four-door
Mercedes Benz as collateral for the P200,000 loan. The P300,000 will have no
collateral. Uy also told him the he (Uy) has complete control of the bank and his
Mercedes Benz will be enough collateral for theP500,000.
Appellant agreed to the proposal. He signed a blank loan application form and a
promissory note plus a chattel mortgage for his Mercedes Benz. Thereafter, he
was told to come back in two days. Uy gave him two Premiere Bank checks
worth P100,000 each. He gave one check to his brother Efren Rigor and the
other to his sister-in-law for encashment in Tarlac. He issued to Uy a personal
check forP500,000 undated. This check was deposited in the bank for
encashment in the later part of May, 1990 but it bounced. When demand was
made for him to pay his loan, he told Uy to get his Mercedes Benz as payment
for P200,000 but Uy refused. Uy wanted him to pay the whole amount
of P500,000.[2]
On July 8, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Court finds accused Alfredo
Rigor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 1 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance on record, imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment for six
(6) months and to restitute to the Rural Bank of San Juan the sum
of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs.[3]
The trial court stated the reasons for petitioners conviction, thus:
In the case at bar, accused admitted having issued Associated Bank Check No.
165476 in the amount of P500,000.00. the check was undated when issued.
Records, however, show that it was issued on 16 November 1989 but as it
appear[s] now it is dated 16 February 1990. The probable reason must be
because upon the maturity of his loan on 16 December 1989, accused asked for
extension of two (2) months to pay the same. And the expiration of that two (2)
months period is 16 February 1990. Nevertheless, Exhibit K for the prosecution
including its submarkings show that the highest outstanding amount in the
current account of accused with the Associated Bank, Tarlac Branch for the
month of November 1989, the month Rigor issued aforesaid check, is only
about P40,000.00. Hence, Rigor has no sufficient deposit in the bank to cover
the amount of P500,000.00 when he issued Check No. 165476. Therefore, Rigor
knowingly issued the same he having no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank in violation of section 1 of [B.P.] Blg. 22.
The defense of the accused that the amount of loan he secured from the Rural
Bank of San Juan is only P200,000.00 is of no moment. The fact is he admitted
having issued Associated Bank Check No. 165476 in the amount of P500,000.00
7
and upon its deposit for encashment, the same was dishonored for reason
account closed.[4]
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the trial courts decision. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that
the reference to lack of mitigating or aggravating circumstances should be
deleted and disregarded.[5]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner raises the following:
1) Absent the element of knowingly issuing a worthless check
entitles the petitioner to acquittal;
2) Without proof that accused actually received a notice of
dishonor, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law cannot prosper;
3) The Pasig Court below had no jurisdiction to try and decide
the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[6]
Petitioner contends that he did not violate Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 because he told the officers of the complainant bank from the very beginning
that he did not have sufficient funds in the bank; he was merely enticed by
Agustin Uy, the banks managing director and comptroller, to obtain the instant
loan where he received only P200,000, while Uy tookP300,000; and his check
was partly used to collateralize an accommodation in favor of Uy in the amount
of P300,000.
The contention is without merit.
Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22, thus:
SECTION 1.Checks without sufficient funds.-- Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a
fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The elements of the offense are: (1) Making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. [7]
As found by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, all the
aforementioned elements are present in this case.
The evidence shows that on November 16, 1989, petitioner applied [8] for a
loan in the amount of P500,000 with the Rural Bank of San Juan and on the same
day, he issued an undated Associated Bank Check No. 165476 [9] worth P500,000
payable to Rural Bank of San Juan in connection with the loan, which check was
later dated February 16, 1990. [10]The check was thus issued to apply for value.
[11]
This shows the presence of the first element of the offense.
The presence of the second element of the offense is shown by petitioners
admission[12] that he knew of the insufficiency of his funds in the drawee bank
when he issued the check and he allegedly did not hide the fact from the
officials of the Rural Bank of San Juan.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled, thus:
xxx
Knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish. We hold
that appellants admission of the insufficiency of his fund at the time he
issued the check constitutes the very element of knowledge
contemplated in Sec. 1 of BP 22. The prima facie presumption of
knowledge required in Sec. 2, Ibid., does not apply because (a) the
check was presented for payment only on May 25, 1990 or beyond the
8
90-day period, which expired on May 16, 1990, counted from the
maturity date of the check on February 16, 1990 and (b) an actually
admitted knowledge of a fact needs no presumption.
While it is true that if a check is presented beyond ninety (90)
days from its due date, there is no more presumption of knowledge by
the drawer that at the time of issue his check has no sufficient funds, the
presumption in this case is supplanted by appellants own admission that
he did not hide the fact that he had no sufficient funds for the check. In
fact, it appears that when he authorized RBSJ to date his check on
February 16, 1990, his current account was already closed two weeks
earlier, on February 2, 1990.[13]
Petitioner, however, argues that since the officers of the bank knew that he
did not have sufficient funds, he has not violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Assuming arguendo that the payee had knowledge that he had insufficient
funds at the time he issued the check, such knowledge by the payee is
immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of the offense under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.[14] The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad
check; hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof are inconsequential. [15]
Moreover, the cited case of Magno v. Court of Appeals,[16] which resulted in
the acquittal of the accused therein, is inapplicable to petitioner as the facts of
said case are different. In Magno, the bounced checks were issued to cover a
warranty deposit in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the
financier of the deposit.[17] It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier of the
goods is also able to sell or lease the same goods at the same time privately
financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. [18] The Court
therein held:
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to
even make him pay an unjust debt, to say the least, since petitioner did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and
operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did
not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to
Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This
fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se,
hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the
warrant deposit.
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it
was she who accommodated petitioners request for Joey Gomez, to source out
the needed funds for the warranty deposit. Thus it unfolds the kind of
transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is
in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to sell or lease
its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who
desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has
in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need
protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called warranty deposit
not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a
lease purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business
clients.[19]
This case, however, involves an ordinary loan transaction between
petitioner and the Rural Bank of San Juan wherein petitioner issued the check
certainly to be applied to the payment of his loan since the check and the loan
have the same value of P500,000. Whether petitioner agreed to give a portion of
the proceeds of his loan to Agustin Uy, an officer of complainant bank, to finance
Uys and his (petitioner) sisters alleged side-banking activity, such agreement is
immaterial to petitioners liability for issuing the dishonored check underBatas
Pambansa Bilang 22.
Lozano v. Martinez[20] states:
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act
not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
People v. Nitafan[21] held that to require that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from
the provisions ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 22 on the basis of such agreement or
understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted.
Further, the presence of the third element of the offense is shown by the
fact that after the check was deposited for encashment, it was dishonored by
Associated Bank for reason of closed account as evidenced by its Check Return
9
Slip.[22] Despite receipt of a notice of dishonor from complainant bank, petitioner
failed to pay his obligation.
Petitioner next contends that he did not receive a notice of dishonor, the
absence of which precludes criminal prosecution.
Very truly yours, MELQUECEDES DE

GUZMAN
The transcript of records[27] shows that petitioner admitted knowledge of the
dishonor of his check through a demand letter sent to him. Hence, petitioner
cannot pretend that he did not receive a notice of dishonor of his check.
The contention is likewise of no merit.

The notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to the drawer or maker by
the drawee bank, the holder of the check, or the offended party either by
personal delivery or by registered mail.[23] The notice of dishonor to the maker of
a check must be in writing.[24]
Lastly, petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no
jurisdiction over this case since no proof has been offered that his check was
issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds
occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The contention is untenable.
In this case, prosecution witness Edmarcos Basangan testified that after

petitioners check was dishonored, he and co-employee Carlos Garcia went to
petitioners residence in Tarlac to inform him about it. Thereafter, petitioner
wrote a letter dated June 28, 1990 to Atty. Joselito Lim, RBSJ chairman of the
Board of Directors, proposing a manner of paying the loan. The letter was
referred to the bank manager who sent petitioner another demand
letter[25] dated September 17, 1990 through registered mail. [26] Said letter
informed petitioner of the dishonor of his check for the reason of account closed,
and required him to settle his obligation, thus:
xxx
As regards venue of a criminal action, Section 15, paragraph (a), of Rule

110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reflects the old rule,
[28]
provides:
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied.)
Dear Mr. Rigor,
Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or

continuing crimes.[29] In such crimes, some acts material and essential to the
crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory
and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try
the cases, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case
excludes the other.[30] Hence, a person charged with a transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.[31]
Please be informed that the check dated February 16, 1990, that you
issued purportedly for the payment of your loan, which has already become due
and demandable in the sum of PESOS: Five Hundred Thousand Pesos Only
(P500,000.00) was dishonored on February 16, 1990 (should be May 25, 1990)
for the reason Account Closed (AC).
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and
delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila [32] on November 16, 1989,
and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25,
1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila.
[33]
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
We trust that you will take the necessary step for the early settlement of
your obligation to us.
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on

the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the
September 17, 1990

Mr. Alfredo Rigor
Victoria, Tarlac
10
offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or
dishonored. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and
issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored
by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn,
issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was
San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also overtly
manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in
November, 1989 in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short
both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC
in Pasig City. [34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 18855, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EUMELIA R. MITRA,
Petitioner,
G.R. NO. 191404

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESand

FELICISIMO S. TARCELO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
July 5, 2010
X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the July 31, 2009 Decision [1] and the February 11, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31740. The subject
decision and resolution affirmed the August 22, 2007 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City (RTC) which, in turn, affirmed the May 21,
2007 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Batangas
City (MTCC).
THE FACTS:
Petitioner Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was the Treasurer, and Florencio L.
Cabrera, Jr. (now deceased) was the President, of Lucky Nine Credit
Corporation(LNCC), a corporation engaged in money lending activities.
Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent Felicisimo S.

Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money
placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts he
invested plus the interest on his investments. The following checks, signed by
Mitra and Cabrera, were issued by LNCC to Tarcelo.[2]
Bank
Date Issued
Date of Check
Amount
Check
Security Bank September 15, 1998
January 15, 1999
P 3,125.00
000004
-doSeptember 15, 1998
January 15, 1999
125,000.00 0000045
January 20, 1999
2,500.00 0000045
January 20, 1999
100,000.00 0000045
January 30, 1999
5,000.00 0000045
January 30, 1999
200,000.00 0000045
-doOctober 3, 1998
February 3, 1999
2,500.00 0000045
-doOctober 3, 1998
February 3, 1999
100,000.00 0000045
-doNovember 17, 1998
February17, 1999
5,000.00 0000046
March 17, 1999
5,000.00 0000046
March 17, 1999
200,000.00 0000046
January 19, 1999
2,500.00 0000046
February19, 1999
2,500.00 0000046
March 19, 1999
2,500.00 0000046
March 19, 1999
100,000.00 0000046
January 20, 1999
10,000.00 0000046
February 20, 1999
10,000.00 0000046
March 20, 1999
10,000.00 0000046
March 20, 1999
10,000.00 0000046
January 30, 1999
2,500.00 0000046
February 28, 1999
2,500.00 0000046
March 30, 1999
2,500.00 0000046
March 30, 1999
100,000.00 0000046
When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were
dishonored for the reason account closed. Tarcelo made several oral demands on
LNCC for the payment of these checks but he was frustrated. Constrained, in
2002, he caused the filing of seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa
11
Blg. 22 (BP 22)
in Batangas City.[3]
in
the
total
amount
of P925,000.00
with
the
MTCC
After trial on the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of the
charges. The fallo of the May 21, 2007 MTCC Decision[4] reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
accused FLORENCIO I. CABRERA, JR., and EUMELIA R.
MITRA are hereby found guilty of the offense of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and are hereby ORDERED to
respectively pay the following fines for each violation and with
subsidiary imprisonment in all cases, in case of insolvency:
1. Criminal Case No. 43637 - P200,000.00
Said accused, nevertheless, are adjudged civilly liable
and are ordered to pay, in solidum, private complainant
Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the amount of NINE HUNDRED TWENTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P925,000.000).
SO ORDERED.
Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that: they
signed the seven checks in blank with no name of the payee, no amount stated
and no date of maturity; they did not know when and to whom those checks
would be issued; the seven checks were only among those in one or two
booklets of checks they were made to sign at that time; and that they signed the
checks so as not to delay the transactions of LNCC because they did not
regularly hold office there.[5]
The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision and later denied their motion for
reconsideration. Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed this petition for
review[6]claiming, among others, that there was no proper service of the notice
of dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition for lack of merit.
Mitra is now before this Court on a petition for review and submits these
issues:
1. WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
ELEMENTS
OF
VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE
CORPORATION WHO OWNS THE CURRENT ACCOUNT
WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE DRAWN BEFORE
LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE SIGNATORIES.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROPER SERVICE
OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND TO PAY TO THE
PETITIONER AND THE LATE FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.
The Court denies the petition.
A check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a substitute for money
and as a convenient form of payment in financial transactions and
obligations. The use of checks as payment allows commercial and banking
transactions to proceed without the actual handling of money, thus, doing away
with the need to physically count bills and coins whenever payment is made. It
permits commercial and banking transactions to be carried out quickly and
efficiently. But the convenience afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded
checks that adversely affect confidence in our commercial and banking
activities, and ultimately injure public interest.
BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific purpose
of addressing the problem of the continued issuance and circulation of unfunded
checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm caused by these bouncing
checks to the community, BP 22 considers the mere act of issuing an unfunded
check as an offense not only against property but also against public order.
[7]
The purpose of BP 22 in declaring the mere issuance of a bouncing check
as malum prohibitum is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others
from committing the offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him, and to maintain social order. [8] The penalty is stiff. BP 22
imposes the penalty of imprisonment for at least 30 days or a fine of up to
double the amount of the check or both imprisonment and fine.
Specifically, BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. Any person
who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account
or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check
is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine
of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand
12
Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person
who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or
entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds.
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which
is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Mitra posits in this petition that before the signatory to a bouncing
corporate check can be held liable, all the elements of the crime of violation of
BP 22 must first be proven against the corporation. The corporation must first be
declared to have committed the violation before the liability attaches to the
signatories of the checks.[9]
The Court finds Itself unable to agree with Mitras posture. The third
paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the
check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." This provision
recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence,
its wording is unequivocal and mandatory that the person who actually
signed the corporate check shall be held liable for a violation of BP 22. This
provision does not contain any condition, qualification or limitation.
In the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals, [10] the Court ruled that the
accused was liable on the unfunded corporate check which he signed as
treasurer of the corporation. He could not invoke his lack of involvement in the
negotiation for the transaction as a defense because BP 22 punishes the mere
issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which the check was issued or
in consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. In this case,
Mitra signed the LNCC checks as treasurer. Following Llamado, she must then be
held liable for violating BP 22.
Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawers

knowledge that he has insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank to cover
his check. Because this involves a state of mind that is difficult to establish, BP
22 creates the prima facie presumption that once the check is dishonored, the
drawer of the check gains knowledge of the insufficiency, unless within five
banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the drawer pays the holder
of the check or makes arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of
the check. The service of the notice of dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity
to make good the check within those five days to avert his prosecution for
violating BP 22.
Mitra alleges that there was no proper service on her of the notice of
dishonor and, so, an essential element of the offense is missing. This contention
raises a factual issue that is not proper for review. It is not the function of the
Court to re-examine the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals. Our review is
limited to errors of law and cannot touch errors of facts unless the petitioner
shows that the trial court overlooked facts or circumstances that warrant a
different disposition of the case [11]or that the findings of fact have no basis on
record. Hence, with respect to the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of
the notice of dishonor, the Court gives full faith and credit to the consistent
findings of the MTCC, the RTC and the CA.
The defense postulated that there was no demand
served upon the accused, said denial deserves scant
consideration. Positive allegation of the prosecution that a
demand letter was served upon the accused prevails over the
denial made by the accused. Though, having denied that there
was no demand letter served onApril 10, 2000, however, the
prosecution positively alleged and proved that the
questioned demand letter was served upon the accused
on April 10, 2000, that was at the time they were
attending Court hearing before Branch I of this Court. In
fact, the prosecution had submitted a Certification issued by the
other Branch of this Court certifying the fact that the accused
were present during the April 10, 2010 hearing. With such
straightforward and categorical testimony of the witness, the
Court believes that the prosecution has achieved what was
dismally lacking in the three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor
Ting and Caras evidence of the receipt by the accused of the
demand letter sent to her. The Court accepts the prosecutions
narrative that the accused refused to sign the same to evidence
their receipt thereof.To require the prosecution to produce the
signature of the accused on said demand letter would be
imposing an undue hardship on it. As well, actual receipt
acknowledgment is not and has never been required of the
prosecution either by law or jurisprudence.[12] [emphasis
supplied]
13
With the notice of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose the
presumption that Mitra and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient funds to
cover the checks upon their presentment for payment. In fact, the account was
already closed.
To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in the
above-quoted provision, a violation exists where:
1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on
account or for value;
2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the full payment of the
check upon its presentment; and
3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [13]
There is no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank
dishonored the checks because the account had been closed. Notice of dishonor
was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make arrangements for
their payment within five days from notice. With all the above elements duly
proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes
for its breach.[14]
WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2009 Decision and the February 11, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31740 are
herebyAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143231. October 26, 2001]
ALBERTO LIM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In his petition for review on certiorari filed in this case petitioner seeks to
set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals of 24 April 2000 in CA-G.R. No.
21016 which affirmed in toto the decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 90, finding petitioner Alberto Lim (hereafter ALBERTO) guilty of
twelve (12) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as
the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing on 15 July 1993 of twelve (12)
informations for violations of B.P. 22 against ALBERTO before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q93-46489 to 93-46500. The information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46489 reads
as follows:
The undersigned accuses Alberto Lim of a Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of May 1992, Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused ALBERTO LIM did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make or draw and issue to ROBERT T. LU to apply on account or for value
METROBANK Check No. 206033 postdated November 6, 1992 payable to the
order of CASH in the amount of P250,000.00, Philippine Currency, said accused
well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said complainant the amount of said
check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The other informations are similarly worded except for the number of the
checks and their amounts and dates of issue. They are hereunder itemized as
follows:
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
Q-93-46490 206031 5 November 1992 P250,000.00
Q-93-46491 206022 5 November 1992 P300,000.00
Q-93-46492 206023 6 November 1992 P300,000.00
Q-93-46493 206056 6 November 1992 P15,000.00
14
Q-93-46494 206055 6 November 1992 P15,000.00
Q-93-46495 206066 7 November 1992 P12,500.00
Q-93-46496 206064 6 November 1992 P12,500.00
Q-93-46497 206030 5 November 1992 P200,000.00
Q-93-46498 206061 5 November 1992 P10,000.00
Q-93-46499 206062 5 November 1992 P12,500.00
Q-93-46500 206054 5 November 1992 P15,000.00[4]
Upon motion of the prosecution, the twelve cases were consolidated and
jointly tried.
At arraignment, ALBERTO pleaded not guilty.[5]
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in the month of May
1992, ALBERTO issued to private complainant Robert Lu (hereafter, ROBERT), for
purpose of rediscounting, sixty-four (64) Metrobank checks, including the twelve
(12) checks subject of the informations filed in these cases. The checks were
signed by ALBERTO in the presence of ROBERT at the latters office located at the
Elco Building, 202 E. Rodriguez Boulevard, Quezon City. Upon the respective
dates of maturity, each of the twelve (12) checks were deposited by ROBERT at
the Roosevelt Branch of the United Coconut Planters Bank, which, however, were
all dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Account Closed. ROBERT then
immediately informed ALBERTO of the fact of dishonor and demanded payment
of the amounts of the checks. ALBERTO explained to ROBERT that he
encountered some financial difficulties and would settle the account in two or
three weeks time. When ALBERTO failed to make good on his promise, ROBERT
endorsed the case to his lawyer who sent a demand letter dated 29 December
1992 to ALBERTO. ALBERTO received the demand letter on 9 January 1993. For
failure to settle his account within the seven days grace period provided in the
demand letter, ALBERTO caused the filing of the twelve informations subject of
the instant case.
For his defense, ALBERTO alleged that sometime in 1989, Sarangani
Commercial, Inc. (hereafter Sarangani Inc.) issued to ROBERT seven checks as
payment for its obligation to the latter in the amount of P1,600,000. ALBERTO,
as guarantor, affixed his signature in all of the seven checks. When the said
seven checks bounced, ALBERTO issued more than three hundred checks,
including the twelve checks which were the subject of the present case, as
replacements. He further alleged that ROBERT had already received the total
amount of P4,021,000 from the proceeds of the replacements checks, which
amount is more than the total obligation of Sarangani, Inc. which was
accommodated by him. Thus, the principal of the said obligation as well as all
interest thereof, if any, have already been fully covered by said payments. It is
therefore the contention of ALBERTO that with the full payment of the
accommodated obligation, the twelve checks subject of the present case have
no valuable consideration.
On 10 October 1996, the trial court, rejecting the contentions of the
defense, rendered a decision finding ALBERTO guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
each of the twelve cases. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Alberto Lim, being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crimes charged in the informations in these twelve (12) cases for
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, is hereby sentenced: to suffer six (6) months of
imprisonment in each of these twelve (12) cases Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9346489 to Q-93-46500, (inclusive) and to pay to the private complainant Robert
Lu the twelve (12) checks in question in these cases in the total amount of ONE
MILLION, THREE HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P1,392, 500.00) with interest thereon at 12% per annum from the date of the
filing of these cases, July 15, 1993, until the said amount is fully paid, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, ALBERTO filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the trial court. [6] On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court, hence, the present petition raising the following arguments:
1. The petitioner is not guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as
the subject checks lack valuable consideration.
2. In any event, the factual setting of the present case warrants
leniency in the imposition of criminal penalty on petitioner. [7]
We find petition without merit.
15
The conviction of ALBERTO must be sustained. The law enumerates the
elements of B.P. Blg. 22 to be (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check
to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[8]
The issuance of the twelve checks and its subsequent dishonor were
admitted by ALBERTO. His defense rests solely on the payment of the obligation
by Sarangani, Inc. including its interests, which was allegedly accommodated by
him. ALBERTO insists that as a guarantor, he merely issued the twelve checks to
replace the bad checks that were previously issued by Sarangani, Inc., and
considering that the total amount of the checks encashed by ROBERT have
exceeded the amount of the bad checks including the interest, then the twelve
checks already lack valuable consideration.
The issue of whether the twelve checks were issued merely to
accommodate the obligation of Sarangani, Inc. as well as the issue of payment
of the said obligation are factual issues which are best determined by the trial
court. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect
the disposition of the case.[9] The jurisdiction of this court over cases elevated
from the Court of Appeals is confined to the review of errors of law ascribed to
the Court of Appeals whose findings of fact are conclusive, absent any showing
that the findings by the respondent court are entirely devoid of any
substantiation on record.[10]
In the instant case, we see no reason to disturb the factual findings of the
trial court which has been affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. ALBERTOs
allegation that the checks were issued to replace or accommodate the bad
checks of Sarangani, Inc. is not worthy of belief. The seven(7) checks issued by
Sarangani, Inc. were all dated and dishonored in September 1989. The twelve
(12) checks including the other fifty-two (52) checks were all dated November
1992, hence the same cannot be a replacement of the bad checks which were
dishonored as far back as three years ago.
In addition, even the corresponding amount of the checks negates said
conclusion. The total amount of the seven (7) checks, representing the
obligations of Sarangani, Inc., is only P1,600,000, [11] while the sum total of the
twelve (12) checks and the remaining fifty-two checks is P7,455,000. [12] If we add
the P7,455,000 to the value of the more than three hundred checks, which
ALBERTO alleged to have been issued also in payment of the said obligation
then the total amount of all the replacement checks will be P111,476,000.
Moreover, records show that the twelve(12) checks and the other fifty-two
(52) checks were issued sometime May 1992 and all postdated 1992, [13] whereas
the 330 checks which were submitted to prove the fact of payment were all
encashed before the issuance of the said checks. Thus, if full payment was made
as early as July 22, 1991, the date of the last check of the 330 checks, why
would ALBERTO issue the twelve (12) checks and the fifty-two (52) checks, if not
for a consideration other than to answer for an obligation which was already
paid. Hence, the 330 checks submitted by the defense did not prove that the
twelve checks were not issued for valuable consideration. On the contrary, it
supported the version of the prosecution that the checks were issued for
rediscounting and not as replacements for the bad checks of Sarangani, Inc., as
claimed by ALBERTO.
Further, if indeed it were true as claimed by ALBERTO that the indebtedness
covered by the checks sued upon has been paid, the petitioner should have
redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary course of business. But the
same checks remained in the possession of the complainant who asked for the
satisfaction of the obligations involved when said checks became due, without
the petitioner heeding the demand for him to redeem his checks which bounced.
[14]
Hence, without evidentiary support, ALBERTOs claim that the twelve checks
lacks valuable consideration must fail. Upon issuance of the said checks, it is
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued
for valuable consideration. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the issuance of a bouncing
check. It is also worthy to note that it is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes, but the act of making and issuing a check that is
dishonored upon presentment for payment. [15] The purpose for which it was
issued and the terms and conditions relating to its issuance are
immaterial. What is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the
fact of its worthlessness is known to appellant at the time of their issuance, a
required element under B.P. Blg. 22. This is because the mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum.[16]
16
ALBERTOs alternative prayer for the modification of penalty by deleting the
sentence of imprisonment and, in lieu thereof, that a fine in an increased
amount be imposed must likewise be denied.
His reliance in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is misplaced. As clarified
in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative
intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or
a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the
determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is
the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be
deemed a hindrance.
In this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals in upholding the trial courts
imposition of imprisonment. ALBERTO is not a first time offender. He has
previously been convicted of 50 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-93-44583 to Q-93-44632, and was placed on probation. [17]
However, despite his prior conviction, he claims that the same shall not be
taken against him. He argues that:
It bears emphasis that the sixty-four postdated checks which include the subject
checks in the subject decision, were issued by the petitioner to Mr. Lu all at the
same time to cover the unpaid obligation of Sarangani. Undeniably, should only
one single complaint was filed for all the sixty-four checks which bounced, then
all of the cases should have been brought up and heard in only one branch of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. But, as fate have it, two criminal
complaints were separately filed by Mr. Lu which complaints were eventually
heard buy two branches of the said court, to wit: Branch 90 and Branch 103.
With the aforesaid scenario, petitioner had been put into a bind. Thusly, when
the joint decision [Annex G] was promulgated by RTC-Branch 103, petitioner
seasonably applied for probation, which application was granted by the court,
after the latter has determined to its satisfaction the qualification of
petitioner. Nonetheless, petitioners worries are far from over because when the
decision of RTC-Branch 90 was subsequently promulgated, petitioner was left
with no recourse but to appeal. Needless to state, petitioner can no longer apply
for probation because of his earlier availment in the first complaint of Mr.
Lu. This, notwithstanding the fact that all the sixty-four checks were issued by
the petitioner to Mr. Lu at the same time and meant to cover an obligation of like
nature. Whereas, had there been only one complaint filed for all the said checks,
there should have been only one judgment of conviction and petitioner could
have had fully availed of the benefits of the Probation Law [PD 968 as
amended].It is, therefore pathetic to even contemplate on the prospect of
petitioner languishing in jail only because of the fact that the sixty-four bum
checks he issued were divided into two criminal complaints. [18]
The foregoing arguments must be rejected. His allegation that the checks
subject of that previous conviction were part of the sixty-four (64) checks which
he issued at the same time to cover one and the same obligation, is not true. A
reading of the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. Q93-44583 to Q93-44632 will
show that there are two accused namely, ALBERTO and William Tan, [19] since the
checks subject of those cases were issued and signed by both accused. Also, the
amount of each of the fifty (50) checks ranges from P122,595.77 to P546,114.00
while the sixty-four (64) checks including the twelve checks were issued and
signed solely by ALBERTO, the amount of which ranges from P10,000 to
P300,000. Hence the fifty (50) checks subject of his prior conviction and the
twelve (12) checks subject of the present case are different from each other.
His act of issuing the fifty (50) and the sixty-four (64) bouncing checks is a
serious offense. To impose only fine would be to depreciate the seriousness of
his malefactions. The importance of arresting the proliferation of bouncing
checks can not be overemphasized.
17
Besides, it is of no moment even if the fifty (50) checks were part of the
sixty-four (64) checks. Each act of drawing and issuing a bouncing check
constitutes a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The rule that there is only one offense
when the offender is moved by one criminal intent or purpose does not apply
because in a statutory offense or malum prohibitum malice or criminal intent is
immaterial.[20] The mischief of circulating unfunded checks is injurious not only to
the payee or holder of such checks but to society in general, and the business
community, in particular. The nefarious practice can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest.[21]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Quezon,
City in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-46489 to 46500 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002]

GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC
JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL D.L.
VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC., respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the decision [1] dated March 14, 1997 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 19621, affirming the Regional Trial Courts
decision[2] finding petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and sentencing him to
suffer imprisonment for a period of six months on each count, to be served
consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of Appeals resolution [3] dated July 8,
1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to
Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When
Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity
as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued the following checks:
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065, dated April 15, 1986
for P100,000.00, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.; and
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066, dated May 1, 1986
for P115,442.65, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.[4]
The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:
These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this
Corporation to be given not later than May 30, 1986.
Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:
18
However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30,
1986, Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall present the cheques for payment. This is final
and irrevocable.[5]
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said
checks for payment on May 30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a
four-week labor strike that had earlier paralyzed the business operations of
Lincoln Gerard.[6]
Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its
treasurer Ricardo R. Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring
the contents of the Lincoln Gerard warehouse in the leased premises since a
new tenant was moving in. Phelps Dodge told Lincoln Gerard that its properties
would be placed in our compound and under our custody. [7]
On June 2, 1986,[8] when no further communication was received from
Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge presented the two checks for payment but these
were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard,
apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking him to fund them
within the time prescribed by law.[9] Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks
but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincolns inability to fund
said checks due to the strike. [10] Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge
notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge
went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20, 1986, [11] despite
Lincoln Gerards protest.[12]
On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 73260 and 73261 were filed against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court. The motion for reconsideration filed by Griffith was
dismissed, and so were his petition for review filed before the Department of
Justice and later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC. Griffith then filed a
petition forcertiorari before the Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for
damages docketed as Civil Case No. 55276 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 69, against Phelps Dodge and the notary public who conducted
the auction sale.[13] On July 19, 1991, the trial court ruled that the foreclosure
and auction sale were invalid, but applied the proceeds thereof to Lincoln
Gerards arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln Gerard
the P1,072,586.88 as excess.[14] The court stated:
The evidence shows that defendant corporation had already received the
amount of P254,600 as a result of the invalid auction sale. The latter amount
should be applied to the rental in arrears owed by the plaintiff corporation to the
defendant corporation (P301,953.12). Thus, the plaintiff corporation still owes
the defendant corporation the amount of P47,953.12 as rental arrears. In order
to get the true and real damages that defendant corporation should pay the
plaintiff corporation, the balance of the rental arrears should be deducted from
the amount of P1,120,540.00, the total value of the items belonging to the
plaintiff corporation and sold by the defendant corporation at a public
auction. The net result is P1,072,586.88. [15]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became
final and executory.[16]
On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the
RTC were remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic
Act No. 7691 that expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found
Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B.P. 22, [17] and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment for six months on each count, to be served
consecutively. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused GEOFFREY F.
GRIFFITH, GUILTY OF VIOLATION of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law on two counts.
The accused is therefore hereby sentence (sic) to suffer imprisonment for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal Case No. 41678 and another SIX (6)
MONTHS in Criminal Case No. 41679, both of which shall be served
consecutively.
Considering that the civil aspect of these cases has already been decided by the
Regional Trial Court Branch 69, Pasig, regardless of its finality, of which this court
has no record, this Court shall not resolve the same because they are either Res
Judicata or Pendente Litis.
SO ORDERED.[18]
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower courts decision.
19
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a
consolidated decision dated March 14, 1997, the appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, absent any prima facie merit in it, the Petition for Review under
consideration is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[19]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this was denied
by the appellate court in a resolution dated July 8, 1997. [20] Hence, this petition
seeking reversal of the CA decision and resolution on the criminal cases,
anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN
MAGNO V. COURT OF APPEALS, WHERE THIS HONORABLE COURT
LAID DOWN THE DOCTRINE THAT A CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22
CANNOT BE BASED ON AN INVERSE APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT
OF KNOWLEDGE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTON DATED 8 JULY 1997 RESULT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 STATING THAT PAYMENT THROUGH
NOTARIAL FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL
INFORMATIONS UNDER B.P. 22 DOES NOT ABATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY, ARE ERRONEOUS AND RESULT IN THE INIQUITOUS
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED CASE (CA-G.R. NO.
20980) INVOLVING THE SAME PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AND
THE SAME TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 WHICH RELIED ON THE RULING IN
THE CASE OF LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS ON VENUE TO JUSTIFY ITS
FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED TWO COUNTS OF
VIOLATION OF
JURISPRUDENCE.
B.P.
22,
ARE
CONTRAY
TO
LAW
AND
[21]
Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note

on the voucher attached to the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded
at the time of their issuance. Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part
negates any intent to put worthless checks in circulation, which is what B.P. 22
seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the second check that was postdated,
petitioner contends that there could not be any violation of B.P. 22 with said
check since the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds is
absent. Petitioner could not have known at the time of its issuance that the
postdated check would be dishonored when presented for payment later on.
Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be violative of the
constitutional proscription against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since
petitioner would be punished not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but
for failing to pay an obligation when it fell due.
Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through
the proceeds of the notarial foreclosure and auction sale extinguished his
criminal liability.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the elements that
comprise violation of B.P. 22 are present in this case. Moreover, the payment in
this case was made beyond the five-day period, counted from notice of dishonor,
provided by the law and thus did not extinguish petitioners criminal liability.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured
Phelps Dodge, through the note on the voucher attached to the checks, that said
checks would be covered with sufficient funds by May 30, 1996, which assurance
was final and irrevocable.[22] The OSG also argues that B.P. 22 does not
distinguish between a check that is postdated and one that is not, for as long as
the drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient funds and the
check is dishonored upon presentment.
There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this
case, since according to the OSG, what B.P. 22 penalizes is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check that is dishonored upon presentation for payment,
not the failure to pay a debt.[23]
The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps
Dodges notarial foreclosure of Lincoln Gerards properties could not bar
20
prosecution under B.P. 22, since damage or prejudice to the payee is
immaterial. Moreover, said payment was made only after the violation of the law
had already been committed. It was made beyond the five-day period, from
notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.
The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith,
president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., has been erroneously convicted and sentenced
for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22). His
conviction on two counts and sentence of six months imprisonment for each
count by the respondent MTC Judge Manuel Villamayor was upheld by
respondent RTC Judge Edwin Villasor and affirmed by the respondent Court of
Appeals. But private respondent appears to have collected more than the value
of the two checks in question before the filing in the trial court of the case for
violation of B.P. 22. Hence, petitioner insists he has been wrongfully convicted
and sentenced. To resolve this issue, we must determine whether the alleged
payment of the amount of the checks two years prior to the filing of the
information for violation of B.P. 22 justifies his acquittal.
Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the provisions of B.P. 22
in this case, however, does not appear to us an appropriate issue for
consideration now. A purported constitutional issue raised by petitioner may only
be resolved if essential to the decision of a case and controversy. But here we
find that this case can be resolved on other grounds. Well to remember, courts
do not pass upon constitutional questions that are not the very lis mota of a
case.[24]
In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on
rental payments incurred by Lincoln Gerard, Inc. The checks were signed by
petitioner, the president of Lincoln Gerard. It was a condition written on the
voucher for each check that the check was not to be presented for payment
without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to be given at a specific date. However,
Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing to a labor strike that
paralyzed its business and resulted to the companys inability to fund its
checks. Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher
attached thereto that if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard
before May 30, 1986, the checks would be presented for payment. This is final
and irrevocable, according to the note that was written actually by an officer of
Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored and Phelps Dodge
filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing took
place only after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with
more than one million pesos to spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction
sale of Lincoln Gerards properties earlier impounded by Phelps Dodge.
In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the instant petition
is meritorious.
The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. [25] It was not
designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through
manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law. [26] Noteworthy, in
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy
preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than
imprisonment to best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward
the classical school that imposes penalties for retribution, [27] such retribution
should be aimed at actual and potential wrongdoers. [28] Note that in the two
criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were
corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason
duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge,
through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared
invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards property for cash amounting toP1,120,540[29] to
satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was already in
Phelps Dodges custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was moving
into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for
said rentals was only P301,953.12.[30] Thus, by resorting to the remedy of
foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of
the two checks, totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by
Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was the
situation when, almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged
with two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln
Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though
respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as involuntary. [31] That
the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already collected,
however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two
criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale,
Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after
it was affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under these circumstances,
see how petitioners conviction and sentence could be upheld without running
afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our
view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and
auction sale as its chosen remedy.
21
That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals
earlier rendered in deciding the petition for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v.
Judge Milagros Caguioa, CA-G.R. SP No. 20980, in connection with the petitioners
motion to quash the charges herein before they were tried on the merits. [32]
Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno
and Asaali S. Isnani:
We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid defenses against both
charges in Criminal Cases Nos. 73260-61. We can even say that the decision
rendered in Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 55276, well-written as it is, had put up a
formidable obstacle to any conviction in the criminal cases with the findings
therein made that the sale by public auction of the properties of Lincoln was
illegal and had no justification under the facts; that also the proceeds realized in
the said sale should be deducted from the account of Lincoln with Phelps, so
that only P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears which Lincoln should
pay, computed at P301,953.12 less P254,600.00; that out of what had happened
in the case as the trial court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty bound to
pay Lincoln in damagesP1,072,586.88 from which had been deducted the
amount of P47,953.12 representing the balance of the rental in arrearages; and
that consequently, there is absolutely no consideration remaining in support of
the two (2) subject checks.[33]
Petitioners efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him
was frustrated on procedural grounds because, according to Justice Francisco,
appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy.[34] In a petition for certiorari,
only issues of jurisdiction including grave abuse of discretion are considered, but
an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation
of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their
presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. [35] We
must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and
reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the
law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also
that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtors criminalization
would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having
collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks
for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtors
president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said
collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by
petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the informations
against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner
herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P.
22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations
of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other
kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19621 dated March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated
July 8, 1997, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is
ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678
and 41679.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
22
23
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April
1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make his venture
workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this
entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing
Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as
Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a
distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that
he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon
Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance
for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and
able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate
petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a

warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the
pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner
could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal
level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the
warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who
advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a
short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from
the decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the
accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal
Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent
appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense
charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the
Solicitor General as official counsel for the public respondent, thus:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item

of Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum
or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the
faithful performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the
satisfactory completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to
the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing
agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and
petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same.
After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to
petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who,
24
unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check
matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as
he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6)
postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and
cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of
the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by
Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient
funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15,
1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all
in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the
amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it
pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner
became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty
deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay
the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were
deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the
accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4)
cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing
the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case
Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant
the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp.
25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the
court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of
the cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand
and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit"
equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is
one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the
Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the
petitioner as lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at the
instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding

to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the
transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by
petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been
different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the
termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the
additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the
purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a
lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by
the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due
to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the
warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to
even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and
operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did
not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to
Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This
fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se,
hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the
"warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it
was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out
the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of
transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is
in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or
lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those
who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus
operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who
likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called
"warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment
under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to
skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat
of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court
system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using
25
the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with
materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to
above in the lease agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of
the cases, were mere accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey
Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount
from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To
argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit
should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out
the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of
the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not
intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich
themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and
objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing
honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the
prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that
the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against
actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be
considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the
offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations
of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations
should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will
not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is
founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are
immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society. This
disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded
and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which
we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral
disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904,
Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed
upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be
directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there
is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for
value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for
mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a
menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the
accused, however, by the open admission of the appellate court below, oven
when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty,
the accused was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation
of the accused to complainant had been extinguished by the
termination of the leasing agreement by the terms of which
the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was refundable
to the accused as lessee and that as the lessor L.S. Finance
neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the
same to the accused, it may he assumed that the amount was
already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even
if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and
established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally
issued on account or for value. And as We have already
observed, in order that there may be a conviction under the from
paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with respect to the
element of said offense that the check should have been made
and issued on account or for value it is sufficient, all the other
elements of the offense being present, that the check must have
been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment,
after the issuance of the checks, of the obligation in
consideration of which the checks were issued, would have
resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the
prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory
proof that there was such an extinguishment in the present
case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced
any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the
26
complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have
been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the
cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the petitionerappellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime
charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit
has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor
which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the
profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of the
accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she
had in her possession the checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real
nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the
accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law,
violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the
rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether
or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not
being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being
prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses of good
faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in
prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated
checks by the petitioner, i.e.,whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on
account or for value", as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed
against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for
which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged
crime could not have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A
promise that certain facts are truly as they are represented to be
and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know

any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that
the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose,
(Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or
security for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if
the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be
part payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser
the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge
for safekeeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for
safety or convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the
depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the
money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives
for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and
generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes
not only deposits payable on demand and for which certificates,
whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on
demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp.
394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very
beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with
which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly
intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this
predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding
the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance
Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
27
SO ORDERED.
28
G.R. Nos. 59568-76 January 11, 1990

PETER NIERRAS, petitioner,
vs.
29
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S. LOPEZ, in their
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Palo, Leyte, and City Fiscal of Tacloban City, Leyte,
respectively, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction for the annulment
of the resolution dated September 17, 1981 of the respondent Judge Auxencio C.
Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter
Nierras" docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384,
4385, 4386 and 4387, for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal
Code which denied petitioner's motion to quash. Said motion to quash was filed
by petitioner on the ground of double jeopardy as these offenses were already
included in Criminal Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123,
4124, and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras," for violation
of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, pending before the
lower court. In both sets of criminal cases, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty
upon arraignment before the lower court. However, immediately after his plea of
not guilty in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to
withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which was
denied by respondent Judge ruling as follows:
The motion to quash should be and is hereby denied. Accused Peter
Nierras allegedly issued the checks in favor of complainant Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation in payment of oil products which the latter
delivered to him simultaneously with the issuance of the checks.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The crime of estafa committed by means of bouncing checks is not
committed by mere issuance of a check. Under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 4885, the following are
the elements of estafa: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
(2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage
to the payee thereof (People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568). Under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (1979) the mere issuance of a check without
sufficient funds issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation and the
check was dishonored upon presentation for that estafa is committed
under the Revised Penal Code. At the same time, the drawer will also be
liable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for offense of issuing a check
without sufficient funds (pp. 1-2, Resolution On Motion To Quash dated

September 17, 1981; Annex "MM", Petition). (p. 100, Rollo)
The issue now submitted for Our consideration is whether the filing of the nine
(9) other informations for estafa against petitioner under the Revised Penal Code
after he had earlier been charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for
issuing the same bouncing checks will put him in jeopardy of being convicted
twice for the same offenses. In other words, can petitioner be held liable for the
nine criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and separately also
be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal
Code for the issuance of the same bouncing checks?
It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,
purchased oil products from it. Simultaneous with the delivery of the products,
he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the
Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the
reason that his account was already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation repeatedly demanded of petitioner either to deposit funds for his
checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to
do either.
Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements
of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code are also present in
that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely (1) "the
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check
and (3) damage to the payee thereof."
Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 approved on April 3, 1979 which
provides that:
Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
30
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one
(1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double
the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which
states as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned herein below . . .
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts,
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and
damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but
are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere
issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient
funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523) which is not so
under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the
following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing obligation,
while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such circumstance
negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each
of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public
interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
These differences are better understood by presenting the pertinent discussions

on the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 between the author of the bill,
former Solicitor General and Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the Honorable
Estelito P. Mendoza, presented in the memorandum for the government as
follows:
MR. MENDOZA. If there is evidence demonstrating that the act
committed does not only violate this proposed Act but also the Revised
Penal Code, there will be further prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code. That is why it is proposed in this Act that there be a single uniform
penalty for all violations in this Act. However the court is given the
discretion whether to impose imprisonment or fine or both or also in
whatever severity the court may consider appropriate under the
circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. VELOSO, F. The other way around, it is not so. So precisely, if I file a
case for estafa against a particular person for issuance of a bouncing
check, then necessarily I can also be prosecuted under this proposed
bill. On the other hand, if a person is prosecuted under the proposed bill,
it does not necessarily follow that he can be prosecuted for estafa.
MR. MENDOZA. This is simply because that in a certain set of
circumstances, the offense under this Act is the only offense committed
while under a different set of circumstances, not only the offense
described in this Act is committed but also estafa. So that, for example,
if a check with sufficient funds is issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation and the position of the Government should turn out to be
correct that there is no estafa, then the drawer of the check would only
be liable under this Act but not under the Revised Penal Code. But if he
issues a check in payment, or contemporaneously with incurring, of an
obligation, then he will be liable not only for estafa but also for violation
for this Act. There is a difference between the two cases. In that
situation where the check was issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation, the issuance of the check does not cause damage to the
payee and so it is but appropriate that he should not be held for estafa
but only for violating this Act. But if he issued a check to induce another,
to part with a valuable consideration and the check bounces, then he
does inflict an injury to the payee of the check apart from violating this
law. In that case, it should be but fair that he be subject to prosecution
not only for estafa but also for violating this law.
31
MR. VELOSO, F. Yes, I agree with the Solicitor General on that point but
my worry is with respect to situations where there is prosecution first to
estafa.
MR. MENDOZA. Well, if there is estafa . . .
MR. VELOSO, F. Estafa committed by the issuance of a bouncing check,
in which case it will be mandatory on the part of the prosecuting official
to also file a case for violation of this offense under the proposed bill.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, that is correct. In such a situation because if the
offender did not only cause injury on account of the issuance of the
check but did issue a bouncing check penalized under this Act, then he
will be liable for prosecution under both laws. I would admit that perhaps
in such situation, the penalty may be somewhat severe. As a matter of
fact, in other jurisdictions, the issuance of bouncing checks is penalized
with substantially lower penalty. However, because of the situation in the
Philippines, the situation being now relatively grave that practically
everybody is complaining about bouncing checks, may be it is necessary
at least initially, at this point in time for us to impose a rather severe
penalty and even allow liability not only under this Act but also for
estafa. Then perhaps, after the necessary discipline has been inculcated
in our people and that the incidence of the offense has been reduced,
we may then decide to amend the law and reduce the penalty. But at
this time, shall we say the evil is of such magnitude that only a dramatic
and expeditious effort to prosecute persons who issue bouncing checks
may be necessary to curb quickly this evil. (explanations given by
Solicitor General ESTELITO P. MENDOZA at the Batasan Pambansa during
his sponsorship speech of BP 22 which he authored, pages 1037-1038,
Record of the Batasan, Plenary Session No. 70, Dec. 4, 1978). (Emphasis
supplied). (pp. 115-117,Rollo or pp. 9-11, Memorandum for
respondents).
Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that:
Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the
prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal
act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or
differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in
the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on
double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses.
Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is
forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two
(2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (People v.
Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).
In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We have held
in Acharon v. Purisima, et al. (13 SCRA 309) that "when a motion to quash a
criminal case is denied, remedy is not certiorari but to go to court without
prejudice to reiterating special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after trial
on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law," invoking the rule laid down in People v.Magdaluyo (1
SCRA 990). If the petitioner cannot appeal at this state of the proceeding, it is
because there is still a necessity for the trial on the merits wherein the parties
may present proofs in support of their contentions and not because the remedy
of appeal is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
32
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision [1] dated April 26, 2002 and the
Resolution[2] dated July 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
66293.
On February 10, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint[3] for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
22
against Alicia
F. Ricaforte (petitioner) with theQuezon City Prosecutors Office. He alleged that
he operates and manages a rice mill in Bulacan; that sometime in June 1996,
Ruby Aguilar (Aguilar) procured rice from him and in payment thereof gave him
two Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks, to wit: FEBTC Check No.
08A096028P dated July 25, 1996 and CheckNo. 08A096029P dated August 25,
1996, in the amount of P431,555.00 each, which were both issued by petitioner
and when presented for payment were dishonored.
In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied the accusation. She alleged that
Aguilar who had lost her Metrobank checkbook borrowed her checks to pay off
Aguilars obligations with Leon Jurado (respondent); that she willingly lent her
checks to Aguilar on condition that these checks will be replaced with Aguilars
own checks once her new checkbook is issued to her by Metrobank; that Aguilar
then used petitioners checks to pay her rice procurement with respondent; that
in accordance with the arrangement, Aguilar issued two replacement checks in
favor of respondent in the amount of P431,555.00 each; that when Aguilar
issued the replacement checks, petitioner demanded from respondent the return
of her checks but respondent refused, thus she was constrained to request her
bank to issue an order of stop payment.Aguilar executed an Affidavit
corroborating petitioners defense.
ALICIA F. RICAFORTE, G.R. NO. 154438
Petitioner,
Present:
Respondent filed his Reply denying that petitioners checks were merely
accommodation checks. Petitioner filed her rejoinder as well as supplement to
rejoinder.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
In a Resolution[4] dated November 24, 1997, Assistant City Prosecutor

Luis Zenon Q. Maceren dismissed the complaint for estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 for
insufficiency of evidence. The prosecutor found that petitioner did not have any
business transaction with respondent; that the subject checks were issued only
to accommodate Aguilar; that these were delivered to respondent not as
payment but as a guarantee and on condition that Aguilar will replace
petitioners checks with her own, which Aguilar did prior to the maturity of
petitioners checks; that upon maturity of Aguilars replacement checks and after
respondent presented them for payment and were subsequently dishonored, it
was then that petitioners checks were also presented by respondent for
encashment; that Aguilars replacement checks are now subject of another
LEON L. JURADO, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 5, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
33
litigation pending in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City; that the
sequence of events showed that indeed petitioners checks were not intended as
payment to respondent because petitioner had no obligation to respondent; that
the checks were not issued to account or for value; thus, there can be no finding
ofprima facie evidence of the charges against him relying on Magno v. Court
of Appeals.[5]
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution [6] dated May
27, 1998. The prosecutor found that although the issuance of a worthless check
ismalum prohibitum, B.P. Blg. 22 still requires that the checks should be issued
with consideration, which element was lacking in this case; that even
respondent admitted in his Complaint-Affidavit that petitioner had no transaction
with him by alleging that Aguilar handed to him petitioners two checks in
payment of rice procurement representing these as Aguilars collection checks
and with assurance that they are good; that when Aguilar replaced petitioners
checks with her own,petitioners checks had no more consideration since these
were issued upon agreement that the real debtor, Aguilar, will also issue her own
checks.
Respondent appealed the dismissal of his complaint to the Department of
Justice. The Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution [7] dated September 21,
2000 modifying the Resolution of the City Prosecutor and directing him to file an
information against petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The Justice Secretary found that while the dismissal of estafa is correct,
petitioner should be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. In so ruling, the Secretary found
that while petitioner has no business transactions with respondent and merely
issued the checks as a guarantee for Aguilars obligation to respondent, the fact
remains that petitioner issued the subject checks and failed to pay respondent
the amount due thereon or make arrangements for their full payment
within five banking
days
after
receiving a notice
of
dishonor;
that
the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing worthless checks or those dishonored upon their presentment for
payment; that the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation; that to require the arrangement surrounding the
issuance of the checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance
from the punitive provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 on the basis of thatarrangement
would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted, i.e. to stop the
proliferation of unfunded checks; that B.P. Blg. 22 applies even when dishonored
checks were issued merely in the form of deposit or guarantee.
The Justice Secretary denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution[8] dated May 30, 2001.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
On April 26, 2002, the CA issued its assailed Decision denying the petition for
lack of merit. The CA found no grave abuse of discretion committed
by the Justice Secretary in his assailed Resolutions. It ruled that trial on the
merits must ensue since it is on said occasion that petitioner is granted
opportunity for a full and exhaustive presentation of her evidence and not
during the preliminary investigation phase where the investigating officer acts
upon probable cause and reasonable belief; that in the preliminary investigation
phase, it is not yet clear whether petitioner could be considered as having
actually
committed
the
offense
charged and
sought
to
be
punished, although petitioner is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt; that the crux of the matter rests upon the reasons for the
drawing of the postdated checks by petitioner; i.e., whether they were drawn or
issued to apply on account or for value as required under B.P. Blg. 22 which will
only be determined during trial.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 29,
2002. The CA ruled that mere issuance of a bouncing check constitutes a
probable cause for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that whether or not the accused is
guilty thereof is determined in the trial proper; that preliminary investigation is
not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court; that Sales,
which is invoked by petitioner, is not applicable to the instant case, since the
issue in that case was whether or not the Ombudsman followed the proper
procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation and the corollary issue of
whether or not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to
submit controverting evidence which are not the issues in this case.
Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS MODIFIED RESOLUTION FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONER FOR VIOLATION OF B.P.
BLG. 22, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
HAS
AGREED
WITH
THE
FINDING
OF
THE QUEZON
CITY PROSECUTION OFFICE DISMISSING THE CHARGE OF ESTAFA
AGAINST PETITIONER.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
PETITIONERS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE NOT
ISSUED TO ACCOUNT OR FOR VALUE BUT SOLELY TO
GUARANTEE RUBY AGUILARS CHECKS, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING
THAT IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT PETITIONER HAD NO BUSINESS
DEALINGS WHATSOEVER WITH THE RESPONDENT REGARDING
RICE PROCUREMENTS.
III
34
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED
TO GO TO TRIAL IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE EVEN DURING
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE QUEZON
CITY PROSECUTION OFFICE, THE SAID PROSECUTION OFFICE
HAD FOUND THAT NO PRIMA FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS
TO WARRANT THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINTS OF ESTAFA AND
VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
IV
THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE MODIFIED RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE DIRECTING THE FILING OFAN INFORMATION AGAINST
PETITIONER FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 OVERLOOKED THE
FACT THAT RESPONDENT WOULD BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AT
THE EXPENSE OF PETITIONER AND THE DEBTOR, MS RUBY
AGUILAR, IN THE FORM OF IMPOSITION OF A FINE WHICH IS
DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF THE BOUNCED CHECKS. [9]
The main issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in ruling that the
Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that
there is probable cause for the filing of information against petitioner for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner alleges that the CA should not have sustained the modified resolution
of the Secretary of Justice because the Secretary misappreciated her
defense, i.e., that Aguilar lost her Metrobank checkbook and borrowed her check
and that she issued the subject checks on the condition that the same will be
replaced when Aguilars new checkbook is issued, thus the subject checks are
merely accommodation or guarantee checks; that it was Aguilar who tendered
them to respondent in payment ofher rice procurements from him; that the
subject checks were not intended for encashment; that Aguilar subsequently
issued her own checks dated July 20, 1996 and August 20, 1996,
for P431,555.00 each as replacement for the subject checks; that such
substitution was with respondents knowledge, since the arrangement was
brought to his attention through a letter dated July 19, 1996.
Petitioner insists that none of the elements of the offense of B.P. Blg. 22 were
present; the first element is absent, since the subject checks were not intended
to apply on account or for value in favor of respondent, as petitioner had no
business transaction on rice procurements with respondent; the second element
is also absent because it is undisputed that at the time petitioner issued the
checks, she had substantial deposits with FEBTC which can readily fund her
checks upon presentment or maturity; that the reason for the dishonor was stop
payment, because she requested the bank to do so due to a valid reason, i.e.,
her checks were already replaced by Aguilars checks dated July 20, 1996 and
August 20, 1996. Petitioner cites Tan v. People,[10] in which the petitioner was
acquitted of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because in ordering the stop payment of her
check, there were sufficient funds in her account.
Petitioner claims that the CA overlooked the fact that the Secretary of Justice
absolved her of estafa; thus, she should also be absolved of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22,since both offenses arose from the same subject checks.
Petitioner contends that the CA misappreciated the importance of a preliminary
investigation when it ruled that the trial on the merits must ensue, and it is on
said occasion when petitioner is granted the opportunity for a full and
exhaustive display of her evidence; that it erred in ruling that it is only during
trial that the presence or absence of the first element of B.P. Blg. 22, i.e.,
whether the subject checks were issued to apply to account or for value, can be
determined; that preliminary investigation should be given due importance and
the determination of whether the first element of B.P. Blg. 22 is present should
not be shifted to the trial court; that contrary to the CAs finding, Sales is
applicable, a case in which it was ruled that at the preliminary investigation
proper, the question whether or not an accused can be bound over for trial can
already be determined; if it was determined at the preliminary investigation that
an accused had not committed the crime charged, then it is useless to still hold
a trial to determine the guilt of the accused, since it can already be determined
at the preliminary investigation.
We are not persuaded.
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. [11] Probable cause implies probability of guilt
and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would
justify a conviction.[12] A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.
[13]
It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.[14] The complainant
need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the
parties evidence.[15] It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of
arbitrariness, credence is given to the finding and determination of probable
cause by the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation. [16]
Contrary to petitioners claim, respondent sufficiently established the existence
of probable cause for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check
is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
35
less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine
of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who,
having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when
he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
thedrawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or
entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following elements must be present:
1) The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to
account or for value;
2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and
3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment.[17] In Lozano v. Martinez,[18] we have declared that it is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is
to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of
worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property, but an offense against public order. [19] In People v. Nitafan,
[20]
we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt though not intended to be
presented for payment has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall
within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
In this case, petitioner issued the two subject checks in favor of respondent, and
when respondent presented them for payment, they were dishonored for reason
of thestop payment order issued by petitioner. Notably, a certification[21] from
the bank showed that they returned the checks for that reason. In
addition, contrary to the claim of petitioner, at the time the said checks were
presented for deposit/payment, there were no sufficient funds to cover the
same. The mere act of issuing a worthless check -- whether as a deposit, as a
guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt -- is malum prohibitum.[22]
Petitioner claims that the subject checks were merely accommodation checks in
favor of Aguilar, as they were not issued to account or for value, since she
had no business transactions with respondent-payee. However, petitioner
admitted that she issued the checks for the rice procurement of
Aguilar from respondent which was a valuable consideration. Notably, in
respondents complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the subject checks were given
to him by Aguilar in payment of the latters rice procurements, with the
representation that the subject checks were her collection checks and assuring
respondent that they would be good upon presentment.
On record is a letter[23] dated July 31, 1996 of respondents counsel to petitioner
on the matter of petitioners subject FEBTC Check No. 08A096028P dated July 25,
1996, a letter in which the counsel wrote that the check which was in partial
payment of the obligation due from Aguilar, and that in return for petitioners
issuance and delivery of the said check, Aguilar acquired a temporary reprieve
on her obligation.
The validity and merits of a partys defense and accusation, as well as
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level. [24] A finding of probable cause
does not ensure a conviction or a conclusive finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test in a fullblown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or
disproved.[25]
In fact, petitioners argument that respondent was aware of the fact that the
subject checks were only accommodation checks in favor of Aguilar is not a
defense againsta charge for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In Ruiz v. People of the
Philippines,[26] where the accused interposed the defense of accommodation
party, we held:
It bears stressing that, whether a person is an accommodation
party is a question of intent. When the intent of the parties does
not appear on the face of the check, it must be ascertained in
the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Invariably,
the tests applied are the purpose test and the proceeds
test. x x x. And even assuming she was such party, this
circumstance is not a defense to a charge for violation of B.P.
22. What the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued or of the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of
issuing
a
worthless
check,
whether
merely
as
an
accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the agreement
36
surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.[27]
In Meriz v. People of the Philippines,[28] we held:
The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for
the issuance of the check is inconsequential in determining
criminal culpability under BP 22. The Court has since said that a
"check issued as an evidence of debt, although not intended for
encashment, has the same effect like any other check" and must
thus be held to be "within the contemplation of BP 22." Once a
check is presented for payment, the drawee bank gives it the
usual course whether issued in payment of an obligation or just
as a guaranty of an obligation. BP 22 does not appear to concern
itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its
primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and
commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for
currency. It is a policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate
application of the legislative enactment can be made.
The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the
offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query
then is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act
of issuing a bad check, without so much regard as to the
criminal intent of the issuer.[29]
Also, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[30] we held:
It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in
cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of
a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not
make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely
to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the
pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has
not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can
be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore,
the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the
definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing,
without making any exception from the operation thereof in
favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the
statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which
was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was
introduced before the BatasanPambansa, that the bill was
introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to
prevent checks, from becoming useless scraps of paper and to
restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the
purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as
above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that
while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained
a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued
as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved
and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in
the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso
deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the
act more effective (Batasan Record, First Regular Session,
December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).
Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused
had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts
and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment
regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the
checks as a guarantee.[31]
Petitioner invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[32] where the accused
therein was acquitted of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing checks to collateralize an
accommodation and not to cover the receipt of actual account or for
value. In Magno, the accused, who was in the process of putting up a car repair
shop, was provided with credit facilities by LS Finance and Management
Corporation (LS Finance) to enable him to lease from MANCOR the needed
equipments. As part of their arrangement, LS Finance required a 30% warranty
deposit of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments to be transacted
upon. Accused then asked the LS Finance Vice President Joey Gomez to look for a
third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit as
he did not have such amount, however, unknown to the accused, it was
Corazon Teng (Vice President of MANCOR) who advanced the deposit in question
on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3%
interest. The accused subsequently issued checks to collateralize an
accommodation made by Teng amounting to Twenty Nine Thousand Seven
Hundred Pesos (P29,700.00) as warranty deposit. Subsequently, the said checks
bounced; thus
the
accused
was
prosecuted
and the
lower
courtsconvicted him of B.P. Blg. 22. On a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we
however acquitted the accused and held that the "cash out" made by Teng was
not used by the accused who was just paying rental on the equipments. To
charge him for the refund of a "warranty deposit" he did not withdraw, because
it was not his own account and it remained with LS Finance, would be to make
him pay an unjust "debt," to say the least, since he did not actually receive the
amount involved. We also held that this is a scheme whereby Teng as the
supplier of the equipment in the name of Mancor, would be able to sell or lease
its goods as in this case, and at the same time privately finance those who
desperately needed petty accommodations as obtaining in said case; that
this modus operandi, in
so
many
instances, victimized
unsuspecting
businessmen
who
likewise
needed protection
from
the
law
by
availing themselves of the deceptively called warranty deposit, not realizing that
they wouldfall prey to a leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase
agreement, when it was a scheme designed to skim off a business client.
37
It bears stressing that Magno was decided after a full-blown trial, and the
proof needed to convict the accused was proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
was not established in that case.
On the other hand, herein case is still in the preliminary investigation
stage which is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. [33] It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty.[34] It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. [35] We are in accord with the Justice
Secretarys finding that there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by petitioner, thus, we refrain from
prejudging the applicablity or inapplicability of Magno in this case.
Petitioner alleges that at the time she issued the subject checks, she has
substantial funds in the bank to cover the value thereof. This is evidentiary in
nature which must be presented during trial more so in the light of the bank
certification that there were no sufficient funds to cover the checks when
presented for deposit/payment.
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee.
We also find no merit in petitioners claim that since the Secretary of Justice
absolved her of estafa, she should also be absolved of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, since both offenses arose from the same subject checks. While
deceit and damage are essential elements in estafa, they are not required
in B.P. Blg. 22. As already aforestated, under B.P. Blg. 22, mere issuance of a
check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part
of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and is hence
punishable.
We do not subscribe to petitioners argument that for Aguilars rice
procurements from respondent, Aguilar had made substantial payments to
respondent through cashiers checks totalling P313,255.00; that despite these
substantial payments, respondent still wanted to collect from petitioners subject
checks the total amount ofP863,110.00; that respondent wanted to collect from
both petitioner and Aguilar for the latters rice procurement. It is during the trial
of this case that evidence may be introduced to prove petitioners
contentions. As of now, it has been established that when the subject checks
were deposited, they were all dishonored.
Furthermore, the allegation of petitioner that if the information for B.P. Blg. 22
would be filed and in the remote event that petitioner would be found guilty
thereof, then the trial court may impose a fine double the amount of the
checks, which fine may amount to millions of pesos; and that this is unjust
enrichment on respondents part at the expense of petitioner and
Aguilar deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to state that the fine that may be
imposed by the court is not awarded to the private complainant. Fine is imposed
as a penalty and not as payment for a specific loss or injury.[38]
In fine, the CA did not commit any error in upholding the findings of the
Secretary of Justice that probable cause exists that the crime of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2002 and
the Resolution dated July 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are
herebyAFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds.[36] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. [37]

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1

G.R. No. 167461

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis supplied.)

Q: Do you have the check now?

Check No. : 165476

[G.R. No. 144887. November 17, 2004]

Very truly yours, MELQUECEDES DE

The contention is likewise of no merit.

In this case, prosecution witness Edmarcos Basangan testified that after

As regards venue of a criminal action, Section 15, paragraph (a), of Rule

Dear Mr. Rigor,

Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or

Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on

September 17, 1990

G.R. NO. 191404

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESand

Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent Felicisimo S.

Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawers

[G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002]

Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a

1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item

By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know

G.R. Nos. 59568-76 January 11, 1990

without sufficient funds (pp. 1-2, Resolution On Motion To Quash dated

These differences are better understood by presenting the pertinent discussions

In a Resolution[4] dated November 24, 1997, Assistant City Prosecutor

LEON L. JURADO, Promulgated:

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