G.R. No.

L-58445 April 27, 1989

ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences),
respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of
confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees'
compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94
presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's
Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has
led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of
"proof of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it
cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational
disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the
petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection
because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the
respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease
is not compensable because the law says so.
The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on
March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent
headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and
then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the
Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain
tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been
lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly
denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the
Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.

1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment
is compensable under the present compensation laws.
2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the
present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17,
Rollo)
The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as
yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes
people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance.
Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on
land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes the difference whether the victim
is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a
housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of
occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as
compensable, namely
Occupational Diseases

Nature of Employment

xxx xxx xxx xxx

16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and
blood forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in
pulp and paper mills and plywood mills.
17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain

plastic workers.

(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's
allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer.
There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by
specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over
a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust,
among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific
cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.
Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines
"sickness" as follows:

The following issues are raised in this petition:

ART. 167. Definition of Terms. As used in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed
by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For this
purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and workrelated illnesses that may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of
employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly
defines who are entitled. It provides:
SECTION 1.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk
of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing the illness
was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust
fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be
adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed .
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988)
this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which
strikes; people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a
particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical
fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .
To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of
decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision
of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the
distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme.
On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel
scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a
system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by
social insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System and Social
Security System under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was

to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's

compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death
or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980];
Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we
now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to
a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the
validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:
We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the
constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the
petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his
claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by
certiorari.
The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected
claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's
constitutional rights.
xxx xxx xxx
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of
employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have
to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is no notice
of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a
new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the
basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not
compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of
administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to
the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not
have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it
has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of

Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering

from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on
presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no
serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should
be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the
former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions,
adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must
be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that
it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the
greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide
to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)
The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an
understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the
poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate
employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is
fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are
paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees
in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving
a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a
government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance
Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time
assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of
contracting the is increased by working conditions.
The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which
distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.
Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers
throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums
or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust
fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were
undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file
claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the said fund and
making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in
the increased amounts fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State
Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by
the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch the tens
of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered
accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or
premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is
Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot
engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching
implications.
We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually
evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more
types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered
occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either
increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making
it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court
to accomplish.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this
decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from
those stated above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the
public respondents is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan , C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-35741

December 20, 1932

VICTORIA TALLER VIUDA DE NAVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO., defendant-appellee.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Debuque for appellant.
A. de Aboitiz Pinaga for appellee.
De Witt, Perkins & Brady as amicus curiae.

STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Victoria Taller
Vda. de Nava, for the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,00.92 from the Ynchausti
Steamship Co., it being alleged that said amount is due to the plaintiff under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428 of the Philippine Legislature, by reason of
the death of her husband in the course of his duty, while serving as helmsman
(timonel) on the interisland steamer Vizcaya, under the circumstances stated in the
complaint. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the
complaint, and the plaintiff appealed.
The case was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts from which it appears that
the Ynchausti Steamship Co. is engaged in the business of operating vessels in the
coastwise and interisland trade, and on April 2, 1930, the steamer Vizcaya, one of its
vessels, was being maneuvered in the mouth of the Iloilo River, at Iloilo. At this time
Valentin Nava held the position of helmsman (timonel) on said boat, receiving a
monthly compensation of P35. In connection with moving the boat Nava, in charge of
other members of the crew, was engaged in hauling in the ship's cable and in coiling
the cable on the deck of the boat preparatory to passing it down a hatchway and
bestowing it in its proper place in the vessel. While thus engaged Nava found the space
which they required for coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed belonging to
one of the third-class passengers. Nava asked whose bed it was, and Dalmacio
Villanueva, one of the passengers, answered that he was the owner of the bed.
Thereupon Nava said that he (Nava) would push it to another place because it
interfered with the work. Suiting the action to the word, he pushed the bed with his
foot towards the other side of the ship. This act aroused the anger of the owner of the
bed, and hot words were exchanged, in the course of which Villanueva, using one of
the wooden bars of the bed, gave Nava a jab in the pit of the stomach. Under the
impact of this blow Nava leaned back, and at this moment Vicente Villanueva, a
brother of Dalmacio Villanueva, ran up to Nava and stabbed him with a fan knife just
above the left nipple. The blade penetrated Nava's heart and he died almost instantly.
For the crime of homicide thus committed Vicente Villanueva was later sentenced to
imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with

accessories, and was required to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000, with costs. The deceased left a wife and seven children, and this action for
compensation was instituted by the widow, under Act No. 3428 of the Philippine
Legislature, as amended.
The answer of the defendant raises several questions all of which were decided in
favor of the plaintiff by the trial court with the exception of the most vital one which
will chiefly engage our attention in the course of this opinion. But as the defendant
relies in its brief upon the various points decided against it in the appealed decision, it
is advisable to notice these points as preliminary to the discussion of what we consider
to be the main question.
Among other things, it is insisted that the death of Valentin Nava was not an accident
within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428. Under section 2 of
Act No. 3428, as it stood when this incident occurred, compensation is demandable for
"a personal injury from any accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment".
By the word "accident" as here used it is intended to indicate that the act causing the
injury shall be casual, in the sense of being unforeseen, and one for which the injured
party is not legally responsible. Now, in the case before us, the death of Valentin Nava,
was not, at least as regards the perpetrator of the deed, any accident whatever. The
death was caused by the criminal and intentional act of Vicente Villanueva. But an act
may be an accident as regards one person or from one point of view and not an
accident as regards another person and from another point of view. This homicide was
not attributable to the act of deceased himself and was not capable of being foreseen as
a likely consequence of the discharge of his duties. The trial court therefore correctly
held that the death of Nava was due an accident within the meaning of section 2 of Act
No. 3428.
Again, it is insisted that Nava was not an "industrial employee", within the meaning of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, inasmuch as he was employed as a helmsman
(timonel) and his duties were not of an industrial nature. This contention takes too
narrow a view of the meaning of the phrase "industrial employee" as used in the Act
cited. As helmsman on the boat Nava was charged with the performance of duties
connected with piloting of the boat and controlling its movements when in motion.
Duties of this character are clearly of an industrial nature, since they are concerned
with effecting the ends and purposes of industry. The definition of "industrial
employment", as given in subsection (d) of section 39, Act No. 3428, covers all
employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for
the purpose of gain, subject only to the limitation of yearly gross income. Nava was
therefore an industrial employee and entitled to compensation under the Act, provided
the other circumstances attendant upon the accident which caused his death were of
such nature as to bring him within the purview of the Act.
It is further insisted that Act No. 3428, as amended, does not cover the case of an
employee upon a coastwise vessel. In this connection attention is directed to the fact
that, under section 38, Act No. 3428 extends to the cases of "employees engaged in the

interisland trade"; and it was only by Act No. 3812 (section 12) that the provision was
amended so as to include employees engaged in the "coastwise and interisland trade".
From this it is supposed that the case in question does not fall under section 38 of Act
No. 3428. The question is in our opinion without merit. In the first place, the word
"interisland", as originally used in section 38, was apparently used in a broad sense, to
include all shipping in and among the islands, in vessels of Philippine registration, and
it is not limited to shipping from a port of one island to a port of another island. The
expression "the coastwise and" was therefore of clarifying a possible ambiguity and to
bring the phraseology of the Act more into harmony with the technical terms
commonly used in the Customs laws and regulations. Even supposing, therefore, that
the Vizcaya was only engaged in the carrying of trade between different ports of the
same island a fact which does not appear the "accident" with which we are here
concerned should be considered within the purview of the law. It is not apparent that
the meaning of the law was changed in any essential feature by this amendment.
Still, again, it is insisted that the case does not come under Act No. 3428 for the reason
that it does not appear that the defendant had a gross income during the year
immediately preceding the one during which the accident occurred of not less than
P40,000. But we note that in the agreed statement of facts it is stated that during the
last twelve months anterior to the month of April of 1930, the defendant had a gross
income of more than P40,000 as a result of its business. This was evidently intended to
cover the requirement expressed in subsection (d) of section 39 of Act No. 3428, and
although the stipulation does not technically cover the gross earning for the full
calendar year anterior to the calendar year in which the accident occurred, we are of
the opinion that the trial judge committed no error in interpreting the stipulation in that
sense.
Finally, it is supposed that the circumstance that the criminal court imposed the civil
obligation on Vicente Villanueva to indemnify the family of the deceased in the
amount of one thousand pesos makes it improper to allow additional compensation in
this case. As the trial court properly held, the suggestion is without merit. In the first
place, it does not appear that the criminal indemnity has been paid and, in the second
place, that obligation is wholly distinct from the obligation imposed by the Workmen's
Compensation Act and the latter is in no sense subsidiary to the former.lawphil.net
This brings us to consider the most important question in the case, namely, whether the
death of Valentin Nava occurred in the course of his employment, or was the result of
the nature of such employment. In this connection we quote section 2 of Act No. 3428,
which runs as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal
injury from any accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts
any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.

This provision was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812 so as to read as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal
injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of
such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.
This last provision, having been enacted since the death of Valentin Nava, is not
directly applicable to the case before us, but it may properly be quoted for purposes of
comparison and interpretation. Fixing our attention then more particularly upon
section 2 of Act No. 3428, it is quite clear that the death of Valentin Nava was not due
to any illness directly caused by his employment or the result of the nature of such
employment. We are of the opinion, however, that it occurred in the course of his
employment and "in pursuance of the employment", as this expression is used in the
provision cited. The attorneys for the appellee presents a narrow view of Nava's
employment and insists that, inasmuch as he was employed as helmsman, he was
acting within the scope of his duties only when his hand was on the helm of the vessel
and he was engaged in actually guiding its motions. We are of the opinion that his
duties should be considered as having greater latitude. It is true that the term indicative
of his employment was that of helmsman, but we think that his duties should be
considered as comprehending acts done by him in helping to guide the ship. In
maneuvering a vessel, in entering and leaving ports, it is necessary for the ship's
officers in charge of the motions of the vessel to avail themselves of cables; and the
taking in of a cable and the coiling of it upon the deck are acts properly incident to
controlling the motion of the vessel. It results that, when Nava found that one of the
third-class passengers had placed his bed on the deck in a position where it was in his
way, he acted within the scope of his duty when he pushed the bed back; and when the
fatal assault was made upon him because of that act, it must be considered that his
death resulted from an act done in the line of his duty.
At this juncture it may be well to give a few words of explanation concerning the
verbiage of section 2 of Act No. 3428 and of the amendment effected in this section by
Act No. 3812, and particularly in the substitution, in the latter Act, of the expression
"arising out of and in the course of the employment" for the expression "due and to in
the pursuance of the employment" used in Act No. 3428. Upon this point we note that
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine Legislature in Spanish, and the original of
the section is taken from the statutes of the Territory of Hawaii (section 3604, Chapter
209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). Our English version here is the official
translation into English of the Spanish version as adopted by the Philippine
Legislature. In the Hawaiian law the expression used in the part of the statute here
under consideration is "arising out of and in the course of such employment". These
words, after passing through the Spanish version, and upon being turned back into
English, appeared as "due to and in the pursuance of the employment". It follows that
the expression found in the amendatory provision (section 1 of Act No. 3812) is
merely a reversion to the English wording of the Hawaiian statute, which corresponds,

we may add, to the wording commonly used in the American statutes. It is clear
therefore that the amendment introduced by the last named Act was merely intended to
bring the English version of our statute into verbal conformity with the Hawaiian and
other American laws. No change whatever in the meaning of the provision was
intended to be effected by said amendment.
The attorneys for the appellee have called our attention to some American decisions,
which, it is insisted, support the conclusion of the trial court that the homicide which
resulted in the death of Valentin Nava was not an accident due to and in the pursuance
of his employment, as this expression runs in section 2 of Act No. 3428. The cases
most emphatically urged upon us in this connection by the appellee are State of
Minnesota ex rel. School Dist. No. 1, in Itasca County vs. District Court (140 Minn.,
470; 15 A. L. R., 579), and Schmoll vs. Weisbrod & Hess Brewing Co. (89 N. J. L.,
150; 97 Atl., 732). In the first of these cases the facts were as follows:
The school district employed a young woman to teach in the Round Lake school, some
35 miles from Deer River in Itasca County and 25 miles from Black Duck in Beltrami
County, these two places being the nearest railway points. The country was densely
wooded and sparsely settled. The school was a one-room school and fifteen pupils
attended. The nearest house was a half mile away, and the boarding house was a mile
or a mile and a quarter. On the morning of September 20, 1916, an unknown man
asked for food at the boarding place of the teacher. On the evening of that day, when
her work at the school was finished, she started for her boarding house, taking a short
cut through the woods. She had some papers which she intended to correct at home in
the evening, and a book to study. As she was on her way, and when just off the school
grounds, she was criminally assaulted by this for the gratification of his passions, and
as part of the transaction he shot her, destroying the sight of her left eye. She filed a
claim for compensation against the school district, under the Compensation Act, which
required an employer to pay compensation "in every case of personal injury or death
of his employee, caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of the
employment". The District Court for Itasca County awarded the compensation prayed
for, and the School District brought an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, claiming that the injury suffered by the employee did not arise out of and
in the course of the employment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
lower court, and held that the injury for which compensation had been awarded by the
district court did not arise out of the employment.
In the second case it appeared that the deceased was a route foreman in the employ of
the respondent. His duties were to look after the various beer delivery routes and see
that they were properly conducted, and on Saturdays he had a beer delivery where he
delivered beer and collected the moneys therefor. On the 19th day of December, 1914,
on a Saturday night, at about 8 o'clock, the deceased made a delivery of beer at some
dwelling house in Atlantic City leaving his wagon in the street, a little distance away,
and while returning to his wagon he was assaulted and shot by some person unknown.
The deceased mounted his wagon and returned to brewery and accounted to his

employer for the moneys intrusted to and collected by him and then went to a hospital
where he, ten days later, died from the effects of the gunshot wound.
In the first of these cases it is quite evident that there was no causal relation between
the service which the plaintiff as a teacher, had rendered and the assault which was
committed upon her. In the second case the motive of the assault was evidently
robbery, and there was no direct connection between the work done by the victim of
the robbery and the assault. If it had appeared, in the first case, that the teacher had
been attacked while in the act of properly disciplining one of her pupils, and because
of that fact, it would, we think, have been held that the injury had been incurred in the
course of her employment. The second case brings us perhaps into more debatable
ground, but the casual relation between the performance of duty and the assault was
not as manifest as in the case now before us. The following decisions, gleaned from
American jurisprudence, shed further light upon the situation before us:
In In re Wooley vs. Minneapolis Equipment Co. and Globe Indemnity Co. (157 Minn.,
428; 196 N. W. 477), where a salesman was shot and killed in a street brawl brought
on by himself and for his own purposes, even though he was engaged in his
employee's business just before the fracas, and intended to resume it afterwards, the
court held that the injury did not arise out of the employment.
In Scholtzhauer vs. C. & L. Lunch Co. (233 N. Y., 12; 134 N. E., 701), it was held that
the injury did not arise out of the employment, where a waitress in a restaurant was
shot by a negro dish-washer because she had declined an invitation to out with him
and had stated that she would not go out with a negro.
In the case now in hand it seems clear to us that the plaintiff is entitled to the
compensation demanded and no question has been made as to the amount thereof.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed, and the plaintiff will recover
of the defendant the sum of P1,000.92, with interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint and with costs. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-47360

November 28, 1940

BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., recurrente y apelante,

vs.
FERMINA VIUDA DE MADANGUIT Y OTROS, recurridos y apelados.
Sres. Alvear y Agrava en representacion de la recurrente.
D. Antonio Logarta y D. Cecilio I. Lim en representacion de los recurridos.
HORRILLENO, J.:
Este es un recurso de certiorari promotivao por la Bohol Land Transportaion Co.
contra Fermina Viuda de Mandaguit, la recurrida, en el que pide se revoque la decision
del Tribunal de Apelaciones, promulgada el 28 de febrero de 1940, la cual, copiada
literalmente, dice asi:.
Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, Ramon
Madanguit left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian of another
municipality in the afternoon of May 17, 1937. On the road he overtook and passed
another truck of the defendant, and in doing so he fell but collided with Ciriaco
Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite direction),practically ditching him.
Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's truck, which a few
minutes later had to park in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because
some pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop, Madanguit went
to the Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty
when he cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the
drug store, and, without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted
and having pleaded guilty was sentenced accordingly.
Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act No.
3428, as amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for
the total sum of P1,507.58, to be paid in the manner directed. The defendant appealed,
questioning not the amount of compensation nor the manner of payment thereof, but
the right of the plaintiff to be compensated, and submitting the proposition: First, that
the death did not arise out of Madanguit's employment and in the course thereof; and,
second that compensation is not due because the death occurred on the account of
Madanguit's notorious negligence, or intention to inflict injury upon Dalmao.
We are of the opinion that under the facts stated at the beginning of this decision, the
death of Madanguit arose out, and in the course of his employment. It appears that
because while driving the defendant's truck he offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and
killed him.
But the defendant maintains that there is no competent proof regarding Dalmao's
motive, maintaining that the declaration in open court of the widow of Madanguit,

who merely repeated Dalmao's testimony in the criminal case against him for murder
is hearsay and incompetent evidence. But hearsay evidence regarding the motive or
intention of a person is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule. (See Wigmore
on Evidence, par. 1729, et seq.: and also notes to its Supplement.) And view of the fact
that the declarations of Dalmao were made under the sanction of an oath, and the
defendant itself presented Exhibit 9 (testimony of some witness in the criminal case
against Dalmao), which corroborates the widow's testimony, we cannot say that there
is not enough evidence about the motive impelling Dalmao's murderous hand.
At any rate, the declaration of the widow at pages 22 to 25 of the transcript of the
stenographic notes were not objected to as hearsay, and for all purposes are in the
record entitled to some value. (Diaz vs. U.S., 223 U.S. 442.).
Nevertheless, let us suppose, that proof of Dalmao's resentment is insufficient. Then
Madanguit's injury does not appear to have arisen out of his employment; yet it being
undeniable that he was killed 'in the course of his employment' (see Jackson vs.
Dairyman's Creamery, 162 S.E., 359; Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. vs. Sartonio, 12
Pac. [2nd] 221, his family is entitled to compensation under the decision of the
Supreme Court in Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., G.R. 39721, Oct 23, 1993
(Philippine Cases on Workmen's Compensation by Butalid, p.7)
Referring to the second point, the accident did not arise out of his employment, which
was that of operating the machine and fixing it when it was out of commission,
inasmuch as said accident did not occur while he was engaged in said work and as a
consequence thereof.
"But that the accident occurred in the course of his employment there can be no doubt,
for the reason that, being an employee of the firm and while riding in the wagon
furnished by the company to bring then home within the concession after their work,
plaintiff was within the radius of action and under the control of the defendant
company." (Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., supra ).
In Bellosillo vs. City of Manila (G.R. No. 34522, November 9, 1931, Butalid, supra, p.
16), a workman employed on a public street temporarily left his work and crossed the
street, he was run over by an automobile and killed. The Supreme Court gave him
compensation under Act 3428, holding that the injury was caused by an accident due
to, and in pursuance of, his employment.
It should be noted in this connection that in constructing this specific provision of the
Workmen's compensation law, the tendency is towards liberality in favor whenever an
employee suffers injury in the course of his employment, a reasonable factual
presumption, is that the hurt arose out of the employment.
The defendant attempted to establish the fact that Madanguit owed Dalmao about
P3.50; that on May 17, just a few minutes before the killing, Dalmao stopped
Madanguit and asked for payment, that Madanguit paid no attention to Dalmao,

whereupon the latter became enraged, followed Madanguit and killed him. The theory
is not plausible for it is unlikely that for a small indebtedness Dalmao should take
away the life of an individual. it is also incredible that he should stop a truck to
demand payment. But this alleged debt of Madanguit lends color to the plaintiff's
version, because his rudeness in crowding Dalmao out of the street was resented by the
latter, who, as a creditor of Madanguit, evidently expected better treatment.
The other defense that the killing was caused by Madanguit's intention to inflict
injuries upon Dalmao, or to his notorious negligence, is concededly premised on the
assumption that the decision in criminal case No. 4180, Exhibit E, is admissible
(appellant's brief, p.34). As we agree with the defendant that said Exhibit, for the
purpose of showing the facts recited therein, is not admissible, we do not have to go
into this defense, specially because we are not convinced there was notorious
negligence or wilfull misconduct on the part of Madanguit.
The net result is that plaintiff are entitled to compensation. And as the defendant has
assigned no error as to the rate or amount of the award, the judgment appealed from
will be affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
La recurrente, como fundamento de su recurso, alega:.
1. The Second Division of said Court of Appeals completely disregarded the fact
that the death of Ramon O. Madanguit was not an accident at all and erroneously held
that, because Ramon O. Madanguit was murdered by Ciriaco Dalmao in the Lourdes
Drug Store, the said death arose in the coarse of his employment or as a result of said
employment it been found by said Second Division of Court of Appeals that the death
of the deceased arose from the following facts:
. . . "On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant, and in doing
so he fell but collided Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite direction),
practically ditching him, Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's
truck which a few minutes after had to park in front of the house of Attorney Celestino
Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the
stop. Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash his hands
which had become dirty when he cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco Dalmao
arrived, went into the drug store and without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death.
Dalmao was prosecuted, and having pleaded guilty, was sentence accordingly."
2. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals committed an error in holding the
deceased was not notoriously negligent when,
(a) The deceased violated and disregarded the rules and regulations of petitioner by
starting late from; petitioner's garage which fact accounted for deceased going to the
Lourdes Drug Store to wash his hands and comb his hair; and

(b) The deceased disregarded the right of Ciriaco Dalmao, his assailant, by almost
colliding with, and there was not enough space for his truck to go through without
causing injury or damage to the travelling public.
3. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals also committed an error of law in
implied holding that petitioner is an insurer against all accidental injuries which might
happened to its employees while in the course of their employment and holding that,
because the deceased was murdered on account of his carelessness and derelictions of
duty, the said deceased Ramon O. Madanguit died in the course of his employment.
(See par. 2, p.2, decision, Appendix A.)
4. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals again committed an error of law by
concluding that petitioner is answerable for the death of decease when it itself finds
that "It appears that because while driving the defendant's truck he (the deceased)
offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and killed him" and . . .
5. Finally, the decision of the Second Division of Court of Appeals is against the
applicable decision of this Honorable Court in that it applied without exception and
limitation, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law in holding that 'the
tendency is towards liberality in favor of the employee. And perhaps it is not error to
say that whenever an employee suffers injuries in the course of his employment, a
reasonable factual presumption is that the hurt arose out of the employment' when
according to the case Vergara vs. Pampanga Bus Co., G.R. No. 44149, January 9,
1936; Vol. V, lawyers' Journal, p. 372, this Honorable Court says:
"We have heretofore given repeated evidence of our desire to see a spirit of liberality
characterize the construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We have
endeavored to interpret the Act to promote its purpose. We have even gone so far as to
interpret it fairly in favor of the employee. But we cannot construct the Act to fit
particular cases, and in this particular case neither the facts nor the law are
demonstrative of a meritorious claim on the part of the employee coming within the
purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act."
No se discuten por la recurrente, ni puede discurtilos en esta instancia, los hechos
declarados probados por el Tribunal de Apelacion en su decision objeto del presente
recurso, a sabeer:
Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, Ramon
Madanguit left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian of another
municipality in the afternoon of May 17, 1938. On the road he overtook and passed
another truck of the defendant and in doing so he fell but collided with Ciriaco Dalmao
(the riding a bicycle in the opposite direction), practically ditching him. Dalmao
immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's truck, which few minutes later
had to work in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some
pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop, Madanguit went to the
Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when

he cleaned the truck. in the meantime , Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug
store, and without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted, and
having pleaded guilty, was sentence accordingly.
Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act
3428, as amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for
the total sum of P1,507,58, to be paid in the manner directed. The defendant appealed,
questioning not the amount of compensation nor the manner of payment thereof, but
the right of the plaintiff to be compensated, and submitting the proposition: First, that
the death did not arise out of Madanguit's employment and in the course thereof; and,
occurred on account of Madanguit's notorious negligence, or intention to inflict upon
Dalmao.
La unica cuestion, por consiguiente, que se plantea ante Nos es la de si, en vista de
tales hechos, procede o no otorgar a la recurrida los beneficios de la Ley de
Compensacion de Obreros No. 3428, segun ha sido enmendada por la Ley No. 3812.
Dicha ley, tal como ha sido enmendada, dispone en su articulo 2, lo siguiente:
ART. 2. Motivos para una compensacion. Cuando un empleado sufre una lesion
personal por accidente proveniente de, y en el curso de su empleo, o contrajere una
enfermedad causada directamente por el empleo o como resultado de la naturaleza de
dicho empleo, su patrono le pagara una compensacion en las cantidades y a las
personas que se especifican mas adelante.
En Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., R.G. No. 39721, este Tribunal, entre otras cosas,
declaro que Pollisco tenia derecho a la compensacion no obstante haber ocurrido el
accidente despues de su trabajo y mientras volvia ya a su casa. El caso de autos es, a
nuestro juicio, mas fuerte y meritorio todavia que el citado de Pollisco. Como se
desprende de los hechos probados segun el Tribunal de Apelacion, Madanguit, el
difunto, era el chofer de uno de los buses de la recurrente, Bohol Land Transportation
Co., y mientras guiaba el coche, este choco contra la bicicleta que montaba Ciriaco
Dalmao; que momentos despues, casi inmediatamente, Madanguit paro su coche frente
a la casa del abogado Celestino Gallares, por haber recibido seas de algunos peatones
que querian coger el camion y, aprovechando esta oportunidad, bajo de el y se dirigio
al Lourdes Drug Store con el objeto de lavarse las manos que se habian ensuciado al
limpiar su coche. Entretanto, Ciriaco Dalmao llego y entro en la botica y, sin mas ni
mas, apualo a Madanguit que murio en el acto.
En otro asunto, Bellosillo vs. City of Manila, R.G. No. 34522, decidido por este
Tribunal, se declaro que un obrero de la Ciudad de Manila, que trabajaba en las calles
publicas, tenia derecho a la compensacion bajo la ley, a pesar de haber dejado
temporalmente su trabajo y cruzado la calle, momento en que fue atropellado por un
automovil que le dejo muerto en el acto. En Corpus Juris, pag. 673, tomo 71, hallamos
lo siguente:

. . . where the employee is injured while seeking toilet facilities or going to ro from a
toilet, the injury arises out of the employment and in the course of it . . .
El Tribunal de Apelacines, por tanto, no incurrio en error alguno al decidir este asunto,
confirmando en todas sus partes el fallo del tribunal a quo a favor de Fermina Vda. de
Madanguit, la recurrida.
En su consecuencia, procede, y asi lo declaramos, confirmar en todas sus partes la
decision objeto del recurso, con las costas en ambar instancias a cargo de la recurrente.
Asi se ordena.
Avancea, Pres., Imperial, Diaz y Laurel, MM., estan conformes.

G.R. No. L-26341

November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for
herself and in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all
surnamed PABLO, respondents.
Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.
Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children.

employment" are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied;3

however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is
unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions
of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words
"arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances
under which the accident takes place.5
As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course
of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place
where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is
engaged in doing something incidental thereto.6

CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to
as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the
decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to
the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin,
Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as
reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the
Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed
as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in
front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road
commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say
anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown
as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of
the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like
Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main
IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the
left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The
entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death
occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the
employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death
was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment
of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific",1 phrase The two components of
the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment."2 The two
components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of

The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule,"
simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in,
going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's
compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions,
to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of
his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises
of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3)
where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment
or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected
with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment,
provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment.8
We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second
exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a
customary means of ingress and egress.
This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber
Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while
proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a
ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died the
next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the
employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in
favor of the claimant thus:
The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner
intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover
for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of
his employment." Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the
deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the
entire working hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in
the morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at full
speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or

sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident
in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and
therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R.
No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's
Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was
allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work,
along a path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latter's
laborers.
In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned
injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m.
(March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he
stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2- meters from it between
the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and
intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a
result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced
by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned
thus:
The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming
from his work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice
Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or
from work on a public highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs.
Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the
employee would not have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since
the same can usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial
Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures the employee against losses
arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act
covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with
something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In
order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has
been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have caused
or allowed to exist. Hence,

In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no particular
causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either his work
or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not
show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the
employees," neither does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual
waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.
Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is
not amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of
law here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State
precedents.
From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws
(1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations:
Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from
work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.
The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out
of" the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the
employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of
injury or "out of" the employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element of
time and space, or "time, place and circumstances."
Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one
hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of
"in the course of" the employment is flatly raised.

It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved

normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and
therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have
removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.)

Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these
injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or
person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states
find something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very
broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises
leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the
employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect
the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any
employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are protected premises.

It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30,
1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he
was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front
of the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an
obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer should have
taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special
way, to the occurrence of the accident.

There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance
before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the
United States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges
the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his
employer's brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short
crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his

employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have
begun. So long as causal relation to the employment is discernible, no federal question
arises.
The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses
the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to
or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is
on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether
in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee
is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is
travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the
employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the
employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6)
where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use
there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own
peculiar circumstances.
Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:
The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee
is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or
going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still
in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by
reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized
way of ingress, or egress either on land under the control of the employer, or on
adjacent property with the express or implied consent of the employer.
On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:
The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case
of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the
public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover
injuries received while going to or from work on public streets, where the employee
has not reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question whether an injury
arises out of and in the course of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the
facts of each case, and in some cases, where an injury occured while the employee was
going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employer's premises, it has
been held compensable.
Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was
held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the employee
slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's place of
business, while on her way to report for duty, and just before entering by the only
entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the general rule that,
if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from
some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or

while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the protection of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to this rule and that
the employment is not limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the scene
of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and
opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment. The court
reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's
place of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in
front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection
with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of
the employer's premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury
was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about
five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile
owned and driven by another employee, within a short distance from the employer's
plant, which was located at the dead end of a street maintained by the employer from
its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public
one, it led nowhere except to the employer's plant, and all of its employees were
obliged to use it in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the
conditions under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no
option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and
environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the employer in
his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering his
employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is
pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within
the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course
of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions
and environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment and his
injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for which
compensation has been provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law.
99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:
It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the
absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and
where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or
from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight
of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or
not occurring, in the course thereof.
However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to
qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and
conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case, and
the cause of the injury.

Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for
extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:
We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises
injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and
highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not
based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of
private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an employee is on public
highway he is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of
any right conferred by his contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say
that while he is on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract right,
otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered
employee should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to
enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.
A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment
beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and
hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the
premises of the employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish
between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a
distinction without a difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as
public or private is obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not
conclusive.
Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:
We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not
nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the
premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct
"arising out of" or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant
must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold
that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)
We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an
"accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the
word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual
or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible."12
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation
was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the
ship's cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the
passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava
expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered

by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood,
jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to
Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which
Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The
latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes
later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus
to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him
to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose
out of and in the course of employment.
In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of
another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union;
while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but
Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee
stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained
by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the
evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its
origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the
assailant."
In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.
In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while
driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the
Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the
employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.
In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised.
While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly
behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the
driver never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death and
then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the assault, although there
were intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority
decision17 ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the
employee died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions
of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the
workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor
of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the workconnection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase
the risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or
harm sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the
increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the
employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs

having to do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with
keeping or carrying of money which subject to the employee to the risk of assault
because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to
direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a
bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its
nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of
employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving
dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying or
keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible
members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate
contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2)
jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment;19 and (3) jobs of
employees whose work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the
employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as
where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired, or where the argument was
over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the violence
was due to labor disputes.20
In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have
arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of employment. This
Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a
claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act.21 According to
this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the
corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say:
In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption
in favor of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts
statute provides:
In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or
mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that
sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not
occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.
This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except
that the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving
an employee's death or inability to testify.
The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that
the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death
or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not
so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind
of preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can attach.

Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one
of your employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the
affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no
connection between the death and the environment.
It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will
give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which
claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor
that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show
where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of
employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment"
factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.
We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs.
Gunderman & Sons:22
The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of
showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course
of his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other
evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation
Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the
employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that
there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries
did arise out of and in the course of the employment." Proof of the accident will give
rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection appears between the
accident and the employment.
Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:
The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of
employment," was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were
put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors
should be observed in the various categories discussed.
A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not
been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single
concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum
theory of work-connection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must
be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the "arising" quantity is large,
the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising"
quantity is very small but the "course" quantity is relatively large.
But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will
not be met.

As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may
cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises,
outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by
a hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from
the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the
premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award,
since the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the
unmistakable character of the causal relation of the injury to the employment has been
sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course" factor. Another example of the
same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to travelling
men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of
these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is
sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the
conditions of employment as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into
the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a
burning hotel will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal
connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak
"course" factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the employer at
the time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too
small to support an award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is
strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of
compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee, although living on
the premises is not on call.

Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the
causal element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors
were likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of
employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and
the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited
from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak (a
cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an unexplained
fall); yet an award was made in New York.

A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline

course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from
work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and
dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work.

1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which

arise out of and in the course of employment.

As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising"
element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the
unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test
is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the
active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the
injury whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or
a mistaken assault by a stranger is not distinctly associated with employment
conditions as such, and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury
would not have occurred to this employee but for the obligation of the employment
which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so
strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on these facts.
Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for
measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation
coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak
both on course of employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the
court is capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in

But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and
arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz
v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing
her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here
we see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch
period; as to the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal
appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each
weakness standing alone lunch period, care of appearance, negligence would not
be fatal; there are many awards in which one or another of these is present. But when
all are present, while an award is not impossible and could be defended on a point by
point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer.
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.
In resume:

2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is
weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are
weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come
within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link
must first be shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury
occurred in the course of employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the
employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is
present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the
employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing
something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his
place of work, is not of the employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but
while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and
egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises
injuries is that there is a causal connection between the work and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault
because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault.
From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in
mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the
particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any
perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the
liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was
killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the
deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led
straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it
belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of
the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was
obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an
extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the
"shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and
therefore within the employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be
used in connection with the private road for the ingress and egress of the employees it
did not apparently take the necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by
employing security guards."
But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the
Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as
to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road.
The decision of the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO.
All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from
work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the
gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that
"the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20)
meters away from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in
the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was
implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to the
Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the incident
took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is
absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were
owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that the assault arose "in the
course of employment."23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would

have fenced it, and place its main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the
public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was
using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads
directly to its main gate.24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from
either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one or
a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged
with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its
premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only
that road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have
instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where
Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly
nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the
IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just
finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal
from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in
Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate
to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within
the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our
principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment.
We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even
though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin
of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the
work is to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or
implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's
premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical
effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the
course of employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was
engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment
may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space
before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule,
employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the
employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the
rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress
and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.
The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty
meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO

employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty meters
on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It
follows that Pablo's death was in the course of employment.
In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage
to employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart
therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished
within a reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a
continuance of the course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee
a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain
hazards adjacent thereto."
The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would
appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was
held that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period,
fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises and
one other located thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection
with those premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the
sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two
business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO
premises which appear to be at the end of the private road.
We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation
of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe
passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure
from his work seems without question."
We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29
The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an
employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the
place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most
instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all
members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do
with and originating in the work or business of the employer....
Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access"
cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the
employer for use as a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of the
employee's work has been held to be in the course of his employment. The courts have
said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer's premises as to be
fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal
authorities dealing with this exception to the general rule.
The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we
think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112

Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by
Hartburg Lumber Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in
Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's
facilities. A railroad track ran through the town and a part of the lumber company's
facilities was situated on either side of the right-of-way. A public road ran parallel to
the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the property of the lumber
company. This crossing was used by any member of the public desiring to go to any
part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work at
noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the
purpose of resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the crossing
in question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's
death did not originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the time of
his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from
other states and especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and
arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were
compensable under the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so
intimate a relation to the lumber company's premises that it could hardly be treated
otherwise than as a part of the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber
company had rights in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the
lumber company's business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In
announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:
Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing
provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He
encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform
the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself to such
dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the lumber
company's business. He had reached a place provided and used only as an adjunct to
that business, and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the
business was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or
business of the lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to this
remedial statute, which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its
purpose and to promote justice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref.,
this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee
was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In
discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney said:
Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his
safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with which
he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and

necessity for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading
over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated
in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time,
place and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or
business of the employer.
Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err.
ref., this court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice
Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful
Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R.
1402, as follows:
An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where
the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or
implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's
premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical
effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the
course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was
engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment
may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space
before the place where the work is to be done is reached.
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road
where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an
"access area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a
part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation"
to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises,
either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of
its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of
easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of
access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO
was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against
dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault
by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over the said area
which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his
death.
As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself
killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement
that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a
causal connection between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the
injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving
Company vs. Jones:31

While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to
the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in
the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557
[137 S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E.
2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be compensable,
injuries do not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where
the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an
injury there occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all
others ... unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such
conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co.
v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley
Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.
But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held
liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed,
because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence,
the injury was in the course of employment, and there automatically arises the
presumption invoked in Rivera that the injury by assault arose out of the
employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the employment.
We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from
overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's
death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it
were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty meters
from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion
of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question
arising from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant therein:
We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that
which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably
older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending,
however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet
new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be suppressed
because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be
decided in the light of then existing law.
Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to
afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which
it was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death.
The Commission did not err in granting compensation.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. L-46046 April 5, 1985

EMELITA ENAO, petitioner,
vs.
THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC.

ALAMPAY, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission (E.C.C.), dated October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for Compensation
of income benefits due to the injuries sustained by her when on August 1, 1975, while
on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies and other training
and school aids for her office, she, together with others, were ambushed by
unidentified men believed to be communist insurgents.
The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed
decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission, subject of the
petition in this case.
... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together
with others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr.,
Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer
of her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per
District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station
when their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed men hitting her on her
forearm and abdomen necessitating operation' (Part II, Income Benefits Claim for
Payment), and according to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the ambushed
party, she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing supplies and
other training and school aids necessary for furthering (our) services as a school
teacher' (Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, respectively). When the
appellant and her group were at barrio de Venta Perla, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte,
they were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be communist insurgents. As
a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left forearm and
abdomen which compelled her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial
Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel)
from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 10 to 12,
1975 for definitive treatment. She also developed interstitial pneumonia as a result.
(Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9).

On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of

Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga
City. It is said that this claim was not controverted.
On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein
petitioner with the Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by
the System in its letter-decision, dated February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that:
It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing your needs,
you were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be NPAS. Though this happened
on August 1, 1975, a regular working day, this was considered your off day, having
held classes in its stead on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District Memorandum No. 1,
s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such situation, for purposes of the Employees'
Compensation, said accident happened outside your time and place of work, not to
mention the fact that you were not in the performance of your official functions when
it happened.
In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 7)
Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion
for reconsideration thereof, the latter appealed to the Employees' Compensation
Commission. On October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS
appealed from and dismissed the Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:
... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was an
off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1, series of 1975 and dated June 2,
1975, win show that August 1, 1975, is not just an isolated off-day, but one of those
dates fixed and set in lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not during office
hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City; more aptly
put, while outside t-he school premises where she normally discharges her official
functions. The sworn statement of the Acting Administrative Officer and the
appellant's witness all point to the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's
witnesses testified in an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City
on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids
to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative
Officer more credible-that is, the appellant was on her way home from station-for there
is nothing which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other hand,
the preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's
witnesses, are only prima facie evidence of weak probative force and are in themselves
self-serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation of a future
litigation. It has been said that 'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au the fallacies
of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at bar, upon the
happening of the accident, the companions of the appellant perhaps still sympathetic to
her for what befall her, and testifying in an affidavit, are apt to side with her. (Annex
"B", Rollo, pp. 9-10)

In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the
Respondent ECC has decided the claim in a way not in accordance with law and
applicable decision of the Supreme Court.
At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law
are to be found in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, which provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds.(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours;
(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be; and
(3) The employee must have been performing his official function.
The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday,
from her station at the Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte,
intended to procure supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in
connection with her services as a school teacher at the Wilbon Primary School, cannot
be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who
appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita
Adanza, have attested in their respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at
that time on their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other
training and school aids necessary for the furtherance of their services as school
teachers." There is no mention at an in the decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission that this particular assertion has been at all contradicted or controverted
by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the Commission by the GSIS.
We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation
Commission in its decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are
merely self-serving declarations because We can discern no circumstance that would
indicate or support such a conclusion. As a matter of fact, the decision appealed from
accepts the fact that the statements given by Petitioner-Appellant's witnesses constitute
prima facie evidence of the matter sought to be established. Uncontroverted and
unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would suffice
to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and
which caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from
August 1 to 6, 1975 for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog
Medical Center from September 1 to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected.

The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the
referred self-serving declaration of her witnesses "in anticipation of a future litigation"
is unfair and untenable. Petitioner could not have even expected that respondent GSIS
would resist her claim. Notice of the same claim for the injuries she sustained is said to
have been presented to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division
Superintendent of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del Norte at Dipolog City,
promptly on August 5, 1975, or four (4) days after the ambush incident and such claim
was not controverted by said public school officials. These submissions of PetitionerAppellant have not at all been contradicted by Respondent. No cause has, therefore,
been shown why petitioner would have been to obtain false affidavits from her coteachers whose sense and probity and righteousness must be presumed until otherwise
disproved.
Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not
at all, by this singular circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence
submitted in this case that Petitioner and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog
City at the time to purchase needed supplies and other training and school aids. That
Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place of residence, in this instance,
becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental.
As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing
her official functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was
then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in
the Petitioner's place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school
materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school
premises and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is
significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which
the Court finds to be so.
The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of
Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-42627, February 21,
1980, 96 SCRA 260, where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held
that a claim arising from a vehicular accident sustained by a school principal on his
way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein ruled that "where
an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of
work, while she is going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen
out of and in the course of her employment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed
from is hereby SET ASIDE, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby
ordered to grant the Petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits and to process and
ascertain the total amount due herein Petitioner and thereafter to pay the same.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la

Fuente, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 90204

death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a
result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).

May 11, 1990

MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution

No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:
and

GOVERNMENT

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school
teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the ground that the cause of death
was not work-connected.

We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum
septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting from the entrance
into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution
of the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of intoxication.
The cause of this condition in the instant case was the infected vaginal lacerations
resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child which took place at home. The
alleged accident in school could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this
case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working
conditions of the deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a
classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the
Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a
classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years. Her husband, the
petitioner, is also a public school teacher.

Hence, this petition for review.

On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a
classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy,
accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of
abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from
recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of
the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report
to the school because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11)
days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at
home (p. 8, Rollo).

Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates

the grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an
employee, as follows:

Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and
headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February
11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum
due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after
five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died three (3) days
later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old, survived
by her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the
youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo).
On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February
14, 1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which
held that 'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease,
and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of
her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have precipitated the

After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the
comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents'
peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

Sec. 1.
Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.

The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is
admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a
classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment
is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her
employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor
caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall
precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature
termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the
classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development
of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the
proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading
to her demise.
. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however, as
might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or relation, but
rather, [is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It
must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere
preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been
adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent
cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.)
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil.
181.)
Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:
. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening
upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur.
132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I Larson Workmen's Compensation Law
3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from
the primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.)
Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her
employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from
it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia
post partum and death, are compensable.

There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's
post partum septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the
decedent's delivery of her child at home" for the incident in school could not have
caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid infection during
or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).
The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a
disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not
accidentally fall in the classroom.
It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital
operating room instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she
had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not
have suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have contracted the
fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5) days in the
hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably would not have died.
But who is to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and the services of
trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries
that the Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of
poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained
doctors and nurses when they or members of their families are in. Penury compelled
the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at home instead of in a hospital.
The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless
for her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people
from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of
living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution and
Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and underpaid public
school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to
ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with adequate medical care or
the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane
society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the
petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents
ignored this imperative of Government, and thereby committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees
Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered
to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania
Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid,
plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 182978-79

April 7, 2009
1. The Police Report on the Death

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their
daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and
JAIME ORTIZ (President,White Falcon Services, Inc.), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 184298-99

2. The Medical Diagnosis

Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian
The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of the hospital; time 12.20 P.M.
and she was unconscious, blue, no pulse, no respiration and the first aid esd
undertaken but without success.

April 7, 2009

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their daughter,
Jasmin G. Cuaresma), Petitioners,
vs.
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND
PROMOTION, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding
White Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.
solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of
US$4,686.73 in actual damages with interest.
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service
Exporter and Promotion, Inc.2 (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a
corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was
found dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her
mouth foaming and smelling of poison.3
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the
Al-Birk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmins body, the likely cause of her
death was poisoning. Thus:
According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk Police Station, for
examining the corpse of Jasmin Cuaresma, 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk
Hospital.

3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory system and brain
damage due to an apparent poisoning which is under investigation.4
Name
: Jasmin Cuaresma
Sex : Female
Marital Status : Single Nationality: Philipino (sic)
Religion : Christian
Profession
: Nurse
Address : Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The Philippines
On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar, both have examined
the dead body of Jasmin Cuaresma, at 12.20 P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the result
was:
1. Report of the Police on the death
2. Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the Extrimes (sic), total halt to
blood circulation and respiratory system and brain damage. There were no external
injuries. Likely poisoning by taking poisonous substance, yet not determined. There
was a bad smell in the mouth and unknown to us.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the
City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting
medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not
poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining physician. The City Health
Officer found that Jasmin had abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds
and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions)
on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular
hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the
labia minora of the vaginal area.6
On March 11, 1999, Jasmins remains were exhumed and examined by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested
negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.7

Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmins parents and her surviving
heirs, received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the
following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life;
P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its
principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and
insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmins death.8
In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmins death was work-related, having
occurred at the employers premises;9 that under Jasmins contract with Becmen, she
is entitled to "iqama insurance" coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory
damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly
salary of US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years
(or the remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25,
assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60).
The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmins death under mysterious
circumstances, they suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they
claim, was aggravated by findings in the autopsy and exhumation reports which
evidently show that a grave injustice has been committed against them and their
daughter, for which those responsible should likewise be made to pay moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing
a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on
the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise
deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits
totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled
to "iqama insurance" because this refers to the "issuance" not insurance of iqama,
or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary
damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have
not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmins case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution
alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White
Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines.
Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated
Becmens arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision10 dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk
Hospital finding that Jasmin died of poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that
Jasmin committed suicide. In any case, Jasmins death was not service-connected, nor
was it shown that it occurred while she was on duty; besides, her parents have received

all corresponding benefits they were entitled to under the law. In regard to damages,
the Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of
Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report,
respectively, the Commission, via its November 22, 2002 Resolution11 declared that,
based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of compensable workconnected criminal aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending
physicians report as well as the KSA police report, finding the same to be
inconclusive. It declared that Jasmins death was the result of an "accident" occurring
within the employers premises that is attributable to her employment, or to the
conditions under which she lived, and thus arose out of and in the course of her
employment as nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in the form
of Jasmins lost earnings, including future earnings, in the total amount of
US$113,000.00. The Commission, however, dismissed all other claims in the
complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the
Commission issued its October 9, 2003 Resolution12 reducing the award of
US$113,000.00 as actual damages to US$80,000.00.13 The NLRC likewise declared
Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals.14 On June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision,15 the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the execution of the decision,
it should first be enforced against White Falcon Services and then against Becmen
Services when it is already impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White
Falcon).
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court affirmed the NLRCs findings that Jasmins death was
compensable, the same having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually
provided by the employer. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred
within the employers premises, arising out of and in the course of her employment.
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the appellate
court rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
award of US$80,000.00 in actual damages is hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus
interest at the legal rate computed from the time it became due until fully paid.

Petitioners are hereby adjudged jointly and solidarily liable with the employer for the
monetary awards with Becmen Service Exporter and Promotions, Inc. having a right of
reimbursement from White Falcon Services, Inc.
SO ORDERED.17
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmins death
was compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual
damages in the amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected, because
the same may be charged only against the perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict.
Instead, the appellate court held that Jasmins beneficiaries should be entitled only to
the sum equivalent of the remainder of her 36-month employment contract, or her
monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19) months, with legal interest.
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The
Cuaresmas, on the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision,
but it was denied. They are now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R.
Nos. 182978-79.
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE MORE
CREDENCE AND WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE
CABANATUAN CITY HEALTH OFFICE THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE
REPORTS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF KINGDOM OF SAUDI
ARABIA AND AL-BIRK HOSPITAL.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE BASIS OF THE
POSITION PAPERS AND ANNEXES THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY
REPORT, IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS
CAUSED BY CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO.
35741, DECEMBER 20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE STILL GOOD LAW.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA NOTWITHSTANDING ITS
ADMISSIONS THAT "IQAMA INSURANCE" WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR
SINCE "IQAMA" IS NOT AN INSURANCE.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN

LIABLE TO JASMINS BENEFICIARIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF HER 36MONTH CONTRACT COMPUTED IN THIS MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF
US$246.67 MULTIPLIED BY 19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM OF
JASMINS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN
LIABLE TO PAY INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM THE TIME IT WAS
DUE UNTIL FULLY PAID.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN AND
WHITE FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE EMPLOYER
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY
WHITE FALCON IN FAVOR OF BECMEN.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following issues:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE CONSIDERED GENERAL LAW DESPITE
THE CASE BEING COVERED BY E.O. 247, R.A. 8042 AND LABOR CODE
CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL LAWS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE
DECEASEDS FUTURE EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN) INHERENT FACTOR IN
THE COMPUTATION OF DEATH BENEFITS OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO
CONTRACT WORKERS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH
BENEFITS AWARDED BY NLRC CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT
CANNOT BE DISTURBED THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by
way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her
employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule,
stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public
order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties.18 An
examination of said employment agreement shows that it provides for no other
monetary or other benefits/privileges than the following:
1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT

THE DEATH OF JASMIN WAS WORK RELATED.

2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines at the end
thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;
3. Transportation to and from work;
4. Free living accommodations;
5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic surgery
charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but the exit/reentry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal,
sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;
7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after twenty fourmonths of continuous service;

perilous undertakings, in the company of friends or strangers, lovers or enemies, this is

not one area which their employers should be made accountable for. While we have
emphasized the need to observe official work time strictly,19 what an employee does
on free time is beyond the employers sphere of inquiry.
While the "employers premises" may be defined very broadly not only to include
premises owned by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses,20 we are not
prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute
employers premises as would allow a finding that death or injury therein is considered
to have been incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment.
There are certainly exceptions,21 but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a
complete determination would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining
and the overall factual environment of the case, which are here lacking.
But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist
that she did; thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal
aggression. On the other hand, the Cuaresmas do not believe so.

8. Eight days public holidays per year;

9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated as per
labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death
or other benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and
appellate court granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not
make Jasmins employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is
not obliged to provide her these benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum
wage unless of course the KSA labor laws have been amended to the opposite effect,
or that a bilateral wage agreement has been entered into.
Our next inquiry is, should Jasmins death be considered as work-connected and thus
compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was
not on duty, or else evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was
she within hospital premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on
personal time when she died. Neither has it been shown, nor does the evidence
suggest, that at the time she died, Jasmin was performing an act reasonably necessary
or incidental to her employment as nurse, because she was at her dormitory room. It is
reasonable to suppose that all her work is performed at the Al-birk Hospital, and not at
her dormitory room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is
not on duty. It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees
personal time away from work, which the latter are free to spend of their own
choosing. Whether they choose to spend their free time in the pursuit of safe or

The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway
into her employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old
Filipina, in the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent
living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country, would
simply commit suicide for no compelling reason.
The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or apparent
victim of poisoning are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence.
On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the
exhumation report of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin
sustained external and internal injuries, specifically abrasions at her inner lip and
gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and
hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs;
intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured rib; puncture wounds; and
abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area. The NBI toxicology report came up
negative on the presence of poison.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her death.
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate
Jasmin was poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever
Jasmin was poisoned, the assailants who beat her up and possibly raped her are
certainly responsible therefor.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the
world blind to the realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of
some foreign employers. It is inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek

employment abroad and face uncertainty in a foreign land, only to commit suicide for
unexplained reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved ones, and the comfort and
safety of home, to work in a strange land requires unrivaled strength and courage.
Indeed, many of our women OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable
employers have been there more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body
yet they have remained strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. Raped,
burned with cigarettes, kicked in the chest with sharp high-heeled shoes, starved for
days or even weeks, stabbed, slaved with incessant work, locked in their rooms, forced
to serve their masters naked, grossly debased, dehumanized and insulted, their spirits
fought on and they lived for the day that they would once again be reunited with their
families and loved ones. Their bodies surrendered, but their will to survive remained
strong.
It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on
suicide, without even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmins death.
Being in the business of sending OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon
should know what happens to some of our OFWs. It is impossible for them to be
completely unaware that cruelties and inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are
unfortunate to be employed by vicious employers, or upon those who work in
communities or environments where they are liable to become victims of crime. By
now they should know that our women OFWs do not readily succumb to the
temptation of killing themselves even when assaulted, abused, starved, debased and,
worst, raped.
Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmens revolting scheme of conveniently
avoiding responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life.
Abandoning their legal, moral and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to
assist Jasmins family in obtaining justice for her death, they immediately gave up on
Jasmins case, which has remained under investigation as the autopsy and police
reports themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who had no
relative or representative in the KSA who would naturally demand and seek an
investigation of her case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient route
to avoiding and denying liability, by casting Jasmins fate to oblivion. It appears from
the record that to this date, no follow up of Jasmins case was ever made at all by
them, and they seem to have expediently treated Jasmins death as a closed case.
Despite being given the lead via the autopsy and toxicology reports of the Philippine
authorities, they failed and refused to act and pursue justice for Jasmins sake and to
restore honor to her name.
Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmins remains
were repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to
make personal representations with Jasmins parents, if only to extend their
condolences or sympathies; instead, a mere colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was
designated to accompany Jasmins body home.

Of all lifes tragedies, the death of ones own child must be the most painful for a
parent. Not knowing why or how Jasmins life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly
unbearable for Jasmins parents, and further aggravated by Rajab, Becmen, and White
Falcons baseless insistence and accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal
sin by any religious standard.
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our
OFWs; and the resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest
desecration of her physical self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of
murderous aggression.
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons indifference to Jasmins case has caused
unfathomable pain and suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their
moral obligation, as employer and recruiter and as entities laden with social and civic
obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in behalf of Jasmin, her parents and
those she left behind. Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to pursue
justice, they chose to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that they may
avoid pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities autopsy and
toxicology reports instead of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing justice for
Jasmins death. They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above
their moral and social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves from
the perceived responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify Jasmins heirs for
her death.
Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995,22 the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens
whether in country or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in
particular.23 The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal
services to Filipino migrant workers.24 The rights and interest of distressed25
overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented
or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded.26
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to
abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend
assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they
abandoned Jasmins case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests
and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly
exact from them. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the
deceased Jasmin, treating her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not
worth wasting their time and resources on. The evidence does not even show that
Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an
investigation of Jasmins case. Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the
person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the argument that Jasmin committed
suicide, which is a grave accusation given its un-Christian nature.

We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmins parents should be the ones to actively
pursue a just resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the
finances to undertake this herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any
assistance at all in this respect. The most Jasmins parents can do is to coordinate with
Philippine authorities as mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal assistance and
secure the aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and
Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying to solve the case or obtain relief, in
accordance with Section 2327 of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all that
was within their power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas
went even further. To the best of their abilities and capacities, they ventured to
investigate Jasmins case on their own: they caused another autopsy on Jasmins
remains as soon as it arrived to inquire into the true cause of her death. Beyond that,
they subjected themselves to the painful and distressful experience of exhuming
Jasmins remains in order to obtain another autopsy for the sole purpose of
determining whether or not their daughter was poisoned. Their quest for the truth and
justice is equally to be expected of all loving parents. All this time, Rajab and Becmen
instead of extending their full cooperation to the Cuaresma family merely sat on
their laurels in seeming unconcern.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,28 a seaman who was being
repatriated after his employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to
Manila connecting flight as he began to wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He
was shot to death by Thai police four days after, on account of running amuck with a
knife in hand and threatening to harm anybody within sight. The employer, sued for
death and other benefits as well as damages, interposed as defense the provision in the
seafarer agreement which provides that "no compensation shall be payable in respect
of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life
by the seaman." The Court rejected the defense on the view, among others, that the
recruitment agency should have observed some precautionary measures and should not
have allowed the seaman, who was later on found to be mentally ill, to travel home
alone, and its failure to do so rendered it liable for the seamans death. We ruled
therein that
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by
its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed
by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some
mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say
the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically
owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise
lost their usefulness.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals,
recruitment agencies have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where
OFWs are likely to encounter uneven if not discriminatory treatment from the foreign
government, and certainly a delayed access to language interpretation, legal aid, and

the Philippine consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to come to the
rescue of our distressed OFWs since they know the employers and the addresses where
they are deployed or stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect the
rights and ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who else is in a
better position, if not these recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their
deployed OFWs abroad?
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly,
Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection.
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public
policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our
OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful
example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with
respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous
treatment of Jasmins case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal
to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious
death, and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she
committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their
own corporate interests above of the welfare of their employees all these are
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of
the poor employee and her familys ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of
power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.
Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting
on it just to protect Rajab and Becmens material interest despite evidence to the
contrary is against the moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not
denouncing ones fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings that undermine their good
name and honor.30
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective
mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the
State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of
the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.31

The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest,32 and
neither shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of
the public.33 In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.34

4) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of
the employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10)35 of the Civil Code, which allows
recovery of such damages in actions referred to in Article 21.36
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to
moral damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to
pay, together with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by
way of example for the public good.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreignbased employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment
agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate
and sufficient payment of what is due him.37 If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for
the aforesaid claims and damages.38
White Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not automatically result in
Becmens freedom or release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas
Manpower Corporation v. NLRC.39 Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should
be held liable solidarily, without prejudice to each having the right to be reimbursed
under the provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand from
the debtor what he has paid.40
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah
Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.,
and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and
ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila
Cuaresma, the following amounts:
1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral
damages;
2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as
exemplary damages;
3) Attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and,

G.R. No. 81327

December 4, 1989

CRISPINA VANO, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, (Bureau of Posts) and
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.
Severino B. Estonina for petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for GSIS.

PARAS, J.:
The only issue in this case is whether or not the death of petitioner's husband,
Filomeno Vano is compensable under the Employees' Compensation Law.
Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July
31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son
as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the
following day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Badge in Loay, Bohol,
the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit
the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood
Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
Vano's widow, Crispina Vano, filed a death benefit claim under PD 626, as amended,
with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On April 6, 1984, the GSIS
denied the claim, citing the following reason:
It appears on record that your husband was on his way to his station when he died in a
vehicular accident he figured in a Sunday, July 31, 1983.
Obviously, the accident occurred outside of his time and place of work; neither was he
performing official duties at the time of its occurrence. Accordingly, the conditions for
compensability in accordance with the law have not been satisfied, to wit:
1. that the employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires
him to be;
2.

that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and

3. if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for his employer. (p. 22, Rollo)

Crispina Vano's requests for reconsideration were denied by the GSIS, consequently,
the case was elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) for
appropriate review under ECC Case No. 2658.
In a Decision dated October 13, 1987, the ECC affirmed the decision denying the
claim of Crispina Vano because:
Under the Employees' Compensation law, injuries resulting from accidents while an
employee is going to and from the place of work is not compensable. Some
exceptions, however, are: when the injury is sustained at a place proximate to the
work-place, when the employee meets the accident while riding in a company vehicle
and when he is on special errand for his employer. (Section 1, Rule III of the Amended
Rules of Employees' Compensation)
We note that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions. In
fact, the subject employee's accident happened on a Sunday, a non-working day. In the
light of the foregoing, we cannot but affirm respondent's denial of the claim. (pp. 1315, Rollo; p. 2, Decision, ECC Case No. 2658)
The petitioner then came to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari. She
alleges that since her husband was precisely commuting from his hometown to
Tagbilaran City, where he would report for duty as letter carrier the following day,
when he met the accident, then his consequent death should be compensated.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) reiterates its views and
contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that
provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act and is "categorical in that the injury
must have been sustained at work while at the workplace or elsewhere while executing
an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 69)
For its part, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission stood firm in
asserting that the death of Filomeno Vano is not the result of an employment accident
as contemplated by law hence petitioner is clearly not entitled to her claim for death
benefits.
The case of Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA
260, 263, 264) supports petitioner's contention of compensability. In the said case, this
Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his
way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the
accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his death.

The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point

reasonably proximate to the place of work, while he is going to and from his work,
such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.
The same ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Alano vs. Employees'
Compensation Commission (158 SCRA, 669, 672):
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work.
She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to
be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal
about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because
her employment required her to be there.
We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two
(2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband the case at bar
was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is
compensable under the law as an employment accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government
Service Insurance System is ordered to pay petitioner the sum of Twelve Thousand
Pesos (P12,000.00)) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-27588

April 28, 1969

LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ROSARIO VDA. DE
ROSANO respondents.
H. San Luis and L. V. Simbulan for petitioner.
Juan B. Moreno for respondent Rosario Vda. de Rosano.
Villavieja, Villanueva and Ocampo for respondent Workmen's Compensation
Commission.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Petition filed by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for review of the decision of the
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (in R04 WC Case No. 3941), ordering it to
pay claimants Rosario Vda. de Rosano, minors Rebecca, Edgardo and Baltazar, all
surnamed Rosano death compensation benefits, burial expenses and attorney's fees for
the death of Pastor Rosano; as well as of the resolution of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission en banc denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid decision.
As found by the Acting Referee of the Department of Labor, supported by the evidence
on record, the facts of the case are as follows:
At about 6 o'clock in the morning of 30 November 1964, stevedore Pastor Rosano
went to Pier 9, Manila, to await the arrival of a barge of herein petitioner corporation,
scheduled to dock at 9 o'clock in the morning. While thus waiting for the vessel
Rosano had a heated verbal argument with one Benjamin Valdez, another stevedore
engaged by petitioner corporation, over the possession of a platform used in the
loading and unloading of cargoes taken into or out of the watercraft. Rosano was able
to get it. As the barge did not arrive as scheduled, Rosano went home for lunch. When
he returned at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, he found the platform again in the
possession of Valdez. Rosano's demand for delivery to him of said platform
precipitated another argument which almost ended in fist fight. Valdez finally gave up
the platform, but not before he had uttered threats against the life of Rosano. Later,
informed that the barge they were waiting for definitely was not arriving, Rosano, with
two companions, boarded a passenger jeep bound for Tondo. When he got off from the
jeep near his house, he was met by Valdez, who whipped out a knife and stabbed him.
Rosano fell to the ground. He was immediately brought to the hospital where he
expired at 2:30 in the afternoon of that same day, 30 November 1964 (Exhibit C).
On 1 March 1965, the widow, Rosario Vda. de Rosano, for herself and on behalf of her
3 minor children filed with the Department of Labor a formal claim for death
compensation benefits against petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for the death

of her husband, Pastor Rosano. The company answered, denying the allegations of the
complaint and raising the defense of prescription, in that the claim was filed beyond
the 3-month period from the death of Rosano, as provided in the Workmen's
Compensation law.
On 15 September 1965, after due hearing, the Acting Referee rendered judgment,
ordering the company to pay to the claimants death compensation benefits in the sum
of P6,000.00; P200.00 as reimbursement for burial expenses; P200.00, as attorney's
fees; and P61.00 as fees payable to the office. The award was based on the finding that
Rosano was an employee of the company and that death arose out of his said
employment. The defense of prescription was rejected, it appearing that the company
had failed to controvert the claimants' right to compensation within the period
prescribed in Section 45 of Act 3428. The company appealed to the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, which affirmed the decision of the Referee. And when its
motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied by the Commission en banc,
the company filed the present petition for review, assigning as all errors committed by
the Commission its finding on the existence of employee-employer relationship
between the petitioner and the deceased and the ruling that the right to demand
compensation benefits has not prescribed.
The contention that there existed no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and the late Pastor Rosano is premised on the allegation that the latter was a
"gang boss" working with the petitioner on an "on and off" basis; that Rosano worked
for petitioner when so assigned by the union, of which he was a member, that, if at all,
the employer-employee relationship existed only whenever the deceased rendered
actual service for the petitioner. Since on 30 November 1964 Rosano was not able to
work (because the barge did not arrive), then, according to petitioner, he was not an
employee when he (Rosano) met his death.
There is no merit to this contention. In the first place, while petitioner company failed
to submit any evidence that the work rendered by the deceased was purely casual, 1 it
has been established that prior to the stabbing incident the deceased, with other
stevedores, was in the pier prepared to do hauling jobs for the petitioner's business.
And there is unrebutted testimony that the deceased had been doing stevedoring work
for said petitioner for 15 years.2 Secondly, even assuming petitioner's allegations to be
true, that the deceased was a union member, and that it was the union that furnished
laborers and stevedors when required by petitioner company, presumably with the
latter delivering the stevedoring charges directly to the union for distribution to the
individual laborers, these facts did not make the union an independent contractor
whose intervention relieved the said company of liability for the death of a laborer
specially where no contractor's bond was required for the union's performance of its
undertaking. 3 The union here was no more than an agent of the company and whose
fiction is merely to save the latter from the necessity of dealing with individual
laborers. And in this kind of indirect employment, it has been repeatedly held, the
employer is not relieved of liability under the Workmen's Compensation law. 4

It is next claimed for the petitioner that even if he were an employee, Rosano's death is
not compensable because it came when he was outside of the company premises and
not at work.
We do not agree with the appellant. From the proved sequence of events that took
place on 30 November 1964 involving the deceased Pastor Rosano, it is evident that
the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin Valdez (who was thereafter accused and
convicted) can be traced to their disagreement over the possession of a platform that
was to be used in their work for petitioner that although the altercation started in the
morning the same was resumed when they returned in the afternoon and carried on
when Valdez left, lay in wait near Rosario's house, and there met and stabbed the latter
when he alighted from the jeep. Neither can it be said that the employer is exempt
from liability under the Workmen's Compensation law because the cause of death
arose outside of the company premises, 5 whereas the quarrel happened at the
waterfront at Pier 9.

Similarly, in Appleford vs. Kimmel, 296 NW, 861, it appeared that a theater
employee's job required him to handle disturbances in the theater; that several patrons
were ordered by him to leave the theater because of disturbances they were causing;
and that after the theater closed the employee started for home and was subjected to
injurious assault by those he had previously ordered to leave; the court held that the
evidence sustained the finding that the employee's injury arose out of, and in the
course of, the employment.
In the leading case of Field vs. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 138, where a
superintendent was injured on the sidewalk by workmen with whom he had quarreled
in the mill, the late Justice Cardozo (then of the New York Supreme Court) declared
the injury compensable, reasoning that the quarrel outside of the mill was merely a
continuation or extension of the quarrel begun within; that continuity of the case had
been so combined with continuity in time and space "that the quarrel from origin to
ending must be taken to be one".

For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall take
place within the place of employment. If a workman is acting within the scope of his
employment, his protection "in the course of" the employment usually continues,
regard of the place of injury. 6 Thus, in one case, 7 an employee went to the House of
the employer across the warehouse where he worked to get a drink of water, that there,
while trying to drive away a puppy that he saw eating fish in the employer's kitchen,
he was bitten in the hand, as a result of which he later died of hydrophobia. The death
of the employee was held compensable, on the ground that his trip to the kitchen was
occasioned by the employer's fault in not providing adequate drinking water at the
warehouse. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that it is inherent in the
stevedoring work for the petitioner that the laborers, like the deceased, stay in the pier
and wait for the docking of petitioner's vessels.

The rationale applies to the case at bar, where the facts, shown by the evidence found
by the referee and affirmed by the Commission, are that Rosano had been assaulted by
the man with whom he had quarreled barely a half hour after leaving the place of work
where the quarrel occurred, in connection with the possession of the platform to be
used in unloading cargo, without any independent agency or cause for the assault
being shown. As pointed out by Larson (Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, section
29.21)

Furthermore, jurisprudence is to the effect that injuries sustained by an employee

while in the course of his employment, as the result of an assault upon his person by
another employee, or by a third person, no question of the injured employee's own
culpability being involved, is compensable where, from the evidence presented, a
rational mind is able to trace the injury to a cause set in motion by the nature of the
employment, or some condition, obligation or incident therein, and not by some other
agency.8

Other cases applying the same principle are collated in Schneider, "Workmen's
Compensation", Perm. Ed., Vol. 6, page 131, et seq.

The rule as stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court is that ... when the employee is
assaulted while he is defending his employer, or his employer's interests, or when the
assault was incidental to some duty of his employment, the injuries he suffers in
consequence of the assault will, as a rule, arise out of the employment. He will then be
serving his employer's ends and not of his own. (Jacquemin vs. Turner and Sermour
Manufacturing Co., Conn., 103 A. 115; Goldshirch vs. American Character Doll Co.,
135 Misc. 817, 238 N. Y. 519.)

since the ultimate test applied by Judge Cardozo was whether "the quarrel from origin
to ending must be taken to be one" it should make no difference how widely separated
the assault was from the employment in time and space if it remained an inherent part
of an employment incident.

As regards the defense of prescription raised by petitioner, it is true that the formal
demand for compensation for the death of Pastor Rosano on 30 November 1964 was
made by the dependent widow and minor children only on 1 March 1965, or beyond
the 3-month period provided for 'in section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
But we are not impressed by petitioner's disclaimer that it had no knowledge of the
stabbing incident prior to its notification by the Regional Office of the filing of the
claim. It may be pointed out that the law does not speak of "formal notice" by the
employer of the accident; it specifies only "knowledge of the accident". For petitioner
to say that it had no actual knowledge of the stabbing incident on 30 November 1964
would run counter to the ordinary course of human behavior. An employer could
scarcely have been spared the news of the killing of one of its laborers by another
laborer, especially where the cause therefor started in the place where the laborers
gather and work. When the widow went to the company premises to demand
compensation for the death of her husband a week after his burial, she was able to talk

to an unknown employee inside the compound, who told her that she could not get
anything because the death of her husband did not occur in the company premises. Far
from showing lack of knowledge by the employer, this fact constitutes sufficient
indication that the death of Rosano was already a matter of common knowledge in
petitioner's office that even an allegedly unidentified employee could advance the
exact defense that the employer later set up in the case.lawphi1.nt
The fact remains that the petitioner failed to controvert in due time the right of the
claimants to compensation, as required by section 45 of Act 3428. And the rule is now
well-settled that the requirements (for claimants) of giving of notice of injury and
filing of claim within the prescribed period is non-jurisdictional and does not
constitute a bar to compensation proceedings if the employer, who had knowledge of
the accident, failed to controvert the claimant's right to compensation pursuant to
section 45 of the law. 9 For such failure of the employer to controvert the claimant's
constitutes a waiver (or a forfeiture by law) of its right to question the validity and
reasonableness of the claim and precludes the setting up of all non-jurisdictional
defenses, such as non-compensability of injuries, prescription, and the like. 10
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission and its resolution en banc, the petition for review is hereby
dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., concurs and certifies that the Chief Justice voted in favor of
this opinion before going on official leave.
Capistrano, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., are on leave.

G.R. No. 84307

April 17, 1989

CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the Philippines),
respondents.
Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:
This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission ("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v.
Government Service Insurance System [Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which
affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") denying
petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's son,
Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin
The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called
to military training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army
as a private first class. At the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the
rank of Sergeant per Special Order P-4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in "A"
company 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters of the
14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was
Detachment Non-Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A"
Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl.
Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie
Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A" Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao,
Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally
granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them,
considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and
order problems due to the presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in
or in the vicinity of Aritao.
Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon
on 1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the
same day. 3 They proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had
lunch. About 4:00 o'clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and
relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two (2)
large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the soldiers left the

Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle,

presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in
the tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon
reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in
front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the
rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally
touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then
still sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently
realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he
had been hit and fell to the ground.
His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for
treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon
being notified of the shooting and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter
confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog
Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and there he
died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause
of death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his
sustaining a gunshot wound.
An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985
concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." 4 On
19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th
Infantry Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late Sgt. Lemick
Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due to
Gun Shot Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes
Alibuyog 085-5009 (Inf.) PA ... ." After receiving and deliberating . g on the
Investigation Report dated 11 August 1985 together with the sworn statements of
witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some further questioning of Capt.
Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and recommendation:
Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan
detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft. Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinoguin
and Cpl. Clavo to his home to celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked
permission to go on overnight and to allow them to carry their firearms with them
because the place where they were going is critical. They were given such permission
verbally by their Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely
accidental as the Investigation Report presented here proved beyond reasonable
[doubt] the fact that Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt.
Hinoguin
RECOMMENDATION:
The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the
members contain the following:

The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death
of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of Duty.
The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt.
Lemick Hinoguin be given. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under
P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and
therefore compensable. This was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's
son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine
Army at the time of his death.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by
the GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission
("WCC") in a Decision dated 24 May 1988 which stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite
simply as "any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of
and in the course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have,
however, elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule
III, Section 1 (a) reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

[F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive
where the work-connection of the events that led to appellant's son's death lies. Under
the law, death resulting from injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in
the course of employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of
employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of work nor was he
performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just came from
a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick
Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.
Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be
found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the
outset that under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1)
of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on Employees' Compensation, the
term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule
XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as
follows:
SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased
employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are
satisfied:
(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;
(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness
which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death
occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System.

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply
to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable
flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in
Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty
status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or
a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is
stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan,
Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public
transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from
their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which
soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally
speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We
note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not
utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or
authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend
themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao
or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might
encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their
way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been
killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any
difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at
the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the
Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had
already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It
may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24
hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24
hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7
days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt.
Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt.
Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance
that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under
his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing "official
functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a
few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was
nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us
that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have
clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going
on an approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered,
be preterminated by superior orders.
More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance,
that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not,
of course, the only ask that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his
occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily
also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier
must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This
is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.
We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by
an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this
case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty
status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.
It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of
official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context
of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the
compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is
commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the
interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes
infusing the Labor Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review
Committee dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the
Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby
REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in

respect of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to

costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128524

April 20, 1999

It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not
confined to the police precinct or station but to any place where his services, as a
lawman, to maintain place and security, are required.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE,
respondents.

At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the
Imelda Commercial Complex where the police assistance center is located. There can
be no dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of work.

ROMERO, J

It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he
was accosted by another police officer. This would lend some semblance of viability to
the argument that he was not in the performance of official duty at the time.

May a moonlighting policeman's death be considered compensable? This is the crux of

the controversy now at bar.

However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen,
by the nature of their functions, are deemed to be on around-the-clock duty.

The records 1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegre's deceased husband,
SPO2 Florencio A.. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National
Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6,
1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda
Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the
Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of
duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words
upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal
shooting of the deceased police officer.1wphi1.nt

Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its

position that SPO2 Alegre's death lacks the requisite element of compensability which
is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected.

On account of her husband's death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for
death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however,
denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre's death, he was
performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to
the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a
decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS.
Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on
February 28, 1997, the appellate court reversed 2 the ECC's decision and ruled that
SPO2 Alegre's death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Citing Nitura
v. Employees' Compensation Commission 3 and Employees' Compensation
Commission v. Court of Appeals, 4 the appellate court explained the conclusion
arrived at thus:
[T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a "workplace" cannot always be literally
applied to a person in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker
in an assembly line in a factor or a clerk in a particular fixed office.

We grant the petition.

As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the death of
SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.
Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that "for
the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer. 5
Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules' application in
the case of police officers. Nevertheless, owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to
keep peace and order, and the risks assumed, the Court has treated police officers
similar to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to the
compensability of their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 6 a case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow
soldier, we held in Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 7 that
"members of the national police are by the nature of their functions technically on duty
24 hours a day" because "policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked

by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and
security of the community."

Reversing the ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the deceased's widow, the
Court ruled:

Upon examination of the Court of Appeals' reasoning, we believe that the appellate
court committed reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited cases.
While we agree that policemen, like soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty as
peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same does not justify the
grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre based on the facts
disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at
hand is in order.

A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura's
station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the
site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been
directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City: In carrying out said directive, he
had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held in the
Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at
cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go
by their commanding officer.

In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together
with two other members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission
by the commanding officer of their company to leave their station in Carranglan,
Nueva Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As they were returning
to their headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his M-16 rifle was on
"semi-automatic" mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin who
then died as a result thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation benefits, this
Court held:
The concept of a "workplace" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be
literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a
worker in assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a
soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 11/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo
and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to
Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission
to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are
required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on
an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on
vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with
which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack
them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture
such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact
encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them
and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that
respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable
one.
Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army,
Pfc. Regino S. Natura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte. At the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to
check on several personnel of his command post who were then attending a dance
party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his way back to the camp, he passed,
crossed and fell from hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death.

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time
of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24
hours a day of official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law
24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all
times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status.
Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have
clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on
approved vacation leave.
The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision
is Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals. This time, the claim for
death compensation benefits was made in behalf of a deceased police officer, P/Sgt.
Wilfredo Alvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong
Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail. Findings showed that the
deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview because the
latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the
deceased was approached by another policeman and shot him to death. Both the GSIS
and the ECC denied the claim by the deceased's widow on the ground that Sgt.
Alvaran was plainly acting as a father to his son and that he was in a place where he
was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed said denial which decision was
affirmed by this Court, declaring that:
But for clarity's sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of
the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically
on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject
to call at anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to
assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No.
626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.

While it is true that, "geographically" speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not actually at his
assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not
also be denied that in bringing his son as a suspect in a case to the police station
for questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father
but as a peace officer.
From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of
death benefits merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case
may be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted
in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his
assigned place of work and the incident that led to his death.
In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was
assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given
to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass.
According to the Court, "a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot
be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their
commanding officer" and hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the
performance of his official functions.

will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a
situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In
fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he had already complied with the
duty detail. 8 At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and
soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within
the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations
that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not
be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police
officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless
basically police service in character.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.1wphi1.nt
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

The same thing can be sad of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his
station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several
personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party.
As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees' Compensation Commission case, although he
was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the
Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the
peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time that he was attacked
and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime, a
basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform.
Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to
claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his
work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have
been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why
SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the
matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying
passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it
did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of
such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of
the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit
permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is
no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC
guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave

G.R. No. 154385

August 24, 2007

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLITA PENTECOSTES, Substituted by Jaime R. Pentecostes, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assails the Decision2 dated
11 April 2002 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
65840 and its Resolution3 dated 17 July 2002 denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
Following are the factual and legal antecedents, as culled from the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Respondent Merlita Pentecostes (Merlita) was 32 years old when she joined the
government service in 1980 as a public school elementary teacher assigned to the
remote and mountainous barangay elementary schools of the towns of Basud, Imelda,
Labo and Jose Panganiban, all in the province of Camarines Norte. In 1995, Merlita
was assigned to the urban town of Daet, Camarines Norte where she retired from
service on 24 April 1998 on account of her serious malady. While assigned at the said
mountainous towns, Merlita had to walk six (6) kilometers daily to and from the
barangay elementary school where she taught and her temporary residence in the
poblacion.4 In said locales, Merlitas only source of drinking water came from a deep
well. Merlita frequently experienced urinary tract infections.5
From 15 November 1997 to 8 December 1997, Merlita was confined at the Bicol
Medical Center in Naga City due to Chronic Renal Failure secondary to Obstructive
Uropathy Secondary to Urolithiasis.6 Consequently, Merlitas right kidney was
removed by way of a nephrectomy in October 1998.7
Merlitas left kidney also failed because of Nephrolithiasis (Renal Stones or
Urolithiasis). On account of her condition, she underwent hemodialysis (a procedure
where blood with the excretory products is removed and replaced with fresh blood)
two (2) times a week which is an expensive procedure done not to cure the disease but
to ease the pain, to lessen the retention of fluids, to minimize further complications,
and to lengthen the chance of survival of Merlita.8
Merlitas condition constrained her to retire from service in April 1998. Her medical
examiners considered her disability as total and permanent.9 On account of her illness,
Merlita filed a claim with GSIS for compensation benefits which was denied on the
ground that Urolithiasis is not work-related. Merlita sought reconsideration, but it was

similarly denied. On appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)

likewise rejected Merlitas claim,10 the pertinent portions of whose decision read:
Viewed against the foregoing, we can safely conclude that the development of
appellants Urolithiasis was not due to factors present in her workplace or the nature of
her employment as a teacher. Familial or hereditary predisposition have been noted in
the development of this disease, thus, we believe that the respondent System correctly
ruled against compensability.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent System appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant case is dismissed for lack of merit.11
Aggrieved, Merlita interposed an appeal in December 1999 before the Court of
Appeals insisting that the conditions of her work greatly increased the risk of
contracting the ailment.12 A couple of days later, Merlita died and was substituted by
her husband and six (6) children.13
The Court of Appeals sustained Merlitas position, reversed the decision of the ECC,
and declared her heirs entitled to the compensation benefits under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 626, as amended.14 The appellate court stated:
It can be stressed that Merlita Pentecostes, when she commenced her career as a public
school elementary teacher, first as a substitute classroom teacher from 1980 to 1984,
then as a regular classroom teacher up to the time she went out of service in 1998
because of her serious kidney disease was, at the age of 32 years, young and in good
perfect healthy condition. In the fourteen (14) years of teaching she was assigned in
the arid, rural, tropical and mountainous barangays of Basud, Labo, Imelda and Jose
Panganiban, all far-flung towns of Camarines Norte where the petitioner has to
regularly walk daily an exhausting, dehydrating, and lung-busting six (6) kilometers
stretch to and from the barangay elementary school and place of her temporary
residence in the Poblacion of the municipality of said towns. A daily routine for
fourteen (14) years which strained her kidneys coupled with drinking unchlorinated
and uncertain impurities-filled water from deep and shallow water wells and the stress
of working away from the loving arms and bliss of her family who lived in Daet,
Camarines Norte. This dehydrating condition of walking six (6) kilometers to and
from the arduous and hot mountainous barangays on the aforesaid towns of Camarines
Norte put heavy toll on petitioners kidneys by reducing urine volume and higher
secretion and concentration of insoluble sediments-predisposing factors which
contributed and increased the risk of petitioners contracting Urolithiasis (a renal
disease attributed to the development of calcium, oxalates, uric acid and/or cystine
stones, in the calyces, papillae, ureter, urinary bladder and other renal parts). This
undue strain on petitioners kidneys predisposed petitioner to develop this malady,
Urolithiasis, which as a consequence suppressed the kidney functions by way of renal
failure. This predisposing factor of chronic dehydration which contributed and
increased the risk of the petitioner to develop Urolithiasis and Renal Failure has been

confirmed by medical experts and authorities in their respective fields in medicine x x

x.15

direct causal relation be shown. It is enough that the theory upon which the claim is
based is probable. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.23

xxxx

Pertinently, the Court stated in the case of Employees Compensation Commission v.

Court of Appeals:24

Moreover, since the cause or causes of Urolithiasis is or are still unknown, no proof
can be presented because the law does not require the impossible.16
In the instant petition, GSIS reiterates its previous submission that Merlita failed to
discharge the burden of presenting evidence that her ailment was caused by her
work.17 Moreover, it states that the sad plight and the deterioration of the GSIS State
Insurance Fund should not be aggravated by approving claims of ailments not intended
by law to be covered.18
In her Comment19 dated 20 January 2003, Merlita maintains that the development of
urolithiasis as being secondary to chronic renal failure has no clear etiologic factor so
as to a create a conclusive causal connection leading to the disease. Since the cause or
causes of the disease is or are still unknown, no proof can be presented because the
law does not require the impossible.20
In a Resolution21 dated 19 March 2007, the Court noted the death of Merlitas
husband and substitute respondent, Jaime P. Pentecostes, Sr. He was substituted by one
of his children, Jaime R. Pentecostes, Jr., as party respondent.
The sole issue before the Court is whether Merlita is entitled to compensation benefits
under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
After a thorough evaluation of the case and assessment of the arguments of the parties,
the Court finds for Merlita and affirms the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Section 1(b), Rule III implementing P.D. 626, as amended, provides:
For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Under the above Rule, for Merlitas sickness and resulting disability to be
compensable, there must be proof that (a) her sickness was the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules of Employees
Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by her working
conditions. This means that if the claimants illness or disease is not included in Annex
"A," then he is entitled to compensation only if he can prove that the risk of
contracting the illness or disease was increased by his working conditions.22 The law
does not require that the connection be established with absolute certainty or that a

Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old

law, the present law has not ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social
legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman
still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional
guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy
towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a
humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social
justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of
disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be
resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the
applicability of the law on employees compensation to as many employees who can
avail of the benefits thereunder.25
Concededly, Merlitas illness, urolithiasis, is not among those listed in the table of
occupational diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees
Compensation. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in its finding
that Merlita was able to prove by substantial evidence that her working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the disease. Substantial evidence is the amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the
conclusion.26
Urolithiasis is the process of forming stones in the kidney, bladder and/or urethra
(urinary tract).27 It is the formation of urinary calculi at any level of the urinary tract.
Urinary calculi (stones) are worldwide in its distribution but are more common in
some geographic areas as in parts of United States, South Africa, Pakistan, India and
Southeast Asia. Nutritional and environmental factors seem to play a role in stone
formation.28 The prevalence of urinary calculi is higher in those who live in
mountainous, desert or tropical areas. Higher temperatures increase perspiration,
which may result in concentrated urine. This promotes increased urinary
crystallization. The mineral content of water also may contribute to the causes of stone
disease. Some studies state that excessive water hardness causes a greater incidence of
stone disease.29
The 15th Edition of Smiths General Urology states that fluid intake and urine output
may have an effect on urinary stone disease. It also states that individuals living in hot
climates are prone to dehydration, which results in an increased incidence of urinary
stones. Although heat may cause a higher fluid intake, sweat loss results in lowered
voided volumes. Hot climates usually expose people to more ultraviolet light,

increasing vitamin D3 production. Increased calcium and oxalate excretion has been
correlated with increased exposure time to sunlight.30 Those who become dehydrated
due to strenuous physical activity are also particularly at risk of developing stones.31
According to the 13th Edition of Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, Vol. 2.
(International Edition, 1994), urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of
a delicate balance. The kidneys must conserve water, but they also must excrete
materials that have a low solubility. These two opposing requirements must be
balanced during adaptation to diet, climate and activity.32lavvphil
The foregoing medical reports establish that the environment (climate and
geographical location), water or fluid intake and activity are important factors in the
development or inhibition of urinary stone disease. The regularity of urination likewise
plays an important role since withholding urine for sometime may disturb the
balance.33 Merlita was assigned to schools located in mountainous barangays which
required her to walk daily a considerable distance. Considering the climate, the
location of her workplace, i.e. mountainous and far-flung, and the strenuous walk she
had to daily endure, she was prone to dehydration which could have led to the
formation of urinary stones. Additionally, in said place the only available drinking
water was the water taken from the deep well which in all probability was hard water,
containing minerals which contribute to the formation of kidney stones. Merlita could
also have missed the important habit of
regular urination. Teachers have a tendency to sit for hours on end, and to put off or
postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes with their teaching hours or
preparation of lesson plans.34 Thus, while the Court concedes that the nature of
Merlitas work as a teacher does not per se ordinarily cause urolithiasis, the risk of
contracting the same in this case was aggravated by the peculiar conditions and
location of her workplace, which required her to undergo a five-day week schedule of
strenuous and protracted walking.
Finally, it is well to recall the Courts exhortation in Vicente v. Employees
Compensation Commission35 reiterated in the case of Employees Compensation
Commission v. Court of Appeals36 wherein the Court ruled that therein private
respondents job as an NBI Engineer, which included field work, increased her risk of
contracting uterelothiasis, also a urinary stone disease, to wit:
The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of
government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose patience, industry,
and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little
recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that
the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by
its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise
for this reason that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingmans struggle
for his just dues.37

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 11 April 2002 of the Fourteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65840, ordering the Government Service
Insurance System to pay the heirs of Merlita Pentecostes compensation benefits as
provided under P.D. No. 626, as amended, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 192531

November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,
Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17,
2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case
No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System
(SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary
of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known
as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As
such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel
whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day.4

SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against
petitioners entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground
she can no longer be considered Johns primary beneficiary. As culled from the
records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather,
petitioners grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in
Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4,
1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the
agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as Johns primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary
even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the
"dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent
of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is
not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for
adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the
statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a
letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:

In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the
adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal
parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file
the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis
supplied)

We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are
no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied
by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues

The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby

dismissed for lack of merit.

I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful
claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due
course/denying petitioners otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the
covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus,
entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners claim for death
benefits is that eventhough she is Johns biological mother, it was allegedly not proven
that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally
adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant
[petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is
the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased.
Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social
Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit
legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father
since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise
of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.12
However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence
offered by the petitioner Cornelios death certificate.13
Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on
October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on
February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have
ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed
away.

This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death
benefits claim in view of Johns work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this
regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents
and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children
and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o
approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of
disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision
as follows:
RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and
determined atthe time of employees death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employees death
until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor
mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged
natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but
not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat
he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect
which is congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground that she is no
longer the deceaseds legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held
by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner,
effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of
being a secondary beneficiary.

It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this
Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood
to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents
us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx

We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviates
from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light of the Labor
Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized
administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an
interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point
isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between
the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to
refer to "legitimate parents."

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule
ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the termin a
more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003
and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as
already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the aforequoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general
sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The
phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish,
one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or
assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not
intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk
of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents
and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children
and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers
contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have
simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the
provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents"
was intended to cover all parents legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or
adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is in
contravention of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded,
prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j)
of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be
countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against
illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that
limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of
reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented.
We see no pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as to
warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind
the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the
policy of PD 626 that employees and their dependents may promptly secure
adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better
served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the
legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown
as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1)
of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.

Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up
John for adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents"
pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the
ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In
addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting
the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the
commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still
qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioners
parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key
detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent
died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about
four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at
bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in
favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling
that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by
virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological
parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552),
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the
legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to
each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of
custody is concerned.1wphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopters parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights
and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration
of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC
extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death
benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was
enacted after Cornelios death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which
provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant
petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies
behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the

child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of
the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his
or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a
time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in
this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the
role of a parent other than the adoptees biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents
are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances,
are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by
the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules
of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants,
his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at
least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption
vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations,
which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offsprings adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the
fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive
parents was snatched from him by deaths cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted childs
quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find

himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelios death at the time of
Johnsminority resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental authority over the
adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioners dependence on
John can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it
appears in the records, petitioner, prior to Johns adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late
husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she
was unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she
consented to Cornelios adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelios death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John
repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In
fact, this veryaddress was used in Johns Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in
the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel
boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is Johns known address as per the ECCs assailed
Decision.27 Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim
before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it
can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John,
petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one
roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries
for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While
RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly
allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member
unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at
least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently,
the confluence of circumstances from Cornelios death during Johns minority, the
restoration ofpetitioners parental authority, the documents showing singularity of
address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively
made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis.
Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a dependent parent given
Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of
the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due
to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome.

G.R. No. 196102

November 26, 2014

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are 1) the October 30, 2009
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 which set aside the
June 24, 2004 Decision3 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC
Case No. GM-16174-0209-04 and ordered the payment of disability benefits to the
herein respondent Aurelia Y. Calumpiano; and 2) the CA's February 23, 2011
Resolution4 denying reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.
Factual Antecedents
As determined by the CA, the facts are as follows:
x x x Aurelia Y. Calumpiano5 was employed as Court Stenographer at the then Court
of First Instance ofSamar from January 5, 1972 until her retirement on March 30,
2002.
On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent] filed before the
Supreme Court, an application for disability retirement on account of her ailment[s],
Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To bolster
her claim, [respondent] submitted the medical certificates issued by her attending
physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of whom are
Op[h]thalmologists [at] Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. She submitted them
together with the results of her perimetry test, [a certificate of] which x x x was issued
by Dr. Lim. On September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court approved [respondents]
application for disability retirement, under Republic Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of
1997).
[Respondents] disability claim was forwarded to GSIS,6 but the latter denied her
claim for the reason that hypertension and glaucoma, which were her illnesses, were
not work[-]related. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS.
Petitioner filed an appeal [with] the ECC, which rendered the assailed Decision,7 the
dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant appeal dismissed for want of merit.

SO ORDERED.8
In dismissing respondents appeal, the ECC held:
"Glaucoma is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevated to produce
intraocular damage. The three major categories of glaucoma are: (1) angle-closure
glaucoma, (2) open-angle glaucoma, and (3) congenital and juvenile glaucoma. Eyes
that develop primary angle glaucoma are anatomically predisposed to the condition. In
primary open-angle glaucoma, [the] angle appears open [and] does notseem to
function properly. The exact nature of obstruction has not yet been elucidated.
Congenital glaucoma and juvenile glaucoma are thought to be hereditary inmost cases,
although infectious causes are possible (rubella).["] (Pathologic Basis of Disease by
Cotran, 6th edition, pages 1374-1375)
"Hypertension is an increase in the blood pressure within the normal of less than
120/80 mm Hg as defined by the Joint National Committee VII. Primary risk factor for
developing hypertension is smoking. Other important risk factors are excess body
weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical
inactivity and psychological factors, including stress." (Principles of Internal
Medicine)
To warrant compensability of ailment and its resulting sickness, disability or death
under P.D. 626, as amended, Rule III, Section 1(b) thereof, specifically provides that
the ailment must be listed by the Commission as an occupational disease with the
conditions set forth therein satisfied, otherwise, the conditions imposed under the
Increased Risk Theory must be complied with.
Appellant9 worked as a Court Stenographer III of the Supreme Court for thirty (30)
years. Her duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop
her ailment, hypertension. However, to make the same compensable, it is necessary
that there must be impairment of function of her body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes
and brain resulting in her permanent disability. An examination of the appellants
records would show that she was not suffering from end[-]organ damage. This was
shown in the x x x report [of the ECG] that was taken on the appellant on January 21,
2002. Thus, the same cannot be considered compensable and work-connected.
Likewise, her other ailment, Glaucoma[,] cannot also be considered work-connected.
Medical science has explained that it is characterized by an intraocular pressure
sufficiently elevatedto produce intraocular glaucoma. Here, there was nothing in her
duties that would cause or increase her risk of contracting the said ailment.10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review11 filed with the CA and docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No.
85908, respondent sought to set aside the aboveECC Decision, arguing that her illness
is work-connected which thus entitles her to disability compensation.
On October 30, 2009, the CA issued the herein assailed Decision containing the
following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision is SET
ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the Employees Compensation Commission
for the payment of the disability benefits due the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA held that while respondents hypertension and glaucoma are not listed as
occupational diseases under the implementing rules of the Employee Compensation
Program under Presidential Decree No. 62613 (PD 626), they were nonetheless
contracted and became aggravated during her employment as court stenographer; that
under the "increased risk theory," a "non-occupational disease" is compensable as long
as proof of a causal connection between the work and the ailment is established;14 that
respondents illnesses are connected to her work, given the nature of and pressure
involved in her functions and duties as a court stenographer; that the certifications
issued by the attending physicians certifying to respondents illnesses should begiven
credence; that the ECC itself conceded that respondents duties were "no doubt
stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension;" and
that while the presumption of compensability has been abrogated with the issuance of
PD 626, employees compensation laws nevertheless constitute social legislation
which allows for liberality in interpretation to the benefit of the employee, and the
policy has always been to extend the applicability of said laws to as many employees
who can avail of the benefits thereunder.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its
February 23, 2011 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS DISEASES (HYPERTENSION AND GLAUCOMA) ARE
COMPENSABLE UNDER THE INCREASED RISK THEORY; AND
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE ECC.16
Petitioners Arguments

Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and that the June 24, 2004
Decision of the ECC be reinstated, petitioner argues in its Petition and Reply17 that
respondents hypertension and glaucoma are not compensable under the principle of
increased risk; that although essential hypertension is listed as an occupational disease,
it is not compensable per seas the conditions under Section 1, Rule III of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation18 should be satisfied; that hypertension is
compensable only "if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys,
heart,eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability;"19 that since respondent did
not suffer "end-organ damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes and brain
which resulted in permanent disability, her illness is not compensable; that
respondents other illness glaucoma is not compensable;20 and that the findings of
the ECC should be accorded respect and finality, as it has the expertise and knowledge
on account of its specialized jurisdiction overemployee compensation cases.
Respondents Arguments
In her Comment,21 respondent seeks the denial of the Petition, arguing relevantly that
the "increased risk theory," which applies to her, has been upheld in several decided
cases;22 that in disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is
compensated for but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of the
employees earning capacity;23 and that while the ECC has the expertise and
knowledge relative to compensation cases, the CA isnot precluded from making its
own assessment of the case which goes against that of the ECCs. Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
In resolving this case, the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Baul24
comes into mind and lays the groundwork for a similar ruling. In said case, the Court
held:
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational
diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules
of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal
relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondents disability.
The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In
general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically
paid benefits.
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed
occupational diseases, their compensability requires compliance with all the conditions
set forth inthe Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebrovascular accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history,
which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual
and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious
gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion
in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or
exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential

hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs

like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resultingin permanent disability, provided that, the
following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood
chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.
The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the above-mentioned
conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What
the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation. It is
enough that the hypothesis on which the workmens claim isbased is probable. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the
test of proof in compensation proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employees welfare. To safeguard the
workers rights, any doubt as to the proper interpretation and application must be
resolved in [his] favor.

It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the etiology of essential
hypertension show that there is a relationship between the sickness and the nature and
conditions of work. In this jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number of cases the
strenuous office of a public school teacher. The case of Makabali v. Employees
Compensation Commission, which we have re-affirmed in the subsequent cases of De
Vera v. Employees Compensation Commission, Antiporda v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, and De la Torre v. Employees Compensation
Commission, amply summarized, thus:
xxxx
The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA
at the time she was already out of service is inconsequential. The main consideration
for its compensability is that her illness was contracted during and by reason ofher
employment, and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is
immaterial.

In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of respondents attending
physicians sufficiently support her claim for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor
the ECC convincingly deny their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made
part of the record and there is no showing that they are false or erroneous, or resorted
to [for the purpose] of deceiving the Court, hence, are entitled to due probative weight.
The failure of respondent to submit to a full medical examination, as required by the
rules, to substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no moment. The law is that
laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable prerequisites to
compensability, the reason being that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed
in claims for compensation. Medical findings of the attending physician may be
received in evidence and used as proof[s] of the fact in dispute. The doctors
certification as to the nature of claimants disability may begiven credence as he orshe
normally would not make untruthful certification. Indeed, no physician inhis right
mind and who is aware of the far[-]reaching and serious effect that his or her
statements would cause on a money claim against a government agency would vouch
indiscriminately without regarding his own interests and protection.

Indeed, an employees disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time
but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was
considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a
partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause. The
right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and
proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result
of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or
misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow fromthe primary injury
are compensable.

Significantly, evenmedical authorities have established that the exact etiology of

essential hypertension cannot be accurately traced:

Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old

law, the present law has not ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social
legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman
still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional
guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy
towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a
humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social
justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of
disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be
resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the

The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of
hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot befound, and in
which the neural element may be only a mediator ofother influences. Since even this
latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the
category of unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by
failing to define; hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to
understand adequately the forces at work.25

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of

compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmens
Compensation Act. Nonetheless, we ruled in Employees Compensation Commission
v. Court of Appeals, that:

applicability of the law on employees compensation to as many employees who can

avail of the benefits thereunder.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Also, in Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro,27 this Court made the
following pronouncement:
Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case is the status of the
ailments that precipitated De Castros separation from the military service CAD and
hypertensive cardiovascular disease. These are occupational diseases. No less than the
ECC itself confirmed the status of these ailments when it declared that "Contrary to
the ruling of the System, CAD is a form of cardiovascular disease which is included in
the list of Occupational Diseases." Essential hypertension is also listed under Item 29
in Annex "A" of the Amended ECC Rules as an occupational disease.
Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the GSIS and the ECC found
De Castros CAD to be non-work related and, therefore, noncompensable. To use the
wording of the ECC decision, it denied De Castros claim "due to the presence of
factors which are not work-related, such as smoking and alcohol consumption." De
Castros own military records triggered this conclusion ashis Admitting Notes, made
when he entered the V. Luna General Hospital due to chest pains and hypertension,
were that he was a smoker and a drinker.
As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at face value because it
considers only one side the purely medical side of De Castros case and even then
may not be completely correct. The ECC itself, in its decision, recites that CAD is
caused, among others, by atherosclerosis of the coronary arteries that in turn, and lists
the following major causes: increasing age; male gender; cigarette smoking; lipid
disorder due to accumulation of too much fats in the body; hypertension or high blood
pressure; insulin resistance due to diabetes; family history ofCAD. The minor factors
are: obesity; physical inactivity; stress; menopausal estrogen deficiency; high
carbohydrate intake; and alcohol.
We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of smoking
and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castros ailments, otherwise listed as
occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and hypertension
that the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be denied; smoking and
drinking are undeniably among these causes. However, they are not the sole causes of
CAD and hypertension and, at least, not under the circumstances of the present case.
For this reason, we fear for the implication of the ECC ruling if it will prevail and be
read as definitive on the effects of smoking and drinkingon compensability issues,
even on diseases that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling raises the
possible reading that smoking and drinking, by themselves, are factors that can bar
compensability.
We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole determinants of
compensability as the ECC has apparently failed to consider other factors such as age

and gender from among those that the ECC itself listed as major and minor causes of
atherosclerosis and, ultimately, of CAD. While age and gender are characteristics
inherent in the person (and thereby may be considered nonwork related factors), they
also do affect a workers job performance and may in this sense, together with stresses
of the job, significantly contribute to illnesses such as CAD and hypertension. To cite
an example, some workplace activities are appropriate only for the young (such as the
lifting of heavy objects although these may simply be office files), and when
repeatedly undertaken by older workers, may lead to ailments and disability. Thus, age
coupled with an age-affected work activity may lead to compensability. From this
perspective, none of the ECCs listed factors should be disregarded to the exclusion of
others in determining compensability.
In any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as
important as raw medical findings and a claimants personal and social history. This is
a basic legal reality in workers compensation law. We are therefore surprised that the
ECC and the GSIS simply brushed aside the disability certification that the military
issued with respect to De Castros disability, based mainly on their primacy as the
agencies with expertise on workers compensation and disability issues.28 (Emphasis
supplied)
This case should not have been difficult for the petitioner to resolve on its own, given
that so many cases have been decided in the past which should have provided it the
guiding hand to decide disability cases on its own rightly instead of putting claimants
in the unfortunate position of having to chase the benefits they are clearly entitled to,
and waste years prosecuting their claims in spite of their adverse circumstances in life.
This Court should not have to parrot over and over again what clearly has been the
settled rule; in many ways, this is a waste of time, and it only indicates that petitioner
has eithernot learned its lesson, or it refuses to realize it.
Applying Bauland De Castro to the instant case and looking at the factual milieu, the
Court agrees with the CAs conclusion and so declares that respondents illness is
compensable. Respondent served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the
ECC itself said, "[h]er duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused
her to develop her ailment, hypertension"29 which is a listed occupational disease,
contrary to the CAs pronouncement that itis not. And because it is a listed
occupational disease, the "increased risk theory" does not apply again, contrary to
the CAs declaration; no proof of causation is required.
It can also be said that given respondents age at the time, and taking into account the
nature, working conditions, and pressures of her work as court stenographer which
requires her to faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the courts
proceedings; transcribe these notes immediately in order to make them available to the
court or the parties who require them; take down dictations by the judge, and
transcribe them; and type in final form the judges decisions, which activities extend
beyond office hours and without additional compensation or overtime pay30 all
these contributed to the development of her hypertension or hypertensive

cardiovascular disease, as petitioner would call it.31 Consequently, her age, work, and
hypertension caused the impairment of vision in both eyes due to "advanced to late
stage glaucoma",which rendered her "legally blind."32
Contrary to petitioners submissions, there appears to be a link between blood pressure
and the development of glaucoma, which leads the Court to conclude that respondents
glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension.
Although intra ocular pressure (IOP) remains an important risk factor for glaucoma, it
is clear that other factors can also influence disease development and progression.
More recently, the role that blood pressure (BP) has in the genesis of glaucoma has
attracted attention, as it represents a clinically modifiable risk factor and thus provides
the potential for new treatment strategies beyond IOP reduction. The interplay between
blood pressure and IOP determines the ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), which
regulates blood flow to the optic nerve. If OPP is a more important determinant of
ganglion cell injury than IOP, then hypotension should exacerbate the detrimental
effects of IOP elevation, whereas hypertension should provide protection against IOP
elevation. Epidemiological evidence provides some conflicting outcomes of the role of
systemic hypertension in the development and progression of glaucoma. The most
recent study showed that patients at both extremes of the blood pressure spectrum
show an increased prevalence of glaucoma. Those with low blood pressure would have
low OPP and thus reduced blood flow; however, that people with hypertension also
show increased risk is more difficult to reconcile. This finding may reflect an inherent
blood flow dysregulation secondary to chronic hypertension that would render retinal
blood flow less able to resist changes in ocular perfusion pressure.33 x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In recent years, weve learned a lot about ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), i.e., the
pressure difference between blood entering the eye and IOP. Its clear that three forces
OPP, IOP and blood pressure are interconnected in the glaucoma disease
process. The mechanics of that relationship, however, remain ambiguous.
xxxx
The ties between hypertension and glaucoma are less well established but the data, in
addition to my involvement in a new study (discussed below), have convinced me they
probably do exist. Therefore, I believe potential hypertension, along with potential low
blood pressure, should be investigated in patients whose glaucoma continues to
progress despite what appears to be well controlled IOP.
xxxx
We suspect there is a close relationship among IOP, OPP, blood pressure and
glaucoma, but the exact nature of these associations remains elusive. Complicating
matters is the physiological phenomenon known as autoregulation.34

Abstract
Aims: To determine whether systemic hypertension and glaucoma might coexist more
often than expected, with possible implications for treatment.
Methods: Case-control study using general practitioner database of patients with
glaucoma matched with controls for age and sex.
Results: Hypertension was significantly more common in the 27[,]080 patients with
glaucoma (odds ratio 1.29, 95% confidence intervals 1.23 to 1.36, p<0.001) than in
controls. x x x35
While some of the above conclusions are not definitive, it must be stressed that
probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases."36 It does not
preclude the Court from concluding that respondents hypertension apart from her
age, work, and working conditions impaired her vision as a result.
The Court likewise disregards the ECCs finding, which petitioner relies upon, that the
primary and important risk factors for developing hypertension are smoking, excess
body weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical
inactivity and psychological factors, including stress. As the Court held in De Castro,
these are not the sole causes of hypertension; age, gender, and work stress significantly
contribute to its development, and the nature and characteristics of the employment are
as important as raw medical findings and a claimants personal and social history.
Finally, while the ECC possesses the requisite expertise and knowledge in
compensation cases, its decision in respondents caseis nonetheless erroneous and
contrary to law. The Court cannot uphold its findings; its specialized training,
experience and expertise did not serve justice well in this case.1wphi1 The medical
certificates and relevant reports issued by respondents attending physicians Drs.
Alfred I. Lim, Elmer Montes, and Salvador R. Salceda as well as hospital records,37
deserve credence. The identical findings of these three eye specialists simply cannot be
ignored.
In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by the principles,
declared in Bauland De Castro, that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation cases;that the primordial and paramount consideration is the employees
welfare; that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for
compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may be received in
evidence and used as proof of the facts in dispute; that in any determination of
compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw
medical findings and a claimants personal and social history; that where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result
of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligenceor

misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of the law on employees
compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 30, 2009 Decision and
February 23, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice