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To cite this article: Lotte Bgh Andersen & Lene Holm Pedersen (2012) Public Service Motivation and Professionalism,
International Journal of Public Administration, 35:1, 46-57, DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2011.635278
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2011.635278
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University and AKF, Danish Institute of Governmental Research,
Copenhagen, Denmark
INTRODUCTION
Many providers of public services are professionals. They
belong to occupations with high levels of specialized, theoretical knowledge and strong intra-occupational norms. This
means that their motivation and behavior potentially differ
from other public employees. While the sociology of professions has already been rediscovered in some parts of the
discipline of public administration (Tonon, 2008; Teodoro,
2010), it has not yet been integrated in the study of public
service motivation. Are professionals more or less motivated
by doing good for others and society than other providers of
public services? Does socialization within an occupational
group with norms and specialized, theoretical knowledge
increase public service motivation (PSM), or is altruistic
motivation replaced by professional norms or even occupational self-interest? Does the association between PSM
and professionalism differ for the different PSM dimensions? These are important questions, especially given that
Correspondence should be addressed to Lotte Bgh Andersen, AKF,
Danish Institute of Governmental Research, Kbmagergade 22, DK-1150,
Copenhagen K, Denmark. E-mail: lba@akf.dk
PSM may increase the individual and organizational performance (Brewer, 2008; Leisink & Steijn, 2009; Andersen &
Serritzlew, 2012). This article therefore investigates how
professionalism and PSM are related.
The main contribution of the article is that it integrates
the sociology of professions and public service motivation
literature and empirically tests the association between PSM
and professionalism, using different operationalizations of
professionalism. The existing literature has predominantly
investigated the effect of individual identification with the
professional organization. For this specification, the results
have been somewhat inconsistent (Perry, 1997; Moynihan &
Pandey, 2007).
We argue that we can more fully understand the relationship by also drawing on the sociology of professions.
We therefore conceptionalize professionalism as the occupational level of specialized, theoretical knowledge combined with the existence of firm intra-occupational norms
(Andersen, 2005, p. 25). Professionalism is thus ultimately
a continuous occupational variable in the sense that some
occupations are more professionalized than others. The term
profession is reserved to describe an occupation with a high
level of professionalism, and professionals are members of
occupations with high levels of professionalism.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Within the public administration literature, professionalism
is typically associated with specialized technical knowledge acquired from a formal educational program; ethical
responsibility; working for the common good and lifetime careers (Mosher, 1968). This definition does, however,
rely only on one of the two most important approaches
within the sociology of professions, namely the functionalist
approach. This approach expects professionals (in the course
of their education) to become socialized to an ideology
that asserts greater commitment to doing good work than
to economic gain (Freidson, 2001, p.127). In contrast, the
neo-Weberians warn us that professions can be collectively
self-interested, trying to maintain or establish a monopoly
on providing certain services. Social closure thus refers to
the way in which status groups such as professions (Weber,
1978, p. 306) try to improve their own situation by limiting rewards and opportunities to themselves (Parkin, 1974,
p. 3).
47
48
TABLE 1
Understanding of the classical PSM dimensions and user
orientation
Dimension
Commitment to
public interest
(public values)
Compassion
Attraction to
policy-making/
public
participation
Self-sacrifice
User orientation
Understanding of
dimension
Motivation to deliver
public services to serve
the relevant society,
based on values and
duty
Emotionally
(empathically) based
motivation to do good
for others by improving
public services
Motivation to improve
decision-making
concerning public
services to help others
and society
The will to bypass ones
own needs to help
others and society by
providing public
services
Motivation to help the
specific user of public
services
Discussed in
Perry (1996)/Kim
&Vandenabeele
(2009)
Perry (1996)
Perry (1996)/Kim
&Vandenabeele
(2009)
Perry (1996)
Vandenabeele
(2008)
Andersen,
Pedersen, &
Pallesen (2011)
to lacking chances to get a job. Like attraction, we therefore assume that the selection effect of PSM at the level of
professionalism is not substantial.
Attrition denotes the gradual, natural reduction in membership or personnel, as through retirement, resignation, or
death. Similar to selection and attraction, our assessment
is that attrition is of minor importance for the association
between professionalism and PSM. Few leave their occupation before retirement, and age-based differences can be
handled by controlling for age. The expectation that attraction, selection, and attrition cannot be expected to cause
substantial effects from PSM to professionalism can, of
course, only be confirmed by panel studies over a long
period, but given that we control for task and sector, we
find it reasonable to treat PSM as the dependent variable
in the analyses. This is also in accordance with the rest
of the literature (Perry, 1996; Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b,
p. 298). We therefore concentrate on the last mechanism,
socialization, which means the process where individuals internalize the values and norms of their peers. We
discuss
1. the arguments for a positive effect,
2. the arguments for a negative effect and finally
3. the arguments for a conditional effect.
Considering the arguments for a positive socialization
effect, Pandey & Stazyk (2008, pp. 1056) argue that professions have ethical codes emphasizing the promotion of
the public interest, but that the effect on PSM depends
on the socializing institutions of the professional associations. In terms of this article, strong socialization necessarily exists within professions, because firm professional
norms are defining characteristics, but it is not self-evident
that this socialization is directed towards (all dimensions
of) PSM. Socialization within professions can potentially
happen already during the formal education.
Within the PSM literature, Perry (2000, pp. 4801) also
argues that schools are an important source in terms of
influencing the motivation of individuals. He expects both
educational level and professional training to affect the
level of PSM. Socialization can also happen after the education is finished, both spontaneously between individual
professionals and within the settings of professional organizations. The existing literature has primarily investigated the
socialization linked to the professional organization. Perry
(1997, p. 185) thus expects that professional organizations
shape the ethical norms of their members and that membership and active participation of these organizations therefore
increase public service motivation. Moynihan & Pandey
(2007, p. 46) also find that professional identification affects
PSM strongly and uniformly positive. In contrast, Perry
(1997) finds that professional identification had no overall
positive effect and has a negative influence for attraction to
policy-making.
49
But what are the arguments for a negative socialization effect of professionalism on PSM? In relation to the
mentioned studies, the difference might be due to the
measurement; Moynihan & Pandey used a dichotomous
measure of membership in professional organizations,
whereas Perry measured activities in and attitudes towards
professional organizations. In contrast to these studies, this
article conceptionalizes professionalism as an occupational
variable. This conceptualization is especially important for
the discussion of why professionals may be socialized to
(occupational) selfishness, implying that professionalism
negatively affects PSM as implicitly implied by the neoWeberian approach. Freidson argues that professional power
exists as a protected position for the occupation in the social
division of labor; as authority, status, and expertise in interactions with individual users; and as dominance in the larger
political economy of ideas (1970, 1986). Frankford (1997,
p. 196) argues that this power is based on professionals creating ideas about their subject area; that these ideas come to
dominate the laity, and that this power over ideas is embodied in educational (and other types of) institutions. He argues
that both professions as collectives and professionals as individuals possess this power, and that it is exercised against
other occupations, individual users and society as a collective, particularly as embodied in the political and legal
systems.
In the public administration literature, Mosher has (1968,
p. 210) called attention to the perspective on professionals,
arguing that the general interest might be substituted by the
(narrower) professional perspective influenced by the professionals own interests (see also Perry 2007, p. 5). Perry
(1997, p. 185) touches on this issue, stating that the degree
to which professionalism influences public service motivation is likely to be constrained by tension between professional self-interest and the ideal of professional responsibility to higher ethical and moral standards. Despite this
tension, Perry still expects that identification with a profession is positively related to public service motivation.
In contrast, we argue that a more nuanced discussion, relating to the PSM dimensions, is necessary to account for the
countervailing forces of professionalism.
As mentioned, there are also arguments for a conditional
socialization effect of professionalism on PSM, implying
that the effect can be positive under some circumstances
and negative under other circumstances. An institutional
approach to professionalism thus calls attention to the fact
that sometimes professional norms and PSM can be competing motivations. If a firm professional norm exists, professionals from the same occupation are expected to behave
and perform similarly (either because the professionals find
the norms the right way to do things or because of (collective) self-interest in upholding the privileged position of
the profession). This implies that other types of motivation
(both altruistic such as PSM and egoistic such as pecuniary
motives) matter less. The professional norms do, however,
50
differ from profession to profession, and it is also different for the PSM dimensions, whether they clash with the
professional norms.
Commitment to the public interest (motivation to deliver
public services to serve the entire relevant society based
on values and duty) hardly clashes with professional norms
in any profession. Given the argument presented above for
including these norms in the definition of professionalism,
they are created to guarantee good service for society in the
implicit bargain between profession and public. In contrast,
we clearly expect all professionals to have lower levels of
compassion. Given that professionals act in accordance with
norms and based on the specialized, theoretical knowledge,
this emotionally based type of motivation should not characterize them. The professional socialization is expected to be
directed towards internalizing norms and removing emotions
as the basis of decision-making; professional power is based
on the ability to convince the public that the professional
autonomy is based on expertise. Professionals are supposed
to respond analytically (rather than emotionally) to people
in need.
The same logic applies to user orientation. Seen from
a professions perspective, only professionals (and not the
users) have the right theoretical and specialized knowledge
to take decisions, and professionals should not be oriented
towards the perceived needs of the user. As Mosher (1968,
p. 109) formulated it there are correct ways of solving
problems and doing things.
Concerning attraction to policy-making, it is harder to
form specific expectations. Mosher (1968, p. 108) argues
that there is a built-in aversion between the professions
and politics, originating in the historical fact that most professions have fought politicians who are seen as amateurs
trying to infiltrate, dominate and influence their work substance to the expense of specialized knowledge, science
and rationality. On the other hand, the literature on political
efficacy and political participation (Milbrath, 1965; Verba,
Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009) has
shown that higher education increases political participation
(Vecchione & Caprara, 2009), and professionals normally
have a long education. As it is impossible to say which effect
dominates, we cannot offer specific expectations for attraction to policy-making. The three investigated hypotheses
thus are:
Hypothesis 1: Professionalism and commitment to the public
interest are not correlated.
Hypothesis 2: Public service providers, who are members
of occupations with a high level of professionalism, have
lower levels of compassion than other public service
providers.
Hypothesis 3: Public service providers, who are members
of occupations with a high level of professionalism, have
lower levels of user orientation than other public service
providers.
51
TABLE 2
Investigated occupations after their professionalism and service area (number of respondents)
Criteria
Very high professionalism
High professionalism
Medium professionalism
Low professionalism
Years
Teaching occupations
University teachers
(8 years/7.20) n = 29
Health occupations
Physicians
(8 years/7.74)
n = 56
High-school teachers
(5 years/5.32) n = 28
School teachers
(4 years/4.64)
n = 189
Pre-school teachers
(3.5 years/4.08)
n = 104
Administrative
occupations
Administrators with
university degree
(5 years/6.25) n = 83
Nurses (3.5 years/
5.71) n = 78
Health assistants
(1.5 years/3.10)
n = 88
Administrators with
vocational training
(3/4.11) n = 304
52
the other; it ensures that the results are similar for very
different operationalizations of professionalism. In order to
make this transparent, the results from both measures of professionalism are reported in the results section. We based our
measures of the PSM dimensions on the short form developed by Coursey & Pandey (2007). Wright & Christensen
(2009, p. 15) found that this short form had a moderately
good fit with the data.
Appendix B presents a factor analysis of the items,
and it indicates that the factors correspond to the expected
dimensions (commitment to public interest corresponds to
factor 1, attraction to policy-making corresponds to factor 2,
compassion corresponds to factor 4, and user orientation corresponds to factor 3 in Table A1 in Appendix B). Cronbachs
alpha for the indexes corresponding to the items belonging to
the different dimensions is between 0.52 and 0.72 (exact values can be seen in Appendix B). We analyze the dimensions
separately and use factor scores from the analysis presented
in Appendix B.
RESULTS
In this section, we present a series of OLS regressions
of the different dimensions of PSM and user orientation.
Hypothesis 1 expects that professionalism does not relate
to commitment to the public interest. As expected, Table 3
shows that professionalism does not systematically correlate
with the level of commitment to the public interest controlled for age and gender. The same result is seen when controls for service area (education, health, or administration)
and sector (public/private) are included. The level of commitment to the public interest is highest for education, and
it is higher in the public sector than in the private sector.
Pedersen & Andersen (2010) discuss this finding. Our interpretation is that the level of professionalism and the level of
commitment to the public interest are not correlated, when
service area and sector is controlled for, because the arguments for expecting a positive and a negative association
neutralize each other, suggesting that professions should neither be seen as pure collective egoists (as suggested by
the Neo-Weberians) or as totally committed to doing good
work (as suggested by the Functionalist approach to professions). It is, however, possible that none of the arguments are
valid. Table 3 shows that there is no substantial difference in
the results using the qualitative or the quantitative measure
of professionalism, suggesting that the findings are robust
concerning the operationalization of professionalism.
Hypothesis 2 expects that a higher level of professionalism is associated with a lower level of compassion. Table 4
confirms this expectation as employees belonging to occupations with a high level of professionalism a have a lower
level of compassion than employees belonging to occupations with a low level of professionalism. Due to multicollinarity, this association is not statistically significant
for the models with interaction terms between professionalism and area, but the coefficients do not change, and
the association does not differ substantially among administration, teaching, and health. Our interpretation is that
professionals are governed by norms rather than emotions,
and that they have been socialized out of being motivated by
TABLE 3
OLS regressions of Commitment to Public Interest (unstandardized regression coef)
Quantitative measure of professionalism
(Intercept)
Age (years)
Gender
(1 = woman)
Professionalism
Service area1 :
Teaching
Service area1 :
Health
Sector
(1 = public)
Interaction:
Teach prof.
Interaction:
Health prof.
n
Adj. R-square
F-value for full
model
1 Reference
0.05
Model 3-1
Model 3-2
Model 3-3
Model 3-4
Model 3-5
Model 3-6
Model 3-7
Model3-8
Model 3-9
71.67
0.111
0.873
70.812
0.113
1.118
69.26
0.098
1.443
67.840
0.090
1.168
66.864
0.098
1.179
69.53
0.113
1.245
68.94
0.098
1.474
67.42
0.090
1.224
66.44
0.096
1.281
0.006
5.60
0.005
2.701
0.643
0.188
5.555
0.209
2.633
0.490
6.020
0.017
1.545
1.466
5.43
845
0.005
3.032
845
0.004
2.239
845
0.033
6.838
845
0.053
8.932
0.025
5.900
1.477
1.468
5.41
1.571
5.44
2.440
5.38
0.086
1.189
0.004
0.226
845
0.054
7.061
845
0.005
2.536
845
0.033
6.848
845
0.053
8.950
845
0.053
6.883
53
TABLE 4
OLS regressions of Compassion (unstandardised regression coef.)
(Intercept)
Age (years)
Gender
(1 = woman)
Professionalism
Service areaa1 :
Teaching
Service area1 :
Health
Sector
(1 = public)
Interaction:
Teach prof.
Interaction:
Health prof.
n
Adj. R-square
F-value for full
model
1
Model 4-1
Model 4-2
Model 4-3
Model 4-4
Model 4-5
Model 4-6
Model 4-7
Model 4-8
Model 4-9
68.6
70.0
67.6
66.7
66.6
69.6
68.5
.083
5.26
.077
5.08
.079
5.06
.111
5.46
69.5
.083
5.19
.077
5.03
67.4
.081
5.05
.052
8.76
.053
6.90
.055
7.94
.298
1.42
9.05
1.40
7.21
1.039
9.080
5.57
3.637
3.22
6.02
4.11
5.105
3.484
3.46
3.43
3.424
.112
5.63
.109
5.24
.027
845
.030
14.268
845
.031
9.993
845
.090
17.625
845
.096
15.873
.026
.697
.011
.400
845
.094
11.940
845
.030
9.596
845
.090
17.720
845
.096
15.912
845
.094
11.940
0.05
CONCLUSION
The literature on the relationship between professionalism
and PSM tends to measure professionalism as individual
identification with professional organizations and to treat
PSM as a unified construct. In contrast, drawing on the
sociology of professions, professionalism in this article is
defined as an occupational variable which refers to the
54
Model 5-1
(Intercept)
Age (years)
Gender
(1 = woman)
Professionalism
Service area1 :
Teaching
Service area1 :
Health
Sector
(1 = public)
Interaction:
Teach prof.
Interaction:
Health prof.
N
Adj. R-square
F-value for full
model
71.1
.119
3.39
845
.019
9.361
Model 5-2
Model 5-3
Model 5-4
Model 5-6
Model 5-7
Model 5-8
Model 5-9
73.7
.114
2.64
73.6
.112
2.43
74.2
.115
2.54
76.3
.113
2.37
76.5
.114
2.44
76.9
.110
2.10
77.6
.113
2.20
78.0
.118
2.27
.052
.056
.219
.005
1.371
.114
2.202
1.65
1.92
.718
1.93
1.915
2.19
5.22
1.453
2.648
.587
2.24
3.486
1.131
2.155
2.248
2.226
2.348
845
.027
8.675
845
.026
5.516
845
.029
5.146
.008
1.056
.096
1.559
845
.034
4.719
845
.032
10.197
845
.033
6.789
845
.036
6.252
845
.039
5.330
1 Reference
0.05
(Intercept)
Age (years)
Gender
(1 = woman)
Professionalism
Service area1 :
Teaching
Service area1 :
Health
Sector
(1 = public)
Interaction:
Teach prof.
Interaction:
Health prof.
N
Adj. R-square
F-value for full
model
52.0
.133
3.258
845
.008
4.449
Model 6-2
Model 6-3
Model 6-7
Model 6-8
Model 6-9
50.0
.115
2.036
44.4
.092
1.753
47.0
.128
2.388
46.2
.113
1.656
46.1
.113
1.671
41.1
.097
1.564
.053
.069
3.089
.069
3.212
.210
3.984
1.505
2.321
3.68
2.322
3.85
4.03
3.99
5.004
5.132
.341
5.93
6.11
.607
.231
.309
.319
.337
845
.018
3.529
Model 6-6
50.1
115
2.025
845
.019
4.236
49.3
.128
2.488
845
.011
4.107
Model 6-4
.215
2.96
.154
-2.15
845
.022
3.411
845
.012
4.443
845
.023
5.011
845
.022
4.176
845
.023
3.490
1 Reference
0.05
degree of specialized theoretical knowledge and the firmness of the professional norms. Furthermore, we argue that
the relationship between professionalism and PSM differs
between the different dimensions of PSM, and the empirical
analysis in this article supports this.
Studying nine different occupations (845 individuals) we
found that professionalism correlates negatively with user
55
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57
High-school
teachers
School teachers
Pre-school
teachers
Physicians
Health assistants
and nurses
Administrators
0.052
0.029
0.054
0.095
0.020
0.110
0.130
0.034
0.019
0.178
0.077
0.001
0.015
0.066
0.019
0.686
0.019
0.806
0.093
0.369
0.355
0.074
0.605
0.016
0.704
0.053