Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
L-13298
CORNELIO
RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.
Basilio
Aromin
for
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.
appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the
registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the
petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit
1, of the Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of
a considerable tract of land located in the municipality of San
Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a
possessory information title to the land, registered as such on
February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the
possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in
February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his
wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on
the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the
ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed
Act No. 926 means "those public lands acquired from Spain
which are not timber or mineral lands."
The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the
land is forestal or mineral in nature and, if not so found, to
consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is
not very helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps,
and all forest reserves of whatever character." This definition of
"public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the purposes of this
chapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in
public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification
of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands." With
reference to the last section, there is no certification of the
Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether this land is better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land
covered with a natural growth of trees and underbrush; a large
wood." The authorities say that he word "forest" has a significant,
not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land
only partly woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees,
usually of considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co.
[1908], 114 N. Y. Supp., 262; People vs. Long Island R. Co.
[1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable
or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in his work on Forest Law of India,
states as follows:
xxx
xxx
[2]
[3]
[4]
[6]
The Issue
[9]
[11]
[13]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
MELO, J.:
This has reference to a petition for review on certiorari seeking
the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 59613 (December 24, 1980, Sison, P.V., Cenzon. Asuncion
[P], JJ) which reversed the decision dated September 7, 1975 of
the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan. In consequence, the
OF
HEREDITARY
SUCCESSION
AND
ORDERED THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
SURRENDER
THE
OWNERSHIP
AND
POSSESSION OF THE SAME TO THEM.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE
PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT IS THE SAME
LAND WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE SALE
WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE (Exh. 1)
EXECUTED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1932 BY THE
ESGUERRAS IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
BE THE ABSOLUTE OWNER AND ENTITLED
TO THE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
PETITIONERS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THIS LAND WAS PURCHASED BY THE
PARENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
FROM THE HEIRS OF THE LATE CATALINO
ESGUERRA ON NOVEMBER 5, 1932 AND THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND HER PARENTS
HAD
BEEN
IN
OPEN,
CONTINUOUS,
ADVERSE,
PUBLIC
AND
NOTORIOUS
While both Socorro Olarte, a signatory to the "Kasulatang-BilingMabibiling-Muli" as one of the vendors-a-retro, and private
respondent testified that the land subject of the sale was covered
by Tax Declaration No. 5096 in the name of the original owner
Catalino Esguerra (tsn, October 21, 1974, p. 6 and December 18,
1974, pp. 3-5), they could not produce a copy of said tax
declaration. Capitalizing on said omission, petitioners presented a
certified true copy of said Tax Declaration No. 5096 (Exh. "G")
covering the year 1948 and which, however, concerns a piece of
lot owned by a certain Teodoro Sinson. Further, petitioners also
produced certified true copies of Tax Declarations Nos. 2214
(Exh. "H"), 2215 (Exh "I") and 2216 (Exh. "J"), all in the name of
Catalino Esguerra as owner, and all for the year 1967.
that the payments were made for the residential lot under
litigation.
It is, therefore, evident that Tax Declaration No. 5096 was
inexistent at the time of the alleged sale. By a simply analysis of
the different tax declarations presented as evidence in this case,
it is likewise clear that when by virtue of the alleged sale, a new
tax declaration numbered 5326, was made in 1938 in the name of
Victoriano Felipe (Exh. "5-C-1"), what was cancelled was Tax
Declaration No. 252 (Exh. "3"), not Tax Declaration No. 5096
which supposedly covered the property subject of the
"Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli". It should be noted that the
property under Tax Declaration No. 5326 bears an identical
description to the property under litigation. Thus, the inevitable
conclusion is that, without any legal basis, Victoriano Felipe had
declared himself the owner of the disputed property for tax
purposes. Tax Declaration No. 5326 thereafter became the basis
for
Tax
Declaration
No. 2383 in 1948 (Exh. "5-C") until it was cancelled and new tax
declarations were made in the name of private respondent, viz.,
Tax Declaration No. 9453 in 1962 (Exh. "5-b"), then Tax
Declaration No. 2657 in 1967 (Exh. "5") and finally Tax
Declaration No. 2962 in 1974 (Exh. "5-A").
As earlier stated, Guillerma de la Cruz had also been paying real
property tax on the house described as located in Dampol 2nd in
the name of Victoriano Felipe under Tax Declaration No. 14984
since 1933 (Exh. "2-C"), and then under Tax Declaration No.
3975 since 1941 (Exh. "2-4") until 1947, and under Tax
Declaration No. 2384 in 1948. By a twist of fate, however, Tax
Declaration No. 2384 describes the house, among others, as
located in the residential lot belonging to Santiago de Jesus or
"solar de Santiago de Jesus" (Exh. "A-1"). While real property tax
continued to be paid under the latter declaration until 1958 (Exh.
"2-y"), by stating in said tax declaration that his house was
was still living. Guillerma de la Cruz died on April 23, 1964 (Exh.
"B"), three years after the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Exh. "4") was
executed. Moreover, the tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for tax purposes upon which private respondent
basically anchors her claim, are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership; they only become evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of
the property (Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650
[1991]; Rojas vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 709 [1992]).
On the issue of ownership by acquisitive prescription, private
respondent contends: "Granting that it was formerly owned by
their late grandfather, they (petitioners) have lost whatever right
they may have over the land by extinctive prescription" for the
reason that she, private respondent has acquired the same by
acquisitive prescription (Brief for the Respondents, p. 9), citing
Section 41 of the old Code of Civil Procedure which states:
Sec. 41. Title to Land by Prescription. Ten
years of actual adverse possession by any person
claiming to be the owner for that time of any land
or interest in land, uninterruptedly, continuously
for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or
otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may
have commenced or continued, shall vest in every
actual possessor of such land, a full and complete
title . . . .
Corazon de Jesus Masiglat testified that from 1930 to 1952, the
period of time she was living in the house her grandfather erected
on the contested property, her grandmother, Victoriano Felipe,
Guillerma de la Cruz, and private respondent also lived there (tsn,
July 16, 1974, p. 23). She was corroborated by petitioner
Edgardo de Jesus who also testified that in 1932 up to the time of
his death in 1948, Exequiel de Jesus was taking charge of the
The Facts
[G.R. No. 79688. February 1, 1996]
PLEASANTVILLE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T.
TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and
ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
[2]
[10]
[12]
[14]
[15]
[17]
[20]
SO ORDERED.
February 6, 1907
EL
BANCO
ESPAOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JAMES PETERSON, sheriff of the city of Manila, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
Del-Pan,
Ortigas
&
Fisher
for
Hartigan, Marple, Rohde, & Gutierrez for appellees.
appellant.
TORRES, J.:
On the 24th of October, 1905, the Spanish-Filipino Bank, a
corporation, through its attorneys, Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher,
filed a complaint against the sheriff of the city of Manila and the
other defendant, Juan Garcia, praying that judgment be rendered
against the said sheriff, declaring that the execution levied upon
the property referred to in the complaint, to wit, wines, liquors,
canned goods, and other similar merchandise, was illegal, and
directing the defendants to return the said goods to the plaintiff
corporation, and in case that he had disposed of the same, to pay
the value thereof, amounting to P30,000, Philippine currency, and
further that it be declared that the said plaintiff corporation, under
the contract of pledge referred to in the complaint had the right to
apply the proceeds of the sale of the said goods to the payment
of the debt of P40,000, Philippine currency, for the security of
which the said merchandise was pledged, with preference over
the claim of the other defendant, Juan Garcia and that both
defendants be held jointly liable to the plaintiff for the sum of
P500, Philippine currency, as damages, and the said defendants
to pay the costs of the proceedings, and for such other and
further relief as the plaintiff might be entitled to under the law.
Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that under the contract entered
into on the 4th of March, 1905, by and between the SpanishFilipino Bank and Francisco Reyes, the former, loaned to the
If so, the bank's claim had preference over the claim of a third
person not secured, as was the bank's, by a pledge, with
reference to the property pledged to the extent of its value, and
therefore such property could not have been legally levied upon
by the sheriff at the request of the defendant, Juan Garcia. (Arts.
1921, 1922, Civil Code.)
In the motion for a new trial it was alleged by the plaintiff that the
judgment of the court below was contrary to law, and that the
findings of fact contained therein were plainly and manifestly
against the weight of the evidence. If plaintiffs contention is
correct, then the judgment of the court below should be reversed.
The fact that the said goods continued in the warehouse which
was formerly rented by the pledgor, Reyes, does not affect the
validity and legality of the pledge, it having been demonstrated
that after the pledge had been agreed upon, and after the
depository appointed with the common consent of the parties had
taken possession of the said property, the owner, the pledgor,
could no longer dispose of the same, the pledgee being the only
one authorized to do so through the depositary and special agent
who represented it, the symbolical transfer of the goods by
means of the delivery of the keys to the warehouse where the
goods were stored being sufficient to show that the depositary
appointed by the common consent of the parties was legally
EDUARDO
CUAYCONG,
ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
RAMONA BENEDICTO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ruperto Montinola and Aurelio
No appearance for appellees.
Montinola
for
appellants.
FISHER, J.:
The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiffs to make use
of two roads existing on the Hacienda Toreno, a tract of land in
the municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the property of
the defendants, Blasa Benedicto and Ramona Benedicto. One of
these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the NancaVictorias road and the other as the Dacuman Toreno road. The
Court of First Instance held that those of the plaintiffs who
claimed to be entitled to make use of the Dacuman Toreno
road had failed to establish the asserted right, and dismissed the
action as to them. From this decision they appealed to this court
but, their brief not having been filed within the time prescribed by
the rules, their appeal was dismissed, on motion of defendants,
by resolution dated February 14, 1916. Consequently, the issues
presented on this appeal are limited to those which relate to the
rights of the parties with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, and
The allegations in the complaint with respect to the NancaVictorias road are that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino
Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of
haciendas situated between the southern boundary of the
Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of
Seravia, and that the appellees Silverio Ginoo, Gervasio Ascalon,
and Juan Ledesma, are the lessees of part of said haciendas;
that more than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors
in interest have made use of the Nanca-Victorias road, which
crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continiously,
with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda, for the
purpose of conveying the products of their haciendas to the town
of Victorias and to the landing place there situated, and for the
purpose of transporting supplies from those points to their
haciendas, making use of the said road by means of carts,
carabaos, and other usual means of transportation; that there is
no outlet to a public road from the hacienda occupied by these
plaintiffs, the only road and way by which the products of the
plaintiffs' property can be taken to the town of Victorias and to the
landing place there being across the Hacienda Toreno by the
road marked on the plan attached to the complaint; that on the
fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road
in question at the point at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno,
and refused to permit plaintiffs to continue using it; that plaintiffs
were about to commence to grind their crop of sugar cane, and
that, if prevented from transporting their sugar across the
Hacienda Toreno to their point of embarkation, would suffer
damages difficult to estimate. Upon these averments of fact the
plaintiffs prayed for a judgment that they are entitled to use the
road in question as they have been using it in the past, and that a
perpetual injunction be issued against plaintiffs restraining them
from impending such use. Upon the filing of the complaint,
plaintiffs moved the court to issue a preliminary injunction
restraining defendants from interfering with the use of the road
during the pendency of the suit, which motion was granted by the
court.
Defendants in their answer put in issue all the special averments
of the complaint, as above set forth, and by way of counterclaim
and special defense, averred that the road crossing the Hacienda
Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right of passage, is the
private property of defendants; and, further, that they have not
refused plaintiffs permission to pass over this road but have
required them to pay toll for the privilege of doing so. Defendants
also claimed damages for the use of the road by plaintiffs during
the pendency of the suit, alleging that the preliminary injunction
had been improvidently issued upon false statements contained
in the verified complaint filed by plaintiffs.
The case was tried in July, 1913. The court on December 8,
1913, rendered judgment, dismissing the complaint with respect
to the plaintiffs Felix Suarez, Probo Jereza, Enrique Azcona, and
Melecio Pido, these being the plaintiffs who claimed the right to
use the Dacuman Toreno road. With respect to the NancaVictorias road, the court held that it was a public highway over
which the public had acquired a right of use by immemorial
prescription, and ordered the issuance of a perpetual injunction
against plaintiffs, restraining them from interfering in any manner
with the use of the said road.
The conclusion of the court with respect to the facts affecting the
Nanca-Victorias road are as follows:
Turning to a consideration of the evidence relative to the
Nanca-Victorias road we find incontestable proof that it
has been in existence for at least forty years. That the
hacenderos located in the southwestern section of
Victorias and the public generally passed over it freely
and that it was used for all purposes of transportation of
farm produce, animals, etc. and by pedestrians as well as
carromatas and other conveyances without break or
interruption until two or three years ago when the
public made use of the road, but there is nothing in the evidence
to indicate that the so called public use extended beyond this.
Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence to support the
finding of the court concerning the general public use of the road
in dispute, the record contains data strongly tending to show that
when the complaint was filed plaintiffs did not contend that the
road was a public highway, but merely contended that they had
acquired by prescription an easement of way across the
Hacienda Toreno. For example, the action is entitled an "action
concerning a right of away." (Bill of Exceptions, pp. 64 and 65.) It
is not averred in the complaint that the road in question was used
by the public. On the contrary, it is averred that it was used by the
plaintiffs and their predecessors. The averment in paragraph 8 of
the complaint that the plaintiffs have no other "outlet to a public
road" than that which they have been accustomed to used by
going across the defendants' hacienda for the purpose of going to
the town of Victorias also shows that when they commenced this
action they had in mind the provisions of articles 564, et seq. of
the Civil Code, which relate to the method of establishing the
compulsory easement of way. The owners of an existing
easement, as well as those whose properties are adjacent with a
public road, have no occasion to invoke these provisions of the
Code, which relate to the creation of new rights, and not the
enforcement of rights already in existence.
It is true in the opening statement made to the court, counsel for
plaintiffs, who was not the same attorney by whom the complaint
was signed, stated that plaintiffs contend that the road in question
is public, but as no evidence was introduced tending to establish
this contention concerning the Nanca Victorias road, counsel
for defendants had no occasion to object upon the ground that
such testimony was not relevant to the averments of the
complaint. No evidence was taken to indicate that at any time
since the road in question has been in existence any part of the
expense of its upkeep has been defrayed by the general
government, the province, or the municipality. The trial judge said
upon this subject:
1. The town of Victorias has always been the shipping point of the
products of the Hacienda Toreno, and of the haciendas of
appellees, as well as the place from which supplies were brought
to those properties.
2. For thirty or forty years before the commencement of the suit a
wagon road, herein called the Nanca-Victorias road, has been in
existence, connecting the haciendas of appellees with the town of
Victorias, and this road traverses the property of defendants.
Since the removal of the town of Victorias to a new site the
Nanca-Victorias road has been used by appellees in travelling
between their properties and the provincial road which crosses
the Hacienda Toreno from east to west.
3. No public funds have at any time been expended on the
construction or upkeep of the Nanca-Victorias road, but from time
to time work has been done on it by the laborers employed by the
present and former owners of the Hacienda Toreno and the
haciendas owned by the appellees and their predecessors in title.
4. The Nanca-Victorias wagon road, including that part of it which
crosses the Hacienda Toreno, has for thirty-five or forty years
been used by the appellees and their predecessors in title for the
transportation, by the usual means, of the products of their
estates to their shipping points in or near the town of Victorias,
and the transportation to their estates of all supplies required by
them, and has been used by all persons having occasion to travel
to and from all or any of the estates now owned by the appellees.
5. The use of the Nanca-Victorias road in the manner and by the
person above mentioned was permitted without objection by the
owners of the Hacienda Toreno until the year 1911, when they
closed it, and began charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart
which passed over the road, including carts belonging to the
appellants, until restrained from continuing to do so by the
preliminary injunction granted in this case.
labor were expended upon it, the question presents itself whether
the use to which the road has been put was such as to justify the
conclusion of the lower court that it has become public property.
There being no evidence that the original use of the road by
plaintiffs' predecessors was based upon any grant of the fee to
the road or of an easement of way, or that it began under the
assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that the
origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owners
of the estates affected.
This being so, has that merely permissive use been converted
into a title vested in the public at large, or in the plaintiffs by
reason of their ownership of the land beneficially affected by the
use?
Had it been shown that the road had been maintained at the
public expense, with the acquiescence of the owners of the
estates crossed by it, this would indicate such adverse
possession by the government as in course of time would ripen
into title or warrant the presumption of a grant or of a dedication.
But in this case there is no such evidence, and the claims of
plaintiffs, whether regarded as members of the public asserting a
right to use the road as such, or as persons claiming a private
easement of way over the land of another must be regarded as
resting upon the mere fact of user.
If the owner of a tract of land, to accommodate his neighbors or
the public in general, permits them to cross his property, it is
reasonable to suppose that it is not his intention, in so doing, to
divest himself of the ownership of the land so used, or to
establish an easement upon it and that the persons to whom such
permission, tacit or express, is granted, do not regard their
privilege of use as being based upon an essentially revocable
license. If the use continues for a long period of time, no change
being made in the relations of the parties by any express or
implied agreement, does the owner of the property affected lose
his right of revocation? Or, putting the same question in another
AQUlNO, J.:
t.hqw
After the respondents had filed their answers, the Mitra spouses
filed a verified motion for summary judgment. They assumed that
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. Peregrina
Astudillo opposed the motion. The parties submitted memoranda.
The lower court treated the motion for summary judgment as a
motion to dismiss. It dismissed Peregrina's petition on the
grounds that she is a mala fide squatter and that the sale of Lot
16 to Mitra cannot be assailed by means of certiorari
and mandamus. Peregrina appealed to this Court.
Her four assignments of error raise questions of law. She
contends that the lower court erred in holding that certiorari
and mandamus do not lie in this case and that she has no right to
question the award to Mitra, and in not holding that the award of
Lot 16 to him was in contravention of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practice Law and of the constitutional provision that a Senator or
Representative should not directly or indirectly be financially
interested in any contract with the government of any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof during his term of office.
In the ultimate analysis the issue is whether Peregrina Astudillo
has a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra and to
compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her.
We hold that she has no cause of action to impugn the award to
Mitra and to require that she be allowed to purchase the lot. As a
squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of
the law, the award to Mitra did not prejudice her since she was
bereft of any rights over the said lot which could have been
impaired by that award (Baez vs. Court of Appeals, L-30351,
September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 22).
The record does not show, and Peregrina does not claim, that
she is a member of the Piahan Homeowners Association some
of whose members are "deserving squatters" (Kempis vs.
Gonzales, L-31701, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 439).
1972 orders city and district engineers "to remove all illegal
constructions, including buildings ... and those built without
permits on public or private property" and provides for the
relocation of squatters (68 O.G. 7962. See Letter of Instruction
No. 19-A). As noted by Justice Sanchez, "since the last global
war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a
widespread vice" (City of Manila vs. Garcia, L-26053, February
21, 1967, 19 SCRA 413, 418).
The lower court did not err in holding that Peregrina Astudillo
cannot use the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus to
secure a judicial review of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court provides:
+.wph!1
she is not clothed with any right to Lot 16 that may be enforced in
a court of justice.
The PHHC board completely ignored the alleged demands of
Peregrina for the purchase of Lot 16. It did not render any
decision against her. Its inaction cannot be assailed by certiorari
or mandamus.
Peregrina's other assignment of error is that the award of Lot 16
to Congressman Mitra was a violation of section 3(h) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Law and of section 17, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution, now section 11, Article VIII of the new
Constitution.
On the other hand, Mitra contends that the PHHC performs
proprietary functions. He observed that the following high-ranking
officials were awarded PHHC lots: Felixberto Serrano, Dominador
Antonio, Manuel Lim, Fernando Lopez, Pacita M. Gonzales,
Genaro Magsaysay, Daniel Romualdez, Felipe A. Abrigo,
Bartolome Cabangbang, Juan Duran, Manuel Enverga, Angel
Fernandez, Jose Nuguid, Antonio de Pio, Lorenzo Teves,
Faustino Tobia, Pedro Trono, Marcelino Veloso and Valeriano
Yancha.
We are of the opinion that that assignment of error need not be
resolved in this case. Having shown that Peregrina has no cause
of action to assail the award of Lot 16 to Mitra, it follows that in
this particular case she cannot assail that award by invoking the
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law and the
Constitution. This is not the proper forum for the ventilation of that
question. (See Commonwealth Act No. 626; Hernandez vs.
Albano, 112 Phil. 506; Solidum and Concepcion, Jr. vs.
Hernandez, 117 Phil. 335).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The decision of the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,
Branch II, Gubat, Sorsogon, rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, dismissing Civil Case No. 1277, entitled
"Angel P. Peran vs. Encarnacion Evasco, et al.", for Forcible
Entry and Illegal Detainer, is being assailed in this Petition for
Review on certiorari on a question of law. Said Decision reversed
the judgment of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of BulusanBarcelona, Sorsogon, for Forcible Entry & Illegal Detainer.
The antecedent facts follow:
No.
L-35833.
June
29,
1984.]
M.
Ampig,
DECISION
for Petitioners.
SYLLABUS
"WHEREFORE,
"1.
judgment
Dismissing
is
hereby
the
rendered:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
Complaint;
virtua1aw
library
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
virtua1aw
library
After the judgment of the Court of Appeals had become final and
executory, the petitioners filed the necessary motion with the Court of
First Instance of Davao to issue a writ of execution placing them in copossession with the private respondents of the seven (7) hectares
being
litigated.
The private respondents filed a counter motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution praying that the petitioners be ordered to execute a
project of partition among the heirs and while doing so, segregate the
seven (7) hectares purchased and possessed by them from the date of
the document of sale. The petitioners, however, opposed the counter
motion emphasizing that the execution of judgment referred to an
action for recovery of possession of a specific seven (7) hectares of
land
and
not
to
an
action
for
partition
of
property.
The respondents countered with a rejoinder which admitted that the
judgment, while ambiguous, confirmed their rights over seven (7)
hectares of land sold to them. Since they have been in possession of a
specific seven (7) hectares of land on which they planted coconuts
already bearing fruits, the most equitable execution according to them
was for those seven (7) hectares to be the seven hectares adjudged in
the
decision.
The Court of First Instance decided the matter by issuing a writ of
execution allowing the respondents to enjoy possession over the entire
twenty-two (22) hectares with the petitioners. The questioned order,
the second paragraph of which is assailed in this petition reads:
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ORDERED."
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portion litigated could not bind her co-plaintiffs; and this being the
final result the adjudication of attorneys fees must have to be
discarded;
The reasons given by the Court of Appeals for not granting undisputed
ownership of the seven (7) hectares already possessed by the
respondents are:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, with the foregoing reasons for a
seemingly ambiguous judgment calling for a future segregation of
seven (7) hectares out of the twenty-two (22) hectares, has long
become
final
and
executory.
"3. CONSIDERING: Now, as to this that while it is true that the Land
Tax Declaration in the name of the heirs of Gaudencio Dacuyan Exh. 3
was afterwards cancelled and reduced from its area of 22 hectares to
15 hectares under Exh. 3-A the remaining seven (7) hectares coming
to be declared in the name of the buyer Camilo Damian under Exh. 5A, 5-B, 5-C and 5-D, yet a scrutiny of these documents would not
show any participation of the other children of Gaudencio and Susana
namely Teodoro, Elena and Samson the co-plaintiffs in this case not
even any proof that they were informed of the sale; neither is there
any evidence present in the record positive in character that they had
ever consented to a physical segregation of the seven (7) hectare
portion sold by Susana unto Camilo so that the point of laches is
without any basis; it is true that Camilo and afterwards in 1966 his
successor-in-interest Juan Magallanes had been in possession
apparently exclusive since the sale to Camilo in 1942 under Exh. 1 but
the trouble is that exclusive possession by a co-owner cannot give rise
to prescription; the law has always been to the effect that between coowners prescription cannot run, Cortez v. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480 and in
order for prescription to run between themselves the repudiation of coownership must be clearly manifested which is not at all the case here
bearing in mind the undisputed fact that Camilo Damian did not even
attempt to register Exh. 1 nor notify said other children of Gaudencio
Dacuyan and tell them he was claiming the seven (7) hectare portion
as solely his own; and neither should it be overlooked that the title
being a Torrens title it cannot be the subject matter of prescription;
this will mean that notwithstanding the possession apparently
exclusive of Camilo Damian for more than twenty (20) years over the
seven (7) hectare portion, he cannot under the law be permitted to
claim absolute ownership therein; and as a corollary neither can his
successor-in-interest Juan Magallanes but since Susana was entitled to
at least 11 hectares; therefore her sale of seven (7) hectares if
undivided would have been valid, but a sale by her of this specific
"x
We agree with the petitioners that the execution ordered by the court
of first instance did not conform to the final judgment being executed.
We stated in Phil-American Accident Insurance Co., Inc. (97 SCRA 811)
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A reading of the decision and its background facts shows that the
controversy litigated and passed upon by the Court of Appeals was
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction
and restraining order of the decision of the Court of Appeals * dated
March 4, 1987 in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 08710, "Maximo Gabrito et al. vs. Hon. Nicias O.
Mendoza and Roberto Tan et al.," affirming the April 2, 1986 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City ** which also affirmed the decision of MTCC, Branch V, Olongapo
City, and the Resolution of respondent court dated March 30, 1987 denying herein
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed on April 13, 1987.
On April 21, 1987, Acting Chief Justice Andres Narvasa,
authorized the grant of Temporary Restraining Order in this case
which was confirmed by the Second Division of this Court in its
Resolution dated April 27, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 86, 87, 88).
In a Resolution dated June 8, 1987, petitioners were required to
comment on the motion dated April 26, 1987 (Rollo, p. 94) of
counsel for respondents, praying to set aside the temporary
restraining order issued on April 21, 1987 and to issue a writ of
execution pending appeal or to allow the Court of Appeals to
proceed with the execution of the decision pending appeal (Rollo,
p. 115), which was complied with by petitioners on July 22, 1987
(Rollo, p. 143).
In the resolution of October 5, 1987 (Rollo, p. 187) the petition
was given due course and the parties were required to submit
their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice.
Petitioners' memorandum was submitted on December 3, 1987
(Rollo, p. 196). Respondents submitted their memorandum on
April 12, 1988 (Rollo, p. 235). Petitioners raised the following
issues:
1. That a Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of a case for Unlawful
Detainer under Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, where the plaintiffs are merely the legal
possessors and recent transferees of a public
land, and the defendants are the absolute owners
of the building existing on the same land, for a
number of years already.
2. That the respondent Regional Trial Court,
Branch LXXIV, Olongapo City, ought to have
dismissed the action for Unlawful Detainer and as
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