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J O U R N A L O F T H E A S S O C I AT I O N
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHNICITY
A N D N AT I O N A L I S M
AS
EN
Introduction
In 2006, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip voted in favor of a new
government led by Hamas.1 The organizations victory signaled a critical shift
in Palestinian national politics as the dominant party, Fatah, suffered its first
electoral defeat since the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
in 1994. Many scholars have since examined the implications of Hamass
political ascent for Palestinians living in the occupied territories (Baumgarten
2005; Hroub 2011; Lybarger 2007; Usher 2006). Few, however, have considered its significance for the millions of Palestinians living throughout the
region who could not participate in the national elections. Thus most of the
literature about Hamas and its supporters has shed little light on the organizations importance for Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon or Syria,
and whose fate remains inextricably linked to the political future of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).
Drawing on two years of ethnographic research in Jordan,2 this article
examines how Palestinian refugees in Amman articulate the meaning of the
Palestinian homeland, struggle and nation. In particular, my analysis shows
how Palestinian refugees frame the meaning of nationhood in ways that (1)
intertwines Islam and nationalist ideology, and (2) underscores the significance
of homeland politics for the meaning of nationalism to one segment of the
The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
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I met, Hamass political ascent signaled new possibilities both politically and
discursively. On the political front, refugees spoke optimistically about a new
course for the Palestinian struggle for independence and, more specifically, the
return of the refugees. Discursively, many Palestinians spoke in terms of a new
national framework in which Muslim political activists would play a certain
role. In other words, while Palestinians in the OPT judged Hamas according to
local matters, in Jordan, the organization received a different kind of endorsement. As a Muslim political organization, Palestinians in Jordan believed
Hamas represented a new phase in the Palestinian national struggle. According to their reading, which I will discuss below, Hamas was their newly elected
leader of the national movement.
805
Northern Ireland where the borders of the nation include all Irish Catholics
but not all Catholics. A third kind of intertwining has to do with the religious
inflection of nationalist discourse. In this form, Brubaker suggests that religion does not necessarily define the boundaries of the nation, but it supplies
myths, metaphors and symbols that are central to the discursive or iconic
representation of the nation (Brubaker 2012: 9). In this approach, Brubaker is
not alone. Smith (2000) has also explored this issue by highlighting the role of
religion in the formation and maintenance of national identities. According to
him, religious traditions, and especially beliefs about the sacred, underpin and
suffuse to a greater or lesser degree the national identities of the populations of
constituent states (Smith 2000: 795).
Central to the approaches offered by Brubaker and Smith is an identifiable
commitment to the idea of the nation. Religion, in other words, is not necessarily antithetical to the nations it supports. Rather:
[Nationalism] and religion are often deeply intertwined; political actors may make
claims both in the name of the nation and in the name of God. Nationalist politics can
accommodate the claims of religion, and nationalist rhetoric often deploys religious
language, imagery and symbolism. Similarly, religion can accommodate the claims of
the nation-state, and religious movements can deploy nationalist language (Brubaker
2012: 16).
806
807
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Hamas stands as one of the most precise offered by any Palestinian national
movement. According to Article 11 of its charter, the land of Palestine is an
Islamic Waqf [Trust] upon all Muslim generations till the day of Resurrection.
It is not right to give it up nor any part of it? (Maqdisi 1993: 125) Palestines
unique Islamic character is further articulated in Article 14, where the homeland is described as an Islamic land accommodating the first Qibla, the third
Holy Sanctuary, [and] the place where the ascent of the Messenger took place
(Maqdisi 1993: 126).
In Jordan, such articulations were widespread among Palestinian refugees.
In particular, the idea that Palestine was a sacred territory and that its liberation represented a sacred national duty was common among Palestinian
Muslims when articulating their relationship to the homeland. During our
shid in the Baqaa camp, for example, described Palestine in
discussions, Ra
ways that resonated with those offered by Hamas. Displaced in 1967, he and
his family lived modestly within a small corner dwelling that was walking
distance from his shop. Rashid claimed that Palestine was of equal religious
value to him as it was to all Palestinian Muslims. Praise to God, he said
during our discussion, Palestine is our land and is an Islamic land. It is like
a creed and (the) Al-Aqsa mosque is our sanctuary. Palestine will thus be
defended with our blood. My discussions with Rma, a Palestinian woman at
sr camp, resulted in similar ideas. Accordan Islamic womens center in the Na
ing to her, Palestine was a religious land with a specific connection to Muslims.
mosque is
All Muslims have a right in Palestine, she said, because Al-Aqsa
qaddassa
t (holy sites)
there; it ties us [Muslims] all to Palestine. There are mu
in Palestine that makes it our Islamic land. During a visit with Abu Imran in
the Baqaa camp, I asked him about the status of Palestine for the refugees.
What, I asked, is the significance of Palestine for you as a Palestinian and for
the Palestinians in Jordan? Emphasizing his homelands religious value as an
Islamic territory, he claimed that
Palestine is for all the Muslims and the Palestinian issue is [fundamentally] an Islamic
issue. So this is more important than my existence as a Palestinian. But this does not
negate [the importance it has for a Palestinian]. We say that Palestine is not for the
Palestinians alone. Palestine is for the Muslims. And we do not . . . we will not forget
Palestine. We did not and will not forget Palestine and we will remember it for the rest
of our lives and we will work for the sake of its return to its people the legitimate
people in all the permissible [observable, in religious terms] ways.
These excerpts emphasize the significance of Palestine to Muslims and Palestinian Muslims in ways that privilege its sacred religious value. In particular,
the designation of Palestine as an Islamic territory in these representations
reflects a sanctification of territory (Smith 1999) in which the faithful are
inseparably bound to the land. It is thus a territory whose holy sites and
location within an imagined Islamic precolonial geography establishes its connection and importance to all Muslims. As such, Palestine achieves a status
resonant with previous ideas about the territory that draw their significance
The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
809
from its religious sites and history. Yet within this seemingly historic and
religious identification of a homeland for all Muslims remains a basic national
claim for Palestinian Muslims. To see how, one has to begin with the very idea
of Palestine implicit within these claims. The antiquity and religious importance of Palestines holy sites notwithstanding, the specific geographic identification of Palestine referred to above reflects a fairly recent idea. The Palestine
of Hamas and Abu Imran, in other words, is a modern one adapted to the
language of history. It is a Palestine constituted within the structures of the
British Mandate and the creation of the state of Israel. It is also a Palestine
identified through the nationalist framework of those who fought for its
independence during both historical periods. Thus one can say that the idea of
Islamic Palestine represents an imagined territory that, while deriving its value
from Islam, gains its identity through modern nationalism.
In addition, although the discussion of Palestine above suggests the mere
identification of a territory, the more important issue concerns the implications of that identification. To say that Palestine is an Islamic territory is as
much a statement about its meaning as it is about the duty one has toward it.
n indicates, Palestines religious status among Muslims means
As Abu Imra
that he and others must work for the return of its people the legitimate
n is referring to
people. By legitimate people, it is clear that Abu Imra
Palestinians since its connection to the idea of return matters most for those
who, like him, were forced to leave. In this sense, the idea that Palestine is a
sacred Islamic territory serves to legitimize Palestinians claim to that territory
and thus the intertwining of religion and nationalism become readily apparent.
By emphasizing the homelands Islamic significance, in other words, Palestinians can claim the validity of their national struggle.
b. The indivisible homeland and the national struggle
Understood as a territory with religious significance, the idea of Palestine
among refugees also reflected an additional claim, namely that no authority
could legitimately partition the homeland. Embracing the discourse of Hamas,
Palestine was widely described as an Islamic waqf that could not be divided by
any secular political authority. Consequently, political negotiations based on
the partition of Palestine in 1947 represented a violation of the basic unity of
Palestine as a distinct territory but also as an integral component of the
broader Islamic homeland. According to Rashid, for example, the Islamic
importance of the Palestinian homeland meant that the territory could not be
divided. As he stated:
Palestine is an Islamic land. There is no person anywhere in the world . . . that can reject
this fact. [Palestine] is from the river to the sea.
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Islamic land. It is not Jewish nor was it divided in 1947. Maybe the politicians
speak this way but we know that this is not true. Palestine cannot be divided.
Here both Rashid and Aqil stressed that Palestines religious status meant
that it cannot be divided by secular political decisions. Speaking against the
possibility of any settlement between the PA and Israel that entails partitioning Palestine, their basic claim rested on the idea that the homeland is forever
for the Palestinians and Islam makes it so.
Affirming the indivisibility of Palestine has to do with more than the Palestinian leadership; it also meant that, for these Palestinians, exclusive Jewish
rule in the territory is illegitimate and that the struggle against Israel represents
a duty incumbent upon all Palestinian Muslims. The state of Israel, in other
words, cannot legitimately assert its authority in Palestine since its rule is
contrary to Muslim rights in the territory. As Shadi expressed during our
interview in the Wihdat camp:
The Jews do not have the right to control or occupy our land even if we are not there.
We reject their occupation . . . Palestine is part of the Islamic lands. Why did they come
and expel the people from Palestine and steal our homes and homeland?
100% of the ahadith [sayings of the Prophet Muhammad] say that Palestine will be
returned to us. Even if not during our generation or the next generation, or even the
generation after that, Palestine will return to the following generation of Palestinians.
There will be a generation [of Palestinians] to whom the God of all worlds will return
hid] for Palestine and it will return to
Palestine. By the will of God, we will struggle [ja
us.
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812
our homeland, then we are all martyrs. Whether with Palestine or without it, our
struggle means we are the winners by God.
The idea that death in the struggle for Palestine earns one the status of a
martyr has been a fairly consistent theme within the Palestinian struggle
beginning with the PLO. During the 19601970s, PLO fighters who gave their
iyn (those who sacrifice). Emphasizing the
lives in battle were honored as feda
religious status of a Muslim martyr within struggle for Palestine, however,
da: the
Hamas crafted its own vision of martyrdom during the first Intifa
istishad (Abu Amr 1993; Abu-Amr 1994; Abufarha 2009; Hroub 2000).
According to Abufarha, the creation and rise of the discourse of the
d) in the resistance movement created a new
istishadiyn (plural of istisha
cultural space for the status of the martyr, one that occupies the highest, most
noble ground in the Palestinian national struggle (Abufarha 2009: 10). In this
sense, Hamas attempted to exalt the status of its own Muslim Palestinian
martyrs above those of secularists working within the national independence
movement.
The religious value of the national struggle for Palestine and the status of
those who struggle fl sabl-illah (in the path of God) as martyrs articulated
above was reflected within the dawa12 activities of young Palestinians working
in the refugee camps. Several students I met who attended a college in Zarqa
said they promoted the message of Islam among Palestinians in order to
remind them of their duty as Muslims in the national cause. Concerned about
the Jordanian authorities and the idea that their work represented extremism,
these Palestinians often relied on more anonymous methods of communication including the distribution of audiocassettes and multimedia CDs. For
example, one of the students I met provided me with one of the CDs his
organization distributed among Palestinians.13 On the disc were a variety of
multimedia options including audio lectures by Hamas leaders, recitations of
Quranic excerpts and key Quranic verses for thikr,14 anashd,15 photographs
of the resistance in Palestine, and the position points of the organization. One
of the more striking features of the disc concerned its attempt to situate the
national struggle of Palestine with a larger imagined Islamic struggle against
invaders, colonizers and infidels.
For example, in the organizations position points shown below (Figure 1),
the group articulated a call for a return to Islam and promoted the vision of
a pan-Islamic struggle in which Palestine was but one site of a larger Muslim
battle. Titled thawabatna nalnaha lakum (a clarification of our positions), the
page begins with the idea that deviation from Islam has limited Muslims
ability to deal effectively with their issues. It then proceeds to underscore the
importance of intma, or attachment to the homeland, which according to
them, is a foundational brick in the unity of Arab Muslims (Al-Wahda
mya). In this sense, the liberation of particular homelands
Al-Arabya Al-Isla
represented a duty necessary for restoring the integrity of the united ArabIslamic peoples a claim not unlike those of pan-Arab nationalists committed
to the preservation of particular nationalisms. Although the idea of a united
The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
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814
of the struggle. Moreover, the first option in the menu specifically concerns the
sn. Within this feature, the CD provides an
martyrdom of Al-Rants and Ya
in-depth account of the two Palestinian leaders and their dedication and
h
sacrifice (martyrdom) for the struggle. In the top center icon, titled saba
Al-Khair ya bilad (good morning my country), and the bottom right-hand
icon, titled sawt Al-Watan (the voice of the homeland), Palestine again
emerges as a prominent feature of the organizations dawa. In both cases,
country and homeland refer specifically to Palestine and thus further
emphasize the centrality of the Palestinian national struggle in the imagined
pan-Islamic battle.
National ambiguities: Christians in Muslim Palestine
The Palestinian refugee camps of Jordan are diverse in the backgrounds of
their populations. Despite such diversity, the majority of camp residents
throughout the Kingdom are Muslims. This is not to say that Christian Palestinians were not refugees or displaced during 1948 or 1967. On the contrary,
a significant population of Christians fled alongside their Muslim neighbors
during all of the major wars of Palestine. Yet these communities do not reside
in the refugee camps of Jordan and thus remain separate from the camp
populations. The result was that my discussions with refugees took a Muslimcentered approach that raised an important question about the status of
Christians vis--vis Palestinian Muslim national discourse.
During my interviews with Muslim Palestinians, I asked about the relationship between Christians and Muslims and the status of their claims to Palestine. The most common response concerned the idea that both religious
The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
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communities shared the same origin and goals in Palestine. Both Christians
and Muslims, Rma said, suffered the same and thus felt the same about their
homeland. Similarly, Asad, a Palestinian refugee who worked at an Islamic
orphanage, described the differences between the two communities as trivial.
For him, both shared a commonality of experience and, more importantly, a
common goal: the liberation of Palestine and the realization of the right to
return to the homeland.
The Muslim and Christian Palestinian share the same foundation and goal. There are
no differences in our goals. We are from the same country and share the same struggle.
Just as in Palestine, during the holidays, we still visit each other and share everything.
There is no conflict between us.
For Amal, an individuals origin in Palestine was sufficient for establishing her
rights in the territory. Christian Palestinians thus had as much right to Palestine as Muslim Palestinians. But that right was restricted in religious national
terms. As her comments illustrate above, insofar as Christians are Palestinian,
they had a right to live in Palestine. Moreover, because they are Christians,
they also had a right to their holy sites within Palestine. They did not, however,
have the right to rule as an authority over the territory. That right, according
to her, was the exclusive privilege of the Muslims grounded in the Caliph
n offered a similar answer to the
Umars conquest of Jerusalem. Abu Imra
question of Christian Palestinians. Although Palestine was a Muslim territory,
he said, Islam did not preclude the rights of Christians or even Jews in Palestine. They could live in Muslim Palestine without fear.
First, the Christians are our brothers in humanity. They are our brothers as members
of the human family and Islam compels cooperation between all humans . . . they are
all welcome.
The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
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Conclusion
This article has taken the question of religion and nationalism from a local
perspective among a displaced community of Palestinians in Jordan. In so
doing, it breaks with a tradition of analysis that takes nationalist leaders as the
focus of nationalism. Instead, I have examined how the recipients of nationalist politics and discourse engage the field of nationalism and articulate their
own claims of identification. From this analysis, two particular points are
important.
First, this article argues that the division in studies of nationalism has failed
to adequately account for the complexities of religious national discourse. On
one hand, the position that nationalism can be distinctly religious does not
capture the nature of claims put forth by Muslim political actors such as
Hamas and their supporters. The Muslim Palestinians I worked with have not
abandoned the idea of a national community nor have they focused their
efforts on the exclusive question of the state. On the other hand, the idea that
Islamists have sacrificed the nation at the altar of the umma is not necessarily
true. In the Palestinian context, there remains a central role for the Palestinian
nation: its struggle for the liberation and reunification in the homeland. My
argument thus rests on an intermediary position grounded in the notion of
intertwining. I suggest this approach offers a more productive analysis that can
account for the ways religion is brought into nationalist discourse without
necessarily undermining nationalism. Given the continued rise of religious
political actors working within the structures of the nation-state, such an
analysis is critical as it points to the necessity of seeing the subtle and often
tense interactions between religious ideals and nationalist visions.
The second contribution this article makes concerns the significance of
nationalism from below (Hobsbawm 1991) or folk nationalism (Smith
2000). My analysis has focused on a displaced community of Palestinians who
remain marginal both within the localnational context of Jordan and to the
Palestinian center in the OPT. In their articulations of the homeland and its
struggle, it is clear that this community has embraced the discourse of Hamas.
However, this does not mean that refugees are passive recipients of the politics
of the Palestinian national center. Instead, the appropriation of Hamass
discourse should also be seen within the specific context of displacement in
which Palestinian refugees lived. The appeal of this discourse cannot be
divorced from the growing marginalization of refugees from the Palestinian
political process in general and the larger conflict with Israel in particular.
The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
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Notes
1 Hamas won 76 out of 132 parliamentary seats.
2 My research was generously funded by a Wenner-Gren dissertation research grant and a
Fulbright IIE.
3 By diaspora, I am relying on Tllyans idea of diasporicity, which manifests itself in
relations of difference wherein a community sees itself as linked to, but different from, those
among who it has settled and sees itself as linked to the people in the homeland (Tllyan 2007).
4 This research is based on two years of ethnographic fieldwork in UNRWA refugee camps in
Amman, Jordan. The research period began in January 2006 and concluded in December 2007.
During my time in Amman, I conducted over 100 formal and informal interviews with registered
Palestinian refugees of multiple generations in the camps of Amman, Jarash and Irbid. In addition, I observed several functions within the camps that emphasized aspects of Palestinian identity
and nationalism including weddings, summer camp activities with refugee youth, orphan center
activities and camp meetings between activists.
5 One could increase the number to 78 by including four Hamas supporters that ran as independents (Shiqaqi 2006).
6 According to Zweiri (2006), Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas ignored warnings by the
prime minister Ahmed Qurei that divisions among Fatah candidates could compromise the
elections.
7 Emphasis mine.
8 For Hamass political structure, see Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2010); Tamimi (2011); Roy
(2011); Gunning (2010); and Mishal and Sela (2006).
9 This is not to suggest that Hamas is disinterested in regional political actors. Its external
leadership is fully engaged with states throughout the region and thus employs multiple rhetorical
approaches that speak both to the Palestinian inside and regional outside (Hroub 2010; Mishal
and Sela 2006).
10 In addition to Hamas, one could add Islamic Jihad and, more recently, salfist organizations.
However, none have been as institutionally successful as Hamas.
The author(s) 2014. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014
819
11 The status of martyrs has been thoroughly discussed in several works including (Abufarha
2009; Allen 2006; Khalili 2009).
12 In Arabic, the word dawa means to call, appeal, request or summons.
Al-Ahlya (The Islamic Position
ha Al-Isla
mi, Ja
miat Al-Zarqa
13 The CD referred to Al-Ittija
).
of the Civil University of Zarqa
14 Thikr, in this context, refers to particular words and/or phrases meant for promoting the
remembrance of God through religious invocations.
15 Anashd is commonly used to refer to songs that do not include particular instruments and
thus do not violate what some Muslims believe is a prohibition on music.
16 Hamas fighters are known for their black hoods and green bandanas bearing the Muslim
testament of faith, there is no God but God and Muhammad is Gods messenger.
17 For a detailed exposition of Hamass official and practical position on Christian Palestinians,
see Hroub, 2000 (especially chapter 3, p. 139).
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