PATRICIO VS DARIO

This petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals that dismissed the complaint for partition
filed by petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence.
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino G. Dario III.
The properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon.
Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario and a new TCT was issued in their names.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the coownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
The trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G.
Dario III, 1/6 and also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of ailure, the subject
property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court, hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the
same.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the appellate court partially reconsidered.
Private respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the
subject property continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the
said family home, still resides in the premises.
Petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which
was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent.Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were
already of age at the time of the death of their father,[8] hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should
continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property
unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of
spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
Hence, the instant petition was filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE : Whether or not the partition of the family home was proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the
ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. Actual occupancy,
however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the
Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife.

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Article 159 of the Family Code provides that if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at
the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
1st requiistes :
The term descendants contemplate all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction;
hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of
deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
2nd requiistes :
Minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994,
or within 10 years from the death of the decedent.
3rd requisites :
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who
is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only
in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest
degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. The obligation to support under Art.
199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations. Since the parties were unable to agree on a
partition, the court a quo should have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the
actual physical partition.

MANACOP VS CA
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the
sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed
a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for
the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the
petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt
from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean
that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his
property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.

KELLY JR VS PLANTERS
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due
to Authers failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court.
After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana
sold on execution real property. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of PPI as the highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of
levy in the RTC on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution. Petitioners motion was denied for failure
to comply with the three-day notice requirement.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI in
the Regional Trial Court. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by the CA.

Petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari contending that the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the RTC Naga City. They claim that Doris was a
stranger to who could not be forced to litigate therein.
Petitioners alleged that the property is the Kelley family home. No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly
constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a
family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties
of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the
unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount ofP300,000 in urban areas
and P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was
incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil
Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions:
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction
of the building.
Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to
believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the
judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law
in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or
owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
We grant the petition only to the extent of allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in the trial court that TCT No. 15079 is in fact their family home as
constituted in accordance with the requirements of law. This is in consonance with our ruling in Gomez v. Sta. Ines[10] where we held:
[The husband and children] were not parties to the Pasig RTC case and are third-party claimants who became such only after trial in the previous case had
been terminated and the judgment therein had become final and executory. Neither were they indispensable nor necessary parties in the Pasig RTC case,
and they could not therefore intervene in said case. As strangers to the original case, respondents cannot be compelled to present their claim with the
Pasig RTC which issued the writ of execution.xxx
In said case, the alleged family home was sold on execution by the sheriff of the Pasig RTC. The husband and children of the judgment debtor filed a
complaint for annulment of sale of the levied property in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where the alleged family home was situated. As they were considered

strangers to the action filed in the Pasig RTC, we ruled that the Nueva Vizcaya RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint and that they could vindicate their
alleged claim to the levied property there.[11]
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. 2000-0188 captioned Spouses Auther G. Kelley, Jr. and Doris A. Kelley v. Planters Products, Inc. and Jorge A. Ragutana is
hereby REINSTATED and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 for determination whether or not the property
covered by TCT No. 15079 is a duly constituted family home and therefore exempt from execution.

KABANG vs BASAY
Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur.

However, Felix Odong and his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the lot.
On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real property from the heirs of Felix Odong for P8,000.00. Consequently, a new Transfer Certificate of Title
was issued on August 6, 1987 in the name of plaintiff-appellants.
The latter also did not occupy the said property.
Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the
present. They were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-222. During the said cadastral proceedings,
defendant-appellees claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were actually occupying was Lot No. 7778.
As it turned out, however, when the Municipality of Molave relocated the townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a big portion of Lot No. 7778 was used by the
government as a public road and as there were many discrepancies in the areas occupied, it was then discovered that defendant-appellees were actually
occupying Lot No. 7777.
On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 92-20-127 for Recovery of Property against defendant-appellees.On July
19, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff 1. Holding that the rights of the plaintiffs to recover the land registered in their names,have been effectively barred by
laches; and2. Ordering the dismissal of the above-entitled case.No pronouncement as to cost.SO ORDERED.

Hiyas vs Acuna
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife
Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not sign or
execute any contract of mortgage in its favor because he was then working abroad. 4
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it
is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out and to Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases
where one of the parties is not a member of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege in the complaint that
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts that
since three of the party-defendants are not members of his family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable.
Alberto also prayed that defendants be declared in default for their failure to file their answer on time. 6

Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment with Opposition to the Motion to Strike and to Declare Defendants in Default.
Rejoinder. 8

Private respondent, in turn, filed his

On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss, thus:
The court agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case considering that the aboveentitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family. If one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts
towards a compromise had been made by plaintiff before filing the complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
respondent filed his Rejoinder. 13

10

Private respondent filed his Comment,

11

after which petitioner filed its Reply.

12

Thereafter, private

On May 7, 2002, the RTC issued the second assailed Order denying petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The trial court ruled:
Reiterating the resolution of the court, dated November 8, 2001, considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family,
failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made by plaintiff, is not a ground for a Motion to Dismiss.
Additionally, the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is defendant Remedios Moreno who stands to be benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code,
being a member of the same family as that of plaintiff, only she may invoke said Art. 151. 14
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts
toward a compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the family
are involved in the suit. Corollarily, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he
applied the decision in the case of Magbaleta v. Gonong instead of the ruling in the case of De Guzman v. Genato.
II. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that a party who is a stranger
to the family of the litigants could not invoke lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. 15
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant Petition for Certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) and not with this Court pursuant
to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Reiterating the established policy for the strict observance of this doctrine, this Court held in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog
v. Melicor 16 that:
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. As we stated
in People v. Cuaresma:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy.
It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases:
(a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on bail in extradition proceedings;
(c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on government contract involving modernization and computerization of voters registration list; (d) Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the
President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area. 17
In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no
reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed.
And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by petitioner, the instant petition likewise fails for lack of merit.
Restating its arguments in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner argues that what is applicable to the present case is the Courts decision in De
Guzman v. Genato 18 and not in Magbaleta v. Gonong, 19 the former being a case involving a husband and wife while the latter is between brothers.
The Court is not persuaded.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. 20
The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken explains:
[I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should
be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. 21
In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the subject property. The Court, taking into consideration the
explanation made by the Code Commision in its report, ruled that:
[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who
is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between or among
relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just
happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way
the latter would settle their differences among themselves. 22 x x x.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest
efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper.
In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by
the husband, through the Philippine Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the
presence of a party who is not a family member, the requirements that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted must be complied with,
pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code.
While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in the Magbaleta is the one that now prevails because it is reiterated in the
subsequent cases of Gonzales v. Lopez, 23 Esquivias v. Court of Appeals, 24Spouses Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City, 25 and the most
recent case of Martinez v. Martinez. 26 Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members.
The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in all of the aforementioned cases should not equally apply to suits involving
husband and wife.
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between brothers. However, the Court
finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in the abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits
involving a husband and his wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the
provisions therein apply to suits involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, to wit:

ART. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 217. Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same family as
respondent, may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code.
Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively
between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.