ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the
RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at
to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and
residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the
the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making
it in effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill
rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the
Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of
constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than
a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general
subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was
enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of
the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted
the bill reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the
proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA
7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory,
wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is
filled up at all times.
Issue:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory.
Held:

No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared
therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in
arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list. We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as
may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the
number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list
seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated
seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC

Facts:
The COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where
it approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party- list
elections.
April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the
names of some herein respondents be deleted from the Certified List of Political parties/
Sectoral Parties/Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvasses, and that latters nominees not be proclaimed
April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution no. 3785
May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it.

Issue:
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party- list
elections2.Whether or not the party- list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations3.Whether or not the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Ruling:
This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party- list
participants.

BANAT V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed
before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of
party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of
the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the
petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution
of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming
thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would
determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula.
COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans
formula.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for

legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also
allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it
can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in
the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 8020 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence, (220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to
allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat
and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold
creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The
Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes
cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of
the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that
the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the
availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats
and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for
the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast,
then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering
less than 2% to also get a seat.
The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,

shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats
are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding
off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the twopercenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these twopercenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case,
17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for
party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the
case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second,
in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast,
and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be
observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) =
number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a
two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a
total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still
get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining partylists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are
occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties
(the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either

from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of
the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate
opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the
will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately
ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized
sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured
in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716
violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement
for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states
that: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province
is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population.
Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.

BAI SANDRA SEMA vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Municipal Corporation Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM)
Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the
province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted
against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative
districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other
municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with
power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the
ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the
exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st
district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended
this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the
elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this
is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a
legislative district (or part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan
with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a
separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting
(probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he
won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S.
Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a
representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless
of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its
representation.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create
validly LGUs.
Held:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local
government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second,
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must
be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot
validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least
250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the
HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k
(population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so
Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the
province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never
be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. et. al v. COMELEC En Banc

Note: COMELEC en banc v. AKB et. al. April 2, 2013 with GR. No. 203818-19
was one of the cases resolved by the Supreme Court in the case discussed below.
AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB) was denied by COMELEC on the following
grounds:
Failure to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector;
The Bicol region already has representatives in Congress; and - The
nominees are not marginalized and underrepresented.
The Cases:
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list group and organizations assaling the Resolutions issued
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration
under the party-list system, our cancellation of their registration and accreditation as
party-list organizations.
Facts:
The COMELEC disqualified Atong Paglaum and other party-list group who were
aspiring to participate in the May 2013 Elections because Atong Paglaum, et. al. are not

considered sectoral group and that they failed to prove that they are representing the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of the society.
Atong Paglaum, et. al. assailed the decision of the COMELEC on the grounds
that the party-list election was never intended to be exclusively for sectoral groups.

Issue:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
2. Is the party-list election intended only (exclusively) for sectoral groups?
Ruling:
1. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections.
2. No. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall
be a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. The commas after the words national[,] and regional[,] separate
national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they
would have stated national and regional sectoral parties. They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could
not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the
sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves
no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from
sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained
in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the
party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles, and policies for the general
conduct of government. On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides

that a sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct
from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To
require all national and regional parties under the party-list systemto represent the
marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideologybased and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideologybased and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party- list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them
from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to
the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
The Court overturned its ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC and BANAT
v. COMELEC and laid down the new doctrines on party-list system and elections. These
are as follows:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party- list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented
or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that
represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to
their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective

sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be

bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.