PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No.

135981, January 15
2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed
and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that
every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the
killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was
able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme
Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial
court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr.
Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme
Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self
defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the
battered woman syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence,
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to
save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the

former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of selfdefense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant
failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on
ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful
aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between
the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw
from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in
favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by
a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the
killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order
to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation.
The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact
that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of
her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence
of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other
lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx.
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELANIO MAPAIT

(Criminal Law: Self-Defense; Treachery)
*Read full
text:http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/nov2011/gr_172606_2011.html http://w
ww.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/nov2011/gr_172606_2011.html)
FACTS
Glen Remigio (Glen), his wife, Nila Remigio (Nila), and their two young children,
Raymond and Genevieve, were traveling on board their family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX,
along a highway. Glen was driving, while Nila sat to his extreme right because their
children sat between them. They picked up two hitch hikers, named Nugas and Araneta,
when they passed a village. Later, the hitch hikers pointed knives at Glen and Nilas
necks demanding that they be brought to a mall. Upon the vehicle reaching Kingsville
Village, the man behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the neck. Thereafter, the two
men alighted and fled.
Despite undergoing treatment, Glen died and his body was brought for autopsy which
revealed that Glen had sustained a fatal stab wound on the left side of his neck. It was
opined that the position of the stab wound would suggest that had the assailant used his
left hand, he was probably directly behind the victim.
Admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas maintained that he did so in self-defense. He
claimed that the Tamaraw FX driven by Glen was a passenger taxi, not a family vehicle;
that when he was about to alight in front of Rempson Supermarket after arguing with
Glen on the overcharged fees, Glen punched him and leaned forward as if to get
something from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard; that thinking that Glen was
reaching for a gun inside the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left hand from where
he was seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya); and that when asked
why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for protection because he
was living in a squatters area.

ISSUE
Whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as to justify selfdefense.
RULING
No. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as to justify self-defense.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified
killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or
imaginary threat.
Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful aggression, namely:
(a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault;
(b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
(c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:
(a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression.
Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause
the injury.
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another
with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
In the case, Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then
reached for his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun

there. For one, as the Court Appeals pointed out, Nugas admitted not actually seeing if
Glen had a gun in his clutch bag.
It is also highly improbable that the victim, in relation to accused-appellant Nugas
position, can launch an attack against the latter. First, the victim was at the drivers seat
and seated between him were his wife and two children. Second, the victim was driving
the FX vehicle. Third, accused-appellant Nugas was seated directly behind the victim.
All things considered, it is highly improbable, nay risky for the victims family, for him to
launch an attack.
Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense because he had
not been subjected to either actual or imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to
prevent or to repel considering that Glen committed no unlawful aggression towards
him.
With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-defense, not having been
established by Nugas, it is superfluous to still determine whether the remaining
requisites of self-defense were attendant. As the Court made clear in People v. Carrero:
Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support the theory of
self-defense and the complete or incomplete exemption from criminal liability; without
such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain that a person acted in selfdefense within the terms under which unlawful aggression is subordinate to the other
two conditions named in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code. When an act of aggression
is in response to an insult, affront, or threat, it cannot be considered as a defense but as
the punishment which the injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and in
such a case the courts can at most consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but never
as a reason for exemption, except in violation of the provisions of the Penal Code.
(emphasis supplied)
Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely:
(a) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(b) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person.
The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and the attack is
swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the
risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate. Treachery may also be appreciated when the victim, although
warned of the danger to his life, is defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the
infliction of the coup de grace.

People vs. Oanis

July 27, 1943 (74 Phil 257)

PARTIES:
Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendants and appellant: Antonio Oanis, Alberto Galanta
FACTS:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict,
Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected house
then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards
the door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the victims
death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.
ISSUE:
1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of their official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.
HELD:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. Ignorance facti excusat applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was
sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1)
the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.