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viii. PARI MATERIA RULE
- Statutes are in pari materia when they
relate to the same person or thing, or
have the same purpose or object, or cover
the same specific or particular subject
matter. It is sufficient that the 2 or more
statutes relates to the same specific
subject matter. Statutes in pari materia
should be construed together to attain the
purpose of an express national policy.
- Exception: If 2 or more statutes on the
same subject were enacted at different
times and under different conditions and
circumstances, their interpretation should
be in accordance with the circumstances
or conditions peculiar to each. A statute
will not be construed as repealing prior
acts or acts on the same subject matter.
ix. Reenacted statutes
- in relation to domestic statutes/laws
Montelibano v Ferrer
97 Phil 228
Facts: In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of
which Montelibano is the president and
general manager, leased a lot to Benares
for five years, with an option in favor of
Benares of another five crop years. On
1951, the Subdivision instituted against
Benares an unlawful detainer case which
rendered a decision ordering him to eject
from the said lot. However, Benares
continued planting on the said lot, instead
of delivering it to Subdivision. Acting upon
Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the
land of sugarcane planted by Benares.
Hence, a criminal case was filed by
Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of
arrest was then filed to the petitioners.
Monteibano and his companions filed a
motion to quash the complaint and
warrant of arrest A civil case against
Municipal Judge and Benares was filed
alleging that the said judge had o
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
criminal case.
Issue: Whether or not the municipal court
may entertain the criminal case relying
upon CA 326, section 22 (Charter of the
City of Bacolod) which provides that the
City Attorney shall charge of the
prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of city ordinances, in the
Court of First Instance and the Municipal
Court of Bacolod.
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the then Court of First Instance (CFI Bulacan) for the sum of P107,481.50
representing construction materials which
the Alvendias had purchased on credit
from Bonamy.
On January 6, 1978, both parties
submitted to the trial court a "Compromise
Agreement" providing, among other
things:
"(1) That defendants do hereby
acknowledge the indebtedness of their
family corporation, Doa Felisa Village and
Housing Corporation, in the amount of
P107,481.50, representing the cost of
construction materials bought on credit
from plaintiff from June 20 - August 12,
1975 and hereby bind themselves to pay
said obligation out of the first release of
funds from the GSIS for housing units and
lots sold by the said corporation to
members of the GSIS.
"(2) That the plaintiff and defendants shall
thereby join hands in asking the
GSIS to expedite the releases of the funds
due to said corporation; and
"(3) That for and in consideration of this
agreement the plaintiff and defendants
hereby waive any and all further claims
monetary or otherwise against each other
regarding the subject matter of this case.
On the same date, the trial court approved
and adopted the same as the decision of
the case. Subsequently, Bonamy moved
for execution of judgment, alleging that
the Alvendias "have not submitted any
finished project with the GSIS, thereby
preventing the full realization of the
aforesaid decision. In a motion dated April
23, 1980, Bonamy sought the issuance of
an alias writ of execution, the first writ
having been returned unsatisfied. He
admitted though in the same motion that
he received P20,000.00 in cash from the
Alvendias sometime in January 1980 and
an additional amount of P4,000.00 by way
of proceeds of the sale of the Alvendias'
vehicle. Pursuant to the alias writ issued
by the Court on May 2, 1980, the Bulacan
provincial sheriff levied on the Alvendias
"leasehold rights" over a fishpond and a
certificate of sale over said leasehold right
was executed in favor of Bonamy on Sept.
10, 1984.
On February 2, 1982, the spouses moved
for the quashal and annulment of the writ
of execution, levy and sale such motion
was denied and the trial court.
In a nutshell, the spouses argued as
follows: [1] that the writ and the alias writ
of execution levied upon properties not
referred to in the judgment by
compromise; [2] the writs made only the
Alvendias liable, when under the
"agreement" their family corporation was
also supposed to be liable; [3] the writ was
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Sometime in August 1980, Facts instructed
the First National State Bank (FNSB) of
New Jersey to transfer $10,000 to Irenes
Wearing Apparel via Philippine National
Bank (PNB) Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. FNSB
instructed Manufacturers Hanover and
Trust Corporation (Mantrust) to effect the
transfer by charging the amount to the
account of FNSB with private respondent.
After Mantrust effected the transfer, the
payment was not effected immediately
because the payee designated in the telex
was only Wearing Apparel. Private
respondent sent PNB another telex stating
that the payment was to be made to
Irenes Wearing Apparel.
On August 28, 1980, petitioner received
the remittance of $10,000.
After learning about the delay, Facets
informed FNSB about the situation. Facts,
unaware that petitioner had already
received the remittance, informed private
respondent and amended its instruction y
asking it to effect the payment to
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) instead of PNB.
Private respondent, also unaware that
petitioner had already received the
remittance, instructed PCIB to pay
$10,000 to petitioner. Hence, petitioner
received another $10,000 which was
charged again to the account of Facets
with FNSB.
FNSB discovered that private respondent
had made a duplication of remittance.
Private respondent asked petitioner to
return the second remittance of $10,000
but the latter refused to do so contending
that the doctrine of solution indebiti does
not apply because there was negligence
on the part of the respondents and that
they were not unjustly enriched since
Facets still has a balance of $49,324.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private
respondent has the right to recover the
second $10,000 remittance it had
delivered to petitioner
HELD: Yes. Art 2154 of the New Civil Code
is applicable. For this article to apply, the
following requisites must concur: 1) that
he who paid was not under obligation to
do so; and 2) that payment was made by
reason of an essential mistake of fact.
There was a mistake, not negligence, in
the second remittance. It was evident by
the fact that both remittances have the
same reference invoice number.
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City of Manila v Gomez
No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary
implications. What is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.
Facts: The Revised Charter of Manila fixes
the annual realty tax at 1.5%. On the
other hand, the Special Education Fund
Law imposed an annual additional tax of
1% on the assessed value of real property
in addition to the real property tax
regularly levied thereon but the total
real property tax shall not exceed 3%
Since the maximum limit imposed is 3%,
the municipal board of Manila imposed an
additional .5% to fix the total imposable
tax on real property at 3% which is divided
into the following: 1.5% as per charter of
Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund
law and .5% as per order of the municipal
board. Private respondent Esso Philippines
paid the additional one-half percent realty
tax under protest and later filed a
complaint for recovery of the said amount.
It contended that the additional one-half
percent is void because it is not
authorized by the city charter or any law.
Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent
imposed by the City of Manila is valid or
legal.
Held: Yes. The Real Property Tax Law
imposes that a city council, by ordinance,
may impose a realty tax of not less than
one-half perfect but not more than two
percent of the assessed value of real
property. The additional one-half percent
then is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine of
implications sustains the contention of the
City of Manila that the additional one-half
percent is sanctioned by the Special
Education Fund Law when the same states
that the total real property tax shall not
exceed a maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of necessary implications
means that that which is plainly implied
in the language of a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed.
xiii. CASUS OMISSUS
- This rule states that a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. The principle
proceeds from a reasonable certainty that
a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative
enumeration.
- In other words, the maxim operates and
applies only if and when the omission has
been clearly established, and is such a
case what is omitted in the enumeration
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the merits cannot be relitigated again and
again.
Facts:
Respondents
Aquial
claimed
ownership of a parcel of land located in
Quezon City having an area of 383
hectares. They alleged that it had been
fraudulently or erroneously included in
OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal and that it was registered in the
names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a
decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No.
7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735
and the titles derived therefrom be
declared void due to certain irregularities
in the land registration proceeding.
Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid.
Held: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of
OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by
the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin
vs Tuason, Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs
Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also
applied in other cases involving the
validity of OCT No. 735. Considerng the
governing principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere (follow past precedents and
do not disturb what has been settled), the
court ruled that respondents cannot
maintain their action without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts that OCT
No. 735 is valid and no longer open to
attack.
V. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
OF WORDS AND PHRASES
i. Rules
a. When the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish - Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.
The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of
the principle that general words and
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be
accorded their natural and general
significance. The rule requires that a
general term or phrase should not be
reduced into parts and one part
distinguished from the other so as to
justify its exclusion from the operation of
the law. In other words, there should be no
distinction in the application of a statute
where none is indicated.
Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v IAC
G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)
Statutory rule: When the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
The rule, founded on logic, is corollary of
the principle that general words and
phrases of a statute should ordinarily be
accorded their natural and general
significance.
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the political contest, and should have
either won or lost.
Issue: W/N petitioner can be held liable
for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures since he
was a "non-candidate", having withdrawn
his certificate of candidacy three days
after its filing.
Held: Yes. Sec. 14 of Ra 7166 states that
"every candidate" has the obligation to file
his statement of contributions and
expenditures. As the law makes no
distinction or qualification as to whether
the candidate pursued his candidacy or
withdrew the same, the term "every
candidate" must be deemed to refer not
only to a candidate who pursued his
campaign, but also to who who withdrew
his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No.
2348 categorically refers to "all candidates
who filed their certificate of candidacy".
Cecilio de Villa v CA
G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)
Statutory rule: When the law does not
make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling
reasons exist to justify it.
Facts: Petitioner Cecilio De Villa was
charged before the RTC of Makati for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the
Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner contends
that the check in question was drawn
against his dollar account with a foreign
bank and as such, it is not covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law..
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Statutory rule: General terms may be
restricted by specific word, with the result
that the general language will be limited
by specific language which indicates the
statutes object and purpose. The rule is
applicable only to cases wherein, except
for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one
specific class.
Facts: Petitioner corporation engages in
manufacturing toilet preparations and
household
remedies.
They
import
materials
including
stabilizers
and
flavors is among those petitioner imports.
For every importation, petitioner pays 17%
special excise tax on the foreign exchange
used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and other charges pursuant
to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. However
the same law also provides that foreign
exchanged used for xxx importation to the
Philippines of xxx stabilizers and flavors
xxx shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefore. Petitioner
now seeks a refund of the 17% special
excise tax they paid in the total sum of
P113,343.99.
Issue: W/N the foreign exchange used by
petitioner in the importation of dental
cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt
from the 17% special excise tax imposed
by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it
to a refund.
Held: Yes. The refusal to deny refund was
based on the argument that all the items
enumerated for the tax exemption fall
under one specific class, namely: food
products, book supplies/materials and
medical supplies and that for petitioners
to be exempt, the stabilizers and flavors
they use must fall under the category of
food products. Respondent contends that
since petitioners use these as toothpaste,
the same is not a food product. Court
ruled that although stabilizers and
flavors are preceded by items that might
fall under food products, the following
which were also included are hardly such:
fertilizer, poultry feed, industrial starch
and more. Therefore, the law must be
seen in its entirety. The rule of
construction that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by a
particular recital does not require the
rejection of general terms entirely. It is
intended merely as an aid in ascertaining
the intention of the legislature and is to be
taken in connection with other rules of
construction.
d. Ejusdem Generis
- The general rule is that where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same
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relative and close associate in E) 1 and the
close relative, business associate, dummy,
agent or nominee in EO 2.
e. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
- The express mention of one person,
thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others. But this maxim is
not applicable where words are used by
example only.
-This maxim and its corollary canons are
generally used in the construction of
statutes granting powers, creating rights
and remedies, restricting common rights,
and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as
well as those statutes which are strictly
construed.
Commissioner of Customs v Court of Tax
Appeals
G.R. Nos. 48886-88 (July 21, 1993)
FACTS: Petitioner contends that the
importation of the foodstuffs in question is
prohibited and the articles thus imported
may be subject to forfeiture under Sec.
2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and
Customs Code. The foodstuffs in question
being articles of prohibited importation
cannot be released under bond.
ISSUE: W/N the imported foodstuffs in
question are not contraband, and are not
as stated by Respondent Court, among the
prohibited importations enumerated in
Sec. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code
therefore these foodstuffs may be
released under bond as provided in Sec.
2301 of the same code.
HELD: Yes. The imported foodstuffs are
considered prohibited importation under
Sec. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs
Code
NOTE: Sec. 102. Prohibited
Importations. The importation into the
Philippines of the following articles is
prohibited:
(k) All other articles the importation of
which is prohibited by law.
Sec. 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture
Under Tariff and Customs Laws. Any
vessel or aircraft, cargo, articles and other
objects shall, under the following
conditions, be subject to forfeiture:
(f.) Any article of prohibited importation or
exportation, the importation or
exportation of which is effected or
attempted contrary to law, and all other
articles which, in the opinion of the
Collector, have been used, are or were