TAADA V TUVERA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-63915

December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April
24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1.

What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2.
Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not?
3.

What is meant by "publication"?

4.

Where is the publication to be made?

5.

When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion
was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the
merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication,
when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case
the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not
binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of
the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government
agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision
under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members
of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as
pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule
did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature
could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be
so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed.
One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which
of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any
legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,"
and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to
the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative
rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid
down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not
covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity,
and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally,
in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be
made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present
membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a
binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating,
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is
not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment
has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved
by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible,
to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a
mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required.
This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for
an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an
open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available
always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic,
with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from
them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review
the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their
freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the
legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and
Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by
which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power
which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims
and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in
those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees
bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the
case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one
granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the
other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was
further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may
be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on
matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of
what the Court is saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication
thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in
other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect
immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to
interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the
due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common
tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom
a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government
and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general
circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The
statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative
Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication
may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code
must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by
which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power
which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims
and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in
those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees
bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the
case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one
granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the
other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was
further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may
be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on
matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of
what the Court is saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication
thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in
other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect
immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to
interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the
due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common
tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom
a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government
and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general
circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The
statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative
Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication
may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code
must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION V VEGA

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105364*. June 28, 2001]
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and
PERFECTO V. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BENJAMIN
VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of
Manila, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LIQUIDATOR
OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and
reopening?
This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for
Preliminary Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity)
filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance
in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank, the same docketed as Case
No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the Philipppine Veterans Bank Employees UnionN.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed
claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court in
SP-32311.[1]
After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees
were made. However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many
remain unpaid.[2]
On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from
hearing the above case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners. [3]
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for
the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. [4]
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for
benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. [5]
Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing
the PVB to reopen.[6]
Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB,
respondent judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank.
Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set to order the payment
and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while
petitioners claims have been frozen to their prejudice.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court
became functus officio, and no longer had the authority to continue with
liquidation proceedings.

In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a

Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with
the case.
On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162
security guards filed a Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded
from the operation of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion before Branch 39 of the RTC of
Manila, in SP-No. 32311, praying that said court order PVB to pay their
backwages and salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders
No. NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A;
and, that said court, in an Order dated June 5, 1992, approved therein movants
case and directed the bank liquidator or PVB itself to pay the backwages and
differentials in accordance with the computation incorporated in the order. Said
intervenors likewise manifested that there was an error in the computation of the
monetary benefits due them.
On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated
July 6, 1992, filed their Comment opposing the Motion for Leave to File
Intervention and for exclusion from the operation of the T.R.O. on the grounds
that the movants have no legal interest in the subject matter of the pending
action; that allowing intervention would only cause delay in the proceedings; and
that the motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal basis and
would render moot the relief sought in the petition.
On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention praying for the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court in connection with the issuance by respondent judge of several orders
involving acts of liquidation of PVB even after the effectivity of R.A. No.
7169. PVB further alleges that respondent judge clearly acted in excess of or
without jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.
We find for the petitioners.
Republic Act No. 7169 entitled An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans
Bank Created Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms
Therefor, And For Other Purposes, which was signed into law by President
Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which was published in the Official
Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine
Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years
from the date of the reopening of the head office. [7] The law likewise provides for
the creation of a rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the implementation
of the provisions of the same.[8]
Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the
proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval.
Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans
Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the respondent judge praying that the liquidation
proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of R.A. No. 7169.
On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No.
348 which approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion
Committee.

Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to

reopen.
On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the
Liquidation Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent
judge.
As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, issued a
temporary restraining order in the instant case restraining respondent judge from
further proceeding with the liquidation of PVB.
On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public
and started regular banking operations.
Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent
developments has rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently,
respondent judge has been stripped of the authority to issue orders involving acts
of liquidation.
Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors
and debtors.[9] It is the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed
to those entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash,
discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.
On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening
or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life
and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former
position of successful operation and solvency.[10]
It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or
contrary to the concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at
the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously
hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.
Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No.
7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette; and, the contention of intervenors VOP
Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on the approval of a
rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view
that both contentions are bereft of merit.
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as
indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided.
In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law
effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was
signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore,
said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity
of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date
when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10,
1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN

DUE COURSE and GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from further proceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORP. V JUDGE

ANGELES
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996]
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON
PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI;
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE
CERAMIC, INC., respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC, for brevity)
filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision
dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles. Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in civil Case No.92-158 entitled
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, et. al. vs. Philippine Industrial Trading
Corporation.
The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION (Remington, for brevity) and
FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC. (Firestone, for brevity), and, in the process, declared as
null and void and unconstitutional, PITCs Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
and its appurtenant regulations. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Petitioner
and Intervenor and against the Respondent, as follows:
1)
Enjoining the further implementation by the respondent of the following
issuances relative to the applications for importation of products from the Peoples
Republic of China, to wit:
a) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 dated August 30, 1989 (Annex A,
Amended petition);
b)

Prescribed Export Undertaking Form (Annex B, Id.);

c) Prescribed Importer-Exporter Agreement Form for non-exporter-importer (Annex

C, Id.);
d) Memorandum dated April 16, 1990 relative to amendments of Administrative Order
NO. SOCPEC 89-08-01 (Annex D, Id.);
e) Memorandum dated May 6, 1991 relative to Revised Schedule of Fees for the
processing of import applications (Annexes E, E-1., Ind.);
f) Rules and Regulations relative to liquidation of unfulfilled Undertakings and expired
export credits (Annex Z, Supplemental Petition),
the foregoing being all null and void and unconstitutional; and,
2)
Commanding respondent to approve forthwith all the pending applications of,
and all those that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from
and without the requirements prescribed in a the above-mentioned issuance.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01,[1] under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the
Peoples Republic of China (PROC. for brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer
himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the
value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Pertinent provisions of the questioned administrative order read:
3. COUNTERPART EXPORTS TO PROC
In addition to existing requirements for the processing of import application for goods
and commodities originating from PROC, it is declared that:
3.1
All applications covered by these rules must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed EXPORT PROGRAM of Philippine products to PROC in an amount equivalent
to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for. Such export program must
be carried out and completed within six (6) months from date of approval of the Import
Application by PITC. PITC shall reject/deny any application for importation from PROC
without the accompanying export program mentioned above.
3.2

The EXPORT PROGRAM may be carried out by any of the following:

a. By the IMPORTER himself if he has the capabilities and facilities to carry out the
export of Philippine products to PROC in his own name; or
b. Through a tie-up between the IMPORTER and a legitimate exporter (of Philippine
products) who is willing to carry out the export commitments of the IMPORTER under
these rules. The tie-up shall not make the IMPORTER the exporter of the goods but

shall merely ensure that the importation sought to be approved is matched one-to-one
(1:1) in value with a corresponding export of Philippine Products to PROC.[2]
3.3
EXPORT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS which are to be submitted by the importer
together with his Import Application are as follows:
a)

Firm Contract, Sales Invoice or Letter of Credit.

b)

Export Performance Guarantee (See Article 4 hereof).

c) IMPORTER-EXPORTER AGREEMENT for non-exporter IMPORTER (PITC Form

No. M-1006). This form should be used if IMPORTER has a tie-up with an exporter for
the export of Philippine Products to PROC.
4. EXPORT GUARANTEE
To ensure that the export commitments of the IMPORTER are carried out in accordance
with these rules, all IMPORTERS concerned are required to submit an EXPORT
PERFORMANCE GUARANTEE (the Guarantee) at the time of filing of the Import
Application. The amount of the guarantee shall be as follows:
For essential commodities: 15% of the value of the imports applied for.
For other commodities: 50% of the value of the imports applied for.
4.1
The guarantee may be in the form of (i) a non-interest bearing cash deposit; (ii)
Bank hold-out in favor of PITC (PITC Form No. M-1007) or (iii) a Domestic Letter of
Credit (with all bank opening charges for account of Importer) opened in favor of PITC
as beneficiary.
4.2
The guarantee shall be made in favor of PITC and will be automatically
forfeited in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if the required export program is not
completed by the importer within six (6) months from date of approval of the Import
Application.
4.3
Within the six (6) months period above stated, the IMPORTER is entitled to a
(i) refund of the cash deposited without interest; (ii) cancellation of the Bank holdout or
(iii) Cancellation of the Domestic Letter of Credit upon showing that he has completed
the export commitment pertaining to his importation and provided further that the
following documents are submitted to PITC:
a)

Final Sales Invoice

b)

Bill of lading or Airway bill

c)

Bank Certificate of Inward remittance

d)

PITC EXPORT APPLICATION FOR NO. M-1005

5. MISCELLANEOUS
5.1
All other requirements for importations of goods and commodities from PROC
must be complied with in addition to the above.
5.2
PITC shall have the right to disapprove any and all import application not in
accordance with the rules and regulations herein prescribed.
5.3
Should the IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized representatives make any
false statements or fraudulent misrepresentations in the Import/Export Application, or
falsify, forge or simulate any document required under these rules and regulations, PITC
is authorized to reject all pending and future import/export applications of said
IMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTER from
doing any business with SOCPEC through PITC.
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and
Firestone, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippines laws,
individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the petitioner, They were
granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers, and after they
executed respective undertakings to balance their importations from PROC with
corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.
Private respondent Remington was allowed to import tools, machineries and other
similar goods. Firestones, on the other hand, imported Calcine Vauxite, which it used for
the manufacture of fire bricks, one of its products.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by
petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter both barred from importing
goods from PROC.[3]
Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer
for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the RTC Makati Branch 58.[4] The court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order on January 21, 1992, ordering PITC to cease from
exercising any power to process applications of goods from PROC. [5] Hearings on the
application for writ of preliminary injunction ensued.
Private respondents Firestones was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2,
1992,[6] thus joining Remington in the latters charges against PITC. It specifically
asserts that the questioned Administrative Order is an undue restrictions of trade, and
hence, unconstitutional.
Upon trial, it was agreed that the evidence adduced upon the hearing on the
Preliminary Injunction was sufficient to completely adjudicate the case, thus, the parties
deemed it proper that the entire case be submitted for decision upon the evidence so far
presented.
The court rendered its Decision[7] on January 4, 1992. The court ruled that PITCs
authority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue

rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has already been repealed
by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino.
The court observed:
Given such obliteration and/or withdrawal of what used to be PITCs regulatory authority
under the Special provisions embodied in LOI 444 from the enumeration of powers that it
could exercise effective February 27, 1987 in virtue of Section 16 (d), EO No. 133, it may
now be successfully argued that the PITC can no longer exercise such specific
regulatory power in question conformably with the legal precept expresio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991,
has empowered the PITC, expressly or impliedly to formulate or promulgate the assailed
Administrative Order. This fact, makes the continued exercise by PITC of the regulatory
powers in question unworthy of judicial approval. Otherwise, it would be sanctioning an
undue exercise of legislative power vested solely in the Congress of the Philippines by
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The lower court stated that the subject Administrative Order and other similar
issuances by PITC suffer from serious constitutional infirmity, having been promulgated
in pursuance of an international agreement (the Memorandum of Agreement between
the Philippine and PROC), which has not been concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the
members of the Philippine Senate as required by Article VII, Section 21, of the 1987
Constitution, and therefore, null and void.
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued in restraint of trade, in
violation of Sections 1 and 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and, an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the equality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combination is restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Lastly, the court declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the
same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code which provides, that:
Article 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless the law otherwise provides. xxx
Petitioner now comes to us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[8] questioning the
courts decision particularly on the propriety of the lower courts declarations on the

validity of Administrative Order No. 89-08-01. The Court directed the respondents to file
their respective Comments.
Subsequent events transpired, however, which affect to some extent, the
submissions of the parties to the present petition.
Following President Fidel V. Ramos trip to Beijing, Peoples Republic
of China (PROC), from April 25 to 30, 1993, a new trade agreement was entered into
between the Philippines and PROC, encouraging liberalization of trade between the two
countries. In line therewith, on April 20, 1993, the President, through Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, directed the Department of Trade and Industry and the
PITC to cease implementing Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, as amended
by PITC Board Resolution Nos. 92-01-05 and 92-03-08.[9]
In the implementation of such order, PITC President Jose Luis U. Yulo, Jr. issued a
corporate Memorandum[10] instructing that all import applications for the PROC filed with
the PITC as ofApril 20, 1993 shall no longer be covered by the trade balancing program
outlined in the Administrative Order.
Forthwith, the PITC allowed the private respondents to import anew from the PROC,
without being required to comply anymore with the lifted requirement of balancing its
imports with exports of Philippine products to PROC. [11] In its Constancia[12] filed with the
Court on November 22, 1993, Remington expressed its desire to have the present action
declared moot and academic considering the new supervening developments. For its
part, respondent Firestone made a Manifestation[13] in lieu of its Memorandum, informing
the court of the aforesaid developments of the new trade program of
the Philippines with China, and prayed for the courts early resolution of the action.
To support its submission that the present action is now moot and academic,
respondent Remington cites Executive Order No. 244, [14] issued by President Ramos
on May 12, 1995. The Executive Order states:
WHEREAS, continued coverage of the Peoples Republic of China by letter of
Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the countrys national interest, as
coursing Republic of the Philippines-Peoples Republic of China Trade through the
Philippine International Trading Corporation as provided for under Letter of Instructions
No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade;
NOW, THEREFORE, I FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Socialist Countries to
delete the Peoples Republic of China from the list of countries covered by Letter of
Instructions No. 444.
Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of May in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen
Hundred and Ninety-Five.
PITC filed its own Manifestation[15] on December 15, 1993, wherein it adopted the
arguments raised in its Petition as its Memorandum. PITC disagrees with Remington on

the latters submission that the case has become moot and academic as a result of the
abrogation of Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01, since respondent Remington
had incurred obligations to the petitioner consisting of charges for the 0.5% Counter
Export Development Service provided by PITC to Remington, which obligations remain
outstanding.[16] The propriety of such charges must still be resolved, petitioner argues,
thereby maintaining the issue of the validity of SOCPEC Order No. 89-08-01, before it
was abrogated by Executive fiat.
There is no question that from April 20, 1993, when trade balancing measures with
PROC were lifted by the President, Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01 no
longer has force and effect, and respondents are thus entitled anew to apply for authority
to import from the PROC, without the trade balancing requirements previously imposed
on proposed importers. Indeed, it appears that since the lifting of the trade balancing
measures, Remington had been allowed to import anew from PROC.
There remains, however, the matter of outstanding obligations of the respondents
for the charges relating to the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service in favor of
PITC, for the period when the questioned Administrative Order remained in effect. Is
the obligation still subsisting, or are the respondents freed from it?
To resolve this issue, we are tasked to consider the constitutionality of
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, based on the arguments set up by the
parties in their Petition and Comment. In so doing, we must inquire into the nature of the
functions of the PITC, in the light of present realities.
The PITC is a government owned or controlled corporation created under P.D. No.
252[17] dated August 6, 1973. P.D. No. 1071,[18] issued on May 9, 1977 which revised the
provisions of P.D. 252. The purposes and powers of said governmental entity were
enumerated under Section 5 and 6 thereof.[19]
On August 9, 1976, the late President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
444,[20] directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all commodities), whether direct
or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned
Economy Countries (SOCPEC), including the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) shall
be undertaken or coursed through the PITC. Under the LOI, PITC was mandated to: 1)
participate in all official trade and economic discussions between the Philippines and
SOCPEC; 2) adopt such measures and issue such rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective discharge of its functions under its instructions; and 3)
Undertake the processing and approval of all applications for export to or import from the
SOCPEC.
Pertinent provisions of the Letter of Instruction are herein reproduced:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 444
II. CHANNELS OF TRADE
1. The trade, direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and
other centrally-planned economy countries shall upon issuance hereof, be
undertaken by or coursed through the Philippine International Trading

Corporation. This shall apply to the export and import of all commodities of
products including those specified for export or import by expressly authorized
government agencies.
xxx
4. The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall participate in all official
trade and economic discussions between the Philippines and other centrallyplanned economy countries.
xxx
V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall adopt such measures and
issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge of
its functions under these instructions. In this connection, the processing and
approval of applications for export to or import from the Socialist and other centrallyplanned economy countries shall, henceforth, be performed by the said
Corporation. (Emphasis ours)
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on February 27, 1987, then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) No. 133 [21] reorganizing
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) empowering the said department to be the
"primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for
the countrys trade, industry and investment activities (Sec. 2, EO 133). The PITC was
made one of DTIs line agencies.[22]
The Executive Order reads in part:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133
XXX
Section 16. Line Corporate Agencies and Government Entities.
The following line corporate agencies and government entities defined in Section 9 (c) of
this Executive Order that will perform their specific regulatory functions, particularly
developmental responsibilities and specialized business activities in a manner
consonant with the Department mandate, objectives, policies, plans and programs:
xxx
d) Philippine International Trading Corporation. This corporation, which shall be
supervised by the Undersecretary for International Trade, shall only engage in both
export and trading on new or non-traditional products and markets not normally pursued
by the private business sector; provide a wide range of export oriented auxiliary services
to the private sector; arrange for a establish comprehensive system and physical
facilities for handling the collection, processing, and distribution of cargoes and other

commodities; monitor or coordinate risk insurance services for the existing institutions;
promote and organize, whenever warranted, production enterprises and industrial
establishments and collaborate or associate in joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, in the fields of production,
marketing, procurement, and other relate businesses; and provide technical advisory,
investigatory, consultancy and management services with respect to any and all of the
functions, activities, and operations of the corporation.
Sometime in April, 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the PROC,
the Philippines and PROC entered into a memorandum of Understanding [23] (MOU)
wherein the two countries agreed to make joint efforts within the next five years to
expand bilateral trade to US $600 US $800 Million by 1992, and to strive for a steady
progress towards achieving a balance between the value of their imports and exports
during the period, agreeing for the purpose that upon the signing of the Memorandum,
both sides shall undertake to establish the necessary steps and procedures to be
adopted within the framework of the annual midyear review meeting under the Trade
Protocol, in order to monitor and ensure the implementation of the MOU.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade
Protocol for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, [24] under which was specified the
commodities to be traded between them. The protocols affirmed their agreement to
jointly endeavor to achieve more or less a balance between the values of their imports
and exports in their bilateral trade.
It is allegedly in line with its powers under LOI 444 and in keeping with the MOU and
Trade Protocols with PROC that PITC issued its now assailed Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01[25] on August 30, 1989 (amended in March, 1992).
Undoubtedly, President Aquino, in issuing EO 133, is empowered to modify and
amend the provisions of LOI 444, which was issued by then President Marcos, both
issuances being executive directives. As observed by us in Philippine Association of
Service Exporters , Inc. vs. Torres,[26]
there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the Letter
of Instruction by way of an Executive Order. This is notwithstanding the fact that the
subject LOI 1190 was issued by President Marcos, when he was extraordinarily
empowered to exercise legislative powers, whereas EO 450 was issued by Pres. Aquino
when her transitional legislative powers have already ceased, since it was found that LOI
1190 was a mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered, or modified
by EO 450.
We do not agree, however, with the trial courts ruling that PITCs authority to issue
rules and regulations pursuant to the Special Provisions of LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071,
have already been repealed by EO 133.
While PITCs power to engage in commercial import and export activities is
expressly recognized and allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is now
limited only to new or non-traditional products and markets not normally pursued by the
private business sector. There is no indication in the law of the removal of the powers of
the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in the area of importations from SOCPEC

countries. Though it does not mention the grant of regulatory power, EO 133, as
worded, is silent as to the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted under
P.D. 1071, from the PITC.
Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO 133 stating that all laws, ordinances,
rules , and regulations, or other parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the Executive
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, cannot operate to abolish the grant
of regulatory powers to the PITC. There can be no repeal of the said powers, absent
any cogency of irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy between the issuances,
relating to the regulatory power of the PITC.
The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul the functions
of the PITC. The DTI was established, and was given powers and duties including those
previously held by the PITC as an independent government entity, under P.D. 1071 and
LOI 444. The PITC was thereby attached to the DTI as an implementing arm of the said
department.
EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and
regulatory arm of government for the countrys trade, industry and investment activities,
which shall act as a catalyst for intensified private sector activity in order to accelerate
and sustain economic growth.[27] In furtherance of this mandate, the DTI was
empowered, among others, to plan, implement, and coordinate activities of the
government related to trade industry and investments; to formulate and administer
policies and guidelines for the investment priorities plan and the delivery of investment
incentives; to formulate country and product export strategies which will guide the export
promotion and development thrust of the government.[28] Corollarily, the Secretary of
Trade and Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to
carry out the departments objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to the said
department as one of its line agencies,[29] and was given the focal task of implementing
the departments programs.[30] The absence of the regulatory power formerly enshrined
in the Special Provisions of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and the limitation of its
previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not mean, however, that PITC
has lost the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. It is our view that
PITC still holds such authority, and may legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and
under the supervision of, the Department of Trade and Industry.
Furthermore, the lower courts ruling to the effect that the PITCs authority to
process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and
regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. 1071 has been repealed by EO 133, is
misplaced, and did not consider the import behind the issuance of the later presidential
edict.
The President could not have intended to deprive herself of the power to regulate
the flow of trade between the Philippines and PROC under the two countries
Memorandum of Understanding, a power which necessarily flows from her office as
Chief Executive. In issuing Executive Order 133, the President intended merely to
reorganize the Department of Trade and Industry to cope with the need of streamlined
bureaucracy.[31]

Thus, there is no real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is,
admittedly, a rearranging of the administrative functions among the administrative bodies
affected by the edict, but not an abolition of executive power. Consistency in statutes as
in executive issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the
contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is possible to
do so, it is the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile
them, and to adopt a constructions of a statutory provision which harmonizes and
reconciles it with other statutory provisions. [32] The fact that a later enactment may relate
to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause
an implied repeal of the latter, since the law may be cumulative or a continuation of the
old one.[33]
Similarly, the grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it
has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the
regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them,
they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.[34] Evidently, in the
exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of
the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function,
exercisable only by our regular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National
Housing Authority, G.R. No. L- 50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).
With global trade and business becoming more intricate nay even with new
discoveries in technology and electronics notwithstanding, the time has come to grapple
with legislations and even judicial decisions aimed at resolving issues affecting not only
individual rights but also activities of which foreign governments or entities may have
interests. Thus, administrative policies and regulations must be devised to suit these
changing business needs in a faster rate than to resort to traditional acts of the
legislature.
This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the subject, viz.:
Since legislatures had neither the time nor the knowledge to create detailed rules,
however, it was soon clear that new governmental arrangements would be needed to
handle the job of rule-making. The courts, moreover, many of them already congested,
would have been swamped if they had to adjudicate all the controversies that the new
legislation was bound to create; and the judges, already obliged to handle a great
diversity of cases, would have been hard pressed to acquire the knowledge they needed
to deal intelligently with all the new types of controversy.
So the need to create a large number of specialized administrative agencies and to give
them broader powers than administrators had traditionally exercised. These included
the power to issue regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide
cases powers that had previously been reserved to the legislatures and the
courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by Administrative Agencies, p. 166.)

The respondents likewise argue that PITC is not empowered to issue the
Administrative Order because no grant of such power was made under the Trade
Protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991. We do not agree. The Trade Protocols aforesaid, are
only the enumeration of the products and goods which the signatory countries have
agreed to trade. They do not bestow any regulatory power, for executive power is
vested in the Executive Department,[35] and it is for the latter to delegate the exercise of
such power among its designated agencies.
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid
exercise of a power ancillary to legislation.
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid
exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued
on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for
importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid
within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. xxx
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were
filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register,
does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.
This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera[36] stated, thus:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and Regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation,
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
xxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an

existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO
133.
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the petitioner were lifted
by President Fidel V. Ramos, the same were never legally effective, and private
respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject to them, because Administrative Order
89-08-01 embodying the same was never published, as mandated by law, for its
effectivity. It was only on March 30, 1992 when the amendments to the said
Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the National
Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Finally, it is the declared Policy of the Government to develop and strengthen trade
relations with the Peoples Republic of China. As declared by the President in EO 244
issued on May 12, 1995, continued coverage of the Peoples Republic of China by Letter
of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the countrys national interest, as
coursing RP-PROC trade through the PITC as provided for under Letter of Instructions
No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade.[37]
Conformably with such avowed policy, any remnant of the restrained atmosphere of
trading between the Philippines and PROC should be done away with, so as to allow
economic growth and renewed trade relations with our neighbors to flourish and may be
encouraged.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED, to
the effect that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents, subject
to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Enjoining the petitioner:
a)
From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export Development Service fee
of 0.5% of the total value of the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the private
respondents;
b)
From further implementing the provisions of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 8908-01 and its appurtenant rules; and
2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and
all those that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free
from and without complying with the requirements prescribed in the abovestated issuances.
SO ORDERED

Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

ROY V. COURT OF APPEALS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS
BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ
BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2)
resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis
Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first
resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second
Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being
verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if
the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and
substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned
by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family
of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death
of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but
the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial
Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M.
Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises,
Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteenday period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated
on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the
rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may
be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
(at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate
Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule
and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144
SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the
operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which
the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February
27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June
30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed
on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period
on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said
rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision
of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is
no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have

been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of

Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse,
if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents
had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning
to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should
be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied
to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant
petition for lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

VICTORIAS MILLING V PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16704

March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the
following tenor: .
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the
System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration
all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of
remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings,
upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum
of P500 for any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through
counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as
contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding
overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective
monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in
arriving at a properinterpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such
computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the
general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages".
Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of
the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President
and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is
not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the
Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a
mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.

The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or
regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social
Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the
President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
and purposes of this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or
regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted
to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and
regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it
renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law
(Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and
regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon
the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance
therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because
statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted
with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the
product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law. (Davis,op. cit., p. 194.) .
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is
followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if
the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom
(Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at
best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the
amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term
"compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its
amendment, reads as follows: .
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of
any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses,
allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the
employer may make, although not legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of
any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.

It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and
overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or
exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion
was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security
Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was,
therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the
Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any
duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and
circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be
construed. 1wph1.t
The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by
appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or
regulation. What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the
form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a
regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general
proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only
interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official
Gazette before it could take effect.
The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not
applicable to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers
and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime
pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance
with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section
27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of
the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in
determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security
contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential
approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied
in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions
excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the
determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such
bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in
pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held
that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation
of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is
demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in
fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered
compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the

employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with
their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically
defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that
particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one
meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the
case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation"
should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition
by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express
substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial
construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear
mandate of the new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,
Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CORON V CARINO

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65894 September 24, 1987
THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CORON, PALAWAN, duly represented by
MAYOR RICARDO F. LIM,petitioner,
vs.
JOSE CARINO, VICTORIANO DACULLA, BEN GUMASING, LUCENA CRUZ,
HILARIA YALON, PEPITO YAMBAO, RIC GACUTAN, ANDRES DACULLA,
FELICISIMA URSAIS, PASTOR JOSOL, TEDDY ACTANG, CANDIDA MANALO,
LETICIA RAMAL, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES PORFIRIO V. SISON, ABDULWAHID A.
BIDIN, MARCELINO R. VELOSO and DESIDERIO P. JURADO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The second paragraph of Section 39, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that:
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof,
the entire original record shall be transmitted with all the pages
prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the
contents thereof.
Likewise, Sections 18 and 19(b) of the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January
11, 1983 provide that:
Sec. 18. The filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with, except
in the cases referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (1) hereof.
No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19 (b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule
109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal
being required.

Whether or not the above provisions are applicable to the case at bar is the lone issue in
this petition which assails the resolution of the respondent appellate court dated July 29,
1983.
The dispositive part of the questioned resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, notwithstanding the foregoing, in the broader interest of
justice and considering that under the present Interim Rules a record on
appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal, the Court resolved to
order the recall of the records of this case from the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan Branch I, Puerto Princess for further proceedings before this
Court. (Rollo, pp. 12-13)
Following are the pertinent facts of the case as culled from the records.
Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the petitioner before the Court of First Instance
of Palawan and Puerto Princess City, Branch IV where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
35. The action sought authority from the court to demolish the structures built by the
private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the petitioner's wharf. The
complaint alleged, among others:
that the defendants' houses were constructed more than 3 years before
the filing of instant action (par. 2, Complaint),: that on August 19, 1974 the
herein defendants undertook to remove their structures on space where
they were then at that time and are presently standing, when it will be
needed by the government (par. 3, Ibid); that the space or area is needed
by the plaintiff for the docking or berthing of pumpboats (motorized
bancas) and fishing boats and for the loading and unloading of cargoes
along the pier on both sides thereof (par. 4, Ibid); and also to ease the
congested traffic along it (par. 10, Ibid); that his Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos had the Mayor of plaintiff-municipality to demolish
and remove all constructions along the pier after giving the defendants
one month notice (par. 5, Ibid) and aside from this directive of the
President, the mayor of the plaintiff-municipality is also authorized to
remove the defendants' illegal constructions under LOI 19 (par. 7, Ibid);
that despite said mayor's desire to comply immediately with the said
presidential directive, the defendants had already been given 3
extensions thereby delaying their ejectment therefrom (par. 6, Ibid); that
most of the defendants are affluent squatters (par. 9, Ibid); and that for
the indigent defendants, a surveyed area has already been made ready
for their relocation (par. 12, Ibid). (Decision CFI, Palawan and Puerto
Princess City, Branch IV, p. 2; Reno, p. 15).
On the other hand, the private respondents, in their answer, counter-alleged, among
others:

that their structures when made were covered by building permits with the
approval of the Bureau of Public Highways (par, 2, Answer); that the area
where their structures were located is a foreshore area (Par. 4, Ibid); that
a meeting was convened and presided by Governor Socrates at Coron,
the same having been attended by the local representatives of the
Philippine Constabulary, the Philippine Coast Guard, the Department
(now Ministry) of Social Services and Development, the Sangguniang
Bayan and the defendants and it was agreed in this meeting that the
demolition of the defendants' houses will be suspended pending action of
the Office of the President (par. 15, 16, 17, Ibid); and that the Chairman of
the National Housing Authority had sent a letter-advice to the mayor of
the plaintiff-municipality to suspend the demolition of the houses of the
defendants (par. 18, Ibid). (Rollo, pp. 15-16)
After a series of postponements, the trial court, on January 16, 1979, reset the hearing
of the case for the last time for three consecutive dates, March 20, 21, and 22, 1979 with
further warning to the private respondents that no more postponements shall be allowed.
On March 20, 1979, despite proper notice, the private respondents and their counsel
failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Consequently, the petitioner moved that
private respondents' non-appearance be considered as a waiver on their part of their
right to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses and their right to present evidence. The
lower court issued an order granting the petitioner's motion and considered the case
submitted for decision.
In view of the above order, the private respondents went to the appellate court on
certiorari. On June 9, 1979, the appellate court dismissed for lack of merit CA G.R. SP09389-R captioned "Jose Carino, et al., petitioners v. Mayor Ricardo Lim and Hon.
Benjamin Vega, Judge CFI, Palawan, Branch IV."
On May 15, 1979, after the main case had been submitted for decision as aforestated,
the private respondents filed a notice to take deposition which the lower court
disregarded for being "irrelevant and for other obvious reasons."
On October 10, 1980, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff-municipality of Coron, Palawan and against all the herein
defendants as follows:
1. Dismissing the defendants'counterclaim for lack of merit;

2. Confirming the power of plaintiff-municipality and authority of its

incumbent mayor to demolish the defendants' structures along the rock
causeway or pier of Coron; and
3. Ordering the said defendants to remove their structures in the area in
question within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision and for their
failure to do so, authorizing the herein plaintiff represented by its
incumbent mayor to demolish the said structures at the expense of the
said defendants.
Costs against all the defendants. (Rollo, pp. 28-29)
On appeal, the private respondents on February 2, 1982 were required "to submit the
forty (40) printed copies of their record on appeal together with the proof of service of
fifteen (15) copies thereof upon the appellee" within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
notice of the appellate court's Acting Clerk of Court regarding their appeal. (Rollo, p. 32)
Upon motion by the private respondents, the appellate court granted an extension of
sixty (60) days from April 7, 1982 within which the required printed copies of the record
on appeal may be submitted. However, despite the extended period given, the private
respondents were not able to comply with the appellate court's requirement.
In a resolution dated July 19, 1982, the appellate court required the private respondents
to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the printed
copies of the record on appeal.
On August 31, 1982, the appellate court resolved to dismiss the private respondents'
appeal docketed as CA G.R. No. 69052-R for failure to file the required record on
appeal.
On December 6, 1982, the Acting Clerk of Court of the appellate court, in an Entry of
Judgment, certified that the above resolution dismissing the private respondents' appeal
had become final and executory on September 27, 1982.
Accordingly, on February 1, 1983, a writ of execution was issued to enforce the October
10, 1980 decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,
Branch IV.
Before the Provincial Sheriff could proceed with the execution of the judgment, the
private respondents, in a motion dated April 12, 1983 asked the appellate court that the
records of the case be recalled from the court of origin. In their supplemental motion, the
private respondents argued that since under the present law, printed records on appeal
are no longer required, their right to be heard on appeal must be upheld instead of the
rule on technicalities.

In its opposition to the private respondents' motion, the Petitioner pointed out that
although the newly promulgated procedural rules invoked by the private respondents
may be given retroactive effect, their applicability only covers pending actions and does
not extend to those which had already become final and executory.
As a consequence of the private respondents' motion to recall the records of the case, a
temporary restraining order dated April 29, 1983 was issued by the appellate court
directing the Provincial Sheriff of Palawan to desist from executing the October 10, 1980
decision.
On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued the disputed resolution. The subsequent
denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration prompted the filing of this petition.
The petitioner maintains that the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11,
1983 to implement the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 29 cannot apply to the case
at bar for the simple reason that to revive or recall appealed cases which had been
dismissed or which had become final and executory would cause a great injustice to
those in whose favor these cases had been decided. It is further contended that to allow
its application would put no end to those appealed cases which are otherwise
considered as closed ones.
We find merit in the petitioner's contentions.
We have resolved the issue as to the extent of the retroactive application of section 18 of
the Interim Rules of Court in Alday v. Camilon (120 SCRA 521). We reiterated the rule
that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent. (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [1946]) Emphasis supplied.
The appellate court should have followed this time-honoured rule instead of issuing its
July 29, 1983 resolution seeking to revive a case already long final as evidenced by the
entry of judgment made by its Acting Clerk of Court on December 6, 1982.
The records of the instant case show that despite the 60-day extension period given to
the private respondents within which they could file their printed record of appeal as then
required, they still failed to do so. It was only after a writ of execution had been issued on
February 1, 1983 that the private respondents responded to the appellate court's
resolution dated July 19, 1982 requiring them to show cause why their appeal should not
be dismissed for failure to file the printed record on appeal. They claimed that the court's
resolution must have been a result of oversight because they actually filed a record on
appeal.

As a general rule, our policy towards an invocation of the right to appeal has been one of
liberality. (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 782 citing De Las Alas vs. Court of
Appeals, 83 SCRA 200). This is so because an appeal is an essential part of our judicial
system and every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities. (See
Siguenza vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 570). However, it is an equally established
doctrine that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. (See United CMC Textile
Workers Union vs. Clave, 137 SCRA 346).
For a proper exercise of their right to appeal, the private respondents should have
complied with Section 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, as amended by our resolution en
banc dated September 17, 1974, which partly provides that:
Sec. 5. Duty of Appellant upon Receipt of Notice. It shall be the duty of
the appellant, within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred
to in the preceding section, to pay to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the
fee for the docketing of the appeal, and within sixty (60) days from such
notice to submit to the court twelve (12) printed copies of the record on
appeal, or twelve (12) typewritten or mimeographed (on one side of good
quality paper, eleven inches in length by eight and a half inches in width
commonly known as letter size written double spaced) copies of
said record on appeal together with proof of service of two (2) printed,
typewritten or mimeographed copies thereof upon the appellee.
Thus, upon failure of the appellant to comply with the above rule, the Court of Appeals
may dismiss his appeal. Said provision implicitly grants the Court of Appeals the power
to do so. (See Pfleider vs. Victoriano, 98 SCRA 491). The private respondents in this
case did not submit printed copies of their record on appeal. When the appellate court
issued its July 19, 1982 resolution, it was to afford the private respondents a chance to
explain why they failed to comply with the applicable rule. After having failed to submit
the required printed copies of their record on appeal, they cannot now rectify a clear
non-compliance with the law by invoking the court's liberality insofar as the application of
remedial laws is concerned. The private respondents even faulted the appellate court as
having issued the July 19, 1982 resolution through oversight. They alleged that they had
filed the required record on appeal when in fact what they referred to was the record on
appeal from the lower court to the appellate court and not the printed record on appeal.
Since the private respondents failed to submit the required printed record on appeal, the
lower court's judgment in favor of the petitioner became final. and executory as an
eventual result of the dismissal of the appeal. Once a judgment becomes final the
prevailing party, the petitioner in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right to the
execution of the judgment in his favor. For the court, it becomes its ministerial duty to
order the execution of said judgment. (Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.

56614, promulgated July 28, 1987 citing Agricultural and Industrial Marketing, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 49; Balintawak Construction Supply Corporation vs.
Valenzuela, 124 SCRA 331; Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Dayrit, 123
SCRA 203; Gonzales vs. Sayo, 122 SCRA 607).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution of respondent appellate
court dated July 29, 1983 is SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the
court of origin for enforcement of the writ of execution of the judgment. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Bidin, * J., took no part.

Footnotes
* As one of the respondents in the above-entitled case, Justice Bidin took
no part.

DBP V COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97973 January 27, 1992

SPOUSES GAUVAIN and BERNARDITA BENZONAN, petitioners, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, BENITO SALVANI PE and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 97998 January 27, 1992
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS
and BENITO SALVANI PE, respondents.
Ruben E. Agpalo for Sps. Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan.
Vicente R. Acsay for Benito Salvani Pe.
Thomas T. Jacobo for DBP.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the August 31, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals which
sustained the right of respondent Benito Salvani Pe to repurchase a parcel of land
foreclosed by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and sold to
petitioners Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan.
Respondent Pe is a businessman in General Santos City who owns extensive
commercial and agricultural properties. He is the proprietor of the firm "Dadiangas B.P.
Trading." One of the properties he acquired through free patents and miscellaneous
sales from the Bureau of Lands is a 26,064 square meters parcel covered by Free
Patent No. 46128 issued on October 29, 1969. OCT No. P-2404 was issued on
November 24, 1969.

On February 24, 1970 or barely three months after he acquired the land, the respondent
mortgaged the lot in question, together with another lot covered by TCT No. 3614 and
some chattels to secure a commercial loan of P978,920.00 from the DBP. The lot was
developed into a commercial-industrial complex with ricemill and warehouse facilities, a
solar drier, an office and residential building, roadway, garden, depository, and dumping
grounds for various materials.
When the private respondent failed to pay his loan after more than seven years had
passed, DBP foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977. On that date, the total
obligation amounted to P1,114,913.34. DBP was the highest bidder. Certificates of sale
were issued in its favor; P452,995.00 was for the two lots and P108,450.00 for the
chattels. The certificate covering the disputed lot was registered with the Registry of
Deeds on January 24, 1978.
After the foreclosure sale, respondent Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP
for P1,500.00 a month. Part of the property was also leased by DBP to the then National
Grains Authority.
The respondent failed to redeem the property within the one year period. On September
24, 1979 DBP sold the lot to the petitioner for P1,650,000.00 payable in quarterly
amortizations over a five year period. The petitioners occupied the purchased lot and
introduced further improvements worth P970,000.00.
On July 12, 1983, claiming that he was acting within the legal period given to him to
repurchase, respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for P327,995.00. DBP
countered, however, that over the years a total of P3,056,739.52 had already been
incurred in the preservation, maintenance, and introduction of improvements.
On October 4, 1983, Pe filed a complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City.
On November 27, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Development Bank of the
Philippines is ordered:
1) to reconvey unto the plaintiff the parcel of land in question (Lot No. P-2404) for the
repurchase price of P327,995.00 plus legal interest from June 18, 1977 to June 19, 1978
only, and the expenses of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; expenses for registration
and ten percent (10%) attorneys fees;
2) ordering the defendants to vacate forever the premises of said property in favor of the
plaintiff upon payment of the total repurchase price;
3) ordering the defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the
amount of P25,000.00;
4) and to set an example to government banking and lending institutions not to take
borrowers for granted by making it hard for them to repurchase by misleading them, the
bank is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff by way of exemplary damages in the amount

of P50,000.00;
Ordering further the defendant DBP:
5) to reimburse the co-defendants spouses Benzonan the amount they have paid or
advanced the defendant DBP for the purchase of Lot O.C.T. No. P-2404;
6) ordering the defendants to pay the cost of suit. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 74-75)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modifications as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
All the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
decision rendered by the court a quo with the modification that the defendant DBP shall
reimburse to its co-defendant Benzonan spouses all amounts that the latter have paid
for the land, minus interest, and that the Benzonan spouses shall be allowed to remove
the improvement that they have made on the property under litigation, without impairing
or damaging the same. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, p. 105)
A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 19, 1991.
The petitioners-spouses in G.R. No. 97973 raise the following "legal issues, reasons, or
errors" allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that conversion and use of the land in question
to industrial or commercial purposes, as a result of which it could no longer be used for
cultivation, and the fact that respondent Pe has vast holdings whose motive in seeking to
repurchase the property is to continue the business or for speculation or greater profits
did not deprive him of the right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141, and, as a result,
in ignoring or disregarding Pe's admissions and undisputed facts establishing such
circumstances, contrary to what this Court held in Santana v. Marias, 94 SCRA 853
[1979], Vargas v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195 [1979] and Simeon v. Pea, 36 SCRA
610 [1970].
2. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe still had the right to repurchase the land
under Sec. 119 of CA 141, the Court of Appeals erred in not counting the 5-year period
from the date of foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977 or at the very most from its
registration on January 24, 1978, in accordance with the prevailing doctrinal law at the
time as enunciated in Monge v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 561 [1957], Oliva v. Lamadrid, 21
SCRA 737 [1967] and Tupas v. Damasco, 132 SCRA 593 [1984], pursuant to which Pe's
right to repurchase already expired.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively the ruling in Belisario v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 SCRA 101 [1988], which held that the 5-year period is
counted from the date after the one-year period to redeem foreclosed homestead
expired, to the foreclosure of the land in question in 1977, as its retroactive application
revived Pe's lost right of repurchase and defeated petitioners' right of ownership that
already accrued under the then prevailing doctrinal law.

4. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe had the right to repurchase the land in
question and assuming, further, that the 5-year period is to be counted from the
consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the one-year period to redeem, the
Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the mere filing of an action for repurchase
without tendering or depositing the repurchase price did not satisfy the requirements of
repurchase, Pe's failure to make the tender or deposit even up to the present being
confirmatory of speculative motive behind his attempt to repurchase.
5. Assuming, finally, that respondent Pe is entitled to repurchase the property, the Court
of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioners are possessors in good faith, similar to a
vendee a retro, entitled (a) to reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses under
Article 1616 of the Civil Code as held in Calagan v. CFI of Davao, 95 SCRA 498 [1980]
and in Lee v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 196 [1975]; and (b) to refund of all amounts
paid by them by reason of the sale of the property in their favor, including interest
payments, in both instances with right of retention. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 14-16)
In G.R No. 97998, DBP limited its petition to the value of the repurchase price and the
nature of the contract between the parties. It framed the issues as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that Section 31 of Commonwealth Act No.
459 as amended is not applicable in the instant case to determine the repurchase price
contrary to decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court in the following cases: DBP v.
Jimenez, et al.(36 SCRA 426) and DBP v. Mirang (66 SCRA 141).
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the law between the contracting parties
are the terms and conditions embodied in the contract signed by them. (Rollo of G.R.
No. 97998, p. 12)
We find merit in the petitions.
The determination of the main issues raised by the petitioners calls for the proper
application of Section 119 of CA 141 as amended which provides: "Every conveyance of
land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five
years from the date of conveyance."
There is no dispute over the fact that the Government awarded the land to respondent
Pe so that he could earn a living by farming the land. Did respondent Pe lose his right to
repurchase the subject agricultural lot under the aforequoted law considering its
conversion for industrial or commercial purposes? The evidence relating to the
conversion is sufficiently established and yet was not properly appreciated by the
respondent court.
Only three months after getting the free patent and the original certificate of title over the
subject lot, it was mortgaged by respondent Pe to get a commercial loan of nearly P1
million from DBP. Pe spent the proceeds of the loan to construct permanent
improvements on the lot for his rice-mill and other businesses, i.e., two warehouse
buildings; administration-residential building; perimeter fence; solar and concrete drier;
shed; machine shop; dirty kitchen; and machineries and equipments such as ricemill
(TSN, August 13, 1984, pp. 173-174). The entire lot has been converted to serve

commercial and industrial purposes. The testimony of petitioners Gauvain Benzonan on

this score has not been successfully challenged, viz:
Q. Out of this 2.6 hectares land area, how much of this is devoted to the solar drier
construction?
A. The solar drier is about one thousand (1,000) square meters . . . ah no, about six
thousand (6,000) square meters.
Q. What about the area occupied by the warehouse and the ricemill complex?
A. The warehouse and ricemill complex is occupying about one and a half (1 1/2)
hectares.
Q. What about the area occupied by the residence as well as the roadways?
A. It covers about another half of a hectare again, Sir.
Q. Is any part of this two point six hectares devoted to agricultural production or
production of agricultural crops?
A. None whatsoever because the other portion is occupied as a dumping area for our
waste materials. (TSN, PP. 361-362, Sept. 3, 1985).
The conversion of the lot for commercial purposes is understandable considering that
the heart of General Santos City developed in that area.
The respondent does not deny that, he is using the land for purely commercial and
industrial purposes. His explanation is that the land may be converted into agricultural
land in the future. He applies the Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461
[1947]) ruling that lands not mineral or forest are agricultural in nature and may be
devoted to business purposes without losing their agricultural classification.
Indeed, the records show that it was never the intention of respondent Pe to utilize the
land, given to him for free by the Government, for agricultural purposes. He was not the
kind of poor farmer for whom homesteads and free patents were intended by the law.
As stated by the petitioners:
1. Respondent Pe acquired by free patent the land in question with an area of 2.6064
hectares, which was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-2404 on November 24,
1969. Instead of cultivating it for agricultural purposes, Pe mortgaged the land, along
with another land, on February 24, 1970, or only three (3) months from issuance of OCT
No. P-2404, with the DBP for P978,920.00. (par. 4, complaint, Annex "A"). Pe testified
that his purpose was to construct in the land in question "bodega", an administrationresidential building, a perimeter fence, a concrete drier, and for some machineries and
equipment." (TSN, p. 95, June 22, 1984). He stated that the improvements and facilities
in the land included "the warehouse, the ricemill and a big warehouse housing the palay
of stocks of the National Grains Authority and an administration-residential building, a

solar drier and a perimeter fence and some sheds or garage . . . a small piggery pen of
several compartments, a dirty kitchen . . . a machine shop." (TSN, pp. 173-174, August
13, 1984). Pe used the property for such purposes and operated the ricemill business for
a period of about nine (9) years until September, 1979 (pars. 7 and 8, complaint, Annex
"A"), without paying the DBP of his mortgage indebtedness, as a result of which DBP
foreclosed the properties. (Annex "F")
2. Respondent Pe testified that the land in question with its improvements has an
appraised value of P1,347,860.00 in 1974, and P2,028,030.00 in 1976. (TSN, pp. 176,
177, August 13, 1984). Petitioner Gauvain Benzonan claimed it has a fair market value,
as of 1985, of P5,000,000.00. (p. 8, trial court decision, Annex "F"). As against such
value of the land and improvements, respondent Pe insisted that the repurchase price
should only be the principal sum of P327,995.00. (par. 10, complaint, Annex "A")
3. Respondent Pe, when he testified in 1984, said he was 60 years old; he is now
therefore over 66 years old. He is a "businessman and resident of Dadiangas, General
Santos City" (TSN, p. 3, June 20, 1984), doing business under the style, "Dadiangas
B.P. Trading" (TSN, 144, June 22, 1984). In his sworn declaration dated July 18, 1983,
filed with the assessor's office pursuant to P.D. No. 1612, he listed the following real
properties and their market value, all situated in General Santos City, to wit (Exh. 11Benzonan):
(a) 447 sq. m. residential P 28,720.00(b) 11.9980 hectares of agri. lot P 23,880.00(c)
2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00(d) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00(e)
6,064 sq. m. of industrial lot P303,200.00(f) Industrial building P434,130.00(g) Industrial
machinery P 96,000.00
On June 22, 1984, when Pe testified, he said that "I own three (3) residential lots," (TSN,
p. 153, June 22, 1984) and that he and his wife own in Antique Province "around twenty
(20) hectares planted to coconut and sugarcane" (ibid., p. 145); he used to have 30
hectares of agricultural lands and 22 subdivision lots, which he sold to Norma Salvani
and Carlos Salvani. (TSN, pp. 166-169, June 22, 1984); Exhs. 1, 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 3, 6, 6A-Benzonan). (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 17-19)
In the light of the records of these cases, we rule that respondent Pe cannot repurchase
the disputed property without doing violence to everything that CA No. 141 (as
amended) stands for.
We ruled in Simeon v. Pea, 36 SCRA 610, 617 [1970] through Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, that:
xxx xxx xxx
These findings of fact of the Court of Appeals that "(E)vidently, the reconveyance sought
by the plaintiff (petitioner) is not in accordance with the purpose of the law, that is, "to
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the
State has gratuitously given to him"" and expressly found by it to "find justification from
the evidence of record. . . ."
Under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to agree with the Court of Appeals

that petitioners' proposed repurchase of the property does not fall within the purpose,
spirit and meaning of section 119 of the Public Land Act, authorizing redemption of the
homestead from any vendee thereof.
We reiterated this ruling in Vargas v. Court of Tax Appeals, 91 SCRA 195, 200, [1979]
viz:
As regards the case of Simeon v. Pea, petitioners ought to know that petitioner therein
was not allowed to repurchase because the lower court found that his purpose was only
speculative and for profit. In the present case, the Court of Appeals found that herein
petitioners' purposes and motives are also speculative and for profit.
It might be well to note that the underlying principle of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and
his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor
in cleaning and cultivating it. (Simeon v. Pea, 36 SCRA 617). As found by the Court of
Appeals, the motive of the petitioners in repurchasing the lots in question being one for
speculation and profit, the same therefore does not fall within the purpose, spirit and
meaning of said section.
and in Santana et al. v. Marias, 94 SCRA 853, 861-862 [1979] to wit:
In Simeon v. Pea we analyzed the various cases previously decided, and arrived at the
conclusion that the plain intent, the raison d' etre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141 ". . . is to
give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family
the land that the state had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning
and cultivating it." In the same breath, we agreed with the trial court, in that case, that "it
is in this sense that the provision of law in question becomes unqualified and
unconditional. And in keeping with such reasons behind the passage of the law, its basic
objective is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living for
destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small landholders which is the
bulwark of peace and order.
As it was in Simeon v. Pea, respondent Marias' intention in exercising the right of
repurchase "is not for the purpose of preserving the same within the family fold," but "to
dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of the law's policy and spirit." The
foregoing conclusions are supported by the trial court's findings of fact already cited,
culled from evidence adduced. Thus respondent Marias was 71 years old and a
widower at the time of the sale in 1956; that he was 78 when he testified on October 24,
1963 (or over 94 years old today if still alive); that . . . he was not living on the property
when he sold the same but was residing in the poblacion attending to a hardware store,
and that the property was no longer agricultural at the time of the sale, but was a
residential and commercial lot in the midst of many subdivisions. The profit motivation
behind the effort to repurchase was conclusively shown when the then plaintiff's counsel,
in the case below, Atty. Loreto Castillo, in his presence, suggested to herein petitioners'
counsel, Atty. Rafael Dinglasan ". . . to just add to the original price so the case would be
settled." Moreover, Atty. Castillo manifested in court that an amicable settlement was
possible, for which reason he asked for time "within which to settle the terms thereof'"
and that "the plaintiff . . . Mr. Marias, has manifested to the Court that if the defendants
would be willing to pay the sum of One Peso and Fifty Centavos (P1.50) per square

meter, he would be willing to accept the offer and dismiss the case."
Our decisions were disregarded by the respondent court which chose to adopt a Court of
Appeals ruling in Lim, et al. v. Cruz, et al.,CA-G.R. No. 67422, November 25, 1983 that
the motives of the homesteader in repurchasing the land are inconsequential" and that it
does not matter even "when the obvious purpose is for selfish gain or personal
aggrandizement."
The other major issue is when to count the five-year period for the repurchase by
respondent Pe whether from the date of the foreclosure sale or from the expiration of
the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property.
The respondent court ruled that the period of repurchase should be counted from the
expiration of the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property. Since the one year
period to redeem expired on January 24, 1979 and he filed Case No. 280 on October 4,
1983 to enforce his right to repurchase the disputed property, the Court of Appeals held
that Pe exercised his right to repurchase within the five-year period provided by Section
119 of CA 141 as amended.
The respondent court cited Belisario, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 165
SCRA 101, 107 [1988] where we held:
. . . In addition, Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 provides that every conveyance
of land acquired under the free patent or homestead patent provisions of the Public Land
Act, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal
heirs within the period of five years from the date of conveyance. The five-year period of
redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at
extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year
period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure. (Manuel v. PNB, et al., 101
Phil. 968) Hence, petitioners still had five (5) years from July 22, 1972 (the expiration of
the redemption period under Act 3135) within which to exercise their right to repurchase
under the Public Land Act.
As noted by the respondent court, the 1988 case of Belisario reversed the previous
rulings of this Court enunciated in Monge, et al., v. Angeles, et al., 101 Phil. 563 [1957]
and Tupas v. Damasco, et al., 132 SCRA 593 [1984] to the effect that the five year
period of repurchase should be counted from the date of conveyance or foreclosure
sale. The petitioners, however, urge that Belisario should only be applied prospectively
or after 1988 since it established a new doctrine.
We sustain the petitioners' position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged
to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a
foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29,
1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as
amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners
Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our

decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the
law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive.
The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v.
Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974] ". . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof."
There may be special cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice
will warrant a retroactive application of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law
as it applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the present petitions,
however, we find no such equitable considerations. Not only did the private respondent
apply for free agricultural land when he did not need it and he had no intentions of
applying it to the noble purposes behind the law, he would now repurchase for only
P327,995.00, the property purchased by the petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00
in 1979 and which, because of improvements and the appreciating value of land must be
worth more than that amount now.
The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings in Monge and Tupas
when they purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under
the rulings in these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot given to
respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise his right. His lost right
cannot be revived by relying on the 1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over
the subject lot had already become vested as of that time and cannot be impaired by the
retroactive application of the Belisario ruling.
Considering our above findings, we find no need to resolve the other issues raised by
the petitioners in their petitions.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 as amended is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

RODRIGUEZ V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37914

August 29, 1932

MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs.THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

The petitioner in his own behalf.Attorney-General Jaranilla for respondent.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed by prisoner Manuel Rodriguez, praying
that after proper proceedings an order be issued requiring the respondent Director of
Prisons to immediately set him at liberty, on the ground that he is illegally detained,
inasmuch as he has already served the penalty corresponding to his offense under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The pertinent facts necessary for a solution of the question raised in the present petition
are as follows:
Upon arraignment for the crime of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
petitioner spontaneously pleaded guilty, whereupon the trial court rendered a judgment
of conviction, and there being no circumstance to modify his criminal liability, imposed
upon him the minimum of the medium degree of the penalty of presidio correccional in
its minimum and medium degrees, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3,
article 534 of the old Penal Code, that is, one year, eight months, and twenty- one days
of presidio correccional, to pay an indemnity of P647.70, and to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The first question to decide here is whether or not the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code with reference to the crime of estafa, of which the petitioner was convicted, are
more favorable to him than those of the old Penal Code.
The penalty of one year, eight months, and twenty-one days imposed upon said
petitioner by the trial court is the minimum of the medium degree of the penalty of
presidio correccional in its minimum and medium degrees, ranging from six months and

one day to four years and two months, as provided in article 534, paragraph 3, of the old
Penal Code as amended by Act No. 3244. The penalty provided in the Revised Penal
Code, article 315, paragraph 3, for the same offense is arresto mayor in the maximum
degree to prision correccional in the minimum degree, that is from four months and one
day to two years and four months, of which the medium degree is from one year and one
day to one year and eight months, which is more lenient and hence more favorable to
the petitioner than the same degree of penalty imposed by article 534, paragraph 3, of
the former Penal Code cited above.
Article 22 of the Revised penal Code provides:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in
so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication
of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
As the provisions of the aforementioned Revised Penal Code with reference to the crime
of estafa here in question are more favorable to the said petitioner, and as the latter is
not habitual criminal, the more lenient penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code must
be imposed upon him.
The second question to decide is whether or not in habeas corpus proceedings the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt established for the first time in
article 13, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code, can be taken into consideration.
The mitigating circumstances, as their name indicates, serve to lessen the penalty fixed
by law, and whenever they are present courts are bound to take them into consideration,
according to article 77, in connection with article 80, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code,
and article 62, in connection with article 64, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
In the present case, the trial court could not legally take into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, established in article 13, paragraph 7, of
the new Penal Code, because it did not exist in the old Penal Code under which the
petitioner herein was prosecuted and sentenced.
Article 22 of the Revised Penal code, above quoted, extends its benefits even to
convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy open to them to make use of such
benefits is the writ of habeas corpus, inasmuch as, if the penalty imposed upon them
under the former penal law was decreased by the revised code, and the latter has
retroactive effect, the excess has become illegal. Now then, it appearing from the
sentence that there was a voluntary confession of guilt, and that it has served as the
basis of conviction, and taking into consideration that had such circumstance been
classified by the old Penal Code as a mitigating circumstance, the trial court would have
been bound to give it effect, could we now disregard it without failing in our duty in order
to give effect to the positive provisions of the law which make all penal laws retroactive
in so far as they favor the accused, who is not an habitual criminal, there being no
necessity to review the proceeding? In the case before us, the voluntary confession of
guilt appears in the sentence and has served as the basis of the defendant's conviction
by the trial court; for which reason we must take it into account, in order to give
retroactive effect to article 22, cited above of the Revised Penal Code for the benefit of

the petitioner herein.

As we have seen, the aforesaid petitioner was sentenced to one year, eight months, and
twenty-one days of presidio correccional, to pay an indemnity of P647.70, and to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which is the minimum of the medium
degree (from one year, eight months, and twenty-one days to two years, eleven months,
and ten days) of the penalty of presidio correccional in the minimum and medium
degrees (from six months and one day to four years and two months), prescribed by
article 534, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244. The
penalty provided in article 315, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code for the same
crime is arresto mayor in the maximum degree to prision correccional in the minimum
degree, that is, four months and one day to two years and four months, which is more
lenient than that provided in the old Penal Code. Taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, without any aggravating circumstance to
offset it, the penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code must be imposed in the
minimum degree, that is, four months and one day to one year (article 80, paragraph 2,
of the old Penal Code, and article 64 of the Revised Penal Code), and inasmuch as it is
the practice of Courts of First Instance in the exercise of their discretion (article 81,
paragraph 7, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2298) to fix the penalty in the minimum
period, and the trial court having fixed the penalty imposed upon the petitioner in the
minimum period of the medium degree, we must also fix it accordingly, that is, four
months and one day of arresto mayor, which is the minimum period of the minimum
degree of the penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code.
The herein petitioner having already served seven months and twenty-nine days of
imprisonment, as against the penalty of four months and twenty-one days, with all
possible allowances, in accordance with the Revised Penal Code, he has already more
than served his sentence and is entitled to be released immediately.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and hold that when in a sentence of
conviction it appears that the defendant voluntarily confessed his guilt in court before the
prosecution has presented its evidence, such voluntary confession shall be taken into
account in a petition for habeas corpus to give effect to article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Wherefore, the herein petitioner being illegally detained, the petition is granted and the
respondent Director of Prison is hereby ordered to set him at liberty immediately, without
special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Abad Santos, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
We stand squarely on the proposition that, after a court having jurisdiction of a criminal
case has rendered a final judgment in that case and the convict has begun to serve his
sentence in conformity with that judgment, the courts can not, in habeas corpus
proceedings, enter upon a review of the decision or record to determine if a mitigating

circumstance should be taken into account in order to obtain a reduction of the penalty
and the liberation of the convict. Habeas corpus lies only to determine the question of
the jurisdiction and lawful power of the custodian to hold the petitioner in custody, and is
not available as a revisory remedy for the correction of errors either of law or fact. (29 C.
J., 25; Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons [1913], 24 Phil., 121.) The Revised Penal
Code provides that felonies and misdemeanors committed prior to the date of
effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the code or acts in force
at the time of their commission, while retroactive effect may only be given to the Revised
Penal Code for the benefit of the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal
to determine the proper penalty as found under the old Penal Code and to contrast with
it the penalty corresponding to the crime under the Revised Penal Code. But if the courts
are to scrutinize the decision and the record to ascertain if mitigating circumstances now
found for the first time in the Revised Penal Code are to be given effect, the courts will
embark upon unchartered seas and unutterable confusion will result. We believe that the
court should not now revise a final judgment by inserting in that judgment a finding
relating to a mitigating circumstance, thus permitting the liberation of the accused. As a
consequence, our vote is for the denial of the writ.
Street, Ostrand, Hull and Vickers, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE V PATALIN, ET AL
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX
MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:
Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch
25 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the
crime of robbery.* The Amended information dated October 11, 1985 charged:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused,
conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still
unknown and who are still at large, armed with bladed weapons by means of force,
violence and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize their
purpose, and in the dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three
Hundred (P300,00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman
and the following personal property: one (1) adjustable wrench, one (l) vise grip, one (1)
screw driver, one (1) pair of levis pants, one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet
containing ten (P10,00) pesos, with a total value of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, owned by the victims Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario,
the over all total of cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of the above-mentioned offended
parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount; that by reason or
on the occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2) accused did then and there
hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting wounds which required

medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict physical injuries to the
other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries
requiring medical attendance for several number of days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp, 92-93, II Record.)
In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and
Nestor Ras were charged before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple
rape, thusly:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused,
with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and
working together with Richard Doe, Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all
armed with firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves into
a band, entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and
with violence against, and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in
cash, one (1) ring worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos,
against the will and/or consent of the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed three (3) accused, conspiring and working together with their companions who
are still at large, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana
Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Josephine Belesario, against their will and
consent.1wphi1.nt

CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 90-91, II Record.)
Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of "not
guilty" to both crimes charged (p. 103, II Record).
After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:
Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing
that the accused in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges
filed against them, they are hereby sentenced as follows:
a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin,
Jr. and Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
Ten (10) years, and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years
and Four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman

the amount of P700.00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and also
to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he
incurred for his medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered.
b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to
indemnify the members of the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the
cash and articles taken from them.
In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 80, Rollo.)
The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:
Criminal Case No. 18376
The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accusedappellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as by their unidentified
companions, based on the positive identification made by complaining witness Corazon
Aliman, and corroborated by her son Reynaldo and the latter's half-sister Josephine
Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).
Criminal Case No. 18305
Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an
unidentified companion, acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple
rape. They were positively identified by the following witnesses. Juliana Carcillar who
was raped twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex
Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar, who
was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape her.
Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally
knew him as former barangay-mate for a long time, as well as by Corazon Aliman,
mother of Reynaldo. The identification of accused-appellants was facilitated and aided
by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the crime scene for a long
period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their memory the countenance or
visage of accused-appellants. Said positive and clear identification by the complaining
witnesses, who were not shown to have ill motive to falsify the truth and to implicate
accused-appellants, prevail over the latter's defense of denial. Band, nocturnity, and
dwelling, were likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp. 78-79, Rollo).
The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs are summarized
as follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants are responsible for
the crimes charged; (2) The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin
notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming
without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes
charged, the trial court in erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was
suspended upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).

The prosecution's version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo
Aliman, Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar,
is summarized in the Solicitor General's consolidated Brief, as follows:
At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister
Josephine Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside
their house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced perimeter of said house, called out
Reynaldo Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons
with him in (pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).
Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant
Alfonso Patalin, Jr. with (2) other persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again
Reynaldo Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and
Alfonso Patalin together with his companions, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque,
entered the premises (pp. 8, 10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture,
appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the
neck, right arm, and the chest (pp. 14-16, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman
immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).
Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house,
witnessed the hacking incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21,
1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, June 30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one of whom is appellant
Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their house,
covered their mouth and told them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque
dragged Josephine Belisario to the house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman)
which is beside their house. The other man stayed put and while holding a doublebladed knife, threatened to kill Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After
Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked the house
and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver one, (1) pair of Levis
trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet containing ten pesos (P10.00); the
total value thereof is seven hundred pesos (P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred
pesos (P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sister's
house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30, 1988).
Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunt's house which is just
twenty (20) meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant, Alfonso Patalin,
Jr., outside the house of her aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunt's
name and ask that the door be opened for her. While the door was being opened, it was
kicked by one of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed the aunt
of Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up. The
other companions of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who
were armed with knive's a bolo and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine
Belisario's cousins, namely Rogelio, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all
surnamed Carcillar, (pp. 11-15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989).
Josephine Belisario together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face down
on the floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1998; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant
Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine Belisario's aunt and the mother of

her cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: "Money, money". "It is money
we want." Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter
gave him money (p. 16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990.). Then,
appellants and their companions seized the following personalities of the Carcillars: (1)
one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs of
lady's rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of earrings, and (4) two (2)
travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990).
Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was
armed with a butcher's knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of
fear, she did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex
Mijaque forcibly removed her underwear and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried
to resist but appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the former's neck and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant
Alex Mijaque brought her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor
again (pp. 13-14, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was
armed with a gun took her outside and brought her to a place not far from where she
was raped (p. 14, ibid.). This man, at the point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will
not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her life, was left with no choice but
to obey the man's orders. There, she was raped for the second time by this gun-wielding
man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped, appellant Alfonso
Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.).
Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who,
with his knife, tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This
angered appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter
but was prevailed upon not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29,
1989).
Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned
her over to one of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed
with a gun. This man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was
overpowered and he undressed her. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and
eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this
companion of appellant Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and
ordered to look for money. When she told him that they have no more money, he kept on
harming her. In the course thereof, he found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by
Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he brought her outside the house again where he had a brief
conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso Patalin. She was then brought
back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on the floor again. While at this
position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside the house. She
refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaque's order to lie down on the ground so he pushed
her downwards. Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She was
then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29, 1989).
Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by
appellant Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and
was able to undress her. He fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She was then left inside the room. Two
companions of appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia

and Perpetua Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another
room. The man demanded money from her but she was not able to give him money. The
man was also carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he
was forcing her to lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out . He likewise
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, the man took a piggy
bank which was at the foot of the bed and brought her back to the room where she was
first raped. Her aunt and cousins were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June
30, 1988).
Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the
living room, she was pulled by the hair by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand
up. When she stood up, she realized that her sister were no longer there. Appellant
Alfonso Patalin, armed with a double-bladed knife, brought her outside the house,
ordered her to undress and lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then
only thirteen (13) years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis
into her vagina but did not succeed. Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to
appellant Nestor Ras, a member of their group who was only about two (2) arms length
away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed with a double-bladed knife which he was pointing at
Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie down. He fondled her breasts, kissed her, and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras
brought her back inside the house. When she was returned inside the house, the
intruders were still demanding for money from her mother and were taking turns in
beating the latter (pp.4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).
Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated
earlier after threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return
and kill all of them (p.19, TSN, February 15, 1990).
Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received
first aid. He was then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao,
Iloilo (pp. 18-20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p.
4, TSN, May 14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following injuries: (1)
hackwound, mid forearm, area ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left
side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for
almost three (3) months and he spent more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for
medicines, food and other expenditures (p. 19, TSN, December 16, 1986).
Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after
she was raped. A hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left
shoulder of Josephine Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie
down on the ground. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits two (2) fingers". Further,
hematoma was noted in the hymen at nine o'clock and three o'clock positions and fresh
lacerations was also noted at nine, eleven, and three o'clock positions. These are
indications that a foreign object, which could be a human penis, was inserted in the
vagina and caused the lacerations of the hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3,
1986).1wphi1.nt

Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and

treated by Dr. Leticia Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p.
17, ibid).
A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18,
ibid). Her vagina admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound
which is one centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Fresh lacerations were likewise noted in her hymen at eight, eleven and three o'clock
positions (p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign
object was inserted in the vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p.
3, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side
of the face, upper right arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital
region of the head and left side of the mouth. She also sustained the following injuries:
(1) 1/2 cm. lacerated wound on the left side of the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma
on the left shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger and right thumb,
(4) 4 inches incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back
including the portion below the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh
lacerations in the hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four o'clock positions (pp. 1015, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a centimeter lacerated wound on the
perineum which was also swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A
fresh laceration at six o'clock position and a hematoma also at six o'clock position were
noted on her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).
(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)
Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of
their witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina
Gumban. The denials, together with other arguments, are summarized as follows:
Alfonso Patalin
Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus
Larang, whom he described as the land lord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters,
to force him to reveal the names of the persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily,
he declared on the stand that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them
(Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn, August 13, 1993,
pp. 10-11, 19-20).
In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when
prosecution witness Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if she recognized "the
person who called [her] brother Reynaldo," said witness responded that she did not
know the person who called her brother, and that she only recognized the caller's voice
(tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31). Further, accused-appellant Patalin also alleges that he
was arrested without a warrant.
Alex Mijaque

Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman
(p. 3, II Record), there is no mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin
as the perpetrators of the crimes charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination
in the lower court, accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the
malefactors. He likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first report mentioned
that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No rape was reported. In the second
report, it was blottered that the alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. Again,
no rape was reported. Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given
by Rogelia Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery but did not report any rape.
According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also
referred to in the record as "Mandurriao") received a complaint from a resident thereat
that his television set was stolen previous to the incidents herein involved. Accusedappellant Mijaque was suspected as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the
Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of arrest and was thence detained for
three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao,
Iloilo was being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the
Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque contends, in order to save
themselves from charges of arbitrary detention, immediately referred him for custodial
investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery. Consequently, three days after his
confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for
robbery with rape was filed against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.
Nestor Pas
The third accused-appellant, Nestor Pas, argues that his name was never mentioned by
Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public
prosecutor into mentioning his name. He also states that the witnesses' declarations as
regards his identification are confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).
Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public
prosecutor about what happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar, testified that "Nothing
happened to them" (p. 210, id). And when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female
prosecution witnesses reported the alleged incident to the police authorities, they never
mentioned that they were raped.
As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also
presented their respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was at home
with his parents, wife, and children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 1617) at the time of the incident. As corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona,
the person in charge of the plantation where he was working, who testified that accusedappellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn,
October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).
For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of
the farm where he was working which was located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993,
p. 6). In July, 1985, he was arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the
Lambunao jail for investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were brought
in front of his detention cell, he was not identified. Instead, the policemen pointed to him
and said, "That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include him, he will file a

case against you." Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993,
pp. 10-13). Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque,
corroborated the latter's alibi that on August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree from 6
o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock midnight, and accused-appellant Mijaque was not
able to leave the premises in Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still
asleep the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).
Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique
(particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11, 1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As
corroborative witness, he presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on
August 11, 1984, she bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras
in Igbangkal, Dao, Antique from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and that he saw
Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tan, March 4, 1994, p. 4).
We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to affirm.
Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog,
268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally uphold and respect this appraisal since, as an
appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a
written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).
A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses' credibility,
particularly the ravished victims, who, for approximately two agonizing hours, were
subjected to a hellish nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their own homes.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense
was not able to prove any motive on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify
that they were robbed and raped by accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims,
Josephine Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of accusedappellant Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily turn against a relative
although this be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they narrated.
Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining
witnesses. As discussed above in their individual defenses, they emphasize that
Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the perpetrators in his sworn statement;
that on August 11, 1984, Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the
hacking and robbery incidents at the Lambunao Police Department, as well as the
robbery committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated that the
alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained no report of any rape; and that
Rogelia Carcillar's report did not mention that she was raped.
Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not
impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs.
Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An examination of Reynaldo Aliman's sworn statement
(p. 3, I Record) shows that he clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant
Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant Mijaque's name, he
explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name of the person who

attacked him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16,
1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was only later that he found out that the name of his assailant
was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact that he mentioned "unknown
persons" in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and positive identification of
accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery
incidents at his home.
Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to
report the matter to the police, otherwise, the assailants will return and kill them (tsn,
Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31).
Besides, the delay in reporting the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was
only 3 days from the date of the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far shorter period
than those mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a
delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on
her honor, does not detract from the veracity of her charge.
The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining
witnesses, as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house
came from a kerosene lamp placed on a small table which was extinguished as a result
of it being knocked down, thus placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand,
Perpetua Carcillar, earlier said that although there was no more light in the house
coming from the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the moon still
illuminated their house, allegedly through the plastic roofing; and (2) the prosecution
witnesses could not agree concerning the date they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to
identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as the date when Ras was arrested.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or
the weight of their testimony, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of
the assailant (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the
credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the
conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).
With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving,
deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587
[1997]). Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails
over alibi and denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Verily, even if the
defense of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves the
barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will be given weight
only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs.
Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs.
Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela
Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs.
Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243 SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs.

Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]).
Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo.
The overland travel time from the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one
hour and twenty minutes. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay
Pandan, which is merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras
testified that he was in Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo, which is approximately two
hours away therefrom via overland transportation. The defense tried to corroborate
these alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years
prior to the date their testimony was given, and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.
Mutatis mutandiPeople vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places
where accused-appellants alleged they were at could be traversed by motorized
vehicles, it was not impossible that accused-appellants could not have been at the crime
scene by 7 o'clock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984. More importantly
and damning yet is the positive identification of their presence thereat by the victims.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
dwelling in Criminal Case No. 18376 considering that nighttime facilitated the
commission of the crime and the evidence shows that accused-appellants took
advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan,
Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the
victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the violation of
the sanctity of privacy in the victims' homes. He who goes to another's house to slander
him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere
(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law, Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting
opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and Viada, 5th ed.,
Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial court's finding on the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of band considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that
accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later identified
as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This was
corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4) persons enter their gate, one
of whom was accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p.10, June 30, 1988). These same
aggravating circumstances likewise attended the commission of the crime of robbery
with multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the
victims thereof who stated that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed
with a bolo, a knife, and a long gun, entered their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn,
June 29, 1989, p. 10; February 15, 1990, p. 5).
With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that they were
arrested without warrants, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA,
269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As correctly pointed out in the People's consolidated brief, the
record shows no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial (p. 324,
Rollo).
It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both
Criminal Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In the first criminal case, the evidence clearly
shows that accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque, together with unidentified
companions, committed the crime charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal

objective of robbing the victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the
occasion of the robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together with
unidentified companions), who were positively identified by the victims themselves,
undoubtedly had the common criminal design of robbing the household of Jesusa
Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the occasion of the robbery. Accusedappellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house and the other culprits
followed suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they
were staging a hold-up. After robbing the household, they proceeded in ravishing the
four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after the
other, thus truly exhibiting their concerted acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]).
It cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among
accused-appellants adduced at the trial
. . . direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe,
and from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of
facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely
parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a
conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is
proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; Seealso People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146;
People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486).
..
( People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).
Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the
straightforward testimony of the victims themselves.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At
the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable
by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death
penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed upon accusedappellants. Said provision reads as follows:
Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for
Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion, "for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the
death penalty at some future time (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).
Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the
Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.
Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death
penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or
imposition of the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them
notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14,
1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any
penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. At the time of the commission of
the crime in 1984, as held by the trial court, robbery with rape, if committed with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death (Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No.
767]).
True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future
restoration thereof "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." At the time of such
ratification, the instant case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been
imposed. Considering that the provision provides that "[a]ny death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the framers intended
said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death
having been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any
death penalty already imposed is automatically without need for any executive action
commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).
The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in
1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested
right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover
them? An affirmative answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the
death penalty.
Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be
compelled to hold his life (or lose it), or the means of living, at the mere will of another, is
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778
[1919]). Before us is a heinous crime indeed where people were harmed, robbed,
ravished, and abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human nature
to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders considering the
inhuman aspect of the crime committed. However, the ascendancy of the law is
axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act must be based on and must
conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz, Phil.
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is insufficient.

There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected
and benefited accused-appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."
A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the
state (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited
provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be
imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during
three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed
and the prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not
begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of
Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]).
In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death
penalty benefits herein accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the
death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that
the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can
only have prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The
Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).
There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles
him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in
the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any
omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so
applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo,
Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given
statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes
would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants'
right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them.
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested (Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory
construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat
vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).
By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to
workmen under the old law cannot be taken away from them by a succeeding law. In the
case at bar, there is greater reason to apply this principle since the very taking of life is
involved and is at issue.
As regards accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376,
correctly awarded P700.00 to Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash
and personal property forcibly taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing

expenses incurred for medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No.
18305, the trial court failed to order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Thus, in line
with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we
said:
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated
and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes
that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the
same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity.
accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five
counts of rape (considering that Juliana Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant
Mijaque) in addition to the sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and
articles that were taken from the victims. In line with the recent ruling in People vs.
Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so that the
instant case may serve as an object lesson to the public, exemplary damages in the
amount of P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA
293 [1997]).
Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are
jointly and severally liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376;
whereas all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in
Criminal Case No. 18305.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on
record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
considering that the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling
attended the commission of the crime, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the
amounts awarded by the trial court in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of
P700.00 representing the total value of the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman,
and P8,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication
and hospitalization;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua;
and

(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar
family representing the value of the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case
No. 18305 are hereby awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of
rape, P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count
of rape as exemplary damages, for which amounts all the three accused-appellant are
jointly and severally liable.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynarez-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave.
Footnotes
* On January 21, 1985, an Information for robbery with multiple rape was filed against
Alfonso Patalin and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305. Said criminal case was
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 18376 based on an Information for robbery with
physical injuries against the same accused and was heard by Branch 25, Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City (pp. 1-2, 53-55, 11 Record).
On July 1, 1985, a motion for consolidation was filed by private prosecutor Rodolfo
Valera Cabado manifesting that another information was filed against Nestor Ras for
robbery in band with multiple rape, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18835, which was
founded on the same facts presented in the first two criminal cases. Eventually, the three
cases were consolidated. Later, Alex Mijaque was identified and apprehended as an
additional conspirator in the aforesaid Criminal Cases No. 18305 and 18835.
Subsequently, a motion to admit Amended Information and to dismiss Criminal Case No.
18835 was filed by the prosecution. As a result, two cases were jointly tried by the lower
court, namely, Criminal Case No. 18305 entitled "The People of the Phils. v. Alfonso
Patalin, Alias "Alpoc", Nestor Ras, and Alex Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for Robbery in band
with rape, and Criminal Case No. 18376 entitled "The People of the Phils, v. Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. Alias "Alpoc", and Alex Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for robbery with physical injuries
(pp 74-76, 86, 88-93, 11 Record).

LARGA V RANADA
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79576 August 3, 1988
CELSO M. LARGA, petitioner, vs.HON. SANTIAGO RANADA JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, ASSISTANT FISCAL EDWIN CONDAYA,
Prosecuting Fiscal of Branch 137, and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND,
respondents.
Ariel M. Los Bahos for petitioner.
Florentino C. de los Santos and Celso Fernandez III for respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to set aside the orders of respondent Judge dated 9 June 1987 and 24 June
1987 denying, respectively, petitioner Larga's Motion to Quash and his Motion for
Reconsideration of the order denying his Motion to Quash, in Criminal Case No. 29102.
Petitioner Celso M. Larga, one of the owners and operators of the "Bistcor Diesel
Calibration Service," issued in favor of respondent Home Development Mutual Fund
("HDMF") Security Bank & Trust Company Check No. 225466 in the amount of
P3,840.00 as payment of the employer-employee contributions to the Pag-Ibig Fund
pertaining to the period from January to April 1984. The check was, however, dishonored
for being stale when it was presented for payment by the drawee bank. Demand was
made upon petitioner Larga to replace the dishonored check or otherwise to pay the
amount thereof in full, but he failed and refused to comply.
It turns out that petitioner Larga failed to remit to the Pag-ibig Fund considerably more
employer-employee contributions than just the P3,840.00. On 23 February 1987, Special
Prosecutor Luis B. Pangilinan, Jr. filed an information against petitioner Larga for
violation of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752, known as "The Home

Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980," committed as follows:

The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses CELSO LARGA AND DIOSCORO LARGA
of the crime of violation of Section 23 of P.D. 1752 committed as follows:
That on or about the period from January 1984 up to the present in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the junction of this Honorable Court, the
above named a being then the owners and operators of BIMOR DIESEL CALIBRATION
SERVICE conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and
aiding one another and with intent to defraud the HDMF, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail and refuse to remit to the HDMF the employer employee
monthly contributions amounting to TWENTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
EIGHTY (P26,880.00) PESOS, more or less, computed as of April 1986 despite regular
deductions made on their monthly salaries.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On 10 April 1987, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash asserting as ground thereof that the
criminal liability for the offense with which he was charged was extinguished with the
issuance of Executive Order No. 90 dated 17 December 1986 by the President of the
Philippines, since Section 10 thereof had made contributions to the Home Development
Mutual Fund ("HDMF") voluntary. Consequently, petitioner argues, the respondent court
had lost its jurisdiction to try and sentence the petitioner for the crime charged in the
above-quoted information.
On 18 May 1987, private respondent HDMF filed an Opposition to the Motion to Quash,
arguing that Section 10 of Executive Order No. 90 had merely amended the portion of
Presidential Decree No. 1752 dealing with the nature of contributions to the Pag-Ibig
Fund by making such contributions voluntary commencing from January 1987, and that
non-remittance of contributions accruing before January 1987 was still punishable under
Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752.
On 9 June 1987, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion to Quash.
On 10 June 1987, petitioner filed a Reply to the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, there
arguing that Section 1 0 (b) and (c) of Executive Order No. 90 and the Implementing
Rules operated as an absolute repeal of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752.
Considering that said repeal was favorable to the petitioner, he urged that it should be
applied retroactively to cover his case.
The Regional Trial Court treated the Reply to the Opposition as a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's Order of 9 June 1987, which Motion the Court denied on
27 July 1987.
In the instant Petition, petitioner urges once more that criminal liability for the acts with
which he was charged has been extinguished and that the Regional Trial Court has lost
its jurisdiction to try and sentence the petitioner.
Most briefly put, Presidential Decree No. 1752 created the HDMF which was funded by
savings which covered government and private sector employees contributed for that

purpose every month and by the counterpart amounts which employers contributed,
based on a graduated percentage of the basic monthly pay of the employees. These
percentage were: 1% in 1981; 2% in 1982; and 3% in 1983 and onwards.
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752 prescribed mandatory coverage in the following terms:
Section 4. Fund Coverage. Coverage of the Fund shall be mandatory upon all
employees covered by the Social Security System and the Government Service
Insurance System, and their respective employers.
Such coverage may be extended to other working groups, with or without employer
contributions, as may be determined by the Board of Trustees.' (Italics supplied)
Section 23 of the same statute established penal sanctions for violations of the statute
and of its Implementing Rules and Regulations in the following manner:
Section 23. Penal Provisions. Refusal or failure without lawful cause or with
fraudulent intent to comply with the provisions of this Decree, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations adopted by the Board of Trustees, particularly with
respect to registration of employees, collection and remittance of employee savings as
well as employer counterparts, or the correct amount due, within the time set in the
implementing rules and regulations or specific call or extension made by the Fund
Management, shall constitute an offense punishable by a fine of not less, but not more
than twice, the amount involved or imprisonment of not more than six (6) years, or both
such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court, apart from the civil liabilities
andlor obligations of the offender or delinquent. When the offender is a corporation, the
penalty shall be imposed upon the members of the governing board and the President or
General Manager, without prejudice to the prosecution of related offenses under the
Revised Penal Code and other laws, revocation and denial of operating rights and
privileges in the Philippines, and deportation when the offender is a foreigner. (Emphasis
supplied)
Executive Order No. 90, which addresses and seeks to implement the National Shelter
Program of the Government, defines the roles therein of the various government
agencies involved in that Program. Executive Order No. 90 provides, among other
things, as follows:
Section 9. Funding Sources. To enable the Social Security System, the Government
Service Insurance System and the Home Development Mutual Fund to provide benefits
to their members and to generate the necessary long-term funds for housing, a
rationalization of all employer and employee contributions for all social insurance and
provident fund benefits is hereby directed to include the following:
a. Raising the Social Security System maximum compensation, inclusive of the Cost of
Living Allowance, as basis for contributions from Pl,000.00 to P3,000.00;
b. Making contributions to the Home Development Mutual Fund voluntary on the parts of
both employees and employers;
c. Instituting a single mandatory contribution rate for employees and employers for all

social insurance programs.

Sec. 10. Home Development Mutual Fundas Voluntary Fund. In the implementation of
the above rationalization program, the following shall govern the operations of the Home
Development Mutual Fund:
a. All existing contributions together with their accumulated earnings shall be retained in
the Home Development Mutual Fund until their maturity in accordance with existing rules
and regulations.
b. Membership in the fund for new private and government employees and their
respective employers shall be voluntary after December 31, 1986.
c. After December 31, 1986, existing members, both employees and employers, shall
have the option to continue or discontinue new Fund contributions.
d. To encourage provident fund savings for home acquisition, all government
instrumentalities, agencies and corporations shall match the voluntary contributions
made by government employees in accordance with existing ratios. Private employers
are urged to match the contributions of their employees who opt to continue their
membership in the Fund. (Emphasis supplied)
It should be made clear, in the first place, that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No.
90 had the effect of modifying Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752. That modification consisted in
rendering fund coverage voluntary, or non-mandatory, afterDecember 31, 1986. Clearly,
Executive Order No. 90, did not by its terms purport to eliminate the obligatory character
of fund coverage or more precisely, the consequences of obligatory coverage
accruing prior to 1 January 1987. It follows that employer-employee contributions to
the Fund which had accrued on or before December 31, 1986 still had to be remitted to
the Fund. Obligations under the statute already accrued as of 1 January 1987 did not
lose their positive law obligatory character. More specifically, the obligation to remit to
the Fund previously accrued employer-employee contributions continued to exist and be
exigible. Put a little differently, Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90 amended
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, not retroactively, but only prospectively. It is perhaps well to
stress that there was no constitutional compulsion upon the legislative authority to
amend Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752 retroactively. A court, moreover, cannot give
retroactive effect to Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, even though favorable
to the accused-petitioner, against the express terms of the amending provisions
themselves . 2
It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 did not purport to "de-criminalize" all prior
violations of P.D. No. 1752 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and did not
modify or repeal, whether expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is
commonplace Teaming that implied repeals are not favored in law and are not casually
to be assumed. The first effort of a court must always be to reconcile or adjust the
provisions of one statute with those of another so as to give sensible effect to both
provisions 3 Only where there is clear inconsistency and irreconcilable conflict between
the provisions of two (2) statutes, may a court hold that the provisions later in point of
time have impliedly repealed the earlier ones. 4 That is not the case here in respect of
Sections 9 and 10 of E. O. No. 90 and Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It goes without

saying that from 1 January 1987 onwards, refusal of an employee or an employer to

become or remain a member of the Pag-Ibig Fund is no longer a violation of Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1752 and by the same token can no longer be the subject of criminal
prosecution under Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. However, failure to remit contributions
accruing on or before 31 December 1986 in a timely manner, remains punishable as a
violation of P.D. No. 1752 and of the Implementing Rules and Regulations adopted by
the HDMF Board of Trustees. 5 In the instant case, petitioner was prosecuted for failure
to remit to the HDMF employer-employee contributions which had accrued on or before
April 1986. Indeed, it may be useful to note here that failure on the part of an employer
to remit the voluntary contributions of its employees accruing after 1 January 1987, in
accordance with the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Pag-Ibig Fund, also
constitutes a violation punishable under Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. 6
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction, for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 14, Annex "A" of Petition.
2 It is, in other words, the intent of the legislative authority in enacting the amendatory
statute that must be given effect. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which states that
"[penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony-----," does not affect the foregoing rule. See e.g., Pardo de Tavera v. Valdez, 1
Phil. 468 (1902).
3 Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196197 (1971); National Power Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vsPalacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs.
Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
4 Philippine American Management Co., Inc. vs. Philippine American Management
Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190
(1971).
5 Section 10 of Rule IV of the HDMF Implementing Rules and Regulations reads:
"Employee contributions collected by an employer under the mandatory provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1752 as amended Which remain unpaid to the Fund must be
remitted to the same by the employer together with the employer contributions in
accordance with the required contribution rate at the time it was collected without penalty
within the time set by Fund Management, failure of which shall render the employerliable
to a fine of not less, but not more than twice the amount involved or imprisonment of not
more than six (6) years; or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the

court, apart from the civil liabilities and/or obligations of the offender or delinquent. When
the offender is a corporation, the penalty shall be imposed upon the members of the
governing board an the President or General Manager, without prejudice to the
prosecution of related offenses under the Revised Penal Code and other laws,
revocation and denial of operating rights an privileges in the Philippines and deportation
when the offender is a foreigner."
6 Section 9, Rule IV, HDMF Implementing Rules and Regulations in relation to Section
23, P.D. No. 1752 as amended.

PEOPLE V MORAN
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17905

January 27, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JUAN MORAN,

FRUCTUOSO CANSINO, and HILARIO ODA, defendants-appellants.
Pedro Ma. Sison for appellants.Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
ARAULLO, C. J.:
On March 31, 1922, the decision of this court in the present case, affirming the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, was published, but the term of
imprisonment by the said court upon the accused, for a violation of the Election Law,
defined and punished in section 2639 of the Administrative Code, was increased to six
months from which judgment the present appeal was taken by the accused. The
accused, after asking for a reconsideration of the said decision and a rehearing and
pending the resolution on the said petition, filed a special motion on May 2d of this year,
alleging that the crime complained of had prescribed under the provision of section 71 of
Act No. 3030, enacted by the Legislature on March 9, 1922, and praying that they be
absolved from the complaint. Upon this motion the Attorney-General was heard, having
filed an answer and a supplemental answer, with the corresponding arguments,
opposing the same, as well as the accused who filed their reply thereto and
supplementary replies, both parties stating at length the reasons and legal grounds for
their respective contentions.
While it is a rule of general application that unless the defense of prescription is pleaded
in the trial court, it will be deemed to have been waived and cannot later be raised, yet
this rule is not of absolute application in criminal cases, for if the prescription of the
crime, as well as of the penalty whereby criminal responsibility is extinguished, may, as
is the case here with regard to the former, be provided by statute after the termination of
all the proceedings in the trial court, as well as in the appellate court, and when the case
has already been submitted for discussion and is awaiting only the final judgment; and if
the prescription of the crime is but the extinguishment of the right of the State to
prosecute and punish the culprit, it is beyond question that, once the State has lost or
waived such right, the accused may, at any stage of the proceeding, ask and move that
the same be dismissed and that he be absolved from the complaint. And not only that,

the right to prosecute and punish the criminal having been lost by the prescription of the
crime expressly provided by the statute, the State itself, the Government through the
proper court, is in duty bound to make a pronouncement to that effect. Therefore, as on
March 9th of this year, 1922, when Act No. 3030 went into effect, providing in its section
71 that offense resulting from the violations thereof shall prescribe one year after their
commission, the accused and the Attorney-General had already filed their respective
briefs in this court for the prosecution of the appeal taken from the judgment of the court
below, and the hearing of the case had already been held, this court itself, without the
necessity of any motion of the accused, or of the Attorney-General, should have
declared the crime in question to have prescribed, in view of the provision of said
section. Consequently, as this court had not up to that time made such pronouncement,
the accused are perfectly justified in asking, as they have done in their motion of May 2d
of this year, that the offense having prescribed, they be absolved from the complaint.
This duty is imperative upon the courts of justice at any moment that the offense
appears to have prescribed under the provision of the law. With particular reference to
the present case, this conclusion is necessarily reached from the letter as well as the
spirit of the provisions of the Penal Code relative to prescription, and from that of section
71 of the aforesaid Act No. 3030, for once the offense or the penalty has prescribed, the
State has no right to prosecute the offender, or to punish him, and if he has already been
punished, it has no right to continue holding him subject to its action by the imposition of
the penalty. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony
or misdemeanor, even if they may be serving sentence, would be useless and nugatory
if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of
whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to
the prescription of the crime and the penalty.
That such is the duty of the courts of justice and has been so recognized by this court, is
shown by the decision in the case of United States vs. Rama, R. G. No. 16247,1 for the
crime of murder of four persons, committed in the month of July, 1902, in the province of
Cebu, in which one of the accused was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of the
said province to death and the other two to life imprisonment. That case was brought to
this court on appeal and, after the filing of the respective briefs of the accused and the
Attorney-General a hearing was had. No allegations was made as to the prescription of
the crime, yet this court rendered a decision (not yet published in the Official Gazette)
wherein, after finding that two crimes of murder and two of homicide had been
committed and that seventeen years had already elapsed from the commission of the
latter to the institution of the judicial proceeding for the investigation and punishment
thereof, that is, more than the fifteen years fixed by lay for the prescription of the crime of
homicide, this court held that the said two crimes of homicide had prescribed and the
criminal responsibility of the three accused for the said crimes extinguished, convicting
the accused only of the two crimes of murder. There is, therefore, on reason whatsoever
why the allegation of prescription made by the accused in their motion of the 2d of May
of this year cannot legally be considered; on the contrary, said motion must be decided
before the petition for the reconsideration of the decision published on the 31st of March
of last year, and for a rehearing of the case, or, to be more exact, the said petition must
be ignored, for the resolution of the aforesaid motion, if favorable to the accused, would
put an end to the proceeding right at its present stage.
The first question to be decided, in connection with the contention of the accused, is
whether or not the prescription provided in section 71 of Act No. 3030 refers only to that

Act and not to any other, for said section 71 says: "Offenses resulting from violations of
this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission," and section 72 adds: "This Act
shall take effect on its approval."
It is enough to take into consideration the fact that Act No. 3030, is, as its title indicates,
amendatory to several sections and parts of sections of chapter 18 of the Administrative
Code, known as the Election Law, and of chapter 65 on penalties for the violation of
various administrative laws, among them, those of the Election Law itself, included in
said chapter 18 of the Administrative Code, in order to understand that when the
Legislature used the words "This Act," that is, Act No. 3030, it referred, necessarily, to
the Election Law included in various sections and provisions of the aforesaid two
chapters of the above-mentioned Code, that is, the Election Law prior to Act No. 3030,
under which the herein accused were convicted. One needs but examine one by one all
the sections of said Act No. 3030, each of which declares the sense in which each of the
sections included in said chapters in amended, in order to convince himself that said Act
No. 3030 is similar to the law that preceded it, with the amendments and some additions
thereto. If the Legislature had passed and enacted a new Election Law different from
that contained in the above-mentioned chapters of the Administrative Code, then it may
be said that the phrase "This Act" can in no way refer to the prior Election Law.
Furthermore, if the offenses resulting from the violations of the Election Law, the
provisions of which are contained in the aforesaid chapters of the Administrative Code,
are the same offenses provided for in Act No. 3030, though with some modifications in
the details as to some of them and with increase in the penalty, it cannot be denied that
when the Legislature used the words "This Act" in section 71 of Act No. 3030, wherein it
is provided that said offenses shall prescribe one year after their commission, it
necessarily referred to offenses resulting from the violations of the former Election Law,
as amended by said Act No. 3030. Besides, one of the objects of this Act, as its title
indicates, is to make more effective the provisions and the purposes of the former Law
contained in the Administrative Code; so that Act No. 3030 rather than being an integral
part of the former election law is in conjunction with the latter the only Election Law in
force; and any other interpretation to the contrary of the phrase "This Act" cannot, in our
opinion, be accepted as good logic and in accordance with the principles of sound
reasoning.
It is true that in the next section, 72, it is provided that said Act No. 3030 shall take effect
on the date of its approval, which took place on March 9, 1922, but the meaning of such
an expression in connection with prescription is that prescription can be invoked from
that date, as was done by the accused, and not that such provision may have a
retroactive effect from that same date.
In this connection, there arises the second question as to whether or not the provision of
article 22 of the Penal Code above cited, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so
far as they are favorable to the defendant in a criminal action for a felony or
misdemeanor, is applicable to crimes penalized by special laws, as does Act No. 3030,
account being taken of the fact that, under article 7 of the Penal Code, offenses
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the said code.
Several decisions have been rendered by this court on this question in which the
distinguished members of this court hold opposite views. Among those may be cited the
case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), which is cited in a later case, United

States vs. Lao Lock Hing (14 Phil., 86), in which case this court did not lay down a
definite rule, but expressly reserved its opinion as to whether or not article 22 of the
Penal Code above referred to was applicable. And it was so recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in an appeal taken by writ of error by the accused, Ong
Chang Wing (40 Phil., 1046), said high court having limited itself to declaring that the
accused, not having been convicted by this court of an offense which was not
punishable when committed, and this court having held only that the right to impose the
penalty prescribed by the Penal Code of the Philippines had not been lost by the
subsequent statute, Act No. 1757, of the Philippine Commission, the accused had not
been denied due process of law, for as the Supreme Court of the United States says in
its decision, the duty of that court in that case was to determine whether or not the
judgment of this court amounted to a denial of due process of law. Therefore, the
decision rendered in those two cases cannot be invoked in the one now before us.
In the case of United States vs. Lao Lock Hing (14 Phil., 86) and United States vs.
Calaguas (14 Phil., 739), cited also in support of the contrary opinion, as the offenses
therein involved were penalized by special laws, that is, by the Opium Law, in the former,
and by the Law of Police and Railroad Preservation, in the latter, this court held, as it
could not have done otherwise, that, under article 7 of the Penal Code, the provisions of
the said Code were not applicable to those offenses, inasmuch as said offenses were
penalized by the said law which prescribed a special and definite penalty for said
offenses, but in those cases said article 7 of the Penal Code was not interpreted in
connection with the application of article 22 of the same Code, providing for the
retroactivity of penal laws favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor.
Wherefore neither can the holding of this court in those cases have any application to
the one before us.
The case in which this court plainly and definitely decided the question under
consideration is that of United States vs. Parrone (24 Phil., 29). There the said accused
was charged with the crime of falsification of a cedula certificate, definite and punished
in section 55 of Act No. 1189 of the Philippine Commission, but before the conviction of
the accused, said Act was amended by Act No. 2126 of the Philippine Legislature, which
prescribed a lesser penalty than the previous Act, and this court, after a careful perusal
of all its decisions dealing with that question, as above indicated, and a luminous and
exhaustive discussion on the interpretation of article 7 of the same Code in connection
with the retroactivity of the penalty, in so far as it is favorable to the accused, held, upon
the appeal taken by the said accused from the judgment of the court below, that, under
the provisions of article 22 of the Penal Code, the penalty provided in Act No. 2126,
which was later than Act No. 1189, was the proper penalty to be imposed upon the
accused in that case. In the course of that decision, the court said:
Considering the provision of article 7 of the Penal Code, are the provisions of article 22
of the same Code applicable to the penal laws of the Philippine Islands other than the
provisions of the Penal Code? Article 22 is found in chapter 1 of title 3 of the Penal
Code. Said chapter is entitled "Penalties in General". Article 21 of said title and chapter
provides that "no felony or misdemeanor shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission." This article is general in its provisions and in
effect prohibits the Government from punishing any person for any felony or
misdemeanor with any penalty which has not been prescribed by the law. It (art. 21),
therefore, can have no application to any of the provisions of the Penal Code for the

reason that for every felony or misdemeanor defined in the Penal Code a penalty has
been prescribed.
The provisions of article 21 can only be invoked, therefore, when a person is being tried
for a felony or a misdemeanor for which no penalty has been prescribed by law. Article
21 is not a penal provision. It neither defines a crime nor provides a punishment for one.
It has simply announced the policy of the Government with reference to the punishment
of alleged criminal acts. It is a guaranty to the citizen of the State that no act of his will be
considered criminal until after the Government has made it so by law and has provided a
penalty. It (art. 21) is a declaration that no person shall be subject to criminal prosecution
for any act of his until after the State has defined the misdemeanor or crime and has
fixed a penalty therefor. The doctrine announcement by this section has been
considered of so much importance to the citizen of a State that many of the States of the
Union have been pleased to include its precepts in their constitutions or have so
declared by express provision of law.
Article 22 provides that "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor
the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same." This
provision clearly has no direct application to the provisions of the Penal Code. Its (art.
22) application to the Penal Code can only be invoked where some former or
subsequent law is under consideration. It must necessary relate (1) to penal laws
existing prior to the Penal Code; or (2) to laws enacted subsequent to the Penal Code, in
which the penalty was more favorable to the accused. Rule 80, Ley Provisional para la
aplicacion de las disposiciones del Codigo Penal. Under the provisions of said article 22,
if a crime had been committed prior to the date of the Penal Code the punishment for
which was more favorable to the accused than the provisions of the Penal Code, it is
believed that the accused might invoke the provisions of said article (22) even though he
was not placed upon trial until after the Penal Code went into effect. (U. S. vs. Cuna 2).
So also if by an amendment to the Penal Code or by a later special law the punishment
for an act was made less severe than by the provisions of the Penal Code, then the
accused person might invoke the provisions of said article. It appears to be clear, then,
that article 22 of the Penal Code can only be invoked when the provisions of some other
penal law than the provisions of the Penal Code are under consideration. In other words,
the provisions of article 22 can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. It
has no application to the provisions of the Penal Code except in relation with some other
law. It is not believed, therefore, that the Legislature in enacting article 7 of the Penal
Code intended to provide that article 22 should not be applicable to special laws.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that such was the intention of the legislature, in view
of the doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain, whose authority as regards the
application and interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code of the Philippines is
unquestionable, because said Code is the same as that of Spain. In two cases
(decisions of July 13, 1889 and April 26, 1892), among others decided by that court, in
which article 22 of the Penal Code was alleged to have been violated by the imposition
of the penalty of prison correccional prescribed by the said Code, instead of prison
menor, prescribed by article 168 of the Election Law of August 30, 1870, upon the
accused therein, who were found guilty of a violation of the said Election Law, which,
was therefore, a special law in force prior to the said Penal Code of that same year, the
said Code having substitute the penalty of prision correccional for that of prision menor,

said court held that the appeal was not well taken on the ground that the penalty of
prision correccional had taken the place of that of prision menor prescribed by the
Election Law, and while the duration of both penalties was the same, the correctional
penalty was lighter and more advantageous and favorable to the accused than prision
menor, as it was of a less grave nature; so that in those two cases, the supreme court of
Spain not only applied the provisions of the Penal Code to a special law, but also gave
retroactive effect to said provisions on account of being more favorable to the therein
accused, in accordance with the precept of article 22 of the Penal Code. And here we
have a most complete, clear and satisfactory solution of whatever doubt might have
arisen as to the interpretation of articles 7 and 22 of the Penal Code aforesaid.
It cannot be maintained that said article 22 of the Penal Code refers only to penalties
and is not applicable to appeals and proceedings, because the prescription of the crime
is intimately connected with that of the penalty, for the length of time fixed by the law for
the prescription depends upon the gravity of the offense, as may be seen from Title VI of
Book I of the Penal Code, containing, as its heading indicates, "General Provisions
Regarding Felonies and Misdemeanors, the Persons Liable and the Penalties," without
distinguishing between the penalties and the extinguishing of the criminal responsibility
dealt with in said Title VI of said Book, which title comes next to Title V, treating of the
penalties incurred by those who evade service of sentence and those who, while serving
sentence, or after having been convicted by a final judgment not yet served, commit
some other crime. And aside from this intimate connection between the prescription of
the crime and that of the penalty, a statute declaring the prescription of the crime has no
other object and purpose than to prevent or annul the prosecution of the offender and, in
the last analysis, the imposition of the penalty. Moreover, if the provisions relative to the
prescription of ownership and to the prescription of actions in civil matters are part of the
civil law, it cannot be denied that the provisions relative to the prescription of crimes and
of penalties are penal laws or form part thereof.
With regard to the question whether prescription must be considered as a matter of
procedural or formal law, or as a substantive law for the purpose of the retroactivity of
laws, we must state, with reference to the present case, that the prescription provided in
section 71 of Act No. 3030 is of the nature both of a substantive law, in so far as it gives
a person accused of any of the crimes therein referred to, the right not to be prosecuted
nor punished after the lapse of the period of one year from the commission of said
crimes, within which the criminal action must be commenced, and of a procedural or
adjective law in so far as it fixes the time within which such action must necessarily be
commenced in order that the prosecution may be legal and the proper penalty may
lawfully be imposed. but however said provision may be considered, the same must
have a retroactive effect, as will be seen later on.
Therefore, as the instant case involves two special laws of the Philippine Legislature, to
wit, the Election Law contained in the above-mentioned chapters of the Administrative
Code, and Act No. 3030 which amended and modified the former, it is evident that the
provision declaring that offenses resulting from the violations of said Act shall prescribe
one year after their commission must have retroactive effect, the same being favorable
to the accused.
This, however, is objected to, although it is based on a general principle frequently
applied by many courts of the American Union, and in support of the objection, several

decisions of the said courts and a doctrine concerning the matter found in Corpus Juris
(volume 16, p. 222) and in Ruling Case Law are cited, wherein it is established that laws
fixing a period of prescription are not applicable to crimes previously committed, unless
by their terms they are clearly retroactive or contain an express provisions to that effect.
We need not discuss each and every one of the said cases, it being sufficient for our
purpose to take up one of them, namely, that of Martin vs. State ([1859], 24 Tex., 62).
There the Supreme Court of Texas held that as regards crimes and misdemeanors,
prescription had no retroactive effect and that the Statute of Limitations enacted in 1854
could not have the effect of barring a criminal action instituted within two years after the
enactment of said Act, provided that no period of prescription was fixed in a former law
for the crime in question, that is to say, that prescription cannot be invoked as a bar to a
criminal action for an offense like that of falsification involved in that case, where said
action was commenced under a statute authorizing it and in the old law penalizing that
crime no period was fixed for the prescription thereof. As can be seen from a reading of
the context of the decision in the aforesaid case and the opinion of the writer thereof,
said doctrine was announced without taking into account the difference between the rule
governing prescription in criminal procedure and that applicable to civil actions, but on
the contrary, application was made only of the latter; hence the holding that a special
provisions as to prescription was necessary in the later statute to give it a retroactive
effect.
It should be noted, however, that the Chief Justice of that Supreme Court voted
vigorously against the said decision, stating in a well-reasoned dissenting opinion the
following:
I . . . am of opinion, that the limitation prescribe to prosecution applies as well to
prosecutions for offenses, committed before the passage of the statute, as afterwards;
and that, as the words of the statute plainly import, the limitation commences to run from
the time of the "commission of the offense," whether that was before or after its passage.
The statute makes no distinction, as respects the limitation; it makes no exception, from
its provision, of offenses previously committed; and I know of no principle, or rule of
construction, which will authorize the court to engraft an exception upon the statute. It is
a statute relating to the remedy, and being enacted for the benefit of persons accused, is
not an ex post facto law. The constitutional inhibition of the enactment of retroactive
laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, has no application to penal statutes.
Retroactive criminal laws, which are forbidden, are those which come under the
denomination of ex post facto laws. There is nothing to prevent statutes, respecting
crimes, from being restrospective, provided they do not come under that denomination.
It is an acknowledged general rule, in the construction of statutes, that they will not be
construed to have a restrospective operation so as to destroy or impair rights of property,
or of action, unless the legislature have plainly expressed such to be their intention. But
laws which affect the remedy merely are not held to be within the rule or the inhibition
against retrospective laws, unless the remedy be entirely taken away, or so restricted, as
to impair the right. Nor, as I conceive, do statutes relating to the punishment of offenses
come within the rule of construction, or the constitutional inhibition, though their effect
should be wholly to defeat a prosecution. On the contrary, laws respecting crimes,
whether they relate to the remedy merely, or to the offense, are, I think, always
construed to relate to past, as well as future offenses, where their operation is in any

wise beneficial to the accused; unless the legislature have plainly declared that they are
not to receive such a construction. To give such effect to laws respecting crimes and
punishments, is not to render them retrospective, or retroactive laws, in the sense of the
constitutional inhibition. These terms have no application to such laws, but relate
exclusively to laws affecting civil rights. (De Cordova vs. City of Galveston, 4 Tex., 470.)
I do not think the reservation contained in the 81st section of the act was intended to
have, or should be construed to have, any effect upon the limitation contained in the
75th section. That section was intended only to prevent repeals by implication, and to
enforce the observance of the rule, which would have applied on general principles,
without its enactment, that where the act mitigates the punishment, the milder penalty
should be imposed. To hold it to apply to the limitation prescribed for prosecution by the
act, would be to except all offenses committed before the passage of the act, from the
operation of the periods of limitation therein contained, and to hold that those offenses
would never become barred under its provisions. I cannot think that such was the
intention of the legislature.
There may be differences of opinion, respecting the policy of prescribing so short
periods of limitation, to prosecution for high crimes. But that was a question for the lawmaking power; and I can see no reason why the legislature should have intended the
limitation to apply to future, and not to pas, offense. The same reasons, and the same
policy, which dictated that the prosecution should be commenced within a prescribed
period, after the offense was committed, would seem to apply equally to offenses
committed before, as to those committed after the passage of the statute.
Entertaining these views, I could not give my assent to the imposition of the pains and
penalties of the law, where the prosecution had not been commenced until after the
expiration of the time within which the legislature have positively enacted that the
offense "shall be prosecuted," or be forever barred.
Furthermore, Mr. Wharton, cited in one paragraph of the said dissenting opinion, in his
work entitled Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th edition, 1889, says that, as a general
rule, the laws of prescription of actions apply as well to crimes committed before the
enactment, as afterwards, and speaking of the rule to be applied to the prescription of
actions and the interpretation of the laws on that subject, he says in section 316, page
215, of said book the following:
We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statute of
limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in
civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the
statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending
parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, the is no intendment to be made in
favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor
against whom the ordinary presumptions of construction are to be made. But it is
otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the
grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to
be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of process, to be
scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time
oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his
country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease

to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence
it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not
only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but
because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public justice
in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It
is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes enforcing
such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace,
but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subaltern,
and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained.
But even if the rule generally and frequently applied by many courts of the American
Union and the doctrine laid down by them were those announced in the abovementioned paragraphs of the Corpus Juris and the Ruling Case Law, the precept of
article 22 of the Penal Code being clear and unmistakable, according to which, penal
laws have retroactive effect in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a
felony or misdemeanor, the courts of justice of these Islands cannot, and must not, make
any application of the said rule and doctrine, but must, on the contrary, abide by the said
precept and comply with it and carry it into effect, as hereinbefore stated, although no
petition to that effect is made by the accused that may be favored by those laws. And a
provision for the retroactivity of penal laws having, as it has, been made in the said
article in the terms already mentioned, it is evidently that when the Philippine
Legislature, the majority of whose members are also members of the Philippine Bar,
and, therefore, were aware of this legal provision, drew section 71 of the Election Law,
Act No. 3030, to the effect that the offenses resulting from the violations of the said law
prescribe one year after their commission, it ought to have known that it was not
necessary for it to say that said provision was to have retroactive effect in so far as it
was favorable to the accused, inasmuch as such provision had already expressly been
made in article 22 of the Penal Code, which was applicable not only to the prescription
therein provided when the same might be favorable to persons accused of those crimes,
but also to every penal law the retroactivity of which might be favorable to persons
accused of a felony or misdemeanor. And, this is the best and most conclusive proof that
in making the provision in section 71 aforecited, the Legislature intended that same be
given a retroactive effect, because the members thereof could not ignore the law. From
all of which it also necessarily follows that, if that doctrine established by many courts of
the metropolis is to be applied in the instant case, it must be by saying that the same is
useless or that it was complied with in so far as the giving of a retroactive effect to the
said prescription was concerned, because that provision regarding retroactivity has
already been expressly made in article 22 of the Penal Code, and, therefore, it is of no
importance that in the former Election Law, that in, the amended law, no provisions was
made regarding prescription to give immediate and full effect to the retroactivity provided
in section 71 of Act No. 3030. The provisions of article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring
the retroactivity of laws favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, is to
be deemed as if also expressly made in any new law at the time of its enactment, when
said law is a penal law, or one of a penal character, such as the prescription contained in
section 71 of Act No. 3030 here in question, which is of that nature, as above stated, and
there is no necessity of making in that law any provisions to that same effect. And this is
the reason why in the case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez, one of the first cases

in the Philippine Jurisprudence (1 Phil., 468) in which, the question, among others, was
raised whether the defendant, who was accused of grave insult defined and punished in
paragraph 1, article 458, of the Penal Code, should be punished under said article, or
under the provisions of Act No. 277, which is the Libel Law and went into effect after the
publication of the libelous article and the institution of the criminal action, the court held,
as stated in the syllabus, that:
"The general rule that penal laws shall be retroactive in so far as they favor the accused
has no application where the later law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions
or existing cause of action," which clearly means that in order for a penal statute
favorable to the accused to have a retroactive effect, it is not necessary that it be so
expressly provided in the statues, or, to put it in another way, that the provision declaring
the retroactivity be repeated therein, but that if the Legislature intends it not to have a
retroactive effect, it should expressly so state in the same statute. And the reason for it is
obvious. For it being the general rule, according to article 22 of the Penal Code, that
penal laws have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the accused, said general rule
applies to all laws that may be enacted in the future, and if the Legislature intends to
make an exception to the said rule, it should expressly say so.
Now, the eminent professor of International Law, Mr. Fiore, in his work on the
Irretroactivity and Interpretation of Statutes, which is termed by various eminent jurists "a
work full of juridical science," after recognizing as a rule universally accepted by the
courts and expressly sanctioned by most of modern legislation that no penal law can
have any retroactive effect, that is, that no action or omission shall be held to be a crime,
nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was
committed, advocates the retroactivity of a penal law favorable to the offender, not as a
right of the latter, but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to
punish and the combination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception
based on political consideration, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.
The same author, on studying the question that may arise in case the new land should
have changed the rules regarding prescription, that is to say, the retroactivity of the law
as to prescription, says:
The modifications as to prescription introduced by the new law may affect the penal
action or the penalty itself. With respect to the former, it can be imagined that the new
law has modified the rules as to the applicability or inapplicability of the prescription to a
given crime, or the necessary conditions for its effectiveness, or, finally, the time and
period when it will have effect.
The authors who had studied this question have reached different conclusions, because
some have considered prescription as a law of procedure or of form, while others have
regarded it as a substantive law, thereby admitting, therefore, the principle of vested
right on the part of the offender.
Those who have considered the statutes of limitations as of a formal or remedial nature
have maintained the opinion that the new law must always be applied in all cases of
prescription where the period was already running at the time of the enactment of the
new law on the ground that all procedural laws must be deemed retroactive by nature.
Against this theory, however, it has been said that even admitting the principle

enunciated, the truth is that the culprit cannot be placed in a worse situation, as would
be the case if that theory is adopted, for although the prescription begun under the
former law, fixing a shorter period, might have been completed, he would be subject to
criminal action under the new law prescribing a longer term, even if the provisions of the
latter, concerning the substance of the penal action, were not in force at the time of the
commission of the crime. Again, setting aside the theory of vested right on the part of the
accused, as we have already done (for we cannot admit any vested right on the part of a
private individual as against that which is considered by the sovereign power as
indispensable for maintaining the juridical order), it can, however, be maintained that the
application of the new law about the prescription of the criminal action, when said law
has extended the time of the prescription, is tantamount to giving that penal law a
retroactive effect, as regards the very substance of punishment, thus prejudicing the
offender and admitting, as to him, a right to punish, which, on account of the longer
period fixed in the new law, cannot be considered as based on any law in force and
already promulgated at the time of the commission of the crime.
On the other hand, those who have considered prescription as a substantive law hold
that the old law should always be applied, the principal reason adduced by them in
support of this opinion being that the accused must at all events suffer the
consequences of the situation created by himself by committing the crime. Against this
opinion, it has been held, however, that the consideration of public policy, which naturally
prevails in matters of prescription, constitutes an obstacle to the invariable application of
the old law, for if the new law is less severe as regards prescription, the result would be
that the culprit would be subject to the more severe law, which has been modified in
harmony with the more modern criteria sanctioned by the new law as more in
consonance with justice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

To our mind, in accordance with the principles underlying all the foregoing theories
regarding the retroactivity of a less severe penal law, it must be admitted that also when
the question is one of prescription must the new law be considered retroactive if it is
more favorable to the accused than the former law, and that contrariwise it should not be
so considered, if it is found to be more prejudicial. Although we are maintaining this
opinion, we do not thereby accept the unjustified theory above set forth of those who
believe that there must be admitted here the supposed vested right on the part of the
offender, for we have already stated the reason why no such vested right can be
recognized as against the penalty provided by law. On the contrary, we admit this theory,
but founded on the principles of justice itself upon which the right to punish, considered
as a supreme right of sovereignty, rests.
In fact, where the new law has shortened the time of prescription or established easier
conditions for its effectiveness with respect to a given crime, it is clear that the reduction
of the period made in the new law implies an acknowledgment on the part of the
sovereign power that the greater severity of the provision of the former statute relative to
the substance of the criminal action is unjust.
Consequently, if the sovereign power should enforce its right under the former law it
would be guilty of an inconsistency in view of its implied admission that the old law was
too severe and consequently unjust. The necessity therefore of applying the less severe

new law rests upon the principle that the sovereign power cannot exercise its right to
punish except only within those limits of justice which that sovereign power has
established as being just and equitable at the time of exercising that right.
On the other hand, when the latter statute of limitations of criminal actions is more
severe than the former, either as to the applicability of the prescription itself, or as to the
requirements and duration of the action, the application of the said law to crime
committed before its enactment must be avoided not because the culprit has acquired
any right to prevent said application, but for the reasons above set out. Indeed, on what
ground can the culprit pretend to prevent the sovereign power from doing what it has the
right to do for the purpose of maintaining the juridical order? There exists, therefore, no
reason in support of the theory of vested right on the part of the culprit, but what must
inevitably be admitted is that the sovereign power cannot, without doing an injustice,
apply the more severe legal provision in the matter of prescription; and that that
provision cannot justly be applied unless it was previously promulgated, as even the
right itself to punish cannot come into existence except by virtue of a law duly
promulgated and in force at the time that it was violated and the crime committed. The
more severe law in matter of prescription extends the field of criminal action and affects
the substance of the same, because it determines the basis and the sphere of the right
to punish. Now, can the sovereign power do all this without any law? Can it, without
committing an injustice, extend the effect of the new law to acts committed before its
enactment? As the sovereign power cannot punish any act not expressly penalized by a
former law, nor punish with a more severe penalty any act performed before said penalty
was prescribed and the law fixing it promulgated, so it cannot extend the criminal action
(that is, its right to punish) by virtue of a later law by applying to acts completed before
its promulgation the less favorable provisions therein made regarding prescription. In
fact, in any case where reduction of the time of prescription formerly fixed is to be made
under a new law, or where harder conditions are required by said law for effectively
taking advantage of the prescription, the sovereign power is exercising the right to
punish acts committed prior to the promulgation of the new law, and it is evident that no
such right can be recognized in the sovereign power.
From all of the foregoing, we conclude that upon the very principles of justice, under
which the less severe provisions of the new law must regulate all the elements of the
criminal action, said less severe new law must also control the matter of prescription,
provided that there is no final and irrevocable judgment, and this rule holds good even if
the modifications of the statute have reference to the prescription of the penalty,
because in substance the prescription of the penalty is equivalent to the prescription of
the criminal action. (Fiore, pages 423-428.)
Wharton gives a clear explanation of the distinction to be made between the construction
of prescription in criminal actions and that of prescription in civil case in the paragraph
above quoted from his book, and the grounds for the distinction are also clear and are
not unknown to anybody, for, as Wharton says, they are inherent in the origin and nature
itself of the law of prescription, which must be liberally construed in favor of the accused
for if prescription in criminal matters is, as said author says, a benefit, a grace granted by
the State, and a waiver of its right to prosecute and an announcement that the crime is
no longer the subject of prosecution, from the moment that the granting of that grace or
benefit, or the making of such waiver, is known, the prosecution for the said crime and
the punishment of the offender would be a juridical contradiction.

But the opinions discussed by Fiore in his book abovementioned are more in point, for
he refers precisely to the prescription provided in a later statute the subject of which is
the criminal action or the penalty, that is, the prescription of the crime, as is the case now
before us, or the prescription of the penalty, whether prescription be regarded as a law of
procedure or of form, or as substantive law.
After examining the different opinions of the writers on the matter, Fiore has come, as
seen from the above quotation, to the conclusion that, whether the statute relative to
prescription be considered as of a procedural or formal, or substantive, nature, the new
statute must be applied if it is less severe or more favorable to the accused, but not if it
is more prejudicial, notwithstanding the general rule that all procedural laws are
retroactive in regard to prescription. In view of the special motion filed by the accused on
May 2, 1922, it does not matter and it is of no importance, so far as the question herein
raised is concerned, whether the provision contained in section 71 of Act No. 3030 be
considered as of a substantive, procedural, or adjective character, because applying the
principles above enunciated, the result is the same, and the more severe law in the
matter of prescription extends, as Fiore says, the field of the criminal action and affects
the very substance thereof, because it determines the basis and the sphere of the rights
to punish.
It may, perhaps, be argued that no term having been fixed in the Election Law prior to
Act No. 3030 for the prescription of the offenses resulting from the violations thereof, and
said Act No. 3030 having fixed at one year the period for the prescription, the former law
is more lenient, less severe, and more favorable to the persons accused of those
offenses than the latter. Such an argument, however, is absolutely erroneous and
untenable, if it is borne in mind that no period of prescription having been fixed in the
former law, those offense were imprescriptible, and the offender could be prosecuted
and punished at any time and indefinitely, even ten, twenty, or more years after the
commission thereof, whereas the new law, that is, Act No. 3030 in providing the period of
one year for the prescription, has, in effect, shortened the time of prescription fixed in the
old law by virtue of the silence thereof, reducing it to one year and has established less
difficult conditions for the application of the same as regards those offenses, which is
evidently more favorable and lenient to the violators of the said former law, and, as Fiore
says in one of the paragraph above quoted from his book, the reduction made by the
new law implies a recognition on the part of the sovereign power that the greater severity
of the former law, as regards the substance of the criminal action, is unjust, and it would
contradict itself if it would attempt to enforce its right under the conditions of the former
law which has already been regarded by the conscientious public opinion as juridically
burdensome, and, therefore, unjust, and the sovereign power cannot exercise the right
to punish except within the limits regarded by it as just at the time of exercising it.
If, therefore, in reviewing the former Election Law contained in the two chapters of the
Administrative Code hereinbefore mentioned, for the purpose of amending and
reforming it in accordance with the dictates of reason, justice and experience, the
Legislature did amend and reform it by the enactment of Act No. 3030, which supplied
the deficiency found in the old law with regard to the prescription of the crimes penalized
therein, by providing in section 71 of Act No. 3030 that those crimes, which year after
their commission, because their imprescriptibility was considered by the conscientious
public opinion as juridically burdensome, and, therefore, unjust, it is evident that the
State, the Government and the courts of justice representing it, cannot, without

committing a gross injustice, exercise the right to prosecute and punish the violator of
the old law under the conditions required by the law and outside of the limits now
regarded by the sovereign power, that is to say, the Legislature, as just by the enactment
of said Act No. 3030, which took effect on March 9, 1922. And such injustice would be
more apparent still, if the violators of the old Election Law, which was amended by Act
No. 3030, would be prosecuted and convicted five, ten, twenty, or more years after the
said violations when the proof of their innocence may not have been kept by them, while
violators of Act No. 3030, who may not have been prosecuted within the one year fixed
by section 71 aforesaid, would be free from being prosecuted and punished for the
crimes committed by them. And this injustice, which is so contrary to conscientious
public opinion and repugnant to humane sentiments, would necessarily result, if the
provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030, which is now in force, are not immediately
applied right at this stage of the case in favor of the herein accused, by taking up first the
special motion of the accused filed on May 2d of this year, before the petition for
reconsideration and re-hearing hereinbefore mentioned, or, better, by ignoring the said
petition and disposing of the case by deciding the motion of May 2d, wherein the
accused invoked the prescription provided in the said section, for the reason that this
action was commenced on December 20, 1920, one year and a half after the
commission of the offense resulting from the violation of the Election Law with which
they are charged.
In view of the foregoing, we find the said crime to have prescribed, and setting aside the
decision of this court published on the 31st of March of this year, the present action is
dismissed with all the costs de oficio, and the bond given by the accused for their
provisional release is cancelled, which release is hereby declared final. So ordered.
Street, Avancea, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
MALCOLM, J., with whom concur JOHNSON and JOHNS, JJ., dissenting:
The high respect which I entertain for the authors of the majority opinions in the cases of
People vs. Moran and People vs. Parel,1 should not, of course, keep me silent when I
am strongly of the opinion that judgments grounded in a mistaken view of the law are
being handed down. My desire to state clearly and bluntly my dissent from the majority
opinions is only bounded by the paucity of the English language in which to express
myself. According to my view, as will hereafter be demonstrated, the majority decisions
discuss questions which need no discussion, do violence to plain provisions of the law,
take stands sup-ported by no authority which can be discovered, and attain the result of
effectuating a general jait delivery of crim-inals who had thwarted the people's will during
the elec-tions in 1919.
An introductory and pertinent inquiry can well be, what is the effect of the majority
decisions?
Juan Moran, Fructuoso Cansino, and Hilario Oda, election inspectors of the first precinct
of the municipality of Bina-lonan, Pangasinan, were found guilty by Judge of First
Instance Nepomuceno and again on appeal by the Supreme Court, with the sole
modification that the penalty was increased, of having falsified election returns.-But
Moran, Cansino, and Oda will now never enter the portals of prison.

Raymundo, Verceles, election inspector of the fifth pre-cinct of the municipality of

Binalonan, Pangasinan, was found guilty by Judge of First Instance Nepomuceno, and
again on appeal by the Supreme Court, with the sole modifi-cation that the penalty was
increased, of having falsified election returns, and is now serving his sentence.-Verceles
will now be liberated.
Norberto Parel and Daniel Paz, election inspectors of the second precinct of the
municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, were found guilty by Judge of First Instance Jaranilla,
of having unlawfully written the ballots of illiterate persons, with the result that following
the trial in an election contest, the protestant was declared elected.-But though the two
cases are on the calendar, the motion to dismiss being granted, the question of the guilt
or innocence of Parel and Paz will never be determined by the appellate court.
Andres Imzon, chief of police of the municipality of San Pedro, Laguna, was charged in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, with having unlawfully intervened in the elec-tions
of 1919, by soliciting votes in the election booths and exchanging ballots previously
prepared by him with those received by the electors from the election board; Claudio de
Leon and Alejandro Cailao, election inspectors of the second precinct of the municipality
of Bay, Laguna, were charged with having seized and destroyed fifty official ballots
already filled in by different persons; and Alejandro Cailao, election inspector of the
second precinct of the municipality of Bay, Laguna, was charged with having abstracted
four official ballots duly filled in from the ballot box and having delivered them to Julian
Carrillo, a can-didate for municipal president.-But Imzon, De Leon, Cai-lao, and Carrillo
will never have these serious charges resolved by the courts of justice.
Francisco Hutalla, Jacinto Alfajora, and Hermogenes Orijuela, election inspectors in the
first precinct of Maca-lelon, Tayabas, and Francisco Catarroja, election inspector in the
second precinct of the same municipality, were charged with various unlawful acts
intended to secure a victory for.Demetrio Pandeno, their candidate for munic-ipal
president.-But Hutalla, Alfajora, Orijuela, and Cata-rroja, will now have this record stand
without any judicial decision as to their guilt or innocence.
Mariano Quilona, Bartolome Severe, and Matias Operario, election inspectors of the
municipality of San Julian, Samar, were found guilty by Judge of First Instance
Capistrano of having falsified the election returns.-But though the guilt of Quiloiia,
Severe, and Operario is clearly apparent, the appeal in this court cannot go forward and
they are absolved from the criminal charges.
Liberate Exaltacion, municipal president of Meycawayan, Bulacan, was convicted of
having extracted ballots from the urn used in Meycawayan, and was sentenced by
Judge of First Instance Jocson to three months' imprisonment, and to pay a fine of
f*125.-But Exaltacion, although thus found guilty by a judge of long experience, of a
most serious crime, will now be exonerated.
Cesareo Navarrete, Ambrosio Diapo, Luciano Nabaira, Eugenio Nabor, Apolonio Castro,
Mamerto Navarra, Esta-nislao Nabor, Tolomeo Segovia, Aproniano Navarrete, Hipolito
Nalangan, Ricardo Nahil, and Severino Nalangan, residents of the municipality of
Libacao, Capiz, were found guilty by Judge of First Instance Salas of having provoked
such tumult and confusion in and about the second election precinct of the municipality
of Libacao, that the election inspectors and policemen were prevented from performing

their respective duties, and of having seized the ballot boxes and other election effects,
thus frustrating th'e election in that precinct.-But all these twelve persons found guilty by
the trial court, and guilty, also, as we read the record, will escape the penalties of the
law.
Twelve (12) cases pending in this court relating to thirty (30) defendants are thus seen to
involve the retroactivity of section 71 of Act No. 3030. According to the revised figures
reported by the Attorney-General, the outcome of at least twenty (20) cases in courts of
first instance relating to sixty-one (61) defendants likewise depend on our deci-sion on
this question. All told, thirty-two (82) cases and ninety-one (91) defendants. Quite a
respectable jail de-livery.
The point next in logical order, to which I would address attention, is whether the
question of the retroactivity of Act No. 3030 is properly and legally before the court.
The status of the Moran case is of particular interest. Recall-Appeal perfected and four
errors assigned, but naturally not including the point of prescription under Act No. 3030,
for the very good reason that the Act was not yet on the statute books. Act No. 3030
enacted and effective on March 9, 1922. Case submitted, and judgment of Supreme
Court rendered on March 31, 1922. Motion of reconsideration filed by the attorney for the
appellants, within the regular fifteen-day period, based on two counts, but again not
including the point of prescription, although Act No. 3030 was then in force. Not until May
2, 1922, that is, not until two months after judgment was rendered, when a third motion,
which the Chief Justice is pleased to call a "special motion," was presented, was the
contention made that the alleged crime had prescribed in accordance with section 71 of
Act No. 3030.
The Chief Justice finds no difficulty in surmounting these obstacles, although the
constant practice of the court has been not to allow new and original questions to be
presented for the first time on a motion for rehearing; although the court has consistently
required that all arguments be ad-vanced in one motion of reconsideration, and although
the Rules of the Court are explicit and mandatory, when they provide that "judgment
shall not be entered until ten days after * * * publication," that "five days after entry of
judgment the clerk shall remand the case to the lower court," and that "applications for a
rehearing shall be filed within fifteen days after the publication of the decision of the
court." (Note U. S. vs. Serapio [1912], 3 Phil., 584; Lucido and Lucido vs. Vita [1911], 20
Phil., 449; Espidol vs. Espidol and Espidol [1913], 25 Phil., 4; Rules of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines, 33, 34, 35; 4 C. J., pp. 629, 642.)
Conceding, however, that as to all these preliminary mat-ters the majority are right, and I
am wrong, I am yet ready to meet them on their own ground and am prepared to prove
that the provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030 approved March 9, 1922, providing that
"Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their
commission," should not, and cannot be given retro-active effect, if the law is to be
followed and justice is to be done. The importance of the subject will serve as an apology for a lengthy and serious consideration of the question above stated.
Act No. 3030 of the Philippine Legislature is entitled, "An Act to amend certain sections
and parts of sections of chapter eighteen, known as the Election Law, and chapter sixtyfive, on penalties for violations of certain administra-tive laws, of Act Numbered Twenty-

seven hundred and eleven, entitled 'An Act amending the Administrative Code/ to make
more effective the provisions and purposes of said Election Law, and for other
purposes." The first seventy sections of Act No. 3030 amend specifically named sections
of the Administrative Code "to read as follows." Then follows section 71 above quoted.
The Act concludes with section 72 reading: "This Act shall take effect on its approval."
The Act was approved on March 9, 1922.
The first duty of the courts is to apply the law. The last duty of the courts is to interpret or
construe the law. When, therefore, the Philippine Legislature said that "Offenses
resulting from violations of this Act shall pre-scribe one year after their commission," it
meant exactly what it said, and the only duty of the court is to make effective the
legislative language. "This Act" could mean only Act No. 3030. Judicial interpretation or
construction are consequently impertinent and offensive in the face of the plain words
used by the Legislature.
It has, however, been suggested, that "this Act" means "the Election Law as amended."
Even if this proposition be conceded, yet it remains true that the amendatory Act will not
be given a retrospective construction; the new provisions are to be understood as
enacted at the time the amended act takes effect. (36 Cyc., 1223.) In this instance
section 72 says that "This Act (No. 3030) shall take effect on its approval"-on March 9,
1922.
It should be observed in relation to what has just been said with regard to the
appropriateness of merely applying the law, that there is nothing in section 71, or in any
other section of Act No. 3030, which would authorize a retrospec-tive construction. Not
one word which even squints at a retroactive effect can be found in Act No. 3030. If the
Philippine Legislature had intended that Act No. 3030 should apply to pending cases, it
could easily have used language to this effect; as for example, "Offenses heretofore
committed," etc. Not having done so, the courts cannot write such words into the law
without usurping legislative prerogatives.
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction, so elemen-tary that I hesitate to repeat it,
that if the courts find it impossible to apply the law, then their duty is to ascertain and
give effect to the intention of the law-making body. Here, the intention of the Philippine
Legislature is self--evident. The various sections of Act No. 3030 were care-fully drafted
to close up the loopholes in the old Election Law and to provide more severe penalties.
The purpose of the Legislature, as announced in the title of the law, is, in part, "to make
more effective the provisions and purposes of said Election Law." It would be a, strange
interpretation indeed, which would attain the result, in a law of this character, of liberating
criminals convicted at the time the law went into effect, when the Legislature intended to
provide more effectively for cleaner elections.
With strong reluctance, therefore, am I led away from the firm ground on which my feet
are planted, when we simply apply the law and effectuate legislative intention, to follow
strange and treacherous.bypaths. That I do so is because of the energy with which these
arguments have been pressed by counsel and out of respect to the point of -view of
colleagues in the Court.
The majority say that "Both consistency and sound legal principle^, * * * demand that we,
in this case, seek our precedents in Latin rather than in American jurispru-dence." I had

thought that the Philippines was under American sovereignty and that the Election Law
was an American importation. But apparently I have been mis-taken. As, however, the
majority with "consistency" cite Wharton, an American authority, possibly, also, I may be
pardoned if I use the same authority and give some promi-nence to the American
precedents.
Mr. Wharton, in his treatise on Criminal Pleading and Practice (9th ed., 1889) announces
the following doctrine: "As a rule, statutes of limitation apply to offences perpe-trated
before the passage of the-statute as well as to sub-sequent offences."' (P. 219.) The.
cases cited in support of the text are found on examination to be early Federal cases
relating to the 32d section of the Act of Congress of April 30, 1790. The contention there
denied was "that an act of limitations to criminal prosecutions can only be used as a bar
in cases declared by law to be criminal at the time the act of limitations was passed,
unless there be express words extending it to crimes to be created in fu-ture." (See
Adams vs. Woods [1805], 2 Cranch, 336.)
Corpus Juris (published in 1918), which the majority decisions avoid mentioning, is
authority for a different statement of the rule, under the subject "Limitation of
Prosecutions in Criminal Cases," namely: "Such statutes are to be given a reasonably
strict construction in favor of accused and against the prosecution. By the weight of
authority, however, they do not apply to crimes previously committed, unless clearly
retrospective in their terms." (16 C. J., 222.) The cases in support of the last sentence
are the following: People vs. Lord ([1877], 12 Hun. [N. Y.L 282), and Martinis. State
([1859], 24 Tex., 62).. Contra, Commonwealth vs. Hutchinson ([1850], 2 Pars. Eq. Gas.
[Pa.], 453, 1 Phila., 77).
The New York case cited is not available in our library. In a standard treatise, Wood on
Limitations, special refer-ence is, however, made to it. It is said: "In New York such
statutes are held not to apply to crimes committed before the statute was changed,
unless expressly included therein, adopting the rule in that respect applicable In civil
cases." (Wood on Limitations, 3d ed., p. 45.)
In the second case cited in the note to Corpus Juris, Martin vs. State, the Supreme Court
of Texas held: "Stat-utes of limitations for the prosecution of crimes and mis-demeanors,
do not have a retrospective operation. * * * The statute of limitations passed in 1854
could not operate as a bar to a prosecution commenced within two years from the time
that statute went into operation, there being no previous limitation to the prosecution of
the offense in question." The Chief Justice rendered a dissenting opinion, which is now
made one of the props of the opinion of our Chief Justice.
The same result was obtained in decisions coming from Massachusetts.
(Commonwealth vs. Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation [1853], XI Gush.
[Mass.], 512; and Commonwealth vs. Homer [1891], 153 Mass., 343.) In the first
Massachusetts case it was held that an indictment against a railroad company under St.
1840, c. 80, for negli-gently causing the death of a passenger, is not within Rev. Sts. c
120, sec. 21, limiting actions and suits for any penalty, or forfeiture, to one year after the
offense is committed, for the reason that St. 1853, c. 414, sec. 3, does not apply Jo
indictments pending at the time of its passage. In the second Massachusetts case, it
was held that the Statute of 389, c. 100, providing that in a criminal prosecution on the
Pub. Sts. c. 207, sec. 9, for attempting to procure a mis-carriage, the dying declaration of

the woman shall be ad-missible in evidence, if her death is alleged to have been the
result thereof, is prospective only in its operation, and does not apply to an indictment
found after its passage for' such an offense theretofore committed. The court followed
the language of another case, namely:
"'The statute is equivocal and ambiguous in its terms, and might without doing violence
to the words in which it is expressed be construed as retroactive. But such is by no
means its necessary interpretation. On the contrary, it willhave full meaning and effect,
consistent with the fair import of its language, if it is held to be prospective only. The true
rule of interpretation applicable to such enactments is well settled, and has been often
recognized and affirmed by this court. It is, that all statutes are to be considered as
prospective, and are not to be held to prejudice or affect the past transactions of the
subject, unless such intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed. (Whitman vs.
Hapgood, 10 Mass., 439; King vs.'Tirrell, 2 Gray, 331; Gerry vs. Stoneham, 1 Allen, 319,
323; Garfteld vs. Bemis, 2 Allen, 446.) No good reason can be given for excepting the
statute under consideration from the operation of this wise and salutary rule.' There is no
express intention to make the St. of 1889, c. 100, retroactive in its operation, and none
can be implied from the subject-matter; it will have full effect if construed as prospective
only, and, in the opin-ion of a majority of the court, it must be so construed."
The following was the holding of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of
Commonwealth vs. Duffy [1880], 96 Pa. St., 506):
"An act of limitation is an act of grace purely on th& part of the legislature, and especially
is this the case in the matter of criminal prosecutions. The state makes no con-tract with
criminals, at the time of the passage of an act of limitations, that they shall have
immunity from punishment if not prosecuted within the statutory period. Such enactments are measures of public policy only. They are entirely subject to the mere will of the
legislative power, and may be changed or repealed altogether as that power may sec fit
to declare. When a right to acquittal has not been absolutely acquired by the completion
of the period of limita-tion, that period is subject to enlargement or repeal without bemg
obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws." (See also
Thompson vs. State [1877], 74 Miss., 740, and Moore vs. State [1881], 43 N. J. L., 203.)
With the exception of the Philadelphia city case, which cannot be found in the
Philippines, all other courts which have given consideration to the subject have refused
to give retroactive effect to statutes establishing limitations of actions in criminal cases,
and have, we think, with all propriety, adopted the rule in civil cases pertaining to
limitations of actions.
A rule as old as law itself is that statutes ought to be construed to be prospective, and
not retrospective, in opera-tion. Laws look forward and not backward. Nova cons-titutio
futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. This rule is applicable to statutes of
limitation, unless by express command, or by necessary and unavoidable impli-cation, a
different construction is required. It has been held that the rule for the construction of
statutes of limita-tions, with respect to their operation as being retroactive or not,
requires such statutes (whether new, reenacted or amended), to be given a wholly
prospective effect, that is, to commence running with respect to a particular cause of
action from the time when the cause is subjected to the operation of the act, so that the
party may have the full period prescribed thereby, unless it clearly appears that the

legislature intended the act to operate on existing causes, so as to commence running

from the time any such cause accrued. (Thomas vs. Higgs & Calderwood [1910], 68 W.
Va., 152, Ann. Cas.,.1912A, 1039; Hathaway vs. Mer-chants' Loan and Trust Co. [1905],
218 III., 580; 4 Ann. oGas., 164; Moore vs. State [1881], 43 N. J. L., 203; Herrick vs.
Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. [1906], 200 U. S., 96, 102; U. S. Fidelity etc. Co. vs.
Struthers Wells Co., [1907], 209 U. S., 806.)
Ruling Case Law summarizes the principles governing the construction of limitation laws
as follows:
"One rule for the construction of laws is that statutes of limitation are presumed to be
prospective and not retro-spective in their operation, in the absence of a clear legis-lative
intent to the contrary, and the presumption is against any intent on the part of the
legislature to make such statute retroactive. It has been said that words of a statute
ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong, and
imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the
legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. *. * * Some courts take the view that since
limitation laws apply only to the remedy, they are not within the principle that statutes
should be given a prospective rather than a retrospective construction, and therefore
that they should be construed as retrospective unless they contain no language clearly
limiting their appli-cation to causes of action arising in the future. But it has also been
pointed out that even statutes as to procedure are not necessarily retrospective in their
operation and the courts are not compelled to construe as retrospective a limitation law
dealing with procedure only." (17 R. C. L., 682-684.)
"While it is undoubtedly within the power of the legis-lature to pass a statute of limitations
or to change the period of limitation previously fixed and to make such statute or
changes applicable to existing causes of action, provided a reasonable time is given by
the new law for the commence-ment of suit before the bar takes effect, yet such a
statute is not to be readily construed as having a retroactive effect, but is generally
deemed to apply merely to causes of action arising subsequent to its enactment, and the
presumption is against any intent on the part of the legislature to make the statute
retroactive. The statute will only be given a retroactive effect when it was clearly the
intention of the legislature that it should so operate." (25 R. C. L., 792, 793.)
One of the cases cited in support of the general rule, and oft followed by other courts, is
United States Fidelity etc. Company vs. Struthers Wells Co., supra. In the course of the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, it was said:
"There are certain principles which have been adhered to with great strictness by the
courts in relation to the construction of statutes, as to whether they are or are not
retroactive in their effect. The presumption is very strong that a statute was not meant to
act retrospectively, and it ought never to receive such a construction if it is suscep-tible
of any other. It ought not to receive such a construc-tion unless the words used are so
clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them or unless
the intention^ of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. (Dash vs. Van Kleeck, 7
Johns., 477, 499; Jack-son ex dem Hicks vs. Van Zandt, 12 Johns, 169; United States
vs. Heth, 3 Cranch, 399, 414; Southwestern Coal & Improv. Co. vs. McBride, 185 U. S.,
499, 503; United States vs. American Sugar Ref. Co., 202 U. S., 563, 577.)

"The language of the amended act is prospective, as it provides 'that hereafter any
person or persons entering into a formal contract with the United States/ etc. That
language standing alone would leave little doubt as to the intention of Congress in the
matter of the taking effect of the amendment.
"It is urged, however, that as the amendment in this respect but reiterates the language
of the original act, the use of the word 'hereafter' in the commencement of the
amendment ought not to have the significance which would >therwise attach to it,
because it is simply in this particular reenacting the law as it already stood.
"There is considerable force in the suggestion that the word 'hereafter' is not to receive
the weight which in other circumstances it ought to have. The question is, however, one
as to the intention of Congress, and when we come to took at the provisions of the
statute, as amended, we are convinced that Congress did not intend that the
amendment should apply to cases where the bond had already been executed, the work
done, the respective rights of the parties settled, and the cause of action already in
existence. If Congress had intended otherwise, we think it would have still further
amended the original act by providing in plain language that the amendment should
apply to all cases, and not be confined to the future. * * *
"Viewing the whole section, we think Congress meant that only in future cases should
the provisions of the amend-ment apply, although some trifling portion of those provisions might be regarded, technically, as in the nature of procedure. It is therefore wiser
to hold the entire section governed by the usual rule and as applying only to the
future."lvvph1n+
It is, however, insisted with marked earnestness, that notwithstanding the simple and
plain provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030, and the almost universal rule adopted by
the American courts, we are in duty bound to apply the provisions of the Spanish Penal
Code.
Article 7 of the Penal Code reads: "Offenses punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code." In the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in which most elaborate consideration was given to article 7 of the Penal Code,
the rule adopted was: "That, when a crime is made punishable by a law other than by
the provisions of the Penal Code, the provisions of said code do not apply." Following
Viada in his commentaries on the Penal Code (1 Viada, 84), it was also pointed out that
among the special laws are election laws. (U. S. vs. Se-rapio [1912], 23 Phil., 584, 592,
593.) The majority de-cisions are strangely silent as to the decision last cited.
Paraphrasing article 7 of the Penal Code as construed by this court: As offenses are
made punishable by Act No. 3030, a special lawt the provisions of the Penal Code do
not apply. But it is said that article 7 should be interpreted with reference to other articles
of the Penal Code, and I concede that this is a fair argument.
Article 22 of the Penal Code is found in Title III, which is headed, "Penalties." Chapter I
of Title III is entitled "Penalties in General." Only passing reference is made to the
epigraphy, in order to concede everything possible to the argument of the petitioner in
this case. Coming then to a consideration of the substance of article 22 of the Penal
Code, its effect can best be judged by setting it side by side with article 3 of the Civil

Code, since both articles have been given indiscriminate application to criminal laws.
These two provisions of Philippine law read as follows:
"ART. 22. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the per-son
guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same."
"ART. 3. Laws shall not have a retroactive effect un-less therein otherwise provided,"lvvph1n+
Article 3 of the Civil Code, given express application to criminal laws in the case of
United States vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil, 241), bears out the general doctrine previously
announced. Article 22, on the other hand, is of an opposite tenor, and if given controlling
effect, might lead to a contrary result. The first two words of article 22 are "Penal laws."
What is meant by the term "Penal laws?" Is section 71 of Act No. 3030 a "penal law?"
I feel that I can, with all propriety, turn to the definition of "penal law" given by the
American authorities, not only because there are numerous judicial definitions of the
phrase available, but because the Election Law, establishing the Australian Ballot
System, is primarily an American innovation, which was unknown in Spain when the
Penal Code of 1870 was promulgated.
"PenaUaws," all of the English and American decisions state, strictly and properly are
those imposing punishment an offense committed against the state, and which, by the
English and American constitutions, the executive of the state has the power to pardon.
In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a
crime or offense against its law. It would be palpably incongruous to call a statute penal
which did not contain a definite and certain provision for punishment. On the other hand,
a statute which gives a remedy for an injury belongs to the class of remedial statutes,
and not to that of penal statutes. (Huntington vs. Attrill [1892], 146 U. S., 657; Whitman
vs. National Bank of Oxford [1900], 176 U. S., 559; Shick vs. United States [1904], 195
U. S., 65; The Antelope [1825], 10 Wheat., 66, 123; United States vs. Reisinger [1888],
128 U. S., 398, 402; Davis vs. Mills [1903], 121 Fed., 703, 704; United States vs. Illinois
Cent. R. Co. [1907], 156 Fed., 182, 185; United States vs. Four Hundred and Twenty
Dollars [1908], 162 Fed., 803, 805; Ross vs. New England Mortg. Security Co. [1893],
101 Ala., 362; Nebraska Nat. Bank vs. Walsh [1900], 68 Ark., 433; Levy vs. Superior
Court [1895], 105 CaL, 600; Plumb vs. Griffin [1901], 74 Conn., 132; Mitchell vs.
Hotchkiss [1880], 48 Conn., 9, 19; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Melton [1909], 133 Ga., 277;
Woolverton vs. Taylor [1890], 132 111,, 197; Diversey vs. Smith [1882], 103 III., 378,
390; American Credit-Indemnity Co. vs. Ellis [1901], 156 Ind., 212; State vs. Hardman
[1896], 16 Ind. App., 357; Lagler vs. Bye [1896], 42 Ind. App., 592; Sackett vs. Sackett
[1829], 25 Mass., 309, 320; Cary vs. Schmeltz [1909], 141 Mo. App., 570; Casey vs. St.
Louis Transit Co. [1905], 116 Mo. App., 235; State ex rel Rodes vs. Warner [1906], 197
Mo., 650; Manhattan Trust Co. vs. Davis [1899], 23 Mont., 273; Globe Pub. Co. vs. State
Bank [1894], 41 Neb., 175; Boice vs. Gibbons [1826], 8 N. J. Law, 324, 330; Hutchinson
vs. Young [1903], 80 N. Y. S., 259; People vs. Wells [1900], 65 N. Y. S., 319; Smith vs.
Colson [1912], 31 Okl., 703; Kiltoh vs. Providence Tool Co. [1905], 22 R. I., 605; Aylsworth vs. Curtis [1896], 19 R. I., 517; Whitlow vs. Nash-ville, C. & St. L. R. Co. [1904],
114 Tenn., 344; Drew vs. Russel [1875], 47 Vt, 250, 253; Norfolk & W. R. Co. vs. Hall
[1897], 44 W. Va, 36.)

Escriche, Diccionario Razonado de Legislacidn y Juris-prudencia (vol. Ill, p. 898),

defines "ley penal," the Spanish equivalent of "penal law," as follows: "Ley penal es la
que tiene por objeto algun delito y la pena con que ha de cas-tigarse." Diccionario
Encidopedico de la Lengua Caste-liana defines "penal" thus: "Perteneciente o relativo a
la pena o que la incluye;"-and "pena" thus: "Castigo im-puesto por superior legitimo al
que ha cometido un delito o falta."
The first instance in which our Supreme Court gave con-sideration to article 22 of the
Penal Code, was in the case Jof Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1 Phil, 468),
The Chief Justice, in his decision, relies on the syllabus which, of course, is the
statement of the reporter and not of the court. I prefer to go to the opinion, wherein it was
said:
"Section 13 of the same act provides as follows: 'All laws and parts of laws now in force,
so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall operate as a repeal of exist-ing laws in so far as they are
applicable to pending actions or existing causes of action, but as to such causes of
action or pending actions existing laws shall remain in full force and effect/ This act went
into effect October 24, 1901, subsequent to the publication of the article in question, and
during the pendency of the prosecution. By article 22 of the Penal Code 'Penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a crime or misdemeanor/ etc. The court below in fixing the punishment proceeded upon the theory that
by the operation of this general rule the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code for the
offense in question was necessarily modified and could not be inflicted in its full
extension. In so doing we think the court overlooked or improperly construed the proviso
in the section of Act No. 277, above cited, by virtue of which the previously existing law
on the subject covered by the act is left intact in all its parts as respects pending actions
or existing causes of action. The language is gpu-eral and embraces, we think, all
actions, whether civil, criminal, or of a mixed character. In this view of the case we have
no occasion to consider the question argued by coun-sel for the private prosecutor as to
whether the provisions of Act No. 277 respecting the penalty are more favorable to the
accused than those of the former law or otherwise. The punishment must be determined
exclusively by the provisions of the former law."
The case of United States vs. Hocbo ([1908], 12 Phil, 304) oft mentioned by Mr. Justice
Ostrand, merely holds that (I now quote from the body of the decision), "All amendments
of the law (meaning the Penal Code) which are beneficial to the defendant, shall be
given a retroactive effect, in so far as they favor the person charged with the crime or
misdemeanor. * * * We find nothing in Act No. 1773 which is more favorable to the
defendant than the provisions of the Penal Code."
The case of United States vs. Parrone ([1913], 24 Phil, 29), gave special attention to the
relative effect of articles 7 and 22 of the Penal Code. It was said that "Article 22 must
necessarily relate (1) to penal laws existing prior to the Penal Code, in which the penalty
was less severe than those of the Penal Code; or (2) to laws enacted subsequent to the
Penal Code, in which the penalty was more favorable to the accused. Rule 80, Ley
Provisional para la aplica-cion de las disposiciones del Codigo Penal. Under the pro-.
visions of said article 22, if a crime had been committed prior to the date of the Penal
Code the punishment for which was more favorable to the accused than the provisions
of the Penal Code, it is believed that the accused might invoke the provisions of said

article (22) even though he was not placed upon trial until after the Penal Code went into
effect. (U. S. vs. Cuna [1908], 12 Phil., 241.) So also if by an amendment to the Penal
Code or by a later special law the punishment for an act was made less severe than by
the provisions of the Penal Code, then the accused person might invoke the provisions
of said article." We gather from this language that the phrase "penal laws" used in article
22 relates to laws enacted subsequent to the Penal Code, in which the penalty is more
favorable to the accused or the punishment for the act is made less severe.
Statutes of limitation, it is well settled, relate to the remedy and not to the right; relate to
procedure and not to the crime. (Moore vs. State, supra; Commonwealth vs. Duffy,
supra; 17 R. C. L., 703, citing Mulvey vs. Boston [1908], 197 Mass., 178; U. S. vs.
Serapio, supra.) Viada, in his commentaries on the Penal Code (vol. I, p. 570, 4th ed.),
makes the following observations: "Prescription of the crime only means the termination
of the right or power to prosecute or punish the offender, after the lapse of a definite
period from the commission of the offense, or if this is not known, from the day of its
discovery and the beginning of the judicial proceedings for investigation and
punishment." The supreme court of Spain, in a decision of January 22, 1872, held that
when the law speaks of the prescription of an offense, it cannot be understood to mean
other than that of the action to prosecute the same.
This construction is the more apparent, when it is re-membered that the Penal Code,
although it does contain some provisions concerning procedure, is, generally speak-ing,
substantive law. As such substantive law, it is but reasonable to suppose that it would
only reach special laws of a similar nature. It must also be recalled that the crim-inal
actions in the case before us and in all other cases on appeal to tbe court, were
instituted before the time Act No. 3030 took effect, and that these courts of first instance
had jurisdiction of the cases at that time.
What, therefore, is the condition of the much vaunted Latin law and jurisprudence on the
question under discus-sion? First, article 7 of the Penal Code and our decisions make
Act No. 3030 not subject to the provisions of the Penal Code; second, article 22 is found
in a title and a chapter of the Code relating to "Penalties," and the article itself specifies
"Penal laws;" third, section 71 of Act No. 3030 does not concern "penalties," and is not a
"penal law," but is a procedural law.
Not a single authority,
majority.lvvph1n+

Latin

or

American,

supports

the

position

of

the

So much for our opinion on the principal question. I note, however, that the majority
decision of Mr. Justice Ostrand argues the facts. I had been told that a legal ques-tion
was to be resolved. But somehow or other, although none of us have read the record or
the briefs in that partic-ular case, it may be a matter which strengthens his position. And
if this is true, and if the argument at least serves as a smokescreen to obscure the real
question, who can object?
The majority decisions also essay to sanctify and deify prescription laws. What this has
to do with the question in issue I do not know. I had thought that the Supreme Court was
a judicial body, but apparently I have miscon-ceived our functions.
The majority further say that "a strong appeal has been made to our emotions by

describing in rather vivid colors, the disastrous consequences which will result from the
dis-missal of actions," etc., etc. I can find no such plea in any of the briefs. But the
statement brings to mind a point on which I would gladly comment. What then are the
consequences which would result from holding that section 71 of Act No. 3030 has
retrospective effect?
One consequence I have already noted. At least thirty-two cases dismissed, and the
crimes of ninety-one accused condoned. "A clear legislative intent, by a repeal of the act
imposing it, or some other expressed purpose, is re-quired to take away a penalty or
condone a crime by a retroactive law. This is especially to be guarded against in
legislation designed to favor individuals at the expense of the public." (State vs. Startup
[1877], 39 N. J. Law, 423.)
In the next place, such a holding would mean that we would make of Act No. 3030 an ex
post facto law, something which is not claimed for it by petitioner, and a pitfall which the
courts invariably avoid. And, lastly, I would recall another well-known principle of
statutory construction: "If the language is clear, and the intent manifest, there is, of
course, no room for presumptions. But if, on the other hand, the language is not clear,
and it is obvious that by a particular construction in a doubtful case great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, the court ought not to presume that such
construction was intended by the makers of the law. A statute will not be so construed as
to work public mischief, unless required by clear, unequivocal words, especially if the
statute be chiefly to subserve indi-vidual interests." (25 R. C. L., 1027.)
Having, then, in view the disastrous consequences of one holding, as contrasted with
the reasonable consequences of another, I can properly recall that in every instance in
which this court has considered the subject, it has avoided the condonation of crime. For
example, when the United States Supreme Court in its decision in the Weems case
([1910], 217 U. S., 349), held article 300 of the Penal Code void, it was incumbent upon
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands to apply and construe the 'decision of the
higher tribunal. In the case of United States vs. Pico ([1911], 18 Phil., 386), in which this
court discussed the subject, it was found that according to the official report of the
Director of Prisons there were serving sentences of analogous crimes four hundred and
eighty-five accused, and that should this court be bound thereby to liberate them, "it * * *
would result in a general jail delivery of all those heretofore convicted of many of the
gravest and most heinous offenses defined and penalized by law; and would be
substantially equivalent to a proclamation of amnesty in favor of all those who have
heretofore committed such crimes and have not yet been brought to trial, or who may
commit them hereafter until such time as the Legislature niay be able to reform the
Penal Code." The court con-tinued: "Confronted as we are with the knowledge that
consequences so far-reaching and disastrous must result from a holding favorable to the
contention of counsel on this motion, it is manifestly our duty rigidly to restrict the
application of the doctrine laid down in the Weems case to cases wherein the ratio
decidendi in that case is clearly applicable and to decline to be bound by inferences
drawn from observations and comments contained in the opinion in that case which
appear to be based upon a mis-apprehension of facts, or upon assumed facts which do
not accord with the facts in the cases brought before us." (Note also Ong Chang Wing
vs. U. S. [1910], 218 U. S., 272.)
Before closing, I would like to disencumber myself of the miscellaneous authorities which

I have discussed, and would again prefer to get back to the fundamentals of ascertaining
and giving effect to legislative intent. On the one hand, by applying the simple
phraseology of section 71, it appears to me that we effectuate legislative intention and
avoid indescribable harm. On the other hand, if we give to the language of the
Legislature an unusual meaning, we nullify legislative intention and turn away from
prison persons who are guilty of violations of the Election Law.
Not many years ago, the public was edified by executive pardons of criminals who had
violated the Election Law during the elections of 1913 and 1916. A judicial veto of
legislative intent, and judicial legislation now effects a blanket pardon of persons who
audaciously thwarted the people's will during the elections of 1919.
It is incomprehensible that members of the Philippine Legislature convened for the
avowed purpose of enacting "a more effective Election Law," to use their own language,
and cognizant as many of the members must have been, of pending cases in the Courts
of First Instance and in the Supreme Court,:-that these same members of the Legislature would insert provisions tantamount to a legislative pardon of persons who had
committed crimes during the elections in 1919, but whose causes had tardily been
brought before the courts. It would, indeed, be a serious charge against the integrity of
the members of the Philippine Legislature to ascribe to them the purpose of inserting in
the new Election Law a section to effectuate a general jail delivery of convicted
criminals, and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands is indeed assuming a grave
re-sponsibility when it distorts legislative language with the result which I have
described. Believing, however, that the Philippine Legislature acted in a patriotic manner
to advance the general public interests, and that no lurking design hides behind the
meaning of its legislative product to advance private interests, we should enforce the law
of an independent branch of the Government as we find it-as it is our duty to do. Motion
granted and case dismissed.
Footnotes
1

Promulgated March 28, 1921.

12 Phil., 241.

FERRER V PECSON
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
DECISION
October 27, 1952
G.R. No. L-5221BENITO FERRER Y RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,vs.POTENCIANO
PECSON, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Maximo Calalang for petitioner.Assistant Fiscal Pedro Ma. Sison, Jr. for respondents.
, J.:
On March 1, 1949, the petitioner Benito Ferrer Y Rodriguez was accused before the
municipal court of Manila of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence under
criminal case No. 10050 of said court. The complaint alleged that on February 2, 1949,
in the City of Manila, petitioner, driver of a jeepney, operated it along Dapitan Street in a
careless, reckless and imprudent manner as a result of which said jeepney driven by him
sideswiped another jeepney thereby causing a collision, inflicting on a passenger named
Avelino Tiu physical injuries of fracture compound, communited, middle third, humerus
left; fracture compound, communited, neck, radius, left, fracture, simple, middle third,
radius, ulna left, which injuries have required and will require medical attendance for a
period of from six (6) to eight (8) months and have prevented and will prevent the said
offended party from engaging in his customary labor during the same period of time.
After trial the Municipal Court of Manila found him guilty and sentenced him to three (3)
months of arresto mayor. Defendant appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
On November 27, 1950, petitioner through counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case on
the ground that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over the offense and,
consequently, the court of first instance had no appellate jurisdiction. The motion to
dismiss was denied by Judge Potenciano Pecson presiding over the court of first
instance, but upon motion for reconsideration, the same judge in his order of June 6,
1951 (Annex D), granted the motion for reconsideration and dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the Fiscal, Judge Pecson in his
order dated August 29, 1951 (Annex E), revoked his order of June 6, 1951 (Annex D)
and declared his first order of December 14, 1950, denying the motion to dismiss as in
force. Counsel for defendant Ferrer asked for a reconsideration of this order and upon
denial of his motion by order of the respondent judge dated October 31, 1951 (Annex I),
has filed the present petition for certiorari to revoked the order of August 29, 1951

(Annex E), and to reinstate the order of June 6, 1951 (Annex D).
After a careful study of this case, we are inclined to agree with the petitioner. The
jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law at the time of
the institution of the action, (People vs. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715). At the time that the
complaint in this case was filed on March 1, 1949, in the Municipal Court of Manila, the
law penalizing the act imputed to the petitioner was the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act
No. 3932), section 67 of which provides that if as a result of negligence or reckless or
unreasonably fast driving any accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury
to any person, the one responsible upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment
for not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than six (6) years in the discretion of the
court.
According to a series of cases decided by this court, among them that of Eustaquio vs.
Liwag (86 Phil. 540) and People vs. Moreno (60 Phil. 712), an act of negligence or
reckless or unreasonably fast driving resulting in death or serious physical injuries to any
person, should be prosecuted under section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and
not under the Revised Penal Code.
The criminal jurisdiction of a justice of the peace or a municipal court as defined in the
Judiciary Act of 1948 approved in June 1948, is confined to offenses in which the penalty
is not more than six (6) months. From this it is clear that the Municipal Court of Manila
had no jurisdiction over this case where a maximum penalty of six (6) years may be
imposed; and if it had no original jurisdiction, the court of first instance presided over by
Judge Pecson had likewise no appellate jurisdiction.
It is true that section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3932) was amended
by section 16 of Republic Act No. 587 which went into effect on January 1, 1951, in the
sense that acts of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving resulting in death
or serious bodily injury upon any person shall be prosecuted and punished under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. But this act may not be given retroactive effect so
as to confer on the municipal court jurisdiction which it did not have when it tried and
decided the case against petitioner. It may be true that the provisions of the penal code
are more favorable to the petitioner in this case as regards the penalty, but when the
very accused (herein petitioner) far from invoking the benefits of said Republic Act No.
587, disregards it and instead, invokes the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3932)
which was in force at the time that the acts imputed to him were committed, at least for
that reason alone the question of retroactivity cannot and will not be considered.
Respondents contend that under the Judiciary Act of 1948 as well as the Charter of the
City of Manila, the Municipal Court of Manila is given jurisdiction to try criminal cases of
assaults where the intent to kill is not evident from the evidence, regardless of the
penalty attached to the crime. But it is obvious that acts of negligence in the operation of
a motor vehicle which cause a collision and result in physical injuries can hardly be
regarded as assaults without the intent to kill.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the order of
respondent judge of June 6, 1951 (Annex D) dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction
is hereby reinstated. No costs.
Paras C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

DBP V COURT OF APPEALS

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28774 September 21, 1982
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL, and SPOUSES HONESTO G. NICANDRO and ELISA F.
NICANDRO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BARREDO, J.:
Motion for reconsideration filed by respondent spouses seeking reversal of Our decision
of February 28, 1980 which overturned the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 35418-E, entitled Honesto G. Nicandro, et al. vs. Development Bank of the
Philippines, et al., affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding
the right of said private respondents over two lots which they had purchased from the
then Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation, now National Housing Authority, to
be referred to later in the opinion only as PHHC, which appear to have been among 159
lots purportedly covered already by an earlier sales agreement between the said
housing corporation, on the one hand, and the Development Bank of the Philippines
hereinafter to be referred to as Bank, on the other.
To be more specific, the background facts relevant to the motion for reconsideration now
before Us extant in the records and in Our decision sought to be reconsidered are as
follows:
On October 25, 1955 the Bank entered into an agreement of sale to it by the PHHC of
159 contiguous lots having a total area of 91,188.30 square meters located in the
Diliman Estate Subdivision West Triangle, Quezon City, paying them a down payment of
P400,000.00 of the P802,155.56 stipulated purchase price. However, the sale could not
be then registered because the subdivision plan of the area was still pending approval.

The foregoing transaction notwithstanding, on October 14, 1958, the then Acting General
Manager of the PHHC, Sergio Ortiz, approved an order of sale of lots Nos. 2 and 4,
which were among the above 159, to private respondent spouses, the Nicandros. On
November 7, 1958, two deeds of sale, one in favor of the husband and another in favor
of the wife, were prepared by the Sales Division of the PHHC evidently upon orders of
higher authorities thereof, and submitted to and approved by the Board of Directors,
after which it was signed by General Manager Bernardo Torres. For reasons not
appearing in the record, the originals of those deeds were retained at the PHHC office.
At this juncture, it must be stated that when Acting General Manager Ortiz approved the
order of sale, and that was before the board and General Manager Torres acted, their
subordinates pointedly informed him as well as the board and Torres later that the two
lots then being sold to the Nicandros were among the 159 lots involved in the transaction
with the Bank.
On January 15, 1959, the sales agreement between the PHHC and the Bank was
entered in the day book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City as a "sale
of an unsegregated portion; new titles to be issued upon presentation of the
corresponding subdivision plan and technical descriptions duly approved by the
authorities." (Exhibit 15) At that time, the title over the lots was TCT 1356.
On their part, on February 16, 1959, the Nicandros sought to register their signed
duplicate copy of the sale to them, but the Register of Deeds demurred because
precisely, the original was not presented, apart from the omission to submit the consent
of the GSIS, then the mortgagee of the property, and for lack of the required
documentary stamps. On the following day, February 17, 1959 the Bank nonetheless
registered affidavits of adverse claims on lots 2 and 4. This was done already on TCT
36533 which had replaced TCT 1356.
Such attempt of the Nicandros and action by the Bank were spawned by the fact that
evidently, the validity of the transaction between the PHHC and the Bank had been
earlier questioned, for as early as January 20, 1959, the Secretary of Justice, upon
request of the Executive Secretary, rendered an opinion (Opinion No. 16, Series of
1959) thus:
(1) Premises considered, it is our opinion that the RFC (DBP) has no express or
incidental power to undertake the housing project under consideration and that the same
is incongruous with, if not a clear violation of, the prohibition contained in Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 85. (Annex "A", Complaint.)
Importantly, on February 17, 1959, on the basis of the foregoing opinion of the Secretary
of Justice, the Office of the President required the Bank to revoke its resolution
authorizing the purchase of the PHHC lots. (That was the day before the Nicandros tried
to register the sale to them) Still, upon being informed that the required subdivision plan
had already been duly recorded on TCT 36533, the Bank forthwith requested, as already
stated, the annotation of its sales agreement, which was done.
Subsequently, the Bank went a step farther by asking for the issuance of new certificates
of title in its favor. This petition was elevated en consulta to the land Registration
Commission which denied the requested registration on July 29, 1959. However, in the

appeal to this Supreme Court, it was held on April 29,1961, in G.R. No. L-16448, 1
SCRA 1334, that the annotation made by the Bank on January 15, 1959 constituted
sufficient annotation to bind third persons, including the Nicandros. But long prior to Our
decision, on March 14, 1960, the Secretary of Justice, answering a query of the Bank
whether the lots could be sold to its employees on cash basis ruled negatively in Opinion
No. 4, series of 1960.
Matters were at such stage, when on June 17, 1961, Republic Act No. 3147 amending
Section 23 of the Organic Act of the Bank, Republic Act 85, was approved and became
effective. 1 The said amendatory Act provides:
No officer or employee of the bank nor any government official who may exercise
executive or supervisory authority over the said bank either directly, or indirectly, for
himself or as representative or agent of others shall, except when the same shall be in
the form of advances appropriated or set aside by the Bank itself in order to provide for
housing for the benefit of its officials and employees, borrow money from the Bank, nor
shall become a guarantor, indorser or surety for loans from the said bank to the others,
or in any manner be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the said Bank. Any such
officer or employee who violates the provisions of this section shall be immediately
removed by competent authority and said officer or employee shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than one year nor exceeding five years and by a fine of not less
than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos.
To definitely clear up matters, on November 10, 1961, the subject action was filed by
respondent spouses praying for the rescission of the sale to the Bank of the two lots in
question and the consequent cancellation of the Bank's certificate of title thereto, with
damages, alleging as their main bases that the said purchase by the Bank was not only
ultra vires but illegal, being a direct violation of the express prohibition of Section 13 of
Republic Act 85, and as an alternative remedy, they asked that the PHHC be made to
pay them the "value which said properties may have on the date of the decision. "After
due proceedings, both the trial court and Court of Appeals ordered the rescission prayed
for, but in Our decision of February 28, 1980, We held otherwise, on the sole ground that
the passage of Republic Act 3147 cured retroactively the lack of authority and violation
of law relied upon by those lower courts, hence the instant motion for reconsideration,
followed by a supplement thereto with the comment thereon of petitioner, rejoinder of
respondents, the petitioner's comment on said rejoinder and finally the sur-rejoinder of
respondents.
The basic prop of respondents' plea for reconsideration is that it was inappropriate for Us
to apply in this case the principle of retroactivity, given the peculiar circumstances of this
case, wherein, it is claimed, it appears that the Nicandros had already acquired a vested
right to buy the lots in controversy preferentially over the Bank. Indeed, as matters stood
at the time of the passage, there could be no doubt that the Bank's resolution authorizing
the purchase in question was, if well intentioned as far as the welfare of its employees
was concerned, definitely beyond the powers of said board, if not on its face, more
importantly in its intention. It is an undeniable fact that the money appropriated in the
resolution was to be used to pay the PHHC for the account of the respective employees
who would be lucky to be awarded a lot, with the obligation on their part of paying the
Bank in periodic installments. In substance and in truth, such an arrangement amounted
to each employee concerned borrowing or getting a loan from the bank. This concept of

the transaction is assumed by both parties as the plain unvarnished objective of the
resolution. And such being the factual situation whose legality or validity We were called
upon to determine, respondents maintain that in a way Our decision evaded the real
issue or failed to pass upon the pertinent ramifications and implications of the
retroactivity theory on which the same was solely based.
After reviewing more carefully and maturely the juridical roots of this controversy in the
light of the arguments adduced by the parties relative to respondents' motion for
reconsideration, We feel persuaded that indeed Our decision was incomplete in the
sense that We did not examine and rule on the relevant aspects of the retroactivity
theory We applied.
To start with, We assumed without any evidentiary basis that Republic Act 4137 was
purposely intended to remedy the problem that the facts of this case had spawned.
Nothing in the record indicates that evidence was introduced in such regard, thus
making Our ruling more or less a mere surmise or inference, quite logical as it might be
in common sense. But who could know that the legislature so intended, considering that
it is a familiar rule of statutory construction that generally all laws are intended to be
prospective in their effect unless there are express provisions to the contrary? Thus,
Article 4 of the Civil Code ordains explicitly that laws " have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided. "
As if to avoid the natural logical consequence of this provision of the Civil Code just
quoted, Our decision resorted to a shade of the theory of retroactivity and held that the
intention of Republic Act 3147 was curative, holding that curative laws " are forms of
retrospective legislation(s) which reach back on past events and which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended: - They thus make valid that
which before enactment of the statute was invalid," footnoting said proposition with three
American decisions, not one of them of the Federal Court.
But as We see it now, at best, the holdings We have quoted are general principles to be
applied only in the appropriate cases wherein their peculiar respective circumstances
permit. On the other hand, the above-quoted Article 4 of our Civil Code is unequivocal
and definite, leaving no room for doubt as to its application. Corollarily, no court decision,
much less of any foreign one can alter such mandate. And, indeed, in this connection, it
may be pointed out that whereas the Old Civil Code provision (Article 3) corresponding
to what is Article 4 now was followed immediately by its Article 4 providing that:
Acts performed contrary to law are void, except in cases in which the law itself gives
validity to such acts.
Rights granted by law may be waived, provided such waiver be not contrary to public
interest or public order, or prejudicial to a third person.
While the second paragraph of said old Article 4 permitted the waiver of rights granted
by law, such as perhaps the non-retroactivity under Article 4, in our new Civil Code,
under its Article 1409, it is made clear that "contracts - expressly prohibited by law or
declared void by law " are " inexistent and void from the beginning" and "cannot be
ratified," thereby making emphatic that as far as prohibitory laws are concerned, their
invalidity is not waivable. In the instant case, Section 23 of Republic Act 85 cannot but

be considered as mandatorily prohibitory, containing as it does heavy penal sanctions for

its violations. Consequently, considering that the contract between the PHHC and the
Bank of October 25, 1955 was void from its inception being expressly prohibited by law,
PHHC could not have waived such invalidity and was therefore, free to disengage itself
therefrom as if it did not exist. No court action was necessary in that respect. (Paras,
Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol - IV, p. 550,1967 ed.)
What is more, in addition to the above general principles, since what is involved here is a
contractual matter, reference to the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on contracts is
even more compelling in its repudiation of the agreement here at issue. As already
stated above, Article 1409 declares as " inexistent and void from the beginning(contracts) expressly prohibited or declared void by law" (No. 7) and further, that such
contract(s) cannot be ratified." (last paragraph)
Of course, Article 1411 provides that "when the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the
cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties
being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be
prosecuted." In the case at bar, however, it is neither the cause nor the object that is
illegal, rather it is the objective as already explained earlier. More, We are impressed
that the prohibition against an officer or employee to borrow money from the employer bank is intrinsically against public policy and not merely illegal by statutory precept. We
have already held that the doctrine of in pari delicto cannot be invoked when to disallow
the illegal transaction would enhance public policy. (Philippine Banking vs. Lui She, 21
SCRA 52; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827)
Logically and corrolarily, the deprivation of any right of action to the PHHC vis-a-vis the
Bank does not carry with it the loss of the right of action by a third party who precisely
predicated his transaction on the very premise that the agreement between the Bank
and PHHC was non-existent, hence his priority over the prohibited party or the Bank. If
the PHHC itself is not barred by pari delicto, much less could respondents covered
thereby. Indeed, it would be unjust, unfair and inequitable to deprive respondents of the
right that clearly belonged to them to deal with the PHHC who at the time of the
transaction was not only guided by opinions of the Secretary of Justice but totally
disengaged from its agreement with the Bank by the directive of the President declaring
the illegality and juridical non-existence of the transaction between it and the Bank. In
simple terms, at the time the Nicandros dealt with PHHC, and that was after the
Secretary of Justice had given his adverse opinion and the president had ordered the
Bank to cancel its purchase resolution, and even much longer before Republic Act 4137
was passed, the latter was entirely free to act as it did, and then and there, the vested
right of said respondents was born. So, even if it were juridically possible to sustain
generally that Articles 4, 5 and 1409 of the Civil Code (New) could be rendered
ineffective by a law enacted after an illegal transaction has already been entered into by
certain parties, as a curative statute, a point We do not have to decide here, it is gravely
doubtful if the theory of curative retroactiveness could be applied here, considering that
the result in such a case would be violative of the constitutional injunction against
deprivation of vested rights born of contracts the obligations under which would be
impaired. (Article IV, Section 11, Constitution of the Philippines)
At this juncture, it may be added that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-16488 of
April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 13334 above - referred to may not be availed of by petitioner

Bank, not only because the validity of the purchase here in controversy was not made an
issue, much less passed upon there, but also because, the PHHC, instead of ratifying
the same repudiated it by transacting with respondents Nicandros over the same subject
matter. In a sense, We feel that the bad faith imputed by Us to the respondents in Our
decision was rather uncalled for, since the questionable character of the sale to the Bank
had already been passed upon by authoritative officials when they dealt with the PHHC.
It now only remains for us to hold as We do hold that Republic Act 3417 contained no
provision imparting to it retroactive effect and inasmuch as, for the considerations
already discussed above, (a) it is not only that the contract between the Bank and the
PHHC could not be ratified but (b) that PHHC could not waive the illegality thereof, it is
juridically absurd to give curative character to said legislation. We reiterate that the rules
of statutory construction on curative retroactivity referred to in Our decision do not
squarely apply to the instant situation.
The Bank insists only now that the contract was not violative of even the original Article
23 aforequoted because there is no showing that any employee of the Bank even
borrowed from the Bank. Such contention overlooks conveniently the fact that as We
have said earlier, the evident intent and purpose of the purchase was to resell the land to
the employees on installment. Besides, if such late argument had any basis, of what use
then was their invocation of Republic Act 4137 as curative? What would have been there
to cure?
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We are constrained to resolve, as We do hereby
resolve, to reconsider and set aside Our decision in this case of February 28, 1980, and
in lieu thereof, We hereby render judgment denying the petition for review, without costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Section 23 of Republic Act 85 originally read thus: "No officer or employee of the bank
nor any government official who may exercise executive or supervisory authority over
the said bank either directly, or indirectly, for himself or as representative or agent of
others shall borrow money from the Bank, nor shall become a guarantor, indorser or
surety for loans from the said bank to the others, or in any manner be an obligor for
moneys borrowed from the said Bank. Any such officer or employee who violates the
provisions of this section shall be immediately removed by competent authority and said
officer or employee shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one year nor
exceeding five years and by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five
thousand pesos.

ZULUETA V ASIA BREWERY

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138137. March 8, 2001]
PERLA S. ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. ASIA BREWERY, Inc., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related
subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the
best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues
involved. Consolidation, when appropriate, also contributes to the declogging of
court dockets.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, questioning the August 4, 1998 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 45020; as well as the February 23, 1999 Resolution [2] denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The decretal portion of the CA Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is given due course. The assailed orders of
the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 142 dated 13 February 1997 and 19
May 1997 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts

Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the manufacture, the

distribution and sale of beer; while Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and an
operator of an outlet selling the formers beer products. A Dealership Agreement
governed their contractual relations.
On March 30, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo, Branch 22, a Complaint against respondent for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance and Damages. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 20341

(hereafter referred to as the Iloilo case), was grounded on the alleged violation
of the Dealership Agreement.
On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo case, respondent filed with
the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, a Complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. 94-2110 (hereafter referred to as the Makati case). The Complaint was for
the collection of a sum of money in the amount of P463,107.75 representing the
value of beer products, which respondent had delivered to petitioner.
In view of the pendency of the Iloilo case, petitioner moved to dismiss the
Makati case on the ground that it had split the cause of action and violated the
rule against the multiplicity of suits. The Motion was denied by the Makati RTC
through Judge Eriberto U. Rosario.
Upon petitioners Motion, however, Judge Rosario inhibited himself. The
case was raffled again and thereafter assigned to Branch 142 of the Makati RTC,
presided by Judge Jose Parentala Jr.
On January 3, 1997, petitioner moved for the consolidation of the Makati
case with the Iloilo case. Granting the Motion, Judge Parentala ordered on
February 13, 1997, the consolidation of the two cases. Respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated May 19, 1997.
On August 18, 1997, respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari assailing Judge Parentalas February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997
Orders.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Setting aside the trial courts assailed Orders which consolidated the Iloilo
and the Makati cases, the CA ruled in this wise:
There is no common issue of law or fact between the two cases. The issue in
Civil Case No. 94-2110 is private respondents indebtedness for unpaid beer
products; while in Civil Case No. 20341, it is whether or not petitioner (therein
defendant) breached its dealership contract with private respondent.
Private respondent in her complaint aforequoted attempts to project a
commonality between the two civil cases, but it cannot be denied that her
obligation to pay for the beer deliveries can exist regardless of any stop
payment order she made with regard to the checks. Thus, the rationale for
consolidation, which is to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered, (Active Wood products, Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 774,
Benguet Corporation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 27; Vallacar Transit,
Inc. vs. Yap, 126 SCRA 503) does not exist. [3]
Hence, this Petition.[4]

The Issues

In her Memorandum,[5] petitioner interposes the following issues for the

consideration of this Court:
a. Were the Orders of February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 142 in Makati City (ordering consolidation of
Makati Civil Case No. 94-2110 with the Iloilo Civil Case No. 20341) already
final and executory when respondent filed its petition for certiorari with the
Hon. Court of Appeals such that said Court could no longer acquire
jurisdiction over the case and should have dismissed it outright (as it
originally did) x x x, instead of due giving course to the petition?; and
b. Independent of the first issue, did the Makati RTC, Branch 142, correctly
order the consolidation of the Makati case (which was filed later) with the
Iloilo Case (which was filed earlier) for the reason that the obligation sought
to be collected in the Makati case is the same obligation that is also one of
the subject matters of the Iloilo case, x x x? [6]
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Propriety of Petition with the CA

Petitioner avers that the Makati RTCs February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997
Orders consolidating the two cases could no longer be assailed. Allegedly,
respondents Petition for Certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the
reglementary sixty-day period prescribed in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Hence, the CA should have
dismissed it outright.
The records show that respondent received on May 23, 1997, the Order
denying its Motion for Reconsideration. It had, according to petitioner, only sixty
days or until July 22, 1997, within which to file the Petition for Certiorari. It did so,
however, only on August 21, 1997.
On the other hand, respondent insists that its Petition was filed on time,
because the reglementary period before the effectivity of the 1997 Rules was
ninety days. It theorizes that the sixty-day period under the 1997 Rules does not
apply.
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain
recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in
nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, (l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there are settled
exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE
or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such
rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor
within the general rule against the retrospective operation of
statutes.[7] (emphasis supplied)
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings
even without express provision to that effect. [8] Accordingly, rules of procedure
can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment.[9]In fact, statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at
the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to
that extent.[10]
Clearly, the designation of a specific period of sixty days for the filing of an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is purely remedial or procedural in
nature. It does not alter or modify any substantive right of respondent,
particularly with respect to the filing of petitions for certiorari. Although the period
for filing the same may have been effectively shortened, respondent had not
been unduly prejudiced thereby considering that he was not at all deprived of that
right.
It is a well-established doctrine that rules of procedure may be modified at
any time to become effective at once, so long as the change does not affect
vested rights.[11] Moreover, it is equally axiomatic that there are no vested rights to
rules of procedure.[12]
It also bears noting that the ninety-day limit established by jurisprudence
cannot be deemed a vested right. It is merely a discretionary prerogative of the
courts that may be exercised depending on the peculiar circumstances of each
case. Hence, respondent was not entitled, as a matter of right, to the 90-day
period for filing a petition for certiorari; neither can it imperiously demand that the
same period be extended to it.
Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1,
1997, respondents lawyers still had 21 days or until July 22, 1997 to file a
petition for certiorari and to comply with the sixty-day reglementary period. Had
they been more prudent and circumspect in regard to the implications of these
procedural changes, respondents right of action would not have been
foreclosed. After all, the 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were wellpublicized prior to their date of effectivity. At the very least counsel should have
asked for as extension of time to file the petition.

Certification of Non-forum
Shopping Defective

Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the sworn certification against forumshopping, arguing that the same was signed by counsel and not by petitioner as
required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. For his part, respondent claims
that even if it was its counsel who signed the certification, there was still
substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91 because, a corporation acts
through its authorized officers or agents, and its counsel is an agent having
personal knowledge of other pending cases.
The requirement that the petitioner should sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping applies even to corporations, considering that the mandatory directives
of the Circular and the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and
juridical persons. In this case, the Certification should have been signed by a
duly authorized director or officer of the corporation, [13] who has knowledge of the
matter being certified.[14] In Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, [15] in
which the Certification was signed by Atty. Nemesio S. Caete who was the
acting regional legal counsel of the National Power Corporation in Mindanao, the
Court held that he was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house
counsel and officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal pleadings and to
represent NPC-Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for the
Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the best position to verify the
truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for
expropriation in Davao City. As internal legal counsel, he was also in the best
position to know and to certify if an action for expropriation had already been filed
and pending with the courts.
Verily, the signatory in the Certification of the Petition before the CA should
not have been respondents retained counsel, who would not know whether there
were other similar cases of the corporation. [16] Otherwise, this requirement would
easily be circumvented by the signature of every counsel representing corporate
parties.
No Explanation for
Non-Filing by Personal Service

Citing Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules, petitioner also faults

respondent for the absence of a written explanation why the Petition with the
Court of Appeals was served on her counsel by registered mail. In reply,
respondent points out that such explanation was not necessary, because its
counsel held office in Makati City while petitioner and her counsel were in Iloilo
City.
We agree with petitioner. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules,
personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the general rule, while a
resort to other modes of service and filing is the exception. Where recourse is
made to the exception, a written explanation why the service and the filing were
not done personally is indispensable, even when such explanation by its nature
is acceptable and manifest. Where no explanation is offered to justify the resort

to other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading
becomes mandatory.[17] Thus, the CA should have considered the Petition as not
having been filed, in view of the failure of respondent to present a written
explanation of its failure to effect personal service.
In sum, the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA by herein respondent,
questioning the orders of consolidation by the Makati RTC, should not have been
given due course. Not only was the Petition filed beyond the sixty-day
reglementary period; it likewise failed to observe the requirements of non-forum
shopping and personal service or filing. All or any of these acts ought to have
been sufficient cause for its outright denial.
Second Issue:
Propriety of Consolidation

Apart from procedural problems, respondents cause is also afflicted with

substantial defects. The CA ruled that there was no common issue in law or in
fact between the Makati case and the Iloilo case. The former involved
petitioners indebtedness to respondent for unpaid beer products, while the latter
pertained to an alleged breach of the Dealership Agreement between the
parties. We disagree.
True, petitioners obligation to pay for the beer products delivered by
respondent can exist regardless of an alleged breach in the Dealership
Agreement. Undeniably, however, this obligation and the relationship between
respondent and petitioner, as supplier and distributor respectively, arose from the
Dealership Agreement which is now the subject of inquiry in the Iloilo case. In
fact, petitioner herself claims that her obligation to pay was negated by
respondents contractual breach. In other words, the non-payment -- the res of
the Makati case -- is an incident of the Iloilo case.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was put in
question, it would be more practical and convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all
the incidents and their consequences. The issues in both civil cases pertain to
the respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership
Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising from it must be
resolved in the judicial forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the
two cases then becomes imperative to a complete, comprehensive and
consistent determination of all these related issues.
Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject
matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court, where the earlier
case was filed.[18] The consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the
resolution of common questions of law or facts. [19]
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both parties in
the two civil cases will best be served and the issues involved therein

expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on the propriety of the venue
in the Iloilo case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Makati RTC (Br. 142)
dated February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 are herebyREINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo
(Chairman),
JJ., concur.

Vitug,

Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,

TAYAG V COURT OF APPEALS

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C.
Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit
Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's
Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the
denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory
order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due
time being petitioner's remedy.
In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and
legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint
denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the
estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad
Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal
properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died
intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983;
3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for
several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a
consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad
Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty.
Ocampo;
4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was
born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with
exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being
his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of
the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are
hereunder reproduced;
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me
alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save
my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio for our
sake and for the child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.
. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him
and you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle
him to all what I am and what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.
. . . How is CHAD and you . . .
. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against
the whole world. After all we love each other and CHAD is
the product of our love.
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless
entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;

6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the
owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City
and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several
millions of pesos;
7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by
the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of
said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo
are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O.
Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf
this instant complaint is filed;
9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the
charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such
that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended
financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant
to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant
failed and refused and still fails and refused and still fails and refuses to
satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty.
Ocampo; 3
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant
to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the
estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987,
disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative
defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is
premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal
and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes of action. 4
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative
defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx

The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further

proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so
as to hear their respective sides
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of
the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the
meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and
the case as set for pre-trial . . . 5
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19,
1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was
granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined
respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint
based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and
thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative
defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said
motion in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in
favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to redress a
wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face
of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case.
Defendant's protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is
therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not
premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then
recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the
defendant by filing one action after another is definitely violative of the
prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court.
It is (her) spurious child that she represents as natural guardian that is
instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may
file an action for recognition within four years from his attainment of
majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the

putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in

a hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was
done in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is
untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special
jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a complaint
such as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the
body of the complaint.
From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in
form and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be
granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the
allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the
action exists.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on
January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and
January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing
clear exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be
elevated by way of the special civil action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals
involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by
this Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art.

281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of
an illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a
will: of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code,
providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish
illegitimate filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action for recognition of a natural
child; and
c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional
Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private
respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint
states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor child, either
voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be established
before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the
latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in the
complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private
respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the
petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants,
to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino,
claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no
proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court;
and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the
deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her
aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground
that it states no cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by
prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of
the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age
of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held
that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the
putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is
necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and
recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the
basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the
action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of
the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a
cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the
complaint, but the prescription of the action.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad
Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance,
from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition.
Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al., 12 wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can
any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural
child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir,
is one which, in the opinion of this court must be answered in the
affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the
two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In, other
words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seers
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so
peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other
cases. . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated
by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior
decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must
be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his co-heirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural
father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and
distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance
are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such
proceedings.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has
prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition,
private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is

sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent

concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to
establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after
the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is another ground for
the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is
not applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family
Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that
the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are
created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from
the attainment of his majority;
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of
birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in
a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and
continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other
evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed
that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the
complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which
the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however,
insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died

during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from
the attainment of majority of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right
of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of
the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime
of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our
ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner
her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with
the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by
the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is
procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings
taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed by the law
regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights
may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper
application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private
respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have
been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in
applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of
the court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject
of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly
obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.

FRIVALDO V COMELEC
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should
be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in
three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be

disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to
have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that
the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate
should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and
that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted
directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence
should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a
"permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections,
and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for
certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated
on December 19,19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en
bane promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections.
On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a
petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not
yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition: 6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until
after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted
for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns
and a Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following
votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr.
51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo
73,440
RaulR.Lee
53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo
1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental)
petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition
"only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate
Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening ofJune 30,1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC
No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee
and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the
afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee
on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said
order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the
Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein
assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number
of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and
that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and xxx having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of
governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to
GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law,
he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and
he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold
the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the
Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the
Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof."
On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996.
On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a
temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution
which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior
to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the
following propositions":15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance
to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in
effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
deciding said petition;
Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing
condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the
Office of Governor;

Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect
thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of
Governor; and
Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity
of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first
two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying
Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on
the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11,
1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755.
However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground:
that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced
hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election." (Italics
supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not
rendered "within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days
before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the
petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election
as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions
null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and
123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are
identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of
governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required
them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as
follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his
lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of
Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship
of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC
No. 95-317 considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an
election protest or a quo warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in
light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in
promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from
assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered
within ( the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold
legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as
a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor,
thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or,
in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on election day.
xxx
xxx
xxx
20
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is
therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine,
that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A.
7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No.
10465422 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his
citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so
"failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his
political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by
this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected
governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the
1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent
Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice
disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to
us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable
decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of
having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring
citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor
General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he
lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his
cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took
his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June
30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board

of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and
since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious
defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that
"then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and
contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum dated
March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization
constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino
directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings
within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal
hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D.
No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then
President Aquino in her memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee
did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or
was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will
not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that
the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot coexist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a
legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even
under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be
regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as
an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance
and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the
former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once
createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she
should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress.
The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly
indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence
and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any
other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the
repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed
on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x
x x," which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof."
Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of
the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the
Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June

8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application.
On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee
required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was
"indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the
Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that
such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and
were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this
Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in
the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere
fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude
that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of
repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they
tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an
applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were
left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life,
in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely
seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country
and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States a naturalization
he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship
he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of the
dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in
returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General,
were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the
existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest
on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the
Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas
the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must
exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed,"
citing our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local Government
Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be
elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only
issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not and
NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be
invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen
was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule
on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where
he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date
or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence
(which must consist of at leastone year's residency immediately preceding the
day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).

LICHAUCO V APOSTOL
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
December 4, 1922
G.R. No. L-19628
LICHAUCO & COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
SILVERIO APOSTOL, as Director of Agriculture, and RAFAEL CORPUS, as
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondents.

Gibbs, McDonough and Johnson for petitioner.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
STREET, J.:
This is an original petition for the writs of mandamus and injunction, filed in this court by
Lichauco & Company against the respondents, Silverio Apostol, as Director of
Agriculture, and Rafael Corpus, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. An
order having been issued by this court requiring the respondents to appear and show
cause why the relief prayed for should not be granted, the Attorney-General presented a
return, in the nature of a demurrer, in their behalf; and the cause is now before us for the
determination of the questions thus presented.
It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands and that it has been engaged for several years in the
business of importing carabao and other draft animals into the Philippine Islands and
that it is now desirous of importing from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment
of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum but that the respondent
Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition, stated in
Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, that said cattle shall have been
immunized from rinderpest before embarcation at Pnom-Pehn. The petitioner therefore
asks for an order requiring the respondents to admit the contemplated importation of
cattle into the Islands and enjoining them from the enforcement of said administrative
order in the future.
The petitioner asserts that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3052 of the Philippine Legislature, it has an absolute and
unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the
manufacture of serum from Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippine Islands and that
the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner the restriction referred
to above, requiring the immunization of the cattle before shipment.
The respondents, on the other hand, rely upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code
and upon Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, promulgated on July
29, 1922, by the Director of Agriculture, in relation with Department Order No. 6,
promulgated on July 28, 1922, by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as
supplying authority for the action taken.
Such portions of the laws above-mentioned as are material to the present controversy
will be set out in full, preceded by section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as originally
enacted, to which will be appended the pertinent parts of the orders referred to and the
communication of the Director of Agriculture of August 31, 1922.

1. First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code in original form:

SEC. 1762. Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden. Except upon
permission of the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of Department
first had, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the
Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous
communicable disease, or any effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to
introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands.
2. First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052
of the Philippine Legislature:
SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands. It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce
live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture
may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authorize the importation,
bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries
for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be
necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per
annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the
importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture
of serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation,
bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be
submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the
head of the department, prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
3. Section 1770 of Administrative Code:
SEC. 1770. Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries.
When the Department Head shall by general order declare that a dangerous
communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign country, port, or place and that
there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of domestic animals
therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the
Philippine Islands any such animal, animal effects, parts, or products from such place,
unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulation of the Bureau of
Agriculture.
4. Department Order No. 6, promulgated on July 28, 1922, by Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources:
DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 6.}
Series of 1922.}

Owing to the fact that a dangerous communicable disease known as rinderpest exist in
Hongkong, French Indo-China and British India, it is hereby declared, in accordance
with the provisions of section 1770 of Act No. 2711 (Administrative Code of the
Philippine Islands of 1917), that rinderpest prevails in said countries, and as there is
danger of spreading such disease by the importation of cattle, carabaos, and pigs
therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the
Philippine Islands any such animal, animal effects, parts, or products from Hongkong,
French Indo-China and British India, unless the importation thereof shall be authorized
under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture.
The provisions of this order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.
5. Administrative Order No. 21, of the Bureau of Agriculture, promulgated July 29, 1922,
by the Director of Agriculture:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 21}
}
Re importation of cattle, carabaos, and pigs from French Indo-China, Hongkong and
India.
1. Pursuant to the provisions of Department Order No. 6, series of 1922, of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present regulations of the Bureau
of Agriculture governing the importation of livestock from French Indo-China and
Hongkong are hereby amended to the effect that the importation of livestock of the
species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby prohibited from
French Indo-China, Hongkong and India. However, animals immunized against
rinderpest, for which the importer before placing his order shall have obtained from the
Director of Agriculture a written permit to import them from the above named countries,
may be allowed entrance into the Philippine Islands.
2. This order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.
6. Communication of August 31, 1922, from the Acting Director of Agriculture to Faustino
Lichauco (in part):
SIR: In reply to your application for permission to import from 300 to 400 carabaos
immunized against rinderpest from Pnom-Pehn, French Indo-China, I have the honor to
inform you that the permission is hereby granted, under the following conditions:

1. Animals must be immunized by the simultaneous method before shipment. At

least 10 c.c. of good virulent blood must be injected at the first injection

simultaneously with the serum. Ten days after the simultaneous inoculation all
non-reactors must receive another injection of not less than 10 c.c. of virulent
blood (alone).
2. The immunization must be done by a veterinarian designated by the French
Government for the purpose, who must issue a certificate stating the fact that the
animal has been immunized according to the requirements in number 1 and it
must not be embarked until ten days after the second injection of virulent blood.
Very respectfully,
SILVERIO APOSTOL,
Acting Director of Agriculture.
Upon glancing over the matter above collated, it will be seen at once that section 1770 of
the Administrative Code on its face authorizes the action taken by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in closing our ports (in the manner and to the extent
indicated in Department Order No. 6) to the importation of cattle and carabao from
French Indo-China, supposing of course, as everybody knows and as the petitioner does
not deny, that the disease of rinderpest exists in that country.
It is claimed, however, that section 1762 of the Administrative Code, so far as it
authorizes restriction upon the importation of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the
manufacture of serum, has been impliedly repealed by the amendatory Act No. 3052,
which is of later enactment that the Administrative Code; and in this connection reliance
is chiefly placed on the first proviso to section 1762, as amended by said Act No. 3052,
which is in these words: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all
cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for
the manufacture of serum. This then is the first and principal question in the case,
namely, whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to
draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. We say repealed by
implication, for it will be noted that that Act No. 3052 has no repealing clause, and it
contains only one section, i. e., that amending section 1762 of the Administrative Code.
We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason
that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature, while section 1770
deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762.
Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as
amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special qualification of section
1762. Of course the two provisions are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as
amended, is considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be
imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the cattle, under the
conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in only upon compliance with the

requirements of Administrative Order No. 21. But this difference between the practical
effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in the sense that the earlier
provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).
That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt
with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions. Thus, we
find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into
the Island at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department
Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous
communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country, and the provision is
intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the
backbone of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special
emergency therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the
administrative authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry of
the Islands from the spread of animal infection originating abroad.
We note that the argument for unrestricted importation extends only to the importation of
cattle for draft purposes and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, leaving section
1770 theoretically in full effect as regards the importation of cattle for other purposes, as
where they are imported for slaughter; but the importation of cattle for draft purposes is
the principal thing, and unless that can be regulated under the conditions and to the
extent attempted by the respondents in this case, the power given in section 1770 is
obviously worthless.
In our opinion section 1762, as amended, and section 1770 must be construed in pari
materia as harmonious parts of the law dealing with animal quarantine; and section
1762, as amended, can be given effect only in so far as it is not restricted by section
1770. Here, as always, the general must yield to the particular.
If the Congress of the United States should this day repeal the Chinese Exclusion Law
so far as it affects these Islands, and should declare that all persons of Chinese
nationality shall be at liberty to enter the Philippine Islands without restriction, would
anybody suppose that such enactment would have the effect of abolishing the power to
maintain quarantine against any Chinese port where cholera or bubonic plaque might
hereafter be raging in epidemic form? Yet the question now before us is not
fundamentally different from the one thus supposed.
The judicial precedents are conclusive to the effect that no implied repeal of a special
provisions of the character of the one now under consideration will result from the
enactment of broader provision of a general nature. In other words, a general statute
without negative words does not repeal a previous statute which is particular, even

though the provisions of one be different from the other. (Rymer vs. Luzerne County, 12
L. R. A., 192; Petri vs. F. E. Creelman Lumber Co., 199 U. S., 487; 50 L. ed., 281.)
Wherever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute,
and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the
particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to
affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. (Sir John Romilly,
Master of the Rolls, in Pretty vs. Solly, 26 Beav., 606, 610.)
The additional words of qualification needed to harmonize a general and a prior special
provision in the same statute should be added to the general provision, rather than to the
special one. (Rodgers vs. United States, 185 U. S., 82; 46 L. ed., 816.)
Specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon the
same subject unless it clearly appears that the provision of the two laws are so
repugnant that the legislature must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the
earlier legislation. The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as
the law of the particular subject and the other as the general law of the land. (Ex Parte
United States, 226 U. S., 420; 57 L. ed., 281; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S., 556; 27 L.
ed., 1030; Partee vs. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 204 Fed. Rep., 970.)
Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and
certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing alone,
would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the
special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act or
provision, especially when such general and special acts or provisions are
contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict.
(Crane vs. Reeder and Reeder, 22 Mich., 322, 334; University of Utah vs. Richards, 77
Am. St. Rep., 928.)
It is well settled that repeals by implication are not to be favored. And where two statutes
cover, in whole or in part, the same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty
of the court no purpose to repeal being clearly expressed or indicated is, if possible,
to give effect to both. In other words, it must not be supposed that the Legislature
intended by a latter statute to repeal a prior one on the same subject, unless the last
statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it
was intended to cover the whole subject, and therefore to displace the prior statute.
(Frost vs. Wenie, 157 U. S., 46; 39 L. ed., 614, 619.)
As stated in the pages of the two most authoritative legal encyclopedias, the rule is that
a prior legislative act will not be impliedly repealed by a later act unless there is a plain,
unavoidable and irreconcilable repugnancy between the two. If both acts can by any

reasonable construction stand together, both will be sustained. (36 Cyc., 1074- 1076; 26
Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 2d ed., 725-726.)
A masterly analysis of the decisions of the United States Courts pertinent to the matter
now in hand will be found in the monographic article on Statutes and Statutory
Construction, written by Chas. C. Moore and prefixed as a General Introduction to
Federal Statutes Annotated. The discussion there given is too lengthy to be here
reproduced in full, but some of the observations of the learned author are so appropriate
to the case before us that we cannot forego the temptation to include the same in this
opinion. Says the writer: The various provisions of an act should be read so that all may,
if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency. The
sections of a code relative to any subject must be harmonized and to that end the letter
of any section may sometimes be disregarded. But where absolute harmony between
parts of a statute is demonstrably non-existent, the court must reject that one which is
least in accord with the general plan of the whole, or if there be no such ground for
choice between inharmonious section, the later section being the last expression of the
legislative mind must, in construction, vacate the former to the extent of the repugnancy.
(1 Fed. Stat. Ann., 2d ed., 49-50.)
And speaking with reference to the rule by which special provisions are held to dominate
over general provisions in the same or later laws, the author proceeds: it is an old and
familiar rule, said Mr. Justice Lamar, that where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment, and also a general one, which in its most comprehensive sense would
include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and
the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. And the Justice
proceeded to apply that rule in the construction of a statute upon which there had been
much ingenious argument and a decided conflict of authority in the inferior federal
courts. The stature was an act of Congress of 1876, declaring nonmailable every
obscene . . . book, pamphlet, paper, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent
character, and other enumerated articles, and making it a misdemeanor to deposit any
of them for mailing. In a prosecution under the act, the Circuit Court certified to the
Supreme Court the following question: Is the knowingly depositing in the mails of an
obscene letter, inclosed in an envelope or wrapper upon which there is nothing but the
name and address of the person to whom the letter is written, an offense within the act?
On behalf of the government it was contended that the word writing comprehended
such a letter, but the Supreme Court held otherwise. In the course of his argument in
support of the view of the court, Justice Lamar pointed out that the statute, after
enumeration what articles shall be nonmailable, adds a separate and distinct clause
declaring that every letter upon the envelope of which . . . indecent, lewd, obscene, or
lascivious delineations, epithets, terms, or language may be written or printed . . . shall

not be conveyed in the mails, and the person knowingly or willfully depositing the same
in the mails shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, etc. This distinctly additional
clause, continued the Justice, specifically designating and describing the particular
class of letters which shall be nonmailable, clearly limits the inhibitions of the statute to
that class of letters alone whose indecent matter is exposed on the envelope. (1 Fed.
Stat. Ann., 2d ed., 50-51; also at pp. 164-166.)
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption
that if the act of latter date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking
power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must
always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of
statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the
Legislature when it appears that the two statute, or provisions, with reference to which
the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. It is therefore
idle to speculate whether in the case before us the Philippine Legislature may or may not
have intended to modify or abrogate section 1770 of the Administrative Code at the time
the amendment to section 1762 was enacted, for if any such intention was entertained, it
was not revealed in a way that would justify a court in giving this intention effect. We may
add, however, that, in the opinion of the majority of the Justices participating in this
decision, the Legislature in amending section 1762 could not possibly have entertained a
design to modify section 1770; for, as we have already shown, the abrogation of that
provision, even as regards draft animals alone, would leave the animal industry of the
Islands exposed to the danger incident to the unrestricted importation of infected animals
from districts where rinderpest prevails. The unreasonableness of this interpretation of
the amendatory law alone supplies sufficient warrant for rejecting it. The Legislature
could not possibly have intended to destroy the effectiveness of quarantine as regards
imported animals.
Our conclusion then is that section 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force;
and the determination of this question is we think necessarily fatal to the petitioners
case.
It is insisted, however, that even supposing section 1770 of the Administrative Code to
be in force, nevertheless, the requirement of immunization at the port of embarcation is
unreasonable, inasmuch as the immunization of the cattle at that port, under the
supervision of the Government veterinarians of French Indo-China, is not unconditionally
accepted as efficacious by the Philippine authorities, as shown by the fact that the latter
further require tests to be made upon the arrival of the cattle here, consisting of
inoculation with virulent blood of animals suffering from rinderpest which involves
additional expenses and exposes the importer to the loss of his entire herd.

Considerations of this nature are we think more proper to be addressed to the authorities
responsible for the regulations than to this court. About the principal fact that rinderpest
exists in the regions referred to in Department Order No. 6, there is, and can be no
dispute; and when the Department Head declared that the disease prevails in those
regions and that there is danger of spreading it by the importation of cattle and carabao
into this country, he was acting upon a matter within his province, and we are not
disposed to review the conclusion.
It has been suggested that the regulative power vested in the Director of Agriculture
under section 1770 of the Administrative Code with respect to the admission of cattle
into the Philippine Islands attaches only when the importation has been effected; and
that the said Director has no authority to dictate the measures to be taken by the
importer before the cattle are embarked for transportation to these Islands. This
contention, in our opinion, reflects a mistaken point of view with reference to the effect of
the regulations; and the answer is to be found in the consideration that the regulation in
question has prospective reference to the condition of the cattle upon their arrival here.
In other words, the prior immunization of the cattle is made a condition precedent to the
right to bring them in; as much as to say, that only animals conforming to the required
type will be admitted. The importer is thus left at entire liberty in respect to the taking of
the necessary measures to gain admittance for his cattle in our ports; and if he fails to do
so, the penalty merely is that the cattle are not admitted.
Upon the whole we are of the opinion that the petition does not show sufficient ground
for granting the writs of mandamus and injunction. The demurrer interposed thereto by
the respondents in their return to the order to show cause, dated October 7, 1922, is
therefore sustained, and the temporary restraining order heretofore promulgated in this
cause, dated September 21, 1922, is dissolved; and unless within five days after
notification hereof the petitioner shall so amend his petition as to show a sufficient cause
of action, an order absolute will be entered, dismissing the same, with costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNS, J., dissenting:
The question involved is the meaning and construction of Act No. 3052 of the Legislature
at its special session approved March 14, 1922, as it amends section 1762 of Act No.
2711, and to what extent, if any, it repeals or modifies section 1770 of Act No. 2711.
It will be noted that section 1 of Act No. 3052 reads as follows:

Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and
eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Hence, Act No. 3052 becomes, and is, a complete substitute for section 1762 of Act No.
2711, which reads as follows:
SEC. 1762. Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden. Except upon
permission of the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of Department
first had, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the
Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous
communicable disease, or any effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to
introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands.
Any such animal or its effects may be permitted by the Director of Agriculture, with the
approval of the head of Department first had, to enter the Islands under such conditions
as to quarantine, cremation, or other disposal as he may direct, or which shall be
deemed by him sufficient to prevent the spread of any such disease.
As amended by Act No. 3052, section 1762 reads as follows:
SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands. It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce
live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture
may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authorize the importation,
bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries
for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be
necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per
annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the
importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture
of serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation,
bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be
submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the
head of the department, prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations and
others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The
Governor-General also may, by executive order, suspend this prohibition for a fixed
period in case local conditions require it.
It was approved March 14, 1922.
It will be noted that the original Act was entitled:

Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden.

And that, as amended by Act No. 3052, it is now entitled:
Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
Of course, it must follow that any animal imported into the Philippine Islands must be
brought here from a foreign country within the meaning of either Act. It will be noted that
the word diseased, as found in the title of the original Act, is not found in the title of the
Act as amended. To my mind this is important, especially in view of the language used in
the amended Act, which reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle
into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country.
Standing alone that language would be construed as an express prohibition against
bringing cattle of any kind into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Act
then says:
The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first
had, authorized the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of
thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of
these Islands, and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to
exceed five hundred head per annum.
By those provisions the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the
department first had and obtained, may authorize the importation of thoroughbred cattle
for breeding purposes not to exceed five hundred head per annum. To import such
cattle, the shipper must obtain the consent of the Director of Agriculture, together with
the approval of the head of the department, and it must appear that the cattle are
thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of
these Islands, and that they are of the kind which will improve the breed of the native
cattle, and the number must not exceed five hundred head per annum. That is to say, by
the express terms of the Act, thoroughbred cattle cannot be imported without the
express consent and approval of the Director of Agriculture and the head of his
department, and then only for specific purposes, and then in a limited quantity. Such
provision will not admit of any other construction. Bearing those provisions and such
construction in mind, the Act further says:
Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the
importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture
of serum.

Under the former provision of the Act thoroughbred cattle cannot be imported without the
consent of the Director of Agriculture, without the approval of the head of the
department first had. But as to draft cattle and bovine cattle, the Act expressly provides:
That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation.
That is to say, as to thoroughbred cattle, he may or may not grant the permit, and then
only in a limited number. But as to draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of
serum, he shall in all cases permit the importation. As to such cattle it is not a matter of
his choice or discretion. But the majority opinion holds that he is given that power and
discretion under section 1770 of Act No. 2711, which reads as follows:
SEC. 1770. Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries.
When the Department Head shall be general order that a dangerous communicable
animal disease prevails in any foreign country, port, or place and that there is danger of
spreading such disease by the importation of domestic animals therefrom, it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such
animal, animal effects, parts, or products from such place, unless the importation thereof
shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture.
It will be noted that section 1770 was enacted in 1917, and that Act No. 3052 was
enacted March 14, 1922, five years after section 1770 became a law. It will also be
noted that the rules and regulation here sought to be enforced were promulgated in July,
1922, under section 1770, and four months after Act No. 3052 became a law. That is to
say, that here you have rules and regulations of a subordinate department promulgated
in July, 1922, that are in dire0ct conflict with an Act of the Legislature approved March,
1922. But it is contended that one is a special and the other a general law, and that the
two Acts should be construed in pari materia. The construction overlooks the fact that
the force and effect of section 1770 of Act No 2711 is founded upon section 1762, and
that both are sections of the same general Act, and that when section 1762 is repealed,
as it is, by Act No. 3052, in so far as it applies to draft and bovine cattle, there is nothing
left upon which section 1770 can operate or to which it would apply. That is to say, that
section 1762 and section 1770 are both sections of a general Act, and part of one and
the same Act, and Act No. 3052 expressly repeals section 1762, and by doing so it
repeals section 1770, in so far as it applies to draft and bovine cattle for the manufacture
of serum.
For illustration: Suppose that section 1762 had never been amended by Act No. 3052,
and that the Legislature enacted a law expressly repealing the whole section, how then
would section 1770 operate, and to what would it apply, and how and where would it be
in force and effect? There would be nothing to which it could apply. Section 1770 is
absolutely dependent upon section 1762, without which it cannot be of any force or

effect. Both of them are sections of the same general law, and one is dependent upon
the other, hence, when you amend or repeal section 1762, you modify or repeal section
1770, in so far as it relates to, or is a part of, section 1762.
Section 1770 is entitled:
Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries.
Section 1762, as amended by Act No. 3052, is entitled:
Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
Section 1762, as amended, recites:
That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, etc.
The word importation has a well-defined meaning, and must have been used with
reference to its legal meaning.
Words and Phrases, volume IV, page 3438, says:
The literal meaning of importation is to bring in with intent to land. It means a bringing
into some port, harbor, or haven, with an intent to land the goods there. It takes place
when the vessel arrives at a port of entry, intending there to discharge her cargo. (Kidd
vs. Flagler [U.S.], 54 Fed., 367, 369; The Mary [U.S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.)
Importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse, but merely the bringing
them into port; and the importation is complete before entry at the customhouse. (United
States vs. Lyman [U.S.], 26 Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. United States, 19 Fed.
Cas., 258.)
Act Cong. July 1, 1812, c. 112, providing a double duty on all goods, wares, and
merchandise imported into the United States from and after the passage of the acts,
means not only that there shall be an arrival within the limits of the United States and of
a collection district, but also within the limits of some port of entry. (Arnold vs. United
States, 13 U. S. [9 Cranch], 104, 120; 3 L. ed., 671.)
An article is not imported from a foreign country, within the meaning of the tariff laws,
until it actually arrives at a port of entry of the United States, and the importation is
governed by the law in force at the time of such arrival; and hence under the Treaty of
Paris, by which Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States, and which took
effect by the exchange of ratification and the presidents proclamation on April 1, 1899,

which repealed the existing tariff duties on goods brought from those islands, the goods,
arriving at a port of entry of the United States from Philippine ports after its taking effect,
were not subject to duty, although they were shipped before April 11th. (American Sugar
Refining Co. vs. Bidwell [U.S.], 124 Fed., 677, 681.)
Applying this definition, the legislative Act says:
That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, etc.
Giving to the word importation, as used in the Act, its legal meaning, it is the express
duty of the Director of Agriculture to permit the bringing or introduction of draft cattle and
bovine cattle with the ports and harbors of the Philippine Islands when they are brought
here with intent to land. That is the definition given to the word importation by both the
Federal and the Supreme Courts of the United State. That is to say, that in all cases it is
the express duty of the Director of Agriculture to permit the bringing or introduction of
draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum within the jurisdiction, ports
and harbors of the Philippine Islands. If that part of Act No. 3052 does not mean what it
says, it does not mean anything. Again, it must be conceded that the Legislature of the
Philippine Islands has no authority to make or enforce any law beyond its jurisdiction,
and that it never intended to do so.
As the majority opinion states, the case is submitted to the court on the demurrer of the
defendants to the complaint. Hence, all of the material allegations of the complaint are
admitted.
The defendants rely upon Department Order No. 6, as follows:
DEPARTMENT ORDERNO. 6.}
Series of 1922.}
Owing to the fact that a dangerous communicable disease known as rinderpest exist in
Hongkong, French Indo-China and British India, it is hereby declared, in accordance
with the provisions of section 1770 of Act No. 2711 (Administrative Code of the
Philippine Islands of 1917), that rinderpest prevails in said countries, and as there is
danger of spreading such disease by the importation of cattle, carabaos, and pigs
therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the
Philippine Islands any such animal, animal effects, parts, or products from Hongkong,
French Indo-China and British India, unless the importation thereof shall be authorized
under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture.
The provisions of this order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.

And Administrative Order No. 21, as follows:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERNO. 21.}
}
Re importation of cattle, carabaos, and pigs from French Indo-China, Hongkong and
India.
1. Pursuant to the provisions of Department Order No. 6, series of 1922, of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present regulations of the Bureau
of Agriculture governing the importation of livestock from French Indo-China and
Hongkong are hereby amended to the effect that the importation of livestock of the
species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby prohibited from
French Indo-China, Hongkong and India. However, animals immunized against
rinderpest, for which the importer before placing his order shall have obtained from the
Director of Agriculture a written permit to import them from the above named countries,
may be allowed entrance into the Philippine Islands.
2. This order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.
Hence, you have this situation. You have an Act of the Legislature which says:
That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or
introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, passed by
the Legislature in March, 1922, and you have rules and regulations of a subordinate
department of the Government which absolutely prohibits the importation of draft cattle
and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, unless the importation thereof shall be
authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture, and that the importation
of livestock of the species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby
prohibited from French Indo-China, Hongkong and India, and where the important,
before placing his order in a foreign country, shall obtain a written permit from the
Director of Agriculture, and then he may be allowed to import cattle into the Philippine
Islands.
The question is thus squarely presented whether the rules and regulations of a
subordinate department can overthrow and destroy the express provisions of a
legislative Act. It will be noted that Act No. 3052 expressly provides that with certain
limitations and reservations, and with the consent and approval of the Director of
Agriculture and the head of the department, thoroughbred cattle may be brought into the
Islands in limited number for certain purposes. There are no such restriction or
limitations for the bringing in or introduction of draft and bovine cattle. Under that
provision, the Legislature has said in express terms that the Director of Agriculture shall

grant the permit in all cases. If it had been the purpose and intent of the Legislature to
place any restrictions or limitations upon the importation, bringing or introduction of draft
cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, it would have said so, as it did in
the previous provision of the Act for the importation of thoroughbred cattle. But it is
contended that, notwithstanding Act No. 3052, section 1770 is not repealed and remains
in full force and effect.
Upon the question of where and how a statute is repealed, Lewis Sutherland Statutory
Construction is a recognized as standard authority in all the courts. In section 247 (vol.
I), the author says:
. . . therefore, the former law is constructively repealed, since it cannot be supposed that
the law-making power intends to enact or continue in force laws which are
contradictions. The repugnancy being ascertained, the later act or provision in date or
position has full force, and displace by repeal whatever in the precedent law is
inconsistent with it.
Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation whether it expressly
declares such repeal or not. In the nature of things it would be so, not only on the theory
of intention, but because contradictions cannot stand together.
Where the later or revising statute clearly covers the whole subject-matter of
antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to
give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, the latter is held to be replaced by
necessary implication.
An affirmative enactment of a new rule implies a negative of whatever is not included, or
is different; and if by the language used a thing is limited to be done is a particular form
or manner, it includes a negative that it shall not be done otherwise. An intention will not
be ascribed to the law-making power to establish conflict and hostile systems upon the
same subject, or to leave in force provisions of law by which the later will of the
legislature may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a
useless and idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainly and
unintelligibility. (Sec. 249.)
Where a later act grants to an officer or tribunal a part of a larger power already
possessed, and in terms which interpreted by themselves import a grant of all the power
the grantee is intended to exercise, it repeals the prior act from which the larger power
had been derived. (Sec. 250.)
In the leading case of Gorham vs. Luckett (6 B. Mon., 146), Marshall, J., says:

This is not a case of the re-enactment of a former law in the same words, or with
additional provisions, nor of a regrant of a pre-existing power to the same or a greater
extent. It is not a case of cumulative or additional power or right or remedy. Nor does it
come within the rule that a subsequent affirmative statute does not repeal a previous
one, which can only apply where both statute can have effect. This is a formal and
express grant of limited power to a depository which already had unlimited power. And it
can have no effect, nor be ascribed to any other purpose, but that of limiting the extent
of the pre-existing power. If certain provisions of two statutes are identical, the last need
not be construed as repealing, but merely as continuing or re-affirming, the first, for
which there might be various reasons. So, if a statute give a remedy, or provide that
certain acts shall be sufficient for the attainment or security of certain objects, and a
subsequent statute declare that a part of the same remedy or some of the same acts, or
other acts entirely different, shall suffice for the accomplishment of the same object,
here the latter act does not necessarily repeal the former, except so far as it may be
expressed or implied in the former that the end shall be attained by no other mode but
that which it prescribes. If there be no such restriction in the first, there is no conflict
between them. Both may stand together with full effect, and the provisions of either may
be pursued.
But if a subsequent statute requires the same, and also more than a former statute had
made sufficient, this is in effect a repeal of so much of the former statute as declares the
sufficient of what it prescribes. And if the last act professes, or manifestly intends to
regulate the whole subject to which it relates, it necessary supersedes and repeals all
former acts, so far as it differs from them in its prescriptions. The great object, then is, to
ascertain the true interpretation of the last act. That being ascertained, the necessary
consequence is, that the legislative intention thus decided from, it must prevail over any
prior inconsistent intention to be deduced from a previous act.
. . . The difficulty, or rather the embarrassment in the case, arises from the fact that a
previous law had given to the same grantee unlimited power on the same subject, and
that this twentieth section makes no reference to the previous law, and contains no
express words or restriction or change, but granting an express and limited power, is
framed as if it were the first and only act on the subject. But do not these circumstance
indicate that it is to be construed as if it were the only act on the subject? Or shall the
first act, which is inferior in authority so far as they conflict, so far affect the construction
of the last, as to deprive it of all effect? We say the last act must have effect according to
its terms and its obvious intent. And as both cannot have full operation according to their
terms and intent, the first and not the last act must yield.
Section 1770 was enacted in 1917, and Act No. 3052 in 1922, five years later, and the
rules and regulations sought to be enforced are founded upon section 1770 and were

promulgated about five months after Act No. 3052 became a law. The two sections are
not only inconsistent, but there is a direct conflict between them as to the importation of
draft and bovine cattle, especially as to the promulgated rules and regulations. The
Legislature says that as to draft and bovine cattle, the permit shall be granted in all
cases, and defendants say that we will not grant the permit under any circumstances,
unless you comply with the rules and regulations that we have promulgated, which are
impossible of performance, and are in direct conflict with Act No. 3052 of the Legislature.
As Lewis Sutherland says:
. . . therefore, the former law is constructively repealed, since it cannot be supposed that
the law-making power intends to enact or continue in force laws which are
contradictions. The repugnancy being ascertained, the later act or provision in date or
position has full force, and displaces by repeal whatever in the precedent law is
inconsistent with it.
And
Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation whether it expressly
declares such repeal or not. In the nature of things it would be so, not only on the theory
of intention, but because contradictions cannot stand together.
It must be conceded that any authority of the defendants to promulgated rules and
regulations must be found upon some legislative act, and that in the absence of
legislative authority, the defendants have no right or license to promulgate any rules and
regulations for any purpose. Hence, you have this situation; that the Legislature in
positive and express language has said that the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases
permit the importation, bringing and introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the
manufacture of serum, and the defendants have said that we will not comply with the
legislative act, you shall not import cattle until you comply with rules and regulations
which we have made and promulgated, which rules and regulations, in legal effect,
absolutely prohibit the importation of such cattle for any purpose.
It is not for this court to legislate or to say whether or not Act No. 3052 is a good law or a
bad law. Suffice it to say that it was enacted by the Legislative, which, to say the least,
knows as much about the cattle business in the Philippine Islands as do the members of
this court.
In its petition, the plaintiff offers to comply with all the port, harbor and quarantine rules
and regulations of the Philippine Islands. But it is contended that they are not sufficient
to prevent the spread of disease among the cattle. If not, they should be amended, and
other and more strict quarantine regulations within the Philippine Islands should be
adopted, and the Legislature has the power to absolutely prohibited the importation of

cattle into the Islands for any and all purposes, which it did in Act No. 3052, except as to
certain limitations and provisions, among which are that in all cases the Director of
Agriculture shall permit the importation, bringing and introduction of draft cattle and
bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum.
Under the facts alleged, the petitioner has brought itself squarely within those provisions
and the Director of Agriculture has denied him the permit which the Legislature says he
must grant, and has imposed upon it the performance of impossible rules and
regulations as a condition precedent to the granting of the permit.
Under the majority opinion, as to the importation of draft and bovine cattle, we have a
government of rules and regulations promulgated by a subordinate of the government
which are in direct conflict with the legislative Act.
By the majority opinion all that portion of Act No. 3052, which says that the Director of
Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, etc., becomes a nullity and is
overruled by a subordinate branch of the Government. In legal effect, it holds that, in so
far as there is a conflict between them, the provisions of section 1770 must prevail over
the provisions of Act No. 3052. That is not good law. In so far as there is a conflict, Act
No. 3052 should be construed as repealing section 1770, for the simple reason that Act
No. 3052 became a law about five years after section 1770.
The majority opinion violates every canon of statutory construction. For such reasons,
with all due respect to it, I vigorously dissent.
Araullo, C. J., and Romualdez, J., concur.

PEOPLE V PIMENTEL
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100210. April 1, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR B.
PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and
ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Is the Court of Appeals, in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, correct
in ruling that Subversion is the main offense in a charge of Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under P.D. No.
1866, as amended, and that, therefore, the said charge should be quashed in
view of a previous charge of Subversion under R.A. No. 1700, as amended by
P.D. No. 885, against the same accused pending in another court?
Stated differently, is the accused charged with the same offense in both cases,
which would justify the dismissal of the second charge on the ground of double
jeopardy?
This is the pith issue presented before us in this appeal by certiorari interposed
by the People under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking a review of
the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) dated May 27, 1991, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, entitled THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, versus HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro
Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A. TUJAN, Respondents.
The record discloses the following antecedent facts:
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion
under Republic Act No. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law), as amended, before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), National Capital Region, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 64079.[2] As a consequence thereof, a warrant for his arrest
was issued on July 29, 1983,[3] but it remained unserved as he could not be
found.
Almost seven (7) years thereafter, or on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was
arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the subversion case. [4] When
arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver and six (6) rounds of live
ammunition were found in his possession. [5]

Consequently, on June 14, 1990, Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 148), docketed as Criminal Case No. 1789. The Information
reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a member of a communist party of the Philippines,
and its front organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody, in furtherance of or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, a special edition ARMSCOR PHILS.
caliber .38 special revolver with Serial No. 1026387 and with six (6) live
ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or permit thereof from
competent government authority. [6]
The above Information recommended no bail for Antonio Tujan, which
recommendation was approved by the trial court in an Order dated June 19,
1990.[7] The same order also directed the continued detention of Antonio Tujan at
MIG 15 of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP), Bago Bantay, Quezon City, while his case is pending.
On June 26, 1990, Antonio Tujan, through counsel, filed a motion [8] invoking his
right to a preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court and praying that his arraignment be held in abeyance until the
preliminary investigation is terminated.
However, on June 27, 1990, during the hearing of Antonio Tujans motion for
preliminary investigation, his counsel withdrew the motion since he would file a
motion to quash the Information, for which reason counsel requested a period of
twenty (20) days to do so. This was granted by the trial court on that same day.[9]
On July 16, 1990, Antonio Tujan did file the motion to quash [10] the Information in
Criminal Case No. 1789 on the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy
of being convicted of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 64079 (for
subversion) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45). The said ground is
based on Sections 3 (h) and 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. In support of the motion, Antonio Tujan contends that common
crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and ammunition should actually be
deemed absorbed in subversion, [11] citing the cases of Misolas vs. Panga, et al.
(G. R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648) and Enrile vs. Salazar, et
al. (G. R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217). Antonio Tujan then avers
that the present case is the twin prosecution of the earlier subversion case
and, therefore, he is entitled to invoke the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy.[12]
The petitioner opposed[13] the motion to quash, arguing that Antonio Tujan does
not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second time because: (a) he has not
even been arraigned in the subversion case, and (b) the offense charged against
him in Criminal Case No. 64079 is for Subversion, punishable under Republic Act
No. 1700; while the present case is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion, punishable under a different law

(Presidential Decree No. 1866). Moreover, petitioner contends that Antonio

Tujans reliance on theMisolas and Enrile cases is misplaced.[14] Tujan merely
relies on the dissenting opinions in the Misolas case. Also, the Enrile case
which involved a complex crime of rebellion with murder is inapplicable to the
instant case which is not a complex offense. Thus, the absorption rule as held
applicable in the Enrile ruling has no room for application in the present case
because (illegal) possession of firearm and ammunition is not a necessary
means of committing the offense of subversion, nor is subversion a necessary
means of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.[15]
The trial court, in an order dated October 12, 1990, granted the motion to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789, the dispositive portion of the order
reading:
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash the information is hereby GRANTED, but
only in so far as the accused may be placed in jeopardy or in danger of being
convicted or acquitted of the crime of Subversion and as a consequence the
Information is hereby quashed and the case dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of Illegal Possession of Firearm.
SO ORDERED.[16]
It is best to quote the disquisition of the respondent court in quashing the
information and dismissing the case:
x x x
xxx
xxx
In other words, the main offense the accused is being charged in this case
is also Subversion considering that the alleged Illegal Possession of the
Firearm and Ammunition is only in furtherance thereof.
Now, subversion being a continuing offense as has been previously held by the
Supreme Court, the fact that the accused has been previously charged of
Subversion before another court before the institution of this instant case is just a
continuing offense of his former charge or that his acts constituting subversion is
a continuation of the acts he committed before.
The court therefore cannot subscribe to the position taken by the prosecution
that this case is very different from the other case and that double jeopardy will
attach in this particular case.
This court agrees with the position taken by the defense that double jeopardy
will attach to the accusation of subversion, punishable now under Republic Act
1700, as Rule 117 of the Rules of Court particularly Section 1 thereof, provides:
Time to move to quash- At any time before entering his plea, the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information.(1a)
In other words, there is no necessity that the accused should be arraigned first
before he can move to quash the information. It is before he pleads which the
accused did in this case.
On the other submissions by the prosecution, that the possession of firearms
and ammunitions is not a necessary means of committing the offense of
subversion or vice versa, then if the court follows such argument, there could be
no offense of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in furtherance of
Subversion, for even the prosecution admits also that in subversion which is an

offense involving propaganda, counter propaganda, a battle of the hearts and

mind of the people does not need the possession or use of firearms and
ammunitions.
The prosecution even admits and to quote:
The defense of double jeopardy, while unquestionably available to the accused,
had not been clearly shown to be invokable(sic) at this point in time.
But the rule says otherwise as previously stated as provided for under Section 1
of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, if ever the accused is caught in possession of a firearm and
ammunition which is separate and distinct from the crime of subversion
and is not a necessary ingredient thereof and the court believed so, the
prosecution will have to file another information as they may wish. The
court therefore has to grant the motion to quash on the aforestated
grounds, subject to Section 5 of Rule 117, considering that the only offense
to which the accused in this case may be placed in jeopardy is Subversion
and not Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions.
The prosecution may file any information as warranted within ten (10) days from
receipt of this order otherwise the court will order the release of the accused,
unless he is in custody for some other offense.[17] (Emphasis ours)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[18] was also denied in an order dated
December 28, 1990.[19]
The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 24273. However, the appellate court
found that the trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the questioned Information. In
dismissing the petition, the appellate court, in its decision dated May 27, 1991,
basically reiterated the aforequoted ruling of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and (2) it was
deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case against private
respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789.
We agree with the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for violation
of P.D. No. 1866 filed against private respondent Antonio Tujan. It ruled:
The foregoing information (for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion) filed before the Makati court shows that the main
case is subversion considering that there is an allegation that the alleged illegal
possession of firearms was made in furtherance of or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion. Also, the information alleged likewise
that the accused is a member of a communist party of the Philippines and its
front organization. Basically, the information refers to the crime of Subversion
qualified by Illegal Possession of Firearms. x x x.[20]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, under which Antonio Tujan is
charged in Criminal Case No. 1789 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(Branch 148), provides as follows:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition

or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to
be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm
or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearms, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty
of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry
any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
(Emphasis ours)
The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and simple. Under the
first paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or
ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of the same
Section makes the use of said firearm and ammunition in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion a circumstance to increase the penalty to death. Thus, the
allegation in the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 that the unlicensed
firearm found in the possession of Antonio Tujan, a member of the communist
party of the Philippines and its front organization, was used in furtherance of or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion does not charge him
with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same Information,
but simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866 was committed[21] so as to qualify the penalty to death.
There is, therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned information, that
is, the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its being
used in furtherance of subversion.[22] There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866,
specifically Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically or by implication that
the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the very acts that are being
penalized. This is clear from the title of the law itself which boldly indicates the
specific acts penalized under it:
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING
IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR

EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF

FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER
PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOFAND FOR RELEVANT
PURPOSES. (Emphasis ours)
On the other hand, the previous subversion charge against Antonio Tujan in
Criminal Case No. 64079, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45),
is based on a different law, that is, Republic Act No. 1700, as amended. Section
3 thereof penalizes any person who knowingly, wilfully and by overt act affiliates
with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association or organization
x x x. Section 4 of said law further penalizes such member [of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive association]
(who) takes up arms against the Government. Thus, in the present case, private
respondent Antonio Tujan could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or R.A.
No. 1700,[23] or both.
This leads us to the issue of whether or not private respondent Antonio Tujan
was placed in double jeopardy with the filing of the second Information for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion.
We rule in the negative.
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act. (Emphasis ours)
Complementing the above constitutional provision, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
The right of an accused against double jeopardy is a matter which he may raise
in a motion to quash to defeat a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense. The pertinent provision of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. (2a) (Emphasis ours)

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an
accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action:
(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge;[24] and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.[25]
Suffice it to say that in the present case, private respondents motion to quash
filed in the trial court did not actually raise the issue of double jeopardy simply
because it had not arisen yet. It is noteworthy that the private respondent has
not even been arraigned in the first criminal action for subversion. Besides, as
earlier discussed, the two criminal charges against private respondent are not of
the same offense as required by Section 21, Article III of the Constitution.
It is clear from the foregoing, that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
not in accordance with the law and jurisprudence and thus should be reversed.
While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as
amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist,
the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 7636 on September 22,
1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as amended, has substantially changed
the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealing law being
favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent,
should be given retroactive effect.[26]
Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-respondents case has
never been raised as an issue by the parties obviously because the said law
came out only several months after the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated and while the present petition is pending with this
Court we should nonetheless fulfill our duty as a court of justice by applying the
law to whomsoever is benefited by it regardless of whether or not the accused or
any party has sought the application of the beneficent provisions of the repealing
law.[27]
That R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accused-private respondent is
beyond question. The repeal by said law of R.A. No. 1700, as amended, was
categorical, definite and absolute. There was no saving clause in the
repeal. The legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion law is
clear. Thus, it would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the
accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer exists. [28]
As early as 1935, we ruled in People vs. Tamayo:[29]
There is no question that at common law and in America a much more favorable
attitude towards the accused exists relative to statutes that have been repealed
than has been adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish
doctrine, but even in Spain, where the offense ceases to be criminal,
prosecution cannot be had. (1 Pacheco Commentaries, 296) (Emphasis ours)
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which
was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the
previous offense is obliterated.[30] It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a

total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence
persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal. [31]
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the
accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.
As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition,
qualified by subversion, this charge should be amended to simple illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition since, as earlier discussed, subversion is
no longer a crime.
Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is
now bailable under Republic Act No. 8294 which was enacted on June 6,
1997. R.A. No. 8294 has amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,
by eliminating the provision in said P.D. that if the unlicensed firearm is used in
furtherance of subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed. [32]Under the
new law (R.A. No. 8294), the penalty prescribed for simple illegal possession of
firearm (.38 caliber) is now reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). [33] The reduced
penalty of imprisonment - which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years - entitles the accused-private respondent to bail. Considering,
however, that the accused-private respondent has been detained since his arrest
on June 5, 1990 up to the present (as far as our record has shown), or more than
seven (7) years now, his immediate release is in order. This is so because even
if he were convicted for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the length
of his detention while his case is pending has already exceeded the penalty
prescribed by the new law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 27,
1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, including the orders dated October 12, 1990
and December 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148),
National Capital Region, in Criminal Case No. 1789, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The subversion charge against accused-private respondent Antonio A. Tujan in
Criminal Case No. 64079 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, is
hereby DISMISSED.
The other Information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion against the same accused in Criminal Case No. 1789
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148, is DEEMED AMENDED
to Simple Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. The accusedappellant is hereby ordered RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from detention for the
reason stated above, unless he is being detained for any other offense.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing. and Purisima, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE V CONCEPCION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18535
August 15, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.
Hartigan and Welch, and Recaredo M.a Calvo for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
STATEMENT
February 4, 1916, the Legislature of the Philippine Islands passed Act No. 2612,
known as the charter of the Philippine National Bank, under which it was
organized with plenary powers and a capital stock of P20,000,000 divided into
200,000 shares of the par value of P100 each, 101,000 of which to be
subscribed, owned and held by the Government, and the remainder by private
persons.
Section 37 provides:
The National Bank shall never at any time, under any circumstances, directly or
indirectly grant to any individual, company of individuals, firm, corporation,
Insular, provincial or municipal government any real estate mortgage loan
exceeding the sum of fifty thousand pesos, or any other loan exceeding the sum
of three hundred thousand pesos.
Section 38 provides:
The National Bank shall not directly or indirectly grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.
Said National Bank is hereby prohibited from making any loan directly or
indirectly in excess of one thousand pesos to any member of the Philippine
Legislature or to any official or employee of the Insular, provincial, or municipal
governments except upon satisfactory real estate security.
Section 53:

Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished
by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed
five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
February 20, 1918, the Legislature passed Act No. 2747, entitled "An Act to
amend in certain particulars Act Numbered Twenty-six hundred and twelve,
entitled 'An Act creating the Philippine National Bank,' which provides:"
In order to explain certain provisions, increase the stability of the institution, and
extend its powers, Act Numbered Twenty-six hundred and twelve, entitled "An Act
creating the Philippine National Bank," is hereby amended in certain particulars,
so that hereafter the said Act shall read as follows:
Section 35 of which provides:
The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.
Section 49:
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished
by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed
five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
January 30, 1921, the Legislature passed Act No. 2938 entitled "An Act to amend
Act Numbered Twenty-six hundred and twelve, entitled 'An Act creating the
Philippine National Bank,' as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred
and forty-seven."
It also provides:
Act Numbered Twenty-six hundred and twelve, entitled "An Act creating the
Philippine National Bank, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred
and forty-seven, is hereby amended in certain particulars, so that hereafter the
said Act shall read as follows:
The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors, the general manager, assistant general
manager, and employees of the bank, nor to agents or employees of the branch
banks, and no loan shall be granted to a corporation, partnership or company
wherein any member of the board of directors is a shareholder, agent or
employee in any manner, except by the unanimous vote of the members of the
board, excluding the member interested: Provided, That the total liabilities to the
Bank of any corporation wherein any of the members of the board of directors is
a shareholder, agent or employee in any manner, shall at no time exceed ten per
centum of the surplus and paid-up capital of the Bank.
All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent or incompatible with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed.
Section 43:
Any member of the board of directors of the National Bank who knowingly
violates or knowingly permits any of the officers, agents, or servants of the Bank
to violate any of the provisions of this Act, and any officer, employee, agent, or
servant of the Bank who violates any of the provisions of this Act and any person
aiding and abetting the violations of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos or by imprisonment not to
exceed five years or by both such fine and imprisonment.

At all of the material times hereinafter stated, the defendant, Venancio

Concepcion, was the duly elected, qualified and acting President of the Philippine
National Bank, which was organized and continued to exist under the respective
legislative acts.
June, 1918, what is known in the record as the Binalbagan Estate, Inc., was
organized by the agriculturists in the provinces of Occidental Negros and Iloilo,
with a capital stock of P10,000. Its primary purpose was to foster the
manufacture and refinement of centrifugal sugar and its by-products. Only
P2,500 of the capital stock was paid, and, for a long time, little, if anything, was
done. In 1920 its corporate interests were acquired by Phil. C. Whitaker and the
defendant, who reorganized the company with a capital stock of P500,000
divided into 5,000 shares of the par value of P100 each, out of which Whitaker
was issued a certificate for 1,865 shares and the defendant 1,615 shares, and
the firm of Puno, Concepcion and Co. a certificate for 250 shares, and the
remainder to other and different persons. In the month of November, 1910, the
capital stock was increased to P1,500,000, and 6,053 shares of stock were
issued to the defendant, portions of which he transferred to other persons,
among whom were his immediate relatives. Notwithstanding the fact that the
original capital stock was for P10,000, and that it was increased to P500,000 and
again to P1,500,000, there is no registered document in the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry in either case showing the increase of the capital stock
of the estate.
January 30, 1920, Whitaker, Luzuriaga, and the defendant entered into an
agreement as partners to acquire and operate what is known as the "Palma"
sugar central and hacienda in the municipality of Ilog, Occidental Negros, a short
distance from the property of the Binalbagan Estate. Under this agreement,
Whitaker and the defendant were to each have 40 per cent and Luzuriaga 20 per
cent. Concurrent therewith, the three entered into another agreement with
Salvador Serra for the sale and purchase of his business known as central
and hacienda "Palma" at an agreed price of P1,500,000, P150,000 of which was
to be paid on or before June 30, 1920, when the property was to be actually
conveyed, and to assume a mortgage on the property for P600,000, the
remainder to be paid in three installments of P250,000 each, respectively, on or
before June 30, 1921, 1922, and 1923. January 29, 1920, this contract was duly
signed by all of the respective parties, and was duly witnessed and
acknowledged before a notary public.
On January 10, 1919, Salvador Serra executed a mortgage upon all of this
property in favor of the Philippine National Bank for P600,000, which was then
owned and held by the bank, and in full force and effect.
On July 17, 1920, in the office of the Philippine National Bank and in the
presence of the defendant and Whitaker, and in accord with the terms and
provisions of the instrument of January 29, 1920, Salvador Serra made, executed
and delivered a deed of conveyance of the property described in the contract of
January 29, 1920, and at the same time and place, and as a part of the
transaction, Whitaker delivered to Salvador Serra the check of the Binalbagan
Estate drawn upon the Philippine National Bank for P750,000, which was

honored and paid by the bank, and out of which it satisfied the mortgage, which it
then held on the "Palma" hacienda, for P600,000 with accrued interest
amounting to P26,218.66, and gave Salvador Serra credit in his current account
in its branch at Iloilo for P123,781.34, making a total of P750,000, which the
defendant and his associates had agreed to pay under the contract of January
29, 1920, thus consummating the deal.
On July 17, 1920, the Binalbagan Estate was indebted to the Philippine National
Bank more than P3,000,000, and did not have the money with which to pay the
check of P750,000. To provide the necessary funds, it executed its promissory
note payable on sight for that amount to the Philippine National Bank, which was
presented to Vicente Gaskell, then in charge of loans and discounts, who in turn
presented the note to the defendant for his approval, and the defendant then and
there approved the loan to the estate, and initialed the note "V. C." which was his
customary and usual method of approving loans, and after the defendant
approved the loan, the check of the Binalbagan Estate for P750,000 was
honored by the bank, and the account of the Binalbagan Estate was then
credited with the amount of P750,000.
In his weekly report of July 22, it appears that Gaskell made a report of the
P750,000 loan to the Binalbagan Estate, but that no specific mention was made
of the loan by the defendant in his report, and that no record of the loan was
made in the corporate minutes of the Board of Directors as of July 23, 1920.
By the provisions of Act No. 2938, the capital stock of the bank was increased
from P20,000,000 to P50,000,000.
Following an investigation, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance
against the defendant, which was later amended, charging him, as President of
the Bank, with a violation of the provisions of section 35 as it relates to section 49
of Act No. 2747 of the Philippine Legislature above quoted. In substance, and to
the effect that, through the commission of such acts and in the making of the loan
of P750,000 to the Binalbagan Estate, the defendant was guilty of a violation of
section 35, and should be punished under section 49 of Act No. 2747. Upon this
charge, he was arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced to two years of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5,000 and costs, from which the defendant
appeals and assigns the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in overruling the demurrer interposed by the defense on
the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a violation of
Act No. 2747.
II. The trial court likewise erred in overruling the motion for dismissal, interposed
by the defense, on the ground that the prosecution has not proved the essential
facts alleged in the complaint.
III. The trial court likewise erred in not ordering the striking out of the hearsay
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, notwithstanding the petition of the
defense, as well as in permitting the fiscal to ask leading questions on
incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant facts, to the witnesses for the prosecution,
and the latter to answer said questions which were objected to by the defense.
IV. The court likewise erred in admitting as proof Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, F-1, G, H,
K, L, P, V-15, X, Y, Y-1, AA, BB, CC, DD, FF, GG, GG-1, HH, HH-1 to HH-12, JJ,

JJ-1, and JJ-2 of the prosecution, notwithstanding that they were objected to by
the defense as being incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, for they are not the
best proof and not having been duly authenticated.
V. The trial court likewise erred in declaring that about the first months of the
year, 1920, a great portion of the interests of the Binalbagan Estate, Inc., was
acquired by Phil. C. Whitaker and the accused, V. Concepcion.
VI. The lower court likewise erred in declaring that the firm of Puno, Concepcion
and Co., Ltd., is exclusively composed of the accused and the members of his
family.
VII. The lower court also erred in declaring that the writing executed on January
29, 1920, by Salvador Serran, the owner of the hacienda and the central "Palma"
in favor of Whitaker, Concepcion, and Luzuriaga was an option and not a
purchase and sale.
VII. The lower court likewise erred in declaring that at the time in which the
Binalbagan Estate, Inc., drew the check for P750,000 in favor of Salvador
Serran, the same had obtained from the National Bank, under the signature and
authorization of its president, the accused herein, several credits, overdrafts and
loans, which amounted to several millions of pesos.
IX. The lower court likewise erred in declaring that the limit of the credit allowed
by the National Bank to the Binalbagan Estates, Inc., in the week which
terminated on the 22d of July, 1920, was P3,660,000.
X. The lower court likewise erred in declaring that the Binalbagan Estate, Inc.,
had been obtaining credits from the Philippine National Bank for various
amounts, against which it was obtaining loans for amounts which at times were
included in the total sum of the credit allowed, and at times exceeded the limit of
said credit.
XI. The lower court likewise erred in not declaring that the concession by the
Philippine National Bank to the Binalbagan Estate, Inc., of P750,000 on July 17,
1920, has been made with the unanimous consent of the members of the Board
of Directors of the bank.
XII. The lower court likewise erred in declaring contrary to section 10 of Act No.
2612, as amended by Act No. 2938, that the obligations contracted with the
National Bank by virtue of the discount of negotiable papers, bills of exchange,
and promissory notes, are loans.
XIII. The lower court also erred in declaring that the opinion of the Insular Auditor,
the ex-officio Auditor of the Bank, cannot in any manner serve as a standard of
conduct for the officers of the bank.
XIV. The lower court likewise erred in declaring that the sum of P750,000 given to
the Binalbagan Estate, Inc., by the National Bank on July 17, 1920, was a loan
granted on said date and not on the date on which the credit contract was
perfected.
XV. The lower court lastly erred in finding the accused guilty of the violation with
which he is charged in the complaint, sentencing him to two years of
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P5,000 and costs of the action.

JOHNS, J.:
There is a clear and correct analysis of the facts in the exhaustive opinion of the
trial court, and there is but little, if any, dispute about any of the material facts.
The testimony is conclusive that the defendant either owned or controlled about
40 per cent of the capital stock of the Binalbagan Estate, which, at the time of the
above transaction, was indebted to the Philippine National Bank more than
P3,000,000. That the bank then owned and held a first mortgage lien upon the
"Palma" property for P600,000, which it satisfied and discharged out of the
proceeds of the check of Binalbagan Estate for P750,00. That is to say, as a
result of the transaction, the bank satisfied its mortgage lien for P600,000 with
accrued interest, and in lieu thereof took and accepted the unsecured promissory
note of Binalbagan Estate for P750,000, and, including the amount of that note,
the total indebtedness to the bank then amounted to P3,952,672.77.
The testimony is also conclusive that the P750,00 loan was personally approved
by the defendant, and was made upon his personal responsibility, and that, so far
as it appears in the record, no other officer or director was ever consulted about
the transaction or the making of the loan at any time prior to its consummation.
The testimony is also conclusive that on the very day that the note was
presented to the bank by the Binalbagan Estate, the loan was consummated,
and the amount of it was placed to the credit of the Binalbagan Estate, which in
turn drew its check for the full amount of the loan, which was honored by the
bank when presented.
In this connection, it will be noted that the capital stock of the bank was then
P20,000,00, and the total amount of the indebtedness of Binalbagan Estate to
the bank was P3,952,672.77.
Section 35 of Act No. 2747 provides:
The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.
Section 37 of Act No. 2612, above quoted, limits the amount of any real estate
mortgage loan to P50,000 or any other loan to P300,000. There is no such
limitation in Act No. 2747, and in so far as it is material to this opinion, section 38
of Act No. 2612 is identical with section 35 of Act No. 2747.
Defendant's counsel ably and adroitly contend that the limitation provided for in
the act is upon the bank itself, and that it does not apply to the defendant, as
President of the Bank.
The bank is a corporation organized by special act of the Legislature, and it could
only act or operate through its officers and board of directors. While the
corporation itself might be made subject to a fine for a criminal offense, it could
not be imprisoned, and it will be noted that section 53 of the original Act, which is
identical with the other two Acts, says:
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished
by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed
five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
The limitation in Section 35 of Act No. 2747 says:
The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors of the bank not to agents of the branch banks.

And section 53 of Act No. 2612 says:

Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act, etc.," and provides
for a fine or imprisonment or both, and it must be conceded that the bank itself
could not be imprisoned for a violation of section 35.
It is very apparent that section 35 was intended to prohibit the making of any loan
by the bank to an officer or director of the bank.
It is also claimed that the loan to the defendant within the meaning of section 35.
He was the President and active Manager of the Bank, and was the owner and
had under his control about 40 per cent of the capital stock of the Binalbagan
Estate, which was also a corporation, which was then indebted to the bank more
than 15 per cent of the capital stock of the bank. With P750,000 loan, its
idebtedness to the bank amounted to very little less than 20 per cent of the
capital stock of the bank.
Upon that question, the case of People vs. Knapp (132 N.Y. Supp., 747), is
square in point. There, third count of the indictment charged the defendant with
violating subdivision 11 of section 186 of the banking law in the making of a loan
to him as director by a loaning of the money to the copartnership of which he was
a member, and that it was done through the direction, permission, advice, and
procurement of the defendant.
The court said:
We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as
to himself directly. The loan was made indirectly to him through his firm. . . .
An appeal was taken, and the lower court was affirmed in (206 N. Y. 373), and
the case is reported in 11 Am. Ann. Cases, p. 243, in which the syllabus says:
The prohibition in a statute forbidding a corporation to do an act extends to the
board of directors and to each director separately and individually.
And the opinion says:
As to the remaining counts the defendant insists that the command that a
corporation shall not do a certain act is not a command that he directors shall not
do the act. A corporation, however, is a mere conception of the legislative mind. It
exists only on paper through the command of the legislature that its mental
conception shall be clothed with power. All its power resides in the directors.
Inanimate and incapable of thought, action or neglect, it cannot hear or obey the
voice of the legislature except through its directors. It can neither act nor omit to
act except through them. Hence a command addressed to a corporation would
be idle and vain unless the legislature in directing the corporate body, acting
wholly by its directors, to do a thing required or not to do a thing prohibited,
meant that the directors should not make or cause the corporation to do what
was forbidden, or omit to do what was directed. We think, as the appellate
division held, that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the
prohibitions extends to the board of directors and to each director, separately and
individually.
. . . The Banking Law should be construed in accordance with the obvious
intention of the legislature so as to permit flexibility and to prevent looseness in
doing business. The prime object is to protect the public, including depositors,
and after that to enable the stockholders to secure a fair return from their

investment. Banking institutions are not created for the benefit of the directors.
While directors have great powers as directors, they have no special privileges
as individuals. They cannot use the assets of the bank for their own benefit
except as permitted by law. Stringent restrictions are placed about them so that
when acting both for the bank and for one of themselves at the same time, they
must keep within certain prescribed lines regarded by the legislature as essential
to safety in the banking business.
The only difference as to the facts is that, there, the money was loaned to a
copartnership of which the defendant was a member, and, here it is loaned to a
corporation of which the defendant was one of the heaviest stockholders. Here,
good faith on the part of the defendant and sound banking would not permit the
personal satisfaction by him, as President of the Bank, of a first mortgage loan of
P600,000, and the taking in lieu thereof, and as a substitute therefor, of the
unsecured promissory note of the Binalbagan Estate in which he owned and
controlled at least 40 per cent of its capital stock and it is very apparent that the
defendant would never have authorized the loan of P750,000, or satisfied the
mortgage of P600,000, if he had not been a heavy stockholder in the Binalbagan
Estate. The fact that he was such a stockholder was one of the main
inducements and the primary consideration for his approval of the transaction.
It will be noted that section 35 of Act No. 2747 does not contain any exception or
proviso, and that section 29 of Act No. 2938, which was enacted in 1921, says:
The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors, the general manager, assistant general
manager, and employees of the Bank, nor to agents or employees of the branch
banks, and no loan shall be granted to a corporation, partnership or company
wherein any member of the board of directors is a shareholder, agent or
employee in any manner, except by the unanimous vote of the members of the
board, excluding the member interested: Provided, That the total liabilities to the
Bank of any corporation wherein any of the members of other board of directors
is a shareholder, agent or employee in any manner, shall at no time exceed ten
per centum of the surplus and paid-up capital of the bank.
This section was enacted in 1921, and section 35 above quoted was enacted in
1918, and section 42 of Act No. 2938 expressly provides that:
All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent or incompatible with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed.
Defendant's counsel vigorously contend that the P750,000 loan to Banalbagan
Estate was reported to, and approved by, the Board of Directors; that section 35
of Act No. 2747 was repealed, and that section 29 of Act No. 2939 is the law
under which the defendant should be prosecuted.
Construing section 29, the record here is conclusive that the defendant, acting
and representing the bank, personally made and consummated the loan, and
that upon his personal advice and instructions, the check was paid, and that
personally, as President, he satisfied the mortgage for P600,000. He not only
authorized the making of the loan, but made the loan himself without the consent
or the authority of the Board of Directors, and the loan was consummated, and
the bank parted with the money without the knowledge of the Board of Directors.

It was a completed transaction. There is a marked difference between the

authority of the president of the bank to promise or negotiate a loan and the
making of the loan itself.
Section 29 of Act No. 2938 contemplates that no loan shall ever be made to any
officer o the bank until such time as it is submitted to, and approved by, the
unanimous vote of the Board of Directors, excluding the applicant for the loan.
But, here, the loan was consummated and the transaction was completed
several days before it was ever brought to the knowledge or attention of the
directors, and, even assuming that they did ratify a loan of that character, it would
not constitute a defense. The law was violated in the making and consummation
of the loan without the knowledge or consent of the Board of Directors. If the
Binalbagan Estate had applied to the defendant, as President of the Bank, for the
loan in question, and if, upon its receipt, he had submitted the application to the
Board of Directors recommending the loan, and acting upon his advice the Board
had approved the loan, and the loan had been made after such approval by the
board, another and different question would have been presented, and there
would have been merit in such a defense, but that is not this case.
Even under section 29, the consent and approval of the Board of Directors was a
condition precedent to the making of the loan in question, and the fact that the
Board of Directors a few days after the offense was committed may have
approved it would not be a defense to the commission of the crime. In other
words, assuming that the Board of Directors did approve of a violation of the law,
it would not aid the defendant. He was occupying a position of special trust and
confidence, and was the president and head of the most important financial
institution in the whole Philippine Islands. His powers and duties were defined
and described in the corporate charter of the bank. It was organized under a
special act, and the Government itself subscribed for, and was the owner of, the
majority of its capital stock. It was the purpose and intent to make it a
conservative, strong and safe bank, and numerous provisions were made in the
Act for its safety an stability, among which was section 35 of Act No. 2747.
Here, you have the President of the Bank upon his own initiative and his sole
approval authorizing, making and perfecting a loan of P750,000 to a corporation
in which he owned and controlled 40 per cent of its capital stock. It was never the
purpose or intent of the corporate charter that any officer of the bank should
have, assume or exercise any such arbitrary or autocratic power.
It is worthy of note that the material provisions of the law prohibiting a loan to an
officer of the bank are almost identical in each legislative act. Also, that the
punishment for a violation is the same in each Act.
Hence, we must assume that at all times, it was the purpose and intent of the
Legislature that no loan should ever be made by the bank to any officer or
director, except under the express provisions of the law.
The loan was maid while Act No. 2747 was in force and effect and before the
passage of Act No. 2938, and appellant's counsel vigorously contend that Act No.
2747 was repealed by Act No. 2938, and appellant's counsel vigorously contend
that Act No. 2747 was repealed by Act No. 2938, and that the repeal of the one
and the enactment of the other operated as a release and discharge of all crime

which were committed prior to the passage of Act No. 2938. In other words, that
the Act of the Legislature released the defendant of any crime which he may
have committed prior to January, 1921.
We do not believe that it was ever the purpose or intention of the Legislature to
release anyone from a crime committed under either one of the Acts, and, in
particular, as to the offense described in the information. As stated upon the
question here involved, each one of the legislative acts expressly prohibits the
bank from loaning any of its money to an officer or director, and the only
difference is found in the latter portion of section 29 of Act No. 2938, which, upon
the undisputed facts, is not material to the question involved here.
Section 42 of Act No. 2938 says:
All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent or incompatible with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed.
Upon the disputed facts, there is nothing inconsistent or incompatible with either
section 37 of Act No. 2612, or section 35 of Act No. 2747, as construed with
section 29 of Act No. 2938. Each section expressly prohibits the making of a loan
by the Bank to an officer, and the only difference is the proviso in section 29,
which does not apply to the facts here. There is nothing in section 37 or in
section 35 which is inconsistent or incompatible with section 29. Each of them
was intended to prohibit the Bank from loaning money to an officer of the bank.
Much stress is laid upon article 22 of the Penal Code, which says:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty
of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same.
For the reason that the bank here was incorporated under a special Act, that
article should be construed as it relates to article 7, which says:
Offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
code.
This was construed in United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), in which this court
held:
Where an Act of the Commission or of the Philippine Legislature which penalizes
an offense repeals a former Act which penalizes the same offense, such repeal
does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict, and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law prior to its
repeal.
Article 22 was further construed and applied in United States vs. Parrone (24
Phil., 29).
But, in the instant case, there is no change in the law for the punishment of the
crime, and section 42 of Act No. 2938 limits the repeal to such portions only of
the previous law as are inconsistent or incompatible with Act No. 2938.
Section 35 says:
The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members, etc.
Appellant contends that the transaction involved here was a discount of the note
of the estate as distinguished from a loan, and, hence, that it was not a violation
of the law. Suffice it to say that, in enacting the law, the Legislature was not

dealing with, and knew but very little, if anything, of, the subtle distinction
between loans and discounts. Section 35 was intended to prohibit any officer of
the bank from borrowing or using any money of the bank for any purpose. Again,
an analysis of the facts clearly shows that the transaction was a loan, and that it
did not have any of the elements of a discount.
The face value of the original mortgage, which the bank held on the
"Palma" hacienda, was P600,000, and the accrued interest was P26,218.66, and
the amount of the check, which the bank gave to Salvador Serra was
P123,781.34, the amount of the check, which the bank gave to Salvador Serra
was P123,781.34, the total amount of which was P750,000, which is the identical
amount of the note which was executed by the Binalbagan Estate to the bank at
the time the deal was closed, hence, the evidence is conclusive that it was a loan
as distinguished from a discount.
In August, 1916, a question arose as to the construction which should be placed
upon sections 37 and 38 of Act No. 2612, and an opinion of the then Insular
Auditor was rendered, which apparently gave color to the legal right of the Bank
to defeat the purpose and intent of those sections, and the defendant claims
that he was justified in his conduct through the previous acts and the established
custom of the bank, and it is true that, in the ordinary course of business, but little
attention was paid to the provisions of those sections. The Auditor was not the
legal adviser of the Bank.
Section 25 of the original act expressly provides that:
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands shall be attorney for said National
Bank: Provided, however, That the Board of Directors of said bank shall have
power to employ other attorneys in special cases.
Hence, it must follow that the Attorney-General was the legal adviser of the bank,
and there is nothing to show that he was ever requested to, or that he ever did,
render a legal opinion upon the construction which should be placed upon
sections 37 and 38 of Act No. 2612. But giving the Auditor's opinion its broadest
construction, it would not justify the commission by the defendant of the acts
shown in the record. It might tend to mitigate, but it would not legalize the
offense.
The record further shows that on September 15, 1916, Mr. Ferguson, as Acting
President of the Bank, addressed a letter to Mr. Dexter, as Acting Insular Auditor,
in which he says:
We can readily see where loans directly made to Directors would be very
harmful, and it is a wise provision in the Act which makes this impossible, but
there is a wide difference between loaning money to a Director, and discounting
the single name paper or Bills receivable of a business house, with whom such a
Director might be interested.
As we have pointed out, the transaction here was a loan and not a discount.
Again, any mitigation of the offense is more than offset by the subsequent
conduct of the defendant.
August 3, 1920, the defendant wrote a letter to the Governor-General in which he
complains of official treatment, and clearly points out the serious financial
condition of the Bank, in which, among other things, he says:

If this Bank is compelled to adopt drastic measures as to the liquidation of its

loans we would be placed in the position of having to shirk the responsibility for
any serious consequences that may arise, and to point to the Department of
Finance for insisting on such a policy.
The policy of contraction which is now in force in the operations of the Bank
and with the party payments on our loans to sugar central, our cash reserve will
be up to the requirements next year aside from our ability to replenish our cash
reserve in substantial amounts.
The whole tenor of the letter clearly reveals that the defendant realized and was
very uneasy about the condition of the bank, and yet seventeen days before that
letter was written, he personally made an unsecured loan to the Binalbagan
Estate for P750,000, because of the very apparent reason that he was one of its
heaviest stockholders.
We have given this case the careful consideration which its importance
demands, and have examined each of the numerous assignments of error.
Defendant's case was skillfully presented in an exhaustive brief by able counsel,
but in the final analysis, the stubborn, undisputed fact remains that the defendant
did personally make a large unsecured loan to a corporation in which he was one
of its heaviest stockholders, and that the loan was consummated and the money
paid over without the knowledge of the Board of Directors, and that it was made
to the prejudice and injury of the bank, and to further and promote his own
personal interests, and that, as President of the Bank, he personally released the
mortgage of the bank upon the property which his corporation acquired through
the deal, and that upon the undisputed facts, it was done in violation not only of
section 35 of Act No. 2747, but also of section 38 of Act No. 2612, and of section
29 of Act No. 2938.
Criticism is made of the penal clause, and its validity is attacked. It will be noted
that it is the same in each act, and that a large discretion is given to the trial
court, varying from a minimum fine to P10,000, or imprisonment not to exceed
five years, or both fine and imprisonment. Its purpose was to prohibit a violation
of any provision of the bank's charter, and to make the penalty correspond to the
gravity of the offense, and that question was left to the discretion of the court.
The judgement of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnsons, Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.

BUSCAYANO V MILITARY COMMISSION

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58284 November 19, 1981
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, BERNABE BUSCAYNO,
JOSE MA. SISON and JULIET SISON, petitioners,
vs.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS NOS. 1, 2, 6 and 25, GENERAL FABIAN VER, GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL VIRGILIO SALDAJENO, CAPTAIN MELCHOR A. ACOSTA and REVIEW
BOARD OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado Guerrero, alleged subversives
classified as "PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional Armed Group personalities", were wanted by the
authorities since 1971.
In Department Order No. 610 Undersecretary of National Defense Efren I. Plana fixed P150,000 and
P50,000 as the prizes to be paid to any person who kills, captures or causes the killing, capture or surrender
of Buscayno and Sison, respectively, or who furnishes information directly leading to and which is the
proximate result of their killing or capture. (p. 96, Rollo of L-47185.)
Buscayno and Sison were included in the so-called "National Target List" of active participants in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power and to take over the government by force whose arrest was
ordered under 'General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972. The list was prepared by Colonel Hamilton
B. Dimaya. (p. 95, Rollo of L-47185.)
Buscayno's case Even before Buscayno's arrest, he and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. (arrested on September
23, 1972) were charged before Military Commission No. 2 in an amended charge sheet dated August 14,
1973 with subversion or violation of the Anti-Subversion Law, Republic Act No. 1700.
It was alleged that as ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arms, the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan and the New People's Army, constituting an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the government by force or placing it under the control of an alien power, they committed the
following acts (Criminal Case No. MC-223, pp. 71-75, Rollo of L-47185):
1. In April 1969, Aquino at 25 Times Street, Quezon City gave P15,000 to the said organizations for the
purpose of staging an NPA-sponsored demonstration in Manila which was in fact carried out in Congress,
Malacaang and the American Embassy on April 19, 1969 to achieve the objectives of the said
organizations.
2. Aquino in 1967 gave to Buscayno in Concepcion, Tarlac a .45 caliber pistol with magazine and
ammunition to be used against the government.
3. Aquino in August, 1967 in the house of Leonida Arceo located at Barrio San Francisco, Tarlac, Tarlac gave
to Buscayno two .45 caliber pistols to be used against the government.
4. Aquino in October, 1969 in Barrio Alto, Hacienda Luisita, San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac, gave to Commanders
Arthur Garcia and Jose Buscayno two armored vests and a pair of walkie-talkies to be used against the
government.

5. Aquino on November 1 and 2, 1965 in San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac, gave to Commander Alibasbas through
Commander Danilo several firearms and ammunition which were taken from the house of Manuel Rodriguez
and which were to be used against the government and in fact the said firearms were recovered from
Commander Alibasbas and his group when they were killed in Barrio Almendras, Concepcion, Tarlac.
6. Aquino in 1970 and 1971 at 25 Times Street, Quezon City provided shelter and medical treatment for
Roberto Santos alias Commander Felman Benjamin Sanguyo alias Commander Pusa and eight other sick
or wounded officers or members of the HMB and NPA.
Aquino, Buscayno, Peter Ilocano and Puriok, as conspirators, were also charged with murder before Military
Commission No. 2 in a charge sheet dated August 7, 1973. It was alleged that during the last days of
November to December 2, 1967 they took Cecilio Sumat a barrio captain of Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac, from his
house and killed him in Barrio San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac (Criminal Case No. MC-2-22, pp. 76-77, Rollo of L47185).
In Criminal Case No. MC-1-92, Buscayno, with ninety-one other persons including Sison and his wife, Juliet
de Lima, Saturnino Ocampo and Mila Astorga-Garcia, were charged with rebellion before Military
Commission No. 1 in a charge sheet dated March 18, 1977.
It was alleged that on or about February 4, 1972 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto the ninetytwo accused as officers and leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New
People's Army, and as conspirators rose publicly and took up arms against the government in Navotas, Rizal
and elsewhere in the Philippines for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said government or its
laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof or of its armed forces by organizing the Karagatan
Fishing Corporation and operating the M/V Karagatan a fishing vessel, to procure firearms and ammunition
for the CPP and NPA as in fact war materials and armanents were landed at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela
on July 2, 1972 from Communist China and were used against the army.
The second specification in Criminal Case No. MC-1-92 is that Buscayno, Sison and others during the
period from August, 1973 to February, 1974 committed rebellion in Manila, Baguio, La Union, Pangasinan,
Bulacan and elsewhere in the Philippines by acquiring, purchasing and operating vessels, motor vehicles,
beach houses, lots and other real and personal properties for use in distributing firearms and ammunition for
the CPP and NPA to be utilized in resisting the army and overthrowing the government. (pp. 78-91, Rollo of
L-47185.)
The said case was refiled in Special Military Commission No. 1 as Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1 with an
amended charge sheet dated November 8, 1977 (pp. 189-205, Rollo of G.R. No. 58284).
Buscayno was arrested on August 26. 1976 in Barrio Sto. Rosario, Mexico, Pampanga by operatives of the
armed forces. He was detained in the Constabulary Security Unit at Camp Crame. When the trial counsel
informed Buscayno that his presence at the hearing on September 15, 1976 before Military Commission No.
2 was necessary, Buscayno in a letter dated September 7, 1976 addressed to the President of the
Commission declared that he had no intention of appearing before the tribunal; that he did not need a
lawyer; that he would not contest the tribunal's jurisdiction and that any reference by the prosecution
witnesses to Buscayno alias Commander Dante would be to him and to no other person.
At Buscayno's arraignment in the subversion and murder cases, he waived his right to be present and to
have counsel. He said that he was not challenging any member of the tribunal. He just wanted to have a
record of the trial. He pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution had finished the presentation of its evidence,
Buscayno was asked whether he wanted to present evidence. He answered in writing that he did not want to
present evidence.
On July 18, 1977, Juan T. David entered his appearance as counsel for Buscayno in Criminal Case No. MC2-23 for subversion. On October 25, 1977, lawyer David filed in this Court in behalf of Buscayno a petition
for habeas corpus and prohibition.
As no restraining order was issued, the Commission continued its proceeding against Buscayno and Aquino.
On November 25, 1977, after Buscayno failed to present any evidence in spite of having been given another
chance to do so, his case was deemed submitted for decision. After deliberation, the Commission found all
the accused guilty as charged and imposed death by firing squad. The complete records of the cases were
transmitted to the Secretary of National Defense.
However, four days later or on November 29, the President of the Philippines directed the Commission to
reopen the trial and give Aquino and Buscayno another chance to present their evidence. According to the
petitioners, on December 15, 1977, this Court enjoined the Commission from rehearing the two cases (p. 20,
Petition) but no restraining order was actually issued.
This Court in its decision dated January 15, 1981 dismissed Buscayno's petition (L-47185, 102 SCRA 7). We
reiterated the rule that a military tribunal has jurisdiction to try civilians and that the proceeding in a military
commission is not violative of procedural due process and would not be vitiated by partiality. (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, L-37364, May 9, 1975, 63 SCRA 546; Gamaua vs. Espino, L-36188-37586, February 29,
1980, 96 SCRA 402.) *
On March 27, 1981, Military Commission No. 2 convened to hear Buscayno's evidence in the subversion
and murder cases. His counsel asked for postponement on the ground that he requested the President of

the Philippines to transfer the two cases to the civil courts and that he should be furnished with the
transcripts of the hearings held on November 25 and December 5, 1977. The truth is that he was furnished
with those transcripts on January 8, 1978.
The postponement was granted. The hearing was reset for April 23. At the hearing on that date, Buscayno's
counsel again asked for postponement because the President had not yet acted upon his request for the
transfer of his cases to the civil courts. He challenged the competency of the president of the Commission
on the ground of lack of adequate knowledge of the two cases. The challenge was rejected. Buscayno did
not present any evidence. The Commission considered the cases re-submitted for decision.
On May 4, 1981, the Commission denied Buscayno's motion for the reconsideration of the ruling that his
case was already submitted for decision. It reaffirmed its 1977 decision imposing on Buscayno the penalty of
death by firing squad.
Cases against Sison and spouses. They were arrested on November 10, 1977 by virtue of arrest, search
and seizure orders issued by the Secretary of National Defense.
As already stated in connection with the Buscayno case, the Sison spouses and ninety-one other persons
including Buscayno and Victor Corpus were charged with rebellion on two counts before Special Military
Commission No. 1 as shown in the amended charge sheet dated November 8,1977.
Even before her arrest, Juliet Sison, with fifty-five other persons including Victor Corpus, was charged with
subversion before Military Commission No. 6 (Case No. 55), as shown in the charge sheet dated November
16, 1972.
It was alleged therein that the fifty-six accused, in 1968 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto,
became and have remained officers and ranking leaders of the CPP and the NPA, the CPP's military arm,
and the CPP's front organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Samahang Demokratikong
Kabataan (SDK), Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), Student Alliance for National Democracy
(STAND), Movement for Democratic Philippines (MDP) and Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan
(MAKIBAKA), whose objective is the overthrow of the government for the purpose of establishing a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power.
It was specified that the accused engaged in extensive indoctrination, agitation and promotion of rallies (ten
instances) and in propagandas, speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures, all intended to promote the
communist pattern of subversion (eleven instances).
The same charge sheet indicated that the accused rose publicly and took up arms against the government,
engaging in war against the forces of the government and committing serious violence (eight instances).
Juliet Sison was pinpointed as a ranking leader of the Kabataang Makabayan operating in the Bicol region,
helping her husband Jose as KM chairman and editing the periodical Ang Bayan in Isabela in 1971-72
(Annex 3 of Return).
Jose Ma. Sison, with Juanito Canlas, Cesario Diego, Saturnino Ocampo, Antonio Liao, Mila Roque, Alfredo
Granada, Ramon Isberto, Ester Ceniza and Evelyn Sarmiento were charged with subversion under
Presidential Decree No. 885 (which superseded Republic Act No. 1700) before Military Commission No.
25 in Case No. 113 as shown in the charge sheet dated October 3, 1978.
It was alleged that the ten accused, in or about 1968 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and
continuously thereafter, in Capas, Tarlac and elsewhere in the Philippines, wilfully organized and joined as
officers and ranking members of the CPP and the NPA for the purpose of overthrowing the government
through armed revolution, violence and subversion with the covert assistance and support of a foreign power
in order to establish therein a totalitarian regime subject to alien control and domination (Annex 4 of Return).
In the rebellion case, Case No. SMC-1-1, the Sison spouses and the Buscayno spouses assailed the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal to try civilians like them.
On January 3, 1979, the Sison spouses, together with the Buscayno spouses, Peter Mutuc, Edgar Pilapil,
Eduardo Lingat, Joaquin Rivera, Leonila Lumbang and Juanito Canlas, filed in this Court a petition for
habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus (L-49579).
That petition, like Buscayno's petition in L-47185, was dismissed in this Court's decision dated January 15,
1981 (102 SCRA 33).
The instant case. On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant omnibus
catchall petition for habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus couched in repetitious, involuted and
obfuscatory verbiage
They prayed that the decision of Military Commission No. 2 dated May -1. 1981, convicting Buscayno of
subversion and murder and sentencing him to death by firing squad, be declared void because he was
denied his constitutional right to present evidence and that he be released from detention.
They also prayed that the charges of rebellion and subversion be dismissed for being in contravention of the
rule on double jeopardy, that Military Commissions Nos. 1, 6 and 25 be enjoined from proceeding with the
trial of the petitioners and that the petitioners be released. They also prayed that they be granted bail.
The petitioners also asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, enjoining the three
Commissions from trying the petitioners, enjoining Military Commission No. 1 from continuing with the

perpetuation of testimonies and from requiring the petitioners to attend the perpetuation proceedings and
enjoining the Review Board-AFP from reviewing the decision in the subversion and murder cases.
Habeas corpus and petitioners' release on bail. - This is Buscayno's third petition for habeas corpus and the
second petition of the Sison spouses. The ultimate issue is whether they are legally detained. We find that
they have not been illegally deprived of their liberty and that there is no justification to order their release.
Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981, which terminated martial law, sanctions the continued
confinement of the petitioners. It provides (77 OG 441):
... Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President/Prime Minister of the Philippines, ... proclaim the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines;
Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and
Provided, that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue; and in all other places the
suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to persons at present detainedas well
as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed
by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith;
General Order No. 8 is also hereby revoked and the military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby
dissolved upon final determination of cases pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil courts
without irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances
which render further prosecution of the cases difficult, if not impossible;
Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly provides that persons, like petitioners who are under detention for rebellion
and the capital offense of subversion, cannot enjoy the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Because the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them, they are not entitled to bail (Lansang vs.
Garcia, L-33964, December 11, 1971 and eight other cases, 42 SCRA 448).
Review of rulings of the military commission. Ordinarily, this Court cannot review the rulings and
proceedings of the military commission. The National Security Code, Presidential Decree No. 1498, which
was issued on June 11, 1978 (74 OG 11066), provides in its sections 86(f) and 87(e) that what this Court
can review are the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals in cases appealed to it from the military
commission.
Generally, this Court does not exercise over military commissions the supervisory jurisdiction which it
possesses over civil trial courts whose interlocutory rulings and decisions may be reviewed by this Court.
(See Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171; Martelino vs. Alejandro, L-30894, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 106).
So, the issue as to whether Buscayno was denied his constitutional right to present evidence should first be
passed upon by the reviewing military authority and not by this Court. The propriety of the perpetuation
proceedings in the rebellion case and the conduct of the trial in the Commission cannot at this stage be
passed upon by this Court.
We have definitively ruled that the petitioners can be tried by the military commissions and that their cases
are within the jurisdiction and competence of military tribunals.
Nevertheless, two legal issues regarding double jeopardy and the alleged repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law
may be resolved in the interest of justice, to dissipate any uncertainty and for the guidance of the parties.
Alleged repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law. Juliet de Lima Sison contends that her criminal liability for
subversion was extinguished when Presidential Decree No. 885 (which took effect on May 11, 1976, 72 OG
3826) repealed Republic Act No. 1700. This contention is bereft of merit.
That decree, which is the Revised Anti-Subversion Law, in repealing or superseding Republic Act No. 1700,
expressly provides in its section 7 that "acts committed in violation" of the former law before the effectivity of
the said decree "shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the provisions of the former Act" and
that nothing in the said decree "shall prevent prosecution of cases pending for violation of" Republic Act No.
1700. That saving or transitory clause is reenacted in section 14(i) of the National Security Code.
It is similar to article 366 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that felonies and misdemeanors
committed prior to the effectivity of the Revised Penal Code shall be punished in accordance with the old
Penal Code and the laws in force at the time of their commission.
The fact that Presidential Decree No. 885 does not mention the CPP does not mean that that party is no
longer regarded as a subversive organization. The purpose of the party is the decisive factor in determining
whether it is a subversive organization.
The issue of double jeopardy. The petitioners invoke their constitutional right not to be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. As may be gleaned from section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, "same offense" means the offense charged, or an attempt to commit it or a frustrated stage thereof, or
"any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information."
For an accused to be in jeopardy, it is necessary (1) that a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction is filed against him; (2) that the charge is filed

in a court of competent jurisdiction and (3) that after he had pleaded to the charge, he was convicted or
acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
(People vs. Pilpa, L-30250, September 22, 1977, 79 SCRA 81).
To be in jeopardy, the case against the accused must be terminated by means of a final conviction, acquittal
or dismissal without his express consent, If the case is not yet terminated, then jeopardy does not set in.
After the accused has been put in jeopardy, the filing against him of another charge for the same offense or
for an attempt or frustrated stage thereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included in the
offense originally charged places him in double jeopardy.
That is forbidden by section 22, Article IV of the Constitution or by the rule against double jeopardy: nemo
bis punitur pro eodem delicto (no one is twice punished for the same offense) or non bis in Idem which is
analogous tores judicata in civil cases.
As stated earlier, Buscayno was charged with subversion together with Aquino in a 1973 charge sheet. Jose
Ma. Sison was charged with subversion in a 1978 charge sheet. His wife, Juliet de Lima, was charged with
subversion in a 1972 charge sheet. The three petitioners were all charged with rebellion in an amended
charge sheet datedNovember 8, 1977. Only the subversion case against Buscayno was decided but the
decision is still subject to review.
Because no case against the petitioners has been terminated, it is once evident that they cannot invoke the
rule on double jeopardy. The petitioners have not yet been placed in jeopardy.
In Bulaong vs. People, L-19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746, Agaton Bulaong was charged with rebellion in
the Laguna Court of First Instance and later with subversion in the Manila Court of First Instance in
connection with his activities as an officer of the CPP and HMB He was convicted of rebellion by the Laguna
court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. He appealed to this Court. The subversion
case was still pending in the Manila court.
In this Court, he contended that because rebellion is an offense cognate with subversion and that the two
informations contain the same facts, he could not be tried for rebellion and subversion without being placed
twice in jeopardy for the same acts.
It was held that the defense of double jeopardy should be interposed by Bulaong in the subversion case. He
could not plead double jeopardy in the rebellion case because the subversion case had not yet been
terminated. (See Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, L-46366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10; Jimenez
vs. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. 54577, January 15, 1981, 102 SCRA 39).
Petitioners contend that rebellion is an element of the crime of subversion. That contention is not correct
because subversion does not necessarily include rebellion. Subversion, like treason, is a crime against
national security. Rebellion is a crime against public order.
Republic Act No. 1700 (quoted in full in People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382),
which took effect on June 20, 1957 and which outlaws the Communist Party and similar associations
because their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national security,
punishes the following acts:
1. By arresto mayor, anyone who knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or
remains a member of the Communist Party or its successor or any subversive association as defined in the
law. Prision correccional shall be imposed for a second conviction. Prision mayor shall be imposed for
subsequent convictions.
2. By prision mayor to death, being an officer or a ranking leader of the Communist Party or of any
subversive association as defined in the law.
3. By prision mayor to death, any member of the Communist Party or similar subversive association who
takes up arms against the government.
4. By prision correccional to prision mayor, one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines or the government of any of its political subdivisions by force,
violence, deceit, subversion or other illegal means for the purpose of placing such Government or political
subdivision under the control and donation of any alien power.
5. By prision correccional any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought under
the Anti-Subversion Law.
As already noted, Republic Act No. 1700 was superseded by Presidential Decree No. 885 which reads as
follows:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 885
OUTLAWING SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS; PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP THEREIN AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Whereas, there are certain associations or organizations in the Republic of the Philippines, not covered by
Republic Act No. 1700, which are seeking to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or
to dismember a portion thereof; and
Whereas, in order to protect the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the people, it has
become necessary to revise Republic Act No. 1700 to broaden its coverage;

Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers in me vested by
the Constitution, do hereby decree as follows:
Section 1. Short Title This decree shall be known as the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.
Sec. 2. Subversive Associations and Organizations - Any association, organization, political party, or group
of persons organized for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof, with the open or covert assistance or support of a foreign power or the open
or covert support from a foreign source of any association, group or person, whether public or private, by
force, violence, terrorism, arson, petition, deceit or other illegal shall be considered and is hereby d a
subversive organization. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 31, effective on June 6, 1979 and P.D. No.
1736, Sept. 12, 1980.).
Sec. 3. Penalties (a) Members. Whoever knowingly, wilfully and by overt act affiliates with, becomes or
remains a member of a subversive association or organization as defined in Section 2 hereof shall be
punished by arresto mayor and shall be disqualified permanently from holding any public office, appointive
or elective, and from exercising the right to vote; in case of a second conviction, the principal penalty shall
be prision correccional and in all subsequent convictions the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed.
The following acts shall constitute prima facie evidence of membership in any subversive association:
(1) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists records, correspondence, or any
other document of the organization;
(2) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever;
(3) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans, or in any
other forms;
(4) Executing orders, plans or directives of any kind of such association or organization;
(5) Acting as an agent, courier, messenger, correspondent, organizer, or in any other capacity, on behalf of
such association or organization;
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan
or enterprise thereof;
(7) Transmitting orders, directives, or plans of such association or organization orally or in writing or any
other means of communication such as by signal, semaphore, sign or code;
(8) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the
objectives and purposes of such association or organization;
(9) Mailing, shipping, . circulating, distributing, or delivering to other persons any material or propaganda of
any kind on behalf of such association or organization;
(10) Advising, counselling, or in other way giving instruction, information, suggestions, or recommendations
to officers or members or to any other person to further the objectives of such association or organization;
(11) Participating in any way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association or
organization.
(b) Officers or Ranking Leaders. If such member is an officer or a ranking leader of any subversive
association or organization as defined in Section 2 hereof, or if such member takes up arms against the
Government, he shall be punished by prision mayor to death with all the accessory penalties provided
therefor in the Revised Penal Code.
(c) Deportation Any alien convicted under this decree shall be deported immediately after he shall have
served the sentence imposed upon him.
Sec. 4. False Testimony. Any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought under
this decree shall be punished by prision correccional.
Sec. 5. Sufficiency of Evidence. Except as provided in Section 7 hereof, the two-witness rule heretofore
provided in Republic Act Numbered Seventeen hundred is hereby obrogated and the accused may be
convicted on the testimony of one witness if sufficient under the rules of evidence, or on his confession given
in open court.
Sec. 6. No Restriction of Thought. Nothing in this decree shall be interpreted as a restriction on freedom
of thought, of assembly and of association for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Sec. 7. Repealing Clause. This decree supersedes Republic Act Numbered Seventeen Hundred, but acts
committed in violation thereof and before the effectivity of this decree, shall be prosecuted and punished in
accordance with the provisions of the former Act. Nothing in this decree shall prevent prosecution of cases
pending for violation of Republic Act Numbered Seventeen Hundred.
Sec. 8. Sequestration of Property. The sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the Government and its duly constituted authorities, is hereby
authorized, in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense.
As used herein, the terms "sequester" and "sequestration" shall mean the seizure of private property or
assets in the hands of any person or entity in order to prevent the utilization, transfer or conveyance of the

same for purposes inimical to national security, or when necessary to protect the interest of the Government
or any of its instrumentalities. It shall include the taking over and assumption of the management, control
and operation of the private property or assets seized.
Sec. 9. Effectivity. This decree shall take effect thirty days after its publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3rd day of February, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventysix.
Presidential Decree No. 885 is incorporated in section 14 of the National Security Code.
On the other hand, rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, Philippine
territory or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Rebellion is distinct from participation or membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly
constituted government (People vs. Hernandez, 120 Phil. 191, 220).
The petitioners were accused of rebellion for having allegedly undertaken a public uprising to overthrow the
government. In contrast, they were accused of subversion for being allegedly officers and ranking
members of the Communist Party and similar subversive groups. The alleged overt acts of resisting the
armed forces were only incidental to the main charge of being leaders of subversive or revolutionary
organizations collaborating with an alien power to make the country a satellite thereof, like Cuba, North
Korea and North Vietnam in relation to Soviet Russia.
The issue on double jeopardy raised by the petitioners was resolved by this Court in People vs. Liwanag
alias Linda Bie, L-27683, October 19, 1976, 73 SCRA 473. In that case, Silvestre Liwanag was charged in
1960 with subversion for being an officer and ranking member of the CPP and HMB.
He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy because he had already been
convicted of rebellion based on the same overt acts allegedly constituting the crime of subversion. The trial
court denied the motion. After trial he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He appealed to
this Court where he again raised the issue that the charge of subversion placed him in double jeopardy.
It was held that there was no double jeopardy because Liwanag was convicted of rebellion for acts
committed before the Anti-Subversion Law took effect while the subversion charge referred to his act of
having remained an officer and ranking leader of the CPP and HMB from the time the Anti-Subversion Law
took effect on June 20, 1957 up to his capture in 1960. Moreover. the crime of subversion is distinct from
rebellion.
In the instant case, the rebellion charge against the petitioners embraced the acts committed by them on or
about February 4, 1972 and during the period from August, 1973 to February, 1974. The subversion charge
against Buscayno involved his acts committed in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971. The subversion charge
against the Sison spouses referred to their acts committed in 1968 and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto. The common denominator of the rebellion and subversion charges is that the petitioners committed
overt acts as alleged communists or leftists. The overt acts in the two charges are different.
Rebellion is an offense that has existed in the Penal Code for a long time. It may be committed by noncommunists without collaborating with the agents of an alien power. In contrast, the crime of subversion
came into existence when the communists sought to dominate the world in order to establish a new social
economic and political order.
The constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Law was upheld in People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27,
1972, 48 SCRA 382 and 56 SCRA 793. Long before the passage of the Anti-Subversion Law membership in
illegal associations has been penalized (Art. 146, Revised Penal Code).
A statute which punishes membership in a party or association that advocates the overthrow or destruction
of the government by force or violence is justified on the ground of self-preservation (Dennis vs. U.S., 341
U.S. 494, 509; Scales vs. U.S. 367 U.S. 203).
The unavoidable conclusion is that in the present posture of the pending cases against the petitioners their
plea of double jeopardy cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., concur in the result.
Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.

DE AGBAYANI V PNB
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971

FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN, defendants, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.
Dionisio E. Moya for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon B. de los Reyes for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any, to be attached to
a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of this appeal from a lower court
decision. Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a
favorable judgment in her suit against defendant, now appellant Philippine National
Bank, permanently enjoining the other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan,
from proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to plaintiff
mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no longer enforceable, the
prescriptive period having lapsed. There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised
by appellant that if the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act
subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation, then the
right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting. In arriving at such a conclusion, the
lower court manifested a tenacious adherence to the inflexible view that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus as
inoperative as if it had never been. It was oblivious to the force of the principle adopted
by this Court that while a statute's repugnancy to the fundamental law deprives it of its
character as a juridical norm, its having been operative prior to its being nullified is a fact

that is not devoid of legal consequences. As will hereafter be explained, such a failing of
the lower court resulted in an erroneous decision. We find for appellant Philippine
National Bank, and we reverse.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00
from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real
estate mortgage duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the
province of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in
the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant instituted
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff
countered with his suit against both defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation
being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years
having elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was
made permanent in the decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed
for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription
would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32
1
was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2extending the period
of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the
time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As noted, the
lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of
plaintiff.
Hence this appeal, which, as made clear at the outset, possesses merit, there being a
failure on the part of the lower court to adhere to the applicable constitutional doctrine as
to the effect to be given to a statute subsequently declared invalid.
1. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for
that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official
act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results
in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts
it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution.
3
It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not
however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of
nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to
be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and
may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act
was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.
This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive

measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of
its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." 4 This language has been
quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill 5 and the decision in Manila Motor
Co., Inc. v. Flores. 6 An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar
speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. 7
2. Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police power legislation
intended to promote public welfare but adversely affecting property rights is involved.
While subject to be assailed on due process, equal protection and non-impairment
grounds, all that is required to avoid the corrosion of invalidity is that the rational basis or
reasonableness test is satisfied. The legislature on the whole is not likely to allow an
enactment suffering, to paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of out running the bounds
of reason and resulting in sheer oppression. It may be of course that if challenged, an
adverse judgment could be the result, as its running counter to the Constitution could still
be shown. In the meanwhile though, in the normal course of things, it has been acted
upon by the public and accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would indeed be the
fruitful parent of injustice. Moreover, as its constitutionality is conditioned on its being fair
or reasonable, which in turn is dependent on the actual situation, never static but subject
to change, a measure valid when enacted may subsequently, due to altered
circumstances, be stricken down.
That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act No. 342, the
moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then
President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by war sufferers. So it was explicitly held in Rutter v.
Esteban 8 where such enactment was considered in 1953 "unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same
should be declared null and void and without effect." 9 At the time of the issuance of the
above Executive Order in 1945 and of the passage of such Act in 1948, there was a
factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines was confronted with an
emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her liberation from the Japanese
military forces in 1945. Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate.
Measures, radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some semblance of
normalcy could be restored and an improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then
that the suspension of enforcement of payment of the obligations then existing was
declared first by executive order and then by legislation. The Supreme Court was right
therefore in rejecting the contention that on its face, the Moratorium Law was
unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
Considering the circumstances confronting the legitimate government upon its return to
the Philippines, some such remedial device was needed and badly so. An unyielding
insistence then on the rights to property on the part of the creditors was not likely to

meet with judicial sympathy. Time passed however, and conditions did change.
When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question before it was its
satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the time of its enactment but as of such date.
Clearly, if then it were found unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual
obligations must prevail over the assertion of community power to remedy an existing
evil. The Supreme Court was convinced that such indeed was the case. As stated in the
opinion of Justice Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these
obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders
Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the
eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a
vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could affect a liquidation of their investment
dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive.
While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief
accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors.
Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are
unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law the debtor is not even
required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the
United States. 10 The conclusion to which the foregoing considerations inevitably led was
that as of the time of adjudication, it was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not
survive the test of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified. That
before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There is
all the more reason then to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the existence
of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to
which legal consequences are attached.
3. Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid
governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court
has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity
that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342
were in force, prescription did not run. So it has been held from Day v. Court of First
Instance, 11 decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez, 12 handed down only last year.
What is deplorable is that as of the time of the lower court decision on January 27, 1960,
at least eight decisions had left no doubt as to the prescriptive period being tolled in the
meanwhile prior to such adjudication of invalidity. 13 Speaking of the opposite view
entertained by the lower court, the present Chief Justice, in Liboro v. Finance and Mining
Investments Corp. 14 has categorized it as having been "explicitly and consistently
rejected by this Court." 15
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus manifest. From July 19,
1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of
fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the
effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously
then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation,
there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed
August 10, 1959 dismissed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Under Executive Order No. 32 providing for a debt moratorium, it was specifically
stated: "Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable
within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations entered into in any
area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation that such area has been freed from
enemy occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending action by the
Commonwealth Government." Executive Order No. 32 was issued on March 10, 1945.
Executive Order No. 32 amended Executive Order No. 25 (1944).
2 According to the declaration of policy in Republic Act No. 342 (1948), Executive Order
No. 32 remains in full force and effect for the war sufferers as for them the emergency
created by the last war was still existent. Then came this specific provision: "All debts
and other monetary obligations payable by private parties within the Philippines originally
incurred or contracted before December 8, 1941, and still remaining unpaid, any
provision or provisions in the contract creating the same or in any subsequent
agreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not be due and
demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage
claim of the debtor by the United States Philippine War Damage Commission, without
prejudice, however, to any voluntary agreement which the interested parties may enter
into after the approval of this Act for the settlement of said obligations." Sec. 2.
3 ART. 7. In the classic language of Justice Field: "An unconstitutional Act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in
legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been." Norton v. Shelly
County, 118 US 425 (1886).
4 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank 308 US 371, 374 (1940).
5 93 Phil. 1002 (1953).
6 99 Phil. 738 (1956).
7 L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095.
8 93 Phil. 68 (1953). Rutter v. Esteban was subsequently cited in the following cases:
Araneta v. Hill, 93 Phil. 1002 (1953); Londres v. National Life Insurance Co., 94 Phil. 627
(1954); Dizon v. Ocampo, 94 Phil. 803 (1954); De Leon v. Ibaez, 95 Phil. 119 (1954);
Picornell and Co. v. Cordovan 95 Phil. 632 (1954); Berg v. Teus, 96 Phil. 102 (1954);
Herrera v. Arellano, 97 Phil. 776 (1955); Chua Lamko v. Dioso, 97 Phil. 821 (1955); Rio y
Cia v. Sandoval, 100 Phil. 407 (1956); Gonzaga v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 100
Phil. 892 (1957); Pacific Commercial Co. v. Aquino, 100 Phil. 961 (1957); Bachrach

motor Co., Inc. v. Chua Tua Hian, 101 Phil. 194 (1957); Liboro v. Finance and Mining
Investment Corp., 102 Phil. 489 1957); Rio y Compania v. Jolkipli 105 Phil. 447 (1959);
People v. Jolliffe 105 Phil. 677 (1959); Uy Hoo and Co., Inc. v. Tan, 105 Phil. 717 (1959);
Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals and Libby, McNeill and Libby (Phil.), Inc., 108
Phil. 469 (1960).
9 Ibid., p. 82. The same conclusion obtains in the opinion of the Court as regards
Executive Order No. 32.
10 Ibid., p. 77.
11 94 Phil. 816.
12 L-24137, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 219, citing Republic v. Grijaldo, L-20240,
December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 681; Republic v. Rodriguez, L-18967, January 31, 1966,
16 SCRA 53; Nielson and Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601,
December 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 540.
13 Day v. Court of First Instance of Tarlac, 94 Phil. 816 (1954); Montilla v. Pacific
Commercial Company, 98 Phil. 133 (1955); Pacific Commercial Co. v. Aquino, 100 Phil.
961 (1957); Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Chua Tua Tian 101 Phil. 184 (1957); Liboro v.
Finance and Mining Investment Corp., 102 Phil. 489 (1957); Rio y Compania v. Jolkipli,
105 Phil. 447 (1959); People v. Jollifee, 105 Phil. 677 (1959) ; Uy Hoo & Co., Inc. v. Tan,
105 Phil. 716 (1959).
14 102 Phil. 489 (1957).
15 Ibid., p. 493.

YNOT V IAC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457

March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to
Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect
repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still
manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of
carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order

No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is
necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition
of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate
the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth,
no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation
of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its
presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3
which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for
review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as
it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported
across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is
also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5
is not applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the
previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the
Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review
by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others,
all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means
that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption
is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a
clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be
the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's
trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve
the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound
or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should
be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular
censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this
Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative

authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in

his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof
or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter
that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the
exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the
force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the
exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination
of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary
at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate
occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question
of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast
in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on
their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was
purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who
forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like
some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable
and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the
best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was
meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its
protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific
description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that
will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of
the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example,
would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up
as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of
fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant
promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or
property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the
law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid

guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow
that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through
the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say
in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of
fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is
made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the
question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be
reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the
arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from
one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that
this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is
tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our
judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of
this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of
fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth
College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of
every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a
worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be
sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption,
for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There
are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these
requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on
the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses
to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat
and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed.
The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without
hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may
be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to
protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be

omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear
and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is
simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property
for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends
to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far
outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society,
is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and
follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in
practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a
ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police
power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the
benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order
No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the
slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present
conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the
benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the
outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis
and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of
burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken
steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law
regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to
be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the
required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An
epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number
had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused
an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly,
necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these
animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the
police power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions
of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these
animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably
necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the
public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again
following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male
and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject
as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it
complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We
note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes
an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
(sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says

executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.

Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be
assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure
applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial
court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing
may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these
minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action
may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is
not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however.
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical
per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why
the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in
a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to
him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,
21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should
have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which
alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain
for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations
that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is
none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only
the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is
here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander
who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing
the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time
presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to
enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the
President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the
Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior
authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his
rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of
his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli
despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present

challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been
perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of
relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage
of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are
but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become
truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they
are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.
Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla
Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

CUI V ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15127
May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with
costs against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for
insufficiency of proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the
agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary
evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the
school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant
University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the
College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff
finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first
semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was
studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the
mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the
defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in
the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean
Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and
having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad
Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the
last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos
University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff,
during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded
scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were

returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were
awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant
and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the
first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total
P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to
take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the
transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the
latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he
had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated.
As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid
to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to
recover from defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he
was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby
waive my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the
University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued
Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed
to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some
schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students for excellence in
scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to
poor but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that
such scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the same
school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep
students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have
enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to
other schools since their credentials would not be released unless they would
pay the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau
believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it
reserves the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked
the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the
transcript of his record in defendant University, without being required to refund
the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position
taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this
notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said
refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written

order directing the defendant to release said transcript of record, "so that the
case may be presented to the court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff
was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum of
P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953.
Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from
P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's
fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of
Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid
and binding and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It,
likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as
attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract
between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to
transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved this question in the
affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the
Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory,
not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be
unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant
without good reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the example of his
uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said
officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by
the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the
question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant
University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and
its far reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a
determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it
essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of
the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to
public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely
incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the Director of Private Schools
correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the
contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10,
1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a
public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution,
the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It
might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or establish a
public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices
of government officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of
the state. It has been consistently held in America that under the principles
relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts

of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or
tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or
to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs.
Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University
understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which
prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not
entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a
direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the
Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound
morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off.
Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as
against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the
thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or
is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine
the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s.
1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that
university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the
business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals?
Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted
principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep
them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and
practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University.
The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children,
does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges
and universities of the United States after which our educational practices or
policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward
merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first
lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one
shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of
the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's
counterclaim. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De
Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.