An Introduction to Failure Analysis

for Metallurgical Engineers

Thomas Davidson

CONTENTS

FORWARD
The objective of this paper is to introduce the reader to
the procedures generally followed when conducting a
metallurgical failure analysis. Due to the large number,
of possible causes of failures, this report will not delve
deeply into theory. Instead, six failure case reports are
provided to allow the reader to learn by example. For
this reason, the reader is expected to have some
background knowledge of failure mechanisms. However,
the paper includes a detailed bibliography containing
several sources that were used during my summer
employment to help carry out these cases. The six cases
presented are cases I worked on over the summer of 98
for Noranda Technology Centre in the Materials
Technology for Failure Prevention group.

PROCEDURE

FORWARD

PROCEDURE

CASE STUDIES
o

Introduction to Case
Studies

Case Study 1: Crane

Bolt Failure

Case Study 2: Rider

Roller Shaft Failure

Case Study 3: Crane

Pin Failure

To increase the odds of completing a conclusive failure

analysis while at the same time saving time and money,
o Case Study 4: Shaft
investigations should be carried out using a systemic
Bearing Failure
approach similar to that outlined in Figure P.1. It is
important to note however, that it is often impossible to
o Case Study 5: Bronze
foresee results that might require the investigator to go
Bull Gear Failure
back and repeat a test. A simple way reduce the
occurrence of this is to go into a case well informed on
o Case Study 6: Analysis
how similar systems have failed. An excellent source of
of 316L Reducer
for this type of information is the ASM handbooks,
Failure
particularly volume 10 on "Failure analysis and
prevention". This book is an invaluable reference to the
APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLE
beginner and the expert and should be consulted
QUESTIONNAIRE
regularly. Another important source of information are
the standards by which the part was manufactured. These
Bibliography
standards give the investigator a measuring stick by
which to compare, as well as indicating areas of
importance. There are many organisations that produce
standards for different applications and several organisations standards can overlap. It would be a

good idea for the investigators to spend some time familiarising themselves with these
organisations and how the standards are used. Table P.1 gives a brief list of the more common
organisations that write standards and their general area of coverage.
The first step in conducting any failure analysis is to gain a good understanding of the conditions
under which the part was operating. The investigator must ask questions from those who work
with, as well as those who maintain the equipment and visit the site whenever possible.
Contacting the manufacturer may also be necessary. A simple questionnaire, presented in
Appendix 1, is a good place to start and will lead the investigator to more detailed questions.
Unfortunately, in many instances the investigator will receive a failed part with little information
about its history and operating conditions. In cases such as these the physical evidence will have
to be more heavily relied on.

Figure P.1. Chart outlining the major steps that are usually taken when conducting a failure
analysis.

Table P.1--Common standard organisations and their general area of coverage.

Acronym
AISI
ASTM
API
ASME
NACE
SAE
UNS

Coverage
Steel composition standards
Standards for materials and their manufacture
Petroleum industry standards which are used by many other industries
Responsible for Boiler Pressure vessel codes
Codes for materials exposed to corrosive environments
Automotive industry standards used by many other industries
Classification for metals and metal alloys

The second step is to conduct a visual examination, cataloguing and recording the physical
evidence at the same time. This serves the functions of:

Familiarising the investigators with the evidence.

Creating a permanent record that can be referred to in light of new information.

Samples should be examined, photographed and sketched taking particular care to identify and
record any area of particular importance, such as fracture surfaces and surface defects. Visual
examination can be aided by the use of a stereomicroscope with lights that can be easily directed.
Shadows can give depth to a surface making it easier to analysis and photograph. Pieces should
always be examined and recorded before any surface cleaning is undertaken. In some cases
substances such as dirt, paint and Oil on the surface can themselves be important clues,
indicating such things as how old the fracture surface is and in what kind of environment the
piece was operating. A good general rule is to be conservative when destroying evidence of any
kind. The visual examination is a good time for the investigator to examine the fracture surfaces
in detail and try to identify the mode of fracture (brittle , ductile, fatigue, etc.), points of
initiation, and direction of propagation. Each mode of fracture has distinct characteristics that
can be easily seen with the naked eye or the use of a stereomicroscope, however, sometimes a
scanning electron microscope (SEM) will have to be used. There are several good books, some
listed in the bibliography, on fracture mechanism and compilations of fracture surface
photographs that can be used by the investigator to identify the mechanism of fracture under
investigation. As a reminder, some common fracture surface characteristics arc listed in Table P.2
with their corresponding mechanism.
Table P.2--Fracture mechanisms and their fracture surface characteristics.
Mode of Fracture

Typical fracture surface Characteristics

Ductile

Cup and Cone

Dimples
Dull Surface
Inclusion at the bottom of the dimple
Shiny
Grain Boundary cracking
Shiny
Cleavage fractures
Flat
Beachmarks
Striations (SEM)
Initiation sites
Propagation area
Zone of final fracture

Brittle Intergranular
Brittle Transgranular
Fatigue

The third step is to decide on a course of action. Based on the visual examinations and the
background information the investigator must outline a plan of action, which is the series of steps
that will be needed to successfully complete the case. There are several resources that an
investigator can draw on to determine the cause of failure, which can classified into one of the
following categories:

Macroscopic examination

Non-destructive testing (NDT)

Chemical analysis

Metallographic examination

Mechanical Testing

Many of these categories will require steps that use the same equipment and therefore much time
can be saved with a little forethought. The macroscopic examination is best performed when
cataloguing the samples, however the investigator will often want to return to examine the part in
more detail once other evidence is gathered. Use of a scanning electron microscope (SEM) is
often useful at this stage because of its large range of magnifications and its large depth of field.
Since undamaged fracture surfaces are not always available, it is often a good idea to open other
cracks that may be present in the piece. This often reveals good quality fracture surfaces similar
to those that caused failure. Procedures for doing this can also be found in the ASM handbook
volume 10.
Nondestructive tests (NDT) are a good way to examine parts without causing permanent damage.
Often times, results obtained from examining failed parts in the lab using NDT's can be used to
examine parts in the field and remove them from service before failure occurs. There are several
NDT's that are available to the investigator and it would be a good idea to read up on each ones
abilities. Table P.3 gives an outline of NDT's available and what they are able to detect.
Table P.3--Commonly used nondestructive tests and there capabilities in detecting defects.
NDT Method

Capabilities

Radiography

Measures differences in radiation absorption.

Inclusions, Porosity, Cracks

Uses high frequency sonar to find surface and subsurface

defects.

Inclusions, porosity, thickness of material, position of defects.

Uses a die to penetrate open defects.

Ultrasonic

Dye Penetrate

Surface cracks and porosity

Uses a magnetic field and iron powder to locate surface and near
surface defects.

Surface cracks and defects

Based on magnetic induction.

Measures conductivity, magnetic permeability, physical

dimensions, cracks, porosity, and inclusions.

Magnetic Particle

Eddy Current

Chemical analysis is done on the bulk of the material to confirm the material composition.
Depending on the investigation, chemical analysis should also be done on any overlay materials
or surface residues. There arc several techniques that can be used to check composition, and the
choice of which to use often depends on accessibility and sample type. In many cases, the SEM
can be a powerful tool for fast identification of surface materials. Care should be taken not to
contaminate samples taken for chemical analysis by surface residue or cutting instruments.
Metallographic examination involves the sectioning of samples to examine the microstructure.
The sections that are selected for examination are dependent on the type of piece and the mode
of fracture. Sections from the sample should be taken in different planes so that any differences
in the microstructure can be seen. Sometimes it is useful to take a cross section through the
fracture surface so that the microstructure below the fracture and the surface profile can be
examined. A section running parallel to the fracture surface is also often taken for examination.
Samples should be mounted, ground, and polished using metallographic techniques. They should
be examined before etching for porosity, inclusions, and other defects. Microstructures should be
identified and their properties researched. There are several referenced that the investigator can
refer to for identification of uncertain structures.
Mechanical testing is done to verify that the mechanical properties of the material conform to the
standards. There are many types of mechanical testing that can be performed and their
procedures can be found in the ASTM mechanical testing standards. The most common method
used is hardness testing because of its relative simplicity, low cost, and the fact that for many
materials tables exist to relate hardness with yield strength. A macrohardness is usually sufficient
to determine material properties, however microhardnesss measurements are helpful in
determining property variations within the material. Use the microhardness measurement to
compare the surface hardness to that of the body or to verify the microstructure. Other
mechanical testing such as tensile tests and impact tests can be used, however their use is usually
limited by insufficient material and high costs .

Once all the data is gathered, the investigator must come to a conclusion based on the evidence
present. This requires that the investigator draw heavily on background experience and research
performed. This step can be difficult because when conducting the investigation clues will lead
the investigator down paths that seem to be the cause but which are merely consequences.
The final and most difficult step in any investigation is coming up with recommendations. Some
cases will be simple, however many cases are not obvious even though the cause and theory are
known. Recommendations are not to be taken lightly. Serious failures can occur if
recommendations are in error. The system may have to be redesigned or a new material put in
place. Sometimes all you will be able to recommend is that inspections be carried out more often.

CASE STUDIES
Introduction to Case Studies
These case studies are actual reports submitted in response to industrial failures. The purpose of
these reports is to demonstrate by example. Most of the cases mention the techniques that where
used when stating the results. They where written at a basic level due to the uncertainty of
background of the reader and further reading is be recommended to better understand the failure
mechanism. Most of the cases that are presented here have comparable cases in the ASM failure
analysis handbook.

Case Study 1: Crane Bolt Failure

Introduction:
One of two bolts supporting a load of 16 200 lbs failed while in service causing eight hours of
downtime on an essential machine to production. The bolts were in operation on a crane used to
transfer anodes into the machine. Figure 1.1 shows a drawing of the set-up and the location of
fraction Just above the nut. The crane cycled 600 time a day 7 days a week.
The broken bolt (Figure 1.2) and a new unused bolt, recommended by the supplier for the
application, were supplied to conduct the investigation. The original designers of the crane
specified a bolt that conforms to SAE standards grade 5. The supplier of the new bolt confirmed
that it was made to conform with ASTM standard A 193 grade B7.

Figure 1.1. Drawing of the bolt and Figure 1.2. Photograph of

crane set-up.
broken bolt

Figure 1.3. Photograph of fracture

surface.

Results:
Observations
Examination of the fracture surface revealed characteristics such as a beachmarks associated
with fatigue (Figure 1.3). The zone of final fracture was located between two areas of fatigue
propagation suggesting the presence of bending forces. The surface area of final fracture was
approximately 12% of the total fracture surface suggesting that the bolt was not overloaded.
Cracks where also found between threads near the fracture surface indicating that the bolt was
highly susceptible to fatigue initiation.
Results from chemical analyses (Table 1.1) show that the original broken bolt had a carbon
content slightly below those required by the SAE standards for a grade 5 bolt. This lower carbon
content would have acted to decrease the material properties. The chemical composition of the
new sample bolt conformed to the ASTM standard A193/A grade B7 that requires an AISI-SAE
4140 composition.
Table 1.1--Chemical analysis results on both bolts.

Element
Carbon
Manganese
Silicon
Phosphor

Original broken SAE Standard

bolt (%)
Grade 5 (%)
0.20
0.65
0.22
0.013

0.28-0.55
--0.048 max.

New Sample
Bolt (%)

ASTM Standard
B7
AISI 4140 (%)

0.42
0.85
0.22
0.015

0.37-0.49
0.65-1.10
0.15-0.35
0.035

Sulphur
Chrome
Nickel
Molybdenum

0.011
0.08
0.06
0.01

0.058 max.
----

0.030
0.79
0.07
0.15

0.040
0.75-1.20
-0.15-0.25

Microscopic examination of the bolts where done using longitudinal and latitudinal mounts for
each. The sections taken from the fractured bolt were taken close to the fracture surface.
Examination before etching of the two bolts showed no cracking or unusually large inclusions.
The original broken bolt did show some flaking at the base of the threads (Figure 1.4) but this is
expected for a bolt that has been in service. Etching the sections revealed a microstructure of
coarse pearlite in a matrix of ferrite (Figure 1.5). The SAE grade 5 standard requires that the bolt
be quenched and tempered to conform and therefore should have a tempered martensite
structure. Martensite has higher material properties such as yield strength and hardness, which
increases its resistance to fatigue initiation. The ferrite matrix of the original bolt has low yield
strength, which in turn reduces its resistance to fatigue initiation. The new bolt was found to be
quenched and tempered as required by the ASTM standard (Figure 1.6). However rolling seems
where found at the tips of the treads (Figure 1.7). This is not a serious defect because of the
defects location in a low stress area however, if the bolt was placed in a corrosive atmosphere
these seams would corrode and then act as fatigue initiation sites.

Figure 1.4. Micrograph of Figure 1.5. Micrograph of Figure 1.6. Micrograph of Figure 1.7. Micrograph of
flaking found at the base fractured bolt. Ferrite
new bolt. Tempered
the new bolt thread
of a thread in the
matrix with pearlite. 2% martensite. 2% nital
showing a rolling seam.
fractured bolt. 2% nital nital 200X
500X
2% nital 200X
100X

Tensile tests were done on the bolts to test their material properties in comparison with the
standards. The results (Table 1.2) show that the yield strength and ultimate tensile strength of the
original bolt are only two thirds that required by the standards. This conforms to the
microstructural observations. The properties of the new bolt conformed to the standard even
though they were slightly elevated.
Table 1.2--Results and standard requirements of tensile tests.

Original Broken Bolt New Sample Bolt

Standard Grade Standard Grade

5 SAE
By AISI

Sample #
Ultimate Tensile
Strength (KSI)
Yield Strength (KSI)
Elongation (%)
Surface Reduction (%)

69.5

69.5

148

146

100

125

42.7
26
67

44.4
24
67

134
20
59

133
20
59

80
16 min.
50 min.

105
16 min.
50 min.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

Examination revealed that the bolt failed as a result of high cycle low load fatigue. Chemical
analysis and tensile tests confirmed that the bolt did not meet the SAE grade 5 standards required
by the original design of the crane. The major cause for this lack of conformity is because the
bolt was not quenched and tempered. Since the resistance of steel to fatigue initiation in
proportional to its yield strength, the low properties of the steel in this case left it open to fatigue
initiation.
Examination of the new bolt revealed that it conformed with the ASTM standards A 193 for a
grade B7 bolt, as the supplier specified. However, rolling seams were found in the thread tips.
Due to the relatively low loads this area is subjected to this is not a major problem but if the bolt
is subjected to a corrosive environments these seams could grow and become fatigue initiation
sites.
The SAE grade 5 bolt specified by the original designers should continue to be used in future and
the upgrade to the ASTM B7 is unnecessary.

Case Study 2: Rider Roller Shaft Failure

Introduction:
A section of a failed "rider roller" shaft was sent for failure analysis (Figure 2. 1). This shaft is
designed to ride on top of cardboard as it is being rolled. It was first installed in December 97
replacing a shaft in which cracks were observed near the ends. In March 98 a crack was observed
in the centre of the roll. Since no replacements were available at the time, welding was used to
repair the crack. This caused the shaft to become out of round by 0. 140". To repair this a
hydraulic Jack was used at the centre of the roll to bend it back leaving a 0.040" deflection that
was corrected by machining. Nine days later, on April 11th 98 at 21: 00, the shaft broke on the
key-way side while the machine was being set up at low speed. The roll usually operates at 550
meters per minute, approximately 630 RPM.
The low carbon steel shaft was suppose to have a stainless steel weld overlay applied before
installation to protect against corrosion in the mill environment. 17-4PH steel was used for this
application before and failed to endure the high cycle low stress conditions.

Figure 2.1. Photograph of "rider

roller" indicating approximate
point of fracture.

Figure 2.2. Photograph of fracture Figure 2.3. Photograph of shaft

surface showing initiation site,
surface indicating weld overlay
beachmarks from fracture
flaw.
propagation, and small area of
final fracture.

Results:
Observations:
The fracture surface is characteristic of a high cycle fatigue failure caused by low torsion stresses
(Figure 2.2). The area of final fracture is small, approximately 35% of total area, indicating that
the material was adequate for the low applied stresses. The beachmarks (Figure 2.2),
characteristics of fatigue that radiate from the initiation site, and the location of final fracture,
being off centre, indicated that initiation did not occur evenly around the circumference of the
shaft. Around the circumference of the fracture surface, a layer was observed which fractured at
a 45' angle to the plane of fracture. This is characteristic of the weld overlay. As well, there were
many grooves running around the outside of the shaft that are weld overlay features (Figure 2.3).
Materials characterisation and evaluation:
Chemical analysis of the material revealed it to be low carbon steel. Compositions correspond to
the AISI 1019 specifications (Table 2.1). Using the alloy analyser, the weld overlay was found to
be a low alloy steel, probably type EFe, and not stainless steel as was thought.
Table 2.1--Result of shaft chemical analysis.

Element
Carbon
Manganese
Silicon
Phosphorus
Sulphur

Analysed
Composition of Shaft (%)

AISI-SAE 1019
Standard Composition Ranges (%)

0.19
0.70
0.26
0.020
0.020

0.15-0.20
0.70-1.00
-0.040 max.
0.040 max.

Chromium
Nickel
Molybdenum

0.10
0.17
0.02

----

Microscopic examination revealed the core to have a ferrite and a coarse pearlite structure
characteristics of low carbon steel (Figure 2.4). The weld overlay had pearlite matrix with some
acicular ferrite (Figure 2.5). A microhardness test revealed a hard surface that gets progressively
softer towards the core (Table 2.2). This concurs with the microstructure. The inclusions present
in the core of the shaft where acceptable (Figure 2.6).
Table 2.2--Results of microhardness measurements.
Distance from Surface (m)

Hardness HVN-200g

35
42
107
140
214
252
Core
Core

257
271
255
247
187
187
156
167

Examination of a longitudinal mount taken from near the point of major crack initiation sites
showed large inclusions between weld passes (Figure 2.7). Examination of the fracture surface
initiation sites (Figure 2.8), on the same sample, showed an initiation site on the fracture surface
that is similar in shape and size to the inclusions. This suggests that these inclusions acted as
stress raisers and thus as fatigue initiation sites. The bending of the shaft would have caused
decohesion of the inclusions and increased the chances of fatigue initiation. Decohesion of the
weld overlay between welding passes can also be seen around the circumference of the shaft
(Figure 2.3). This indicates poor bonding between the weld overlay and the base material.

Figure 2.4.
Micrograph of core
microstructure
composed of ferrite
and pearlite. 2%
nital 100X

Figure 2.5.
Micrograph of weld
overlay
microstructure
composed of a
pearlite matrix with

Figure 2.6.
Micrograph
representing
average inclusion
content of the low
carbon steel core.

Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.8.
Micrograph
Micrograph showing
showing two
the fracture surface
inclusions found in initiation site. 2%
the weld overlay 2% nital 15X
nital 15X

the presence of
2% nital 100X
acicular ferrite. 2%
nital 500X

Conclusions and Recommendations:

The failure was caused by high cycle low stress fatigue, which was initiated at inclusions in the
weld overlay. For this kind of failure, when there is an absence of other defects, the surface
conditions become an important factor in the prevention of crack initiation. Bending the shaft to
correct its alignment probably caused decohesion of the weld inclusions encouraging
microcracks to form. This would have increased local stress concentrations and the possibility of
crack initiation. These inclusions probably originated from the weld being applied too quickly.
The use of a weld overlay to reconstruct existing rolls is an acceptable procedure provided the
weld is applied property. This would harden the surface and thereby make the shaft more
resistant to fatigue initiation at surface defects. A welding procedure should be developed that
would involve the making of block samples in which the welding conditions, such as current and
speed, are varied and optimised. Noranda Technology Centre can help in developing a procedure.
A liquid penetrant inspection should be performed to inspect the weld overlay for any cracks or
porosity.
Future shafts should be made out of low alloy steel AISI-SAE 4340, heat-treated to a hardness of
35 HRC. The properties of this material fall between those of 1019 and 174PH. It will resist
crack initiation better than the former, due to its higher endurance limit, and will resist crack
propagation better than the latter, due to its higher fracture toughness (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3--Fatigue related properties of selected materials.
Fracture Toughness
Material

Endurance limit (MPa)

1018
4340
17-4PH

275
450
--

260
110
53

Other recommendations are:

Avoid bending of shafts that have been surface hardened or had weld overlay applied due
to the high possibility of inducing surface cracks.

Avoid mechanical damage to the surface, such as scratches and dents, because they can
act as crack initiation sites.

Corrosion can be prevented in both cases by applying a coat of paint.

Case Study 3: Crane Pin Failure

Introduction:
After several failures, a pin connecting a chain to a load transfer bloc was sent for failure
investigation (Figures 3.1a and 3.1b). The conditions of operation are similar to those under
which the bolt in case study I was operating.

Figure 3.1a. Pin industrial drawing.

Figure 3.1b. Photograph of

broken pin.

Observations :

Figure 3.2. Industrial drawing of pin chain and block

mechanism.

The pin was broken in two locations

approximately 2.4 and 5.2 centimetres
from one edge. These locations are shown
in relation to the mechanism in Figure
3.2. Examination of the surface revealed
that where the bolt came in contact with
the chain, sever plastic deformation was
present. Examination of the 2.4 cm.
fracture surface (Figure 3.3), which was
located in an area of chain contact plastic
deformation, revealed characteristics of
fatigue. The fracture surface had little to
no zone of final fracture indicating that
the loads perpendicular to the fracture
plane where low. Fatigue characteristics

showed that fracture initiated on the opposite side to the deformation. This indicate that bending
forces were present in the pin. Bending would have caused one side of the pin to be in tension
and the other in compression. The fatigue started on the tension side. Examination of the 5.4 cm
fracture surface located in the middle of the load transfer block revealed the same characteristics
of fatigue failure (Figure 3.4). However, a comparison of the two fracture surfaces on the
adjoining Piece of the Pin revealed that the initiation sites were on opposite sides of the pin
(Figure 3.5). This indicates that bending forces at the two fractures were opposite.

Figure 3.3. Photograph of

fracture surface of 2.4 cm
fracture.

Figure 3.4. Photograph of

fracture surface of 5.4 cm
fracture.

Figure 3.5. Photograph of pin

indicating locations of fracture
initiation.

A chemical analysis performed on the body of the pin revealed it to conform to the SAE AISI
standard 1095. The original drawings for this application specify a SAE-AlSl 4140 (Table 3.1)
Metallurgical examination of the mounted sample revealed plastic deformation at the edges as
well as no significant inclusions. Examination of the microstructure revealed a ferrite matrix with
spherodised carbides (Figure 3.6). The soft ferrite matrix increases the odds of fatigue initiation
but will slow down fatigue propagation.
Table 3.1. Results of pin chemical analysis.
Element
Carbon
Manganese
Silicon
Phosphor
Sulphur
Chrome
Nickel
Molybdenum

Pin
1.06
0.31
0.25
0.011
0.008
0.03
0.03
0.01

SAE-AISI 1095
0.90-1.03
0.30-0.50
-0.040
0.050
----

Figure 3.6.
Microphotograph of pin
microstructure. Ferrite
matrix with spherodised
carbides. 2% nital 1000X

Microhardness measurements show that the pin was slightly harder in the centre than on the
surface (Table 3.2). The softer surface would have increased the possibility of fatigue initiation at
the surface.
Table 3.2. Microhardness results.

Location

Hardness VHN (200g)

Longitudinal Section
Transversal Section

Side

Centre

235
232
241
275
294

229
248
261
268
294

Conclusions and Recommendations:

As the crane charges and unloads, the pin is subjected to bending forces. These forces create
tensile forces on the surface at which point the probability of fatigue initiation is high.

Since the pin undergoes cyclic stresses, a steel for this application must have a high
resistance to fatigue initiation. For these reasons, the original design material, SAE AISI
4140 hardened to a range of 45 - 50 HRC, was a good choice.

The block and chain should be examined for wear. If worn they would allow for larger
bending then was originally allowed for in the design. If they are worn, they should be
replaced.

If these measures do not correct the problem and the pin continues to break in future, the
forces in the original design should be revised.

Case Study 4: Shaft Bearing Failure

Introduction:
A bearing that had been in service for a year and a half was sent to undergo failure analysis
(Figure 4.1). This bearing had been installed in the drive of a #P-40 centrifugal pump in the R-8
plant. It was located on a long shaft to separate the pump from the drive due to the presence of
concentrated sulphuric acid. The shaft was belt driven at about 800 RPM. No special events were
noticed in the pump operation.

Figure 4.1. Photograph of Figure 4.2. Photograph of Figure 4.3. SEM

bearing setup
inner ring showing
photograph of spalling,
spalling in groove.
flaking and cracking, in
the groove. 200X

Figure 4.4. SEM

photograph showing
presence of 45 sheer
planes. 500X

Results:
Observations:
The inner raceway showed severe plastic deformation around its circumference in the form of a
groove, which is located above the area designed to be the ball raceway (Figure 4.2). Spalling, a
flaking and cracking of the surface, was observed in the groove but was not evenly distributed
around its circumference. Examination of the spalling using a scanning electron microscope
(SEM) exposed flaking and the presence of surface cracks (Figure 4.3). Increased magnification
of this area revealed fracture surfaces at forty-five degree angles indicating shear loads were
present (Figure 4.4).
The inner raceway fracture surface is perpendicular to the groove and is located where the
spalling is most severe. Beachmarks and river lines, which are characteristic of fatigue failures,
revealed several initiation sites situated in the base of the groove (Figure 4.5). Closer
examination with the SEM confirms that fatigue initiated from the spalling damage (Figure 4.6).
Spalling was also seen to a lesser degree on the balls surfaces. The outer raceway revealed no
major defects.

Figure 4.5. Photograph of the inner ring

fracture surface.

Figure 4.6. SEM

photograph of the inner ring
fracture surface showing

fatigue initiating at spall in

the groove. 200X

Material characterisation and evaluation:

Both the compositions of the ball bearing and the inner raceway were found to fall within the
norms for 52100 steel, AISI-SAE standards (Table 4.1). The microhardness measurements of
both pieces are typical for this type of steel (Table 4.2). Surface hardness measurements for both
ball and inner ring are similar, which is required by this type of application.
Table 4.1--Result of chemical analysis.

Element

Analysed Composition of
Ball (%)

Analysed
Composition
of Inner Ring (%)

AISI-SAE 52100
Standard
Composition
Ranges (%)

0.97
0.40
0.24
0.013
0.007
1.21
0.11
0.02

1.02
0.37
0.23
0.013
0.006
1.36
0.12
0.05

0.98-1.10
0.25-0.45
0.15-0.30
0.025
0.025
0.025
---

Carbon
Manganese
Silicon
Phosphorus
Sulphur
Chromium
Nickel
Molybdenum

Table 4.2--Results of microhardness tests.

Ball Bearing

Inner Ring

Hardness #

Centre

Surface

Damaged
Surface

Centre

Outside
Surface

1
2
3

650
574
618

890
890
927

890
890
890

775
792
804

890
787
890

Microscopic examination of a cross section of the inner raceway revealed surface cracks
consistent with the spalling observed (Figure 4-7). Etching the sample revealed a homogeneous
macrostructure of a tempered martensite matrix with undissolved carbides present (Figure 4.8).
This microstructure agrees with the chemical analysis and microhardness measurements.

Figure 4.7.
Micrograph of
cracks on the inner
ring surface. 200X

Figure 4.8.
Microphotograph of
the inner ring
microstructure
composed of
martensite and
undissolved
carbides. 2% nital
200X

Figure 4.9.
Micrograph of
cracks on the ball
surface. 100X

Figure 4.10.
Microphotographs
of crack in a ball.
15X

Figure 4.11.
Microphotograph of
figure 4.10 etched
with 2% nital
showing
heterogeneous
martensite structure
with undissolved
carbides. 15X

Microscopic examination of a quartered ball bearing also revealed surface cracks (Figure 4.9). A
large crack extending towards the centre of the bearing was also found (Figure 4.10). The
microstructure is heterogeneous, unevenly distributed; tempered martinsite with undissolved
carbides. The large surface crack ties along a border of the heterogeneity (Figure 4.11). Some
decarburization was observed on the surface near spalling cracks.
Conclusions:
The failure was a result of vibrational fatigue initiated at spalling on the surface of the inner
raceway. The spalling, which is a characteristic of contact fatigue, originated from the bearing
being Installed Incorrectly or from it undergoing abnormal equiaxial radial loads in service,
which caused a displacement of the inner ring. This displacement increased the axial loads
causing the plastic deformation and spalling. Decarburization and uneven tempering of the balls
as well as the extent of plastic deformation indicate a temperature rise.

Case Study 5: Bronze Bull Gear Failure

Introduction:
A bronze bull gear was sent for failure investigation (Figure 5.1). It was used to rotate bleach
washer number 65B at a rate between 4 and 5 RPM. The contacting gear was a hardened steel
worm gear, which was powered by a 50 horsepower 1800 RPM electric motor. The gear is a cast
copper alloy with cut teeth and machined surface and was only in service for one month.

Figure 5.1. Photograph showing the

bronze bull gear.

Figure 5.2. Photograph of the bull gear profile showing

debris and severe materials loss.

Observations:
Examination of the gear tooth revealed that there was a large amount of material loss. A
measurement taken near the base of the tooth where the material loss was most obvious revealed
that tooth had gone from a thickness of 31 mm to 20 mm, a loss of I I mm. The contact surface
had grooves running along the path the worm gear would have taken. Debris was also found
along what was probably the exiting edge of the gear teeth (Figure 5.2). Along the front of the
teeth, plastic deformation was seen near the edges where decreasing thickness could no longer
support the load. Some cracking was observed in these areas. When opened, they revealed that
the mode of crack propagation was interdendritic.
Table 5.1--Chemical composition of bull gear.
Composition %
Element

Bull Gear

Standard C90700

Copper
Aluminium
Manganese
Iron
Tin
Lead
Nickel
Silicon
Zinc
Phosphorous

88.51
<0.01
0.03
0.03
9.83
0.42
0.29
<0.005
0.73
--

88.0-90.0
0.005 max.
-0.15 max.
10.0-12.0
0.30* max.
--*
-0.50* max.
0.1-0.3

* Lead + Nickel + Zinc < 1.0 max.

Chemical analysis of the bronze gear revealed that it conformed most closely with the UNS
standard for copper alloy C90700 (Table 5.1). The lead and zinc content however were slightly
above those allowed by the standard. Several samples where taken from the gear and examined
microscopically. They revealed large amounts of interdentritic shrinkage porosity (Figure 5.3)
and interdentritic segregation (Figure 5.4). The porosity reduces the amount of area supporting
the load and therefore raises stresses in the material. The heterogeneity of the structure is caused
by rejection of tin into solution as the dendrites grow while cooling. This segregation also
reduces the mechanical properties of the material. Etching the microstructure with 20 nil
NH40H, 20 ml H20, 20 nil H202 (3%) revealed a coarse dendrite microstructure (Figure 5.5). No
plastic deformation of the working surface was observed which indicates abrasive wear.

Figure 5.3.
Microphotograph
showing the large
amounts of porosity. 15X

Figure 5.4.
Microphotograph
showing interdendritic
segregation. 200X

Figure 5.5.
Microphotograph
showing the large
dendritic structure. 15X

Hardnesses were taken on the cross section of a tooth which

gave an average Vickers hardness number of 76.6 VHN (5Kg)
Table 5.2. Vickers Macrohardness
Results
(Table 5.2). This is below the Brinell-500 Kg hardness number
of 95 (100VHN) required by the ASTM standard, B427-93a
Sample
VHN (5Kg)
"Standard Specification for Gear Bronze Alloy Castings". A
lower hardness number also suggests that the mechanical
1
74.4
properties of the material would be below standards. This agrees
2
77.0
with our metallographic examination.
3
78.2
Conclusions:

4
5

71.6
81.6

The bronze bull gear failed as a result of sever abrasive wear. The gear did not meet ASTM
materials specifications for this application and this probably had a great influence on the final
failure. However, there are several possible causes of abrasive wear for which the system should
be examined:

If the surface of the matching worm gear were damaged in any way, the difference in
hardness would have led to severe wear.

If the lubricant was contaminated with an abrasive material wear will occur.

If there was a misalignment between the two gears, the contact surface may be reduced
increasing contact loads above those that the material can withstand.

If the system was overloaded, the rate of wear increases.

If one or a combination of these factors is present, it is then likely others failures would follow.
In this case, a large amount of porosity, a coarse dendrite structure, and interdentritic segregation
combined to reduce the properties of the bronze bull gear below those required by ASTM B42793a standards. A possibility is that that when the gear is subjected to loads or overloading, these
low properties would allowed the gear teeth to deflect. The gear surfaces would no longer meet
as they were designed, decreasing the contact surface, which would have increased the loads and
therefore wear. Contamination of the lubricant would have followed, causing the wear to
continue.
In future this bronze bull gear should be ordered specifying that it conform to ASTM standard
B427-93a for the copper alloy UNS C 90700. As well the lubricant should be checked regularly
for contamination and both gear surfaces should be examined for damage.

Case Study 6: Analysis of 316L Reducer Failure

Introduction:
An 8" x 6", 316L stainless steel reducer was sent for failure analysis (Figure 6. 1). It had been in
service for 13 months when a leak was noticed. The reducer was installed on #1 acid storage
tank, equipment number 50-200. The anodically protected carbon steel tank, contained off
specification concentrated 93% sulphuric acid. The flow rate through the reducer was 400
gal/min.

Figure 6.1. Photograph of Figure 6.2. (a-left) Old tank installation. (b-right) Tank installation at the time of
reducer.
reducer failure.

The tank was originally designed with a 4" diameter carbon steel nozzle, at floor level, that
connected directly to a valve (Figure 6.2a). This lasted seven to eight years without incident. The

design was changed to accommodate renovations so that an 8" carbon steel nozzle was installed
6" above the tank floor. This nozzle lead into the failed reducer, which then connected to a valve
composed of alloy 1-0 steel (Figure 6.2b). This valve was said to be badly corroded. The valve
then led to a 6" pipe made of 316L stainless steel in which no problems were found. After the
reducer failure, the piping arrangements were changed so that the reducer is now after the valve.
Observations:
Visual examination of the reducer revealed an area at the top where little damage was observed
(Figure 6.3). This area, which was probably an air pocket, extended from the top of the 87'
diameter flange into the reducing pipe where is stopped just before the 6" diameter flange.
Damage in this area consisted of minor pitting (Figure 6.4). Damage, resembling a honeycomb
structure in places, was most severe just below the air pocket in the reducing pipe near the 6"
diameter end (Figures 6.5a and 6.5b). This is where the leak was found (Figure 6.6). The damage
becomes less severe in the pipe section towards the bottom. Only pitting was found in both the
8" and 6" flanges.

Figure 6.3. Photograph of Figure 6.4.

the top insider of the
Microphotograph of
reducer showing the area pitting in air pocket. 15X
at the top where little
damage occurred.

Figure 6.5. Photographs showing areas to the (a-left)

right and (bright) left of the top relatively
undamaged surface. The red arrow in (a) indicated
where the leak occurred.

Chemical analysis of the flange and the pipe revealed that they both conform to AISI-SAE
standards for 316L stainless steel (Table 6.1)
Table 6.1--Result of chemical analysis.

Element

Analysed
Composition of
Flange (%)

Analysed
Composition of Pipe AISI-SAE 316L Standard
(%)
Composition Ranges (%)

Carbon
Manganese
Silicon
Phosphorus
Sulphur

0.031
1.85
0.57
0.014
0.023

0.034
1.28
0.35
0.011

0.001

0.03 max.
2.00 max.
1.00 max.
0.045 max.
0.03 max.

Chromium

16.53

17.47

16.0-18.0

Nickel
Molybdenum

10.85
2.16

11.46
2.08

10.0-14.0
2.0-3.0

Closer examination of the inside surface of the reducer with a SEM revealed dimples (Figure
6.7). These features are typical of a ductile deformation, which indicates abrasion. The
orientation of the features also follows the direction of liquid flow. Pitting and uniform corrosion
was also found in the region (Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.6. Photograph taken

on the outside of the reducer
showing the hole where the
reducer leaked.

Figure 6.7. SEM

photograph of the inside
surface of the reducer in
the damaged area. 200X

Figure 6.8. SEM

photograph of the inside
surface of the reducer in
the damaged area. 500X

Conclusions and Recommendations:

A combination of two mechanisms caused the failure. Severe turbulence in the reducer caused a
degradation of the passive layer that protects the stainless steel from corrosion. This would have
left the system open to severe corrosion, which in turn would have lead to failure. The top of the
reducer was probably protected by the presence of an air pocket.
The second mechanism was erosion, originating when air bubbles near the surface imploded
causing mechanical damage, cavitation. Turbulence in the system may have formed bubbles from
the air pocket at the top of the reducer. These bubbles would then have been carried into the
reducer where increasing pressures would have caused them to implode. The highly corrosive
environment would have increased the rate of degradation dramatically.
The new setup, placing the valve before the reducer, changed the dynamics of the system and
may have solved the problem, however existing reducers and valves should have their thickness
monitored at regular intervals using an ultrasonic thickness gauge. If problems reoccur, the
system should be evaluated for excessive turbulence and air pockets. A possible solution would
be to use a PTFE liner in the reducer. This would provide a barrier that protects against
turbulence but not cavitation.
APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

Bibliography

D.A. Ryder et al., "General Practice in Failure Analysis," in ASM Metals Handbook Volume 11
"Failure Analysis and Prevention", Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio: ASM International, 1986)
B.E. Wilde, "Stress-Corrosion Cracking," in ASM Metals Handbook Volume 11 "Failure Analysis
and Prevention", Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio: ASM International, 1986)
K. H. Kamdar, "Liquid-Metal Embrittlement," in ASM Metals Handbook Volume 11 "Failure
Analysis and Prevention", Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio: ASM International, 1986)
Alan G. Glover et al., "Failures of Weldments," in ASM Metals Handbook Volume 11 "Failure
Analysis and Prevention", Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio: ASM International, 1986)
L. Windner, "Failures of Rolling-Element Bearings," in ASM Metals Handbook Volume 11
"Failure Analysis and Prevention", Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio: ASM International, 1986)
"Threaded Steel Fasteners," in ASM Metals Handbook Volume 11 "Failure Analysis and
Prevention", Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio: ASM International, 1986)
Walter J. Jensen, "Failures of Mechanical Fasteners," in ASM Metals Handbook Volume 11
"Failure Analysis and Prevention", Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio: ASM International, 1986)
E. Alban, "Failures of Gears," in ASM Metals Handbook Volume 11 "Failure Analysis and
Prevention", Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio: ASM International, 1986)
Michael Bauccio ed. Et al., ASM Metals Reference Book, Third Edition, Ed. Kathleen Mill (Ohio:
ASM International, 1993)
Geaorge E. Dieter, Mechanical Metallurgy (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1986)
Douglas A. Skoog and James J. Leary, Principles of Instrumental Analysis, Fourth Edition
(Toronto: Sauders College Publishing, 1992)
William D. Callister, Jr., Materials Science and Engineering: An Introduction, Third Edition
(Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994)
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ASM International, 1993)
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