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STORAGE AND MATERIAL TRANSFER

Raw material and in-process storage tanks often represent a major portion of the risk of a chemical plant. Hazardous
material transfer lines can also be a significant hazard. Attention to the design of storage and transfer equipment can
reduce hazardous material inventory.
Storage
Storage tanks for raw material and intermediates are often much larger than really necessary, usually because this makes it
"easier" to operate the plant. The operating staff can pay less attention to ordering raw materials on time, or can accept
downtime in a downstream processing unit, because upstream production can be kept in storage until the downstream unit
is back on line.
This convenience in operation can come at a significant cost in risk of loss of containment of the hazardous materials
being stored. The process design engineers must question the need for all intermediate hazardous material storage, and
minimize quantities where such storage is really needed. SimilarIy, hazardous raw material storage should also be
minimized, with greater attention being given to "just in time" supply. Inventory reduction can also result in lower
inventory costs, as well as increasing the inherent safety of the manufacturing facility. The reduction in inventory resulting
from greater attention to plant operations and design of unit interactions can be extremely largeFor example:
An acrylonitrile plant eliminated 500,000 pounds (-277,000 kg) of inprocess storage of hydrogen cyanide by accepting a
shutdown of the entire unit when the product purification area shut down. This applied pressure to the plant to solve the
problems that caused shutdown of the
purification area.
Another acrylonitrile plant supplied by-product hydrogen cyanide to various other units. An inventory of 350,000 pounds
(-159,000 kg) of hydrogen cyanide was eliminated by having the other units draw directly from the acrylonitrile plant.
This required considerable work to resolve
many issues related to acrylonitrile purity and unit scheduling.
A central bulk chlorine system with large storage tanks and extensive piping was replaced with a number of small
cylinder facilities local to the individual chlorine users. Total inventory of chlorine was reduced by over 100,000 pounds.
MATERIAL STORAGE
Storage areas in the plant usually contain the largest volumes of hazardous materials. Frequently storage areas contain
flammable liquids or liquefied gases. The main concern in the design of storage installations for such liquids is to reduce
the hazard of fire by reducing the amount of spillage, controlling the spill, and controlling fire.
Minimizing storage quantities also reduces the potential for large spills and further damage. Pipeline feeds from a reliable
source can eliminate the requirement for large storage areas. Solid chemicals may be stored in bulk in bins, hoppers, piles
or containers. Liquid chemicals may be stored in tanks, reservoirs or specified shipping containers. Gases may be stored in
low pressure gas holders, in high pressure tanks or cylinders; or in liquid form in tanks or containers under pressure,
refrigeration or both. Pressure and temperature of storage greatly affects dispersion/emission of liquid or vapor in case
containment is lost.
Whether intended for use at atmospheric, low pressure, or high pressure conditions, the primary considerations of tank
design are stresses, both pressure and thermal, including fire exposure. The objective is to maintain working pressure
within permissible limits by providing pressure relief (outbreathing) and vacuum relief (inbreathing).
TYPES OF STORAGE
The main types of storage tanks and vessels for liquids and liquefied gases are
1.atmospheric storage tank
2.low pressure storage tank
3.pressure or refrigerated pressure storage vessels
4.refrigerated storage tanks
1.Atmospheric storage:
There are horizontal cylindrical tank having flat ends,vertical cylindrical tanks with coned or domed roof,fixed roof tank
and floating roof tank. Atmospheric tanks are designed to withstand an internal pressure /vacuum of not more than 1 psig.

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Horizontal cylindrical tanks have a relatively small capacity.Domed roof tank go upto 60 ft diameter.Coned roof tank are
built upto 250ft diameter and 60ft height.Floating roof tank may be 250ft in dia and 72 ft in height.
The two main types of large tanks (50,000 gallons) used for storing liquids at near atmospheric conditions are the welded
vertical flat bottom tank with a fixed cone, flat, or domed roof, and the welded vertical tank with a floating roof in place
of the cone roof .Both types can be used to store hazardous materials. The fixed tank is normally preferred in applications
where it is desirable to collect and treat all emissions from the tank or where an inert gas is used to reduce the possibility
of fire, explosion, or chemical reaction. Floating roof tanks are typically used where the vapor pressure of the stored fluid
would be excessive for a cone roof tank or where collection of emissions from the tank is not required but it is still
desirable to minimize them. It should be recognized that a drain can be provided, but drains can plug up and the roof
could then flood and sink. For environmental emissions controls, domed or cone roof tanks with internal floaters are also
now common. For many types of materials, particularly for organics, the type of tank that may be used will be governed
by the EPA or by state environmental authorities. The material's vapor pressure (VP) is the main determining factor.
Most organics with a VP below 1.5 psia can be stored in fixed roof tanks; materials with a VP between 1.5 and 11 psia
must be stored in at least a floating roof tank; and for organics with a VP over 11 psia tank emissions must be recovered
for reuse or destruction. For some specific compounds, these regulations may be stricter.
For smaller near-atmospheric tanks, horizontal tanks, at ground level on saddles or on legs or vertical tanks on legs or
skirts are used. These are normally cylindrical tanks with various combinations of heads For materials such as butane or
ammonia that are normally stored as pressurized liquids, pressure spheres are normally used. These spheres may be
insulated; pressure is normally maintained by recompressing the tank vapor and returning the liquid to the tank after
cooling it. For liquids or gases requiring high pressure storage horizontal tanks on saddles are used. These tanks are
cylindrical with elliptical or domed pressure heads.
2.Low pressure storage
This include horizontal cylindrical tank with dished ends, vertical cylindrical hemispheroidal tank.Low pressure tanks are
designed to withstand internal pressure in the range 0.5 -15 psig. The design of low pressure tank is governed by API Std
620. Low pressure tanks are suitable for the storage of liquids which are too volatile for for atmospheric storage.Gasoline
is stored in this manner.
3. Pressure or refrigerated pressure storage vessels
Pressure storage vessels are regular pressure vessel and can be designed to high pressures as required.The lower end of
scale for pressure storage is 15 psig.Horizontal cylindrical vessels have a limited capacity and for large quantities spheres
are used.Spherical pressure vessels have a number of advantages.The surface to volume ratio is minimal and only 88% of
that of vertical cylindrical tank, which reduces heat leak.The foundation structure is simpler and there is no danger of soil
freezing.Pressure storage tanks are suitable for the storage of liquefied gases such as LPG and ammonia.
4.Refrigerated storage tanks
This is a doomed roof ,flat bottomed tank.It is essentially an atmospheric tank ,with a design pressure below 1 psig.Low
pressure tanks may also be used for refrigerated storage.
Safety Considerations for Atmospheric Storage Tanks
Hazards associated with atmospheric tanks (ambient pressure to 15 psig) include overpressure and underpressure, vapor
generation, spills, tank rupture, fire and product contamination.
Overpressure and Underpressure. Internal deflagration is a concern because of the presence of a flammable organic/air
mixture in the presence of an ignition source. This mixture can occur during filling, emptying, or mixing in tanks that
contain vapors of organics near their flash point. The mixture may also occur in stored products containing impurities or
light gases such as hydrogen in petroleum fractions as a result of an upset in an upstream process unit. A peripheral railing
and walkway, if attached to the top of the wall and to the outer portion of the roof, make the wall-to-roof joint too strong
relative to the strength of the wall-tofloor joint. The result is that overpressure may cause the bottom to cup up and tear
loose from the wall, instead of tearing off the roof. This is a critical concern for tanks with a diameter less than 10 m (30
feet). Weak seam tanks for storing toxic materials are generally discouraged since a tank rupture would release the

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material to the atmosphere. Additional pressure relief devices, directing the hazardous material to a safe area, are used to
protect the tank.
Underpressure (vacuum) in fixed roof tanks can be caused when material is rapidly withdrawn or when a sudden drop in
temperature or pressure, usually caused by weather conditions, reduces the volume of the vapor in the tank. The
underpressure protection should be sized to handle the maximum withdrawal rate plus the maximum temperature/ volume
reduction occurring simultaneously. The vacuum relief device should be located at, or near, the highest point in the tank.
In addition, differential pressure measurement relative to local ambient conditions must be provided.
Excessive Vapor Generation. Excessive vapor generation is the result of a deviation of temperature or routing of products
more volatile than the design fluid. For tanks provided with internal heaters, adequate level should be maintained above
the surface of the heater so as not to overheat the tank contents and cause vapor generation or reach the autoignition
temperature.
The polymerization of materials in a tank can yield sudden high overpressure combined with elevated temperatures in the
tank. In this situation standard pressure relief valves may not be enough, both because very large two-phase flows may be
involved, and because solid, polymerized materials may plug the relief valve. In these cases rupture discs with ducting
leading to the atmosphere may be used, with the relief effluent being directed to a safe area of the plant. If the
polymerization of the tank can yield potentially hazardous materials, the safe area may include an isolation or containment
tank or sump for the hazardous material.
Tank Spills. Common causes of spills are:
overfilling due to operator error or high level alarm failure (vehicular as
well as stationary tanks)
withdrawal of water from the tank bottom without operator attention
mechanical failure of tank support causing collapse of roof
accumulation of a large volume of water, snow or ice on the tank roof causing collapse and subsequent exposure of
liquid surface
Tank Rupture. A tank rupture is the sudden loss of tank integrity over a relatively large area of the tank structure, causing a
large loss of contents. It can be caused by any of several conditions: overfilling, overpressure due to an internal chemical
reaction or material boiling due to a constant exposure to heat, continued impingement of flame over an area of the tank,
loss of wall integrity due to corrosion, or loss of wall weld integrity.
The chances of tank rupture can be reduced by attention to several design features:
the proper use and sizing of overflow piping and pressure relief safety valves and rupture disks.
the installation of the appropriate high level alarms and flow shutoffs to prevent overfilling
the installation of water sprays to protect exposed tank walls during a fire
the diked area should be sloped to a sump within the diked area
the proper specification of tank materials and thickness, including corrosion allowances
the inspection of tank welding during and after construction and the pressure testing of the tank prior to use.
Fire. When flammable materials are being stored, fire is the greatest hazard normally addressed in the design of the
storage system. Design items that should be addressed in this area are given below.
Protection against electrostatic charges which can cause ignition. This may include the bonding and grounding of the
tank, piping, and other ancillary equipment and the use of bottom or dip-pipe loading to minimize material splashing in
the tank.
Fire fighting facilities applicable to the type of tank protected. This can include fire loops with hydrants and monitors in
the storage area, foam systems for the individual tanks, and deluge spray systems to keep the exposed surfaces of tanks
cool in case of fire in an adjacent tank.
Foam systems usually consist of a foam storage tank, an incoming firewater line, a mixing fixture, foam / water piping up
the side of the tank, and foam/water applicator nozzles. The systems for fixed roof tanks are designed to create a foam
layer over the flammable material in the tank.

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The systems for floating roof tanks are designed to cover the space immediately over the seal area, but if an internal
floating roof is constructed of lightweight materials, the foam system should be designed as if the tank were a cone roof
type.
Adequate spacing between tanks.
Install flame arresters on atmospheric vents to prevent impinging fire on the outside of the tank from reaching the vapor
space inside the tank
Do not use air to mix flammable materials.
Provide fire resistant insulation for critical vessels, piping, outlet valves on tanks, valve actuators, instruments lines, and
key electrical facilities.
Provide remote controlled, automatic, and fire-actuated valves to stop loss of tank contents during an emergency;
provide fire protection to these valves. Valves should be close-coupled to the tank, and must be resistant to corrosion or
other deleterious effects of spilled fluids.
Contamination of Product. The contamination of material in tanks by the introduction of incompatible materials or
material of the wrong temperature can cause runaway reactions, polymerization, high temperature excursions, or
underpressurization of the tank. To avoid potential contamination of products or routing wrong materials to tanks, piping
valves and manifolds to the tank should be clearly marked, operating procedures should be simple and well-defined, and
periodic operator training should be provided. Plant upsets or emergency shutdowns can affect the quality of product
routed to tankage. The designer must evaluate the potential effects of these events and mitigate them. Protection features
can be incorporated into the design of process units that can reduce or eliminate hazards in tank storage areas. Two such
features are:
Monitor streams routed to tankage for deviations from product specifications.
Emergency rundown coolers for hot streams routed from a process unit to tankage in the event of downstream unit
shutdown, if the fluid temperature exceeds the acceptable tank temperature.
Safety Considerations for Bin Storage
The safety considerations for the bin storage of powdered or pelleted materials is similar to that for fixed roof tanks. The
primary danger in the bins comes from dust in the vapor space above the material creating an explosive or ignitable
condition. Ignition sources should be minimized and dust conditions reduced by the use of filters or baghouses. A safety
vent or rupture disk should be included to prevent overpressurization in case the filter bags clog during operations. Care
should be taken during the design of the bin to reduce horizontal surfaces inside the bin where material can remain and
create a hazard when the bin is opened for maintenance; the air above such areas has been known to explode while work
inside the bins was being performed during normal repairs. Additionally, the bin can be inerted in a manner similar to that
used for atmospheric storage tanks (NFPA 68 and 69). The pneumatic transfer of solids can also be preformed using an
inert or a low-oxygen gas with a closed loop return to the sending tank.
Safety design considerations are:
Pressure/vacuum relief valves (including conservation vents for atmospheric tanks) and relief discharge venting
Fire relief and protection, including fire loops and monitors, protective sprays, foam application, and flame arresters
Foundations, fabrication techniques and anchorages
Materials of construction and corrosion
Design considerations for related pipework and fittings including stresses due to movement, expansion/contraction,
vibration, connections, valves, and layout.
Selection of ancillary equipment including pumps, compressors, vaporizers, etc.
Consideration of the range of operations as well as nonoperational periods such as commissioning, decommissioning,
unit shutdowns, and tank cleaning.
Safety Considerations for Container Storage
The primary additional safety concern when hazardous materials are stored in containers is the large amount of vehicle
and employee traffic associated with containers combined with the hazard caused by constant handling. Storage areas
should be designed to allow the smooth flow of traffic without the need to constantly maneuver a forklift or truck. The
storage area should be arranged to allow personnel access to inspect all containers for leakage or other damage on a
regular basis. The storage of compressed gases should meet all the requirements specified in the applicable OSHA
standards, while flammable materials storage should meet those specified in NFPA 30. It is recommended that the
warehouse storage areas of hazardous liquids include secondary containment similar to that required for liquid hazardous

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wastes in 40 CFR 264an area with an impermeable liner that can contain at least 10% of the total volume of the
containers or the largest container, whichever is larger.
Incompatible materials should be kept separated so that any spills cannot mix. The storage of containers in rack areas may
require specialized fire control systems such as individual sprinkler lines to deliver water or foam directly to each rack
level. The placement of drums in processing area for the dispensing of the contents may not need to meet the same
stringent storage specifications, but it will still be necessary to meet all pertinent safety requirements. The process drums
area may include safety barriers to prevent traffic from hitting the drums, portable drum sumps to contain any spills, a
ventilation system to control fumes, and double valving or a valve and plug to minimize drum leakage.
STORAGE LAYOUT
Layout of hazardous materials storage areas requires careful attention. Typically a far larger quantity of material is held in
storage than in process. Some of the important aspects of storage layout are:
Storage tanks should be arranged in groups so that common dike and fire fighting equipment can be used for each group.
Tanks should be located downwind of other areas to prevent flammable materials reaching ignition sources, should a
leak develop in a tank.
It is essential to keep storage tanks away from process areas since a fire or explosion in a process unit may endanger the
large inventory of the storage tank.
Storage tanks should be diked in accordance with NFPA 30. Piping, valves and flanges should be kept to a minimum
when located within dikes. Valves, manifolds, and piping should be installed outside dikes or impounding areas.
The effect of intensity of thermal radiation from an adjacent tank on fire should be considered in spacing the tanks.
Tolerance of tanks to thermal radiation can be increased by insulating or fireproof ing the tank shell, and providing water
cooling arrangements.
Segregation:
The segragation and separation of materials within the storage area is largely based on classification of materials
stored,on secondary containment on hazardous area classification and on fire protection measures.
Separation distances:
Minimum recommended separation distances for storage are given in various codes and other publications.The separation
distances for petroleum products given in the IP Refining safety code .
Secondary containment:
Some types of liquid storage tank are normally surrounded by a bund,dike,or provided with a pit to retain any spillage of
liquid.Bunds are made of earth or concrete.The bunding is done to retain the liquid so that it can be dealt with in a
controlled manner, by evaporation from a specially designed catchment /evaporation area ,by foam blanketing or other
measures.
The spacing is given as a tank shell-to-shell separation distance and is a function of the largest tank diameter. Additional
spacing may be required depending upon accessibility, fire water supply, fire fighting facilities, and drainage.
Spacing requirements will vary depending on whether storage tanks are classified as pressurized, refrigerated or
atmospheric. Separation distances depend on the shape of the tank, the size of the tank, the distance between tanks and
groups of tanks, the number of tanks in a group, the type of roof (dome or floating), insulation on the tank, and the tank
contents. Consult the codes for specifics because many exceptions and limitations exist. Many aspects of storage and
piping system design require special attention to reduce seismic risks. Tanks can tip over or slide due to inadequate
bracing or anchorage. Tank movement can cause attached piping to fail, resulting in release of toxic or flammable liquids.
Unanchored tanks may be anchored and flexibility provided in attached piping to ensure it moves independently of the
tank during an earthquake. Proper design and location of pipe supports will ensure that severe stresses at nozzles do not
occur during seismic shake. Tank foundation problems may be reduced by designing for asymmetric pressures from
sloshing of vessel contents and the sliding and overturning loads at the vessel anchorage.
ATMOSPHERIC VENTING
Ventilation

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For environmental control of airborne toxic material the most common method of choice is ventilation, for the following
reasons:
Ventilation can quickly remove dangerous concentrations of flammable and toxic materials.
Ventilation can be highly localized, reducing the quantity of air moved and the equipment size.
Ventilation equipment is readily available and can be easily installed.
Ventilation equipment can be added to an existing facility.
The major disadvantage of ventilation is the operating cost. Substantial electrical energy may be needed to drive the
potentially large fans, and the cost to heat or cool the large quantities of fresh air can be large. These operating costs need
to be considered when evaluating alternatives.
Ventilation is based on two principles: (1) dilute the contaminant below the target concentration, and (2) remove the
contaminant before workers are exposed.
Ventilation systems are composed of fans and ducts. The fans produce a small pressure drop (less than 0.1 psi) that moves
the air. The best system is a negative pressure system, with the fans located at the exhaust end of the system, pulling air
out. This ensures that leaks in the system draw air in from the workplace rather than expel contaminated air from the ducts
into the workplace. There are two types of ventilation techniques: local and dilution ventilation
Local Ventilation
The most common example of local ventilation is the hood. A hood is a device that either completely encloses the source
of contaminant and/or moves the air in such a fashion as to carry the contaminant to an exhaust device. There are several
types of hoods:
An enclosed hood completely contains the source of contaminant.
An exterior hood continuously draws contaminants into an exhaust from some distance away.
A receiving hood is an exterior hood that uses the discharge motion of the contaminant for collection.
A push-pull hood uses a stream of air from a supply to push contaminants toward an exhaust system.
The most common example of an enclosed hood is the laboratory hood.Fresh air is drawn through the window area of the
hood and is removed out the top through a duct. The airflow profiles within the hood are highly dependent on the location
of the window sash. It is important to keep the sash open a few inches, minimally, to ensure adequate fresh air. Likewise,
the sash should never be fully opened because contaminants might escape. The baffle at the rear of the hood ensures that
contaminants are removed from the working surface and the rear lower corner
Another type of laboratory hood is the bypass hood. For this design bypass air is supplied through a grill at the top of the
hood. This ensures the availability of fresh air to sweep out contaminants in the hood. The bypass air supply is reduced as
the hood sash is opened.
The advantages of enclosed hoods are that they completely eliminate exposure to workers, require minimal airflow,
provide a containment device in the event of fire or explosion, and provide a shield to the worker by means of a sliding
door on the hood. The disadvantages of hoods are that they limit workspace and can be used only for small, bench-scale or
pilot plant equipment.
Dilution Ventilation
If the contaminant cannot be placed in a hood and must be used in an open area or room, dilution ventilation is necessary.
Unlike hood ventilation, where the airflow prevents worker exposure, dilution ventilation always exposes the worker but
in amounts diluted by fresh air. Dilution ventilation always requires more airflow than local ventilation; operating
expenses can be substantial For exposures to multiple sources the dilution air requirement is computed for each individual
source. The total dilution requirement is the sum of the individual dilution requirements.
The following restrictions should be considered before implementing dilution ventilation:
1.The contaminant must not be highly toxic.
2.The contaminant must be evolved at a uniform rate.
3.Workers must remain a suitable distance from the source to ensure proper dilution of the
contaminant.
4.Scrubbing systems must not be required to treat the air before exhaust into the environment.
A fixed roof atmospheric storage tank is connected to the atmosphere by some form of vent,generally either a simple free
flow atmospheric vent or pressure/vacuum valve.Vents for atmospheric storage tanks are dealt within BS 2654.Since

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atmospheric tanks can withstand pressure/vacuum of only few inches,it is essential that atmospheric vents should remain
free.Blockage can occur accidentally due to debris, solids formation, polymerization etc.
A flame arrestor at the end of a vent also serves to keep out debris.If there is no arrestor, a coarse wire mesh guard is
usually provided.
The tank may also suffer overpressure or underpressure if the capacity of vent is not sufficient.Situations in which tank
failure tend to occur due to accidental blockage or deliberate sealing off of a vent or to lack of capacity in the vent.

Safe Storage and handling of Chemicals

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Storage procedures
When keeping chemicals in storage, the following precautions should be observed:
The quantities of hazardous chemicals shall be kept to a minimum, commensurate with their usage and shelf life. Some
chemicals degrade in storage and can become more hazardous e.g. chloroform can produce phosgene from prolonged
storage. Such chemicals shall be identified and managed appropriately.
Ensure chemical containers and their seals or stoppers are appropriate for the type and quantity of chemical stored. As far
as is practicable, chemicals should be stored in the containers in which they are supplied.
All packages in storage shall be labeled to allow unmistakable identification of the contents. All labels should comply
with the relevant regulations (see UQ OH&S Guideline for the Labelling of substances).
Storage of chemicals, including wastes, shall be based on the properties and mutual reactivities of the chemicals.
Incompatible chemicals shall be kept segregated from one another, e.g. by fire isolation in a chemical storage cabinet or
segregation in space. A separate spill catchment shall be provided for each incompatible liquid.
Opening of packages, transferring of contents, dispensing of chemicals or sampling shall not be conducted in or on top
of a cabinet or a cupboard for storing chemicals unless it is specifically designed for this purpose and appropriate
procedures and equipment are used.
Packages shall be inspected regularly to ensure their integrity. Leaking or damaged packages shall be removed to a safe
area for repacking or disposal. Labels shall be reattached or replaced, as necessary, to clearly identify the contents of the
package.
The relevant requirements concerning avoidance of ignition sources shall be complied with in situations other than
those where the ignition source is controlled and is necessary for experimental purposes, such as the use of a Bunsen
burner. Electrical equipment shall comply with AS 3000 Electrical Installations if installed or other appropriate
standards if portable..
Hazard zoning assessments should be conducted for all new laboratories storing and using chemicals, in accordance
with the provisions of AS 60079
Procedures shall be established to deal with clean up and safe disposal of spillages. Supplies and materials needed to
control the spillages shall be readily accessible.
Substances which are unstable at ambient temperature shall be kept in a controlled temperature environment set to
maintain an appropriate temperature range. Reliable alternative safety measures shall be provided for situations when
utilities, such as power, fail. Substances that can present additional hazards on heating shall be clearly identified.
Sunlight can affect some plastic containers or the chemical contents. Containers or chemicals that can be affected shall
not be stored in a laboratory where they can be exposed to direct sunlight.
Regularly review the chemicals held in storage and correctly dispose of those no longer required using the University
chemical waste procedures
Storage of time sensitive chemicals
Time-sensitive chemicals are those chemicals that, when stored for prolonged periods or under poor storage conditions,
can develop hazards that were not present in the original formulation. There are four general categories of time-sensitive
chemicals loosely based on those unsafe properties that can develop, being:
1. peroxide formers,
2. peroxide formers that can undergo hazardous polymerization,
3. materials that become shock or friction sensitive upon the evaporation of a stabilizer, and
4. materials that generate significant additional hazards by undergoing slow chemical reactions.

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It should be noted that time-sensitive chemicals can be pure reagents or they can be commercial mixtures formulated as
cleaners, adhesives and other products.
All time-sensitive chemicals should be immediately marked with an expiration date upon receipt and listed on the
laboratory chemical inventory to ensure timely disposal. The Safety Data Sheet for the chemical will state whether it is
unstable under certain conditions or after a period of time in storage, and this information should be highlighted in the risk
assessment.
Containers should be inspected periodically to verify their condition. Signs of peroxide formation include: crystal
formation in the container, discoloration of liquids, or a mossy appearance around the cap. If suspect materials are
recognized, do not handle the container. Particularly, do not attempt to remove the cap. If explosive crystals have formed
around the cap, the friction created by the unscrewing of the cap may be enough to detonate the compounds.
Chemical storage room requirements
All chemical storage rooms must be purpose built and comply with the requirements of Section 5 of AS2243.10. This
standard allows for the storage of chemicals in quantities that exceed the quantities permitted to be kept on laboratory
shelves or in chemical storage cabinets in the laboratory.
All 500L flammable stores must be designed and constructed to AS1940 and licensed by Brisbane City Council. Stores
may be located above ground floor only by exception where a risk assessment shows an acceptable risk, in accordance
with AS2243.10.
Storage of chemicals in refrigerators
Where flammable substances are to be stored in refrigerators, a pharmaceutical fridge or freezer with a spark proof
interior must be purchased. Refer to the Guideline for the Storage of flammable substances in refrigerators

Safe Storage and handling of Industrial gases

The handling of compressed gases must be considered more hazardous than the handling of liquid and solid materials
because of the following properties unique to compressed gases: pressure, low flash points for flammable gases, low
boiling points, and no visual and/or odor detection of many hazardous gases. Hazards may arise as a result of equipment
failure and leakage from systems that are not pressuretight. Also, improper pressure control may cause unsafe reaction
rates due to poor flow control. Diffusion of leaking gases may cause rapid contamination of the atmosphere, giving rise to
toxicity, anesthetic effects, asphyxiation, and rapid formation of explosive concentrations of flammable gases. The flash
point of a flammable gas under pressure is always lower than ambient or room temperature. Leaking gas can therefore
rapidly form an explosive mixture with air.
The procedures adopted for the safe handling of compressed gases are mainly centered on containment of the material, to
prevent its escape to the atmosphere, and proper control of pressure and flow.
Some general precautions for handling, storing, and using compressed gases follow.
1.Never drop cylinders or permit them to strike each other violently.
2. Cylinders may be stored in the open, but should be protected from the ground beneath to prevent rusting.
Cylinders may be stored in the sun, except in localities where extreme temperatures prevail; in the case of certain gases,
the suppliers recommendation for shading should be observed. If ice or snow accumulates on a cylinder, thaw at room
temperature.
3. The valve-protection cap should be left on each cylinder until it has been secured against a wall or bench, or placed in a
cylinder stand, and is ready to be used.
4. Avoid dragging, rolling, or sliding cylinders, even for a short distance. They should be moved by using a suitable hand
truck.
5. Never tamper with pressure relief devices in valves or cylinders.
6. Do not store full and empty cylinders together.
7. Do not have full and empty cylinders connected to the same manifold. Reverse flow can occur when an empty cylinder
is attached to a pressurized system.
8. No part of a cylinder should be subjected to a temperature higher than 125F. A flame should never be permitted to
come in contact with any part of a compressed gas cylinder.

10
9. Cylinders should not be subjected to artificially created low temperatures (-40F or lower), since many types of steel
will lose their ductility and impact strength at low temperatures. Special stainless steel cylinders are available for low
temperature use.
10. Do not place cylinders where they may become part of an electric circuit. When electric arc-welding, precautions
must be taken to prevent striking an arc against a cylinder.
11. Bond and ground all cylinders, lines, and equipment used with flammable compressed gases.
12. Use compressed gases only in a well ventilated area. Toxic, flammable, and corrosive gases should be carefully
handled in a hood. Proper containment systems should be used and minimum quantities of these products should be kept
on-site.
13. Cylinders should be used in rotation as received from the supplier. Storage areas should be set up to permit proper
inventory rotation.
Filling
Nonliquefied gases may be filled to the service pressure marked on a cylinder. These markings will appear on the shoulder
of the cylinder, Liquefied gases, on the other hand, must be filled to a filling density. This filling density represents the
maximum weight of the material permitted in the cylinder, as a percentage of the water capacity of the cylinder.
Transportation
When cylinders are being moved from a storage area into the laboratory or plant, the valve-protection cap should be left in
place. The cylinder should then be transported by means of a suitable hand truck. Such a hand truck should be provided
with a chain or belt for securing the cylinder on the truck. If a large number of cylinders must be moved from one area to
another, a power device, such as a fork truck equipped with a special container and provided with some means of securing
the cylinder, can be used. Do not lift cylinders by the cap. Avoid dragging or sliding cylinders. Use hand trucks even for
short distances.

Cylinder Hand Trucks

Pressure Relief Devices

Pressure relief devices are incorporated in most DOT compressed gas cylinders, except those containing poison or toxic
gas, where the risk of exposure to fumes is considered more hazardous than that of a potential cylinder failure. Pressure
relief devices are incorporated in the cylinder valve, in plugs in the cylinder itself, or both.
Leak Detection
Check cylinders and all connections under pressure for leaks prior to using the contents. When
using toxic gases, it is
advisable that some device be used to warn of the presence of toxic concentrations.
There are numerous monitoring devices available for detection of dangerous concentrations of gases in the atmosphere
There are also appropriate chemical procedures for detecting leaks in lines and equipment and for determining dangerous
concentrations of gases in the atmosphere. The user of gases should become familiar with suitable control procedures for
the determination of such dangerous concentrations. Instructions are usually supplied in the Materials Safety Data Sheets
(MSDS) associated with the particular gas being used.
SAFE DISPOSAL METHODS
Three principal methods are used for the disposal of fluids released by pressure release devices:
1. by discharge to the atmosphere;
2. by burning;
3. by disposal to a lower-pressure system.

11
This includes the use of separators to collect released liquids and special chemical scrubbers to prevent the release of
highly toxic gases and vapours to the atmosphere.
Factors to be considered when deciding on the method of disposal include toxicity, odour, smoke, particulate matter,
noise, heat, reliability and ease of maintenance
The pipework of disposal systems must be designed and supported to withstand the thermal strains resulting from the
entry of hot and cold fluids, and the shock loading resulting from the sudden release of compressible fluids and slugs of
liquid. If compressed liquefied gases are relieved, flash evaporation will occur at the release device subjecting the
pipework to very low temperatures. It is then essential to choose an alloy which does not suffer embrittlement at the
lowest temperature which may be reached, and to provide adequate bends in the pipework to cater for contraction. If solid
materials (such as rubbers and polymers) are liable to be released into or formed in the pipework, adequate flanged joints
must be provided to allow it to be cleaned and inspected internally. Means must also be provided (e.g. locks on valves or
line blind for leak testing the pipework after installation and maintenance.
If liquid is liable to be present in the discharge, the piping should be self-draining into an adequately sized knockout pot
before the vent stack, flare or scrubber, and effective means of removing liquid collected must be provided.
Discharge to the atmosphere
This is usually the cheapest method and is commonly used not only for air and steam and other gases of low toxicity but
also for flammable gases and vapours. Individual vent pipes near the equipment relieved are generally used. The levels of
noise and atmospheric toxicity to which nearby workers and members of the public are liable to be subjected by the
discharge should be evaluated and be within accepted limits for the chosen location. Mist is generally only a problem with
steam discharges since most saturated vapours superheat on passing through a relief valve. In the case of flammable gases,
these must leave the vent at a sufficiently high velocity to entrain enough air to reduce its concentration to below the
lower explosive limit before the energy of the jet has dissipated. Hydrocarbon gases and vapours are generally diluted to
below their lower flammability limit [10.1] at a distance from the vent exit equal to 120 times its diameter. When the
cross-sectional area of the vent exit is equal to that of the full valve opening, this condition is usually met so long as the
valve is passing gas only and is at least 25% open. This applies to pop-open relief valves which close positively when
the pressure in the equipment relieved falls below the set pressure. The vent should be located on the top of a tall structure
and so directed that the jet does not impinge on any solid object which would cause a stable flame if ignition occurred.
The vent should preferably point upwards, and be adequately supported against reaction from the jet discharge. A small
drain hole is needed at the bottom of the vent pipe to ensure drainage of rain-water. This should be arranged so that a little
air is sucked into the vent pipe by the momentum of the gas rather than allowing gas to escape through it at low level.
There is always some risk of ignition when flammable gases are discharged to the atmosphere, especially if the relief
device opens as a result of fire. This happened in the FCzin disaster of 1966,when the gas released ignited, causing a
huge flame which radiated heat back onto the LPG spheres and was a major factor in causing their disastrous rupture. The
consequences of radiation from burning gas at the vent exit must therefore be considered when deciding its position.
Possible causes of ignition include lighting, static electricity and iron oxide particles. The risk of ignition increases if the
gas contains molecular hydrogen. The exit of the vent can be designed to reduce the chance of static ignition when
hydrogen-containing gases are vented, and also to ensure that any flame which tends to form is blown out by the jet. There
should be no risk of forming an explosive vapour cloud with a properly designed vent discharge since the concentration of
flammable gas is only momentarily within explosive limits in the jet itself. Considerations of jet dispersion favour
separate elevated vents for each pressure-relief valve rather than manifolding several discharge lines together into a
common stack. For similar reasons, process vents of flammable gases should be kept separate from pressure-relief vents.
Disposal by burning
Disposal of combustible gases by burning is generally accomplished in elevated flares which can be a nuisance to local
communities, especially at night-time. Flare stacks and burners are best designed by, obtained from and installed by
specialist firms. This is because of the difficult problems of ensuring positive pilot ignition, flame stability and acceptable
levels of noise, thermal radiation and luminosity. Smokeless operation generally requires considerable quantities of steam,
high-pressure waste gas or forced-draught air. Carbon deposited on the lip of the burner presents an ignition hazard, since
red-hot particles may be detached and travel considerable distances in the air, with the risk of igniting pockets of
flammable vapour, e.g. above floating roof tanks. Another potential hazard of flare stacks is that of explosion within the
stack resulting from air entering it when no gas is flowing through it. Care should be taken to avoid holes in the piping,

12
knockout vessel and stack through which air could enter, and a small continuous flow of inert gas through the system is
recommended to prevent back diffusion of air through the burner. If space permits, a ground-level flare has the advantage
of facilitating maintenance and allowing a light shield to be constructed which obscures visible flames under all
conditions other than major releases. When continuous flaring is necessary, smokeless combustion can be achieved
through the use of a number of small burners at ground-level without the need for steam or forced-draught air.
Combustible liquids released by pressure-relief valves can where space is available be discharged to a burning pit in
which a fire is maintained continuously.
Disposal to a lower pressure system
For this method to be safe the lower-pressure system must have adequate capacity to take the maximum amount of fluid
liable to be discharged from the higher-pressure system without itself becoming overpressurised. This method might be
used in an LPG storage terminal with spheres and a considerable amount of pipework which requires thermal expansion
relief for liquid LPG trapped between closed valves. Here the small amount of liquid LPG relieved could generally be
routed to a storage sphere provided all possible hazards are checked.
Treatment of toxic gas and hot fluid discharges
Properly engineered systems for dealing with releases of highly toxic and hot fluids are essential. Highly toxic gases must
be treated in adequately sized towers with liquid absorbent or solid adsorbent, or catalytically to form non-toxic
compounds. Companies and industries which have these problems usually develop their own methods and codes for
dealing with them, such as BCISCs chlorine code.
Even where an adequate system is installed, the fact that it may not be needed for a long time may induce managements to
question its need and allow it to lapse into a state of disrepair, as appeared to happen at Bhopal . The rate of discharge
which such systems may have to deal with in an emergency must also be properly appreciated when they are designed.
The high cost of an adequate system is a temptation to provide a 'cosmetic' but inadequate solution.

LIGHTNING PROTECTION
Lightning protection systems are intended to minimize damage to facilities that may be subject to atmospheric stroke. The
damage caused by lightning may be thermal (fire), electrical (flashover) and/or mechanical (torsional forces). The energy
in a lightning stroke can ignite flammable vapors and damage the equipment and structures by the flow of lightning
discharge current through any resistance in its path. In process plants, electrical equipment, all equipment containing
hazardous liquids and gases, outdoor metal structures, vessels or other tall equipment subject to lightning strokes should
be properly grounded. In addition, buildings or structures made of nonmetallic materials, those normally occupied by
personnel, or those that if seriously damaged could result in a major loss either to the structure itself or from the effect on
other facilities, also require lightning protection systems.
Lightning Phenomena Theory
Lightning is the discharge of electricity from a charged cloud to another cloud or the ground. An atmospheric discharge to
ground is shown in fig. The last part of the distance travelled by the downward leader is the most critical for a lightning
protection, because at that point the stroke may be influenced to take a specific path which provides protection to a given
structure. The current that may be discharged during a lightning stroke varies widely between 2 and 200 kiloamperes, with
some exceptional cases as high as 300 kA . Any lightning protection system will have to deal with large currents draining
to earth in a very short period of time. However, it must be pointed out that the probability of occurrence of thunderstorms
also influences design of a lightning protection system. Statistics have been compiled for this probability and are
presented on a map by isokeraunic lines that designate geographic areas of equal frequency of thunderstorm activity . The
value read from the isokeraunic line is the number of days per year that thunder was heard in that particular region.
Isokeraunic levels are particularly useful for transmission line design.

13

NOTE: A storm cloud produces a charge of one polarity distributed within the base of the cloud and a corresponding, but
opposite, charge distributed on the surface of the earth under the cloud. The process starts with a downward corona-like
streamer from the cloud defined as a stepped leader. This leader transports the electric charge from the cloud to the earth
following several unpredictable paths depending on atmospheric ionization of the air in a series of hesitating steps. As the
top streamer approaches earth, another upward stream of electric charge builds up almost instantaneously aimed at
encountering the top streamer. If a plasma channel is established within property ionized air the two streamers meet and
lightning occurs, establishing a path for conduction of a large electric current, defined as the return stroke, which
equalizes the charge between the two equipotential planes. The total elapsed time for a leader to complete its path from
cloud to earth is less than 10 milliseconds.
Lightning Protection Systems
The basic theory of protection against direct lightning strikes is to provide terminals projecting into the air above the
highest parts of a given structure with interconnecting grounding conductors that provide a path of minimum resistance to
earth. The tallest structure in a group is the likeliest target and it determines the degree of protection for lower structures.
Lightning strokes, which might otherwise fall inside the zone, are attracted to the mast. In a petrochemical plant, taller
structures like splitters, strippers, absorbers, and fractionating columns shield lower structures like reactors or drums.
A well-designed lightning protection system protects against direct lightning strikes as well as induced lightning voltages.
Protection against direct strikes may be accomplished in buildings, cooling towers, and stacks by the use of air terminals
(lightning rods) connected into the grounding system in addition to metal ground bonds. Steel process towers are by
nature lightning rods and do not require additional air terminals. Suppression of induced lightning voltages is achieved by
means of lightning arresters and surge capacitors at strategic locations particularly if a bare aerial power distribution line
is exposed to direct lightning stroke. The protected zone for structures is determined by spanning a 100-foot arc, as shown
in Figure 12-3 both for a single mast and for a rig of four masts with overhead ground wires. In both cases the striking
distance radius is the same. It is at this distance that the upward streamer is formed and the downward leader is attracted to
the mast.
Conventional steel structures, at least 3/16 inch in thickness, such as process columns, vessels, steel storage tanks and
steel stacks of petroleum and petrochemical processing plants, will not be damaged by direct lightning strokes. Still, it is
necessary to adequately ground the structures to prevent damage to the foundation, dissipate the energy and to provide a
zone of protection for electrical apparatus and other equipment in the vicinity. Grounded tanks containing flammable

14
liquids or liquified petroleum gas under pressure do not require specific lightning protection since they are inherently selfprotecting if adequately grounded. Structures, cooling towers, or buildings made entirely of nonconductive materials and
located outside of the zone of protection of another structure require full lightning protection as indicated in NFPA 78.
Incoming utility substations, as well as outdoor pumping stations, that have a large number of major electrical apparatus
and which provide extremely important process functions also require lightning protection.
Masts or steel lattice extensions to provide cones of protection to the equipment within the substation. The shield angle
fora single mast is 30, but increases to 60 for a shielding angle that lies within the masts.
Overhead static wires on incoming transmission to protect phase conductors. The static wire(s) should be connected to
one of the masts or lattice extensions within the substation.
Messenger cable grounded at frequent intervals to provide protection to aerial cables.
Metallic conduits and metal sheaths need to be grounded and bonded at each end. Feeders in metallic conduits or with
metal sheaths are essentially self-protecting.
Lightning arresters will also be required to protect electrical equipment connected to a distribution system exposed either
directly or indirectly to lightning strokes. A lightning arrester is a device that drains to ground high currents at surge
voltages just like the ones created by an atmospheric discharge. Lightning arrester applications are covered in IEEE
Standard 242.
Grounding of electric power systems and equipment is necessary in order to limit voltage disturbances due to lightning,
line surges, or unintentional contact with higher voltage sources, and to provide safe return paths to the power source
during ground fault conditions. Grounding is a conducting connection, intentional or accidental, between an electrical
circuit or equipment and the earth.

RELIEF SYSTEMS
The relief system is composed of the relief device and the associated downstream process equipment to safely handle the
material ejected.
The method used for the safe installation of pressure relief - The first step in the procedure is to specify where relief
devices must be installed. Definitive guidelines are available. Second, the appropriate relief device type must be selected.
The type depends mostly on the nature of the material relieved and the relief characteristics required. Third, scenarios are
developed that describe the various ways in which a relief can occur. The motivation is to determine the material mass
flow rate through the relief and the physical state of the material (liquid, vapor, or two phases). Next, data are collected on
the relief process, including physical properties of the ejected material, and the relief is sized.
Pressure relief systems are required for the following reasons:

15

to protect personnel from the dangers of overpressurizing equipment

to minimize chemical losses during pressure upsets
to prevent damage to equipment
to prevent damage to adjoining property
to reduce insurance premiums, and
to comply with governmental regulations.

Definitions that are commonly used within the chemical industry to describe reliefs are given below
.
Set pressure: The pressure at which the relief device begins to activate.
Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP): The maximum gauge pressure~ermissiblea t the top of a vessel for a
designated temperature. This is sometimes called the design pressure.
Operating pressure: The gauge pressure during normal service, usually 10% below the MAWP.
Overpressure: The pressure increase in the vessel over the set pressure during the relieving process. Overpressure is
equivalent to the accumulation when the set pressure is at the MAWP. It is expressed as a percentage of the set pressure.
Backpressure: The pressure at the outlet of the relief device during the relief process resulting from pressure in the
discharge system.
Relief system: The network of components around a relief device, including the pipe to the relief, the relief device,
discharge pipelines, knockout drum, scrubber, flare, or other types of equipment that assist in the safe relief process.
The procedure for specifying the location of reliefs requires the review of every unit operation in the process and of every
process operating step. The engineer must anticipate the potential problems that may result in increased pressures.
Pressure relief devices are installed at every point identified as potentially hazardous, that is, at points where upset
conditions create pressures that may exceed the MAWP.
Relief Types
Specific types of relief devices are chosen for specific applications, such as for liquids, gases, liquids and gases, solids,
and corrosive materials; they may be vented to the atmosphere or vented to containment systems (scrubber, flare,
condenser, incinerator). In engineering terms the type of relief device is specified on the basis of the details of the relief
system, process conditions, and physical properties of the relieved fluid.
There are two general categories of relief devices (spring-operated and rupture discs) and two major types of springoperated valves (conventional and balanced-bellows) On spring-operated valves the adjustable spring tension offsets the
inlet pressure. The relief set pressure is usually specified at 10% above the normal operating pressure. To avoid the
possibility of an unauthorized person changing this setting, the adjustable screw is covered with a threaded cap. For a
conventional spring-operated relief, the valve opens based on the pressure drop across the valve seat; that is, the set
pressure is proportional to the pressure drop across the seat. Thus, if the backpressure downstream of the valve increases,
the set pressure will increase and the valve may not open at the correct pressure. In addition, the flow through the
conventional relief is proportional to the difference in pressure across the seat. The flow through the relief, therefore, is
reduced as the backpressure increases.
For the balanced-bellows design the bellows on the backside of the valve seat ensures that the pressure on that side of the
seat is always atmospheric. Thus the balanced-bellows valve will always open at the desired set pressure. However, the
flow through the balanced-bellows relief is proportional to the difference in pressure between the inlet and the outlet of
the valve. Therefore the flow is reduced as the backpressure increases.
Rupture discs are specially designed to rupture at a specified relief set pressure. They usually consist of a calibrated sheet
of metal designed to rupture at a well-specified pressure. They are used alone, in series, or in parallel to spring-loaded
relief devices. They can be made from a variety of materials, including exotic corrosion-resistant materials.
An important problem with rupture discs is the flexing of the metal as process pressures change. Flexing could lead to
premature failure at pressures below the set pressure. For this reason some rupture disc systems are designed to operate at
pressures well below the set pressure. In addition, vacuum service may cause rupture disc failure if the relief system is not
specifically designed for this service. Another problem with rupture disc systems is that once they open, they remain open.
This may lead to the complete discharge of process material. It may also allow air to enter the process, leading to a
possible fire and/or explosion. In some accidents discs were ruptured without the process operator being aware of the
situation. To prevent this problem, rupture discs are available with embedded wires that are cut when the disc ruptures;
this can activate an alarm in the control room to alert the operator. Also, when rupture discs rupture, pieces of the disc may

16
become dislodged, creating potential downstream plugging problems. Recent advances in rupture disc design have
minimized this problem.
Rupture discs are available in much larger sizes than spring-operated relief valves, with commercial sizes available up to
several feet in diameter. Rupture discs typically cost less than equivalently sized spring-operated relief valves.
Rupture discs are frequently installed in series to a spring-loaded relief (1) to protect an expensive spring-loaded device
from a corrosive environment, (2) to give absolute isolation when handling extremely toxic chemicals (spring-loaded
reliefs may weep), (3) to give absolute isolation when handling flammable gases, (4) to protect the relatively complex
parts of a springloaded device from reactive monomers that could cause plugging, and (5) to relieve slurries that may plug
spring-loaded devices.
.

SIZING OF RELIEF-CALCULATIONS
Physical property data and sometimes reaction rate characteristics are required for making relief sizing calculations. Data
estimated using engineering assumptions are almost always acceptablewhen designing unit operations because the only
result is poorer yields or poorerquality. In the relief design, however, these types of assumptions are not acceptable
because an error may result in catastrophic and hazardous failures.

17
After the relief type has been chosen and the relief size computed, the engineer takes the responsibility for completing the
design of the relief system, including deciding how to install the relief in the system and how to dispose of the exiting
liquids and vapors. Regardless of how carefully the relief is sized, specified, and tested, a poor installation can
result in completely unsatisfactory relief performance.
A designer of relief systems must be familiar with governmental codes, industrial standards, and insurance requirements.
This is particularly important because local government standards may vary. Codes of particular interest are published by
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American Petroleum Institute, and the National Board of Fire
Underwriters.It is recommended that relief designers carefully consider all codes and, where feasible, select the one that is
most suited to the particular installation.
In most cases a relief is first discharged to a knockout system to separate the liquid from the vapor; here the liquid is
collected and the vapor is discharged to another treatment unit. This subsequent vapor treatment unit depends on the
hazards of the vapor; it may include a condenser, scrubber, incinerator, flare, or a combination of them.
Knockout drums are sometimes called catch tanks or blowdown drums, this horizontal knockout drum system serves as a
vapor-liquid separator as well as a holdup vessel for the disengaged liquid. The two-phase mixture usually enters at one
end, and the vapor leaves at the opposite end. Inlets may be provided at each end, with a vapor exit in the center to
minimize vapor velocities. When space within a plant is limited, a tangential knockout drum is used. The design method
for sizing this type of system was published by Grosse18 and in API 521.9 The method is based on the maximum
allowable velocity for minimizing liquid entrainment.
The dropout velocity of a particle in a stream is

where
u, is the dropout velocity,
g is the acceleration due to gravity,
d, is the particle diameter,
p, is the liquid density,
p, is the vapor density, and
Cis the drag coefficient given by Figure 8-14.

18
The abscissa of Figure 8-14 is

where
v is the vapor viscosity in centipoise
C(Re)2 is unitless.

Flares
Flares are sometimes used after knockout drums. The objective of a flare is to burn the combustible or toxic gas to
produce combustion products that are neither toxic nor combustible. The diameter of the flare must be suitable to maintain
a stable flame and to prevent a blowout (when vapor velocities are greater than 20% of the sonic velocity).
The height of a flare is fixed on the basis of the heat generated and the resulting potential damage to equipment and
humans. The usual design criterion is that the heat intensity at the base of the stack is not to exceed 1500 Btulhrlft2. Using
the fundamentals of radiation, we know that the heat intensity q at a specific point is a function of the heat generated by
the flame Q,, the emissivity E, and the distance R from the flame:

Assuming a flame height of 120df, an emissivity E = 0.048m, and a heating value of 20,000 Btullb, Equation (8-3) can be
algebraically modified to give the flare height Hi(i n ft) as a function of the flare stack diameter df (in ft) and the desired
heat intensity qf (in ~tu/hr/ft') at a distance Xf from the base of the flare (in ft) for a burning fuel with a molecular weight
M
and a vapor rate Q, (in lblhr):

19
Sizing of Relief Valves
It is recommended that designers consider using personal computer programs to aid in valve sizing when a vendor has
been chosen. Consult the ASME Code and API RP 520, along with vendor technical information.
Vapor Service
The ASME Code is the primary reference for pressure relief device sizing requirements. API RP 520 recommends
formulas for calculating the discharge area of a relief valve for gas or vapor, for low pressure steam exhaust.
Liquid Service
Liquid capacity certification is required for pressure relief valves designed for liquid service .The procedure for obtaining
capacity certification includes determining the coefficient of discharge for the design of liquid relief valves at 10%
overpressure. Valves that require a capacity in accordance with the ASME Code maybe sized using the equation given in
API RP 520, Section 4.5. Where liquid-full equipment can be blocked-in and continued heat input cannot be avoided, a
pressure relief device shall be provided. The rate of expansion depends primarily on the rate of heat input and the liquid
properties. Liquid expansion rates for the sizing of relief devices that protect heat exchangers, condensers, and coolers
against thermal expansion of trapped liquids can be approximated using an equation from API RP 520
Relief Valve Inlet and Outlet Sizing
The inlet line of a relief valve must be designed using the criteria given in the codes and standards. the proper operation of
a relief device depends upon proper installation including line sizing. Consult the ASME Code for basic requirements for
pipe sizing and limitations. The outlet line size of a relief valve discharging to atmosphere is generally dictated by back
pressure, velocity limitations and environmental considerations. Sizing of relief valves discharging into a closed system,
for example, a
flare, is impacted primarily by back pressure considerations. Design guidelines for sizing outlet lines are also given in the
aforementioned design codes and standards.
TEMPERATURE RELIEF
The temperature safety relief valves limit the temperature of water in multi-fuel or solid fuel boilers with either a boiler
incorporated or an emergency heat exchanger. When the temperature reaches 95C, the valve starts to discharge the
necessary amount of water to keep the boiler temperature within the safety limits.
Operating principle
When the temperature rises, the fluid contained within the sensor (1) undergoes a change of state from liquid to gas. The
consequent volume increase creates a mechanical movement causing the expandable bellows (2), inside the valve, to push
on the obturator and lift it up.

Construction details
Redundant expansion system
The entire expansion system has a built-in redundancy (1)-(2) to ensure maximum safety, so if one part of the sensor
system fails the other part will perform the same functions as the entire sensor.

20

Pocket and capillary tubes-The size of the pocket is such that it is always in contact with the sensors, which improves
heat transmission and keeps thermal inertia to a minimum. The capillary tubes are protected by a galvanized sheath.
Bellows holder support
The bellows holder support is made of acetalic resin and can be repositioned by loosening the knurled lock nut.

Drain -The lower part of the valve contains a button in order to drain the system
Installation-The sensor should be mounted at the top of the boiler or on the outlet piping upstream of any isolating device
and at a maximum distance of 0,5 m.
1. After mounting the valve on the pipe, according to the flow direction indicated on the valve body, place the part
connected to the sensor in its seat.
2. Loosely tighten the knurled lock nut.
3. Position the sheath outlet that connects the probe by turning the black cap. Completely tighten the knurled lock nut
.

COLOUR CODING OF PIPELINES

Identification and colour coding for the pipelines is essential to avoid potential hazards, accidents. Giving a colour code
and maintaining the uniformity for colour coding in industrial piping will eliminate accidental chances, reduces
operational errors. Moreover it enhances the safety aspects.
Colour coding or the colouring scheme is to know, identify which fluid is flowing inside the pipelines. This can be
applicable to building piping, process piping, industrial piping, chemical or process plants. Complete piping systems
including valves, fittings are to be painted accordingly.
Paints and paint shades selected should conform to the governing standard prior to provision.
Colour Coding to Pipelines (Ground Colour and Colour Bands)
Giving a base or ground colour to pipelines based on fluid flowing, the line identification is done. Further colour bands
are provided accordingly. The base/ground colour gives the basic nature of the flowing fluid (i.e. water, air, gases etc.).
Typically ground colours are provided on the full pipe section or minimum 300 mm length portion or by attaching the
label.
Ground colour
Green
Sky Blue

Fluid flow inside the pipe

Water
Air

21
Yellow
Aluminum

Gases
Steam

Over and above the base colour or ground colour to the pipeline, colour bands are provided to differentiate and identify
the application of the basic fluid.
Example:
(1)Fluid:Water
Groundcolourcode:Green
Cooling water: Sea green (ground colour) and application is for cooling hence a further colour band of French blue is
provided.
(2) Fluid: Air
Ground colour code: Sky blue
Plant air: Sky blue (ground colour) and application is for supplying the plant air hence a further colour band of silver grey
is provided.

Colour Bands
As stated earlier, colour bands in single or double over the ground colour on the pipeline, and the ground colour on the
entire or partial length of the pipeline is provided. These colour bands are provided at suitable locations such as:

At the beginning and termination points

For yard piping around 50 to 60 m distances

At change in flow direction points and flow diversion locations.

At locations where the pipe enters the building or exits from the building

22
Typical Practices Followed for the Provision of Ground Colour and Colour Bands on the Pipelines
(1) If colour bands are provided over the ground colour, then the ground colour should extend on both sides of the colour
bands.

(2) When double colour bands exist on the pipeline, then a proportional width of 4:1 to the next colour band is provided.
(3) Minimum colour band width to be 25 mm.
(4) Generally below 80 NB piping width of the colour band is 25 mm.
(5) For piping 100 NB to 150 NB width of the colour band is 50 mm.
(6) Valves and piping accessories to be painted with the same colour as that of the pipe ground colour.
(7) For insulated pipes, non-ferrous pipes, S.S. pipe ground colour to be given for minimum 1.5 m length.
(8) For uninsulated piping above 100 Degree C, generally colour bands are not provided (only ground color Aluminum).
If bands are to be provided then they should be of Teflon tape.
(9) Flow direction, arrows to be marked at suitable intervals along the line. Line carrying fluid, the fluid name should be
written in the white box on the ground colour provided for the line.
Arrow sizes, dimensions differ w.r.t. company standards.
Example:
Below 200 NB line arrow dimensions are given below.

23
Lettering size for fluid name is also based on the pipe diameter
Examples:
100 NB Pipe ---------------Legend Size is 30 mm
50 NB Pipe -----------------Legend Size is 25 mm
200 NB Pipe ---------------Legend Size is 50 mm
(10) Visibility of Marking: It should be such that the operator can see if it is at the normal height. If lines are above the
operator's head (may be along the roof, or side wall or through the rack), then the lettering is to be done below or towards
the bottom side of the pipe.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN LABORATORY

Layout

Laboratory space should be physically separate from personal desk space, meeting space and eating areas.
Workers should not have to go through a laboratory space where hazardous materials are used in order to exit
from non-laboratory areas. Consider making visible separation between lab and non-lab space, for instance with
different flooring.

Fire-rated hallway doors should have magnetic hold-open features, such that the door will close in the event of an
alarm.

Doors to laboratories should not be fire-rated unless necessary.

Entryways should have provisions for mounting emergency information posters and other warning signage
immediately outside the laboratory (e.g., on the door).

Each door from a hallway into a lab should have a view panel to prevent accidents from opening the door into a
person on the other side and to allow individuals to see into the laboratory in case of an accident or injury.

Laboratory areas with autoclaves should have adequate room to allow access to the autoclave and clearance
behind it for maintenance. There should also be adequate room for temporary storage of materials before and after
processing. Autoclave drainage should be designed to prevent or minimize flooding and damage to the floor.

For laboratories using radioactive materials:

24

Eating and drinking areas should be physically separate and conveniently located.

Allow for security of laboratory and materials.

Consider designing the lab to allow separation of radioactive materials use from other laboratory activities.

Furniture and Fixtures

Work surfaces should be chemical resistant, smooth, and readily cleanable, such as chemical-grade Formica.

Work surfaces, including computer areas, should incorporate ergonomic features, such as adjustability,
appropriate lighting and equipment layout.

Benchwork areas should have knee space to allow room for chairs near fixed instruments, equipment or for
procedures requiring prolonged operation.

Handwashing sinks for particularly hazardous chemicals or biological agents may need elbow or electronic
controls.

Wet chemical laboratories and darkrooms should have solvent resistant coved flooring using sheet goods rather
than tile, particularly in areas where fume hoods are located.

Do not install more sinks or cupsinks than are necessary. Unused sinks may develop dry traps, resulting in odor
complaints.

Sink faucets and hose bibs that are intended for use with attached hoses are provided with back siphon prevention
devices.

Storage

Cabinets for chemical storage should be of solid, sturdy construction. Hardwood or metal shelving is preferred.
Some may require ventilation.

Materials of construction should be carefully considered where corrosive materials will be stored, e.g., corrosiveresistant liners or trays on shelves, location away from copper fittings, etc.

Allow space within the building for any central chemical and biological or radioactive waste storage needs.

Wall shelving should have heavy-duty brackets and standards and should be attached to studs or solid blocking.
For office spaces, bookcases are preferable to wall-mounted shelving.

Flammable liquid storage needs should be defined in advance so that the laboratory may have space for a suitable
number of flammable storage cabinets. Per the Uniform Fire Code, quantities greater than 10 gallons of
flammable liquids must be stored in a flammable liquid storage cabinet, unless safety cans are used. No more than
25 gallons of flammable liquids in safety cans may be stored outside a flammable liquid storage cabinet.

Flammable liquid storage is not allowed below grade or near a means of egress, per the Uniform Fire Code.

Flammable storage cabinets should not be vented unless there is a significant odor or vapor control concern.

Laboratories using corrosive liquids should have ample storage space low to the floor, preferably in low cabinets,
such as under fume hoods.

25

Allow space for the variety of waste collection containers needed. Depending on the laboratory, these may include
laboratory trash, broken glass, sharps, recyclable containers, used oil, medical waste, and/or radioactive waste.

Laboratories using compressed gases should have recessed areas for cylinder storage and be equipped with
devices to secure cylinders in place.

All laboratories should have storage space for supplies and combustible materials, e.g., boxes of gloves, spill kits,
boxes of centrifuge tubes, etc.

Laboratory Ventilation

Laboratory ventilation rates should ensure 8-10 air changes per hour minimum for occupied spaces and 6 air
changes per hour minimum when unoccupied.

Bypass style fume hoods should be used. Auxiliary air hoods should not be used.

Fume hoods should have recessed work surfaces to control spills.

The location of fume hoods, supply air vents, operable windows, laboratory furniture and pedestrian traffic should
encourage horizontal, laminar flow of air into the face of the hood, perpendicular to the hood opening. Hoods
should be placed away from doors and not where they would face each other across a narrow isle.

Hoods may have a face velocity of 100-125 linear feet per minute with the sash fully open or at its standard
configuration (e.g., at the stopper height).

Each hood must have a continuous monitoring device, such as a magnehelic gauge. The device should display
either air velocity or static pressure, rather than only an audible alarm.

Supply air vents should be placed away from or directed away from fume hoods to avoid interference. Air
velocity caused by supply vents should not exceed 25 feet per minute at the face of the hood.

Noise from the fume hood should not exceed 65 dBA at the face of the hood.

Use hard ducting for the positive side of exhaust ducting for all internal (penthouse) fans to prevent contaminant
leakage into work areas.

Fume hood exhaust ducts must not contain fire dampers.

Unless otherwise specified (e.g., clean rooms), air pressure in the laboratory should be negative with respect to the
outer hallways and non-laboratory areas.

Consider the need for vented chemical storage areas or cabinets for chemicals with low odor thresholds.

Semi-conductor and other hazardous gases (e.g., silane, hydrogen fluoride, chlorine, etc.) must be placed in
vented gas cabinets

Hoods for perchloric acid require stainless steel construction and a wash-down system and a dedicated, isolated
fan.

Hoods requiring filters (such as those for some radioisotopes or biological materials) should be designed and
located such that filters may be accessed and changed easily.

26

Provisions should be made for local exhaust of instruments, gas cabinets, vented storage cabinets or other
operations requiring local ventilation.

Single vertical sliding sashes are preferred over horizontal or split sashes.

Debris screens should be placed in the ductwork leading from the hood.

Emergency Equipment

Laboratories using hazardous materials must have an eyewash and safety shower within 100 feet or 10 seconds
travel time from the chemical use areas.

Drench hoses support, but do not replace, safety showers and eyewashes.

Eyewashes and safety showers should have plumbed drains.

Eyewashes and safety showers should be standardized at least within a laboratory building.

Flooring under safety showers should be slip-resistant.

Safety showers may have privacy curtains, particularly in large laboratories or teaching laboratories.

Fire extinguishers, safety showers and eyewashes should be conspicuously labeled, particularly if recessed.

Fire extinguishers appropriate for the chemicals and equipment in use should be placed near the entrance of each
laboratory, mechanical and electrical room.

Some chemical operations (e.g., distillation hoods) may benefit from hood fire suppression systems.

Windowless laboratories and environmental chambers should have emergency lighting.

Alarm enunciator panels should be descriptive of the area where the alarm has activated.

Materials Handling

Loading docks should be equipped with dockboards and should have enough room to maneuver pallets safely.

Cryogenic liquid tanks should be placed in such a manner that their controls could not accidentally be
manipulated and such that they may be secured to prevent unauthorized access.

Cryogenic liquid tanks should be placed away from below grade areas where dense vapors may collect and away
from glass doors or windows.

A phone should be placed near any loading area.

Utilities

Utility shut-off controls should be located outside the laboratory.

Laboratories should have an abundant number of electrical supply outlets to eliminate the need for extension
cords and multi-plug adapters.

27

Electrical panels should be placed in an accessible area not likely to be obstructed.

Ground fault circuit interrupters should be installed near sinks and wet areas.

Environmental chambers where evacuation or other alarms cannot be heard should be equipped with strobe
lighting or additional alarms.

Central vacuum systems should not be used, since they are vulnerable to contamination. Local vacuum pumps are
preferable.

All vacuum lines should have cold traps or filters to prevent contamination.

Chilled water loops should be available for equipment in need of cooling. Loops help to avoid excessive
wastewater.

Laser laboratories should have an emergency cut-off switch installed near the entrance of the laboratory to turn off
the laser remotely. Many lasers require water-cooling systems requiring ground-fault circuit interrupters.

Other

Laboratories using highly toxic gases should be equipped with alarmed vapor sensors, preferably with automatic
shutdown systems.

Gas lines from highly toxic gases should use coaxial tubing for double containment.

Animal care and use areas must meet Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care
International standards.

Laboratories classified as Security Protection Level 2 (high value equipment or security-sensitive materials) may
require additional security measures.
PIPELINE TRANSPORT- TRANSPORT HAZARDS

For a pipeline carrying flammable gas,some principal hazard are jet fire and flammable vapour cloud, leading to a flash
fire or vapour cloud explosion ,whilst for one transporting liquid,the scenario is the liquid spillage leading to a pool fire or
flowing liquid fire.The main hazard scenario for a pipeline carrying toxic gas or liquid is a toxic vapour cloud.
Most people associate pipes with the hot and cold water they see in their houses. Also, most of us will have seen the
plastic pipes laid under our streets and roads to locally distribute natural gas. But what many people do not know is that
there are hundreds of thousands of kilometres of very large pipelines crossing our nations and oceans delivering
(transmitting) huge quantities of crude oil, oil products, and gas.Crude oil is often transported between continents in
large tankers, but oil and natural gas is transported (transmitted) across continents by pipelines. These pipelines are very
large diameter diameters up to 1422mm), and can be over 1000km in length.
The oil and gas are transported in these large transmission pipelines to refineries, power stations, etc., and converted into
energy forms such as gasoline for our automobiles, and electricity for our homes. Oil and gas provides most of the world
with its energy. The fuels providing the world with its primary energy needs are:
Oil = 34%
Coal = 24%
Gas = 21%

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Nuclear = 7%
Hydro = 2%
Other = 12%
These pipelines are also very safe forms of transporting energy:
Pipelines are 40 times safer than rail tanks, and 100 times safer than road tanks for transporting energy;
Oil pipelines transport liquid petroleum products from one point to another. There are generally three types of oil
pipelines.
1.Gathering lines: travel short distances, collect unprocessed oil products from wells and deliver them to oil storage tanks.
Pipes range from 4 to 12 inches in diameter. There are more than 250,000 kilometers of these lines in Western Canada.
2. Feeder lines move product from oil storage tanks and processing plants to the transmission pipelines. They are
generally bigger than gathering lines, but smaller than transmission lines. There are more than 25,000 kilometers of feeder
lines.
3. Transmission lines can be up to 48 inches in diameter and transport oil and associated products from producing to
consuming areas, including across provincial and international boundaries. The oil is piped to refineries where it is refined
into petroleum products.
The main features of an oil pipeline are:
Storage tanks to accumulate oil for injection and to accept deliveries.
Injection stations: where the product is injected into the pipe.
Pump stations: located along the line to keep the product moving.
Intermediate delivery stations: allow product to be delivered to clients along the way.
Block valve stations: allow a section of the pipeline to be closed for maintenance, or to isolate a leak or spill. These can
be operated manually, or remotely.
Final delivery station: where the remainder of the product is distributed to the client.

Most transmission pipelines are buried in the ground and are made of carbon steel. External corrosion is caused
by electrochemical interaction between the pipe and the surrounding environment (soil in the case of buried
pipes). The process is similar to the reactions in a battery, where electrons flow between anodic (positive
terminal) and cathodic (negative terminal) sites on metals. Operators try to prevent external corrosion by
coating the pipe with a corrosion resistant material (such as epoxy) and by applying an external voltage source
to keep the pipe cathodic (cathodic protection).
Although all pipelines are coated and under cathodic protection, corrosion can still occur. This may occur through a
process called cathodic disbondment the loosening of the coating from the pipe. Internal corrosion can also occur,
however it usually occurs only when there is significant water content mixed in with the fuel flowing through the pipe.
Corrosion inside pipelines usually only occurs in areas where deposits of sludge build up. Sludge is comprised of
*sediment and* bacteria that can grow in the small pockets of water. Some sludges are more corrosive than others, and
research is currently underway to better understand how to prevent these sludges from forming.
Pipelines are required to be monitored by the National Energy Board (below). The pipeline right-of-way is monitored
through weekly, bi-weekly or monthly inspection. Pipeline operators may fly over the lines, drive along side where
possible, and conduct investigative digs around the line. Internal inspection of the pipe is generally carried out on a five to
ten year basis by high-resolution inspection tools (known as intelligent pigs see below) that can detect damage.
The transport of hazardous materials may present a hazard to1. the transporter 2. The crew 3. The public.
The relative importance of these varies between the different modes of transport.The hazards presented by the transport of
chemicals are:
1. Fire
2. Explosion
3. Toxic release-conventional toxic substances,ultrasonic substances
Mode of transport such as road ,rail, waterway, pipelinecan give rise to release of flammable vapour or gas,which may
result in a flash fire or vapour cloud explosion or of a flammable liquid which may lead to pool fire.Flammable liquid can

29
spread and then ignite giving rise to a flowing fire.Jet flame may occur on the containers.The contained material may
undergo a BLEVE(Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) or other form of explosion.In general a flammable liquid
is more likely to give rise to fire than to explosion.
An explosion hazard also exist with substances that are to some degree unstable.
If the material is toxic, release may result in a toxic gas cloud.Toxic or corrosive materials may also spread as liquids.
With waterway or sea tranport , the release of vapourizable materials onto the water is liable to give rise to very rapid
vapourization, resulting in large vapour cloud.
Transport accidents are liable to cause pollution,since material spilled is often not recovered,but is dispersed into the
environment.
The initiating factor in atransport accident may be 1. Cargo 2. Transporter 3. Operations
The cargo may catch fire, explode or corrode the tank.The transporter may be involved in a crash or derailment or fire.the
perations such as charging and discharging may be wrongly executed.
Thus the events which can give rise to hazards include particularly
Container failure
Accident impact
Loading and unloading operations.
SAFETY PROVISIONS -LEVEL AND FLOW INDICATORS
Flow

The most common method of measuring flow rate uses an element inserted into a flowing stream that will generate a
differential pressure (d/p) that is proportional to the flow. The differential pressure is then measured by instruments that
are calibrated in terms of flow rate. Each d/p type device requires sufficient upstream and downstream piping in order to
produce a fully developed flow velocity profile and an accurate and repeatable differential pressure that can be measured
and read in terms of flow rate. Some sources of information on d/p type flow elements are: Flow Measurement
Engineering Handbook and "Orifice Metering of Natural Gas and Other Related Hydrocarbon Fluids.'
Orifice plates are commonly used and are relatively easy to apply, but their range is limited. For certain applications,
caution must be exercised. A vapor stream may cany a considerable amount of entrained liquid or ambient conditions may
cause condensation which can collect on the bottom of the pipe. A liquid stream may cany entrained gases which collect
on the top of the pipe in horizontal meter runs. These conditions will cause inaccurate flow measurement because the
geometry of the entering fluid stream is affected by the collection of liquid or gas on the inlet face of the orifice plate.
However, the adverse effects on accurate measurement can be minimized by correct installation. Installing the meter run
in a vertical line, with vapor flow down or liquid flow up, is one solution. The use of one of the other differential flow
elements which do not have a buildup problem may be a better solution. As a last resort, weep holes will allow the liquid
or vapor accumulation to pass down the line and not build up behind the orifice plate
Other flow devices include load cells, mass flow meters, positive displacement meters, variable area meters (rotameters),
turbine meters, vortex meters, doppler effect meters and magnetic flow meters. Some of these devices, particularly the
positive displacement meter and the turbine meter can offer high accuracy and reliability. Other meters, such as the
doppler effect and nuclear meters are placed on the surface of the pipe being monitored. This makes them extremely safe,
but at the cost of lower accuracy and more difficult calibration. Additionally some materials may not register with the
nonintrusive types of flow meters. The choice of the flow meter used in a particular application will depend upon a set of
tradeoffs involving the material being measured, the flow range, the pressure drop, the accuracy required, and the
safety required. Avoid meters with glass tubes in hazardous or high pressure service; rotameters should be of all metal
construction.

Flow Instruments
On line, flow meters should generally be one of the following types:
1. Turbine (or nutating disk); 2. Magnetic; and 3. Ultrasonic (Doppler).
All of these types of instruments can be equipped to provide both flow rate and flow total measurements.

30
Price, line size, flowrate, flow range, required accuracy and water quality will dictate the election of the type of
instrument. The following are some general guidelines:
1. Where considerable silt is present (as in many raw waters), either a magnetic or a Doppler-type ultrasonic meter should
be used. Turbine meters will wear rapidly and are not practical. Transit-time meters may not operate properly if there
is considerable silt (consult the manufacturer).
2. An ultrasonic meter is generally more economical than a magnetic type on lines of 300 mm diameter and larger.
3. For, on lines of very low flowrate (less than 0.3 m/sec), turbine or magnetic flow meter is recommended. Where
chemicals are present in the water, check with the manufacturer to ensure that the meter will not suffer damage.
4. Corrosion and abrasion resistant linings should be considered for these applications. Regardless of the meter type, the
minimum flow velocity should be within the specified range of the meter.
5. For, on lines of high flow velocity (higher than 5 m/sec), magnetic or ultrasonic flow meter is recommended.
Regardless of the meter type, the maximum flow velocity should be within the specified range of the meter.
6. Where the water is free of solids and bubbles (as is the case on a potable distribution line), Doppler-type ultrasonics
will not operate; a transit-time type should be used.
1.Turbine Flow Meters
Turbine flow meters determine the flowrate by reading the rotating speed of the turbine, which is immersed in the fluid. A
flow totalizer is almost always included, and a flow transmitter is usually available. Because they totalize volume without
power, they will continue to operate during power failures and because they will operate without any configuration on the
part of the user or operator they are often used where ease of use and maintenance are essential.
1. Where debris may be present in the water, such as in a raw water intake, a screen filter (such as a Y-type strainer)
upstream of the meter should be provided.
2. A continuous straight run of piping upstream of the meter, 10 pipe diameters if possible should be provided, to produce
a smooth flow profile through the meter. This will minimize errors in the reading.
3. If it is not possible to provide at least five diameters of straight piping upstream of the meter, install straightening vanes
in the pipe immediately upstream of the filter. Even with vanes, the accuracy of the meter may be compromised.
4. Five diameters of straight piping should be provided downstream, if possible.
5. If a totalizer or flowrate display is provided, they should be located so that the display is easily read.
2.Magnetic Flow Meters
Magnetic flow meters operate by applying a magnetic field around the flowing liquid and reading the voltage produced on
a pair of immersed electrodes.
1. The manufacturer should be consulted regarding electrode material and liner material. The meter should operate with
silt, chemicals, etc.
2. It is essential that the pipe be full of water at all times; the meter will not operate with large air bubbles in the pipe.
Some small bubbles, such as are found downstream of pumps, can be tolerated.

31
3. A continuous straight run of piping should be provided upstream of the meter, 10 pipe diameters if possible, to produce
a smooth flow profile through the meter. This will minimize errors in the reading.
Because magnetic meters read the total voltage produced across the full width of the pipe, some averaging is provided,
and this makes them more resistant to turbulence than either turbine or ultrasonic meters. Less than 10 pipe diameters
straight run upstream may compromise the accuracy of the meter.
1. Five diameters of straight piping should be provided downstream if possible.
2. Magnetic meters should be supplied with flowrate and flow total displays; the controller should be installed so that the
display is easily read.
3.Ultrasonic Flow Meters
Ultrasonic flow meters operate by firing a sonic pulse through the pipe wall into the flowing liquid. A transit-time meter
uses two transducers, one mounted upstream of the second, and measures the difference in travel time for a pulse from
one transducer to the other. A Doppler type measures the difference in the frequency received by the transducer as the
sonic pulse reflects off particles or bubbles in the liquid. In either case, the difference is directly proportional to the
velocity of the liquid.
1. The manufacturer should confirm that the flow meter will operate with the pipe wall material and thickness expected.
2. Ultrasonic flow meters should not be installed where the pipe will contain large bubbles or air pockets; the sonic pulse
will be disrupted so that the meter wont operate.
3. Ultrasonic meters are sensitive to the flow profile; at least five pipe diameters of straight piping should be provided (ten
pipe diameters recommended) between the meter and an upstream elbow or other hydraulic disturbance.
Level
Level measurement is often accomplished by displacer/ float instruments and level glasses. Other choices include
differential pressure gauges, gas bubblers, and noncontact level instruments, such as ultrasonic, microwave, and fiberoptic
instruments. The use of differential pressure gauges is discouraged in tanks or vessels where the specific gravity of the
stored material is variable since the change in the weight of the material column will change the pressure at the level
instrument. Level glasses are not recommended for materials that are highly flammable or toxic, unless they are armored
or high pressure design. IRI (1990) has published recommendations on the use of sight glasses and gauge glasses in
hazardous and flammable liquid service. In order to minimize fabrication complexity and expense, the use of level bridles
or standpipes is recommended when more than four vessel connections are required. Bottom level connections should
never be located in such a manner that the level measurement will be affected by liquids flowing out of the vessel, i.e.,
connected to the bottom outlet piping. Additionally, the connecting piping should not form a liquid trap that does not drain
back into the vessel.
Dedicated service level switches may be necessary on suction vessels to protect pumps from losing suction caused by low
liquid level and to protect compressors from liquid carryover caused by high liquid level. Level switches intended to
protect rotating equipment are often directly connected to the vessel and not to level bridles. This prevents them from
being blocked-in and rendered ineffective if the bridle is blocked-in to service an instrument in a less critical service.
Often, correct level control and indication is critical to safe and secure operations and in these cases redundant level
controls are typically installed. Examples include deaerators, steam drums, or certain distillation tower overhead
accumulators. Redundant level indication should be considered on any vessel containing hazardous materials, including
storage tanks.
Level Instruments
Where access to the top of the reservoir is convenient (such as in a clearwell), ultrasonic level transmitter should be used.
Where access to the bottom of the reservoir is convenient (such as at a tower or above-ground reservoir), a pressure
transmitter should be used as a level-sensing device.

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1. Ultrasonic Level Measurement
The ultrasonic level transmitter fires a sonar signal toward a surface, such as the surface of the water in a well, and
measures the time required to receive an echo in order to determine the level of the liquid.
The ultrasonic transducer should be installed so that it is protected from damage, there are no obstructions between the
transducer and the water surface, and it is accessible for calibration and maintenance.
1. The transducer should be installed in the top of a stilling well to prevent turbulence from producing errors in the
reading. The stilling well should be a continuous length of pipe, either PVC or steel of sufficient diameter and without
couplings or fittings that could reflect a sonic echo back to the transducer thus giving a false reading.
2. The well must extend from a convenient height above the high-water line, at which level the transducer will be
installed, to the low-water line.
3. Consider the transducers blanking distance, inherent its design, and ensure that the transducer is mounted high
enough above the high-water line so that it will properly read the highest water level anticipated.
4. Several holes should be provided in the side of the stilling well near the bottom for water to enter the well. The holes
must be large enough to prevent clogging if silt is present.
5. The controller and display should be located where it can be conveniently read by the operator.
6. Where the air temperature between the transducer and the liquid surf ace is not constant (this is usually the case),
provide a temperature measurement for the controller in order that it can compensate for the speed of sound travel
through the air, and correct for temperature variations. Note that some manufacturers include the temperature sensor
in the transducer itself, while some provide a separate temperature probe.
2.Pressure-Sensing Level Transmitter
The pressure-sensing level transmitter reads the head of a column of liquid and transmits a signal proportional to the level
of liquid.
1. The level transmitter should be installed as near as practical to the bottom of the tank being measured, so as not to
introduce a zero offset in the reading.
2. A block and bleed valve should be provided on the pressure line so that the transmitter can be calibrated for zero level,
and can be removed from service.
3. If the pressure-sensing line is small in diameter (12 mm or less), clamp it to supports or walls to provide adequate
support.
4. If the transmitter is equipped with an integral display, the transmitter should be located so the display is clearly visible.
If no display is provided, and the head being measured is high enough (100 kPa or higher), consider installing a
pressure gauge in addition to the transmitter as a backup and calibration aid.
ALARM SYSTEMS
Development of the alarm system includes determining what parameters should be alarmed, how they should be alarmed,
and how they should address operator response. Guidance is provided in publications from the Instrument Society of
America, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, and the
Institute of Chemical Engineers.
The need for stand-alone dedicated alarm systems, even where modern PES controls are implemented, continues for two
primary reasons. First, with modern distributed control systems there is a tendency to overalarm. This overalarming
tendency compromises the reliability and safety of an alarm system. Unless an alarm condition exists only rarely, it is

33
almost certain to be disconnected or ignored. Dedicated annunciators help to ease operator comprehension of process unit
status, particularly in a critical upset situation. Consequently, a dedicated, stand-alone annunciator has the ability to draw
attention to specific alarm information and provides an important advantage over a corresponding cathode ray tube (CRT)
alarm display. Priority alarm or time sequencing of alarms in PES time history is also useful to show the sequence of
process variations. The second primary factor contributing to the survival of stand-alone alarm systems is the desire to
provide redundancy for critical alarm functions. Even if displayed on a CRT console, a separate annunciator display offers
added security in the event of a CRT workstation failure
Manual Alarms
Manual alarm stations are usually simple contact closing devices. Two of the most common fire alarm stations are of
either pull-lever or break-glass design requiring two distinct operations to avoid accidental operation. Manual alarm
stations should be located with respect to normal means of egress from all areas and as may be required by local codes.
All buildings and process blocks should have at least one station in clear view, readily accessible to personnel from any
point within the facility, with the maximum travel distance to a station no greater than 200 feet.
All critical points of operation in a plant are normally protected by alarms and/or shutdown devices which are actuated by
microswitches triggered by high or low pressures, flows, levels, temperatures, etc. An audible/visual alarm is actuated
when the variable deviates from normal and reaches a certain figure, to allow the operator to take corrective action. If this
is unsuccessful and the variable deviates further to reach another figure, a shutdown device may be actuated, which, by
means of solenoid valves in the appropriate instrument air lines, shuts down one or more sections of the plant. The alarm
consists of a horn or other audible device and lights which appear at labelled positions on an annunciator board mounted
on the instrument panel.
The operator can usually stop the audible device, but cannot switch off the light completely, although he or she may be
able to alter it in some way (e.g. change from flashing to continuous) so that it is not confused with a new warning signal
from another point in the plant which appears on the board. All warning lights continue to show until the variables which
set them off have returned to their normal range. More sophisticated alarm display and cancelling arrangements are
available with PESs.
When some malfunction, perhaps of an instrument, develops suddenly on a highly interactive plant, it generally actuates
an alarm for a particular part of the plant. It is then often surprisingly difficult to pinpoint the source of the malfunction
and distinguish between cause and effect. Misconceptions readily arise.Y. The plant has the same propensity to disguise its
ailments as the human body, where even doctors can be misled, and such dictums have arisen as for pain in the knee, treat
the spine. Confusion is compounded by the simultaneous blowing of a pressure relief valve, with an ear-splitting roar.
The near-disaster on the Three Mile Island atomic power plant in the USA was a classic example of this kind of difficulty
in fault diagnosis.
On PES-controlled plant it is possible to provide software programs to help operators in rapid fault diagnosis. These
programs are designed by experts who have carefully studied the various faults which might develop and how to diagnose
and handle them.2h Even here the operators generally nced special training. For this special process simulators with
similar VDUand keyboard-equipped control stations are being increasingly used.
To avert complete plant shutdowns because of minor malfunctions, the panel instruments should allow operators to take
some holding action, such as putting the plant on total recycle or columns on total reflux, while the problem is being
investigated.
Procedures must be established between operating and instrument department personnel for the calibration, zeroing and
other necessary testing of instruments carried out while the plant is running. This generally involves tcmporarily putting
each control instrument in turn on remote manual control and similarly de-activating alarms and trips. Clearly marked tags
or notices should be displayed on any panel instruments which are out of service. Verbal and written warnings of this must
be given to incoming shifts.

If the alarm is indicated by a lamp, it must flash until acknowledged then remain steady until the alarm clears. If it is
indicated on a computer screen, an appropriate colour code or symbol must be used to indicate for each alarm
whether it has been acknowledged. Automated systems should log the time at which the alarm occurred, the time it
was acknowledged and the time it cleared. Logs may be printed on paper or recorded electronically.
Valve and equipment status should use a consistent method of symbols and colours, whether the status is indicated
through lamps or on a colour computer screen. The colour-coding scheme should be consistent with any existing
equipment displays elsewhere in the plant.
As a minimum, the following alarms should be provided:

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1. High turbidity on the raw water, clarifier effluent (if applicable), filter effluent, and plant discharge;
2. High and low pressure on the raw water line;
3. High flowrate on the raw water line;
4. High and low level in clarifiers or flocculators;
5. High torque on solids contact clarifier recirculator and rake;
6. High torque on flocculators;
7. High level in filters;
8. High and low level in chemical storage tanks;
9. High and low chemical feed rates;
10. High flowrate on each filter individually (also low flowrate on declining rate filters);
11. High and low levels in each clearwell, pumpwell, and reservoir;
12. High and low pH on the raw and treated water (if on-line measurements are provided);
13. High and low chlorine residual on the plant discharge (where on-line measurements are provided);
14. High head loss on the filters (if constant rate type);
15. Trip or failure to run on each pump;
16. High and low pressure on the plant discharge line;
17. High flowrate on the plant discharge line;
18. Chlorine gas detection in the chlorine storage, metering and injector rooms;
19. Chlorine scale low weight (where scales are equipped with transmitters); and
20. Valve operation failure (where valves are provided with limit switches).
More alarms may be required where additional treatment processes are provided. Alarms should be provided for all
control system interlocks that can shut down equipment or systems. n plants that are left unattended for periods of
time, an automatic alarm dialler should be provided.