Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Wigmore II SR Edition

SPS DALION V. CA (1990)

Petitioners: Spouses Dalion
Respondents: CA and Sabesaje, Jr.
Ponente: Medialdea, J.

hat this e em odied in a u lic instrument is not a

re uirement for the validity of a cont ract of sale of a arcel
of land
Dalion argued:

Doctrine: A contract of sale is a consensual contract,

which means that the sale is perfected by mere consent.
No particular form is required for its validity.
Short version: A land was registered in Dalions name. He
allegedly sold this to Sabesaje. Da lion denies the sale
ever ha ened (saying his signature was forged) and also
says that assuming the signature was valid, sale is still
invalid because it was not executed in a public document.
SC says Dalions argument is wrong. In a contract of sale,
no articular form is re uired.
A land in S outhern eyte was declared in the name of
Segundo Dalion. Sa esa e sued to recover ownershi this
land based on a private document of absolut e sale,
allegedly executed by Segundo Dalion.
Dalion, however, denied the sale, saying that:

he document was fictitious

His signature was a forgery, and

hat the land is con ugal ro erty, which he and

his wife ac uired in
from S aturnina Sa esa e
as evidenced
y the
scritura de
enta
A soluta.
he s ouses denied the claims of Sa esa e that after
e ecuting a deed of sale over the arcel of land, they had
leaded with Sabesaje to be allowed to administer the
land because Dalion did not have livelihood.
S ouses Dalion admitted, however, administering
arcels of land in Southern eyte, which elonged to
eonardo
Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje, who died in 1956.
The Dalions never rec eived their agreed 10% and 15%
commission on the sales of co ra and a aca.
Sabesaje's suit, they say, was intended merely to harass
and forestall Dalion s threat to sue for thes e un aid
commissions.
C decided in favor of S abesaje and ordered the Dalions
to deliver the parcel of land in a u lic doc ument.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Was the contract of sale valid? YES
Is a public document needed for transfer of ownership?
NO

hat the sale is invalid ecause it is em odied in a

rivate document.
That acts and contracts which have for their
o ect the creation, transmission, modification or
e tinction of real rights over immovable property
must appear in a public instrument." (NCC 1358
par. 1)

A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means

that the sale is erfected y mere cons ent.

o articular form is re uired for its validity.

on erfection of the contract, the arties may

reci rocally demand erformance
CC
,
CC , i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of
ownershi of the o ect of the sale, and the vendor
may re uire the vendee to ay the t hing sold
CC
.
he trial court thus rightly and legally ordered Dalion to
deliver to Sa esa e the
arcel of land and to
e ecute corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a
public document.
nder CC
, when the sale is made through a u lic
instrument, the e ecution is e uivalent to the delivery of
the thing.
Delivery may either be actual (real) or
constructive. Thus delivery of a arc el of land may
e done y lacing the vendee in cont rol and
possession of the land (real) or by embodying the
sale in a public instrument (constructive).

(ADDITIONAL: The authenticity of the signature of Dali on

was proven by the testimony of several witness including
the person who made the deed of sale. Dalion never
presented any evidence or witness to prove his claim of
forgery.
Dallions claim that the sale is invalid ecause it was not
made in a public document is of no merit. This argument is
misplaced. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a
public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a
contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in
a public instrument. Sale is perfected upon meeting of the
minds of both parties.)

LEE TEK S HENG VS. CA

HELD:
FACTS:
RATIO:
RE: VALI DITY OF THE CONTRACT
People who witnessed the execution of the deed positive ly
testified on its authenticity.

After his mothers death, etitioner eoncio ee ek

Sheng filed a complaint against his father (private
respondent) for the partition of the conjugal properties of
his parents.

hey stated t hat it had een e ecuted and signed y the

signatories.

The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land

registered in etitioners name are con ugal ro erties.

RE: PUBLIC DOCUMENT

The provision of NCC 1358 on the necessity of a public
document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforcea ility.

The PR contends that the lots were registered under

eoncios name only as a trustee ecause during the
registration, Leoncio was the only Filipino in the family.

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Wigmore II SR Edition

Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case

and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner
the conjugal regime.
To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the
pendency of the case, PR caused the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but
it was denied by RTC on the grounds that: (a) the notice
was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing
petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the
power of the court pending litigation. CA affirmed the
decision. Hence this petition.
Petitioners contention: he res olution of an incidental
motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was
improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the
disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a
partition case and that it would amount to a collateral
attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago.
Privat e res ondents contention:
he evidence of
ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a
ro ate or land registration roceedings when the courts
jurisdiction is limited.
ISSUE: WON the annot ation of a notice of lis pendens is
valid.
HELD: Yes.
Petitioners claim is not legally tenable. The annotation of
a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor
can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of
the certificate of title for a parcel of land.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the
mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership
is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the
best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the
best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangea ly used. In this case, contrary to etitioners
fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private
res ondent. What the latter dis utes is the formers claim
of sole owners hi . hus, although etitioners certificate of
title may have become incontrovertible one year after
issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar
private respondent from questioning his ownership.
A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on t wo
grounds:
(1) If the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the
title of the adverse party
(2) When the annotation is not necessary to protect the
title of the party who caused it to be rec orded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was
convincingly shown to concur in this case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis
endens is only for the ur ose of announcing to the
whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over said property does so at his own risk, or that he

gam les on the result of the litigation over said ro erty.

On the cont ention that ownership cannot be passed upon
in partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless
ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect partition of the property. For purposes of annot ating
a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which
requires the party seeking annotation t o prove that the
land belongs to him. Besides, an action for partition is one
case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is
proper.

REPUBLIC VS CA
These two cases are about the cancellation and
annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals
are existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore,
uncalled for.
2 lots of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty five and t wenty-four hectares, respectively, located at
Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in
the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The
originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in
Pasig, Rizal. They were not destroyed during the war.
E ven the originals of the preceding cancelled titles for
those two lots are intact in the registry of deeds.
The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa
Laborada, a widow residing at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street,
Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
Caloocan City a petition dated November, 1967 for the
reconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot
No. 915. She alleged that she was the owner of the lot and
that the title covering it, the number of which she could not
specify, was "N.A." or not available. The petition was
sworn to on November 16, 1967 before Manila n otary
Domingo P. Aquino.
On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting
the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968. The notice of
hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies
thereof were posted in three conspicuous places in
Caloocan City and were furnished the supposed adjoining
owners. The registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal
were not served with copies of the petition and notice of
hearing.
State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel
for the Government, did not oppose the petition. Laborada
presented her evidenc e before the deputy clerk of court.
Judge Serafin Salvador in his "decision" dated July 6,
1968 granted the petition.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer
certificate of title which was not available and which was
issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The
transfer certificate of title covering the lot was allegedly
destroyed during the war. The plan and t echnical
description for the lot were approved by the Commissioner
of Land Registration who recommended favorable action
on the petition.
The lower court directed t he register of deeds of Caloocan
City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 915 in the name of
Laborada. The order of reconstitution was not appealed. It
became final and executory.
Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued
to Laborada on August 14, 1968 Trans fer Certificate of
Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R).

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Lot No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots Nos.
915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land
Registration approved the s ubdivision plan. The register of
deeds cancelled TCT No. (N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on
October 15, 1968 seven titles to Laborada.

whom the two cases for cancellation were assigned,

issued restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds,
city engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from
accepting or rec ording any transaction regarding Lots Nos.
915 and 918.

In another and later case, one Francisco S. Bombast,

single, residing at 2021 S an Marcelino Street, Malate,
Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated November
16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of another lot, the
aforementioned Lot No. 918.

The respondents in the two cases, through a common

lawyer, filed separat e ans wers containing mere denials.
The Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro forma
answers wherein he interpos ed n o objection to the
issuance of the preliminary injunction sought by the State.

She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged
that the title was "N.A" or not available. She claimed to be
the owner of the lot and that the title covering it was
destroyed during the war. Like the first petition, the second
petition was sworn to on the same date, November 16,
1967, before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it
was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's petition was
not explained.

After a joint trial of the t wo cases, respondents corporation

and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they
pleaded the defense that they were purchasers in good
faith and for value.

The lower court set the second petition for hearing on

January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition, the notice of
hearing for Bombast's petition was published in the Official
Gazette. It was posted in three conspicuous places in
Caloocan City and copies thereof were sent to the
supposed adjoining owners. But no copies of the petition
and notice of hearing were s erved upon the registers of
deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would
be interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost title
and who could certify whether the original of the title was
really missing.
Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador.
It was not opposed by the government lawyers, Enrique A.
Cube and Conrado de Leon; Judge Salvador in his order
of April 3, 1969 granted the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the allegedly
missing or "not available" title was issued to Regino Gollez
who sold the land to petitioner B ombast. The owner's
duplicate of Gollez's title was supposedly destroyed during
the war. Tax es were paid for that land by Gollez and
Bombast. The technical description of the land the plan
were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration
who submitted a report recommending the reconstitution
of the title.
The lower court ordered the register of deeds to
reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in the name of
Bombast. Acting on that directive, the register of deeds
issued to Bombast Trans fer Certificate of Title No. N.A.
4(R).
Five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title,
Francisca Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow)
and a resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco,
Manila, which was the same address used by Fructuosa
Laborada (Bombast used first the address 2021 S an
Marcelino Street ) sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo
allegedly for P249,880. Trans fer Certificate of Title No.
34146R was issued to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos
Engineering Corporation allegedly for P250,000. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued to the
corporation.
On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for
the cancellation and annulment of the rec onstituted titles
and the titles issued subsequent thereto. Judge Salvador,
who had ordered the rec onstitution of the titles and to

On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bot her to
inhibit himself) rendered a decision in the two cases
holding that the State's evidenc e was insufficient to
establish its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915
and 918 and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering
Corporation were purchasers in good fait h and for value
and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable and
annullable.
Judge S alvador further held that the titles, whose
reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in confo rmity with
law, could not be attack ed collaterally and, therefore, "the
reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same
validity, force and effect as the originals before the
reconstitution". The State appealed.
CA affirmed RTC and held that the reconstitution can no
longer be set aside and that if there were irregularities in
the reconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties,
the State, as the party that made possible the
reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of Appeals
cited section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a
registered owner may lose his land "by the registration of
any other person as owner of such land".
ISSUE: W/N the reconstituted titles were valid
HELD: NO
We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court
and the trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity
of the reconstituted titles which, although issued with
judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and forged
titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution
proceedings were simply devices employed by petitioners
Laborada and Bombast for landgrabbing or for the
usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of
State-owned urban land with considerable value.
The crucial and decisive fact is that two valid and existing
Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names of
Laborada and Bombast on the false or perjurious
assumption that the two titles were destroyed during the
war.
That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous
fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It was a stultification
of the judicial process.
One and the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and
then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the
cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted

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titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government ipso
facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified
that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged
ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any
credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceit ful
and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture
cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of
legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for
the reconstitution of Torrens certificat es of title that are
missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are ex isting.
It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates
of title that are on file and available in the registry of
deeds. The reconstitution proceedings are void because
they are cont rary to Republic Act No. 26 and bey ond the
purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are
actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not
require reconstitution at all.
As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these
cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized
as an instrument for landgrabbing or to sanction fraudulent
machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land,
to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and
to impair the Torrens system of registration.
The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that
it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is
indefensible because the title of the lot which it purchased
unmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted. That
circumstance should have alert ed its officers to make the
necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of
Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that
Lot 918 is owned by the State.
Republic is held as the owner.

MARI A CONS UELO FELISA ROXAS VS RAFAEL

ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:
1) Maria Cons uelo applied for a registration of title of 4
parcels of land in 1906. (under torrens system)
2) The only one of said parcels to which attention need
be given in the present appeal is Parcel A.
3) The adjoining owners of the land were informed of
such application, but no one went to question it so
they were declared in default.
4) The same application was published in two
news papers.
5) The record shows that each of said persons received
a copy of said notice, including the representative of
the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde &
Gutierrez). The record further shows, by the certificate
of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that
said notice was posted upon the land in question. The
record further shows that said notice had been
published in two daily news papers of the city of
Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.
6) The City of Manila questioned in court the borders of
Parcel A. The Court ordered the correction but none
was executed.
7) The court approved the application and Consuelo was
given the titles.

8) In 1912, the City of Manila applied for the c orrection of

the title because it covered a public road.
9) It was also in 1912 the Consuelo went to court to ask
for a correction of the title because there were 2
buildings which were not included in the title, although
it was in the applicati on.
10) She sold the same to Masonic Temple Assoc.
11) During t he hearing, the heirs of A ntonio Enriquez,
owners of the adjoining land, appeared in court
questioning the title.
12) The Court granted the motions of the City of Manila
and Cons uelo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not personal notice to all of the persons
interested in an action for the registration of real property
under the Torrens system, is an absolut e prerequisite to
the validity of said registration.
HELD: NO
Personal notice of the pendency of the original petition had
been given and that a publication of the same had been
made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and
32 of Act No. 496.
The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court
made a certificate showing that that notice had been
issued and publis hed in accordance wit h the law.
Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no pers on appears
and answer within the time allowed, the court may at onc e,
upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the
application ( petition) be tak en for confessed.
By the description in the notice "To all whom it may
concern," all the world are made parties defendant and
shall be concluded by the default and order. The court
shall not be bound by the report of the examiner of titles,
but may require other and further proof."
The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary
to the contention of the appellants. It seems to directly
contradict the requirements of pers onal notice as an
absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under
the Torrens system.
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of
section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38 provides
that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land and
quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated
in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government, and
all the branc hes thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice or citations, or included in the
general description 'To all whom it may concern. '"
It will be noted also t hat the petitioner in registration cases
is not by law required to give any notice to any person.
The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices.
(Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the
court may also cause other or further notice of the
application to be given in such a manner and to such
persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is seen that the
applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any
obligation whatsoever to give motive to any person of the
pendency of his application to have his land registered
under the Torrens system.
Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem t o contain a
remedy for persons who have suffere d damages for the

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

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failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law.

His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate
annulled, unless he comes within the provisions of section
38, and even then he is without a remedy against the
applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year
after the decree of registration and the granting of the
certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate
or interest therein," by fraud, and not even then, if an
"innocent purchaser for the value has acquired and
interest." In the present case five years and a half had
transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an
innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not
intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the
slightes degree.
The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No.
496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem,
dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried
to judgment without personal service upon the claimants
within the state or notice by name to those outside of it.
(ADDITIONAL: notice was served to the heirs of Enriquez:
Records show that the counsel of Enriquez received a
notice. E ven if it is denied by the party, personal
notification is not a requirement of the law. Registration is
a proceeding in rem and not in personam. It is the only
practical way that allows the Torrens system to fulfill its
purpose.)

LEGARDA VS SALEEBY
(Land Titles and Deeds Purpose of the Torrens System
of Registration)
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of
Legarda and S aleeby. The said wall and the strip of land
where it stands
is registered in the Torrens system
under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the
decree of registration is released in favor of
Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under
the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in
favor of the latter included the stonewall and the strip of
land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its
improvement which has been registered under the name
of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act
(Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed
that where two certificates purports to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to
hold title and will prevail.
The real purpos e of the Torrens system of registration, is
to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subs equent thereto. That being the purpose of the
law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it
has entered into the Torrens system.

TIBURCIO VS PHHC
FACTS:

Tiburcio et al filed an action alleging that for many years

prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the present they and
their ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open, public,
exclusive and continuous possession as owners of the
land in litigation; that they have been cultivating the land
and enjoying its fruits exclusively; that from time
immemorial up to the year 1955, they have been paying
the land ta es thereon; that in
defendant Peo les
Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title
theret o claiming that its title embraces practically all of
laintiffs ro erty, while the ot her defendant University of
the Philippines began also asserting title thereto claiming
that its title covers the remaining portion; that PHHC are
not innocent purchasers for value, having had full notice of
i urcio et als actual ossession an d claim of ownership
thereof; and that the inclusion their property within the
technical oundaries set out in PHHC and Ps titles was
a clear mistake and that at no time had defendants
predecessors -in-interest exercised dominical rights over
their property.
(Plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died
intestate in 1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to
plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land locat ed in Quezon
City; that said plaintiffs have always been in actual, open,
notorious and exclusive possession of the land as owners
pro-indiviso; that sometime in 1955 defendants began
asserting title to the land claiming that the same is
embraced and covered by their respective certificates of
title; that defendants acquired their respective titles with
full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership
of plaintiffs and as such they cannot be considered
innocent purc hasers for value.)
It appears, however, that the land in question has been
placed under the operation of the Torrens system since
1914 when it has been originally registered in the name of
defendants redecessor-in- interest. It further appears
that sometime in
Peo les Homesite & Housing
Corporation acquired from the original owner a parcel of
land embracing ractically all of etitioners ro erty, while
defendant University of the P hilippines likewise acquired
from the same owner another portion of land which
embraces the remainder of the property.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners right to file the present action
has pre scribed; YES
W/N they are guilty of laches; YES
HELD:
PHHC and UP own the subject property; Petitioners
guilty of laches-assuming arguendo that their action
for reconveyance had not yet prescribed.
It is, therefore, clear that the land in question has been
registered in the name of defendants redecessor-ininterest since 1914 under the Torrens system and that
notwithstanding what they now claim that the original title
lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for
their validity, they (Petitioners) have never taken any step
to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted the
present action.
In other words, they allowed a period of 43 years
before they woke up to invoke what they now claim to
be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the
registration of the land in the name of defendants
predecessor-in-intere st.
Evidently, thi s cannot be done for under our law and
jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set
aside within one year after entry on the ground of

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fraud provided no innocent purcha ser for value has

acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496)
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration
of the one-year period within which to review the decree of
registration, the decree as well as the title issued in
pursuance thereof becomes incontrovertible (Section 38,
Act No. 496).
The purpose of the law in limiting to one year the period
within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to
the time within which a claimant may ask for its re vocation.
If after title to property is decreed an action may be
instituted beyond the one-year period to set aside the
decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to
guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would be
defeat ed.
There is nothing in the complaint to show that when it
acquired the property said defendant knew of any defect in
the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or
incumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to
defendant University of the Philippines. Said defen dants
are therefore, presumed to be purchasers for value and in
good faith and as such are entitled to protection under the
law.
The foregoing finds support in the following well -settled
principle: "A person dealing with registered land is not
required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of
the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of
the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do
more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens
system.
Assuming arguendo that laintiffs action for reconvey ance
had not yet prescribed, their right however to bring the
instant action may be considered barred by laches for not
having taken the action seasonably aft er title to the
property had been issued under the Torrens system. It
appears that the property in question was originally
registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on October 11,
1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto when
they brought the present action. virtua1aw library
Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata by
taking judicial notice of its own records in Land
Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their
contention the principle that a court cannot take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when such cases had been tried by the same court and
notwithstanding the facts that both cases may have been
tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is
considered to be the general rule, the same is not
absolute. There are exceptions to this rule.
"In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of
proceedings in other causes, because of their close
connection with the matter in controversy.
Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whet her or not the case pending is a moot one
or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the
case under consideration."
Petitioners do not dispute the fact that a ppellant Marcelino
Tiburcio, who instituted the present case, is the same
person who filed the application in Land Registration Case
No. L-3 for the registration of t he same parcel of land
which application was denied by the court. It appears that
in that registration case the o ositors were the Peo les

Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co., and

the Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the
Philippines was not an oppositor in that case, in effect it
was represent ed by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason
and Co. from which it acquired the property. It may
therefore be said that in the two cases there is not only
identity of subject-matter but identity of parties and causes
of action. Indeed, the trial court did not err in dismissing
the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK VS. COURT OF APP EALS,
PATRI A CAPAY, ET AL
FACTS:
A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was
mortgage to and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in
public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary
injunction alleging the mortgage was void because they
did not rec eive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis
pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of
Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book.
Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proc eeded with the TRB as
the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was
cancelled and a new one was entered in RBs name
without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The
Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court
rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for
want of consideration and thus cancelled RBs title and
issued a new cert. of title for the Capays.
Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sol d the land to
Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers
who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the
subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for
value and in good faith since they purchase the land after
it became a subject in a pending suit before the court.
Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the
titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering
of the land and notice to all persons with adverse claim
over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon
selling the property while knowing it is pending for
litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the
land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.
Issue:
Who has the better right over the land in dispute?
Whether or not TRB is liable for damages
Ruling:
The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid
which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real
properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the
property there was no lis pendens annotated on the title.
E very person dealing with a registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to
interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title.
Henc e the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained
the property from a clean title in good faith and for value.
On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they
filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not
annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for
15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the
foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the
declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of
consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no legal
effect.
However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real
owner of the property it has already been passed to
purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the
property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus,

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Wigmore II SR Edition

TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value
of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.

LACBAYAN VS. SAMOY

There is no dispute t hat a Torrens certificate of title cannot

be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the
case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the Register of
Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to
by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that doc ument.

Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and B ayani S. Samoy

(respondent ) had an illicit relationship. During their
relationship, they, together with three more incorporators,
were able to establish a manpower services company. The
company acquired five parc els of land were registered in
etitioner and res ondents names, allegedly as husband
and wife. When their relations hip turned sour, they
decided to divide the said properties and terminate their
business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.

Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the

Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can
no longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certificate of
title in the name of any person does not foreclos e the
possibility that the real property may be und er coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or
that the registrant may only be a trustee, or t hat other
parties may have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to t he issuance of the certificate of title.
Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over
a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.

FACTS:

Initially, res ondent agreed to etitioners ro osal that the

properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be
assigned to the latter, while t he ownership over the three
other properties will go to respondent. However, when
Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in the
partition agreement, Samoy refused.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial
partition of the said properties.
Petitioners contention: She claimed that they started to
live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the
benefit of marriage and worked together as business
partners, acquiring real properties amounting to
P15,500,000.00.
Res ondents contention: He
using his own personal funds.

urchased the

Other topic:
Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating coownership over the subject realties.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to
the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend
the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not
have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement
she intentionally refused to sign.
Moreover, to follow etitioners argument would e to allow
respondent not only to admit against his own interest but
that of his legal spous e as well, who may also be lawfully
entitled co-ownership over the said properties.

ro erties

RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.

ISSUES:
1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on
the issue of ownership.
2. Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject
the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a
collateral attack?

LU VS MANIPON
-Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of
the CAFACTS:
On 5/9/81 Juan Peralta executed a deed of sale by
installment in favor of S pouses Manipon which he agreed
to sell by installment to said spouses 350 sq. met ers of the
2078 sq. meter lot he owned. This said DOS was not
registered with the RD.

HELD:
1. No.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premis ed on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership bet ween the parties. Until and
unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will
not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does
not even have any right ful int erest over the subject
properties.
A careful perusal of the cont ents of the so-called Partition
Agreement indicates that the document involves matters
which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law,
basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties
have the right to freely divide amo ng themselves the
subject properties.
2. No.

On 6/10/81, Juan Peralta mortgaged the lot to Thrift

Savings and Loan Association (TSLA I) but he failed to pay
the loan he obtained for which the mortgage was
constituted so it was judicially foreclosed and sold to
TSLA IN for P62, 789.18 who was the highest bidder.
TSLA I then sold the same for P80,000.00 to the petitioner
who caused the subdivision of the said lot into 5 lots (one
of which was Lot 5582-B -7-D which was sold to
respondents. This said lot is now covered by TCT No
171497) On 7/30/83, Juan Peralta executed a DOS in
favor of respondents after the couple paid a tot al amount
of P8K for the subject lot, but said DOS was not
registered.
On 1/ 22/90 petitioner wrote respondents regarding the
resence of the latters house which was eing occu ied
by them and efforts were made to settle the dispute but to
no avail. On 2/26/90, petitioner commenced the action
alleging that he is the owner of the lot in question which
was being occupied by respondents and further claims his
ownership was confirmed by the RTC of Urda neta and for

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Wigmore II SR Edition

reasons unknown to him, respondents constructed a

house thereon on 1/22/90.
In answer, respondents claim that petitioner is a buyer in
bad faith because he knew for a fact that they already
bought Lot 5582-B -7-D from the original owner of said lot
and have been residing since 1981 even before he bought
the 2078 sq. meter lot. They also claimed that petitioner
had knowledge of their claim because when the whole lot
was foreclosed, they shared the same dilemma with
petitioner who also bought a lot with the 2078 sq.meter lot
of Juan Peralta.
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not a buyer in good
faith, which was affirmed by the CA
ISSUES: Who has better right over disputed property?
Was petitioner a buyer in bad faith?
What should be the purchas e price of the disputed lot ?
HELD: Petitioner claims that from the time they fully paid
for the lot until they received a notice to vacate, they did
not do anything to perfect their title and are now estopped
for questioning his ownership over it. The court has held
that in estoppel, a person who by deed or conduct induces
another to act in a particular manner is barred from
adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of
conduct that causes loss or injury to another. This is not
applicable to the present case as respondents exercised
dominion over the [property by occupying and building a
house on it.
Registration is not the equivalent of a title, it only gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. It
was not established as a means of acquiring title to private
land becaus e it merely confirms but does not confer
ownership. Preferential right of the first registrant of real
property in case of double sale is always qualified by good
faith under Art 1544 of the civil code. A holder in bad faith
of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the
law, for it cannot be used as shield for fraud.
When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a
party cannot base his preference of title thereon, because
the law will not protect anything done in bad faith. Bad
faith renders the registration futile. Thus, if a vendee
registers the sale in his favor after he has acquired
knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same
property to a third party, or that another person claims said
property under a previous sale, or that the property is in
the possession of one who is not a vendor, or that there
were flaws and defects in the vendors title, or that this
was in dispute, the registration will constitute x x x bad
faith, and will not confer upon him any preferential right.
The situation will be the same as if there had been no
registration, and the vendee who first took possession of
the real property in good faith shall be preferred. Petitioner
is evidently not a subsequent purchas er in good faith so
respondents have a better right to the property.
It seems that the main reason why petitioner bought the
entire lot from TSLA I was his fear of losing the 350 sq.m.
lot he bought sometime in 1981 which also forms part of
Lot 5582 B-7, having been aware of the defects in the title
of TSLA I is concerned he cannot now claim to be a
purchaser in good faith even if he traces his ownership to
TSLA I who was a purc haser in good faith - the latter not
being aware of the sale that transpired between
respondents and Juan Peralta before subject lot was sold
in a public auction. E ven assuming t hat petitioner was not
aware of the sale between Peralta and respondents, he
cannot be considered a buyer in good fait h as he has
ersonal knowledge of res ondents occu ation of lot, this

should have put him on guard. The purchaser may not be

required to go beyond t he title to determine the condition
of property but a purchaser cannot also ignore facts which
would put a reasonable man on his guard and claim he
acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor.
On bad faith: Petitioner denies being a purchaser in bad
faith. He alleges that the only reason he spoke to the
respondents before he bought the foreclosed land was to
invite them to share in the purchase price, but they turned
him down.
Petitioners contention is untena le. He might have had
good intentions at heart, but it is not the intention that
makes one an innocent buyer. A pu rchaser in good faith
or an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys
property and pays a full and fair price for it, at the time of
the urchase or efore any notice of some other ersons
claim on or interest in it.
Petitioners contention is untena le. He might have had
good intentions at heart, but it is not the intention that
makes one an innocent buyer. A purchaser in good faith
or an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys
property and pays a full and fair price for it, at the time of
the urchase or efore any notice of some other ersons
claim on or interest in it.
Purchase Price: The CA modification exempting
respondents from paying petitioner is flawed, because the
RTC had ordered Juan P eralta to refund the P18,000 paid
to him by petitioner as the purchase price of the disputed
lot. Thus, the trial court correctly ordered (1) respondents
to pay petitioner P13,051.50 plus legal int erest for Lot
5582-B-7-D and (2) the third-party defendant Peralta to
refund to respondents the P18,000 they had paid for the
lot. The CA ruling would unjustly enrich respondents, who
would rec eive double compens ation

LEGARDA VS SALEEBY
(Land Titles and Deeds Purpose of the Torrens System
of Registration)
FACTS: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of
Legarda and S aleeby. The said wall and the strip of land
where it stands
is registered in the Torrens system
under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the
decree of registration is released in favor of
Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under
the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in
favor of the latter included the stonewall and the strip of
land where it stands.
ISSUE: Who should be the owner of a land and its
improvement which has been registered under the name
of two persons?
HELD: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act
(Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed
that where two certificates purports to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to
hold title and will prevail.
The real purpos e of the Torrens system of registration, is
to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subs equent thereto. That being the purpose of the

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Wigmore II SR Edition

law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,

without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it
has entered into the Torrens system.

CAPITOL SUBDIVISIONS VS. PROVINCE OF NEGROS

ORI ENTAL
7 SCRA 60 (1963)

FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this cas e,

is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name
of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of
the aforementioned in 1916.
Sometime in
1920, the Amenabars
sold the
aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the
purchase price of P300,000, payable in instalments. In
1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of
the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
Benares obtained a Trans fer Certificate of Title under his
name.
Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda
including Lot 378 to B acolod-Murcia Milling Co. A nd then
later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including
said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to
the first mort gage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.
These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently
foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including
Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was
cancelled and anot her TCT was issued in the name of the
Bank.
In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son
of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of
P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the
condition that the title will remain with the Bank until full
payment.
Thereafter, Carlos Benares trans ferred his rights, under
his contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which
completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank
in 1949.
Henc e, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of
absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certific ate of
title covering Lot 378 was issued.
It should be not ed that, despite the acquisition of the
Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take
possession of the property for Jose B enares claimed to be
entitled to ret ain it under an alleged right of lease.
For this reas on, the deed of promise t o sell, executed by

the Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a

caveat emptor stipulation.
When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale
1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda
and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied
by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental.
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made represent ations with
or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made represent ations with
the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation.
Not being satisfied with the explanations given by said
officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer, defendant maintained t hat it had acquired
the lot in question in the year 1924-1925 through
expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of
the lost and began the construction of the provincial
hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some
reason beyond their comprehension, title was never
transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only
for assessment purposes.
And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot
knowing that the provincial hospital was situated t here and
that he did not declare such property for assessment
purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the

lot in question in the aforementione d expropriation
proceedings.

HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to

sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal title
over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the
expropriation had not been consummated.
First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the
expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication
in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an
absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour
of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property
was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378
could not have been expropriated without the intervention
of the Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party
in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second
mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which
would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not
belonged to the mort gagor. Neither could said lot have
een e ro riated without the Banks knowledge and
participation.
Furthermore, in the deed execut ed by the Bank promising
to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was
explicitly stated that some particular lots had been
expropriated by the P rovincial Government of Negros
Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that
Lot 378 had not been expropriat ed.

LAKBAYAN VS SAMOYE
FACTS:
Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and B ayani S. Samoy
(respondent ) had an illicit relationship. During their
relationship, they, together with three more incorporators,
were able to establish a manpower services comp any. The
company acquired five parc els of land were registered in
etitioner and res ondents names, allegedly as hus and

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Wigmore II SR Edition

and wife. When their relations hip turned sour, they

decided to divide the said properties and terminate their
business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.

subsequent to t he issuance of the certificate of title.

Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over
a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.

Initially, res ondent agreed to etitioners ro osal that the

properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be
assigned to the latter, while t he ownership over the three
other properties will go to respondent. However, when
Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in the
partition agreement, Samoy refused.

Other topic:

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial

partition of the said properties.
Petitioners contention: She claimed that they started to
live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the
benefit of marriage and worked together as business
partners, acquiring real properties amounting to
P15,500,000.00.
Res ondents contention: He
using his own personal funds.

urchased the

Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating coownership over the subject realties.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to
the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend
the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not
have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement
she intentionally refused to sign.
Moreover, to follow etitioners argument would e to allow
respondent not only to admit against his own interest but
that of his legal spous e as well, who may also be lawfully
entitled co-ownership over the said properties.

ro erties

RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.

ISSUES:
1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on
the issue of ownership.
2. Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject
the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a
collateral attack?
HELD:
1. No.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premis ed on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership bet ween the parties. Until and
unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will
not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does
not even have any right ful int erest over the subject
properties.
A careful perusal of the cont ents of the so -called Partition
Agreement indicates that the document involves matters
which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law,
basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties
have the right to freely divide among themselves the
subject properties.
2. No.
There is no dispute t hat a Torrens certificate of title cannot
be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the
case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the Register of
Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to
by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that doc ument.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can
no longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certificate of
title in the name of any person does not foreclos e the
possibility that the real property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or
that the registrant may only be a trustee, or t hat other
parties may have acquired interest over the property

RICARDO CHENG vs RAMON GENATO and SPS. DA

JOS E
G.R. NO. 129760, December 29, 1998
FACTS:
Ramon Genato is the owner of two parcels of land
located at Paradise Farms, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.
September 6, 1989: Genat o entered int o an
agreement with the Da Jose Spouses over said
land. The agreement culminated in the execution
of a contract to sell gor which t he purc hase price
was P80.00 per sq.m. It was in a public instrument
and contained the sti ulation that: after 3 days,
after having satisfactorily verified and confirmed
the truth and authenticity of doc uments vendee
shall pay the vendor the full payment of the
urchase rice.
The Da Jose Spouses asked for an extension of
30 days when it failed to verify the said titles on
the condition that a new set of documents be
made seven days aft er.
Pending effectivity of said extension period, and
without due notice to Spouses Da Jose, Genato
executed an affidavit to annul the Cont ract to Sell.
This was not annotated at the back of his titles
right away.
October 24, 1989: Ricardo Cheng went to
Genatos residence and e ressed interest in
buying the subject properties. Genato showed
Cheng the copies of his titles and the annotations
at the back thereof of his cont ract to sell with the
Da Jose Spouses. He likewise showed Cheng the
affidavit to annul cont ract to sell.
Despite these, Cheng still issued a check for
P50,000 upon the assurance that the previous
contract will be annulled.
The Da Jos e Spouses met Genato at the Office of
the Resgistry of Deeds by coincidence, and were
later shocked of Genatos decision to annul the
contract and protested regarding the matter. They
reminded Genato t hat the 30 day extension period
was still in effect and they are willing to pay the
downpayment.
Genato later continued with their cont ract,
informed Cheng of hi decision and returned to the
latter, the downpayment paid. Cheng however
contended that their contract to sell said property
had already been perfected.
ISSUES:

10

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Wigmore II SR Edition

1.
2.

W/N the contact to sell between Genato and

Spouse s Da Jose was validly rescinded.
W/N Chengs own contract with Genato was
not just a contract to sell but of a conditional
contract of sale.

The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels

of land registered in etitioners name are con ugal
properties.

The PR contends that the lots were registered

under eoncios name only as a trustee ecause
during the registration, Leoncio was the only
Filipino in the family.

Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the

partition case and for the reconvey ance of the lots
to its rightful owner the conjugal regime.

To prot ect the interest of the conjugal regime

during the pendency of the case, PR caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278.

Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said

annotation but it was denied by RTC on the
grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the
purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and
(b) also to keep the property within the power of
the court pending litigation. CA affirmed the
decision. Hence this petition.

Petitioners contention:
he resolution of an
incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens was improper to thresh out the issue
of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership
cannot be passed upon in a partition case and that
it would amount to a collateral attack of his title
obtained more than 28 years ago.

Privat e res ondents contention: he evidence of

ownership is admissible in a partition case as this
is not a probate or land registration proceedings
when the courts urisdiction is limited.

HELD:
1. NO.
In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is
a positive suspensive condition, the failure of whic h is not
a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents
the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring
an obligatory force. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code
cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant
case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose
spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet
expired.
The cont ention of the Da Jose spouses that no further
condition was agreed when they were granted the 30 -day
extension period from October 7, 1989 in connection with
clause 3 of their contract to sell should be upheld. Also,
Genato could have sent at least a notice of such fact, and
there being no stipulation authorizing him for automatic
rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance on his
titles and make it available to other would be buyers, it
bolstered that there was no default on the part of the Da
Jose Spouses. Genato is not relieved from the giving of a
notice, verbal or written, to the Da Jose spouses for his
decision to rescind their cont ract. In many cases.
2.

IT WAS A CONTRACT TO SELL.

The Court ruled that if it was assumed that the receipt is to

be treat ed as a conditional contract of sale, it did not
acquire any obligatory forc e since it was subject to
suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell
between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be
cancelled or rescinded a condition never met, as
Genato, to his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed
himself by respecting and maintaining his earlier contract
with the Da Jose spouses.
Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the
contract bet ween herein respondents first in time, it was
also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a
second buyer (P RIMUS TEMP ORE, PORTIOR JURE).
(Spouses made annotation on the title of Genato). Since
Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had
chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses
under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer
certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes
unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is
indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.
NB: "Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo,
means any ent ry made in the books of the registry,
including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense,
and cancellation, annotation, and even marginal notes. In
its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the registry
which records solemnly and permanently the right of
ownership and other real rights.

LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG vs CA

G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998
FACTS:
After his mothers death, etitioner eoncio ee
Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his father
(private respondent) for the partition of the
conjugal properties of his parents.

ISSUE: W/N the notice of li s pendens would amount to

a collateral attack of Leoncio s title obtained more
than 28 years ago. NO (W/N annotation of a notice of
lis pendens i s valid. YES.)
HELD:
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any
case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a
collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of
land.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the
mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership
is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the
best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the
best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to etitioners
fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private
res ondent. What the latter dis utes is the formers claim
of sole owners hi . hus, although etitioners certificate of
title may have become incontrovertible one year after
issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar
private respondent from questioning his ownership.
A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on t wo
grounds:
(1) if the annotation was for t he purpose of molesting the
title of the adverse party

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(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title

of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was
convincingly shown to concur in this case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis
endens is only for the ur ose of announcing to the
whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said ro erty.
On the cont ention that ownership cannot be passed upon
in partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless
ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect partition of the property. For purposes of annot ating
a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which
requires the party seeking annotation t o prove that the
land belongs to him. Besides, an action for partition is one
case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is
proper.

REPUBLIC VS BENJAMIN GUERRERO

G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006
FACTS:
December 1964: Benjamin Guerrerro filed wit h the
Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales
Application covering a parcel of land situated at
Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. This ap plication was
approved and Miscellaneous Sales Patent was
issued subsequent thereto.
Angelina Bustamante later filed a protest wit h the
Bureau of Lands claiming that Guerrero obtained
the sales patent through fraud, false statement of
facts and/or omission of material facts. This was
however dismissed by the Director of lands and
further affirmed by then Minister of Natural
Resources.
Through a MFR, an ocular investigation and
relocation survey found out that 83 sq. m. of the
titled property of Guerrero is under actual physical
possession of Marc elo Bustamante, husband of
Angeluna. Thus, upon the directive of the Office of
The President, the Director of Lands instituted a
petition for the amendment of plan and technical
description.
Guerrero opposed said motion through a motion to
dismiss but however was dismissed thereafter.
However, the RTC ruled in favor of Guerrero
stating that the Republic failed to prove its
allegation that Guerrero obtained the sales patent
and certificate of title through fraud and
misrepresent ation. RTC also ruled that the original
certificate of title in t he name of Guerrero acquired
the characteristics of indefeasibility after the
expiration of 1 y ear from the entry of the decree of
registration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Republic has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that Guerrero procured
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT through
fraud and misrepresentation.
2. W/N Guerreros title acquired the characteristic
of indefeasibility.
HELD:
1. NO.

the property in question, while once part of the lands of the

public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales
arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate.
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of
the Torrens system by Act No. 4 96, or the Land
Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of
registration, the government is required to issue an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named
is the owner of the property described therein, subject to
such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what
the law warrants or reserves.
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of
Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and
again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence
of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person
whos e name appears thereon.
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 rec ognizes the right of
a person deprived of land to institute an action to reopen
or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud.
However, the Republic in this case failed to prove that
there is actual and extrinsic fraud to justify a review of the
decree. It has not adduced adequate evidenc e that would
show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud
in procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of
title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove t hat it was
prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question
and from properly presenting its case by reason of such
fraud.
2. Y S. Guerreros title, having een registered
under the Torrens system, was vested with th
garment of indefeasibility.
NB: The Torrens system was adopted in this country
because it was believed to be the most effective measure
to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established
and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on
the assuranc e that the sellers title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be
unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted,
public confidenc e in t he system would be eroded and land
transactions would have t o be attended by complicated
and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence would be that land
conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent.
The government, recognizing the worthy purpos es of the
Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of
titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by
the law are satisfied.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of ac quiring titles
to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to
lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should
not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake
or negligence of the States agents, in the a sence of
proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to
third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to
quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as
to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in
the certificate at the time of the registration or t hat may
arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the
Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude
and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are
ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.

LEGARDA VS SALEEBY
G.R. NO. L-8936, October 2, 1915

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FACTS:
Legarda and Saleeby are owners of adjoining
lands in Manila.
There exists a stone wall bet ween said lots.
In 1906, the said wall and the land where it stands
was registered in the Torrens system under the
name of Legarda.
In 1912, Saleeby also applied for registration of
his lot which included the same stone wall and
strip of land where it stands. This was later
granted and title was issued in favor of Saleeby.
ISSUE: Who should be the owner of the land and its
improvement which has been registered under the
name of two persons.
HELD:
Act 496 providing for the registration of titles under the
torrens system actually provides for no remedy. However,
the rule is well settled that the decree ordering the
registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future
litigation over the same between the same parties. In view
of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that
future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be
no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we
think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the
certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain
other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present.
A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an
adverse, open, and not orious possession. Registered title
under the torrens system can ot be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
NB: The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the
title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it
would seem that once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid
the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it cannot be
denied that the proceeding for the registration of la nd
under the torrens system is judicial. It is clothed with all the
forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon
all the world. It is an action in rem.
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordi nary action. All the world
are parties, including the government. After the registration
is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are
no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The
rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decre e of
registration. The government itself assumes the burden of
giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are
parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the
world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again
cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The
registration, under the torrens system, does not give the
owner any better title than he had. If he does not already
have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee
simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of
registration accumulates in open document a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the
evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct

proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in

registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral
proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the
lapse of the period prescribed by law.

BARANDA VS GUSTILO
GR 81163, SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
GUTI ERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI
(now RTC) of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCT
No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.
The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued
in the names of petitioners Baranda and Hitalia.
The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio
Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor
on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the
same Lot No. 4517.
The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently
acquired by Perez, Gotera and Susana.
Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was
questioned by Perez and others so a motion for
reconsideration was filed.
Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO.
62042) for the execution of judgement in the res olutions
issued by the courts.
In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO.
00827) involving the same properties. (NOTE: This time
three cases na ang involve excluding the case at bar.)
The petitioners prayed that an order be releas ed to cancel
No. T-25772. Likewise to canc el No. T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No. T25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.
In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting
Register of Deeds A vito Saclauso annotat ed the order
declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, canc elled the same
and issued new certificate of titles in the name of
petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the
Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in
the new certificat e of title.
This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates.
Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of
Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but
the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for
reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

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ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of

Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a
torrens certificate of title.

HELD:
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It
shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing
with real or personal property which complies with all the
requisites for registration. ... If the instrument is not
registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the present or of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right
to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of
this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is

in doubt wit h regard to the proper step to be taken or
memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for
registration or where any party in interest does not agree
with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question shall be
submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the
Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the
Register of Deeds. ... ."

The function of ROD i s ministerial in nature

The function of a Register of Deeds with reference t o the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the
like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting
Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a
motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's
Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over
the subject parcel of land.

In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in

pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument present ed to
him, he should have asked the opinion of the
Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator
of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of
Presidential Dec ree No. 1529.

No room for construction for the laws on functions of

ROD
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employ ed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. The statute concerning the
function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in
a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for
construction.

ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUS AN

On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from

Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality
of Esperanza, province of Agus an, and covered by original
certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio A balo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962
Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Agusan in B utuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a trans fer certificate of title.
Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon
the following grounds:
That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered
in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M.
Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal
property;
That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both
spouses sign the document; but
Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the
sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of
the whole property without violating the existing law.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First
Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel
the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to
issue to him the corresponding trans fer certificate of title.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court,
declaring that the Mandamus does not lie ecause the
adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act
dismissed the etition, with costs against the
petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified

in refusing to register the trans action appealed to by the
petitioner.

HELD:
No. Although the reas ons relied upon by the respondent
show a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the
law on succession and transmission of rights over real
properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his
refusal to register the deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register
of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a
court of competent jurisdiction.
A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of
Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment
and discretion when confronted with the problem of
whet her to register a deed or instrument on the ground
that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in
doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any
deed or other instrument presented to him for registration
all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who
shall, aft er notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing
the step to be taken on the doubt ful question.

THIRD DIVISION
JOS EFINA V. NOBLEZA, PETITIONER, VS. SHIRLEY B.
NUEGA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 193038, MARCH 11, 2015

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:

THE FACTS:
In 1988, when Shirley and Rogelio were still engaged,
Shirley (respondent, then working as a domestic helper in
Israel, sent money to Rogelio, upon his request, for the
purchase of a residential lot in Marikina which they will use

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as their residence when they eventually marry each

other. On September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the
house and lot. Upon her arrival in 1989, Shirley settled the
balance of the equity through SSS financing and paid the
succeeding mont hly amortisation. On October 31, 1989,
TCT No. 171963 was issued by the Registry of Deeds in
Rogelios name. They were married in 1990 and lived on
the same property. Shirley then returned to Israel for
work; thereat, she received information that Rogelio
brought home another woman in the conjugal house, and
she also learned that Rogelio introduced the woman as
her wife. She then filed two cases against Rogelio, one for
Conc ubinage, and one for Legal Separation and
Liquidation of P roperty; the latter she withdrew but later refiled on January 29, 1993. In between, she learned of
Rogelios intention to sell the ro erty. She thus advised
the interested buyers, including Josephine Nobleza of the
pendency of the cases she filed against Rogelio. Still,
Rogelio sold the property to Josephine Nobleza
(petitioner) thru a Deed of A bsolute S ale on December 29,
2, without Shirleys consent in the deed. In a Decision
rendered on May 16, 1994, the RTC of Pasig City
rendered a decision granting the petition for legal
separation and the dissolution of the community property
of Shirley and Rogelio. On August 27, 1996, Shirley filed
a Complaint for Rescission of S ale and REconvey ance
against Josephine before the RTC to rec onvey the
property the latter bought from Rogelio. After trial, the
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Shirley, rescinding
the Deed of Absolute S ale dated Dec ember 29, 1992
between Rogelio and Josephine, and for Josephine to
reconvey the property to Shirley. Josephine appealed to
the Court of Appeals, but the latter affirmed with
modification the RTC judgment. Hence, Josephine sought
recourse with the Supreme Court via petition for review on
certiorari.
THE ISSUE:
Whether or not Josephine is a buyer in good fait h of the
property.
THE RULING:
We deny the petition.
Petitioner is not a buyer in good fait h.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the
property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right or interest in the property, for which a full and
fair price is paid by the buy er at the time of the purchase
or before receipt of any notice of claims or interest of some
1
other person in the property. It is the party who claims to
be an innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of
proving such assertion, and it is not enough to invoke the
2
ordinary presumption of good faith.
To successfully
invok e and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the
presumption is that first and foremost, the uyer in good
faith must have shown rudence and due diligence in the
exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did
everything that an ordinary person would do for the
protection and defense of his/her rights and interests
against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in
such a situation. The prudence required of a buyer in good
faith is not that of a erson with training in law, ut rather
that of an average man who weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibration of our
technical rules of evidenc e of which his knowledge is
3
nil.
A buyer in good faith does his homework and
verifies that the particulars are in order such as the title,
the parties, the mode of transfer and the pro visions in the
deed/contract of sale, to name a few. To be more specific,
such prudence can be shown by making an ocular

inspection of the property, checking the title/ownership

with the proper Register of Deeds alongside t he payment
of taxes therefor, or inquiring into the minutiae such as the
parameters or lot area, the type of ownership, and the
capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which
capacity necessarily includes an inquiry into the civil status
of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is
secured when necessary. In fine, for a purchaser of a
property in the possession of another to be in good faith,
he must exercise due diligence, conduct an investigation,
and weigh the surrounding facts and circumstances like
4
what any prudent man in a similar situation would do.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that she is a buyer in
good fait h of the subject property which is titled under the
name of the seller Rogelio A. Nuega alone as evidenced
by TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012 5
04723 and D-012-04724.
Petitioner argues, among
others, that since she has examined the TCT over the
subject property and found the property to have been
registered under the name of seller Rogelio alone, she is
an innocent urchaser for value and she is not re uired to
go beyond the face of the title in verifying the status of the
subject property at the time of the c onsummation of the
6
sale and at the date of the sale.
We disagree with petitioner.
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for
value by merely relying on t he TCT of the seller while
ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant
to the sale.
In the case of Spouses Raymundo v. S pouses
7
Bandong,
petitioners therein as does petitioner herein
were also harping that due to the indefeasibility of a
Torrens title, there was nothing in the TCT of the property
in litigation that should have arous ed the uyers sus icion
as to put her on guard that there was a defect in the title of
therein seller. The Court held in the Spouses Raymundo
case that the buyer therein could not hide behind the cloak
of being an innoc ent purchaser for value by merely relying
on the TCT which showed that the registered owner of the
land purchased is the seller. The Court ruled in this case
that the buyer was not an innocent purchaser for value
due to the following attendant circumstances, viz.:
In the present case, we are not convinced by the
etitioners incessant assertion that Jocelyn is an innocent
purchaser for value. To begin with, she is a grandniece of
Eulalia and resides in the same locality where the latter
lives and conducts her principal business. It is therefore
impossible for her not to acquire knowledge of her grand
aunts usiness ractice of re uiring her biyaheros to
surrender the titles to their properties and to sign the
corresponding deeds of sale over said properties in her
favor, as security. This alone should have put Jocelyn on
guard for any possible abuses that Eulalia may commit
8
with the titles and the deeds of sale in her possession.
9

Similarly, in the cas e of Arrofo v. Quio, the Court held

that while the law does not re uire a erson dealing with
registered land to inquire furt her than what the Torrens
itle on its face indicates, the rule is not
10
absolute.
Thus, finding that the buyer therein failed to
take the necessary precaution required of a prudent man,
the Court held t hat Arrofo was not an innocent purchaser
for value, viz.:
In the present case, the records show that Arrofo failed to
act as a prudent buyer. True, she asked her d aughter to
verify from the Register of Deeds if t he title to the Property
is free from encumbrances. However, Arrofo admitted that

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the Property is within the neighborhood and that she

conducted an ocular inspection of the Property. She saw
the house constructed on the Property. Yet, Arrofo did not
even bother to inquire about the occupants of the house.
Arrofo also admitted that at the time of the sale, Myrna
was occupying a room in her house as her lessee. The
fact that Myrna was renting a room from Arrofo yet selling
a land with a house should have put Arrofo on her guard.
She knew that Myrna was not occupying the house.
Henc e, someone else must have been occupying the
house.
Thus, Arrofo should have inquired who occupied the
house, and if a lessee, who received the rent als from such
lessee. Such inquiry would have led Arrofo to discover that
the lessee was paying rentals to Quino, not to Renato and
11
Myrna, who claimed to own the Property.
An analogous situation obtains in the case at bar.
The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner
is the seller Rogelio himself who was therein also
descri ed as single. However, as in the cases of
Spouses Raymundo and Arrofo, there are circumstances
critical to the case at bar which convince us to affirm the
ruling of both the appellate and lower courts that herein
petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.
First, etitioners sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the
sale, was residing near Rogelio and Shirleys house the
subject property in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City.
Had petitioner been more prudent as a buyer, she could
have easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to dispose
of the subject property. Had petitioner been more vigilant,
she could have inquired with such facility considering
that her sister lived in the same Ladislao Diwa Village
where the property is located if there was any person
other than Rogelio who had any right or int erest in the
subject property.
To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned
their neighbors at Ladislao Diwa Village including
etitioners sister not to engage in any deal with Rogelio
relative to t he purchase of the subject property because of
the cases she had filed against Rogelio. Petitioner denies
that respondent had given such warning to her neighbors,
which includes her sister, therefore arguing that such
warning could not e construed as notice on her art that
there is a person other than the seller himself who has any
right or int erest in t he subject property. Nonetheless,
des ite etitioners adamant denial, oth courts a quo
gave probative value to the testimony of respondent, and
the instant petition failed to present any convincing
evidence for this Court to reverse such factual finding. To
be sure, it is not within our province to sec ond-guess the
courts a quo, and t he re-determination of this factual issue
is beyond the reach of a petition for review on certiorari
12
where only questions of law may be reviewed.
Second, issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale also pose question on the claim of petitioner
that she is a buyer in good faith. As correctly observed by
both courts a quo, the Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed and dated on December 29, 1992. However, the
Community Tax Certificates of the witnesses therein were
13
dated January 2 and 20, 1993.
While this irregularity is
not a direct proof of the intent of the parties to the sale to
make it appear that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed on December 29, 1992 or before Shirley filed
the petition for legal separation on January 29, 1993 it is
circumstantial and relevant to the claim of herein petitioner
as an innocent purchaser for value.

That is not all.

In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992,
the civil status of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while
etitioner as uyer was indicated as single, viz.:
ROGE LIO A. NUE GA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and
with postal address at 2-A -2 Ladislao Diwa St.,
Conc epcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred
to as the VENDOR
And
JOSEFINA V. NOB LE ZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
single and with postal address at No. L -2-A-3 Ladislao
Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter
14
referred to as the VENDEE.
It puzzles the Court that while petitioner has repeatedly
claimed that Rogelio is single under C
o.
3
and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724,
his civil status as seller was not stated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale further creating a cloud on the claim of
petitioner that she is an innocent purchaser for value.
As to the second issue, we rule that the appellate court did
not err when it modified the decision of the trial court and
declared that the Deed of Abs olute Sale dated D ecember
29, 1992 is void in its entirety.
The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the
owner of t he subject property is Rogelio alone, respondent
was able to prove at the trial court that she cont ribut ed in
the payment of the purchase price of the subject property.
This fact was also settled with finality by the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 70, and affirmed by the CA, in the case for
legal separation and liquidation of property docketed as
JDRC Case No. 2510. The pertinent portion of the
decision reads:
xxx Clearly, the house and lot jointly acquired by the
parties prior to their marriage forms part of their
community property regime, xxx
From the foregoing, Shirley sufficiently proved her financial
contribution for the purc hase of the house and lot covered
by TCT 171963. Thus, the present lot which forms part of
their community property should be divided equally
between them upon the grant of the instant petition for
legal separation. Having established by preponderance of
evidence t he fact of her hus ands guilt in contracting a
subsequent marriage xxx, Shirley alone should be entitled
to the net profits earned by the absolute community
15
property.
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not
remised on roof of res ondents financial contri ution in
the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is
not relevant in determining whether a piec e of property is
community property for the law itself defines what
constitutes community property.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall
consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the
time of the c elebration of the marriage or acquired
thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those
excluded from the absolute community by the Family
Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in

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Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the
community property:
(1) P roperty acquired during the marriage by gratuitous
title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income
thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor,
testator or grantor that they shall form part of the
community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either
spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community
property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse
who has legitimat e descendants by a former marriage, and
the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
16

As held in Quiao v. Quiao:

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute
community, the husband and the wife becomes joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever
property each spous e brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
mass of the cou les ro erties. And when the cou les
marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is
divided bet ween the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally
owned.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the
exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore forms part of
the absolute community property of S hirley and Rogelio.
Regardless of their respective contribution to its
acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that
only Rogelios name a ears in the C as owner, the
property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and
Rogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on Sept ember 1,
1990. Rogelio, on his own and without the consent of
herein respondent as his spous e, sold the subject property
via a Deed of Absolut e Sale dated December 29, 1992
or during the subsistence of a valid contract of marriage.
Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said
disposition of a communal property is void, viz.:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the
community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the hus ands decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the dat e of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the ot her spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include t he powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the t ransaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
17
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code
that Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the
written consent of respondent or the authority of the court.
Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void.

As correctly explained by the appellate court:

In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire
subject property to defendant-appellant Josefina on 29
Decem er
2 or during the e istence of Rogelios
marriage to plaintiff-appellee Shirley, without the consent
of the latter. The subject property forms part of Rogelio
and Shirleys a solute community of ro erty. hus, the
trial court erred in declaring the deed of sale null and void
only insofar as the 55.05 square meters representing the
one-half (1/2) portion of plaintiff-appellee S hirley. In
absolute community of property, if the husband, without
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells (their) property,
such sale is void. The cons ent of bot h the husband
Rogelio and the wife Shirley is required and the absence
of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void
including the portion of the subject property pertaining to
defendant Rogelio who contracted the sale with
defendant-appellant Josefina. Since the Deed of A bsolute
Sale x x x entered into by and between defendantappellant Josefina and defendant Rogelio dated 29
December 1992, during the subsisting marriage between
plaintiff-appellee Shirley and Rogelio, was without the
written consent of Shirley, the said Deed of Absolute Sale
is void in its entirety. Hence, the trial court erred in
declaring the said Deed of Absolute Sale as void only
insofar as the 1/2 portion pertaining to the share of S hirley
18
is concerned.
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely
entered into the contract of sale with petitioner and
acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the
contract under the Deed of Absolute Sale, S hirley could
not be held accountable to petitioner for the
reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the
subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the
a solute community of ro erty shall only e lia le for
x [d]ebts and obligations cont racted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have een enefited
. As correctly stated
by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record
that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the
benefit of the family, res pondent cannot be made to
19
reimburse any amount to petitioner.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2010 and July 21, 2010,
respectively, in CA-G. R. CV No. 70235 are AFFIRME D.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERE D.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. SOFRONIO

G. SAYO
G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
NARVAS A, J.:
FACTS:
The spouses, Casiano S andoval and Luz Marquez, filed
an original application for registration of a tract of land
identified as Lot No. 7454 having an area of 33,950
hectares.

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Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the

Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry.

1) the possessory information title of the applicants and

their predecessors-in-int erest;

The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until

March 3, 1981 when a compromise agreement was
entered int o by and among all the parties, assisted by their
respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands, the
Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc.
Under t he compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and
ceded

2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be pu blic

land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral
proceedings;

1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109

hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341
hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberat o Bayaua, 4,000 hectares;
and

3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated

August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de
Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in
the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was
registered under the 'Spanish system of land registration
as private property owned by Don Liberato Bay aua,
applicants' predec essors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496
(the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title
to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from
proceedings under the Public Land Act where the
presumption is always that the land involved belongs to
the State.
ISSUE:

4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc.,

8,000 hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the
compromise agreement, adjudicated t o and acknowledged
as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this
area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs
to their couns el, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his
attorney's fees.
In a decision rendered on Marc h 5, 1981, the respondent
Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in
accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, has taken t he present recourse in a bid to
have the March 5, 1981 decision annulled as being
patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General cont ends
that
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in
support of their petitions for registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest
Development had legal aut hority to enter into the
compromise agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but
was not given notice of the compromise agreement or
otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision
approving the compromise; it was the S angguniang
Panlalawigan of Quirino P rovince that drew his attention to
the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to
take immediate remedial measures to bring about its
annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the
Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the
proposition that Lot 7454 is public land. According to them,
as pointed out in the application for registration, the private
character of the land is demonstrated by the following
circumstances, to wit:

Whether or not the private respondents have registrable

rights over Lot 7454. No
HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private owners hip are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence, it is that all
applicants in land registration proceeding s have the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
thus sought to be registered form s part of the public
domain.
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the property involved was
acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be
part of the public domain.
The applicant must present compete nt and persuasive
proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title.
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal
document relied upon and presented by the applicants for
registration, to prove the privat e character of the large tract
of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a
certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932
(already above mentioned) to the effect that according to
the Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela
issued in 1896, the property in question was registered
under the Spanish system of land registration as private
property of Don Liberato Bayaua.
But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that
Spanish
document,
the (Estadistica
de
Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it
not being one of the grants made during the Spanish
regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of
ownership. It is an inefficacious document on which to
base any finding of the private character of the land in
question.

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The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest

Development to the compromise agreement did not and
could not supply the absence of evidence of title required
of the private respondents.
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby,
declared null and void, and set a side. Considerations
of fairne ss however indicate the remand of the ca se to
the Registration Court so that the private parties may be
afforded an opportunity to establish by competent
evidence their respective claims to the property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APP ELLATE COURT, ES TEBAN
MENDOZA and LEON PASAHOL
G.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987
GUTI ERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban
Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the t hen Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the
land in question (Lot 444) by purchase from its original
owners and thereafter, actual, continuous, public and
adverse possession by them tacked on to their
predecessors -in-interest for a period exceeding 30 years.
Petitioners ' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the
cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the existence of an
ongoing cadastral proceeding because of which Lot No.
444 was declared public land by CFI Bataan.
On appeal, the Int ermediate Appellat e Court affirmed the
trial court's decision which granted the private
respondents' petition to reopen the cadastral registration
proceeding of the lot in dispute and ordering its registration
in the names of the respondents.
In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the
decision of the appellate court as being contrary to law on
the ground that it held that the subject land is agricultural
and alienable land of the public domain and that the same
can be subject to acquisitive prescription of thirty (30)
years of open, continuous and uninterrupted possession.
The petitioner maintains that unless the President upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Natural
Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as
agricultural or disposable, its status as military reservation
or forest land remains unaltered and no amount of
physical occupation and cultivation thereof can change it
to agricultural land and bring it within the provisions of the
Public Land Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a bona
fide claim of ownership as to entitle them to registration
and title over the subject land. NO

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the fact remains that the
subject land has not yet been released from its
classification as part of the military res ervation zone and
still has to be reclassified as alienable public land with the
approval of the President of the Philippines as required by
the Public Land Act (Commonwealt h Act No. 141) and
Republic Act No. 1275.
Therefore, the SC cannot sustain the appellate court's
ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part of the
military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to
classify the same as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. A proposal cannot take the place of a
formal act declaring forest land released for disposition as
public agricultural land. To sustain the appellate ruling
would be to pre-empt the executive branc h of the
government from exercising its prerogative in classifying
lands of the public domain.
It was ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, (129 S CRA 689, 692-693) that:
The classification of public lands i s an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government and not of the
Courts. In the absence of such cla ssifi cation,
the land remains as uncla ssified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition, Thi s i s also in consonance with
the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 &
10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the cons ervation of such
patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 S CRA
648 [1979])
Since the subject property is still unclassified, what ever
possession Applicant may have had, and, however long,
cannot ripen into private owners hip.

MATEO CARINO (PLAI NTIFF IN ERROR) VS. INSULAR

GOV ERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (DEFENDANT IN
ERROR)
212 US 449, 41 PHIL G. R. No. L-2746 December 6,
1906
JUSTICE HOLMES
HOW IT REACHED THE COURT:
Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it
was the government of the United States appealed to the
Court of first instance of Benguet (they were taking the
property for public and military purposes. The CFI
dismissed the application (for registration) and this was
affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. This was
brought to the US Supreme court by writ of error.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30
years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had
held the land for years. The local community rec ognizes
them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived
upon it and maintained fences around the property. His
father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited
the land according to Igorot custom. There was no
document of title issued for the land when he applied for
registration. The government contends that the land in
question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all

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lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with

permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription
against the Crown. He tried t wice to have it registered
during the Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he
filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was
only granted a possessory title.
PREMILINARY ISSUES.
That even if Carino was able to have a title over the land,
he could not have it registered because Benguet was one
of the excluded provinces in the Phili ine Commissions
act no. 926 (AN A CT PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULA TIONS GOVERNING THE HOMES TEA DING,
SELLING, AND LEAS ING OF PORTIONS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMA IN OF THE P HILIPPINE IS LANDS...). But
that law dealt with ac quisition of new titles and perfecting
of titles begun under the Spanish law. Carino argued that
he could register the land under Philippine Commissions
Act no. 496 which covered the entire Philippine
archipelago. Holmes held that he could register the land if
ownership can be maintained
MAIN ISSUE: WON t he land in question belonged to the
Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Governments argument: S ain had title to all the land in
the Philippines except those it saw fit to permit private
titles to be acquired. That there was a decree issued by
Spain that required registration within a limited time.
Carinos land wasnt registered and so in effect it ecame
public land.
HELD: No. Law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted title to his land.
USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it
does not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost
all his rights to the land this would amount to a denial of
native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain would
not have granted to anyone i n the province the registration
of their lands.
Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property
and rights acquired there by the US would be for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made
a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the
constitution, it rovides that no law shall e enacted in
said islands whic h shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to any
erson therein the e ual rotection of the laws. It would
be hard to elieve that that any erson didnt include the
inha itants of Benguet. or it meant ro erty to refer
only to thos e lands which had become such under a
ceremony (of registration) many of t he people of the land
may have not even heard of.
Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the
Philippine commission may prescribe rules and regulations
for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that
this section refers to those cases where the land was
admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to
suppose t hat it was intended t o declare every native who
had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still
remains: what property and rights did the US acquire?
In cases like this one, the presumption would and should
be against the government. As far back as memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it was never public land. It would not be
proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with
the Philippine tribes if it really meant to us e the rights

ac uired
thereof.

y them for the

enefit of the inha itants

The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own

some lands, irres ective of any royal grant. hey didnt
intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle
of rescri tion was admitted: that if they werent a le to
produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription.
Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that
required everyone to get a document of title or else lose
his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but
only those who wrongfully occu ied royal lands. I doesnt
appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal
land nor was it considered to have been wrongfully
occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that
titles would be attributed to those who may prove
possession for the necessary time. There were indications
that registration was e ected ut it didnt mean that
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof was not to confer title to them but to establish it.
Law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of
what, by the practice and belief of those among whom
he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
Judgment reversed.

LEE HONG KOK V. DAVI D (1972)

G.R. NO. L-30389 DECEMBER 27, 1972

FACTS:
Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which
an order of award and for issuanc e of a sales
patent (*similar to public auction) was made by the
Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.
On the basis of the order of award of the Director
of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on
October 21, 1959.
Land in question is not a private property as the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character for
having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to
peittioners contention that it is accretion)
The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground
of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case
ISSUES:
W/N Lee Hong K ok can question the grant. - NO
W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES

HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for

nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot arising from
the grant made in his favor by respondent officials)
Only the Government, represent ed by the Director of
Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate

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of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The legality of the

grant is a question between the grantee and the
government. Privat e parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim
that the patent and title issued for the land involved are
void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor
had they been declared as owners in the cadastral
proceedings of Naga Cadastre aft er claiming it as their
private property.

loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.

"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. S wampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
possession of forestlands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question
never ceased to be classified as forestland of public
domain.

Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by

private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the government
Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free
patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. Not only does a free patent have a
force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the
person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the
right to repurchase within a period of 5 years.
Imperium v. Dominium

Imperium - government authority possessed by the state

which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty

Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use

of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by
the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it
may provide for the exploitation and us e of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as
limited by the Constitution.

HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI VS DIRECTOR OF

FORESTRY
FACTS:
There were two petitions for review on certiorari
questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which
declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject
to titling in favor of private pers ons, Borre and
Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the
Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the
application for registration of title claiming that the land
was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest
land and part of the public domain.

CRUZ VS DENR, G.R. NO. 135385, DECEMBER 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ V. DEPT. OF ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES,
G.R. NO. 135385, DECEMBER 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the
validity of the RA 3
or the Indigenous Peo les Rights
Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
de rivation of the States ownershi over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The
IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by
providing for an all-encom assing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IP RA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberat ed upon the matter. After
deliberation they vot ed and reached a 7-7 vot e. They
deliberat ed again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no ma ority vote, Cruzs etition was dismissed
and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral
domains may include nat ural resources somehow
against the regalian doctrine.

MATEO CARINO (PLAI NTIFF IN ERROR) VS. INSULAR

GOV ERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (DEFENDANT IN
ERROR)
212 US 449, 41 PHIL G. R. No. L-2746 December 6,
1906
JUSTICE HOLMES
HOW IT REACHED THE COURT:

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition

insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said
portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
ISSUE:
WON the lot in question can be subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of the private person.
HELD:
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was
strengthened by the appellate court 's finding that timber
licenses had t o be issued to certain licensees and even
Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime
in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but
only after a previous warning from the District Forester that
the same could not be done because it was classified as
u lic forest.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because

Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it

was
the government of t he United states appealed to the Court
of first instance of Benguet (they were taking the property
for public and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the
application (for registration) and this was affirmed by the
Philippine Supreme Court. This was brought to the US
Supreme court by writ of error.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30
years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had
held the land for years. The local community rec ognizes
them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived
upon it and maintained fences around the property. His
father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited
the land according to Igorot custom. There was no
document of title issued for the land whe n he applied for

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registration. The government contends that the land in

question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all
lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with
permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription
against the Crown. He tried t wice to have it registered
during the Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he
filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was
only granted a possessory title.
PREMILINARY ISSUES.
That even if Carino was able to have a title over the land,
he could not have it registered because Benguet was one
of the e cluded rovinces in the Phili ine Commissions
act no. 926 (AN A CT PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULA TIONS GOVERNING THE HOMES TEA DING,
SELLING, AND LEAS ING OF PORTIONS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMA IN OF THE P HILIPPINE IS LANDS...). But
that law dealt with ac quisition of new titles and perfecting
of titles begun under the Spanish law. Carino argued that
he could register the land under Philippine Commissions
Act no. 496 which covered the entire Philippine
archipelago. Holmes held that he could register the land if
ownership can be maintained
MAIN ISSUE: WON t he land in question belonged to the
Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Governments argument: S ain had title to all the land in
the Philippines except those it saw fit to permit private
titles to be acquired. That there was a decree issued by
Spain that required registration within a limited time.
Carinos land wasnt registered and so in effect it ecame
public land.
HELD: No. Law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted title to his land.
USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it
does not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost
all his rights to the land this would amount to a denial of
native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain would
not have granted to anyone in the province the registration
of their lands.
Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property
and rights acquired there by the US would be for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made
a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the
constitution, it rovides that no law shall e enacted in
said islands whic h shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to any
erson therein the e ual rotection of the laws. It would
e hard to elieve that that any erson didnt include the
inha itants of Benguet. or it meant ro erty to refer
only to thos e lands which had become such under a
ceremony (of registration) many of t he people of the land
may have not even heard of.
Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the
Philippine commission may prescribe rules and regulations
for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that
this section refers to those cases where the land was
admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to
suppose t hat it was intended t o declare every native who
had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still
remains: what property and rights did the US acquire?
In cases like this one, the presumption would and should
be against the government. As far back as memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it was never public land. It would not be

proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with

the Philippine tribes if it really meant to us e the rights
ac uired y them for the enefit of the inha itants
thereof.
The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own
some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. hey didnt
intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle
of rescri tion was admitted: that if they werent a le to
produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription.
Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that
required everyone to get a document of title or else lose
his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but
only those who wrongfully occu ied royal lands. I doesnt
appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal
land nor was it considered to have been wrongfully
occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that
titles would be attributed to those who may prove
possession for the necessary time. There were indications
that registration was e ected ut it didnt mean that
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof was not to confer title to them but to establish it.
Law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of
what, by the practice and belief of those among whom
he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
Judgment reversed.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND TABANGAO REALTY

TUESDAY, JULY 1, 2014
FACTS:
On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an
application for Original Registration of Title over three
parcels of land.
Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application
that it acquired the above-mentioned lots by purchase
from its previous owners as evidenced by the
corresponding Deeds of Sale; that it is the owner of all
adjoining lots; that it had been in actual possession of the
lots since the time it acquired the same from the previous
owners up to t he pres ent; and that its possession and
occupation as owners including that of its predecessor-ininterest has been open, peaceful, continuous, advers e to
the whole world and in the concept of an owner.
Tabangao Realty alleged that the plant of the Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LP G) Com pany is partly erected on the
subject lots which improvements are owned by it
(applicant). {There is a lease contract between LPG and
Tabangao}
Should the property registration decree invoked not be
allowed, the applicant in the alternative applied for the
benefits under CA No. 141 as amended and thus alleged
that together with its predecessors-in-interest it had been
in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years.
Geron
a angos witness testified that the applicantcorporation was duly organized and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and is aut horiz ed to
acquire land by purchas e and develop, subdivide, sell,

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mortgage, exchange, lease and hold for investment or

otherwise, real estate of all kinds.

In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly

established by competent evidence.

He also testified that the subject properties in this case

were purchased by Tabangao Realty as evidenced by
Deed of Sale and that the taxes of the properties were
properly paid by the corporation.

Henc e, the application for registration of the properties

must be denied. (Ruled in favor of the Republic.)

Marasigan corroborat ed the testimony of Romeo Geron

with regard to the owners hip, possession and the status of
the lots subject of the application.
Loida Maglinao (from the Bureau of Forest Development)
testified that the subject properties are within the alienable
and disposable area of the public domain and no forestry
interest is adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest
Development.
RTC and CA granted the petition of Tabangao. Hence, this
appeal by the Republic.
ISSUE: WON Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title
over three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao,
Batangas City applied for.
HELD: NO. The ruling of the CA was erroneous.
There is a presumption that all lands belong to the public
domain of the State
An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land
must conclusively show that he is the owner thereof in fee
simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands
belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired
from the Government either by purchase or by grant,
except lands possessed by an occupant a nd his
predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been private
property even before the Spanish conquest.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. AVELINO R. DELA

PAZ, ARS ENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA P AZ,
AND GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, REP RES ENTED BY
JOS E R. DELA PAZ
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents filed a case to register a parcel of land
covering almost 25,800 square kilomet res situated in
Taguig. They alleged that they came into the possession
of the land thru their parents who have been continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the
same, in the concept of owner since 1987. The Republic
(Petitioner) opposed the application on the ground that
they have not been in continuous, unint errupted, open,
public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of
owner, but the RTC ruled in favour of the Respondents.
The Republic interposed an Appeal to the CA, but it was
also denied, the court reasoning that Respondents have
established their right to the parcel of land.
Petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the continuous, uninterrupted, open,
public and adverse possession was sufficiently established
by evidence.

The land in question is admittedly p ublic.

The applicant has no title at all. Its claim of acquisition of
ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the
parcels of land applied for were declared public land by
decision of the Cadastral Court. Such being the case, the
application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) is barred by the prior
judgment of the Cadastral Court.

2. Whether the land is part of t he alienable part of public

domain.

The land having been subjected to compulsory registration

under the Cadastral Act and declared public land can no
longer be the subject of registration by voluntary
application under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The
second application is barred by res-judicata. As previously
held, "[W]here t he applicant possesses no title or
ownership over the parc el of land, he cannot acquire one
under the Torrens System of registration."

1st Issue:

There is no sufficient evidence that Tabangao Realty was

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the lands for 30 years.
Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature
of its possession and that of its predec essors in interest.
"The applicant must present specific acts of owners hip to
substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual
evidence of possession." "Actual possession of land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would nat urally exercise over his
own property."

HELD:
No. It has not been sufficiently established.
Civil Law: Land Registration

Respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of

the alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
under abona fideclaim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Respondents have not presented tangible proof to
establish this kind of possession. At best, they ha ve only
given a tax declaration on 1949, but this is merely indicia
of ownership.
2nd Issue:
To overcome this presumption,incontrovertibleevidence
must be established that thelandsubject of theapplication
(or claim) isalienable ordisposable. To support this,
Respondents have merely relied on the survey plan of a
geodetic engineer. This is insufficient under the law.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the

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proper government agency to establish that the subject

land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain.
Petition GRANTED. The registration i s DENI ED.

NTESTATE ESTATE OF DON MARI ANO SAN PEDRO

V. COURT OF APP EALS
FACTS: This is a claim of a huge parcel of land covering
lands in the provinces Nueva ecija, Bulacan, and in cities
including Quezon City.
This case involves 2 cases, which prior to being decided
by the SC were consolidated. The first case was a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against Ocampo, Buhain, and Dela Cruz. In the complaint,
it was alleged that the defendants (Ocampo - Dela Cruz)
were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City titles to a portions of the claimed estate. In the end,
the lower courts ruled in favor of Ocampo - Dela Cruz,
declaring that the Torrens titles of the defendants cannot
be defeat ed by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad
no. 4316.
The 2nd case is a petition for letters of adiministration over
the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro Y
Esteban. This involves a prayer to be declared as
administrator. This case eventually ended in the same
manner as the first case - the Titulo de Prorpriedad was
declared void and of no legal force, therefore the lands
covered by the Titulo are not within the estate of the
deceased.
ISSUE: W/N the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and
therefore the lands covered or claimed under such title are
not included in the estate of the deceas ed.
HELD: The Titulo is null and void. It has been defeated by
the title of the defendants under t he Torrens system. It is
settled that by virtue of P d no 892 which tool effect on Feb
16 1976 the syte of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to
be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6mos
from date of effectivity of the said decree.
Proof of compliance (Certificate of Title) with the said
decree should have been presented during trial.

application for registration of the two lots pursuant to

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law alleging that it and its
predecessor-in-interest had possessed the land for more
than 30 years. The Republic of the Philippines opposed
the application on the ground that the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as
a corporation sole, is disqualified under the Constitution to
hold alienable lands of the public domain and that the land
applied for is a public land. After hearing, the trial c ourt
ordered the registration of t he t wo lots in the name of
private respondent. Hence, this appeal by the Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Iglesia ni Cristo may acquire or
hold lands of public domain.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution
prohibits a corporation sole or a juridical person like the
Iglesia Ni Cristo from ac quiring or holding lands of the
public domain; that said church is not entitled to avail of
the benefits of Section 48(b) of the P ublic Land Law which
applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons; and that
the subject lots are not privat e lands becaus e possession
by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest has not
been since time immemorial and because land registration
proceeding under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law
presupposes that the land is public.
The provision in the Constitution that "No private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; Art. XIV, Sec. II of the Constitution is not
the decisive consideration for the denial of the registration
in favor of appellee. It is the view that the Bill of Rights
provision on religious freedom which bans the enactment
of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of
religious profession and worship without discrimination or
preference. (being) forever . . . allowed." Here the Iglesia
Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The
area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313
square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a
chapel is therein located. It is that basic consideration that
leads to the conclusion that the balancing process, which
finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally
requires that when two provisions in the Constitution
maybe relevant to a certain factual situation, it calls for the
affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing
the registration.

NEW REGENT S ERVICES V. TANJUATCO

April 16, 2009
FACTS:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

Director of Lands, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE
CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA
NI CRISTO, a s a corporation sole, represented by
ERAO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister,
respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-55289. June 29, 1982

FACTS:
In 1933, Iglesia ni Cristo, private respondent, a
corporation sole duly existing under Philippine laws,
acquired two lots with a total area of 313 square meters
from Andres Perez, who had possessed the property since
1933 and had declared the same for tax purposes. On
September 13, 1977, private respondent filed an

Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRS I) filed a

Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Cont ract,
Reconveyance and Damages against respondent
Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba. NRS I
alleged that in 1994, it authorized Cuevas, its Chairman
and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of
two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion.
Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by
paying P82,400.38 to the Bureau of Lands. On January 2,
1995, Cuevas and his wife exec uted a Voting Trust
Agreement over their shares of stock in the corporation.
Then, pending approval of the application with the Bureau
of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the
sum of P85,000. On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands
released an Order, which approved t he transfer of rights
from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Titles
were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco. NRSI anc hors

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its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of
accretion. It submitted in evidence, titles to four parcels of
land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name of
Tanjuatco.

Bed, which under Article 502 (1) of the Civil Code rightly
pertains to the public dominion. The Certification issued by
the forester confirms that said lands were verified to be
within the Alienable and Disposable lands certified and
declared as such on September 28, 1981. Clearly, the
Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer
ownership thereof to res pondent.

ISSUES:
3) Yes.
1)

W/N the complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity

of contract, reconveyance and damages against
Tanjuanco may prosper
2) W/n NRS I has claim over the subject property base on
the right of accretion
3) W/N Cuevas is an innocent purchaser in good faith
RULI NGS:
1) No.
An action for rec onveyance is one that seeks to transfer
property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful
22
and legal owner. In an action for reconvey ance, the
certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property, specifically
the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in anot her ersons name, to its rightful and
legal owner, or to one with a better right.
To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the action must be brought in the name of a person
claiming ownership or dominical right over the land
registered in the name of the defendant;
(2) the registration of the land in the name of the
defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal
means;
(3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value; and
(4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already
become final and incontrovertible but within four years
from the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years
in the case of an implied trust.
Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.
2)

No.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article

31
457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the
following
requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the
river;
and
(3) that the land where accretion t akes place is adjacent to
the banks of rivers.
It is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the
benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion
must show by preponderant evidence t hat he has met all
the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably
failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to
prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.
Further, it is undisputed t hat Tanjuatco derived his title t o
the lands from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) registered
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Said
parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River

an uatcos titles were derived from Original Certificates

of Title in the name of no less than the Republic of the
Philippines. Hence, we cannot validly and fairly rule that in
relying upon said title, Tanjuatco acted in bad faith. A
person dealing with registered land may safely rely upon
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and
the law will in no way oblige him t o go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. This
applies even more particularly when the seller happens to
be the Republic, against which, no improper motive can be
ascribed. The law, no doubt, considers Tanjuatco an
innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for
value is one who buys the property of anot her, wit hout
notice that some other person has a right or interest in
such property and pays the full price for the same, at the
time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claims or interest of some other person in the property.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMP ANY VS. JUDGE

FLORELI ANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME
114 SCRA 799
JUNE 29, 1982

FACTS: The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots

(165 sqm.) with an assessed value of P3270 in Tanay,
Rizal from t he Piguing s pous es on August 13, 1976, who
had consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on
the 3rd of July 1947, the original owner of the land even
before 1941. They consequently filed for the c onfirmation
of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the
Court of First Instance. The Meralco consequently filed an
appeal with the following contentions:
1. The land after having been possessed by Olimpia
Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years
had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional prohibition
banning a private corporation from ac quiring alienable
public land is not applicable.
2. It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not
for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino
citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their
imperfect title to the land
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
qualified to apply for a judicial confirmation of an
imperfect/incomplete title.
2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is
recognized. 3. Whether or not the conversion of the land
from public to private property is contingent on the judicial
confirmation of title.
RULI NG:
1. NO. According to S ec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the
Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualifie d from applying
for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Furthermore,
according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973
Constitution prohibits private c orporations from hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not
to exceed 1000 hectares in area. In fine, only natural

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persons and citizens of the P hilippines are allowed to

apply for confirmation under the PLA.
2. NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to
private property is contingent upon (1) fulfilling the
necessary condition of possession by the predecessors -ininterest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2) the
judicial confirmation of the title by the Court of First
Instance. C. J. Fernando concurred with the decision, but
accepted that a conversion i ndeed took place.
Note: J. Teehankee dissented and trac ed the line of
jurisprudence from Carino to Susi to Herico which
maintained that the conversion or acquisition effectively
happens by the operation of law, ipso jure, as soon as it
can be conclusively presumed, juris et de jure, that all the
conditions for the confirmation of the grant have been met.
According to his reas oning, upon the fulfillment of the
aforementioned conditions, the confirmation of an
imperfect title is only a formality.

DIRECTOR OF LAND VS IAC AND ACME

FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land.
The possession of the Infiels, members of Dumagat tribes,
over the land dates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan. The possession of the applicant
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse
andpublic from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the
applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the
possession is already considered from time immemorial.
The land sought to be registered is a private land purs uant
to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domain. Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M wort h of
improvements. The ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela. Acme donated part of the land as the townsite of
Maconac on Isabela.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations
applies- NO
HELD:
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certific ate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already

private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could
not acquire, hold or lease public agricult ural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares.

VICTORI A ONG DE OCSIO vs. the RELIGIOUS OF THE

VIRGIN MARY (Feb. 28, 1989)

FACTS
A cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of Lands,
in behalf of the Republic, for t he settlement and
adjudication of title to a large tract of land situated in the
City of Iligan.
Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably
presented an answer to the petition. She alleged that she
was the owner, by purchase, of two (2) parcels of land with
specific boundaries comprehended in the cadastral
proceeding. As owner, she had been in possession of both
lots for fifteen (15) years, and her predec essors-in-interest,
for sixty (60) years. Title to the same parcels of land was
however claimed by the Religious of the Virgin Mary. In its
answer, it averred that it had bought the lots from Victoria
Ong de Ocsio and had been in possession as owner
thereof for over four years, and its possession and that of
its predecessors was immemorial.
The Cadastral Court rendered judgment, declaring t hat the
evidence satisfactorily established that Victoria Ong de
Ocsio had in truth sold the lot to the Religious of t he Virgin
Mary in virtue of a deed of sale dated A pril 12, 1956.
De Ocsio now asserts that as the private respondent is a
religious corporation, it is disqualified to obtain judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act which grants that right only to natural
persons.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contention was correct.
HELD
No. Privat e respondent, a religious corporation, may
obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.
Open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable
public land for at least thirty (30) years in accordance with
the Public Land Act ipso jure converts the land to private
property, and a juridical person who thereaft er acquires
the same may have title thereto confirmed in its name.
In this case, a private corporation had purchased the land
originally of the public domain from parties who had, by
themselves and through their predec essors-in-interest,
possessed and occupied it since time immemorial. It had
thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
The prohibitions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
against acquisition or registration of lands by or in behalf
of private corporations do not apply to public lands already
converted to private ownership by natural persons under
the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the present case,
Virginia Ong de Ocsio and her predecessors -in-interest
having possessed Lot No. 1272 for the period and under
the conditions prescribed by law for acquisition of

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ownership of disposable public land prior to the sale of the

property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary, confirmation
of title theret o in the latter's name is, under the precedents
referred to, entirely in order.
REPUBLIC VS JUANITO MANIMTIM (G.R. No. 169599
March 16, 2011)
FACTS:
Respondents filed with the RTC two applications for
registration and confirmation of their title over two (2)
parcels of land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay
City. The respondents alleged that they are the owners pro
indiviso and in fee simple of the subject parcels of land;
that they have acquired the subject parcels of land by
purchase or assignment of rights; and that they have been
in actual, open, public, and continuous possession of the
subject land under claim of title exclusive of any other
rights and adverse to all other claimants by themselves
and through their predecessors -in-interest since time
immemorial. In support of their applications, the
respondents submitted blueprint plans of Lot 3857 and Lot
3858, technical descriptions, certifications in lieu of lost
geodetic engineers certificates, declarations of real
property tax, official receipts of payment of taxes, real
property tax certifications, and deeds of absolute sale.
The OSG opposed the petition, alleging, among others,
that the respondents have not proven actual, open, public,
and continuous possession of the land from June 12, 1945
or earlier. Moldex Realty also opposed, stating that a part
of one of the parcels of the land overlapped with lands it
owned.
The RTC handed down its Judgment granting the
respondents application for registration ofthe first lot but
deferred the approval of registration of the second lot
pending the segregation of 4,243 square meter portion
thereof which was found to belong to Moldex. It rendered
an amended judgment lat er, granting registration of the
second lot. The OSG and Moldex appealed with the CA,
which reinstated the earlier RTC decision. The OSG
appealed.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents had a valid claim over the
two parcels of land (NO)
HELD:
The following are the requisites required by law for the
registration of land.
Applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1073 must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject
land forms part of t he disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) t hat the applicant and his
predecessors -in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These the
respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive
and convincing evidence.
The respondents best evidenc e to prove possession and
ownership over the subject property were the tax
declarations issued in their names. Unfortunately, these
tax declarations together with their unsubstantiated
general statements and mere xerox copies of deeds of
sale are not enough to prove their right ful claim.
Well settled is the rule that declarations and receipts are
not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to

possess land when not support ed by any other evidence.

The fact that the disput ed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors -ininterest does not necessarily prove owne rship. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

REPUBLIC VS TEODORO RI ZALVO (G.R. No 172011

March 7, 2011)
FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Riz alvo, Jr.
filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land
registration court, an application for the registration of a
parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706,
located in Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged that he
is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that
he obtained title over the land by virtu e of a Deed of
Trans fer dated December 31, 1962, and that he is
currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim,
he present ed, among others, Tax Declaration No.
22206for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment
of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to t he time of
filing
of
the
application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of t he Solicitor General
(OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that neither respondent
nor his predec essors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945or
earlier and that the tax declarations and tax payment
receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of ownership. The OSG also asserted that the
subject property was a portion of public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to
private
acquisition.
The Land Investigator/ Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CE NRO) of San Fernando, La Union thereafter certified
that the subject parcel of land was within the alienable and
disposable zone and that the applicant was in actual
occupation
and
possession
of
the
land.
The MTC, acting as a land registration court, approved the
application for registration, which the OSG appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was in open,

continuous, adverse, and public possession (OCE NPO) of
the land in question in the manner and length of time
required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial
confirmation
of
imperfect
title.
(NO)
HELD:

Requisites for the registration of a title:

Under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Dec ree,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish
first, that the s ubject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The
certification and report dated July 17, 2001submitted by
Special Investigator Dionisio L. Picar of the CE NRO of

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San Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire land

area in question is within the alienable and disposable
zone.
Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as
to owners hip and possession. The MTC and the CA both
agreed that respondent has presented sufficient
testimonial and doc umentary evidence to show that he
and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question. Said findings are binding upon this Court
absent any showing that the lower courts committed error.
However, the third requirement has not been sati sfied.
Respondent only managed to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership
and possession of the land since 1958 through a
photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 8,
1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo.
He presented Tax Declaration No. 11078 for the year 1948
in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax
receipts beginning in 1952. What is required by law is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June
12,
1945or
earlier.
Under Section 14(2) applicant is likewise not entitled to
registration of title through prescription, since the 30-year
period will only commence from the moment the State
expressly declares that the public dominion property is no
longer int ended for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. There was no such declaration
in this case.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS HON. SALVADOR

REYES AND PIDC AND TAMAYO (GR No L-27594
November 28, 1975)
FACTS: Applicant Alipio Alinsunurin sought the
registration of title under Act 496 a vast tract of land,
containing an area of 16, 800 hectares, more or less,
situated at the municipality of Laur, provinc e of Nueva
Ecija.
On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of
Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was
without sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question for at least thirty (30) years
immediat ely preceding the filing of the application; that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the
military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under
Proclamation No. 237.
In 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for
substitution of parties, requesting that the Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation be considered
as the applicant in his place, it having acquired all his
rights, interests, ownership and dominion over the property
It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired
the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued
during the Spanish regime and upon his death in 1900, he
transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his
daughter and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn
continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized
portions for pasture, until her death sometime i n 1944.

The lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel

of land applied for is adjudicated to and ordered to be
registered in favor of P araaque Investment and
Development Corporation (2/ 3 of the land was adjudicated
to PIDC), and the remaining 1/ 3 portion to Tamayo.
ISSUE: W/N P IDC or its predecessors-in-interest have
been in OCE NPO of the subject property (NO)
HELD: The applicant relies on a purported titulo de
informacion posesoria issued in the name of Melecio
Padilla. However, neither the original of the said titulo de
informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy
thereof, was submitted in evidenc e, and there are serious
flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the doc ument.
Moreover, according to the official records of the Register
of Deeds, on the basis of the "List of Possessory
Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the
corresponding supporting documents of which are kept in
the vault of said office, the name of Melecio Padilla does
not appear among those listed as holders of informacion
posesoria titles. There is another factor which weighs
heavily against the claim of the applicant. The alleged
informacion posesoria covers an area of "seis mil
quiiones, poco mas e menos" or an equivalent of 16,800
hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in force at the time of
the supposed acquisition, no one could acquire public land
in excess of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal Decrees of
November 25, 1880 and October 26, 1881, prohibited any
grant of public land in excess of one thousand (1,000)
hectares
Also under Spanish law, in order that an informacion
posesoria may be considered as title of ownership, it must
be proven that the holder thereof has complied with the
provisions of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession
has been legally converted into a registration of ownership
because Melecio Padilla had not complied with the
requirements of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law,
to wit: "that the applicant has been in open possession of
the land; that an application to this effect be filed aft er the
expiration of 20 years from the date of such registration;
that such conversion be announced by means of a
proclamation in a proper official bulletin; that the Court
order the conversion of the registration of possession into
a record of ownership; and that the Registrar make the
proper record thereof in the Registry."
E vidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9,
1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the
informacion posesoria, could not have c onverted the same
into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such
inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish
Mortgage Law.
It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record,
that neither applicant Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the
latter's predecessors-in-interest have been "in open,
continuous, exclusive, and not orious possession and
occupation" of the property in question, "under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediat ely preceding the filing of t he application for
confirmation of title."
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that
sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to

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give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While

grazing livestock over land is of cours e to be considered
with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere
occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without
substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements,
is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive
prescription.
The possession of public land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS TESALONA (GR No. 66130

September 8, 1994)
FACTS:
On June 23, 1971, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia Tesalona
filed an application for registration o f five (5) parcels of
land with the CFI of Quezon, Gumaca Branch. They
alleged that they acquired the lands through succession
from their mother Magdalena.
They said that their great grand mother Maria Rosita
Lorenzo acquired 7.4343 hectares of land located in
Quezon under a possessory information title dated May
20, 1896 under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894.
The Director of Lands through the Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Quezon filed his opposition to the application
alleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessorsin-interest had sufficient title of the land applied for nor had
they been in possession thereof for a period of at least
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application and that the same is public land.
Constancio dela Pena Tan likewise filed an opposition
even as he supported the government's contention that
the lands applied for are part of the public domain. Tan
averred that he had possessed the land as lessee for a
period of more than thirty five (35) years. She said that the
lands were converted into fishponds and had been subject
of a sales application sometime in 1963. 11 The
application to purchase filed by Constancio is still pending
before the Bureau of Lands.
Lower court decision: A fter hea ring, the trial court
rendered judgment adjudicating Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in
favor of the applicants and declaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as
owned by the government subject to the rights of the
lessee, Constancio dela Pena Tan, pending the approval
of his sales application.
The CA ruled that lots 1-5 should be registered under the
names of esalonas si lings.
The Director of lands filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whet her or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 &
2. (NO)
HELD:
Submission of tracing cloth plan is mandatory whic h the
Tesalonas were not able to comply.

To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land

applied for was not submitted in evidence by private
respondents. Such omission is fatal to their application as
the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character.
While a blue print of survey Plan Psu 215382 as surveyed
for the Heirs of Magdalena Lizada was presented before
the trial court, the same falls short of the mandatory
requirement of law.
The original tracing cloth plan, together with the duplicate
copy of their application for registration of land title were
under the custody of the Land Registration Commission
(LRC) at that time. But such does not relieve the private
respondents of t heir duty to ret rieve the said tracing cloth
plan and submit it before the court.
In the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, this Court
clearly declared that if the original tracing plan was
forwarded t o the LRC, "the applicants may easily ret rieve
the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence."
This was not done. Assuming that the same was in their
possession during the trial, private res pondents should
have made it available to the trial court for verification.
The proofs presented by Tesalonas were uestiona le
and the basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona, herein
private respondents, is a Spanish title, a possessory
information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita
Lorenzo pursuant to the Roy al Decree of February 13,
1894 for 1.0481 hectares. But private respondents did not
submit the original of the possessory information title.
What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a
Spanish document purporting to be the title evidencing the
land grant of 1896.
Also this art of the Courts decision is more connected
with the topic of OCE NPO)
Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classi fied as swampy area and
were as early as 1955, filled with mangrove trees.
This belies the contention of herein private respondents
that said lots were planted to coconuts in 1909 and,
thereafter, to palay and other seasonal crops. Being
swampy area covered by mangrove trees and the like,
these lots may very well be considered and classified as
forest lands. In the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry we declared that:
A forested area classified as forest land of the u lic
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way place. S wampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brack ish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of im erfect title do not a ly.

Moreover, well -ent renched is the rule that possession of

forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen int o private
ownership. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be

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issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens

System, nullifies the title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (March 16, 1987)
IGNACIO PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (January
21, 1997)
FACTS: On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the
Philippine Islands, issued Executive Order No. 40 which
reserved for provincial park purposes a land situated in the
Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of
the Philippine Commission.
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay
ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by
Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego
Palomo. Diego Palomo donated t hese parc els of land to
his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo
two mont hs before his deat h in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certific ates of title were
lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed
a petition for reconstitution wit h the Court of First Instance
of Albay. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Titles.
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by
Executive Order No. 40 into the " Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park," under the control, management, pr otection and
administration of a division of the B ureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable
and dispos able portion of the public domain and,
therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable
under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed
a civil case for the annulment and cancellation of
Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land
registered in the name of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whet her or not the alleged original certificate of
titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First
Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in
1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.
HELD: No. The OCT and the subsequest TCTs are not
valid.
The lands are still not capable of appropriation. The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were
not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the
District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show
that the subject lands were never declared as alienable
and dispos able and subject to private alienation prior to
1913 up to the present. Moreover, as part of the
reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of
the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands
are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

FACTS: Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was

declared public land in a decision rendered before the last
war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest
zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry
as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land
Act.
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case
No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097 to perfect their
rights and register their titles to said lots, having allegedly
acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land
by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose
possession of the same including that of the herein
Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active,
exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners
thereof for more than 30 years.
The petition was approved and the Commissioner of Land
Registration was directed to issue the corresponding
decrees of registration of said land.
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed
a petition for review of the decrees of registration under
Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the
corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds
that the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to reopen cadastral proceedings are portions of the public
domain, admittedly within the unclassified public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on or about
July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not have
a registerable title to the land subject matter of the
proceedings.
ISSUE: Whet her or not the lots claimed by respondents
could legally be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title
under the Public Land Act, as amended.
HELD: No. It cannot be claimed by the respondents.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded. They are
incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title,
whet her suc h title be one issued during the Spanish
sovereignty or under t he present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title. Thus, possession of forest
lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
Torrens
System.
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings
was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified
for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141,
the facts being that private respondents could only be
credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession
and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6,
1965, the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio
Cabc aban, Mariveles, Bataan, which includes the lots
claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the
forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an

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agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

Cons equently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence,
neither private respondents nor their predecessors -ininterest could have possessed the lots for the requisite
period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.

REPUBLIC vs. DE GUZMAN (Feb. 28, 2000)

FACTS
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title
were filed by Norma Almanzor and privat e respondent
Salvador De Guzman over parc els of land located in
Silang, Cavite. A fter trial on the merits, the lower court
rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De
Guzman.
The Republic now raised the issue in a petition that the
trial court erred in not declaring that the de Guzman have
not overt hrown the presumption that the lands are portions
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines and that they have fulfilled t he time required by
law to justify confirmation of an imperfect title.
It is not disput ed that the subject parcels of land were
released as agricultural land only in 1965 while the petition
for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private
respondents only in 1991. Thus the period of occupancy of
the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the
application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26)
years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year
period
possession
requirement
under Sec. 14, P.D. 29and R.A. No. 6940.
In finding that private respondents' possession of the
subject property complied with law, the Court of Appeals
reasoned out that
(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable
and disposable only in December, 1965, however,
records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro
Ermitao, appellees' predecessor-in-interest, was
already in possession of the property, cultivating it
and planting various crops thereon. It follows that
appellees ' possession as of t he time of the filing of
the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro
Ermitao's possession is 63 years or more than
the required 30 years period of possession. The
land, which is agricultural, has been converted to
private property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the time required by law to justify
confirmation of an imperfect tile is satisfied in this case.
HELD: No. It is not satisfied.
In the case before us, the property subject of private
respondents' application was only declared alienable in
1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land
incapable of private appropriation. It cannot be registered
and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not
convert it into privat e property, (unless) and until such
lands were reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable
land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon
cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year
possession requirement.

The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not

apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that
private res pondents and their predecessors -in-interest
have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three
(63) years at the time of the application of their petition,
our hands are tied by the applicable laws and
jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact
remains that from the time the subject land was declared
alienable until the time of their application, private
respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26)
years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of
possession prior to the releas e of the land as alienable
because absent the fact of declassification prior to the
possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the
property occupied by him remained classified as forest or
timberland, which he could not have acquired by
prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases
which reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not
capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property.
Possession of the land by privat e respondents, whether
spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into
ownership.

VICTORI A V REPUBLIC
FACTS:
On November 2, 2004 petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana
Victoria applied for registration under the law of a 1,729square meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of t hat city. The Office of
the Solicitor General (OS G), representing the respondent
Republic of the P hilippines, opposed the application in the
usual form.
The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in
evidence showed that the land is inside the alienable and
disposable area under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623,
as certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on
January 3, 1968. Victoria testified that she and her
predecessors -in-interest have been in possession of the
property continuously, uninterrupt edly, openly, publicly,
adversely and in the concept of owners since the early
1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared
as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years.
On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a
decision granting the application for registration and
finding that Victoria.
The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA), pointing out in its brief that Victoria failed to
present evidence that the subject property is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain and that she failed to
establish the kind of possession required for registration.
Victoria in her reply attached to her brief a
Certification dated November 6, 2006 issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DE NR), verifying the subject property as within the
alienable and dis posable land of the public domain.
Ca reversed Me Cs decision.
ISSUE:

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Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

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1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot

is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and
2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of
ownership of the property.
RULI NG:
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree has
three requisites for registration of title: (a) that the property
in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; (b) that the applicants by themsel ves or through
their predecessors -in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There are no material differences bet ween Sec.
14(1) of the P roperty Registration Dec ree and Sec. 48(b)
of the Public Land Act. Sec. 14(1) operationaliz es the
registration of such lands of the public domain.
To prove that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may secure a certification from the government
that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but
the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of
the pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verific ation through survey by
the PENRO or CE NRO. The applicant must also pres ent a
copy of the original classification of the land into alienable
and dispos able, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as
proclaimed by the President.
Besides, the record shows that the subject property was
covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig conducted by the
government at its expense. Such surveys are carried out
precisely to encourage landowners and help them get
titles to the lands covered by such survey. It does not
make sense to raise an objection after such a survey that
the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public
domain, like a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in
the middle of the metropolis.

SOUTH CITY HOMES V REP UBLIC

The subject of this dispute (lot No.5005) is a strip of land
between two lots owned by the petitioner.
The rec ord shows that Lot 2381 was purchased on
installment basis by Basilia Dimaranan, and Lot 2386 was
acquired under similar condition by Fernando Guic o, both
from the Friar Lands Division of the Bureau of Landsin the
year 1910. Eight (8) years thereafter, installment-payment
for Lot 2386 was completed in favor of Basilia Dimaranan.
On the other hand, Lot 2381 was on September 12, 1911
assigned to Bartolome Pea who continued and
completed the installment payments culminating into the
issuance in his name of Pat ent No. 19138 on September
26,1919. From Bartolome Pena, Lot 2381 was acquired by
Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. and the title was transferred to his
name (Exh. "F") while Lot 2386 was acquired by the

Garcias (Exh. "J-2") On August 27,1981, Lot 2386-A was

sold by the Garcias to the applicant South City Homes,
Inc. (Exh. "J"). Lot 2381 was on February 25,1977 sold by
Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. to Koo Jun Eng (Exh. "G") who in
turn assigned t he property to the applicant in February of
1981 (Exh. "H"). 4
It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005 should
be registered in its name for either of two reasons. The
first is that the disputed strip of land really formed part of
Lots 2381 and 2386-A but was omitted therefrom only
because of the inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral
surveys. The second is that it had ac quired the property by
prescription through uninterrupted possession thereof in
concept of owner, by itself and its predecessors -ininterest, for more than forty years.
For its part, the Republic of the Philippines argues that the
elongated piece of land between the t wo lots now owned
by the petitioner used to be a canal which could not have
been appropriat ed by the purchasers of the adjacent lots
or their successors-in-interest. Neither could it be deemed
included in the lots now owned by the petitioner because
their respective technical descriptions indicate otherwise.
Prescription is also not applicable because the petitioner
has not established the requisite possession of the lot, as
to manner and lengt h, to justify judicial confirmation of title
in its name.
The parties also differ on t he nature of the disputed lot.
The petitioner insists it is patrimonial property of the State,
being part of the so-called Friar Lands, while the Republic
maintains it is part of the public domain and cannot
therefore be acquired by a private corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner own Lot 5005.
RULI NG:
To argue that Lot No. 5005 is really a part of the other t wo
lots owned by the petitioner is to oppose the obvious.
What is obvious is the technical descriptions of the two lots
whos e areas do not include the strip of land between
them. The petitioner points to the original survey of the
lands in 1906 which states that the two lots adjoin each
other, without mention of what is now Lot No. 5005. But it
forgets that it has itself suggested that the old surveys
were inaccurate, which could explain the omission.
If it is true that there was no canal bet ween the two lots at
the time of their survey, then the disputed strip of land
should have been included as part of eit her of the two
adjoining lots. It was not. The petitioner itself insists that
the canal, if there ever was one, had dis appeared after it
had been filled with silt and dirt. The result was the
segregation of a third and separate lot, now known as Lot
No. 5005. Not ably, the area of that dried-up canal is not
negligible as to come under what the petitioner calls the
allowable margin of error in the original survey.
As we have already rejected the contention that the third
lot was part of the other two lots, the petitioner must fall
back on its claim of acquisitive prescription over it as a
separate lot. Its submission is that its possession of t he lot
dates back to "time immemorial," by which tired phrase it
is intended to convey the idea that the start of such
possession can no longer be recollected. Indeed, it can
be. The petitioner's possession does not in fact go back to

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"time immemorial," but only to the rec ent remembered

past.
It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of
the Civil Code:
In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an
area greater, or less, than that expressed in his title,
prescription shall be based on the possession.
This possession, following the above quot ed rulings,
should be limited only to that of the successor -in-interest;
and in the case of the herein petitioner, it should begin
from 1981 when it acquired the two adjacent lots and
occupied as well the lot in question thinking it to be part of
the other two.
It follows that when the application for registration of the lot
in the name of the petitioner was filed in 1983, the
applicant had been in possession of the property for less
than three years. This was far too short of the prescriptive
period required for acquisition of immovable property,
which is ten years if the possession is in good faith and
thirty years if in bad fait h, or if the land is public.
The weakness of the petitioner's position prevents this
Court from affirming the claim to the lot in question either
as part of the two other lots or by virtue of acquisitive
prescription. And having made this ruling, we find it
unnecessary to determine whether the land is patrimonial
in nature or part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against
the petitioner.

CHI NG V CA
FACTS: By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal
address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September
18, 1961 and T.C. T. No. 78633 was deemed canc elled.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston,
Massachusetts, United States of America. His legitimate
son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, P asay City a petition for
administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on
the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a
news paper of general circulation on November 23 and 30
and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at the
hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after
presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was
appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on
December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on
January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by
T.C. T. No. 91137 was among those included in the
inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit
against him was commenced on Dec ember 27, 1978 by
private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (now RTC), Branch XXV II, Pasay City
docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of
the abovesaid property and cancellation of T. C.T. No.
91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.).
Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libert ad Street,
Pasay City which appears on the face of T. C. T. No. 91137

(not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in

private respondent 's complaint). (Order dated May 29,
1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by
private res pondent against Ching Leng and/ or Estate of
Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging " That on
account of the fact that the defendant has been residing
abroad up to the present, and it is not k nown whether the
defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be
served by summons and other processes only by
publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to
Ching Leng and/ or his estate was directed by the trial
court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The summons
and t he complaint were published in the "Economic
Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and
19, 1979. Despite t he lapse of the sixty (60) day period
within which to ans wer defendant failed to file a res ponsive
pleading and on motion of counsel for t he private
respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25,
1979, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A
judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the
complaint to be duly substantiated by the evidence,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant declaring the former (Pedro
Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the property
covered by T.C. T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant to
reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff;
sentencing the defendant Ching Leng and/or the
administrator of his estate t o surrender to the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T. C.T.
No. 91137 so that the same may be c ancelled failing in
which the said T. C. T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby
ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate
of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff
Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella
Street, Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the fees
that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes
due the Government.
IT IS SO ORDE RE D.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT AN A CTION FOR RECONVEYA NCE
OF PROPE RTY AND CANCELLA TION OF TITLE
IS IN PERSONA M, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN
AND/OR HIS ESTA TE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF
SUMMONS AND DECIS ION BY PUBLICA TION.
RULI NG:
The com plaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens
Title must be filed in the original land registration case,
RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in
accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI P asay City in
connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Cas e No.
6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 S CRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties
in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other
world when the summons was published he could not
have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for
cancellation of title could not have been held

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Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed

land for 19 years from the date of registration of title is
fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the
ground of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable length of time to do that which by ex ercising
due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is
negligenc e or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 41508, June 27, 1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
land and to stop forever any question as to its legality.
Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility
of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157
SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a c onclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act
496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are
regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is
incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or
title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annot ated on
the title.

REPUBLIC V CA AND SPS LAPINA

FACT:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347
and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area
of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one
Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the
purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This
time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and
have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the
parties have pres ented their respective evidence, the
court a quo rendered a decision confirming private
respondents' title to the lots.
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents'
application for registration of title on the ground of foreign
nationality.
ISSUE:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land which he acquired by purchas e while still a
citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied
with the requirements for registration under the Public
Land Act (CA 141)?
RULI NG: In the case at bar, privat e respondents were
undoubtedly nat ural -born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired
vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the conc ept of owner and the prescribed
period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under

the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have

constructed a house of strong materials on the contested
property, now occupied by respondent Lapi as mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this
case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private
respondents to register the contested parcels of land in
their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to
wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be trans ferred or convey ed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above
quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then
1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
14 of this Article, a natural -born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang P ambansa may
provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed
into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural -born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who
has the legal capacity to enter into a contract
under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of one
thousand square met ers, in the c ase of urb an
land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be
used by him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail of the
privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both
shall avail of the same, the total area acquired
shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In cas e the t rans feree already owns urban or rural
lands for residential purposes, he shall still be
entitled to be a trans feree of an additional urban or
rural lands for residential purpos es which, when
added to those already owned by him, shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up t o the
present, no other law has been passed by the legislature
on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of
private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
E ven if private respondents were already Canadian
citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above
were already private lands; consequently, there could be
no legal impediment for the registration thereof by
respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part

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of the public domain. They are already private in c haracter

since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June
12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his P hilippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a privat e land up to a
maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare
in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a
private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of
residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question.
What is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordanc e with t he mandate of S ection 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and
character of possession of their predecessors -in-interest
over the subject lots, their application for registration of
title must perforce be approved.

RAMI REZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ

FACTS: Jos e Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in
Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27,
1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix
of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of
partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be
divided int o two arts. One art shall go to the widow en
plenodominio in satisfaction of her legitime; the other art
or free ortion shall go to Jorge and Ro erto Ramirez en
nudapropriedad. Furthermore, one third /3 of the free
portion is charged wit h the widows usufruct and the
remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda
de Wrobleski.
Respondents opposed such partition, arguing that the
granting of a usufruct in favor of Wanda is invalid because
it violates the constitutional prohibition on aliens owning
property in the Philippines (Sec. 5, Art. XIII, 1935
Constitution).

ISSUE: W/n the granting of usufruct to Wanda is valid.

HELD: YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
Art XIII, Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no privat e agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the
public domain in the Philippines.
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of
law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the
opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary
succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught
and meaningless.

Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying

money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise
of a piece of land BUT an alien may be bestowed
USUFRUCTUA RY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the
Philippines.
Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real
right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in
the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to
land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.

PHIL. BANKI NG CORP. V. LUI SHE

FACTS: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister
Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of land in
Manila.
The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a
Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had
been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property,
having a monthly rental of P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner
of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir.
Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90
years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with
no other relative to live with, but she was taken cared of by
Wong.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of
the Lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November
15, 1957, a contract of leas e in favor of Wong, covering
the portion then already leased t o him and another portion
fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50
years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw
at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was
P3,120. Ten days later (November 25), the contract was
amended so as to make it cover the entire property,
including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos
stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360.
On December 21 she executed contract giving Wong the
option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable
within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000.
The option was conditioned on his obtaining P hilippine
citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the
Court
of
First
Instanc e
of
Rizal.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts,
one extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and
another fixing the term of the option at 50 years. Both
contracts are written in Tagalog. In two wills ex ecuted on
August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to respect
the contracts she had ent ered into with Wong, but in a
codicil of a later dat e (November 4, 1959) she appears to
have a change of heart. Claiming that the various
contracts were made by her bec ause of machinations and
inducements practised by him, she now directed her
executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.

Both parties however died, Wong Heng on October 21,

1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong
was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant
in this case, While Justina Santos was substituted by the
Philippine Banking Corporation. Justina Santos maintaine
AN ACT INTRODUC ING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN

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Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

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THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

b.

Within three (3) days from the filing of the

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

petition, the Commission shall issue summons to

Date: 05 January 1998

the respondent candidate together with a copy of

the petition and its enclosures, if any.

Section 1. Tit le. - This Act shall be known and cited as

"The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987."
Sec. 2. Law Governing Elect ions. - The first local
elections under the new Constitution and all subsequent
elections and plebiscites shall be gover ned by this Act and
by the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
know n as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,
and other election laws not inconsistent with this Act.
Sec. 3. Voters in Cit ies. - The registered voters of a
highly ur banized city shall not vote in the election for
provincial officials of the province in which it is located. No
component city shall be declared or classified as a highly
urbanized city within sixty (60) days prior to a local
election.

c.

receipt of the summons within which to file his

verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the
petition, ser ving copy thereof upon the petitioner.
Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as
affirmative defenses.
d.

In lieu of the additional copies of the cer tificate of

candidacy equal to twice the number of polling places
which a candidate is required to file under said Section 75,
the Commission shall cause to be printed cer tified lists of
candidates containing the names of all registered
candidates for each office to be voted for in each
province, city or municipality immediately followed by the
nickname or stage name of each candidate duly registered
in his certificate of candidacy and his political party
affiliation, if any. Said list shall be posted inside each
voting booth during the voting period.
Whenever practicable, the board of inspectors shall cause
said list of candidates to be written clearly and legibly on
the blackboar d or on manila paper for posting at a
conspicuous place inside the polling place.
The names of all registered candidates immediately
followed by the nickname or stage name shall also be
printed in the election returns and tally sheets.
Sec.
5. Procedure
Candidates. a.

in

Cases

of

Nuisance

A verified petition to declare a duly registered

candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section
69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed
personally
representative

or

through
with

the

duly

authorized

Commission by any

registered candidate for the same office within

five (5) days from the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy.
be allowed.

Filing by mail shall not

The Commission may designate any of its officials

who are lawyers to hear the case and receive
evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in
nature.

In lieu of oral testimonies, the parties

may be required to submit position papers

together with affidavits or counter-affidavits and

The registered voters of a component city shall be entitled

to vote in the election for provincial officials of the
province of which it is a part, unless its charter provides
otherwise.
Sec. 4. Cert ificates of Candidacy; Certified Lists of
Candidates. - The certificates of candidacy shall be filed
in twelve legible signed copies with the offices mentioned
in Section 75 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. In cities with
more than one election registrar, the Commission on
Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, shall
designate the election registrar who shall receive the
certificates of candidacy.

The respondent shall be give n three (3) days from

other documentary evidence. The hearing officer

shall immediately submit to the Commission his
findings, reports, and recommendations within
five (5) days from

the completion of such

submission of evidence.

T he Commission shall

render its decision within five (5) days from

receipt thereof.
e.

The decision, or der, or ruling of the Commission

shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy
thereof by the parties, be final and executory
unless stayed by the Supreme Court.

f.

The Commission shall within twenty-four hours,

through the fastest available means, disseminate
its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court
to the city or municipal election registrars, boards
of election inspectors and the general public in the
political subdivision concer ned.

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any

candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquir y, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any inter venor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Pet ition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy. - The procedure hereinabove
provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as pr ovided in Section 78
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
Sec. 8. Representatives of Parties Dur ing Pr inting
of Returns and Ballots. - The registered political parties
or coalitions of parties, or their components should there
be any dissolution or division of said coalition, whose
candidates obtained at least ten percent (10%) of the

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Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

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total votes cast in the next preceding senatorial election

shall each have a watcher and/or representative in the
procurement and watermarking of papers to be used in
the printing of election returns and official ballots and in
the printing, numbering, storage, and distribution thereof.
Sec. 9. Public Forum. - The Commission shall encourage
nonpolitical, nonpartisan private or civic organizations to
initiate and hold in ever y city and municipality, public fora
at which all registered candidates for the same office may
simultaneously and personally participate to present,
explain, and/or debate on their campaign platforms and
programs and other like issues. The Commission shall
promulgate the rules and regulations for the holding of
such fora to assure its nonpartisan character and the
equality of access thereto by all candidates.
Sec. 10. Common Poster Areas. - The Commission
shall designate common poster areas in strategic public
places such as markets, barangay centers and the like
wherein candidates can post, display, or exhibit election
propaganda to announce or fur ther their candidacy.
Whenever feasible common billboards may be installed by
the Commission and/or nonpartisan private or civic
organizations w hich the Commission may authorize
whenever available, after due notice and hearing, in
strategic places where it may be readily seen or read, with
the heaviest pedestrian and/or vehicular traffic in the city
or municipality.
The space in such common poster areas or billboards shall
be allocated free of charge, if feasible, equitably and
impartially among the candidates in the province, city or
municipality.
Sec. 11. Prohibited For ms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited
under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful:
a.

to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or

publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any
place, whether private or public, except in the
common poster areas and/or billboards provided
in the immediately preceding section, at the
candidate's ow n residence, or at the campaign
headquarters of the candidate or political par ty:
Provided,

That

such

posters

or

election

propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet

by three (3) feet in area: Provided, fur ther, T hat
at the site of and on the occasion of a public
meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2)
and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet
each may be displayed five (5) days before the
date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed
within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting
or rally; and
b.

for

any

newspaper,

radio

broadcasting

or

television station, or other mass media, or any

person making use of the mass media to sell or to
give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political pur poses except to the
Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media

columnist, commentator, announcer or personality
who is a candidate for any elective public office
shall take a leave of absence from his wor k as
such during the campaign period.
Sec. 12. Official Watchers. - Ever y registered political
party, coalition of political parties, and ever y candidate
shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling
place: Provided, That candidates for members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan or for city or municipal cou ncilors
belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be
entitled only to one watcher. There shall also be
recognized two principal watchers, one representing the
ruling coalition and the other the dominant opposition
coalition, who shall sit as observers in the proceedings of
the board. The principal watcher shall be designated on
the basis of the recommendation of the ruling coalition,
represented by the political party of the incumbent elected
district representative, and of the dominant opposition
coalition, represented by the political par ty which
performed best or w hich polled at least ten percent (10%)
of the votes in the last national election.
A duly signed appointment of a watcher shall entitle him
to recognition by the board of election inspectors and the
exercise of his rights and discharge of his duties as such:
Provided, however, That only one watcher of each of
those authorized to appoint them can stay at any time
inside the polling place.
The watchers shall be permitted full and unimpeded
access to the proceedings so that they can read the
names of those written on the ballots being counted with
unaided natural vision, consistent with good order in the
polling place.
In addition to their rights and duties under Section 179 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the two principal watchers
representing the ruling coalition and the dominant
opposition coalition in a precinct shall, if available affix
their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns
for that precinct. If both or either of them is not available,
unwilling or should they refuse to do so, any watcher
present preferably with political affiliation or alignment
compatible with that of the absent or unwilling watcher,
may be required by the boar d of election inspectors to do
so.
Sec. 13. Boar d of Election Inspectors. -The board of
election inspectors to be constituted by the Commission
under Section 164 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be
composed of a chairman and two (2) members, one of
whom shall be designated as poll cler k, all of w hom shall
be public school teachers, giving preference to those with
permanent appointments. In case there are not enough
public school teachers, teachers in private schools,
employees in the civil ser vice, or other citizens of known
probity and competence who are regis tered voters of the
city or municipality may be appointed for election duty.
Sec. 14. Per Diems Of Boards of Election Inspectors
and Ot her Personnel. - The chairman and the members
of the boards of election inspectors shall each be paid a

37

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

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per diem of One hundred pesos (P100.00) on each

registration or revision day and Two hundred pesos
(P200.00) on election day.
Support personnel from the Depar tment of Education,
Culture and Sports shall each receive a per diem of P50.00
during election day. Supervisors, principals and other
administrators of the Depar tment of Education, Culture
and Sports, who may be required by the Commission to
perform election duties shall each be entitled to a per
diem of P100.00.
Provincial, city and municipal treasurers shall each receive
a per diem of P200.00 on election day.
Sec. 15. Signatures of Chair man and Poll Cler k at
the Rack of Every Ballot. - In addition to the
preliminary acts before the voting as enumerated
in Section 191 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the chairman
and the poll clerk of the board of election inspectors shall
affix their signatures at the back of each and every official
ballot to be used during the voting. A cer tification to that
effect must be entered in the minutes of the voting.
Sec. 16. Certificate of Votes. - After the counting of
the votes cast in the precinct and announcement of the
results of the election, and before leaving the polling
place, the board of election inspectors shall issue a
certificate of votes upon request of the duly accredited
watchers. The certificate shall contain the number of votes
obtained by each candidate written in words and figures,
the number of the precinct, the name o f the city or
municipality and province, the total number of voters who
voted in the precinct, and the date and time issued, and
shall be signed and thumbmar ked by each member of the
board.
Sec. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. - The
provisions of Sections 235 and 236 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 notwiths tanding, the certificate of votes shall be
admissible in evidence to pr ove tampering, alteration,
falsification or any anomaly committed in the election
returns concer ned, w hen duly authenticated by testimonial
or documentary evidence presented to the board of
canvassers by at least two members of the board of
election inspectors who issued the certificate: Provided.
That failure to present any certificate of votes shall not be
a bar to the presentation of other evidence to impugn the
authenticity of the election returns.
Sec. 18. Transfer of Count ing of Votes to Safer
Place. - If on account of imminent danger of violence,
terrorism, disor der or similar causes, it becomes necessary
to transfer the counting of votes to a safer place, the
board of inspectors may effect such transfer by unanimous
approval by the board and concurrence by the majority of
the watchers present. T his fact shall be recorded in the
minutes of voting and the members of the board and the
watchers shall manifest their approval or concurrence by
affixing their signatures therein. The Commission shall
issue rules and guidelines on the matter to secure the
safety of the members of the board, the watchers, and all
election documents and paraphernalia.
Sec. 19. Number of Copies of Elect ion Returns and
their Distr ibution. - The election retur ns required
under Section 212 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be
prepared in sextuplicate. T he first copy shall be delivered

to the city or municipal board of canvassers as a body for

its use in the city or municipal canvass. T he second copy
shall be delivered to the election registrar of the city or
municipality for transmittal to the provincial board of
canvassers for its use in the provincial canvass. T he third
copy shall likewise be delivered to the election registrar for
transmittal to the Commission. The fourth copy, to be
know n as advance election returns, shall be delivered to
the city or municipal treasurer who, in the presence of the
election registrar or his authorized representative, shall
immediately and publicly open the same and post the
votes therein in an election board, sufficiently lar ge to
enable the public to read them, built on a public place
preferably within the immediate vicinity of the city hall or
municipal building. The fifth copy shall be deposited in the
compartment of the ballot box for valid ballots. The sixth
copy shall be delivered to the city or municipal trial judge
or municipal circuit trial j udge, as the case may be, or in
his absence to any official who may be designated by the
Commission for safekeeping. Said copy may be opened
during the canvass upon order of the board of canvassers
for purposes of comparison with other copies of the
returns whose authenticity is in question.
The city or municipal treasurer shall issue certified copy of
any election returns in his possession upon request of any
interested par ty and payment of the fees required by
existing or dinances.
The Commission shall promulgate rules for the speedy and
safe delivery or preservation of the election retur ns.
Sec. 20. Boards of Canvassers. - There shall be a
board of canvassers for each province, city and
municipality as follows:
a.

Prov incial

Board

of

Canvassers. -

The

provincial board of canvassers shall be composed

of the provincial election supervisor or a lawyer in
the

regional

office

of

the

Commission,

as

chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vice-chairman,

and the provincial superintendent of schools, as
member.
b.

City Board of Canvassers. - The city board of

canvassers shall be composed of the city election
registrar or a law yer of the Commission, as
chairman, the city fiscal, as vice-chairman, and
the city superintendent of schools, as member. In
cities with more than one election registrar, the
Commission shall designate the election registrar
who shall act as chairman.

c.

Municipal

Board

of

Canvassers.

The

municipal board of canvassers shall be composed

of the election registrar or a representative of the
Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer,
as vice-chairman, and the most senior district
school supervisor or in his absence a principal of
the school district or the elementar y school, as
member.
The proceedings of the board of canvassers shall be open
and public.

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Sec. 21. Substit ution of Chair man and Members of

the Board of Canvassers. - In case of non-availability,
absence, disqualification due to relationship, or incapacity
for any cause of the chairman, the Commission shall
appoint as substitute, a ranking law yer of the Commission.
With respect to the other members of the board, the
Commission shall appoint as substitute the following in the
order named: the Provincial Auditor, the Registrar of
Deeds, the Cler k of Court nominated by the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, and any other available
appointive provincial official in the case of the provincial
board of canvassers; the officials in the city corresponding
to those enumerated, in the case of the city board of
canvassers; and the Municipal Administrator, the Municipal
Assessor, the Cler k of Court nominated by the Executive
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, or any other available
appointive municipal officials, in the case of the municipal
board of canvassers.
Sec. 22. Canvassing Committees. - The board of
canvassers may constitute such number of canvassing
committees as may be necessary to enable the board to
complete the canvass within the period prescribed under
Section 231 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881: Provided, T hat
each committee shall be composed of three members,
each member to be designated by the chairman and
members of the board and that all candidates shall be
notified in writing, before the election, of the number of
committees to be constituted so that they can designate
their watchers in each committee. The committees shall
be under the direct supervision and control of the board.
Sec. 23. Not ice of Meetings of the Board. - At least
five (5) days before the initial meeting of the boar d of
canvassers, the chairman of the boar d shall give written
notice to all members thereof and to each candidate and
political party presenting candidates for election in the
political subdivision concerned of the date, time and place
of the meeting. Similar notice shall also be given for
subsequent meetings unless notice has been given in open
session of the board. Proof of service of notice to each
member, candidate and political party shall be attached to
and shall form part of the records of the pr oceedings. If
notice is given in open session, such fact shall be recorded
in the minutes of the proceedings.
Sec. 24. Proceedings of the Board. - T he board of
canvassers shall have full authority to keep order within
the canvassing room or hall and its premises and enforce
obedience to its lawful or ders. If any person shall refuse
to obey any lawful order of the board or shall so conduct
himself in such disorder manner as to disturb or interrupt
its proceedings, the board may order any peace officer to
take such person into custody until the adjournment of the
meeting.
Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel Dur ing
the Canvass. - Any registered political party, coalition of
parties, through their representatives, and any candidate
has the right to be present and to counsel during the
canvass of the election returns: Provided, That only one
counsel may ar gue for each political party or candidate.
They shall have the right to examine the returns being
canvassed
without
touching
them,
make
their
observations thereon, and file their challenges in
accordance with the r ules and regulations of the

Commission. No dilator y action shall be allowed by the

board of canvassers.
Sec. 26. COMELEC Hear ings and Proceedings. - In all
hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the Commission,
including preliminar y investigations of election offenses,
no person subpoenaed to testify as a witness shall be
excused from attending and testifying or fro m producing
books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other
records on the ground that the testimony or evidence,
documentar y or otherwise, required of him, may tend to
incriminate him or subject him to prosecution: Provided,
That no person shall be prosecuted criminally for or on
account of any matter concerning w hich he is compelled,
after having claimed the privilege against selfincrimination,
to
testify and produce evidence,
documentar y or otherwise.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, the
Commission may grant immunity fr om criminal
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession and production of documents or other
evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any
hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Commission or under its authority in the performance or in
the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory
objectives. The immunity granted under this and the
immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the
witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false
testimony.
Sec. 27. Election Offenses. - In addition to the
prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
amended, the following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
a.

Any person who causes the printing of official

ballots and election returns by any printing
establishment which is not under contract with the
Commission

on

establishment

Elections
which

any

printing

undertakes

and

such

unauthorized printing.
b.

Any member of the board of election inspectors or

board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in
any election or any member of the board who
refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to
credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered
votes.

c.

Any member of the board of election inspectors

who refuses to issue to duly accredited watchers
the

cer tificate

of

votes

provided

in Section

violates Section

11 hereof

16 hereof.
d.

Any

person

regarding

w ho

prohibited

forms

of

election

propaganda.
e.

Any chairman of the board of canvassers who fails

to give notice of meetings to other members of

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Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

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the board, candidate or political party as required

under Section 23 hereof.
f.

Any person declared a nuisance candidate as

defined under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, or is otherwise disqualified, by final and
executory

judgment,

who

continues

to

misrepresent himself, or holds himself out, as a

candidate, such as by continuing to campaign
thereafter, and/or other public officer or private
individual, who knowingly induces or abets such
misrepresentation, by commission or omission,
shall be guilty of an election offense and subject
to the penalty provided in Section 264 of the same
Code.
Sec. 28. Prosecut ion of Vote-Buy ing and VoteSelling. - The presentation of a complaint for violations of
paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 suppor ted by affidavits of complaining witnesses
at testing to the offer or promise by or of the voter's
acceptance of money or other consideration from the
relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be
sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately
conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly
authorized legal officers, under Section 68 or Section 265
of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 .
Proof that at least one voter in different precincts
representing at least twenty percent (20%) of the total
precincts in any municipality, city or province has been
offered, promised or given money, valuable co nsideration
or other expenditure by a candidate's relatives, leaders
and/or sympathizers for the purpose of promoting the
election of such candidate, shall constitute a disputable
presumption of a conspiracy under paragraph (b)
of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
Where such proof affects at least twenty percent (20%) of
the precincts of the municipality, city or province to which
the public office aspired for by the favored candidate
relates, the same shall constitute a disputable
presumption of the involvement of such candidate and of
his principal campaign managers in each of the
municipalities concer ned, in the conspiracy.
The giver, offeror, and promisor as well as the solicitor,
acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any
person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who
voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any
violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding
shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the
offenses with reference to w hich his information and
testimony were given: Provided, fur ther, That nothing
herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution
for perjury or false testimony.
Sec. 29. Designation of Ot her Dates for Certain Preelections Acts. - If it should no longer be reasonably
possible to obser ve the periods and dates prescribed by
law for cer tain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix
other periods and dates in order to ensure

accomplishment of the activities so voters shall not be

deprived of their right of suffrage.
Sec. 30. Effect iv ity of Regulations and Orders of the
Commission. - The rules and regulations promulgated by
the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after
their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two
(2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Orders and directives issued by the Commission shall be
furnished by personal delivery to all parties concer ned
within forty-eight (48) hours from date of issuance and
shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof unless a
later date is expressly specified in such or ders or
directives.
Sec. 31. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders,
rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent
herewith are deemed repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 32. Separability Clause. - If for any reason, any
section or provision of this Act, or any par t thereof, or the
application of such section, provision or portion is declared
invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder thereof shall not
be affected by such declaration.
Sec. 33. Effect iv ity. - This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Approved: January 5, 1988.
d now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation
that the leas e contract should have been annulled
along with the four other contracts because it lacks
mutuality, among others.
Paragraph 5 of the lease cont ract states that "The lessee
may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is
claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil
Code which provides that "the cont ract must bind both
contracting parties; its validity or compliance c annot be left
to the will of one of them."
ISSUE: Was the contract between Wong and Justina
Santos enforceable?
HELD: No. The contract of lease, as in this case, cannot
be sustained. However, to be sure, a lease to an alien for
a reasonable period was valid, so was an option giving an
alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is
granted Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also an
option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the
Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it became clear that
the arrangement was a virtual trans fer of ownership
whereby the owner divested himself in stages not only of
the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus
fruendi and jus abutendi ) but also of the right to dispose of
it (jus disponendi ) rights the sum total of which make up
ownership. It was just as if today the possess ion is
transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the
disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of
which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien.
And yet this was just exactly what the parties in this case
did within this pace of one year, with the result that Justina
Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow
concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban
against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in
grave peril.

40

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

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The contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the

land subject-matter of the cont racts was ordered returned
to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the
Philippine Banking Corporation.

REPUBLIC V. QUASHA
FACTS: Res pondent William H. Quasha, an American
citizen, acquired by purchase a parcel of land with
permanent improvements thereon locates at 22 Molave
Place, Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, Province of
Rizal. The said property had an area of 2,616 sq. m.,
described in and covered by TCT No. 36862. Quasha filed
this petition claiming that his ownership of the properties in
question, made possible through the P arity Amendment
between t he USA and the Philippines whic h grants to US
citizens the right to acquire lands in the Philippines,
continues notwithstanding the termination of the effectivity
of the Amendment.
Petitioner Republic, on the other hand, contended that the
land ac quired by respondent is a private agricult ural land,
and that Quashas ac uisition of such violates Sec. , Art.
XIII of the (1935) Constitution. Such argument is based
upon the express provision in the Parity Amendment which
only extended the right of aliens to acquire and utilize
lands only to public lands (agricultural, timber and
mineral lands of public domain). Despite such argument,
the CFI of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of Quasha,
holding that his acquisition of the said privat e agricultural
land is valid.
ISSUE: W/n res ondents ac uisition of the
question is valid des pite his status as an alien.

ro erty in

HELD: No. The Court, upon examination of the Parity

Amendment, found that the same only establishes an
express exception on two provision of the (1935)
Constitution, to wit: (a) Sec. 1, Art. XIII, regarding
disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of
agricultural, timber and mineral lands of public domain and
other natural resources of the Philippines; and (b) Sec. 8,
Art. XIV, regarding operation of public utilities. Moreover,
the Court reiterated that in cases of laws such as the
Parity Amendment, the same shall be given a strict
construction. Since the said Amendment merely extended
the right in question t o Americans with respect to public
lands, the said Amendment could not be further construed
to mean that they can also do the same to private lands
such as the property in question.
Furthermore, Quashas argument that S citizens are
always qualified to acquire lands via the 1935 Constitution
is untenable, for that a provision of the Ordinance
appended to the 1935 Constitution (Sec. 17), which is reenforced by Sec. 127 of the Public Land Act of 1936 (CA
141) provides that such rights of non-Filipinos only exist
during the existence of the Commonwealth and before the
Republic of the Philippines is e stablished. Therefore, it
is clear that US citizens can only acquire and utilize lands
of public domain via the implementation of the Parity
Amendment.

HULST V. PR BUILDERS
FACTS: Petitioner Jacobus Bernhard Hulst and his
spouse, bot h Dutch nationals, entered int o a Contract to
Sell with respondent PR Builders, Inc., for the purchase of

a 210-s . m. residential unit in res ondents townhouse

project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. Petitioner
filed a complaint for rescission of contract with interest,
damages and attorneys fees efore the Housing and Land
se Regulat ory Board H RB u on res ondents failure
to comply with its verbal promise to complet e the project
by June 1995. The complaint was then decided in favor of
Hulst, which was followed upon by a Writ of Execution
issued on August 21, 1997.
Pursuant to a subsequent Alias Writ of Execution, the
Sherrif levied on res ondents
arcels of land. he
respondent then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of
Levy on the ground that the Sherrif made an overlevy
since the aggregate appraised value of the levied
properties at P 6,500 per sq. m. is P 83,616,000 which is
over and above the judgment award. The said levy was
then set aside pursuant to an Order.
ISSUE: W/n petitioner should be entitled to recovery
despite the Contract to Sell he entered into with
respondent is void for violating the Constitutional
prohibition against aliens owning real property in the
Philippines.
HELD: Yes. Sec. 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibits aliens from owning lands in the Philippines, thus
the Contract to Sell between Hulst and P R Builders is void
pursuant to A rticle 1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code.
However, void contracts such as the one in the present
case are subject to exceptions, in the case at bar being
provided in Article 1414 of the Civil Cod e. Such exception
allows a party to recover whatever he lost provided that
the illegal purpose of the void contract has not yet been
accomplished.
It is important to take note that the contract in question is a
Cont ract to Sell and not a contract of sale. Therefore
ownership is not transferred to the alien (Hulst) yet, and as
an effect no illegal purpose has been accomplished.
Article 1414 therefore finds application in the instant case.
In view of t his, petitioner is entitled to recover what he has
paid, but only with respect to the amount of P 3,187,500
which was the purchase price paid to PR B uilders.
Petitioner is not entitled to damages, interests, and
attorneys fees since the contract which is the source of
such is void. In addition, he is required to return to
respondent the excess of what he received from the levy
pursuant to the principle against unjust enrichment.

FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO vs. JOAQUIN TENG

QUEEN TAN, TAN TENG BI O, DOLORES TAN,
ROS ARIO TAN HUA ING, and TO O. HIAP
FACTS:
Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing petitioner's action
for annulment of contract with damages.In 1938, petitioner
Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential
lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan
Tai died leaving herein respondents his widow, To O.
Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng
Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing. Before the
death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons,
Joaquin, became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan
Tai's death, or on November 18, 1962, his heirs executed
an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale, whereby
the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.

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On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the

heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for alleged
violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of
land to aliens.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs are not allowed to inherit the
land owned by Tan Tai because the sale of the land to him
violat ed the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land
to aliens.
HELD: Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an
answer to the complaint, respondents moved to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds of
(a) Lack of cause of action, the plaintiff being in pari delicto
with the vendee, and the land being already owned by a
Philippine citizen;
(b) Laches; and
(c) Acquisitive prescription.

The sale of the land in question was consummated

sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not
acquire private agricultural lands, save i n cases of
hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chines e citizen,
was disqualified to acquire the land in question.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands
of the public or private domain was intended to protect
lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this
case, however, there would be no more public policy
violat ed since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified
to ac uire and own such land. If land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or trans fers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.
SC sets aside the order of reconstitution of title.

The court a quo dismissed the complaint, sustaining the

first two grounds invoked by the movants.Independently of
the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the
sale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold.
While the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the
land has since become the property, of respondent
Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is
constitutionally qualified to own land. The litigated property
is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer
owned by a disqualified vendee. Laches also militates
against petitioner's cause. She sold the disputed lot in
1938. She instituted the action to annul the sale only on
July 15, 1968. What the Court said in the cited Sarsosa
case applies wit h equal force to the petitioner.
it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept
on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long
inaction of inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred
from asserting her claim to the litigated property.
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the right ful
owner of the property.The appealed ord er is affirmed.

ELI ZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE vs. REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr.,
Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose,
Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan
sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with
an approximat e area of 1,631 square meters, designated
as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
3389, situated at the corner of Roxas A venue and Pavia
Street, Roxas City.
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court
of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee
Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The
plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale bec ause of the
constitutional prohibition
against aliens
acquiring
ownership of private agricultural land, including residential,
commercial or industrial land.
Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the
Philippines.
RULI NG:

MATHEWS VS TAYLOR
FACTS: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A.
Taylor (B enjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C.
Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-y ear old Filipina. On June 9, 1989,
while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square -meter lot (Boracay
property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The
sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and
Ben amin, also using the latters funds, constructed
improvements thereon and event ually converted the
property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the
Admiral B en Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for
the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of
Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister. However, Ben amin and
Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a S pecial
Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing
the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and
otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect
to their B oracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as
lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered
into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the
Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual
rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the
parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner
thereafter took possession of the property and renamed
the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the
Agreement was null and void since it was ent ered into by
Joselyn without his Ben amins consent, Ben amin
instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement
of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and
cou led with the fact that he was Joselyns hus and; any
transaction involving said property required his consent.
ISSUE: W/N an alien husband can nullify a lease contract
entered into by his Filipina wife bought during their
marriage. NO
HELD: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are
absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in
the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt
to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through
another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues
that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional

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provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a

particular pro erty e declared as art of their fat hers
estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in
purchasing a property titled in the name of another; that an
im lied trust e declared in their aliens favor; and that a
contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin,
being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated
vendee in the Deed of Sale of said ro erty, she
acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we
sustain Ben amins claim that he rovided the funds for
such acquisition. By ent ering into s uch contract knowing
that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor;
no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and
no declaration can be made that the subject property was
part of t he conjugal/community property of the spouses. In
any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent lease of the Borac ay property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal,
this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.

KRIV ENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS G.R. NO. L-630.

NOV EMBER 15, 1947
FACTS: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a
residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December
1941. The registration was interrupt ed by the war. In May
1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration but
was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the
grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot acquire a
land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the
CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land,
being an alien. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in
the Philippines.

agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the

fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted,
lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and
jurisprudence into agric ultural, mineral, and timber, and
that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as
referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral,
and as including residential lands. It may safely be
presumed, therefore, that what the members of the
Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted
the Constitution was this well -known classification and its
technical meaning then prevailing.
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing
in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be
construed as including residential lands, and this is in
conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the
adoption of the Constitution.
It is true t hat in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No.
141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the
same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution are
classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other purposes.
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into
agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic
classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At
the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and,
therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case
of Mapa vs. Ins ular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that
the phrase 'agric ultural public lands' means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor
mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our
Supreme Court in much subsequent case.
Residential, commercial, or industrial lots forming part of
the public domain must have to be included in one or more
of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor
mineral, of necessity; therefore, they must be classified as
agricultural.
It is thus clear t hat the three great departments of the
Government judicial, legislative and ex ecutive have
always maintained that lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that
agricultural lands include residential lots.

HELD: No. Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about

the conservation and utilization of natural resources. The
said provision embrac es all lands of any kind of the public
domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent and
fundamental policy for the cons ervation and utilization of
all natural resources of the nation. Although it mentions
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that
in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the
test is not only whet her it is actually agricultural, but also
its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
Henc e, u lic agricultural land was construed as
referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral.
Therefore, it includes residential lands (except by
hereditary succession).

Scope of Private Agricultural Lands

(ADDITIONAL
MAINTI NDI HAN)

Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to

insure the policy of nationalization c ontained in section 1.
Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they
have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It
must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same

EXPLANATION

PARA

MAS

The Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of

land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually
agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for

Sec. 5. Save in cases of heredit ary succession, no private

agricultural land will be trans ferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining
avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into
aliens' hands. It would cert ainly be futile to prohibit the
alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,
they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming
private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.

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persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or

hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
The subject matter of both sections is the same, namely,
the non-trans ferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots,
the same technical meaning should be attached to
"agricultural land under section 5.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as
not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely
acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses
for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns
and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their
names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,
airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are
not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the
conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision
of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied
in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and
Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the
Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests,
and ot her natural resources constitute the exclusive
heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be
preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that
nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Filipino Constitution, p. 595.)
Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such
can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body,
the lack of possession of which may cause instant death
or the shortening of life. If we do not completely nationalize
these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid
that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time
we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery,
for what kind of independence are we going to have if a
part of our country is not in our hands but in t hose of
foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.)
Approval of R.A. No. 133
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved
Republic Act No. 133 which allows mort gage of "private
real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but wit h a
qualification consisting of ex pressly prohibiting aliens to
bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a
consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no
distinction between private lands that are strictly
agricultural and privat e lands that are residential or
commercial. The prohibition embrac es the sale of private
lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear
implementation and a legislative interpretation of the
constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of
opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens
under the Constitution, no legislative meas ure would have
been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would
have been deemed also permissible under the
Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress
that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was
such opinion that prompt ed the legislative measure
intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the
constitutional prohibition.
We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely
excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for
residential purposes. Since their residence in the

Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary

rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by
the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever
and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution
aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is
affirmed, without costs.

EPIFANIA SARSOS A VDA. DE BARS OBI A and PACITA

W. VALLAR vs VICTORI ANO T. CUENCO,
G.R. No. L-33048. April 16, 1982
FACTS:
The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern
side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land loc ated at
Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental
(now Camiguin province).
The entire land was owned previously by a certain
Leocadia B alisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio
Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, who were
Filipino citizens.
Epifania who was then a widow, sold the land in
controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po who later took
actual possession and enjoyed the fruits of the property.
Ong King Po later litigated the property to Victoriano
Cuenco, a naturalized Filipino who immediately took
possession of the property.
Epifania later usurped the controverted property who later
sold one-half of the property to Pacita Vallar.
Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the
property as it was only to evidence her indebtedness to
Ong King Po.
Cuenco then filed a case for Forcible E ntry against
Epifania before the MTC which was later dismissed since
the question of possession could not be properly
determined without first settling the issue on ownership.
Cuenco later filed a case in the CFI for recovery of
possession and ownership of the said land. The CFI
rendered a decision in favor of Epifania and Vallar.
The CA later reversed the Decision decreeing instead that
Cuenco was the owner of the litigated property.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the property?
CUENCO.
HELD:
No private lands shall be transferred or conveyed to
aliens.
There should be no question that the sale of the land in
question in 1936 by Epifania t o Ong King Po was
inexistent and void from the beginning, because it was a
contract executed against the mandatory provision of the
1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy
to conserve lands for the Filipinos.
Had this been a suit between E pifania and Ong King Po,
she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land.

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But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property

is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer
owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own
the subject property. There would be no more public policy
to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the
land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King P o, private respondent's
vendor, had no rights of owners hip to transmit, it is
likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on
her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long
inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred
from asserting her claim to the litigated property.

petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the

hands of a qualified person.
The lots in question were conveyed to Gregorio Reye s
Uy Un in December 1934, so 1935 constitution i s not
applicable
Plainly, the conveyances were made before the 1935
Constitution went into effect, i.e., at a time when there
was no prohibition against acqui sition of private
agricultural lands by aliens.
Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the
lands thus purchased by him, and his ownership was not
at all affected eit her:

Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the right ful

owner of the property.

by the principle subsequently enunciated in the 1935

Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to acquire
lands in the count ry, since that constitutional principle has
no ret rospective application, or

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, GUILLERMO GONZALV ES
G.R. No. 74170 July 18, 1989

by his and his successor's omission to procure the

registration of the property prior to the coming into effect of
the Constitution.

FACTS:
The case principally concerns Chua Kim Uy @ Teng Be,
who became a naturalized Filipino citizen in 1977.

Chua Kim acquired the lots through succe ssion in

1946

Chua Kim was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un.

When Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, his adopted son Chua
Kim, took possession of the properties acquired by him in
1934.
Chua Kim filed a petition for the issuance of c onfirmation
and registration of title of the lots to his name. His petition
was granted by the CFI of Quezon.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, challenged the correctness of the Order and
appealed it to the Court of Appeals. However, CA affirmed
R Cs ruling. Hence this appeal.
Respondent cont ended that the conveyances to Chua Kim
were made while he was still an alien, i.e., prior to his
taking oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen on January
7, 1977, at a time when he was disqualified to acquire
ownership of land in the Philippines (ART XIII, SEC. 5,
1935 Constitution; ART. XIV, Sec. 14, 1973 Constitution);
hence, his asserted titles are null and void.
ISSUE: WON the registration of the lots under the name of
Chua Kim was valid. YES
HELD:
Conveyance of residential land to an alien prior to his
acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization is
valid
Be this as it may, the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine
citizenship should foreclose any further debate regarding
the title to the property in controversy, in line with this
Court's rulings relative to persons similarly situated.
In S arsosa V da. de Barsobia v. Cuenc o, 113 SCRA 547,
for instance, the ruling was as follows:
...The litigated property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee. Respondent, as a nat uralized citizen, was
constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There
would be no more public policy to be served in allowing

Since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un in San Narciso,

Quezon, in 1946, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be had been in
continuous possession of the la nds in concept of owner,
as the putative heir of his adoptive father without protest
what ever from any person.
Note: Chua Kim because a naturalized Filipino citizen only
on January 1977.
It was indeed Chua Kim's being in possession of the
property in concept of owner, and his status as adopted
son of Gregorio Reyes, that were the factors that caused
his involvement in Civil Case No. C-385 of the CFI at
Calauag, Quezon, at the instance of the original parties
theret o, 22 and his participation in the Compromise
Agreement later executed by all parties. As already
mentioned, that compromis e agreement, approved by
judgment rendered on July 29, 1970, implicity recognized
Chua Kim's title to the lands in question.

SOCORRO VASQUEZ vs.LI SENG GI AP and LI SENG

GIAP & SONS
CAS E: G.R. No. L-3676, January 31, 1955
FACTS:
Vasquez sold and t rans ferred to Li Seng Giap, then
Chinese citizen, a parcel of land together with a house in
Tondo, Manila.
In 1940: Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto Li Seng
Giap & Sons, Inc., whose shareholdings then were owned
by Chines e citizens, the property, together with the
improvements thereon, and duly registered under a TCT.
Li Seng Giap was duly naturaliz ed as a Filipino citizen on
1941,
Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. is now a Filipino corporation,
96.67 per cent of its stock being owned by Filipinos, and
duly authorized by its articles of incorporation to own,
acquire or dispose of real properties.

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Vasquez filed an action to rescind the sale on the ground

that the Li Seng Giap was an alien and under the
Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands.

Ong Ching Po says that the reason why the title is

constituted in the name of Soledad was that Ong Ching Po
was not yet a Filipino citizen.

The Court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint

with cost against Vasquez.

ISSUE: Which of the two Deed of Sales ha s more

probative value? (Soledad Parians or Ong Ching Pos)

ISSUE: WON Li Seng Giap & S ons, Inc. is allowed to

acquire the property. YES.

HELD:
It is the Deed of Sale in favor of Soledad Parian that must
be given value. We cannot go along with the claim that
petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used privat e respondent
as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land
registered in her name because being an alien he was
disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To
sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a
high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.

HELD:
The subsequent naturalization of Giap and transfer to
a Filipino corporation cured the defect.
The majority of the Court has ruled that in Sales of real
estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue
of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and
the vendee are deemed to have committed the
constitutional violation and being t hus in pari delicto the
courts will not afford protection to either party.
Vasquez argued that if at the time of the conveyance of
the real property Giap was incapable of holding title to
such real estate, the cont ract of sale was null or void and
may be annulled, and his subsequent naturalization as a
Filipino citizen cannot retroact to the date of the
conveyance to make it lawful and valid.
However, if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only
agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this
Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's
lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or
purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The
title to the parcel of land of the Giap, a naturalized Filipino
citizen, being valid that of the domestic corporation to
which the parcel of land has been transferred, must also
be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by
Filipinos.
Action for annulment not Re sci ssi on
The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated
upon any of t he grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the
old Civil Code and bec ause the action of rescission
involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an
action for annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book II,
on nullity of contracts, based on a defect in the contract
which invalidates it independently of such lesion or
damages.

Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chines e citizen; therefore,

he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real
property. Assuming that the genuineness and due
execution of Exhibit "B" has been established, the same is
null and void, it being contrary to law.
On the other hand, the Deed of Sale pres ented by
Soledad Parian is duly notarized document.
Other issue s:
Was the sale made with due consideration? Yes it
appears that the price for the land was paid out of Soledad
Parian and Ong Yees con ugal funds. Such transaction is
a common practice in Filipino-family affairs.
Was there delivery? Yes. Even though there was no
physical possession of the spouses because they were
residing in Ilo-ilo, under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the cont ract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO

G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
FACTS:

ONG CHI NG PO versus COURT OF APP EALS and

SOLEDAD PARIAN
G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994

Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of

German descent. He is an electrical engineer by
profession, but worked as a pilot with the New Guinea
Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started
engaging in business in the country two years thereafter,
and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981,
Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board wit hout
obtaining a divorce.

FACTS:
Spouses Soledad Parian and Ong Yee bought a parcel of
land in Fundidor Street, San Nicolas from Ong Joi Jong.
The transfer was in a notarized Deed of Sale and was also
registered (Exhibit A). Subsequently, Ong Yee died.

Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney,

Australia for a vac ation. He went to King's Cross, a night
spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met respondent
Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao
City.

Soledad filed unlawful detainer against her brother-in-law

Ong Ching Po contending that she entrusted the
administration of the hous e to Ong Ching Po while the
spouses were residing in Ilo-ilo but when her husband Ong
Yee died, she asked Ong Ching Po to leave the house.

Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and

was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left
Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where
she found employment as a masseuse in t he King's Cross
nightclub. Alfred followed Ederlina to the Philippines where
they cohabited together in a common-law relationship.
During the period of their common-law relationship, Alfred
acquired in the Philippines real and personal properties
valued more or less at P724,000.00.

On the other hand, Ong Ching Po filed an action of

reconvey ance and damages against Soledad contending
that he has the right over the land becaus e Ong Joi Jong
sold it to him. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit B ) present ed by

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Since Alfred knew t hat as an alien he was disqualified

from owning lands in the P hilippines, he agreed that only
Ederlina's name would appear in the deeds of sale as the
buyer of the real properties, as well as in the title covering
the same.
Alfred and Ederlina's relationship det eriorated. Alfred
wrot e Ederlina's father complaining that Ederlina had
taken all his life savings and because of this, he was
virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of
acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased
with his own money. He demanded the return of all the
amounts that Ederlina and her family had "stolen" and turn
over all the properties acquired by him and E derlina during
their coverture.
Alfred filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional
Trial Court, Davao City, for specific performance,
declaration of ownership of real and pers onal properties,
sum of money, and damages.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ederlina.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to recover the property.
HELD:
No. The Supreme affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. According to the Court, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that
he acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty
than the respondent. Petitioner is fully aware that he
wasdisqualified from acquiring and owning lands under
Philippine law even before he purchas ed the properties in
question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, he had
the deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as
the sole vendee thereof.
Being a party to an illegal contract, petitioner cannot come
into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective
carried out because one who loses his money or property
by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which
involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an
action for his losses. To allow petitioner to recover the
properties or the money used in the purchase of the
parcels of land would be subversive of public policy.

MULLER v. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent
Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a
house owned y res ondents parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992.
By this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for t he purchase of a parcel of land in A ntipolo,
Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a
house amounting to P2,300,000.00.

The Antipolo property was registered in the name of

petitioner under Trans fer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5
of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incom ati ilities and res ondents alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the s pouses
eventually separated.
On Sept ember 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for
separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision
which terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between the petitioner and res pondent. It also
decreed the separation of properties between them and
ordered the equal partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous
title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using
paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled
that respondent cannot rec over his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article
XII of the Constitution.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts
Decision. It held that respondent merely pray ed for
reimbursement for the purchas e of the Antipolo property,
and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also
considered etitioners ownershi over the ro erty in trust
for the res pondent. As regards the house, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution
which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of
the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
HELD:
No. Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof
to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo
property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust
was created and result ed by operation of law in view of
etitioners marriage to res ondent. Save for the e ce tion
provided in cases of heredit ary succession, res ondents
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is
absolute. Not even an ownership in t rust is allowed.
Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can res ult in favor of the party who is guilty of the
fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law
but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has
been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks
equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case,
respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile

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e ercise on res ondents art. To allow reimbursement

would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own.
DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA MARAVILLAS
vs. HON. EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA
G.R. No. L-31606 March 28, 1983
FACTS:
Maximino Rico executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap who was then a
Chinese national. After the lapse of nearly fifteen years
from and aft er the execution of the deed of a bsolute sale,
Donato Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen and
allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.
On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the major
portion of a lot which he acquired by purc hase under the
deed of sale in favor of his engineer s on, Felix Yap, who
was also a Filipino citizen because of the Filipino
citizenship of his mother and the naturalization of his
father Donato Reyes Yap.
Subsequently, Lourdes
Rico, aunt and co-heir
of respondent Jose A. Rico, son of maximino Rico, sold
the remaining portion of that lot to the petitioner who had
his rights.
Donato Reyes Yap, has been in possession of the lots in
question since 1939, openly, publicly, continuously, and
adversely in the concept of owner until the present time.
ISSUE: WON t he sale of residential lot in question t o a
Chinese national is null and void in spite of the fact that
the vendee had been a naturalized born Filipino citizen.
HELD:
The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee.
Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property. There would be no
more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner
Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of
a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this
Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Leng Seng Giap & Sons:
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural
but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve t he nation's lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful t he acquisition of
real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.

VICENTE GODINEZ vs. FONG PAK LUEN

G.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983
FACTS:
The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold
by their father Jose Godinez to defendant Fong Pak Luen.
Said defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of
his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold
the above described parcel of land to co-defendant
Trinidad S. Navata.

Navata was aware of and wit h full knowledge t hat Fong

Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming,
who under the l aw are prohibit ed and disqualified to
acquire real property; that Fong Pak Luen has not
acquired any title or interest in said parcel of land as
purported contract of sale exec uted by Jose Godinez
alone was contrary to law and considered non -existent.
The defendant filed her answer that the complaint does
not state a cause of action since it appears from the
allegation that the property is registered in the name of
Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose
of the same; that the cause of actio n has been barred by
the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale
executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941,
conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a
result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that
under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an action based
upon a written cont ract must be brought wit hin 10 years
from the time the right of action accrues; that the right of
action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint
was filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10-year
period provided by law.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by plaintiffs but was
denied.
ISSUE: WON the sale was null and void ab initio since it
violat es applicable provisions of the Constitution and the
Civil Code.
HELD:
No. Prescription may never be invoked to defend that
which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no
necessity from t he facts of t his case to pass upon the
nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez
and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or
merely prohibited. It is enough to stress that ins ofar as the
vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But
neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument
based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941
is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the
constitutional prescription was never intended to apply.
As earlier mentioned, Fong P ak Luen, the disqualified
alien vendee later sold the same property to Navata, a
Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property.
Navata, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property.

LEE VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. 128195
October 3, 2001
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold to Lee
Liong (Chinese citizen) a parcel of land situated at the
corner of Roxas A venue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.
In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed
with the RTC of Rox as City a petition for reconstitution of
title of the lot. (Alleging that the trans fer certificate of title
issued to Lee Liong was lost or destroyed during World
War II.)
Petitioners Elizabeth and Pacita alleged that they were the
widows of the dec eased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun

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Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the
lot.

their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino

citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.

The RTC approved reconstitution of the lost or destroyed

certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of
an approved plan and technical description.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands

of the public or private domain was intended to protect
lands from falling in the hands of non -Filipinos. In this
case, however, there would be no more public policy
violat ed since t he land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified
to acquire and own such land.

Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for annulment of the RTC decision alleging that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were
not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since
their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title
to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was
constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.
CA declared the reconstitution void. Hence this petition.
Elizabeth and Pacita emphasized that the ownership of the
land had been settled in two previous cases of the
Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their
predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong.
They also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the
land through actual possession of the lot and their
consistent payment of taxes over the land for more than
sixty years.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted
that the decision in the reconstitution case was void;
otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring
ownership of private or public agric ultural lands.
ISSUES:
WON Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the
Philippines. NO
WON the rec onstitution was valid. NO
HELD:
Lee Liong was not qualified but the ownership of the
lot was already acquired by Filipino citizens Lee Liong
was disqualified to acquire the land under the 1935
Constitution. The sale of the land in question was
consummated sometime in March 1936, during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquire
private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary
succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was
disqualified to acquire the land in question.
The fact that the Court did not annul t he sale of the land to
an alien did not validat e the transaction. It was still
contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring lands of the public or private domain.
The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General.
This was what was done in this case when the
Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of
judgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the
Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not
barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies
against the State.
The land is now in the hands of Filipinos.
The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the
land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently

If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who

subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Thus, the subsequent trans fer of the property to qualified
Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the
invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands
has been achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the
original certificate of title must e ased on an owners
duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid
sources of the title to be reconstituted.
Reconstitution was void for lack of factual support
In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and
technical description approved by the Land Registration
Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void for
lack of factual support. A judgment with absolut ely nothing
to support it is void.
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the
re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed
in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed
title.
Any change in the ownership of t he property must be the
subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in
possession of the land, a separate proceeding is
necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.
The SC Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
of the CA.

JG SUMMIT V. CA
G.R. No. 124293
January 31, 2005
FACTS:
January 27, 1997 - the National Investment and
Development Corporation
(NIDC), a government
corporation, ent ered into a Joint Venture A greement (JVA)
with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan
(KAWASAKI) for t he construction, operation and
management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc. (S NS)
which subsequently bec ame the Philippine S hipyard and
Engineering Corporation (PHILSE CO). Under the JVA, the
NIDC and KAWASAKI will contribute P330 million for the
capitalization of PHILSE CO in the proportion of 60%-40%
respectively.
One of its salient features is the grant to the parties
of the right of first refusal should either of them decide to
sell, assign or trans fer its interest in the joint venture.
November 25, 1986 - NIDC transferred all its rights, title
and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB).

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As a result of a quasi-reorganization of PHILSE CO to

settle
its
huge obligations to PNB, the National
Government's shareholdings in PHILSE CO increased to
97.41% thereby reducing KAWASAKI's shareholdings
to 2.59%.
After a series of negotiations bet ween the APT and
KAWASAKI, they agreed that the latter's right of first
refusal under the JVA be "exchanged" for the right to top
by five percent (5%) the highest bid for the said shares.
They furt her agreed that KAWASAKI would be entitled
to name a company in which it was a stockholder,
which could exercise the right to top.
On September 7, 1990, KAWASAKI informed AP T that
Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI) would exercise its right to
top.
JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, one of the bidders objected to
this right to top agreement.
CONTENTION OF JG SUMMIT:
That a shipyard like P HILSECO is a public utility whose
capitalization must be sixty percent (60%) Filipinoowned.
Cons equently, the right to top granted to KAWASAKI
under the Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for
the sale of the 87.67% equity of the National Government
in PHILSECO is illegal not only because it violates the
rules on competitive bidding but more so, because it
allows foreign corporations to own more than 40%
equity in the shipyard.
ISSUE:
WON KAWASAKI had a valid right of first refusal over
PHILSECO shares under the JVA, considering that
PHILSECO owned land until the time of the bidding and
KAWASAKI already held
% of PHI S COs e uity.
YES!
HELD:
The right of first refusal is a property right of
PHILSECO shareholders, KAWASAKI and NIDC, under
the terms of their JVA. This right allows them to purchase
the shares of their co-s hareholder before they are offered
to a third party. The agreement of co -shareholders to
mutually grant this right to each other, by itself, does not
constitute a violation of the provisions of the Constitution
limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino
corporations.
As PHILYARDS correctly puts it, if PHILSECO still owns
land, the right of first refusal c an be validly assigned t o a
qualified Filipino entity in order to maintain the 60%-40%
ratio. This transfer, by itself, does not amount to a violation
of the Anti-Dummy Laws, absent proof of any fraudulent
intent. The transfer could be made either to a nominee or
such other party which the holder of the right of first refusal
feels it can comfortably do business with.
Alternatively, PHILSECO may divest of its landholdings,
in which case KAWASAKI, in exercising its right of first
refusal, can e ceed
% of PHI S COs e uity. In fact,
it can even be said that if the foreign shareholdings of a
landholding corporation exceeds 40%, it is not the foreign
stockholders ownershi of the shares whic h is adversely
affected but the capacity of the corporation to own land
that is, the corporation becomes disqualified to own land.
This finds support under the basic corporat e law principle
that the corporation and its stockholders are separate
juridical entities.

In this vein, the right of first refusal over shares pertains to

the shareholders whereas the capacity to own land
pertains to the corporation. Hence, the fact that
PHILSECO owns land cannot deprive stockholders of their
right of first refusal.
No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares
in a landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed
the allowed foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the
corporation from owning land.

REGISTER OF DEEDS RI ZAL VS. UNG SUI SI TEMPLE

G.R. No. L-6776
May 21, 1955
FACTS:
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to
accept for record a deed of donation exec uted in due
form by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel
of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal in favor of the
unregistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple",
operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality.
The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese
nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting
in representation and in behalf of the latter and its
trustees.
When elevated, the lower court upheld t he decision by
saying that appearing from the record that UNG SIU SI
TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess,
founder, trustees and administrator are all Chinese
citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that
in view of the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the
acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens
adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko
vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation
in question should not be admitted for admitted for
registration.
Henc e, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON a deed of donation of a parcel of land
executed in favor of a religious organization whose
founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese
citizens should be registered or not.
HELD:
NO.
The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious
associations.
The Constitution provides that Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall
be trans ferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the u lic domain in the Phili ines.
Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2
of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public
agricultural lands and other natural resources to
"corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of t he capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of
the Philippines).
The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is
obviously to ensure that corporations or associations

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allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural

resources shall be cont rolled by Filipinos.
The fact that the appellant religious organization has
no capital stock does not suffice t o escape the
Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its
members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the
sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural
land or t o exploit nat ural resources shall be cont rolled by
Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in
the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership
should be composed of Filipino citizens. To permit
religious associations cont rolled by non-Filipinos
to
acquire agricultural lands would be to drive the
opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings
in this country.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO VS.

LRC
G.R. NO. L-8451
DECEMBER 20, 1957
FACTS:
Mateo Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of Davao City,
executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in Davao City
in favour of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc. (RCAAD Inc.). RCAAD, Inc. is a corporation
sole organized in accordance with Philippine laws, with
Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian national, as actual
incumbent (or administrator).
The Register of Deeds (ROD) Davao req uired the said
corporation to submit an affidavit declaring that 60 per
cent of t he members thereof are Filipino Citizens for
purposes of registration. In the required affidavit, RCAADI
Inc. said that the totality of the Catholic Population of
Davao would become the owner of the property bought to
be registered.
ROD eing dou t ful as to the registera ility of the
land, the matter was referred to the Land Registration
Commission (LRC).
After proper hearing, LRC rendered a resolution
holding that the vendee RCAADI Inc. was not qualified to
acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of
conformity to the constitutional requirement of at least 60%
of the capital, property, or assets belonging to a Filipino
Citizen, as postulat ed under Sections 1 and 5 of Article 8
of the Constitution. That it is not owned by the Filipino
Citizens but rather the only incumbent Msgr. Thibault
who is a Canadian Citizen, hence, the denial of
registration of the subject property to ROD Davao.

On the other hand, respondent averred that though the

petitioner does not own the land, yet he has control
over the same. With full power to administer, alienate,
encumber, and sell or dispose of thereby exercising all
rights of ownership on the property. Also, respondents say
that a conglomeration of people cannot just be pointed
out as the recipient beneficiaries of the Catholic
Church. This set-up, according to the petitioners, falls
short of trust.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner RCAADI Inc. is qualified to own
private agricultural lands in the Philippin es pursuant to the
provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution? YES
HELD:
Under the circumstances of the present case, it is
safe to state t hat even before the establishment of the
Phil. Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines
every corporation sole (special form of corporation usually
associated with clergy)then organized and registered had
by express provision of law, the Corporation Law or Public
Act No. 1459, the necessary power and qualification to
purchase in its name private lands located in the
territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry. A
corporation sole is created not only to administer church
properties but also to hold and transmit the same to
his successor in said office.
That the Rom an Catholic Apostolic Church of the
Constitution has no nationality and did not have in
mind the religious corporation sole when they provided
that 60% of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino
Citizens.
Thus, if this constitutional provision were not intended
for corporation sole, it is obvious that this could not
be regulated or restricted by said provision.
Corporation soles cannot be considered aliens because
they have no nationality at all. In det ermining, therefore,
whet her the constitutional provision requiring 60 % Filipino
capital is applicable to corporations sole, the nationality of
the constituents of the diocese, and not the nationality of
the actual incumbent of the parish, must be taken into
consideration. In the case at bar, even if the question of
nationality
be considered, the
aforementioned
constitutional requirement is fully met and satisfied
considering that the corporation sole in question (RCAAD
Inc.) is composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos.
With these, the LRC resolution which holds that the
petitioner corporation sole is not qualified to acquire
private land is hereby reversed. The ROD is ordered to
register the deed of sale subject of the litigation.

A motion for reconsideration was filed but later denied.

Subsequently, an action for mandamus before the S C is
filed.
RCAA D Inc. alleges that under the Corporation Law as
well as the settled jurisprudence on the matter, petitioner
is
qualified
to
acquire
private
lands for the
establishment and maintenance of places of worship.
That by acquiring private lands, the petitioner is not
considered the owner but rather a mere administrator.
That there are more than 80% of Filipino Citizens who are
Roman Catholic in Davao as er the Bureau of Census
records which signifies that the mentioned constitutional
requirement has been fully satisfied.

UNITED CHURCH BOARD FO R WORLD MINISTRI ES,

as owner of BROKENSHI RE MEMORI AL HOSPITAL vs.
HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO E. S EBASTIAN, as
Presiding Judge of the CFI of Davao del Norte, and
MELENCIO B. DELENA and MAURO GEMENTI ZA as
Co-Executors of the Testate Estate of DAVID,
Jacobson, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:

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David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a

resident of the Philippines for more than thirty years and
up to the time of his death in 1970. He left a will in which
he "devised and bequeat hed" to t he Brokenshire Memorial
Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua
Plantation Co., inc. which was incorporated under
Philippine law in 1948. This corporation was the
registered owner of a tract of land in Pantuhan Davao del
Nort e, with a total area of about 445 hectares acquired by
virtue of a sales patent issued to it in 1953.
Judge Sebastian dis allowed the above -described legacy
on the ground that it was in effect an alienation of private
agricultural land in favor of a transferee which was not
qualified under the Constitution of 1935. The finding was
that the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was owned by the
United Church Board for World Ministries (UCBWM) which
was a non-stock corporation organized in the United
States by virtue of a charter granted by the state
legislature of Massachussets .
The basis of this ruling was Article XII, Sections I and 5 of
the 1935 Constitution, which barred foreigners, including
Americans, from acquiring agricultural lands in this country
except only by hereditary succession.
United Church came to this Court, contending that the
constitutional provisions were not applicable because the
object of the legacy was not land but shares of stocks.
Moreover, even assuming that what was really involved
was a transfer of land, the petitioner was nonetheless
qualified to acquire it under the provisions of the Parity
Amendment and the Laurel-Langley Agreement.
The Solicitor General disagreed at first, insisting that the
legacy was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution and did not
come under any of the allowed exceptions. During the
protracted exchange of pleadings among the parties,
however, certain events transpired to considerably change
the original situation and, consequently, also the position
of government.
The doc uments submitted in this case that at the time the
will was executed in 1966, the land on which the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was situated was already
registered in the name of the Mindanao District
Conference, an affiliate of the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines (PUCC). It was this non-stock corporation,
organized in 1949 under P hilippine law with a 100%
Filipino membership, that owned and was operating the
Hospital at the time of Jacobson's death. Later, the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was itself incorporated as a
charitable institution, wit h Filipinos constituting the majority
of its membership, and on December 16,1970, became
the successor-in-interest of the UCCP to the devised
parcel of land.
To prove these Brokenshire presented the articles of
incorporation of the UCCP and the Hos pital and their
corresponding certificates of registration issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the licenses issued
by the Board of Medical Sciences for the operation of the
Hospital to the UCCP from 1968 to 1972 and to the
Brokenshire Memorial Hos pital, Inc. from 1973 to 1974,
and the certificate of title over the subject land in the name
of the "Mindanao District Conference, commonly known as
the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital."
These facts were not brought earlier to the attention of the
probate c ourt by the former counsel of the Hospit al, Atty.
Juan V. Faune for reasons that do not appear in the
record. It was for such omission (the new counsel would

call it "misrepresentation") that Atty. Faune was replaced

by Atty. Rodolfo D. de la Cruz, who disavowed his
predecessor's represent ations. At any rate, the abovestated documents have now made it clear that the United
Church for Christ in the Philippines and not the United
Church Board for World Ministries was the owner o f the
Hospital at the time of the execution of the win in 1966 and
of the testator's death in 1970. It is also not disput ed that
such owners hip passed to the B rokens hire Memorial
Hospital itself upon its incorporation in 1970 when it thus
became the proper party-in-interest to claim the property
directly devis ed by Jacobson to it.
ISSUE: May Brokenshire be registered as the owner?
YES
HELD:
E ven on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the
owner of the Hospital at the time of the effectivity of the will
and that the devise was for that reason unenforceable, the
defect in the will should be deemed rectified by the
subsequent transfer of the property to the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital, Inc. Our consistent ruling on this matter
is that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or trans fers it to a ctitizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Thus, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, where a
Filipino citizen sold her land to an alien who later sold it to
a Filipino, we held that the invalidity of the initial transfer to
the alien was corrected by the subsequent trans fer of the
property to a citizen.
A similar ruling was made in Godinez v. Fon g Pak
Luen, involving a similar set of facts, where we also cited
Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap, and Herrera v. Luy King
Guan. In Yap v. Maravillas, we validated the s ale of
agricultural land to an alien who, after the purchase, was
naturalized as a Filipino and so became qualified to
acquire it. The facts were slightly different in De Castro v.
Teng, where, upon the death of an alien who had
purchased a residential lot, his heirs entered into an
extrajudicial partition of his estate and transferred the land
to one of his sons who was a naturalized Filipino. We also
sustained the sale.
WHEREFORE, the Brokenshire Memorial Hos pital, Inc. is
hereby substituted for the United Church Board for World
Ministries as petitioner in this case and DECLARE D to be
qualified to accept the legacy of the late David Jacobson.
The petition as thus modified is GRANTED. The order of
the respondent judge dated December 9, 1971, and his
Resolution dated December 9, 1971, are SE T ASIDE. This
decision is immediat ely executory. No costs.

ATTY. JOS E S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA,

ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OX CIANO, BENITA GOMEZ
GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESP EJO, ARMANDO
GOMEZ, ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ
CALI CDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO
S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now decea sed)
represented by hi s wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and
children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y.
GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y.
GOMEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APP EALS,
HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial
Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON.
CHI EF, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION, Quezon
City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief,

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Divi sion of Original Registration, Land Registration

Commi ssion, Quezon City, Metro Manila, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) s ettled that
12 parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez.
Cons olacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were
inherited by Jose Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs
agreed to divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition
to the application, the trial court issued an order of general
default. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision
ad udicating the su ect lots in Gomez et als favor. he
decision became final and executory hence the court
directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office
(GLRO) to issue the corresponding decrees of registration
over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio P erez opposed the adjudication and
petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the
12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which
was already grant ed by homestead patent in 1929. Under
the law, land already grant ed by homestead patent can no
longer be the subject of another registration. The lower
court granted Silverios recommendation.
Gomez et al invok ed Sec. 30 and 32 of P D 1529 (Land
Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue
an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the
issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of
title. That once the judgment becomes final and executory
under Sec 30, the decree of registration must issue as a
matter of course.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial
ruling on approving the adjudication even after it had
became final and executory. YES
2. Whether or not the respondents Acting Land
Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez,
Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land
Registration Commission, have no alternative but to
issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the
decision of 5 A ugust 1981 and the order for issuance
of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so
being purely ministerial. NO

1.

2.

HELD:
Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding does not
become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after
the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of t he final
decree of registration. The Supreme Court has held t hat
as long as a final decree has not been entered by the
Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the
period of one (1) year has not elaps ed from date of entry
of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the res pondent land
registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act
under the orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in
the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point

in relation t o the preparation and issuance of t he decree,

it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in
this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the
court. They are specifically called u on to e tend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration roceedings .

REPUBLIC V NILLAS
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007
FACTS:
On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas
(Nillas) filed a Petition for Revi val of Judgment with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.
On 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Negros Oriental rendered a decision, acting as a cadastral
court, adjudic ated several lots, together with the
improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who
had established their title to their respective lots and their
continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and
ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. One of these lots was adjudicated to
Eugenia Calingacion and Engracia Calingacion.
illas arents, Sera ion and Josefina A. A ierra, y way
of a Deed of A bsolute S ale, acquired the said lot through
various purchases they effected from the Eugenia and her
heirs bet ween the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases
were evidenced by three separate Deeds of A bsolute S ale
all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.
In turn, Nillas acquired the lot from her parents through a
Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite the
rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision, no decree of
registration has ever been issued. Thus, Nillas sought the
revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration.
On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding
merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering
the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Aut hority (LRA) to
issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and
registration based on the 1941 Decision. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section
6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a
prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by
motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special"
proceedings such as land registration cases.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that
contrary to the opinion of the Court of A ppeals, the
principles of prescription and laches do apply to land
registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the
Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must
be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues. Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil P rocedure establishes that a final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which
time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by
statute of limitations.
ISSUE:

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WON prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a

judgment in a land registration case. NO (What is the
nature of duty to issue Decree? Ministerial.)
HELD:
NO, the S upreme Court denied certiorari and instead
affirmed the assailed rulings of the lower courts.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to
ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary
proceedings not expressly governed by the Rule s of
Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal
modality such as land registration case s. Unlike in
ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to
establish owners hip by a person of a parcel of land,
consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary
proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or
fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating
such owners hip, no further step is required to effectuate
the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part
of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and
the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration
Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on
execution of final judgments; hence, the application of
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil P rocedure in suppletory
fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No.
1529 does not specifically provide for execution of
judgments in the s ense ordinarily understood and applied
in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the
prevailing party to apply for a writ of exec ution in order to
obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in
the first place.
Section 39 of PD No. 1529 lays down the procedure that
interposes bet ween the rendition of the judgment and the
issuance of the certificat e of title. No obligation whatsoever
is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or
oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the
title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on
the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue in t urn the
corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court
(that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to
the Commissioner), and the Land
Registration
Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the
decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the
Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial
on the officers charged with their performance and
thus generally beyond di scretion of amendment or
review.

enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within
which the court may order or issue a decree. The
reason i s xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory
in character and does not need to be asserted or
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the
judge and of the Land Regi stration Commi ssi on;
failure of the court or of the clerk to i ssue the decree
for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed
can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom
the land is ordered to be registered.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for
pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res
judicata that arred su se uent attacks to the ad udicates
title over the subject property. The Republic submits that
said decision would operat e as res judicata only after the
decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in
this case. We dou t that a final decisions status as res
judicata is the impelling ground for its very own execution;
and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a
defense or as a factor in relation to a different case
altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the
Re u lics arguments on this oint do not dissuade from
our central holding that the 1941 Decision is still
susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of
registration not withstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or
her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and
the reasons for such delay, following the prostracted
failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to
issue the decree of registration. In this case, all that Nillas
needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights
of the original adjudic ates her predecessors-in-interest-in
order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in
the names of the original prevailing parties who are her
predecessors -in interest. Both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and
the Republic does not offer any compelling argument to
dispute such proof.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERE D.

is

DENIE D.

No

SPOUS ES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA,

represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL
SANTOS, JR., petitioners,
vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J:

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to

do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration
cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the
land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with
said authorities can. The ultimat e goal of our land
registration system is geared towards the final and
definitive det ermination of real property ownership in the
country, and the imposition of an additional burde n on the
owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property
Registration Law from the time decisions in land
registration cases become final i s complete in itself and
does not need to be filled in. From another pers pective,
the judgment does not have t o be executed by motion or

FACTS:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which
was approved by the trial court. Upon motion of
petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the
LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
However, the LRA refus ed. Hence, petitioners filed an
action for mandamus.
The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A which
sought to be registered by Sps. Laburada is part of Lot No.
3, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued.
Upon the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by
Trans fer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name
of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as
a transfer from TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to
issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by

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the petitioners, it would result in the duplication of titles

over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the
policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and
destroy the integrity of the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus
to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the
subject land may already be included in an existing
Torrens certificate of title? NO
HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of anot her in an earlier land
registration case. A s econd dec ree for the same land
would be null and void, since the principle behind original
registration is to register a parcel of land only onc e. Thus,
if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to
register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the
issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run
counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of
registration is part of the judicial function of c ourts and is
not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled
through mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the
LRA to issue a decree of registration.
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the
judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act
which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this
Court held inValmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable:
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration
or cadastral court, there remain many things to be done
before the final decree can be issued, such as the
preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions,
especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot,
the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to
another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court
in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227,
234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of
registration must be stated in convenient form for
transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain
an accurate technical description of t he land. This requires
trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that
only portions of a parcel of land included in an application
are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions
can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court.
In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes
additional surveys become necessary before the final
decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the
court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief survey or
of the General Land Registration Office with such
duties (Administrative Code, section 177).
Furthermore, although the final dec ree is actually prepared
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the
administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can
hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that
said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not
as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court
and so the issuanc e of a final decree is a judicial function
and not an administrative one .
Indeed, it is well -settled that the issuance of such decree
is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial
act involving the exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ
of
mandamus
can
be
awarded
only
when the petitioners legal right to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and

complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear

legal right is a right whic h is indubitably granted by law or
is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the
case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical
questions will be dis regarded. But where the right sought
to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this
case, mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act
upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot
be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties. As
stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by
mandamus. The court has to decide a question according
to its own judgment and understanding of the law.
It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree
of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits
and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate
to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with
finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property
described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon
to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of
this Decision, after which the said court shall act with
deliberat e speed according to the facts and the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the
case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City.
The LRA, on the other hand, is ORDE RED to submit to the
court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot
3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595,
within sixty (60) days from notice. After rec eipt of such
report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to
ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the
issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of
registration, according to the facts and the law as herein
discussed.

HEIRS OF MANUEL ROX AS VS CA

FACTS:
Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration
of two parcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay. In
support of its application for registration they presented a
Deed of Absolute S ale dated June 10, 1990, executed by
Zenaida Melliza as vendor who bought the property from
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half months
earlier, as evidenc ed by a Deed of Sale dated March 26,
1990 and an A ffidavit of Self-A djudication dated March 24,
1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land
Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon
Luna while Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not
notified because she was not named as an adjoining
owner, occupant or adverse claimant. Publication was
made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly.
After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court
proceeded to hear the land registration case.
On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the subject parcels
of land had previously been applied for registration at the
CFI of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon
but no decision has been made.
February 13, 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun
Corporation's application for registration. Consequently
RTC issued the Order for Issuanc e of the Decree on
March 14, 1991, after it ordered the application of Manuel
A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon dismissed.

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It was only when the caretaker of the property was being

asked to vacat e the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon
Vda. de Rox as learned of its sale and the registration of
the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, she filed
a petition for revi ew before the RTC to set aside the
decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud, alleging that her
signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the
Affidavit of Self-A djudication; that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted her name as an advers e claimant,
occupant or adjoining owner in the application for
registration submitted to the LRA, such that the latter could
not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing
RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual
fraud and dismissed the petition for review of decree of
registration April 15, 1992. CA affirmed the findings of
R C, ruling that Ro as failed to and demonstrate that
there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive
or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a
judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Was there actual fraud on the part of Maguesun
Corporation to warrant the reopening and the setting aside
of the registration decree?
HELD:
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree
of registration sought to be reviewed by Roxas.
Actual Fraud; Defined.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or
positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception
practiced by means of the misrepresent ation or
concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is
construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon
public interests and public or private confidenc e, even
though the act is not done or committed with an actual
design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other
persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is
regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to
an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated
therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case
to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining
not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but
collateral to the transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant bec ause only actual fraud
or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a
judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of
registration reopened and reviewed. The "fraud"
contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No
1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional
omission of fact required by law.
Intentional Omission of Name
In the corporation's application for registration filed with
the RTC only the following names appeared: Hilario Luna,
Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road. The court found that
the some words are typed in with a different typewriter,
with the first five letters of the word "provincial" typed over
correction fluid.

However, Maguesun Corporation, annexed a differently worded application for the petition to review the application
of the Ro as where in instead of PRO I CIA ROAD, the
name ROXAS appeared. The discrepancy which is
unexplained appears intentional.
It is reasonable to assume that the reas on is to mislead
the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the
original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer,
occupant or claimant, the same application which formed
the basis for the LRA in sending out notices of initial
hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 also
requires the applicant for registration to state the full
names and addresses of all occupants of the land and
those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the
extent of the search made to find them. Maguesun
Corporation failed to comply wit h this requirement.
Possession in OCE NO
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession
of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker,
Jose Ramirez. Maguesun Corporation also that the subject
land was unoccupied when in trut h and in fact, the Roxas
family caretaker resided in the subject property. Maguesun
Corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of
such possession and occupancy, for its President, who
signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well
that her grandaunt Trini dad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned
the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to
have inspected the property prior to the sale such that the
ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants
could have been made facilely.
Maguesun Corporation intentional concealment and
re resentation of Ro as interest in the su ect lots as
possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual
fraud justifying the reopening and review of the dec ree of
registration.

Conc ealment of the Existence of Trinidad Roxas

Mention of the late President 's name as well as that of
Trinidad was made principally in the Formal Offer of
Exhibits for Magues un Corporations tax declarations and
as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient
compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the
application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's
adverse interest, occupation and possession should be
made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the
application for registration, otherwise, the persons
concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and
will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their
opposition or claims.
Publication of Notice of Initial Hearing
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication
in a newspaper of general circulation remains an
indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in
mandatory terms, it is a component of proc edural due
process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible"
so that all persons having an adverse int erest in the land
subject of the registration proceedings may be notified
thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected,
the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of
general circulation is material and relevant in assessing
the applicant's right or title to the land.

Forgery and Discrepancies

A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court
to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed

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attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of

respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in
the execution and preparation of the forged instruments,
there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun
Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who
merits the protection of the law.
The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale
and A ffidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from
the sample signatures in several documents executed by
Trinidad. The questioned signatures are smooth and
rounded and have none of the jagged and shaky character
of petitioner's signatures characteristic of the penmanship
of elderly persons.
The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to
the general public, as well as the demise of the late
President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at
Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities
are too glaring to have been ignored. If Tinidad did in fact
execute said A ffidavit, there is no reason why she should
state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning
herself and her family.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

HEIRS OF ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118436 March 21, 1997
FACTS:
On July 2, 1990, Maguesun Management and
Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an
Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered
land. In support of its application for registration,
Maguesun Corporation present ed a Deed of Absolut e Sale
dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as
vendor and indicating the purchase price to be
P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property
from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda.
de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier,
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990
and an A ffidavit of S elf-Adjudication dated March 24,
1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land
Registration A uthority (the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to 3 parties on the
basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for
registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was
not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse
claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings.
Publication was made. A fter an Order of general default
was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land
registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land
Registration A uthority reported, among other things, that
the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for
registration in Land Registration Case by Manuel A. Roxas
and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered
thereon. E vent ually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional
Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for
registration.
Cons equently, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration
Case applied for by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de
Leon, dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being
asked to vacat e the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon

Vda. de Rox as learned of its sale and the registration of

the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name.
Henc e, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for
review before the Regional Trial Court, to set aside the
decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the
lots were among the properties she inherited from her
husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, and that her
family had been in open, continuous, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the
concept of owner for more than thirty years before they
applied for its registration under the Torrens System of
land titling. Petitioner further denied that she s old the lots
to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and
that her signature was forged in both the Deed of S ale and
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims,
she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents
to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more
significantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted her name as an advers e claimant,
occupant or adjoining owner in the application for
registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority
such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial
Hearing. As a result, an order of general default was
issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for
registration was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petion for review of the registration
may be granted.
HELD:
YES. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens
System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529,
the Property Registration Decree which amended and
codified
laws
relative
to
registration
of
property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or
cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible
until the expiration of one year after the ent ry of the final
decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the
decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another
party. Absence, minority or other disability of any person
affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing
judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise
said dec ree. However, the right of a person deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized
by law (S ection 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a
valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree
of registration. It is further required that a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed
within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that
the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the
property has not yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or
positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception
practiced by means of the misrepresent ation or
19
concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is
construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon
public interests and public or private confidenc e, even
though the act is not done or committed with an actual
design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other
persons.

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Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is

regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to
an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated
therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case
to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining
not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but
collateral to the transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant bec ause only actual fraud
or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a
judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of
registration reopened and reviewed.
The " fraud"
contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No
1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional
omission of fact required by law. For fraud to justify a
review of a dec ree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and
the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were
fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the
original registration case are entitled t o a review of a
decree of registration.
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree
of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether under the circumstance of t here being an
innocent purchaser for value, there could still be a review
of a decree of registration?
HELD:
No. A dec ree of registration sec ured through fraud is valid,
although annulable, upon petition filed within one (1) year
after entry of the decree, in t he absence of an innocent
purchaser for value, whereas a decision rendered wit hout
notice to the parties of rec ord is void for lack of due
process .... Indeed, acts of Congress, as well as those of
the Executive, can deny due process only under pain o f
nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same
flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory
provision to the contrary not withstanding." Nonetheless,
the next paragraph was explicit on the point that the
reopening on the ground of fraud was predicated on "no
innocent purchaser for value [being] injured thereby."
Thus: "Now then, if a decree issued in pursuance of
a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within
(1) y ear from entry of said decree, there is more reason to
hold that the same, if entered in compliance with a
decision suffering from a fat al infirmity, for want of due
process, may be reviewed, set aside and cancelled upon
petition filed wit hin the same period, provided that no
innocent purc haser for value will be inj ured thereby.

Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun

Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that of the
Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of
the subject property.
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession
of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker,
Jose Ramirez. Respondent Maguesun Corporation also
declared in number 5 of the same application that the
subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the
Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property.
Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and
representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as
possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud
justifying the reopening and review of the decree of
registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family
was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving
their property, thus effectively depriving them of t heir day
in court.
TIONGCO vs. DE LA MERCED
G.R. No. L-24426 July 25, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner Tiongco and t he ot her claimants of the lots in
question were deprived of their rights without due process
of law, through the fraudulent machinations of deputy clerk
of court Pascual Cando. There was in that case a
pronouncement by this Court, that even if a dec ree in a
cadastral proceeding is infected with nullity in view of a
clear denial of procedural due process, still an innocent
purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title issued in
pursuance thereof is protected. The best that could be is
to stress what was considered its obiter aspect. That does
not suffice, for the reference to the rights vested in an
innocent purchaser for value is based on express statutory
language, allowing the filing of a petition for review within
one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.

ESCONDE vs.DELFIN
G.R. No. L-67583, July 31, 1987
FACTS:
Privat e respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in the
"Application for Registration of Title". The application was
granted in a "Decision", and private respondent received
copy thereof on the same dat e. Said parcel of land is now
covered by an OCT .On February 13, 1978 s aid private
respondent Ramon filed his "Petition for Writ of
Possession" against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa
Esconde. The petitions filed a motion to quash which was
then denied.
On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a
second alias writ of possession in view of the failure of the
petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to
private respondent and the same was granted in the Order
of November 21, 1983.
Petitioner then filed with Judge A velino M. Constantino of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash
and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ
of Possession on the ground that they have filed a civil
action for rec onveyance.
ISSUE: May the action for reconveryance prosper?
HELD:
An action for rec onveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of
another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer
or rec onvey the land to him. The prevailing rule in this
jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was
wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens

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System from bringing an action, after one year from the

issuance of the decree, for the reconvey ance of the
property in question. Such an action does not aim or
purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set
aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the
person who secured the registration of the questioned
property is not the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil
action for reconvey ance does not seek to set aside the
decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and
no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey
the land from the registered owner to the right ful owner.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent
that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. As earlier
stated, there was no proof of irregularity in t he issuance of
title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it
established that fraud had indeed intervened in the
issuance of said title, and the period of one year within
which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired.
Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the land
should be adjudicated to the registered owner.
Moreover, petitioner's action for reconveyanc e had already
prescribed. An action for reconveyance of real property on
the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from
the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to
have taken place from the issuanc e of an original
certificate of title.

MARQUEZ vs. COURT OF APP EALS

G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998
FACTS:
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and
Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1)
Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5)
Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr., (9)
Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Ant onio.
Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land
with a lot area of 161 square meters in S an Juan Del
Monte, Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No.
1
47572, wherein the constructed their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years
later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an
"Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unt o himself sole
ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572.
Cons equently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT
2
No. 33350 was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Ma rquez, Sr.
executed a " Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" covering the
land described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the house
constructed thereon to three of this children, namely: (1)
petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both
private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other
children, petitioners herein. As a result of the donation,
TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was
issued in private respondents' name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual
possession of the land. However, when petitioners learned
about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately
demanded that since they are also children of Rafael
Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their res pective shares
over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle
the dispute proved unavailing since private respondents
ignored petitioners' demands.

In view of t he private respondents' indifference,

petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on
May 31, 1991 for "Reconvey ance and P artition with
Damages" before the trial court alleging that both the
"Affidavit of A djudication" and " Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents took
advantage of the advanced age of their father in making
him execute the said documents.
In their A nswer, privat e respondents argued that
petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of
limitations since the same should have been filed within
four years from the dat e of discovery of the alleged fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed.
HELD:
It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus,
succession to her estate is governed by the pres ent Civil
Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are
her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent
therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in
1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire
property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication"
claiming that he is the sole surviving heir of his deceased
wife Felicidad F. Marquez.
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or
another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he
was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children
were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of
certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust
under A rticle 1456 was established. Constructive t rusts
are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment.
They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud,
duress or abuse of confidence, obtains o r holds the legal,
right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold. Prescinding from the foregoing
discussion, did the action for reconveyance filed by the
petitioners prescribe, as held by the Court of Appeals?
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconvey ance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the isuance of the Torrens title over the
property. For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive
period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued,
which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the
action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or
approximately nine years later, it is evident that
prescription had not yet barred the action.

ARGUELLES VS TIMBANCAYA
FACTS: Defendant Guillermo Timbancaya appeals
directly and on purely questions of law the decision of
Palawan CFI. The trial court ruled that the property,
su ect of laintiffs action for rec onveyance and y virtue
of a compromise agreement and judgment in Spec ial
Proceedings No. 211, was owned jointly one-half thereof
by Caridad Arguelles and the ot her half by Guillermo and
Alberto Timbanc aya.
During the special proceedings for Intestate Estate of Jose
Arguelles, the court rendered a decision, in conformity wit h
a compromise agreement, adjudicating one half of the land

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to Arguelles and the other half to the im ancayas. It also

ordered both parties to pay for the coconut trees plant ed in
their respective portions of the land, which they relinquish
in favor of the other.
Cont rary to the agreement and judgment in the special
proceedings however, Timbancaya was able to have the
original certificat e of title cancelled and have a new CT
issued in his favor covering the whole land (June 5, 1961),
des ite Arguelles actual open and continuous possession
of one half of the property even before the filing of the
special proceedings.
Upon knowing the issuance of the TCT, A rguelles filed the
instant case for reconveyance (April 30, 1965).
Timbanc aya, for his part, alleges that Arguelles has no
right to the property in question bec ause she is not an heir
of the estate of the late Jose Arguelles despite the
decision in the special proc eedings.
ISSUE: W/N TCT had already become indefeasible, since
almost four years have laps ed before action was filed
RULING: No. The rule that a decree of registration once
issued becomes final and incontrovertible 1 year after its
issuance is not relevant to the case at bar.
Arguelles does not question the validity of the OCT but
instead seeks the annulment of the TCT, which was
issued to Timbancaya after the judgment by compromise
and based on his misrepresentation in the Register of
Deeds. Timbancay a had claimed that he and his brother
are the e clusive owners of t he ro erty as the only
legitimate children and surviving heirs of (their) parents
Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los
Reyesa
representation cont rary to his previous admissions that
they are not the legitimate children of the deceased
Spouses Jos e Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes, but the
sons of Rufina de los Reyes with her first husband,
Joa uin im ancaya.
In this case, the action to annul the title or action for
reconvey ance has its basis in Section 55 of Act 496, which
rovides that in all cas es of registration rocured y fra ud
the owner may purs ue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a
certificate of title. his remedy is distinct from that
authorized by Section 38, which has for its purpose the
reopening of the decree of title, on the ground of fraud,
within 1 year from its issuance. Judgment appealed from
affirmed.

MAMUYAC VS ABENA
FACTS: Gregoria PIME NTEL was the owner of the 2
parcels of land in LA UNION she sold and conveyed on
June 1, 1926, to Pedro ABENA. On January 27, 1927,
Pimentel again sold and convey ed the same parcels to
Tiburcio MAMUYAC.
The document of sale, in favor of Abena was duly
inscribed in the registry of property of the province on
January 31, 1927, and from April, 1927, said parcels of
land were declared for taxation in the name said Abena.
The doc ument execut ed in favor of the Mamuyac on
January 27, 1927, was neither inscribed in t he registry of

property nor were the parcels of the land declared for

taxation in the name of the latter.
Mamuyac instituted an action against Abena for the
recovery of the parcels of land but both trial court and CA
favored A bena.
ISSUE: Who has better rights over the property.
HOLDING: ABENA.
Alleged Contract of Mortgage in favor of Mamuyac
Mamuyac contends that he has a better right over the
parcels of land involved because of possession claimed by
him by virt ue of an alleged private contract of
mortgageexecuted in his favor on January 4, 1935. It is
sufficient answer to this contention that "in order that a
mortgage may be deemed to be legally constituted, it is
indispensable that the instrument in which it appears be a
public doc ument and be recorded in the property register.
Therefore, a mortgage in legal form was not constituted by
said privat e document." E ven were we to accord validity to
the mortgage, article 1473 of the Civil Code, invoked by
him, applies only to the determination of presence
between sale and sale.
Mamuyacs alleged posse ssion vs. Abenas registered
Deed of Sale
E ven
assuming,
for
the
sake
of
argument,
thatMamuyachad been in possession of said properties by
reason of the alleged cont ract of mortgage executed in his
favor, on January 4, 1925, and were to accord legal effect
to the document of sale of January 27, 1927, which was
not recorded in the registry of property, still his right cannot
prevail over that of A bena who had duly registered his
deed of sale.
No actual delivery to Abena
Mamuyacs contention that A ena s ownershi
and
preference over the property in question is not complete
because of lack of material delivery of the possession to
him by the vendor is not well taken, for the reason that the
execution of the public document of sale in favor of
Abenais equivalent to the delivery of the realty sold.

CONRADO C. FULE and LOURDES F. ARAGON vs.

EMILIA E. DE LEGARE and COURT OF APP EALS
FACTS:
This is an action for annulment of cert ain deeds of sale
and conveyance covering a parcel of land, together with
the improvements existing thereon, situated in the
municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, and for
damages.
Emilia E. de Legare, was the owner of a parcel of land,
together with a residential house erected thereon, situated
at No. 146 Sta. Mesa Boulevard Extension, San Juan,
Rizal, her owners hip being evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 21253, issued by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. This property
was mortgage to a secure a loan in favor of Tomas
Soriano which is properly annot ated in the title.
At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 29, 1953,
while in her house an unknown man intruded into the
room, approached the plaintiff, covered her mouth, and,
pressing a knife on her side, demanded that she give him
P10,000.00 if she did not like to be killed. John Legare her

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adopted son concluded that, that man was a huk afraid of

their lives John had Emilia and their maid signed a piece
of document. John said that the document is a letter
concerning some compensation she was to recei ve from
the Veterans Administration. Since she could not read
though she can wife signed the said paper and so as their
made. After which John instructed them to pack up their
things and that they will live in a hotel for t he meantime for
safety reason.
After a month of staying in a hotel she Emilia decide to go
back to her house and only to find out that there were
already people living there.
It turned out that John had sold the property to herein
petitioners. The piece of paper that she signed was a deed
of sale in favour of John.
John had the title transferred to his name and
subsequently transferred to herein petitioner with full
knowledge of the encumbrances and only after john had
the title transferred to his name then t he petitioner paid for
the purchase price.
ISSUE:
Were the herein petitioners purchasers in good faith and
for value of the properties here contested? Yes
RULI NG:
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of
another, without notice that some other persons has a
right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another.
It should be noted that the deed of sale was regular upon
its face, and no one would have questioned its aut henticity
since it was duly acknowledged before a not ary public.
Moreover, even if the petitioners had the opport unity to
compare the signature of the respondent on the deed of
conveyance with a specimen of her genuine signature, the
effort, nonetheless, would have been in vain since the
respondent's signat ure on the document was admittedly
hers. Lastly, it should not be overlook ed that the
respondent, during the whole period of t he negotiation,
was nowhere available to confirm or deny the execution of
the deed. She was then in hiding, or, hidden, at the
Windsor Hotel in Manila.
The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners
themselves could hardly have been wanting. The rec ords
show that they did not rely solely and fully upon the deed
of sale in favor of John W. Legare and the fact that John
had t hen in his possession the corresponding certific ate of
title of the registered owner. They demanded more. They
insisted that the sale in favor of John W. Legare be first
registered and that the transfer in their favor be thereafter
likewise registered. It was only after all these were
complied with that they paid the purchase price. In other
words, the petitioner spouses relied not really on the
documents exhibited to them by John W. Legare, but, on
the registerability of those documents. This in Our view,
satisfies the measure of good faith cont emplat ed by law.
Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was
fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to s ecure a
registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which
he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We
have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a

nullity and c onveys no title (Director of Lands v. A ddison,

49 Phil. 19). However, we have also laid down the doctrine
that there are instances when such a fraudulent document
may become the root of valid title. One such instance is
where the certificate of title was already trans ferred from
the name of t he true owner to the forger, and while it
remained that way, the land was subs equently sold to an
innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to
rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs.
Cruz, G.R. No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).
Besides, the records of this case reveal that the herein
respondent is herself not entirely free from blame. We note
that when John presented to her the document which
turned out to be a bed of conveyance in his favor, she
readily affixed her signature thereto upon the simple
representation of John that it was a document pertaining to
her claim with the U.S. Veterans Administration. She could
have asked her maid to read the contents of the same for
her and yet she did not. These, we believe, amount to a
lack of prudence and precaution on the part of Mrs. Emilia
de Legare.

GLORIA R. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, ROMY V. SUZARA and MANUEL R.
VIZCONDE, respondents.
FACTS:
Gloria R. Cruz was the owner of Lot 10, BLK. 565, PS D38911, with an area of 747.7 square meters, together with
the improvements thereon, situated at 22 Bituan St., Bgy.
Doa Imelda, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 242553 in
her name; in 1977 she and respondent Romeo V. Suzara
lived together as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage; in September 1982, solely out of love and
affection for Suzara, she executed a deed of absolut e sale
over Lot 10 in favor of Suzara without any monetary
consideration; thereaft er, Suzara registered the document
in his favor and used the property as collateral for a bank
loan P 350, 000. 00; he however failed to pay the loan so
that after four (4) years the mortgage was foreclosed. She
paid the bank P40,638.88 to restructure the loan resulting
in the extension of the redemption period to two (2) years.
However, without her knowledge and before the expiration
of the extended period, Suzara redeemed the property.
She tried to talk to him but he avoided her. Finally, to
protect her interest, she execut ed an A ffidavit of Adverse
Claim which she filed with the Register the Deeds of
Quezon City asserting that her s ale in favor of Suz ara was
null and void for lack of consideration and being cont rary
to law and public policy. Moreover, the said property was
already been sold by Suzara to Manuel Vizconde.
Petitioner contends that she and respondent Suzara were
common-law husband and wife, the sale between them
was void and inexistent, citing Art. 1490 of the Civil Code.
She argues that the consideration of "love, affection and
accommodation" for the sale was not a valid cause for the
conveyance of the property as there was no price paid in
money or its equivalent, and since her sale to Suzara was
null and void the issue of its illegality cannot be waived or
ratified; resultantly, the sale by Suzara to his corespondent Vizconde must also be declared null and void
the latter being a purchaser in bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Vizconde is a buyer in bad faith.
RULI NG:
We cannot sustain petitioner. Although under Art. 1490 the

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husband and wife cannot sell property to one anot her as a

rule which, for policy consideration and the dictates of
morality require that the prohibition apply to common-law
relationships, 4 petitioner
can
no
longer
seek
reconvey ance of the property to her as it has already been
acquired by respondent Vizconde in good faith and for
value from her own trans feree.

Sale of the parcel of lands in favor of the heirs of

Batallones and Quimio was evidenced by Deed of
Convey ance duly issued by the Bureau of Lands

Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness

of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the
property the court cannot disregard such rights and order
the total canc ellation of the certificate. 7 The effect of such
an outright cancellation would be t o impair public
confidenc e in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing
with property registered under the Torrens system would
have to inquire in every instance whether the title has
been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the
evident purpose of the law. 8 E very person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and t he law will in no way
oblige him to go behind the certificate to det ermine the
condition of the property. 9 Even if a decree in a
registration proceeding is infected with nullity, still an
innocent purc haser for value relying on a Torrens title
issued in pursuance thereof is protected. A purchaser in
good faith is one who buys the property of another wit hout
notice that some ot her person has a right to or int erest in
such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claim of another person.

The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were

also issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses
Atagan asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a
product of forgery because it was based on an alleged
transferred certificate in favor of Pedro Banayo and Pablo
Pugay who have no right whatsoever on the real estate in
question. Upon investigation, it was certified by the Bureau
of Lands that the said titles were falsified and forged.

We cannot grant petitioner's prayer to have respondent

Vizconde's certificate of title declared null and void.
Neither can we order the reconveyance of the property to
petitioner. Vizconde being a purchaser of registered land
for value in good faith holds an indefeasible title to the
land. This is without prejudice however to any appropriate
remedy petitioner may take against her erstwhile commonlaw husband, respondent Suzara.

Spouses Poblete alleges that they are registered owners

of a parcel of land having purchased the same from Juan
Battallones and Gaudencio for themselves and on behalf
of their c o-heirs as evidenced by Deed of Sale. The
spouses took possession of the land and alleges that the
defendants (Spouses Mathay ) have enclosed a portion of
the said property with a fence wit hout the consent a nd
against the will of the plaintiffs.

SPS. SONYA & ISMAEL MATHAY, JR. vs. HON.

COURT OF APP EALS, SPS. TEODULFO & SYLVIA
ATANGAN, SPS. AGUSTINA & AMOR POBLETE, SPS.
EDUARDO & FELICISIMA TIRONA
FACTS:
A. Civil Case No. TM -175 (Spouses Atangan vs. Spouses
Mathay and RegisterDeeds of Cavite)Involves two parcels of land (Lot No 2186 -A and Lot No.
2186-C)covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT No.
T-195350 and TCTNo. 195351) issued in the name of
Spouses AtanganSps. Atangan alleges that they are owners of t wo (2)
parcels of landpurchased from Spouses Tomas Lucido
and E ustaquia Villanueva as evidenced by the deed of
sale and by the Trans fer Certificates issued. They
immediat ely took possession of the same and paid the
corresponding realty taxes.
Atagan alleges that the vendees titles were transferred to
them by virtue of a decision on the Civil case (Lucido vs
Batallones and P etronilla Quimio, Director of Lands, and
Registers of Deeds of Cavite).B atallones and Quimio, on
the other hand are the vendees of the lands from the
Bureau of Lands.-

Sps. Atagan furt her alleges that Mathays (defendant) have

enclosed a portion of said property with a fence wit hout
their consent.

Atagan t herefore prays that since the title of the Mathays

have no basis in law and that the same was illegally
procured on the basis of forgery, the same should be
cancelled and the Mathays have no right o take poss ession
of the property in question. They also demand moral,
irre ara le damages and attorneys fee for the same.
B. Civil Case No. TM -180 (Spouses Poblete vs. Spouses
Mathay and the Registerof Deeds of Cavite)Involves a parc el of land registered in the name of Juana
Batallones and Gaudencio Quimio which was allegedly
sold to S ouses Po lete as er Deed of Conditional Sale

The vendees whose titles were transferred in favor of the

plaintiffs have obtained the title by virtue of the decision by
the court on the civil case (Tomas Lucido vs. Juana Onate
Batallones and Petronilla Q.Quimio, Director of Lands, the
Register of Deeds of Cavite). The heirs of Onofre
Batallones and Modesta Quimio are the vendees of the
land form the B ureau of Lands as evidenced by a
Certification issued by the Record Officer of the District
Land Office.
The sale of the subject parcel of land from the Bureau of
Lands in favor of the heirs of B atallones and Quimio was
also evidenced by a Deed of Convey ance duly issued by
the Bureau of Lands.The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were
also issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses
Poblete asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a
product of forgery because it was based on an alleged
transferred certificate in favor of Pedro Banayo and Pablo
Pugay who have no right whatsoever on the real estate in
question. Upon investigation, it was certified by the Bureau
of Lands that the said titles were falsified and forged.
Spouses Poblete therefore prays that since the title of the
Mathays have no basis in law and that the same was
illegally procured on the basis of forgery, the same should
be cancelled and the Mat hays have no right to take
possession of the property in question. They alsodemand
moral, irre ara le damages and attorneys fee for the
same.

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C. Civil Case No. TM -206 (Spouses Tirona vs. Spouses

Mathay, et. al)Spouses Motas bought a parcel of land (Lot 2186 -B)
covered by a Transfer of Certificate of Title of the Registry
of Deeds of Cavite from David Quimio as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale. They were issued by a Transfer
Certificate (TCT No. T-203730).
Vendors David Quimio, Sr., et. al, are the previous
registered owners of the said land as evidenced by a
Trans fer Certificate of Title (TCT No. T-192530). They
obtained rights and interest thereon from their
predecessors who were vendees from the Bureau of
Lands which was then confirmed in a decision on a Civil
case (Tomas Lucido vs. Juana Batallones and Petonila
Quimio)The subject land was subdivided into eight lots as
evidenced by a Subdivision Plans. The subdivided lots
were bought by the Spouses from Motas in good faith, and
were therefore issued with Transfer Certificates of Title.
Spouses Tirona are the one paying the corresponding real
property taxes thereon and were issued with
corresponding tax declaration. They allege that the
defendants (Spouses Mathay) have enclosed among
others the property in question with a fence and took
physical possession thereof without their knowledge and
consent
The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were
also issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses
Tirona asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was
a product of forgery and falsification because it was based
on an alleged trans ferred certificate in favor of Pedro
Banayo and Pablo Pugay who have no right whatsoever
on the real estate in question. Upon investigation, it was
certified by the Bureau of Lands that the said titles were
falsified and forged.
Spouses Tirona therefore prays that since the title of the
Mathays have no basis in law and that the same was
illegally procured on the basis of forgery, the same should
be cancelled and the Mat hays have no right to take
possession of the property in question. They also demand
moral, irre ara le damages and attorneys fee for the
same.
The lower court decided for the defendant spouses
Mathay and against the plaintiffs in the three consolidated
cases. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of
the plaintiff-appellants. Thus, the appeal.
ISSUES:
WON Spouses Mathay can be considered buyers in good
faith.
WON Spouses-private respondents own the individual
properties in question
HELD:
Spouses Mathay cannot be considered as purchasers in
good faith because prior to the fencing of the subject land,
neither they nor their predecessors-in-int erest (Banayo
and Pugay) ever possessed the same. At the same time
the property was sold to petitioners (Mathays), the private
respondents were not only in actual possession of the
same but also built their houses thereon, cultivated it and
were in full enjoyment of the produce and fruits gathered
therefrom. Although it is a well-settled principle that the

person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond

the certificat e of title, there are still circumstances which
would put party on guard and prompt him to investigate or
inspect the property being sold to him. It is expected from
the purchaser of a valued price of a land to inquire first into
the status or nature of possession of the occupants, in
concept of owner. Failure of a prospective buyer to take
such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his
part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or
invoking the rights of a urchaser in good faith. In
addition, before the fence around subject property was
erected, private respondent communicated their objection
to the fencing of the area by petitioners but they were
ignored by the Mathays, who continued enclosing the
premises under controversy in the present of armed men
employed by them.
2. The Spouses-Privat e respondents are the valid owners
of the individual properties in question because all the
su se uent certificates of title including the etitioners
titles are void for the same were forged and falsified. It
was further proved that the titles issued to Mathays are
void forth allegedly Sales Certificat e executed by Tomas
Lucido in favour of Pedro P ugay was not signed by the
said Tomas Lucido. Neither does it bear the signature of
the latter. It further proved that the deeds showed by
Banayo and Pugay were not for the individual property in
question. The circumstances surrounding the execution of
the Deed of Abs olute S ale by P edro Banayo and Pablo
Pugay in favor of the spous es Sonya Mathay and Ismael
Mathay furt her s howed that it did not comply with the legal
formalities and was not duly not arized. Furthermore, the
residence certificates of vendors Banayo and Pugay
appeared to be of dubious source. The Spouses Mathay
utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving the
sustainability of t heir posture of them being buyers in good
faith. Furthermore, the title of Pedro Banayo and Pablo
Pugay relied upon by them has been shown by
preponderance of evidence to be the product of forgery.
Petition is DISMISSE D for the lack of merit, and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRME D in toto.

COL. FRANCISCO DELA MERCED, substi tuting by hi s

heirs, namely, BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUIS
CESAR DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA E. DELA
MERCED(nee MACATANGAY) and MARI A OLIVIA M.
PAREDES vs. GOV ERNMENT S ERVICE INS URANCE
SYSTEM (GSIS) and SPOUS ES VICTOR and
MILAGROS MANLONGAT
FACTS:
This case involves five registered parcels of land located
within the Antonio Subdivision, Pasig City Lots 6, 7, 8, and
10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 (subject properties).
These lots were originally owned by, and titled in the name
of, Jose C. Zulueta (Zulueta), as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26105 which contains several
lots other than the subject properties within the Antonio
Subdivision.
Later, the Zulueta spous es mortgaged several lots
contained in TCT No. 26105 to the GSIS, which eventually
foreclosed on t he mortgaged properties, including the
subject properties. Upon consolidation of GS ISs
ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas name was
cancelled, and TCT No. 23554 was issued in GS ISs
name.
Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners predecessor,

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Francisco Dela Merced (Dela Merced), later on substituted

by his heirs, filed a complaint praying for the nullity of the
GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties (Lots 6, 7, 8,
and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8) on the ground that
he, not the Zuluet as, was the owner of these lots at the
time of the foreclosure. Dela Merced also impleaded Victor
and Milagros Manlongat, who were claiming Lot 6, Block 2
by virtue of a sale executed by the GS IS in their daughters
(Elizabeth Manlongat) favor. Dela Merced argued that, due
to the nullity of GSISs foreclosure over the subject
properties, it had no owners hip right that could be
transferred to Elizabeth Manlongat.
After a protracted litigation, the SC rendered a Decision in
the petitioners favor and nullified GS ISs foreclosure of the
subject properties because these lots were never part of
its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses.
Pursuant to the finality of the Decision, petitioners filed a
Motion for Execution which GSIS opposed on the basis of
Section 39 of the GS IS Act of 1997 (RA 8291 which
allegedly exempts GSIS funds and properties from
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy and other court
processes. A writ of execution was finally issued, however,
first by the RTC and then by the CA. The GS IS filed a
petition for review before the SC which was denied by the
latter.
After the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption,
petitioners encountered more problems with the execution
of the Decision. According to the RD of Pasig City,
Policarpio Espenesin, he could not cancel the titles of
GSIS over Lots 7 and 8 bec ause it no longer had title over
these two lots and had already conveyed the same to two
other persons. Hence, the RD claimed that the writ of
execution must first be modified to include the cancellation
of derivative titles of the GS IS title.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the GSIS can still raise the issue of exemption
II. Whether a final and executory judgment against GSIS
and Manlongat can be enforced against their successorsin-interest or holders of derivative titles
III. Whether an order to cancel title to a particular property
includes an order to provide technical descriptions and
segregate it from its mother title
HELD:
(1) The issue of GSISs alleged exemption under RA 8291
had been finally decided against when this Court denied
GSISs petition for review. GSISs attempt to resurrect the
same issue by interjecting the same in this proceeding is
barred by the principle of "law of the case," which states
that "determinations of questions of law will generally be
held to govern a cas e throughout all its subsequent stages
where such determination has already been made on a
prior
appeal
to
a
court
of
last
resort."
(2) A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the
whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over the said
property. It is not disputed that petitioners caused the
annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 23554 of the lots in
question. The current holders of the derivative titles to
these lots were aware of such annotation when the
individual titles were issued to them. Ineluctably, both were
bound by the outcome of the litigation.

(3) The order contained in the Decision in G. R. No.

140398 is for the RD to cancel GSISs titles over Lot 10,
Block 2 and Lot 8, Block 8, inter alia. Whether these titles
are individual or contained in a mother title is of no
consequence. The RD has to cause their cancellation. If
the cancellation can only be carried out by requiring GSIS
or the Bureau of Lands to provide the necessary
information, then they can be compelled to do so.
Otherwise, the Courts decision would be rendered
inefficacious, and GSIS would retain ostensible ownership
over the lots by the simple expedience that they are
included in a mother title, instead of individual titles. That
result is manifestly contrary to the Courts ruling and would
subvert the very purpose of bringing this case for a
complete resolution.

HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMP ANY

(HBSTC) V. CA
(AUSTRI A-MARTINEZ, J.)
FACTS: Each of private res pondents entered into
separate contracts to sell with TransAmerican Sales and
osition
ransAmerican
through
the
latters
Owner/General Manager, Engr. Jesus Garcia, involving
certain portions of land covered by Trans fer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 19155, located at No. 45 Gen. Lim Street,
Heroes Hill, Quezon City, together with one unit threestorey townhous e to be built on each portion, as follows:
Respondent Pablo N. Arevalo purchased the portion
of land denominated as Unit No. 5 for the amount of
P750,000.00 on August 21, 1988 and had already
fully paid the purchase price on September 3, 1988;
Respondent Alfredo Lim purchas ed the portion of
land denominated as Unit No. 1 for the amount of
P800,000.00 on December 22, 1988 and fully paid
the same upon execution of the agreement on the
same day;
Respondent Francisco A. Uy purchased the portion
of land denominated as Unit No. 6 on October 29,
1988 in the amount of P800,000.00 payable in
installments and had allegedly made a total payment
of P581, 507. 41. He ordered to stop the payment of
all [postdated] checks from Sept ember 1990 to
November 1995 on the ground of non-completion of
his unit and had later learned of the foreclos ure of
the property;
Respondent spouses Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. and
Lilian Soriano purchased the portion of land
denominated as Unit No. 3 on Feb ruary 15, 1990 in
the amount of P 1,600,000.00 and had allegedly
made a payment of P669,960.00. They had stopped
paying because of non-completion of t he project and
had later learned of the foreclosure of the property;
Respondents Alfredo Lim and Santos Lim purchased
the portion of land denominated as Unit No. 7 for
P700,000.00 on October 1988 and had been fully
paid as of March 18, 1989; Santos Lim subsequently
sold and assigned his share of the property to
private respondent Felisa Chi Lim on May 12, 1989.
It is stipulated in their respective contracts that their
individual townhouses will be fully completed and
constructed as per plans and specifications and the
respective titles theret o shall be delivered and transferred

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to private respondents free from all liens and

encumbrances upon their full payment of the purchase
price.
However,
despite
repeated
demands,
Garcia/ TransAmerican failed to comply with their
undertakings.
On May 30, 1989, Engr. Garcia and his wife Lorelie Garcia
obtained from petitioner Home Bankers Savings and Trust
Company (formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust
Company ) a loan in the amount of P4,000,000.00 and
without the prior approval of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB ), the spouses mortgaged eight
lots covered by TCT Nos. 3349 to 3356 as collateral.
Petitioner registered its mortgage on these titles without
any other enc umbrance or lien annotat ed therein. The
proceeds of the loan were intended for the development of
the lots into an eight-unit townhouse project. However,
five out of these eight title s turned out to be private
respondents townhouse s subject of the contracts to
sell with Garcia/TransAmerican.
When the loan became due, Garcia failed to pay his
obligation to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner instituted
an extrajudicial foreclosure8 on the subject lots and being
the highest bidder in the public auction, a certificate of sale
in its favor was issued by the sheriff on February 26, 1990.
Su se uently, the sheriffs certificate of sale was
registered and annotated on the titles of the subject lots in
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
On November 8, 1990, private respondents filed a
complaint with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and
Legal
Affairs
(OAALA ),
HLURB,
against
Garcia/ TransAmerican as seller/developer of the property
and petitioner, as indispensable party, for non -delivery of
titles and non-completion of the subdivision project. They
prayed for t he completion of the units, annulment of the
mortgage in favor of petitioner, release of the mortgage on
the lots with fully paid owners and delivery of their titles,
and for petitioner to compute individual loan values of
amortizing respondents and to accept payments from
them and damages.
Petitioner filed its Answer contending that private
respondents have no cause of action against it; that at the
time of the loan application and execution of the
promissory note and real estate mortgage by Garcia,
there were no known individual buyers of the subject
land nor annotation of any contracts, liens or
encumbrances of third persons on the titles of the
subject lots; that the loan was granted and released
without notifying HLURB as it was not necessary.
The OAA LA rendered its decision in favor of private
respondents, ruling that the mortgage is unenforceable
and ordering the cancellation of the annot ations of the
Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner. The OAALA
likewise ordered the delivery of t he TCTs that cover the
rivate res ondents townhouses. Petitioner a ealed the
said decision but the same was affirmed.
In this present Petition, HBS TC contends that, granting
arguendo that the mortgage is unenforc eable, it is not
obliged to go beyond the certificates of title registered and
had every reason to rely on the correctness and validity of
those titles.
ISSUE: W/n a mortgagee is obliged to look beyond the
certificate of title prior to entering into the transaction in
question.

HELD: Ye s. While the cases cited by petitioner held that

the mortgagee is not under obligation to look beyond the
certificate of title when on its face, it was free from lien or
encumbrances, the mortgagees therein were considered
in good fait h as they were totally innocent and free from
negligenc e or wrongdoing in the transaction. In this case,
petitioner knew that the loan it was extending to
Garcia/ TransAmerican was for the purpose of the
development of the eight -unit townhouses.
Petitioners insistence that rior to the a roval of the loan,
it undertook a thorough check on the property and found
the titles free from liens and encumbrances would not
suffice. It was incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into
the status of the lots which includes verification on whether
Garcia had secured the authority from the HLURB to
mortgage the subject lots. Petitioner failed to do so. We
likewise find petitioner negligent in failing to even ascertain
from Garcia if there are buy ers of the lots who turned out
to e rivate res ondents. Petitioners want of knowledge
due to its negligenc e takes the place of registration, thus it
is presumed to know the rights of respondents over the lot.
The conversion of the status of petitioner from mortgagee
to buyer-owner will not lessen the importance of such
knowledge. Neither will the conversion set aside the
consequence of its negligence as a mortgagee.
Judicial notice can be taken of the uniform practice of
banks to investigate, examine and assess the real estate
offered as security for the application of a loan. We
cannot overemphasize the fact that the Bank cannot
barefacedly argue that simply bec ause the title or titles
offered as security were clean of any encumbrances or
lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to
verify the over-reaching implications should the
subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure.

DOMINGO REALTY, INC. AND AYALA STEEL

MANUFACTURING CO., INC. V. CA AND ANTONIO M.
ACERO
(VELAS CO, JR., J.)
FACTS: Petitioner Domingo Realty filed a complaint
against private respondent Acero for recovery of
possession of three parc els of land located in Cupang,
Muntinlupa. Acero allegedly constructed a factory building
for hollow locks on a ortion of thes e lands. In Aceros
answer, he claimed that he merely leased the land from
David Victorio who in turn assailed the validity of
etitioners
C s
y claiming that he and his
predecessors -in-interest had been in possession of the
property for more than 70 years and that the TCTs
emanated from spurious deeds of sale.
A Compromise Agreement was eventually executed by the
parties-in-interest which prompted the RTC to adopt the
same in its Decision. Petitioner, in order to implement the
Decision, filed a motion asking permission to conduct a resurvey of the subject properties, which was grant ed in an
Order dated Jan. 22, 1988. Acero subsequently filed a
motion to nullify the said Agreement, claiming that the resurvey would violat e the Agreement since the whole area
he occupied will be adjudged as owned by petitioner. The
same was denied. The results of the re-survey showed
that the land occupied by the factory of Acero is covered
by the TCTs of petitioner. Petitioners (with Ayala Steel
being the transferee) filed a motion for execution on Dec.
10, 1991 which was approved on Jan. 15, 1992.

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Aggrieved, respondent moved for the annulment of the

Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Execution on the
ground that the survey plan (results of the re-survey by
petitioners) violated the Compromise Agreement in such a
way that he will be forced to vacate the whole of the
property he was occupying instead of vacating only a
portion of the same (sinc e the compromise agreement was
only as to a portion of the land occupied by him which
2000 sqm more or less). The same was denied.
In the CA, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO
and the annulment of the RTC Order granting the
execution of the judgment. The CA ruled in favor of him,
holding that his belief that he would only be vacating a
portion of the property he was occupying was a mistake
that is a basis for the nullific ation of the compromise
agreement.
ISSUE: W/n the compromise agreement should be set
aside on the ground of mistake.
HELD: No. it is presumed that the parties to a contract
know and understand the import of their agreement. Thus,
civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino opined that:
To invalidate consent, the error must be
excusable. It must be real error, and not
one that could have been avoided by the
party alleging it. The error must arise
from facts unknown to him. He cannot
allege an error which refers to a fact
known to him, or which he should have
known by ordinary diligent examination of
the facts. An error so patent and obvious
that nobody could have made it, or one
which could have been avoided by
ordinary prudence, cannot be invoked by
the one who made it in order to annul his
contract. A mistake that is caused by
manifest negligenc e cannot invalidate a
juridical act. (Emphasis supplied.)
Prior to the execution of the Compromise Agreement,
respondent Acero was already aware of the technical
description of the titled lots of petitioner Domingo Realty
and more so, of the boundaries and area of the lot he
leased from David Victorio. Before consenting to the
agreement, he could have simply hired a geodetic
engineer to conduct a verification survey and determine
the actual encroac hment of the area he was leasing on the
titled lot of petitioner Domingo Realty. Had he undert aken
such a precautionary measure, he would have known that
the entire area he was occupying intruded into t he titled lot
of petitioners and possibly, he would not have signed the
agreement.
In this factual milieu, respondent Acero could have easily
averted the alleged mistake in the contract; but through
palpable neglect, he failed to undertake the meas ures
expected of a person of ordinary prudence. Without doubt,
this kind of mistake cannot be resorted to by respondent
Acero as a ground to nullify an otherwise clear, legal, and
valid agreement, even though the document may bec ome
adverse and even ruinous to his business.
Moreover, respondent failed to state in the Compromise
Agreement that he intended to vacate only a portion of the
property he was leasing. Such provision being beneficial to
respondent, he, in the exercise of the proper diligence
required, should have made sure that such matter was
specified in the Compromise Agreement. Respondent
Aceros failure to have the said sti ulation incor orated in

the Compromise Agreement is negligence on his part and

insufficient to abrogate said agreement.

DBP V. THE ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA

ECIJA
(NARV ASA, J.)
FACTS: On June 13, 1980, the Development Bank of the
Philippines (hereafter, DBP) presented for registration to
the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a
sheriff's certific ate of sale in its favor of two parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033
and NT-149034, both in the names of the spouses Andres
Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which said institution had
acquired as the highest bidder at an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. The transaction was entered as Entry No.
8191 in the Registry's Primary Entry Book and DBP paid
the requisite registration fees on the same day.
Annotation of the sale on the covering certificates of title
could not, however be effected because the originals of
those certificates were found to be missing from the files of
the Registry, where they were supposed to be kept, and
could not be located. On the advice of the Register of
Deeds, DBP instituted proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija to reconstitute said certificates,
and reconstitution was ordered by that court in a decision
rendered on June 15, 1982. For reasons not apparent on
the record, the certificates of title were reconstituted only
on June 19, 1984.
On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the
reconstituted titles of the certificate of sale s ubject of Entry
No. 8191 on the basis of that same four-year-old entry.
The Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper
action to take on the solicitation, took the matter to the
Commissioner of Land Registration by consulta raising two
questions: (a) whether the certificate of sale could be
registered using the old E ntry No. 8191 made in 1980
notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of the
reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June
19, 1984; and (b) if the first query was answered
affirmatively, whether he could sign the proposed
annotation, having assumed his duties only in July 1982.
The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No. 8191
had been rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility
of accomplishing registration at the time the document was
entered because of the non-availability of the certificate
(sic) of title involved. For said certificate of sale to be
admitted for registration, there is a need for it to be reentered now that the titles have been reconstituted upon
payment of new entry fees," and by-passed the second
query as having been rendered moot and academic by the
answer to the first. Aggrieved, DBP appealed the
resolution to the CA.
ISSUE: W/n the refusal of the ROD to annotate the
reconstituted titles is proper.
HELD: No. The appealed resolution appears to be based
upon a reading of the cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529,
and particularly of the provision therein referring to the
Register's act of making a primary entry as "...a
preliminary process in registration...," as depriving of any
effect a primary entry without a corres ponding annot ation
thereof on the certificate of title to which the instrument
subject of said entry refers.

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That view fails to find support from a consideration of

entire context of said Section 56 which in another part also
provides that the instrument subject of a primary entry "...
shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted ...,"
and, at the very least, gives such entry from the moment of
its making the effect of putting the whole world on notice of
the existence the instrument on entered. S uch effect (of
registration) clearly attaches to the mere making of the
entry without regard to the subsequent step of annot ating
a memorandum of the instrument subject of the entry on
the certificat e of title to which it refers. Indeed, said
Section, in also providing that the annotation, "... when
made ... shall bear the same date ..." as the entry, may be
said to contemplate unspecified intervals of time occurring
between the making of a primary entry and that of the
corresponding annotation on the certificate of title wit hout
robbing the entry of the effect of being equivalent to
registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in the
appealed resolution that annotation must annotation entry
immediat ely or in short order justified by the language of
Section 56.
Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus
between primary entry and proposed annotation in this
case has not been of DBP's making. Though it was under
no necessity to present the owner's duplicates of the
certificates of title affected for purposes of primary entry,
since the transaction sought to be recorded was an
involuntary transaction, and the record is silent as to
whet her it present ed them or not, there is nonetheless
every probability that it did so. It was the mortgagee of the
lands covered by those titles and it is usual in mortgage
transactions that the owner's duplicates of the
encumbered titles are yielded into the custody of the
mortgage until the mortgage is discharged. Moreover, the
certificates of title were reconstituted from the owner's
duplicates, and again it is to be presumed that said
duplicates were presented by DBP, the petitioner in the
reconstitution proceedings.
It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration
fees were fully paid and that the certificate of sale was
registrable on its face. 11 DBP, therefore, complied with all
that was required of it for purposes of both primary entry
and annotation of the certificate of sale. It cannot be
blamed
that
annotation
could
not
be
made
contemporaneously with t he entry because t he originals of
the subject certific ates of title were missing and could not
be found, since it had nothing to do with t heir s afekeeping.
If anyone was responsible for failure of annot ation, it was
the Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the
keeping and custody of thos e documents.
It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to
repeat the process of primary entry, paying anew the entry
fees as the appealed resolution disposes, in order to
procure annotation which through no fault on its part, had
to be deferred until the originals of the certificates of title
were found or reconstituted.

FLOR MARTINEZ V. ERNESTO G. GARCI A AND

EDILBERTO M. BRUA
(PERALTA, J.)
FACTS: Respondent Brua was the registered owner of a
parcel of land locat ed in Mandaluyong, Rizal covered by
TCT No. 346026. The same property was mortgaged
several times, as evidenced by annotations found at the
back of its TCT. On Oct. 22, 1991, Brua sold the property
in the amount of P 705K to Garcia, as partial payment of

the formers mortgage inde tedness to the latter. Garcia

then registered the said deed with the ROD of Rizal and
TCT No. 5204 was issued in Garcia and his wifes name.
However, the several annotations at the back of the
previous title were c arried over, such as Entry no. 2881
showing a notice of levy on execution in favor of petitioner
Flor Martinez.
It appeared that the annotations found at the back of the
title of the subject property in favor of petitioner, i.e.,
Notice of Levy on Attachment and/ or Levy, Notice of Levy
on Execution, and Certificate of Sale, were all made in
connection with petitioner's action for Collection of Sum of
Money, in which a decision was rendered in favor of
petitioner, where the RTC ordered respondent Brua t o pay
the former the amount of P244,594.10, representing the
value of the dishonored checks plus 12% int erest per
annum as damages and the premium paid by petitioner for
the attachment bond. The decision became final and
executory as respondent Brua failed to appeal the same,
and a notice of levy on execution was issued. A public
auction was subsequently conducted, where the subject
property was awarded to petitioner as the sole bidder in
the amount of P10, 000. 00, and a Certificate of Sale was
issued in her favor.
On February 9, 1994, res pondents Garcia and Brua filed
with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 267, an Action to Quiet
Title,
initially
against
petitioner
due
to
the
encumbrances/liens annotated on respondent Garcia's
new title. They contended that these encumbrances/liens
were registered subsequent to the annotation of
respondent Garcia's adverse claim made in 1980, and
prayed that these be canceled. Subsequently, the
complaint was amended to include Pilipinas Bank as an
additional defendant. Petitioner and Pilipinas Bank filed
their respective Ans wers theret o.
he R C dismissed Garcias action. In so ruling, the R C
found that the adverse claim which respondent Garcia
caused to be annotat ed on the previous title of the subject
property, i.e, TCT No. 346026, on June 23, 1980 was
predicated on his interest as a mortgagee of a loan of
P150,000.00, which he extended to respondent Brua; that
respondent Garcia's adverse interest was merely that of a
second mortgagee, as he was not yet the purchaser of the
subject property as of s aid date; that when the judicial
liens, i.e., Notice of Levy on Attachment and/or Levy and
Notice of Levy on Execution, were caus ed to be registered
by petitioner on res pondent Brua's title on January 8, 1981
and July 8, 1998, respectively, by virtue of petitioner being
adjudged judgment creditor by Branch 60 of RTC Makati,
respondent Garcia's claim became inferior to that of
petitioner.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA said that a
subsequent sale of property covered by a certificate of title
cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and
annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale;
that while one who buys a property from the registered
owner need not have to look behind t he title, he is
nevertheless bound by the liens and enc umbrances
annotated thereon; and, thus, one who buys without
checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses
consequent to such failure.
ISSUE: W/n petitioner has a better right with respect to the
property in question.
HELD: No. Petitioner contends that the adverse claim of
respondent Garcia inscribed on the title of the subject
property is but a notice that the latter has an interest

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adverse to respondent Brua's title, to the extent of

P150,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage, and such
adverse claim cannot be considered superior to that of a
final sale conducted by the sheriff by virtue of a court
judgment that has attained finality.
Sec. 12, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. E ffect of levy on execution as to
third persons. The levy on execution shall
create a lien in favor of the judgment
obligee over the right, title and interest of
the judgment obligor in such property at the
time of the levy, subject to liens and
encumbrances then existing.
Clearly, the levy does not mak e the judgment creditor the
owner of the property levied upon. He merely obtains a
lien. Such levy on exec ution is subject and subordinate to
all valid claims and liens existing against the property at
the time the execution lien attached, such as real estate
mortgages.
Respondent Garcia's adverse claim, which refers to the
deed of mortgage executed by respondent Brua in his
favor, was annotated on respondent Brua's title registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on June 23, 1980 as
Entry No. 49853. The adverse claim was already existing
when the Notice of Levy on Execution, as well as the
Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner, was inscribed on
July 11, 1988 and Sept ember 2, 1988, respectively; and,
hence, the adverse claim is sufficient to constitute
constructive notice to petitioner regarding the subject
property. When petitioner registered her Notice of Levy on
Execution on the title of the s ubject property, she was
charged with the knowledge that the subject property
sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered
by an interest the same as or better than that of the
registered owner thereof. Thus, no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the CA when it held that the
notice of levy and subsequent sale of the subject property
could not prevail over respondent Garcia's existing
adverse claim inscribed on respondent Brua's certificate of
title.
The annot ation of an adverse claim is a measu re designed
to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real
property, where the registration of such interest or right is
not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or
Act No. 496 (now P.D. No.1529 or the Property
Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties
dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or a better right than that of the
registered owner thereof.
Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. A
purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claims or interest of s ome
other person in the property. Here, petitioner admitted on
cross-examination that when she registered her notice of
attachment in 1981 and the levy on execution on July 11,
1988, she already saw respondent Garcia's advers e claim
inscribed on res pondent Brua's title on June 23, 1980.

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