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ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was
never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.
LAUREL VS GARCIA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the
Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the
properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for
damage done by the latter to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of
men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They
posit that the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or
to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the
Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is
outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and
void ab initio.
No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal
an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to
an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself
in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it rights the sum total of
which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
Sanders v. Veridiano
7/30/2014
0 Comments
FACTS:
Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings
conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval
Personnel explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the
Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners claiming
that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two. Due to the failure to appear in the court,
Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have
been sued for damages.
RULING:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special
services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said for
Moreau. Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the
petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. There should be no question by
now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has
given its consent to be sued.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only
relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.
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RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
FRANCISCO M. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 130876 January 31, 2002
MARIO FL. CRESPO, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
(Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the
three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages
against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and
Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners
motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its]
sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in
question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only
on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the
Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business
relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status
of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the
Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the
universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each
widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the
redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and
Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a
foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause
through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the
Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first
task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the
Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall
first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States,
Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government
decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private
cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
US v. Ruiz (Consti1)
US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal
and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos
Facts:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales.
The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio
de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based
on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company
did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is
to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also
asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the
subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or
any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider
but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.
779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able
to invoke state immunity
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and
Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act
SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK vs. JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR, G.R. No.
for lack of jurisdiction. But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court
sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the BOP are
exclusively proprietary in nature, since they receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, therefore
consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP) to
present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.
Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality,
the BOP cannot be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).
It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for
overtime work on regular working days and holidays, but these facts do not justify the
conclusion that its functions are exclusively proprietary in nature. Overtime work in
the BOP is done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of
administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is
discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so
that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly
proprietary in character.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually
be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled
that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its jurisdiction.
Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of
are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is
dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court
Consti II
GR 135962
March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting
the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567
are unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is
one of the greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a
leading position among its export products; that it gives
employment to thousands of laborers in the fields and factories;
that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of
theIMPORTANT source of foreign exchange needed by our government
and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy
of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement,
therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was
competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare
demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the
wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide
that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase
in taxes that it had to sustain.
The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide
means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid
exercise of police power.
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does
not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated
available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the
resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00
for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved
said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since
it will only benefit a few individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general
welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic
utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the
State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with
private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide
scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto,
but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the
corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably
classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our
legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes
have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenantfarmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, reenacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision,
however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)
DIGEST
FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery
for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such
public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were
available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss
and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that
would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of
land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation.
Thus, the same filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.
HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire
to.
Facts: Respondent
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for
the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable
them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their
platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission
for
dissemination
of
vital
election
information.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
Comelec
Resolution
No.
2772
is
unconstitutional.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon
City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of
property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These
are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that
would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section
9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate
such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not
only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city,
by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best
and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds
it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.
A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common
good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject
to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all
matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised
in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and
oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section
12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial
in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner
as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or
to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and
practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from
the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in
turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is
affirmed.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr
1987]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the
MactanEXPORT Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed.
Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for
brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation.
Respondent
Judge
Dulay
then
issued
an
order
for
the
Issue:
just
compensation
Held:
compensation
The
method of
in
in
PD
PD
ascertaining
1533
1533
just
is
is
unconstitutional.
unconstitutional.
compensation
constitutes
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not
substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, orexecutive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the
Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein.
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or
confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts
the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of
power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the States
police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a
nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge
to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower courts ruling which declared null and
void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police
power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to
tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practised in the City. (Subsections C, Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL
33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery,
because under Section 13 of said ordinance, Violation of the provision thereof is punishable
with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and
maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the
penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can
the ordinance in question be justified under sub- section t, Section 12 of Republic Act 537
which authorizes the City Council toprohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their
burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council may determine, subject to the
provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing
funerals and disposal of the dead. (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically
termed by the respondents, donation
We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a
valid exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section
00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and
such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote,
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce
obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the
forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3)
taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada
and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken
for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power,
the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of government
powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of
government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May
31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya
Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in
scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence
from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable
Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of
police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public
welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since
the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through
which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process
clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of
government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the
form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the
general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception
of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it
for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as
for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is
not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy
burden shouldered by whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether
national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250)
that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, more so, where the ma
corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and
general welfare.
In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and
now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm The presumption is all in favor of validity. The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality
and with all the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. The Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There
was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the
leading Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare
clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety,
health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his
use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. An property in the
state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good
and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are
subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution,
may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with
plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of
the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of
the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the
total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the
city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial
of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation.
The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied
powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis
of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation
but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance
was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses
and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery
cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private
respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the
petitioners had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the
prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May
10, 2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.
2.
WON respondents court will not stray the investigation regarding his sudden leave in the
country, abandoning his residency in Tolosa.
Ruling:
The petition was impressed merit, although the said respondent had leave the country. He Is still
a sovereign here in the Philippines and not to question his right to suffrage. The self-exile of the
respondent was for the purpose of safety and security to his family from the rage of Marcos
regime.
The respondent was a domicile in U.S. but it doesnt mean that there would an estopped to
exercise his privilege as a Filipino citizen in registering his name from the said precinct in Leyte:
questioning right to suffrage.
The petition was GRANTED WITH DUE COURSE, RTCs discretion was reverse and the TRO
issued is in permanent to question the decision of the trial court, initiating a no cost
promulgation, and MTCs decision is hereby REINSTATED.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of the
Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and
a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an
election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may
have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the
presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not
to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does
not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is
a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines
otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to
vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if
such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious
of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as
promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated
because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent
of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is
to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise
the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not
constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs
to it. The canvassing of the votes and theproclamation of the winning candidates for President and
Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power
under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the
winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing
Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. Read full text
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11,
1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998
Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following
documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his
place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5,
1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine
citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable
time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching
the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after
reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
o
o
o
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder,
a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also
known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by
the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the
Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions,
later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on
the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of
the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal
of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become
the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity
of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The
parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3)
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan
F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before
the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed
to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
citizen does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant
does not possess all the qualifications required for applicant for naturalization (CA 473),
even she has proven that she possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized
ipso facto, provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA
473. (Sections 15 and 4)
Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1
to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces
of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth
as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents
on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian
citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous
Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27,
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. 6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10,
2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath
of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis
M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute
a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27,
2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public
office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office
of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the second
division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she
no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of
candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not
apply to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not
under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was
not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).
ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON
MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C.
CORONA, DISMISSED THE APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER
RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF
RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME
COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST
CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER
OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL
REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY
EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING
THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT.
IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY
THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended
by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a wellsettled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains
the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into
such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have
taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under
Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common
goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method'
which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common
goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as
in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are
mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same
having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration
of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been
subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels
was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would
not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of
law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is
estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in
injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.
What is RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that provides for extended
criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO
was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted
October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. 19611968.
While its intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in organized crime,
its application has been more widespread.
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
Penal Code and other laws which are bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently
mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be established together
with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not
require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a
lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life
and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against
political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.
What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the
business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in
the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on
petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in
petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the
Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the
conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit,
regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of
the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in
this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.
Posted by Ruzzel Diane Oducado at Monday, November 25, 2013
The instant petition seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 36, Manila which
affirmed the summary judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 17.
On November 29, 1989 the City of Manila filed an action against herein petitioner
with the MTC for ejectment. The complaint alleged that:
1. That plaintiff is a municipal corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of Rep.
Act No. 409, as amended, with offices at City Hall Building, Manila, represented in
this action by its incumbent City Mayor, Hon. Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., with the same
address as plaintiff;
Defendant is likewise a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines with
offices at the Army and Navy Club Building, Luneta, Manila, where it may be served
with summons;
2. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 12,705.30 sq. m. located
at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay, Manila, covered by TCT No. 156868/1059 of
the Register of Deeds of Manila, together with the improvements thereon known as
the Army and Navy of Manila;
3. That defendant is occupying the above-described land and the Army and Navy Club
Building by virtue of a Contract of Lease executed between plaintiff and defendant in
January 1983, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "A";
4. That paragraph 1 of the said Contract of Lease provides that:
(1) That the LESSEE shall construct, at its own expense, a modern multi-storied hotel
at a cost of not less than FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P50,000.00) (sic), which shall
automatically belong to the LESSOR upon the expiration and/or termination of the
lease agreement, without right of the LESSEE for reimbursement for the costs of its
construction; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that construction of the said hotel shall be
commenced within one (1) year, and completed as far as practicable within five (5)
years, from date of approval by proper government officials of this lease agreement;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, that the plans and specification for the same hotel shall be
approved first by the LESSOR before actual construction;
5. That in violation of the aforequoted provision, defendant has failed and/or refused to
construct a modern multi-storied hotel provided for therein, long after the expiration
period therein stipulated and despite demands of plaintiff, to the prejudice of plaintiff
who has agreed to defendant's continued retention of the property on a lease-back
agreement on the basis of the warranties of defendant to put up a contemporary
multi-storied building;
6. That paragraph 3 of the Contract of Lease also stipulates that:
(3)
That the LESSEE shall pay a rent of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) a year, which may be paid by the LESSEE
in twelve (12) equally monthly installments within the first five (5) days of
each month, without the necessity of a demand, subject, however, to rental
adjustment after the first five (5) days of each month, without the necessity of a
demand, subject, however, to rental adjustment after the first five years of this
lease, at the rate of not more than ten per centum (10%) per annum every two
years, or on the basis of the increase in the prevailing market value of the
leased premises whichever is higher of the two criteria;
7. That defendant also reneged on its rental obligation notwithstanding plaintiff's
demand to pay, for its use and occupancy of the plaintiff's property, starting from
January 1983 to the present, and its rental account stood at P1,604,166.70 as of
May, 1989;
8. That in paragraph 4 of the Contract of Lease, it is also provided that:
(4) That the LESSEE shall pay the realty tax due on the land, including those assessed
against the improvements thereon, as well as all government license, permits, fees and
charges prescribed by law, Presidential decrees and ordinances for the leased
premises, including those for the establishment and operation of a modern multi-
storied hotel and all constructions and modifications pursuant to the provisions of this
Contract;
9.
That defendant violated its undertaking to pay the taxes due on the land and
improvement, so much so that as of December 1989, its aggregate realty tax
liability amounts to P3,818,913.81;
10. That repeated demands of plaintiff had been made upon the defendant to comply
with its aforesaid contractual obligations, but defendant however remained unfazed;
it still failed to perform any of its contractual obligations.
11. That as a result, plaintiff rescinded their Contract of Lease and demanded
defendant to vacate, the last of which was contained in a letter dated May 24, 1989,
copy of which is attached hereto asANNEX "B". To date however, defendant
however, has not budged an inch from the property of plaintiff;
12. That the reasonable rental value for defendant's continued use and occupancy of
the subject premises which is a prime property along Rozas (sic) Boulevard in
Luneta area is P636,467.00 a month in the context of the prevailing rental rates of
comparable real property;[1]
On December 29, 1989 or within the reglementary period, petitioner filed its answer
to the complaint. Subsequently, on February 22, 1990, it filed a "Motion for Leave to File
and for Admission of Amended Answer" allegedly asserting additional special and
affirmative defenses.
On May 23, 1990, the City of Manila filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the
ground that there exists no genuine triable issue in the case.
[2]
On July 27, 1990, the MTC denied the petitioner's motion for leave to admit its
amended answer for lack of merit. Thus, on October 5, 1990, a decision was rendered
with the following dispositive portion:
[3]
Petitioner elevated its case to the Court of Appeals. On October 30, 1992, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
On May 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated October 30, 1992. At the same time, it also denied
the City of Manila's motion for issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.
Petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
shall belong to the City upon expiration or termination of the lease without right of
reimbursement for the cost of construction.
[6]
Petitioner failed to pay the rents for seven (7) consecutive years. As of October,
1989 when the action was filed, rental arrears ballooned to P7.2 million. Real estate
taxes on the land accumulated to P6,551,408.28 as of May, 1971. Moreover, petitioner
failed to erect a multi-storey hotel in the site. For violations of the lease contract and
after several demands, the City of Manila had no other recourse but to file the action for
illegal detainer and demand petitioner's eviction from the premises. Article 1673 of the
New Civil Code is explicit:
ART. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:
(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under
articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;
(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;
(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service not stipulated
which causes the deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in
No. 2 of article 1657, as regards the use thereof.
The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by special laws. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner invokes and capitalizes on the fact that the Army and Navy Club has been
declared a national historical landmark by the National Historical Commission on June
29, 1992 which the lower courts allegedly never gave due consideration. Thus, its
existence should not in any way be undermined by the simple ejectment suit filed
against it. Petitioner contends that all parties are enjoined by law to preserve its
existence and site.
To support its claim, petitioner presented the Certificate of Transfer and Acceptance
of the Historical Marker granted to it pursuant to R.A. 4846, as amended by PD 374
which provides that it shall be "the policy of the State to preserve and protect the
important cultural properties and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to
safeguard their intrinsic value."
[7]
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSFER
AND
ACCEPTANCE OF HISTORICAL MARKER
ARMY AND NAVY CLUB
TO ALL PERSONS TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS MAY COME:
Be it known that the National Historical Institute, in the exercise of its authority
vested by law and in compliance with its mandate to honor national heroes and
perpetuate the glory of their deeds, and to preserve historical sites, has transferred this
historical marker unto Administration of Army and Navy Club, who has agreed to
accept the same and to maintain it as a sacred duty.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands this 29th day
of June, 1992, in Manila.
NATIONAL HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
by:
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
CAPT. VICENTE J. BRILLANTES SERAFIN D. QUIASON
Transferee Transferor
Attested:
(SGD) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
CHIEF SUPT JOSE PERCIVAL ADIONG AVELINA M. CASTANEDA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in Manila, Philippines, this 29th day of
June, 1992 by the affiants.
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
BGEN ANTONIO V. RUSTIA COL MANUEL R. GUEVARA
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
RAMON J. SIYTANGCO, JR. CAPT. DANIEL A. ARREOLA
(SGD.) LOPE M. VELASCO
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires Dec. 31, 1993
Not. Reg. No. 297 PTR 022088
Page 61 1-2-92, Manila
Book II IBP 320197
Series of 1992 12-18-91, Pasig
[8]
The country's artistic and historic wealth is therefore a proper subject for the exercise
of police power:". . . which the State may regulate." This is a function of the
legislature. And once regulation comes in, due process also comes into play. When the
classification of property into historical treasures or landmarks will involve the
imposition of limits on ownership, the Bill of Rights demands that it be done with due
process both substantive and procedural. In recognition of this constitutional principle,
the State in fact has promulgated laws, both general and special, on the subject.
x x x the current general law on the subject is R.A. 4846, approved on June 18, 1966,
and amended by P.D. No. 374. The Act prescribes the manner of classifying historical
and cultural properties thus:
Sec. 4. The National Museum, hereinafter referred to as the Museum shall be the
agency of the government which, shall implement the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 5. The Director of the Museum, hereinafter referred to as the Director, shall
undertake a census of the important cultural properties of the Philippines, keep a
record of their ownership, location, and condition, and maintain an up-to-date register
of the same. Private collectors and owners of important cultural properties and public
and private schools in possession of these items, shall be required to register their
collections with the Museum when required by the Director and to report to the same
office when required by the Director any new acquisitions, sales, or transfers thereof.
Sec. 6. The Director is authorized to convene panels of experts, as often as the need
for their services may arise, each to be composed of three competent men in the
specialized fileds of anthropology, natural sciences, history and archives, fine arts,
philately and numismatics, and shrines and monuments, etc. Each panel shall, after
careful study and deliberation, decide which among the cultural properties in their
field of specialization shall be designated as "National Cultural Treasures" or
"Important Cultural Properties." The Director is further authorized to convene panels
of experts to declassify designated "National Cultural Treasures."
The Director shall within ten days of such action by the panel transmit their decision
and cause the designation-list to be published in at least two newspapers of general
circulation. The same procedure shall be followed in the declassification of important
cultural properties and national treasures.
Sec. 7. In designation of a particular cultural property as a "national cultural treasure,"
the following procedure shall be observed:
a. Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is privately owned, shall be
notified at least fifteen days prior to the intended designation, and he shall be invited
to attend the deliberation and given a chance to be heard. Failure on the part of the
owner to attend the deliberation shall not bar the panel to render its decision. Decision
shall be given by the panel within a week after its deliberation. In the event that the
owner desires to seek reconsideration of the designation made by the panel, he may do
so within days from the date that the decision has been rendered. If no request for
reconsideration is filed after this period, the designation is then considered final and
executory. Any request for reconsideration filed within thirty days and subsequently
again denied by the panel, may be further appealed to another panel chairmanned by
the Secretary of Education, with two experts as members appointed by the Secretary
of Education. Their decision shall be final and binding.
b.
Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and
unique objects may be designated as "National Cultural Treasures." The
remainder, if any, shall be treated as cultural property.
c. Designated "National Cultural Treasures" shall be marked, described, and
photographed by the National Museum. The owner retains possession of the same but
the Museum shall keep a record containing such information as: name of article,
owner, period, source, location, condition, description, photograph, identifying marks,
approximate value, and other pertinent data.
Thus, for Manila Hotel to be treated as special cultural or historical property, it must
go through the procedure described above. Eloquent nationalistic endorsements of
classification will not transform a piece of property into a legally recognized historical
landmark. . . .
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the above procedure has been complied
with. The City of Manila even observed that the signatories thereto are officers and
members of the Club making such certification self-serving. It behooves us to think
why the declaration was conferred only in 1992, three (3) years after the action for
ejectment was instituted. We can only surmise that this was merely an afterthought, an
attempt to thwart any legal action taken against the petitioner. Nonetheless, such
certification does not give any authority to the petitioner to lay claim of ownership, or
any right over the subject property. Nowhere in the law does it state that such
recognition grants possessory rights over the property to the petitioner.Nor is the
National Historical Commission given the authority to vest such right of ownership or
possession of a private property to the petitioner. The law merely states that it shall be
the policy of state to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and National
Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. In line with this,
any restoration, reconstruction or preservation of historical buildings shall only be made
under the supervision of the Director of the National Museum. The authority of the
National Historical Commission is limited only to the supervision of any reconstruction,
restoration or preservation of the architectural design of the identified historical building
and nothing more. Even assuming that such recognition made by the National Historical
[10]
[11]
Commission is valid, the historical significance of the Club, if any, shall not be affected if
petitioner's eviction from the premises is warranted.Unfortunately, petitioner is merely a
lessee of the property. By virtue of the lease contract, petitioner had obligations to
fulfill. Petitioner can not just hide behind some recognition bestowed upon it in order to
escape from its obligation or remain in possession. It violated the terms and conditions
of the lease contract. Thus, petitioner's eviction from the premises is inevitable.
Anent the procedural issues raised, the Court finds no reversible error in the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court.
A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact
involved (except as to the amount of damages), and that therefore the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[12]
In the case at bar, there is clearly no substantial triable issue. In the Answer filed on
December 29, 1989, petitioner does not deny the existence of the lease contract
executed with the City of Manila in January 1983. It admitted that it failed to pay the
rents and real estate taxes and construction of a multi-storey building.
It put up the defense that it was unable to fulfill its obligations of the contract due to
economic recession in 1984 as an aftermath of the Ninoy Aquino
assassination. Considering that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, a
summary judgment is proper. The argument that it was declared a historical landmark,
is not a substantial issue of fact which does not, in any way, alter or affect the merit of
the ejectment suit.
Likewise, we find no error much less any abuse of authority on the part of the lower
court in not admitting the Amended Answer. Aside from the fact that it was filed one (1)
year after the original answer was filed, it put up defenses which are entirely in
contradiction to its original answer. This is in contravention of the rules of procedure.
Having admitted in the original answer that the City of Manila is the registered owner
of the property and that it leased the property from it, petitioner can not now deny such
claim of ownership. The Court of Appeals correctly observed on this point:
[13]
Be that as it may, at this last stage, after herein petitioner has dealt with the private
respondent as the owner of the leased premises and obtained benefits from said
acknowledgment of such ownership for almost half a century, herein petitioner cannot
be permitted to assume an inconsistent position by denying said private respondent's
ownership of the leased premises when the situation calls for it. Herein petitioner
cannot be allowed to double deal, recognizing herein private respondent's title over
the leased premises and entering into a lease contract and other covenants, and
thereafter after failing to comply with its obligation provided for in the lease
agreement attempt to repudiate the ownership of private respondent of the subject
property.
[14]
[1]
[2]
Id., at 108.
[3]
Id., at 125.
[4]
Id., at 127.
[5]
Id., at 27-28.
[6]
Id., at 203-204.
xxx
Sec. 2. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state to preserve and protect the important cultural
properties and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value.
Sec. 3. x x x
a. Cultural properties are old buildings, monuments, shrines, documents, and objects which may be
classified as antiques, relics, or artifacts, landmarks, anthropological and historical sites, and specimens
of natural history which are of cultural, historical, anthropological or scientific value and significance to the
nation; such as physical, anthropological, archaeological and ethnographical materials, meteorites and
tektites; historical objects and manuscripts; household and agricultural implements; decorative articles or
personal adornment; works of art such as paintings, sculptures, carvings, jewelry, music architecture,
sketches, drawings, or illustrations in part or in whole; works of industrial and commercial art such as
furniture, pottery, ceramics, wrought iron, gold, bronze, silver, wood or other heraldic items, metals, coins,
medals, badges, insignias, coat of arms, crests, flags, arms and armor; vehicles or ships or boats in part
or in whole.
b. cultural properties which have been singled out from among the innumerable cultural properties as
having exceptional historical and cultural significance to the Philippines, but are not sufficiently
outstanding to merit the classification "National Cultural Treasures" are important cultural properties.
c. A National Cultural Treasure is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural
artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation.
xxx
i. A historical site is any place, province, city, town and/or any location and structure which has played a
significant and important role in the history of our country and nation. Such significance and importance
may be cultural, political, sociological or historical.
[8]
[9]
Id., at 193.
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997.
[10]
Sec. 13. All restorations, reconstructions, and preservations of government historical buildings, shrines,
landmarks, monuments, and sites, which have been designated as 'National Cultural Treasures,' and
'important cultural properties' shall only be undertaken with the written permission of the Director of the
National Museum who shall designate the supervision of the same.
[11]
Secs. 1, 2, 3, Rule 34. Philippine National Bank vs. Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery, 226 SCRA 36 (1993);
Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753 (1987); Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 75 (1988).
[12]
[13]
[14]
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of
local- hires.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that
labor is entitled to humane conditions of work. These conditions
are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office
or the field but include as well the manner by which employers
treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by
the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution
mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right
and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as
the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited
to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.
GSIS v. MONTESCLAROS
FACTS: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and
equal protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension.
GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
HELD: There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be
heard. There is also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of
togetherness in marriage before the employees death is valid to prevent sham marriages contracted
for monetary gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if
the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioners death, the
dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within 3 years
before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose intended.
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who
was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as
authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of
the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office and
the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.
Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review,
three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his
disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely
affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the imminent
elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging
and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask
if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package
making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating
procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the
substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the
package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found driedmarijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found
guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right
of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence
against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one
who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and
siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was
AFFIRMED.
Posted by gemendio at 1:04 AM
FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May
10, 1984. The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the
articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the officers
conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and
eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his
application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in
the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both
of whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat.
Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the
contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the
same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure
in issuing the Search Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that
his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant
Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search
warrant on the basis of the information provided by the witnesses whose
depositions had already been taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search
warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known
to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.
PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR
APRIL 9, 2014 | KAAARINA
PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR
G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988
Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant
of arrest against fifty (50) John Does transgressing the Constitutional provision
requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things
to be seized.
Issue: Whether said warrant is valid
Held: No.
Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) John Does not one of whom
the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a
general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional
and
once
anathematized
subject.[30] Clearly
as
violative
totally
of
the
subversive
of
the
constitutional
liberty
of
injunction
the
that