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Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935

Posted by Pius Morados on November 21, 2011

(Land Titles and Deeds Native Title)


Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for
more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land
when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the
Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no
prescription against the Crown.
Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:
It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the
theory of jura regalia.

CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L2746 December 6, 1906


MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring
that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of

such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was
never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.

LAUREL VS GARCIA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the
Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the
properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for
damage done by the latter to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of
men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They
posit that the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public


dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As
property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no
conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only
when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables,
the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title.
There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines.
The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light
on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does

not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through


reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell
them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional
limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE


AUTHORITY
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was
passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed
lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila
Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or
to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the
Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is
outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and
void ab initio.

RELLOSA v. GAW CHEE HUN


RELLOSA v. GAW CHEE HUN
G.R. No. L-1411. September 29, 1953
Ponente: J. Bautista Angelo
DOCTRINE:
The In Pari Delicto doctrine provides that the proposition is universal that no action arises, in
equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to
recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its
violation.
FACTS:
On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together with the
house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila, Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor
remained in possession of the property under a contract of lease entered into on the same date between
the same parties.
Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that the vendee, being a Chinese
citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military Administration in accordance with (seirei) No. 6
issued on April 2, 1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and that,
even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void under article XIII, section 5, of our
Constitution.
The vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the
annulment of the sale
ISSUES:

1. Whether the sale was void because it is against the constitution


2. Whether the petitioner have the sale declared null and void and recover the property considering the effect
of the law governing rescission of contracts
HELD:
1) Yes, the court held that under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, including residential lands. This matter has been once more submitted to the court for deliberation,
but the ruling was reaffirmed. This ruling fully disposes of the question touching on the validity of the sale
of
the
property
herein
involved.
2) No, even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution to set aside the sale in question, they are now
prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted with,
because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. They
cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law.

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. LUI SHE


PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. LUI SHE
G.R. No. L-17587. September 12, 1967
Ponente: J. Castro
DOCTRINE:
Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is against a constitutional prohibition, the
same should be considered null and void.
FACTS:
Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then
already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years,
although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement.
On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased
premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in
Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her
household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining
Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered
that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children
on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was
discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts
she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a
change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and
inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid
HELD:

No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal
an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to
an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself
in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it rights the sum total of
which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.

Sanders v. Veridiano
7/30/2014
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Constitutional Law. Political Law. Doctrine of State Immunity.


Sanders v. Veridano
GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city.
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the
Philippines and who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of
NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders
disagreed with the hearing officers report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent fulltime status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which
caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners.
ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which
the private respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters,
the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As such, the
complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent
to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with
the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged
offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

Case Digest: Sanders and Moreau, Jr. vs. Veridiano II


10 June 1988

G.R. No. L-56930

FACTS:
Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings
conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval
Personnel explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the
Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners claiming
that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two. Due to the failure to appear in the court,
Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have
been sued for damages.
RULING:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special
services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said for
Moreau. Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the
petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. There should be no question by
now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has
given its consent to be sued.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No.


L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and
possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its consent
to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through
the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only
relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.
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FRANCISCO M. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 130876 January 31, 2002

MARIO FL. CRESPO, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

HOLY SEE VS. ROSARIO


MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as


Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over
the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines
by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land
consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of
Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was
contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his
rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to
private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner
of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation

(Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the
three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages
against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and
Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners
motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its]
sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in
question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only
on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the
Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business
relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status
of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the
Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the
universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each
widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the

newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is


recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site
of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign
sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state,
necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic
mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on
November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal
thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character.
Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to
dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it
almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the
donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still
occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the
redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and
Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a
foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause
through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the
Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first
task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the
Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall
first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States,
Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government
decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private
cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

US v. Ruiz (Consti1)
US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal
and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos
Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales.
The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States.

US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio
de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based
on the letters received from the US.

In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company
did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is
to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also
asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the
subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or
any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider
but to no avail.

Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.
779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able
to invoke state immunity
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and
Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R.


No. 154705. June 26, 2003]
FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance
agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical
facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.
The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the
respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot
be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their
immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.
HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as
the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the
inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state
may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the
embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a
contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia
in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
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LABELS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST


SATURDAY, APRIL 26, 2014

BOP v BPEA, 1 SCRA, 340


Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial
Court against petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General Services and
Director of BOP). The complaint alleged that both the secretary of DOG and the director
of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor practices. Answering the complaint, the
petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and
alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending result of administrative
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the
BOP is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic
performing governmental functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction. But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court
sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the BOP are
exclusively proprietary in nature, since they receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, therefore
consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP) to
present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.
Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality,
the BOP cannot be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).
It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for
overtime work on regular working days and holidays, but these facts do not justify the
conclusion that its functions are exclusively proprietary in nature. Overtime work in
the BOP is done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of
administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is
discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so
that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly
proprietary in character.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually
be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled
that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its jurisdiction.
Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of
are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is
dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court

Consti II

MMDA v Bel-Air Village


Association, Inc.
Posted on November 18, 2012

GR 135962
March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting
the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the

perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be


demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune
Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an
agent of the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body
politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of
the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants
of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of
1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its
inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
[LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no
grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a political unit
of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening
by the MMDA is illegal.
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LUTZ v. ARANETA 98 PHIL. 145 December 22, 1955


(CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of


the Intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, plaintiff-appellant v. J. ANTONIO
ARANETA, as collector of Internal Revenue,
defendant-apppelle
G.R No. L-7856. December 22, 1955
REYES, J.B L., J.:
FACTS:
Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial
Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal
Revenue the total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six
and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under
section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar
Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950.
Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the
existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on
each picul of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the
owners or persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation
of sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or
otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between the money
value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount
representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It
was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being
levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively,
which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a
tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed by the
CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567
are unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is
one of the greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a
leading position among its export products; that it gives
employment to thousands of laborers in the fields and factories;
that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of
theIMPORTANT source of foreign exchange needed by our government
and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy
of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement,
therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was
competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare
demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the
wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide
that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase
in taxes that it had to sustain.
The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide
means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid
exercise of police power.

Binay vs Domingo Case Digest


Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of Municipal Corporations

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does
not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated
available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the
resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00
for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved
said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since
it will only benefit a few individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general
welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,

which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic
utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the
State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with
private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide
scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto,
but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the
corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably
classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our
legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes

have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenantfarmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, reenacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision,
however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)

Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649) - Digest


Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit governments
right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same
reason, the law has intruded into the local governments right to impose local
taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that
power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore
must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon
by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax.
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress, which has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax
certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
2. The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue license or
permits for the operation of gambling.

3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National


Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category
of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of
the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will
be violated by P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the
local government.
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to
impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may
provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil.


349 (1919)
CASE

DIGEST

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery
for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such
public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were
available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss
and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that
would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of
land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent

domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation.
Thus, the same filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.
HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire
to.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA


272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Respondent

Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing

newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for
the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable
them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their
platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission

for

dissemination

of

vital

election

information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of


newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power)
of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises
during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.

Issue:
Whether

or

not

Comelec

Resolution

No.

2772

is

unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held


that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to
taking of private personal property without payment of the just compensation
required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the
newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private
property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no
showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon
City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of
property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These
are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that
would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section
9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate
such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not
only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city,
by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best

and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds
it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.
A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common
good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject
to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all
matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised
in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and
oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section
12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial
in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner
as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or
to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and
practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from
the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in
turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is
affirmed.

EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr
1987]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the
MactanEXPORT Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed.
Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for
brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation.

Respondent

Judge

Dulay

then

issued

an

order

for

the

appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was


later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be
P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that
under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the
fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the
case.

Issue:

Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining

just

compensation

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just

compensation
The

method of

in

in

PD

PD
ascertaining

1533

1533
just

is

is

unconstitutional.

unconstitutional.

compensation

constitutes

impermissibleencroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the


courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for
financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding

principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not
substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, orexecutive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983


CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
City Fiscal for petitioners.
Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.

DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the
Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE

CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND


PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for
operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city
authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council
passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park
lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino,
Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance
in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and
respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court,
therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and
void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council
filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the
burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized
under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to make such further ordinances
and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge

the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein.
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or
confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts
the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of
power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the States
police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a
nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge
to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower courts ruling which declared null and
void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police
power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to
tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practised in the City. (Subsections C, Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL
33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery,
because under Section 13 of said ordinance, Violation of the provision thereof is punishable
with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and
maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the
penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can

the ordinance in question be justified under sub- section t, Section 12 of Republic Act 537
which authorizes the City Council toprohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their
burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council may determine, subject to the
provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing
funerals and disposal of the dead. (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically
termed by the respondents, donation
We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a
valid exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section
00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and
such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote,
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce
obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the
forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3)
taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada
and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken
for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power,
the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of government

powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of
government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May
31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya
Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in
scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence
from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable
Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of
police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public
welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since
the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through
which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process
clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of
government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the
form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the
general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception
of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it
for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as
for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is
not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy
burden shouldered by whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether
national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250)
that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, more so, where the ma
corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and
general welfare.

In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and
now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm The presumption is all in favor of validity. The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality
and with all the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. The Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There
was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the
leading Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare
clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety,
health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his
use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. An property in the
state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good
and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are
subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution,
may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with
plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of
the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of
the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the
total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the
city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial
of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation.
The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied
powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis
of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation
but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance
was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses
and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery
cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private
respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No.


189868, December 15, 2009)
FACTS:
In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC Resolution No.
8514, to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10,
2010.
The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal
filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer
during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election."
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer
upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest
elections; that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for preelection acts which include voters registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by
operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the prohibitive period
set forth by R.A. 8189.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in every
national or local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during
office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day
period, as the case may be, was enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming
elections and COMELEC's rule making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration under R.A.
8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election
activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by law. However, this
grant of power, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common
underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.

In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the
petitioners had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the
prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May
10, 2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.

PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ VS. RTC


CASE DIGEST
Topic: Suffrage Qualification
Facts:
Philip G. Romualdez is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and a son of a former governor of
Leyte Benjamin Kokoy and sole nephew of First lady Imelda Marcos. He served as a barangay
captain of the said place during snap election in 1986.
He fled the country and went to U.S. and sought asylum, took special studies in the development
of Leyte-Samar with International business studies as well.
When Romualdez came back in the Philippines and run in National Congress the Commission
on Election allowed him to vote and have him registered on precinct 9 of Tolosa, Malbog Leyte
where he had resided.
However, Advincula filed a petition questioning the registration of Romualdez to the said
Municipality in MTC. The former allege that Romualdez was not a resident of the said
municipality because he leave the country and resided in U.S. Massachussets. He just recently
arrive here and didnt acquired 1 year residency here yet.
The MTC denied the petition of Advincula in the Registration of Romuladez on the said precinct
and the right to suffrage. But the RTC reverse the discretion and disqualified the voter
registration of Romualdez favoring the petitioner.
The respondent prayed that the MTCs discretion over questioning his right to suffrage will be
affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. WON MTC and RTC will find jurisdiction over respective petitions.

2.

WON respondents court will not stray the investigation regarding his sudden leave in the
country, abandoning his residency in Tolosa.
Ruling:
The petition was impressed merit, although the said respondent had leave the country. He Is still
a sovereign here in the Philippines and not to question his right to suffrage. The self-exile of the
respondent was for the purpose of safety and security to his family from the rage of Marcos
regime.
The respondent was a domicile in U.S. but it doesnt mean that there would an estopped to
exercise his privilege as a Filipino citizen in registering his name from the said precinct in Leyte:
questioning right to suffrage.
The petition was GRANTED WITH DUE COURSE, RTCs discretion was reverse and the TRO
issued is in permanent to question the decision of the trial court, initiating a no cost
promulgation, and MTCs decision is hereby REINSTATED.

MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC


G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming
that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition
as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in Section
1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating
the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual

physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of the
Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and
a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an
election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may
have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the
presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not
to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does
not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is
a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines
otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to
vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if
such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious
of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as
promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated
because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent
of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is
to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise
the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not
constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs
to it. The canvassing of the votes and theproclamation of the winning candidates for President and
Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power
under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the
winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing
Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional

authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. Read full text

AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELEC


G.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27,
2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001
was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC.Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly
provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time
left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special registration of
new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and
the May 14, 2001 general elections.
HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters. The
right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of
the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance. However, court took
judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special
Session to allow the conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in
Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189. Read full text

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999


Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine
Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner
Facts:

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11,
1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998
Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following
documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his
place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5,
1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine
citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable
time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching
the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after
reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000

o
o
o

Principle of jus sanguinis


How Philippine citizenship is acquired
Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other
citizenship
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and
an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle
in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in
the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as
candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder,
a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also
known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3


March 2004]
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino
X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2)
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26

January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by
the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the
Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions,
later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on
the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of
the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal
of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become
the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity
of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The
parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3)
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan
F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before
the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed
to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION


Posted by kaye lee on 1:40 PM
GR # L-21289, October 4, 1971 [Naturalization - Qualification and Disqualification; CA 473]
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the Philippines
was to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen. Solicitor General opposes the ground that the marriage of the alien to a Filipino

citizen does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant
does not possess all the qualifications required for applicant for naturalization (CA 473),
even she has proven that she possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized
ipso facto, provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA
473. (Sections 15 and 4)
Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1

Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001


Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he
is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli.
However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection
therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was
elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that
Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those
who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of
C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due

to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces
of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth
as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26,


1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through

expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of


entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Consti II case digest: TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,


vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO
V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents.
Facts:

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents
on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian
citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous
Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27,
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. 6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10,
2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath
of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis
M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute
a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27,
2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public
office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office
of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the second
division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she
no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of
candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not
apply to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not
under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was
not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).

CASE DIGEST : CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT


G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997 HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary
for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of
Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of
Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.
FACTS: : IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF
APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION
ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT. ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92

ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON
MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C.
CORONA, DISMISSED THE APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER
RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF
RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME
COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST
CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER
OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL
REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY
EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING
THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT.
IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY
THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT

CASE DIGEST : City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio


G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005 CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of
Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding
Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON.
AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U.
LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C.
PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G.
RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON.
MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ,
HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON.
GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON.
FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON.
BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON.
BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON.
ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as
councilors of the City of Manila, Petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge,
RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
\On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically
prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels andHOTELS from operating in the Malate
District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist
Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includesHOTELS AND MOTELS in the
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market
such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can
only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose

of the law is to promote morality in the City.


ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional
limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it
is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different from sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The
Supreme Court Said that it is baseless and insupportable.
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of
the beneficial use of its property. Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in
order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid.
The Ordinance however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property
and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid
Posted by Raymond Sangalang at 11:01 AM

Estrada v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.


7/13/2010
0 Comments

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'

Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:


I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE
OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT
ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE
DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING
THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended
by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a wellsettled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to

use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains
the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into
such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have
taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under
Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common
goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method'
which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common
goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as
in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.

In view of due process


On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents
the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the
crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is
no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.

In view of mens rea


As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires
proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are
mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are

the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are
mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same
having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration
of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

In view of presumption of innocence


At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is
a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be
expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given
situations. The application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will
then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of the
courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative
enactments.
A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish
the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its
enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just
private parties or personal interests but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a crime
against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped permanently."

In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been
subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels
was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would
not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of
law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is
estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in
injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.

What is RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that provides for extended
criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO
was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted
October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. 19611968.
While its intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in organized crime,
its application has been more widespread.

In view of facial challenge


A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.'
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from

their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.

In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J.


In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution before this Court
may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental
law prohibits, the statute allows to be done. 40 To justify the nullification of the law, there must be a clear, unequivocal
breach of the Constitution; not a doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law which are easily
clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from
establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional
challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of constitutionality without
the same requisite quantum of proof.
Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of
plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of over or criminal acts indicative of unlawful
scheme or conspiracy."
All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the reality with respect to the
crime of plunder that "the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth and entirety, be discovered, by reason
of the 'stealth and secrecy' in which it is committed and the involvement of 'so many persons here and abroad and
[the fact that it] touches so many states and territorial units."'
"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the
conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in favor of
constitutionality . . . To doubt is to sustain.'

In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.


The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal statute should not be so vague and
uncertain that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.
There are three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that
individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was
articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute
that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.
The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty
the standards to which an individual must conform his conduct, it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable
standards to guide prospective conduct. And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is
higher. The penalty imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to death.
Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher than that
of other laws.
It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the Plunder Law, and that
"facial" or "on its face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several
problematical portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you have a 'series' of
criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings
of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.
To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to
constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and sentence
the accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise punishable under the Revised

Penal Code and other laws which are bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently
mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be established together
with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not
require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a
lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life
and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against
political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.

In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.


It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do justice is tarnished by
anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections accorded an accused may be taken away.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law
which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures leading to conviction may be fair and
proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be
sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial construction
takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due process requires that a criminal
statute should not be vague and uncertain. More explicitly That the terms of a penal statute. . . must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a wellrecognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process.
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. 9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad,
in violation of the due process clause, where its language does not convey sufficiently definite warning to the average
person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning.
In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the
criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed. Equally disagreeable is the provision
of the Plunder Law which does away with the requirement that each and every component of the criminal act of
plunder be proved and instead limits itself to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy,
and does away with the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are concerned. In other words, R.A.
No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to
constitute the crime of plunder, because the law requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the specifications of details in an
information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot rise higher than the statute
upon which it is based. Not even the construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can
supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information should be
drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an information should also be present in the law upon which
the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the information will come from the prosecutor.

The prosecution takes over the role of Congress.

In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.


As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded
on the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by
the Constitution are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how
socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the enumerated "criminal acts" under
Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and
repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove
beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. The State
may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With more reason, it should not be allowed to go
around the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a "means" of committing the crime.
For the result is the reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the existence of a "combination
or series." As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the Justices need not be in full agreement.
Surely, this would cover-up a wide disagreement among them about just what the accused actually did or did not do.
Stated differently, even if the Justices are not unified in their determination on what criminal acts were actually
committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the law, still, they could convict him of plunder.
The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated under Section 1(d)
thereof." 33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times. And the Office of the
Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends differently. It defines the term
series as a "repetition" or pertaining to "two or more."
A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already punished with lesser
penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be cured by judicial construction.
In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this
Court is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the law. I vote to grant the petition, not
because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond today and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to the
life, liberty and property of anyone who may come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this Court,
my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good conscience,
fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.

Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)


Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of
its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review
material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official
or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions

during the three days immediately proceeding every examination


day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the
sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations
of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to
take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October
25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of
a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain
the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to
declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on
the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to
enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21,
1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the
case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and
giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on
November 10, 1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
petition was granted.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal
branches. They relied heavily on the case of National Electrification
Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of
First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC, the two being
a co-equal branch.
SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly
apparent that the reason why the Court ruled that the Court of First
Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was that this
was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said cases was it held
that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other
government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically
limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred when it place he SEC
and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the next
course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order
of the PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to

the Office of the President for general direction and coordination.


Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the
Office of the President may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the
foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the case
and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has
a commendable purpose which is to preserve the integrity and
purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is unreasonable
in that an examinee cannot even attend and review class, briefing,
conference or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any
tip from any school, college or university, or any review center. The
unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught
committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives will be
barred from taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to
how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations
specially if the steps they take are lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates
the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot
interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination.
Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to be
inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools
and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the
alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or
at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is
to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there.
The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court


of Appeals
G.R. No. 100152

Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.

March 31, 2000

Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals


Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business
permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed
thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No.
5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot
put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or
prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of
optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription
having first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic.
Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and
similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can
advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but
only
upon
the
prescription
of
an
independent
optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI
lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the
conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or
revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of
Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving
petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.
Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a
valid exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits
Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue
licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising
purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant
licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue
licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with
utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of
the law.
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor
to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding
by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in
imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or
ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the
imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a
valid exercise of police power.
The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially
regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to
issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power
of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the
business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in
the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on
petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in
petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the
Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the
conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit,
regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of
the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in
this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.
Posted by Ruzzel Diane Oducado at Monday, November 25, 2013

ARMY AND NAVY CLUB OF MANILA, INC., petitioner, vs.


HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES,
as Judge REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 36
(formerly (Branch 17), HON. A. CAESAR SANGCO, as Judge,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17-MANILA and the
CITY OF MANILA, represented herein by MAYOR ALFREDO
LIM, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

The instant petition seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 36, Manila which
affirmed the summary judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 17.
On November 29, 1989 the City of Manila filed an action against herein petitioner
with the MTC for ejectment. The complaint alleged that:
1. That plaintiff is a municipal corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of Rep.
Act No. 409, as amended, with offices at City Hall Building, Manila, represented in
this action by its incumbent City Mayor, Hon. Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., with the same
address as plaintiff;
Defendant is likewise a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines with
offices at the Army and Navy Club Building, Luneta, Manila, where it may be served
with summons;
2. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 12,705.30 sq. m. located
at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay, Manila, covered by TCT No. 156868/1059 of
the Register of Deeds of Manila, together with the improvements thereon known as
the Army and Navy of Manila;

3. That defendant is occupying the above-described land and the Army and Navy Club
Building by virtue of a Contract of Lease executed between plaintiff and defendant in
January 1983, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "A";
4. That paragraph 1 of the said Contract of Lease provides that:

(1) That the LESSEE shall construct, at its own expense, a modern multi-storied hotel
at a cost of not less than FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P50,000.00) (sic), which shall
automatically belong to the LESSOR upon the expiration and/or termination of the
lease agreement, without right of the LESSEE for reimbursement for the costs of its
construction; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that construction of the said hotel shall be
commenced within one (1) year, and completed as far as practicable within five (5)
years, from date of approval by proper government officials of this lease agreement;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, that the plans and specification for the same hotel shall be
approved first by the LESSOR before actual construction;
5. That in violation of the aforequoted provision, defendant has failed and/or refused to
construct a modern multi-storied hotel provided for therein, long after the expiration
period therein stipulated and despite demands of plaintiff, to the prejudice of plaintiff
who has agreed to defendant's continued retention of the property on a lease-back
agreement on the basis of the warranties of defendant to put up a contemporary
multi-storied building;
6. That paragraph 3 of the Contract of Lease also stipulates that:

(3)
That the LESSEE shall pay a rent of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) a year, which may be paid by the LESSEE
in twelve (12) equally monthly installments within the first five (5) days of
each month, without the necessity of a demand, subject, however, to rental
adjustment after the first five (5) days of each month, without the necessity of a
demand, subject, however, to rental adjustment after the first five years of this
lease, at the rate of not more than ten per centum (10%) per annum every two
years, or on the basis of the increase in the prevailing market value of the
leased premises whichever is higher of the two criteria;
7. That defendant also reneged on its rental obligation notwithstanding plaintiff's
demand to pay, for its use and occupancy of the plaintiff's property, starting from
January 1983 to the present, and its rental account stood at P1,604,166.70 as of
May, 1989;
8. That in paragraph 4 of the Contract of Lease, it is also provided that:

(4) That the LESSEE shall pay the realty tax due on the land, including those assessed
against the improvements thereon, as well as all government license, permits, fees and
charges prescribed by law, Presidential decrees and ordinances for the leased
premises, including those for the establishment and operation of a modern multi-

storied hotel and all constructions and modifications pursuant to the provisions of this
Contract;
9.

That defendant violated its undertaking to pay the taxes due on the land and
improvement, so much so that as of December 1989, its aggregate realty tax
liability amounts to P3,818,913.81;

10. That repeated demands of plaintiff had been made upon the defendant to comply
with its aforesaid contractual obligations, but defendant however remained unfazed;
it still failed to perform any of its contractual obligations.
11. That as a result, plaintiff rescinded their Contract of Lease and demanded
defendant to vacate, the last of which was contained in a letter dated May 24, 1989,
copy of which is attached hereto asANNEX "B". To date however, defendant
however, has not budged an inch from the property of plaintiff;
12. That the reasonable rental value for defendant's continued use and occupancy of
the subject premises which is a prime property along Rozas (sic) Boulevard in
Luneta area is P636,467.00 a month in the context of the prevailing rental rates of
comparable real property;[1]

On December 29, 1989 or within the reglementary period, petitioner filed its answer
to the complaint. Subsequently, on February 22, 1990, it filed a "Motion for Leave to File
and for Admission of Amended Answer" allegedly asserting additional special and
affirmative defenses.
On May 23, 1990, the City of Manila filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the
ground that there exists no genuine triable issue in the case.
[2]

On July 27, 1990, the MTC denied the petitioner's motion for leave to admit its
amended answer for lack of merit. Thus, on October 5, 1990, a decision was rendered
with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the


plaintiff, ordering the defendant:
a)
and all persons claiming rights or title under it, to immediate (sic)
vacate and surrender to the plaintiff, the premises more particularly described as
the Army and Navy Club Bldg. located at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay,
Manila;
b) to pay, all with legal interest thereon, its rental arrearages at the rate of P250,000.00
per year with a corresponding ten (10%) percent increase every two years from
January, 1983 until it finally vacates and surrenders the premises to the plaintiff;
c) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

[3]

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court presided by Judge Wilfredo D. Reyes


affirmed in toto the summary judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
[4]

Petitioner elevated its case to the Court of Appeals. On October 30, 1992, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
On May 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated October 30, 1992. At the same time, it also denied
the City of Manila's motion for issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.
Petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

1. RESPONDENT COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE OUSTER


OF HEREIN PETITIONER FROM THE DISPUTED PREMISES WHICH IS A
CLEAR TRANSGRESSION OF THE FORMAL DECLARATION OF THE SITE OF
HEREIN PETITIONER AS A HISTORICAL LANDMARK.
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT (MTC) AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC) JUDGES
DENYING ADMISSION OF PETITIONER'S AMENDED ANSWER.
3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT RENDERED BY RESPONDENT
MTC AND RTC JUDGES.
4. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE
RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST IT.
5. AS AN INCIDENT TO THE MAIN ISSUE, THE PROPERTY, SUBJECT
MATTER OF THIS CASE, IS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THEREFORE, THE
CONTRACT OF LEASE EXECUTED BY THE CITY OF MANILA IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER IS VOID.
[5]

There is no merit in the petition.


Amidst all the issues raised by the petitioner, the instant case is a simple ejectment
suit.
There is no dispute that the City of Manila is the owner of a prime parcel of land with
an area of 12,705.30 square meters located at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay
together with the improvement thereon known as Army and Navy Club of Manila.
Petitioner entered into a lease contract with private respondent sometime in January,
1983. In said lease contract, it agreed to: 1) pay an annual a rent of P250,000.00 with a
10% increase every two (2) years; 2) pay the realty tax due on the land; and 3)
construct a modern multi-storey hotel provided for therein within five (5) years which

shall belong to the City upon expiration or termination of the lease without right of
reimbursement for the cost of construction.
[6]

Petitioner failed to pay the rents for seven (7) consecutive years. As of October,
1989 when the action was filed, rental arrears ballooned to P7.2 million. Real estate
taxes on the land accumulated to P6,551,408.28 as of May, 1971. Moreover, petitioner
failed to erect a multi-storey hotel in the site. For violations of the lease contract and
after several demands, the City of Manila had no other recourse but to file the action for
illegal detainer and demand petitioner's eviction from the premises. Article 1673 of the
New Civil Code is explicit:

ART. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:
(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under
articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;
(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;
(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service not stipulated
which causes the deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in
No. 2 of article 1657, as regards the use thereof.
The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by special laws. (emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner invokes and capitalizes on the fact that the Army and Navy Club has been
declared a national historical landmark by the National Historical Commission on June
29, 1992 which the lower courts allegedly never gave due consideration. Thus, its
existence should not in any way be undermined by the simple ejectment suit filed
against it. Petitioner contends that all parties are enjoined by law to preserve its
existence and site.
To support its claim, petitioner presented the Certificate of Transfer and Acceptance
of the Historical Marker granted to it pursuant to R.A. 4846, as amended by PD 374
which provides that it shall be "the policy of the State to preserve and protect the
important cultural properties and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to
safeguard their intrinsic value."
[7]

The Marker reads as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSFER
AND
ACCEPTANCE OF HISTORICAL MARKER
ARMY AND NAVY CLUB
TO ALL PERSONS TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS MAY COME:

Be it known that the National Historical Institute, in the exercise of its authority
vested by law and in compliance with its mandate to honor national heroes and
perpetuate the glory of their deeds, and to preserve historical sites, has transferred this
historical marker unto Administration of Army and Navy Club, who has agreed to
accept the same and to maintain it as a sacred duty.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands this 29th day
of June, 1992, in Manila.
NATIONAL HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
by:
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
CAPT. VICENTE J. BRILLANTES SERAFIN D. QUIASON
Transferee Transferor
Attested:
(SGD) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
CHIEF SUPT JOSE PERCIVAL ADIONG AVELINA M. CASTANEDA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in Manila, Philippines, this 29th day of
June, 1992 by the affiants.
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
BGEN ANTONIO V. RUSTIA COL MANUEL R. GUEVARA
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
RAMON J. SIYTANGCO, JR. CAPT. DANIEL A. ARREOLA
(SGD.) LOPE M. VELASCO
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires Dec. 31, 1993
Not. Reg. No. 297 PTR 022088
Page 61 1-2-92, Manila
Book II IBP 320197
Series of 1992 12-18-91, Pasig

[8]

While the declaration that it is a historical landmark is not objectionable, the


recognition is, however, specious. We take the occasion to elucidate on the views of Fr.
Joaquin Bernas who was invited as amicus curiae in the recent case of Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS where the historical character of Manila Hotel was also dealt with. He
stated that:
[9]

The country's artistic and historic wealth is therefore a proper subject for the exercise
of police power:". . . which the State may regulate." This is a function of the
legislature. And once regulation comes in, due process also comes into play. When the
classification of property into historical treasures or landmarks will involve the
imposition of limits on ownership, the Bill of Rights demands that it be done with due
process both substantive and procedural. In recognition of this constitutional principle,
the State in fact has promulgated laws, both general and special, on the subject.
x x x the current general law on the subject is R.A. 4846, approved on June 18, 1966,
and amended by P.D. No. 374. The Act prescribes the manner of classifying historical
and cultural properties thus:
Sec. 4. The National Museum, hereinafter referred to as the Museum shall be the
agency of the government which, shall implement the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 5. The Director of the Museum, hereinafter referred to as the Director, shall
undertake a census of the important cultural properties of the Philippines, keep a
record of their ownership, location, and condition, and maintain an up-to-date register
of the same. Private collectors and owners of important cultural properties and public
and private schools in possession of these items, shall be required to register their
collections with the Museum when required by the Director and to report to the same
office when required by the Director any new acquisitions, sales, or transfers thereof.
Sec. 6. The Director is authorized to convene panels of experts, as often as the need
for their services may arise, each to be composed of three competent men in the
specialized fileds of anthropology, natural sciences, history and archives, fine arts,
philately and numismatics, and shrines and monuments, etc. Each panel shall, after
careful study and deliberation, decide which among the cultural properties in their
field of specialization shall be designated as "National Cultural Treasures" or
"Important Cultural Properties." The Director is further authorized to convene panels
of experts to declassify designated "National Cultural Treasures."
The Director shall within ten days of such action by the panel transmit their decision
and cause the designation-list to be published in at least two newspapers of general
circulation. The same procedure shall be followed in the declassification of important
cultural properties and national treasures.
Sec. 7. In designation of a particular cultural property as a "national cultural treasure,"
the following procedure shall be observed:
a. Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is privately owned, shall be
notified at least fifteen days prior to the intended designation, and he shall be invited

to attend the deliberation and given a chance to be heard. Failure on the part of the
owner to attend the deliberation shall not bar the panel to render its decision. Decision
shall be given by the panel within a week after its deliberation. In the event that the
owner desires to seek reconsideration of the designation made by the panel, he may do
so within days from the date that the decision has been rendered. If no request for
reconsideration is filed after this period, the designation is then considered final and
executory. Any request for reconsideration filed within thirty days and subsequently
again denied by the panel, may be further appealed to another panel chairmanned by
the Secretary of Education, with two experts as members appointed by the Secretary
of Education. Their decision shall be final and binding.
b.
Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and
unique objects may be designated as "National Cultural Treasures." The
remainder, if any, shall be treated as cultural property.
c. Designated "National Cultural Treasures" shall be marked, described, and
photographed by the National Museum. The owner retains possession of the same but
the Museum shall keep a record containing such information as: name of article,
owner, period, source, location, condition, description, photograph, identifying marks,
approximate value, and other pertinent data.
Thus, for Manila Hotel to be treated as special cultural or historical property, it must
go through the procedure described above. Eloquent nationalistic endorsements of
classification will not transform a piece of property into a legally recognized historical
landmark. . . .
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the above procedure has been complied
with. The City of Manila even observed that the signatories thereto are officers and
members of the Club making such certification self-serving. It behooves us to think
why the declaration was conferred only in 1992, three (3) years after the action for
ejectment was instituted. We can only surmise that this was merely an afterthought, an
attempt to thwart any legal action taken against the petitioner. Nonetheless, such
certification does not give any authority to the petitioner to lay claim of ownership, or
any right over the subject property. Nowhere in the law does it state that such
recognition grants possessory rights over the property to the petitioner.Nor is the
National Historical Commission given the authority to vest such right of ownership or
possession of a private property to the petitioner. The law merely states that it shall be
the policy of state to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and National
Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. In line with this,
any restoration, reconstruction or preservation of historical buildings shall only be made
under the supervision of the Director of the National Museum. The authority of the
National Historical Commission is limited only to the supervision of any reconstruction,
restoration or preservation of the architectural design of the identified historical building
and nothing more. Even assuming that such recognition made by the National Historical
[10]

[11]

Commission is valid, the historical significance of the Club, if any, shall not be affected if
petitioner's eviction from the premises is warranted.Unfortunately, petitioner is merely a
lessee of the property. By virtue of the lease contract, petitioner had obligations to
fulfill. Petitioner can not just hide behind some recognition bestowed upon it in order to
escape from its obligation or remain in possession. It violated the terms and conditions
of the lease contract. Thus, petitioner's eviction from the premises is inevitable.
Anent the procedural issues raised, the Court finds no reversible error in the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court.
A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact
involved (except as to the amount of damages), and that therefore the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[12]

In the case at bar, there is clearly no substantial triable issue. In the Answer filed on
December 29, 1989, petitioner does not deny the existence of the lease contract
executed with the City of Manila in January 1983. It admitted that it failed to pay the
rents and real estate taxes and construction of a multi-storey building.
It put up the defense that it was unable to fulfill its obligations of the contract due to
economic recession in 1984 as an aftermath of the Ninoy Aquino
assassination. Considering that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, a
summary judgment is proper. The argument that it was declared a historical landmark,
is not a substantial issue of fact which does not, in any way, alter or affect the merit of
the ejectment suit.
Likewise, we find no error much less any abuse of authority on the part of the lower
court in not admitting the Amended Answer. Aside from the fact that it was filed one (1)
year after the original answer was filed, it put up defenses which are entirely in
contradiction to its original answer. This is in contravention of the rules of procedure.
Having admitted in the original answer that the City of Manila is the registered owner
of the property and that it leased the property from it, petitioner can not now deny such
claim of ownership. The Court of Appeals correctly observed on this point:
[13]

Be that as it may, at this last stage, after herein petitioner has dealt with the private
respondent as the owner of the leased premises and obtained benefits from said
acknowledgment of such ownership for almost half a century, herein petitioner cannot
be permitted to assume an inconsistent position by denying said private respondent's
ownership of the leased premises when the situation calls for it. Herein petitioner
cannot be allowed to double deal, recognizing herein private respondent's title over
the leased premises and entering into a lease contract and other covenants, and
thereafter after failing to comply with its obligation provided for in the lease
agreement attempt to repudiate the ownership of private respondent of the subject
property.
[14]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The instant


petition is DENIED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., in the result.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 81-84.

[2]

Id., at 108.

[3]

Id., at 125.

[4]

Id., at 127.

[5]

Id., at 27-28.

[6]

Id., at 203-204.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 374 AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC


ACT NO. 4846. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "CULTURAL PROPERTIES
PRESERVATION AND PROTECTION ACT:
[7]

xxx
Sec. 2. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state to preserve and protect the important cultural
properties and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value.
Sec. 3. x x x
a. Cultural properties are old buildings, monuments, shrines, documents, and objects which may be
classified as antiques, relics, or artifacts, landmarks, anthropological and historical sites, and specimens
of natural history which are of cultural, historical, anthropological or scientific value and significance to the
nation; such as physical, anthropological, archaeological and ethnographical materials, meteorites and
tektites; historical objects and manuscripts; household and agricultural implements; decorative articles or
personal adornment; works of art such as paintings, sculptures, carvings, jewelry, music architecture,
sketches, drawings, or illustrations in part or in whole; works of industrial and commercial art such as
furniture, pottery, ceramics, wrought iron, gold, bronze, silver, wood or other heraldic items, metals, coins,
medals, badges, insignias, coat of arms, crests, flags, arms and armor; vehicles or ships or boats in part
or in whole.
b. cultural properties which have been singled out from among the innumerable cultural properties as
having exceptional historical and cultural significance to the Philippines, but are not sufficiently
outstanding to merit the classification "National Cultural Treasures" are important cultural properties.
c. A National Cultural Treasure is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural
artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation.
xxx
i. A historical site is any place, province, city, town and/or any location and structure which has played a
significant and important role in the history of our country and nation. Such significance and importance
may be cultural, political, sociological or historical.
[8]
[9]

Id., at 193.
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997.

[10]

Comment, Rollo, p. 208.

Sec. 13. All restorations, reconstructions, and preservations of government historical buildings, shrines,
landmarks, monuments, and sites, which have been designated as 'National Cultural Treasures,' and
'important cultural properties' shall only be undertaken with the written permission of the Director of the
National Museum who shall designate the supervision of the same.
[11]

Secs. 1, 2, 3, Rule 34. Philippine National Bank vs. Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery, 226 SCRA 36 (1993);
Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753 (1987); Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 75 (1988).
[12]

[13]

Rule 10, Sec. 3.

[14]

Rollo, pp. 75-76.

ISAE vs. QUISUMBING


OCTOBER 23, 2012 ~ VBDIAZ

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE),


petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his
capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY
in his capacity as the Superintendent of International
School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.,
respondents.,
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to


PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily
for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary

residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own


teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being
exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending
their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for
the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two:
(1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded localhires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than localhires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner
ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining
representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the
difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue,
as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included
in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a
compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which
favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of
local- hires.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that
labor is entitled to humane conditions of work. These conditions
are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office
or the field but include as well the manner by which employers
treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by
the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution
mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right
and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as
the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited
to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit


are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The
basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether
or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to
all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have
indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for
purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history
in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy
security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions
under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires
are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as
foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter.
To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would
not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is
hereby GRANTED IN PART.

GSIS v. MONTESCLAROS

FACTS: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and
equal protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension.
GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
HELD: There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be
heard. There is also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of
togetherness in marriage before the employees death is valid to prevent sham marriages contracted
for monetary gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if
the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioners death, the
dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within 3 years
before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose intended.

Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January


22, 1980
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy
for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to
run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who
was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as
authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of
the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office and
the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.
Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review,
three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his
disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely
affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the imminent
elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable


classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need
for new blood assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is
that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same government
work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional
guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all those belonging to the same class.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at
times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully
heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a
person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts,
as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him
is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of
arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the
term of the sentence.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome
the prima facie evidence against him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial


determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC Case Digest


DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
95 SCRA 392
L-52245
January 22, 1980
Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30,
1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution which provides that .Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. He likewise
alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on purely arbitrary
grounds, therefore, class legislation.
Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.
Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that
the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government
work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that
provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to
the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA


57) Case Digest
Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging
and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask
if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package
making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating
procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the
substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the
package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found driedmarijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found
guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right
of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence
against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one
who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and
siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was
AFFIRMED.
Posted by gemendio at 1:04 AM

Sunday, November 20, 2011

Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May
10, 1984. The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the
articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the officers
conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and
eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his
application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in
the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both
of whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat.
Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the
contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the
same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure
in issuing the Search Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that
his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant
Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search
warrant on the basis of the information provided by the witnesses whose
depositions had already been taken by the undersigned.

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search
warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known
to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.

PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR
APRIL 9, 2014 | KAAARINA
PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR
G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988
Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant
of arrest against fifty (50) John Does transgressing the Constitutional provision
requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things
to be seized.
Issue: Whether said warrant is valid
Held: No.
Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) John Does not one of whom
the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a
general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional
and

once

anathematized

subject.[30] Clearly

as

violative

totally
of

the

subversive

of

the

constitutional

liberty

of

injunction

the
that

warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons


to be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.
WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as
it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it
is issued against fifty (50) John Does. The respondent Judge is directed to
forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary
investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further
appropriate action.

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