FIRST DIVISION

JUAN GALOPE,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 185669

Present:

- versus CORONA, C.J.,

Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
CRESENCIA BUGARIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

Represented by

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

CELSO RABANG,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

February 1, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Juan Galope appeals the Decision[1] dated September 26, 2008 and
Resolution[2] dated December 12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97143. The CA ruled that there is no tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondent Cresencia Bugarin.
The facts and antecedent proceedings are as follows:
Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-229582.[3]Petitioner farms the land.[4]

In Barangay Case No. 99-6, respondent complained that she lent the land to
petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in return from
petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her
own. Petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had
been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 toP6,000
or 15 cavans of palay per harvest. The case was not settled.[5]
Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery of
possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No.
9378. Rabang claimed that respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that
the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for
the use of the land. Rabang also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose
Allingag who allegedly possesses the land.[6]
After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled
that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure. The Adjudicator said
substantial evidence prove the tenancy relationship between petitioner and
respondent. The Adjudicator noted the certification of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) that petitioner is the registered farmer of the land; thatBarangay
Tanods said that petitioner is the tenant of the land; that Jose Allingag affirmed
petitioners possession and cultivation of the land; that Allingag also stated that
petitioner hired him only as farm helper; and that respondents own witness, Cesar
Andres, said that petitioner is a farmer of the land.[7]
On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is
not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay rentals and vacate the
land, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer to assist in computing the rentals.
The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and stressed that
the elements of consent and sharing are not present. The DARAB noted petitioners
failure to prove his payment of rentals by appropriate receipts, and said that the
affidavits of Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz are self-serving and
are not concrete proof to rebut the allegation of nonpayment of rentals. The
DARAB added that respondents intention to lend her land to petitioner cannot be
taken as implied tenancy for such lending was without consideration.[8]

Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARABs ruling that no tenancy

relationship exists; that the elements of consent and sharing are not present; that
respondents act of lending her land without consideration cannot be taken as
implied tenancy; and that no receipts prove petitioners payment of rentals.[9]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner alleges that the CA erred
[I.]
x x x IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE DARAB
AND IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER THAT HE IS INDEED A
TENANT[;]
[II.]
x x x IN RELYING MAINLY ON THE ABSENCE OF RECEIPTS OF
THE PAYMENTS OF LEASE RENTALS IN DECLARING THE
ABSENCE OF CONSENT AND SHARING TO ESTABLISH A
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
THE RESPONDENT[; AND]
[III.]
x x x WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE PETITIONER HAS NOT
DISCHARGED THE BURDEN [OF] PROVING BY WAY OF
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HIS ALLEGATIONS OF TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RESPONDENT.[10]

The main issue to be resolved is whether there exists a tenancy relationship

between the parties.
Petitioner submits that substantial evidence proves the tenancy relationship
between him and respondent. Specifically, he points out that (1) his possession of
the land is undisputed; (2) the DAR certified that he is the registered farmer of the
land; and (3) receipts prove his payment of irrigation fees. On the absence of
receipts as proof of rental payments, he urges us to take judicial notice of an
alleged practice in the provinces that payments between relatives are not supported
by receipts. He also calls our attention to the affidavits of Jose Allingag, Rolando

Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz attesting that he pays 15 cavans of palay to
respondent.[11]
In her comment, respondent says that no new issues and substantial matters are
raised in the petition. She thus prays that we deny the petition for lack of merit.[12]
We find the petition impressed with merit and we hold that the CA and DARAB
erred in ruling that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.[13]
The CA and DARAB ruling that there is no sharing of harvest is based on the
absence of receipts to show petitioners payment of rentals. We are constrained to
reverse them on this point. The matter of rental receipts is not an issue given
respondents admission that she receives rentals from petitioner. To recall,
respondents complaint in Barangay Case No. 99-6 was that the rental or the
amount she receives from petitioner is not much. [14] This fact is evident on the
record[15] of said case which is signed by respondent and was even attached as
Annex D of her DARAB petition. Consequently, we are thus unable to agree with
DARABs ruling that the affidavits[16] of witnesses that petitioner pays 15 cavans
of palay or the equivalent thereof in pesos as rent are not concrete proof to rebut
the allegation of nonpayment of rentals. Indeed, respondents admission confirms
their statement that rentals are in fact being paid. Such admission belies the claim
of respondents representative, Celso Rabang, that petitioner paid nothing for the
use of the land.
Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents act of allowing
the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show
her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation
is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone. [17] Section

5[18] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an
oral agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are
present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter
of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. [19] They mutually agreed to
the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of
their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After the
harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in
cash. Respondents motion[20] to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes
in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly,
petitioners personal cultivation of the land[21] is conceded by respondent who
likewise never denied the fact that they share in the harvest.
Petitioners status as a de jure tenant having been established, we now address the
issue of whether there is a valid ground to eject petitioner from the land.
Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the existence
of a lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the tenant/agricultural lessee.
[22]
This rule proceeds from the principle that a tenancy relationship, once
established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure.[23] The tenant can only be
ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.[24]
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds, to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any
agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family
will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding,
if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or
other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five
years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections

[25] and [34], except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of
disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance
notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are
filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not
cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out
such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it
shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss
incurred by him because of said dispossession;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code
unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a
purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section [29];
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated
through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop
failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although
the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of
the terms of paragraph 2 of Section [27].

Through Rabang, respondent alleged (1) nonpayment of any consideration, (2) lack
of tenancy relationship, (3) petitioner mortgaged the land to Allingag who
allegedly possesses the land, and (4) she will manage/cultivate the land. [25] None of
these grounds were proven by the respondent.

As aforesaid, respondent herself admitted petitioners payment of rentals. We also

found that a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
On the supposed mortgage, Allingag himself denied it in his affidavit. [26] No such a
deed of mortgage was submitted in evidence.Rabangs claim is based on a hearsay
statement of Cesar Andres that he came to know the mortgage from residents of the
place where the land is located.[27]
That Allingag possesses the land is also based on Andress hearsay statement. On
the contrary, Allingag stated in his affidavit that he is merely petitioners farm
helper.[28] We have held that the employment of farm laborers to perform some
aspects of work does not preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold
relationship, provided that an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process
of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly
requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on the land, we
have nevertheless declared that the hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a
temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does not negate the existence of the
element of personal cultivation essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold
relationship.[29] There is no showing that petitioner has left the entire process of
cultivating the land to Allingag. In fact, respondent has admitted that petitioner still
farms the land.[30]
On respondents claim that she will cultivate the land, it is no longer a valid ground
to eject petitioner. The original provision of Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844 has
been removed from the statute books[31] after its amendment by Section 7 of R.A.
No. 6389[32] on September 10, 1971, to wit:
SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the
gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar
years.

Since respondent failed to prove nonpayment of rentals, petitioner may not be

ejected from the landholding. We emphasize, however, that as long as the tenancy
relationship subsists, petitioner must continue paying rentals. For the law provides
that nonpayment of lease rental, if proven, is a valid ground to dispossess him of
respondents land. Henceforth, petitioner should see to it that his rental payments
are properly covered by receipts.
Finally, the records show that Allingag, petitioners co-respondent in DARAB Case
No. 9378, did not join petitioners appeal to the CA. If Allingag did not file a
separate appeal, the DARAB decision had become final as to him. We cannot grant
him any relief.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Decision
dated September 26, 2008 and Resolution dated December 12, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97143.
The petition filed by respondent Cresencia Bugarin in DARAB Case No. 9378 is
hereby DISMISSED insofar as petitioner Juan Galope is concerned.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

VIEGELY SAMELO, represented

by Attorney-in-Fact CRISTINA

G.R. No. 170509

SAMELO,
Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

- versus -

PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
MANOTOK SERVICES, INC.,
allegedly represented by
PERPETUA BOCANEGRA
(deceased),
Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 27, 2012

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by

Viegely Samelo (petitioner), represented by her attorney-in-fact
Cristina Samelo, to challenge the decision dated June 21,
2005[2] and the resolution dated November 10, 2005 [3] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664.

Background Facts

Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it is the

administrator of a parcel of land known as Lot 9-A, Block 2913,
situated at 2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila. On January
31, 1997, the respondent entered into a contract with the
petitioner for the lease of a portion of Lot 9-A, Block 2913,
described as Lot 4, Block 15 (subject premises). The lease
contract was for a period of one (1) year, with a monthly rental
of P3,960.00. After the expiration of the lease contract on
December 31, 1997, the petitioner continued occupying the
subject premises without paying the rent. [4] On August 5, 1998,
the respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok, sent a letter to
the petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises
and pay compensation for its use and occupancy. [5] The petitioner,
however, refused to heed these demands.

On November 18, 1998, the respondent filed a complaint for

unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.[6] The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 161588-CV. The respondent prayed, among others,
that the petitioner and those claiming rights under her be ordered
to vacate the subject premises, and to pay compensation for its
use and occupancy.

In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had no

right to collect rentals because the subject premises are located
inside the property of the Philippine National Railways (PNR). She
also added that the respondent had no certificate of title over the
subject premises. The petitioner further claimed that her
signature in the contract of lease was obtained through the
respondents misrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she
is now the owner of the subject premises as she had been in
possession since 1944.[7]

The MeTC Ruling

The MeTC, in its judgment [8] of March 28, 2002, decided in

favor of the respondent, and ordered the petitioner to vacate the
subject premises and to deliver their peaceful possession to the
respondent. The MeTC held that the only issue to be resolved in
an unlawful detainer case is physical possession or possession de
facto, and that the respondent had established its right of
possession over the subject premises. It added that the
petitioners right under the lease contract already ceased upon the
expiration of the said contract. It further ruled that the petitioner
is already estopped from questioning the right of the respondent
over the subject premises when she entered into a contract of
lease with the respondent. The dispositive portion of the MeTC
judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant,
ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under
her:

1.

To vacate the premises located at 2882 Dagupan

Extension, Tondo, Manila, and deliver the peaceful
possession thereof to the plaintiff[;]

2.

To pay plaintiff the sum of P40,075.20 as

compensation for the use and occupancy of the
premises from January 1, 1998 to August 30,
1998, plus P4,554.00 a month starting September
1, 1998, until defendant and all person[s]
claiming rights under her to finally vacate the
premises[;]

3.

To pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 for and as

attorneys fees; and

4.

To pay the cost of suit.[9]

The RTC Decision

The petitioner filed an appeal [10] with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 50, Manila. The RTC, in its decision [11] of July 1, 2004,
set aside the MeTCs decision, and dismissed the complaint for
unlawful detainer. The RTC held, among others, that the
respondent had no right to collect rentals as it failed to show that
it had authority to administer the subject premises and to enter

into a contract of lease with the petitioner. It also ruled that the
subject premises, which were formerly owned by the PNR, are
now owned by the petitioner by virtue of her possession and stay
in the premises since 1944.

The CA Decision

Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent filed a petition for

review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85664. [12]The CA,
in its decision of June 21, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC
decision, and reinstated the MeTC judgment. The CA held that the
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the right of the
respondent over the subject property. It explained that in an
action involving the possession of the subject premises, a tenant
cannot controvert the title of his landlord or assert any rights
adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the
premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between
themselves. The appellate court added that the petitioner cannot
claim that she repudiated the lease contract, in the absence of
any unequivocal acts of repudiation.

The CA further held that the only issue in an ejectment suit

is physical or material possession, although the trial courts may
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose
of determining the issue of possession. It explained that the issue
of ownership is not required to determine the issue of possession
since the petitioner tacitly admitted that she is a lessee of the
subject premises.[13]

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA

denied her motion in its resolution dated November 10, 2005. [14]

In presenting her case before this Court, the petitioner

argued that the CA erred in ruling that a tenant is not permitted
to deny the title of his landlord. She maintained that the
respondent is not the owner or administrator of the subject
premises, and insisted that she had been in possession of the
land in question since 1944. She further added that she
repudiated the lease contract by filing a case for fraudulent
misrepresentation, intimidation, annulment of lease contract, and
quieting of title with injunction before another court. [15]

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

Respondent has a better right of possession over the subject

premises

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person

unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or
from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue
of any contract, express or implied. [16] The only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties involved. [17] Thus, when the
relationship of lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful
detainer case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question of

ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might throw

light on the right of possession.[18]

In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner and

the respondent entered into a contract of lease. We note in this
regard that in her answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim before the MeTC, the petitioner did not deny that
she signed the lease contract (although she maintained that her
signature
was
obtained
through
the
respondents
misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the petitioner
obligated herself to pay a monthly rental to the respondent in the
amount of P3,960.00. The lease period was for one year,
commencing on January 1, 1997 and expiring on December 31,
1997. It bears emphasis that the respondent did not give the
petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the lease
contract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on
August 5, 1998), and the latter continued enjoying the subject
premises for more than 15 days, without objection from the
respondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor, there can
be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract.
[19]
An implied new lease was therefore created pursuant to Article
1670 of the Civil Code, which expressly provides:

Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee

should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days
with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice
to the contrary by either party has previously been given,
it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for
the period of the original contract, but for the time
established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of
the original contract shall be revived.

An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when

the following requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the
original contract of lease has expired; b) the lessor has not given
the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee continued
enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence
of the lessor.[20] As earlier discussed, all these requisites have been
fulfilled in the present case.

Article 1687 of the Civil Code on implied new lease provides:

Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been
fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent
agreed upon is annual;from month to month, if it is
monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and
from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.

Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of

lease is considered to be from month to month, in accordance
with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. [A] lease from month to month
is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the
end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.
[21]
When the respondent sent a notice to vacate to the petitioner
on August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and the
contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that month. [A]
notice to vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the
lessor that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by
the lessee of its property.[22] After such notice, the lessees right to
continue in possession ceases and her possession becomes one of
detainer.[23]

Estoppel of tenant

We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the

respondent had no authority to lease the subject premises
because the latter failed to prove that it is its owner or
administrator.

The Rules of Court protects the respondent, as lessor, from

being questioned by the petitioner, as lessee, regarding its title or
better right of possession over the subject premises. Section 2(b),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that the tenant is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them. Article 1436 of the Civil Code likewise states that a lessee
or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or
received, as against the lessor or bailor.

These provisions bar the petitioner from contesting the

respondents title over the subject premises. The juridical
relationship between x x x [a] lessor and x x x [a lessee] carries
with it a recognition of the lessor's title. As [lessee, the petitioner
is] estopped [from denying the] landlord's title, or to assert a
better title not only in [herself], but also in some third person
while [she remains] in possession of the subject premises and
until [she surrenders] possession to the landlord. This estoppel
applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the
relation of [the] lessor and [the] lessee was created, and may be
asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who
succeed to his title.[24] Once a contact of lease is shown to exist

between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however

strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a
valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject
premises than the lessee.

The Court thus explained in Tamio v. Ticson:[25]

Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not

depend on the formers title but on the agreement
between the parties, followed by the possession of the
premises by the lessee under such agreement. As long as
the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it is
immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title or any title
at all at the time the relationship was entered
into. [citations omitted]

The issue of ownership

We are likewise unpersuaded by the petitioners claim that

she has acquired possessory rights leading to ownership [26] over
the subject premises, having been in possession thereof since
1944. We emphasize that aside from her self-serving allegation,
the petitioner did not present any documentary evidence to
substantiate her claim that she stayed on the subject premises
since 1944. That the petitioner presented certificates of title of
the Manila Railroad Company over certain properties in Tondo,
Manila, which allegedly cover the subject premises, is of no
moment. One cannot recognize the right of another, and at the
same time claim adverse possession which can ripen to

ownership, thru acquisitive prescription. For prescription to set in,

the possession must be adverse, continuous, public, and to the
exclusion of [others].[27] Significantly, the RTC decision failed to
state its basis for concluding that the petitioner stayed in the
subject premises since 1944.

At any rate, we hold that no need exists to resolve the issue

of ownership in this case, since it is not required to determine the
issue of possession; the execution of the lease contract between
the petitioner, as lessee, and the respondent, as lessor, belies the
formers claim of ownership. We reiterate that the fact of the
lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements in an
action for unlawful detainer. The defense of ownership does not
change the summary nature of [this] action. x x x. Although a
wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this is
merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order.
The question of ownership is to be settled in the proper court and
in a proper action.[28]

Interest on rentals due

Additionally, the petitioner is liable to pay interest by way of

damages for her failure to pay the rentals due for the use of the
subject
premises.[29] We
reiterate
that
the
respondents
extrajudicial demand on the petitioner was made on August 5,
1998. Thus, from this date, the rentals due from the petitioner
shall earn interest at 6% per annum, until the judgment in this
case becomes final and executory. After the finality of judgment,
and until full payment of the rentals and interests due, the legal
rate of interest to be imposed shall be 12%.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the

petition. The decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated June 21, 2005 and November 10, 2005, respectively, in CAG.R. SP No. 85664 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the unpaid rentals shall earn a corresponding interest of six
percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from August 5, 1998
until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be computed at
twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
LEONARDO DAVID, G.R. No. 152992
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J.,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
NELSON and DANNY CORDOVA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

July 28, 2005

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

In this Petition[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner

Leonardo A. David (David) assails theDecision[2] of the Court of
Appeals, Fifteenth Division, and the Resolution[3] of the same
division denying hisMotion for Reconsideration[4] and Supplement to
the Motion for Reconsideration.[5] The Court of Appeals declared null
and void the Decision[6] of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(FMCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan and the Order[7] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner David filed a Complaint[8] for forcible entry, docketed as

Civil Case No. 1067, with the FMCTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan
against respondents Nelson and Danny Cordova (the Cordovas).
The Complaint alleged these material facts:
....

3. That plaintiff is the co-owner of Lot 774, with an area of 14,000 square
meters, situated in Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 009087, xerox copy of which is hereto attached, marked
as ANNEX A, and made part hereof.

4. That on April 26, 1997, plaintiff passed by said Lot 774 on his way to
Dinalupihan Public Market and he noticed persons who forcibly entered
said Lot 774 by destroying the fence and started erecting a structure
thereon.

5. That when plaintiff got near said Lot 774, defendants and their
workers threatened him with harm should he interfere with their work.

6. That plaintiff requested defendants and their workers to stop the

construction of a structure inside said Lot 774, but defendants and their
workers refused to stop their said construction.
7. That plaintiff reported the matter to the Government Authorities of
Dinalupihan,

Bataan

and

requested

assistance

in

stopping

said

construction undertaken by defendants inside said Lot 774 of plaintiff.

8. That the Municipal Engineer together with some policemen of

Dinalupihan, Bataan, went to the place where said Lot 774 is situated
and they stopped the construction undertaken by defendants.

9. However, on the succeeding days, defendants continued with

construction of the structure inside plaintiffs Lot 774, despite plaintiffs
vehement protest.

10. That this construction undertaken by defendants inside plaintiffs

said Lot 774 is without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff nor his coowners.

11. That plaintiff brought the matter before the Barangay Authorities for
conciliation, but no settlement was arrived at the Barangay Authorities,
xerox copy of the Barangay Certification is hereto attached, marked as
ANNEX B, and made part hereof.

12. That plaintiff has been compelled by defendants to litigate to enforce

his rights and to engage the services of counsel for the sum
of P20,000.00

13. That the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation by
defendants of plaintiffs said Lot 774 isP15,000.00 per month.

ALLEGATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY

MANDATORY INJUNCTION

14. That plaintiff hereby reproduced all the allegations of the preceding
paragraphs insofar as they are material to issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
15. That under the provisions of Article 539 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and Section 3, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff
should be restored to the possession of said Lot 774.

16. That plaintiff is ready, able and willing to post a bond to be

fixed by this Honorable Court to answer for any and all damages in the

event that the Honorable Court finally adjudge that plaintiff is entitled
thereto.[9]

and incorporated the following-

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after the filing of the case

and upon posting of the bond to be fixed by this Honorable Court, a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction issue to restore plaintiff in
possession of said Lot 774, . . . .

[10]

Before filing their Answer,[11] respondents filed a motion to dismiss

alleging that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and not
the FMCTC that has jurisdiction over the case. Said motion was
denied in an Order of the lower court dated 24 November 1997. [12]

In their Answer, the Cordovas contended that David is not a coowner of the subject property, it being owned by the Government as
said property forms part and parcel of the Dinalupihan Landed
Estate . . . .[13] The Cordovas questioned the jurisdiction of the
FMCTC to take cognizance of the case as allegedly the subject
property is under the disposition and administration of DAR which

will award it to qualified beneficiaries such as respondents. The

Cordovas prayed that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction. [14]

Based on the position papers submitted by the parties to the case,

the inferior court rendered a Decision on 20 January 1998, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is

hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them
to vacate the landholdings in suit;

2. Ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the amount

of P2,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount

of P3,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

4. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[15]

The Cordovas thereafter filed with the RTC, Branch 5 of

Dinalupihan, Bataan, a petition[16] for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court to nullify the Decision of the lower court,
docketed as Civil Case No. DH-456-98. The Cordovas contended
that the inferior court had no jurisdiction over the forcible entry
case as the property, being an agricultural land, is within the
administration and disposition of the DAR. Hence, they argued that
the Decision dated 20 January 1998 was null and void for having
been issued without jurisdiction.[17]

On 26 May 1998, the RTC issued an order[18] dismissing the

petition. Apart from the petition being filed out of time,
the RTC ruled that the findings of facts of the lower court is given
due respect and at times treated with finality.

On 8 September 1998, the Cordovas filed another

petition[19] for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the RTC of Bataan to annul the Decision dated 20 January 1998 of
the lower court, docketed as Civil Case No. DH-492-98. Again, the
Cordovas put forward that the assailed Decision was null and void
as the inferior court had no jurisdiction to entertain the forcible
entry case considering that subject property is government-owned
and falls within the administration and disposition of the
DAR.[20] The Cordovas petition was dismissed by the RTC, this time
on the ground of res judicata.[21]

The Cordovas then filed a petition[22] for certiorari before the

Court of Appeals praying that theDecision dated 20 January 1998
of the lower court be nullified. They restated before the Court of
Appeals their previous assertion that the Decision rendered by the
lower court was null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction, the subject property being under the administration
and disposition of the DAR. And for the first time they raised the
argument that the Complaint for forcible entry suffers from a fatal
flaw as it failed to allege prior physical possession of the property by
David. [23]

For his part, David contended that the petition should be

dismissed for having resorted to in lieu of the lost remedy of appeal
and for having been filed out of time at that. [24]

On 8 April 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated

a Decision[25] granting the Cordovas petition. It agreed with the
Cordovas allegation that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the
property
in
litigation
as
this
was
supported
by
a
certification[26] dated 12 January 1999 issued by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office in Dinalupihan, Bataan to the effect that
the land in suit is situated within the Dinalupihan Landed Estate;
and that Danilo Cordova had filed an application dated 10 January
1997 to purchase the said lot.[27]

The Court of Appeals likewise considered a statement in

the Order[28] dated 14 May 1992 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
which pointed out that-

(r)egarding Lot No. 774, it was not included in the Order of Partition and
based on the report of the Chief of Landed Estate Division of DAR Region
III, the said lot is not identifiable at the moment for lack of approved
reference map.

[29]

in its finding that David fell short of proving that he has a better
right to the subject property as he failed to prove ownership of the
same and the identity thereof.[30]

The Court of Appeals also observed that the Complaint for

forcible entry suffers from a major flaw as it failed to allege, much
less prove, prior physical possession over the property. It held that
such allegation is indispensable in actions for forcible entry. [31]

In the instant Petition, David insists that the Cordovas petition

before the Court of Appeals should not have been given due course
as it was filed out of time and in lieu of a timely appeal. David also
maintains that the FMCTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan has jurisdiction
over the forcible entry case he filed against the Cordovas.

We grant the petition.

Petition before Court of Appeals

was a wrong remedy that was even
filed out of time

At the outset, the petition must be upheld on procedural

grounds. We find, as David has repeatedly posited, the Court of
Appeals erred in giving due course to the Cordovas petition for
certiorari as it was filed in lieu of appeal which is the prescribed
remedy, and far beyond the reglementary period to boot. Quite
lamentably, the appellate court did not accord the fundamental
grounds
raised
by
David
even
with
a
perfunctory
acknowledgment, totally ignoring said grounds and opting to rule
on the petition solely on the basis of the arguments raised
therein.
Instead of filing an appeal, the Cordovas filed two petitions for
certiorari[32] under Rule 65 before theRTC and a petition for
certiorari also under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals on 16
November 1998, notably almost nine (9) months after the lower
court had rendered its assailed Decision on 20 January 1998. It
bears stressing that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution[33] sought to be annulled. Presumably the
Cordovas received a copy of the assailed Decision of the lower court
when they first filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC on 5

May 1998. Even if we were to begin counting the period from such
date or from 26 May 1998, when the RTC issued an order denying
the Cordovas petition, the petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals would still have been filed out of time.

In addition, a petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for

an appeal from a lower court decision. Where appeal is available to
the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari
are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence,
certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially
if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be
no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion. [34]

As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, time and again,

we have emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the
decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded
upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due
process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality
must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. While every
litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and

just determination of his cause, free from constraints of

technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a
jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction over the appeal.[35]

As the Cordovas failed to file a timely appeal, the lower

courts Decision had long become final and executory in favor of
David. The Court of Appeals should have denied outright the
Cordovas petition for certiorari.

Complaint recites facts essential

to a forcible entry suit falling
within the jurisdiction of the
inferior court

Now to the substantive aspect of the case. The issue for our
resolution is whether or not the FMCTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan
had jurisdiction over the Complaint for forcible entry filed by David
against the Cordovas. According to the Court of Appeals, the
inferior
court
was
bereft
of
jurisdiction
because:
(1)
itsComplaint allegedly failed to allege Davids prior physical
possession and his dispossession by any modes on which an action

for forcible entry is based; and (2) the lot in question is allegedly a
public agricultural land.

Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is conferred

only by the Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction of the court, as well
as the nature of the action, is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.[36] An error in jurisdiction can be raised at any time and
even for the first time on appeal.[37]

Contrary to the Court of Appeals ruling, a careful reading of

the facts averred in the Complaint filed by David reveals that his
action is indeed one of forcible entry that falls within the
jurisdiction of the FMCTC.
The facts upon which an action for forcible entry can be
brought are specially mentioned in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. Said section likewise defines an action for unlawful
detainer. In forcible entry (desahucio), one is deprived of physical
possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer (detentacion), one
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from
the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was
originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual

possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of

the defendants right to continue in possession. [38]

In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special

facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set
out. In actions for forcible entry, the law tells us that two allegations
are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First,
the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property.
Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession
by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court.[39]

It is not necessary that the complaint allege, in the language of

the statute, that the person has been deprived of his possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. However, the plaintiff
in an action of desahucio must set up in his complaint facts which
show that he had prior physical possession of the property and that
he was deprived of such possession by reason of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth.[40] To effect the ejectment of an occupant
or deforciant on the land, the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings
are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. [41]
The Complaint filed by David alleged these material facts:
....

3. That plaintiff is the co-owner of Lot 774, with an area of

14,000 square meters, situated in Dinalupihan, Bataan,
Philippines, covered by Tax Declaration No. 009087,
xerox copy of which is hereto attached, marked as ANNEX
A, and made part hereof.

4. That on April 26, 1997, plaintiff passed by said Lot 774 on his way to
Dinalupihan Public Market and he noticed persons who forcibly
entered said Lot 774 by destroying the fence and started erecting a
structure thereon.

5. That when plaintiff got near said Lot 774, defendants and their
workers threatened him with harm should he interfere with their work.

....

13. That the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation by
defendants of plaintiffs said Lot 774 isP15,000.00 per month.

ALLEGATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY

MANDATORY INJUNCTION

....

15. That under the provisions of Article 539 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and Section 3, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff

should be restored to the possession of said Lot 774.[42] (Emphasis

supplied.)

Clearly, David alleged that he is the co-owner of the subject

property, evidenced by a tax declaration receipt, and therefore
entitled to possession thereof; that the Cordovas illegally and
forcibly entered the premises without his consent and started
erecting a structure thereon; and despite the request to vacate the
premises, the Cordovas refused to leave the property thus David
prayed for restoration of possession thereof. On the face of
the Complaint, it also appears that David was seeking to recover
merely the physical possession or possession de facto of the subject
property. In fine, the allegations in the Complaint make out a case
for forcible entry.

Davids prior physical possession of the subject property and

deprivation thereof are clear from the allegation that he is the owner
of the subject property which the Cordovas forcibly entered, of
which he was unlawfully turned out of possession and for which he
prays to be restored in possession. [43] The acts of the Cordovas in
unlawfully entering the land, erecting a structure thereon and
excluding therefrom the prior possessor would also imply the use of
force.[44] In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to
institute a state of war. The act of going on the property and
excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property and this is all that is necessary.
[45]
Thus, the foregoing averments are sufficient to show that the
action is based upon the proviso of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court.

We have previously held that the foundation of a possessory

action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a
person who has entered without right. The words by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real
property and exclude another, who has had prior possession
therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under
the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession,
but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and
excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of
forcibly entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even
though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is
necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the
ground and excluding the other party.[46]
The foregoing establish that indeed David averred the
necessary jurisdictional facts and should therefore quell the
Cordovas assertion that Davids Complaint suffered from a major
flaw.

Respondents are estopped from

assailing jurisdiction of the
inferior court

In any event, the Cordovas are estopped from questioning the

jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that

the Complaint filed

by

David lacked

the

material

averments

sufficient to make out a case for forcible entry.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in

different ways and for different reasons. In the case at bar, the
respondents are estopped by laches. This we defined in the seminal
case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy:[47]

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds

of

public

policy

which

requires,

for

the

peace

of

society,

the

discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is

not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
.

Furthermore, it has been held that after voluntary submitting a

cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late
for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs.
Rathbun-Jones etc. 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis
etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). [48]

It is too late in the day for the Cordovas to challenge the

jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that
the Complaint failed to assert the necessary jurisdictional facts. The
Cordovas first raised the issue in its petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. After participating in all stages of the case before
the lower court, the Cordovas are effectively barred by estoppel from
challenging the lower courts jurisdiction. While it is a rule that a
jurisdictional question may be raised any time, this, however,
admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has
supervened.[49]

Participation in all stages of a case before the lower court

effectively estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction. One
cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily
submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief
against ones opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The
Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of
a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction
when adverse.[50]

Alleged public character of land

does not deprive court of jurisdiction
over forcible entry case

Next, the point that the property in dispute is public land. The
matter is of no moment and does not operate to divest the lower
court of its jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such
property. Indeed, the public character of the land does not preclude
inferior courts from exercising jurisdiction over forcible entry cases.
We have ruled in the case of Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining
Co., et al.,[51] that the land spoken of in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural or
mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. [52]

Moreover, ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings

only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved.
The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to
the physical or material possession of the premises or
possession de facto.[53] Our ruling
in Pajuyo v. Court of
Appeals[54] illustrates this point, thus:

The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment

proceedings iswho is entitled to the physical possession of the premises,
that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It
does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or
when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to
own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property
allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only
issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to
physical possession.[55]

Also worth noting is the case of Pitargue v. Sevilla,[56] wherein,

as in this case, the government owned the land in dispute. The
government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in
the forcible entry case to occupy the land. Both parties were in
effect squatting on government property. Yet we upheld the courts
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if title remained
with the government.

Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue

of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the
basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment
suits is to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to
compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law
alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of
possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment
proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle
speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding
need to quell social disturbances.[57]

Thus, the better rule is that even while the power of

administration and disposition of public or private agricultural
lands belongs to DAR, courts retain jurisdiction over actions for
forcible entry involving such lands. To restate this, courts have
jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private
agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as
this issue is independent of the question of disposition and
alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in DAR.[58]

In addition, the instant case does not involve the adjudication

of an agrarian reform matter[59] nor an agrarian

dispute[60] falling within the jurisdiction of DAR. As such,

possessory actions involving the land in dispute rightfully falls
within the jurisdiction of the FMCTC.

On this point, the following pronouncements we made

in Pitargue are enlightening:

The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of possessory actions involving these public lands
before final award is made by the Lands Department, and before title is
given any of the conflicting claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as
there are public lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers,
especially in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as
it requires the determination of the respective authorities and functions

of two coordinate branches of the Government in connection with public

land conflicts.

Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil Code, either
in the old, which was in force in this country before the American
occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action, the aim and
purpose of which is the recovery of the physical possession of real
property, irrespective of the question as to who has the title thereto.
Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the accion interdictal, a summary
proceeding which could be brought within one year from dispossession
(Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as
early as October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we implanted the
common law action of forcible entry (Section 80 of Act No. 190), the
object of which has been stated by this Court to be to prevent breaches of
the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal
of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create
that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing
themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain
possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert
their claims. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312,
314.) So before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926)
the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the
country. So the question to be resolved is, Did the Legislature intend,
when it vested the power and authority to alienate and dispose of the
public lands in the Lands Department, to exclude the courts from
entertaining the possessory action of forcible entry between rival
claimants or occupants of any land before award thereof to any of the
parties? Did Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all public
lands for that matter, be removed from the jurisdiction of the Judicial
Branch of the Government, so that any troubles arising therefrom, or any
breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival claimants, could be
inquired into only by the Lands Department to the exclusion of the
courts? The answer to this question seems to us evident. The Lands
Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does
it have the means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain
breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts

of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and

alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to
make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is
recognized in the courts herein has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the
protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the
prevention of breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate
could not have been intended to include the power to prevent or settle
disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior
to the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of
the Government must continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within
the limits of their respective functions. The vesting of the Lands
Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public
lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches
of the Government of the exercise of their respective functions or powers
thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of
the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take
jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving,
directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.

Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in American

courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction to determine the
rights of claimants to public lands, and that until the disposition of the
land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts
will not interfere with the administration of matters concerning the same.
(50 C.J. 1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with this principle. The
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands is
different from the determination of who has the actual physical
possession of occupation with a view to protecting the same and
preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court
ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual
occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of
force or in any other illegal manner, can never be prejudicial interference
with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if
courts were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of
possession, that threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace
committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of

lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants

or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule.

It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to solve
conflicts of possession between rivals or conflicting applicants or
claimants would be no other than that of forcible entry. This action, both
in England and the United States and in our jurisdiction, is a summary
and expeditious remedy whereby one in peaceful and quiet possession
may recover the possession of which he has been deprived by a stronger
hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of
the peace and criminal disorder. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and
Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere possession
as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession. (Mediran vs.
Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title or right to possession is never in issue
in an action of forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is
expressly banned, except to prove the nature of the possession. (Section
4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature of the action in mind, by no
stretch of the imagination can conclusion be arrived at the use of the
remedy in the courts of justice would constitute an interference with the
alienation, disposition, and control of public lands. To limit ourselves to
the case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any way
interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition of the land
contested? On the contrary, it would facilitate adjudication, for the
question of priority of possession having been decided in a final manner
by the courts, said question need no longer waste the time of the land
officers making the adjudication or award.[61]

Forum-shopping
A final note. We observe that the Cordovas in their petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals were not completely forthright
about the pleadings they filed previously before the RTC. They only

disclosed the petition for certiorari[62] they last filed on 8 September

1998 before the RTC of Bataan, thus concealing the fact that they
had previously filed a petition for certiorari on 5 May 1998 also
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC, Branch 5 of
Dinalupihan, Bataan. Such failure to declare may constitute forumshopping under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. [63]

WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
is
GRANTED.
The Decision dated 8 April 1999 and Resolution dated 15 April 2002
of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated 20 January 1998 of the First Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan is REINSTATED. Atty. Jaime G.
Mena, counsel for herein respondents in their petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, is given ten (10) days from receipt of
this Decision to show cause why he should not be held liable for
forum-shopping.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE
Justice

O.

TINGA Associate

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

MANUEL A. LUMAYOG,

G.R. No. 169628

Petitioner,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

- versus -

PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
SPOUSES
PITCOCK and
PITCOCK,

LEONARD
CORAZON

March 14, 2012

Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Court of Appeals

Decision[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 74482 dated March 30, 2005 and its Resolution
dated September 6, 2005, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lipa City, Branch 12, which held that no tenancy relationship existed
between the parties and which affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court

in Cities (MTCC), ordering petitioner Manuel A. Lumayog, Sr. and his family to
vacate the barn/stable of respondents Spouses Leonard and Corazon Pitcock and to
return to respondents the possession of the same; to pay rent for the occupancy of
the said premises in the amount ofP1,000 per month from September 22, 2000 until
the premises is vacated, and to pay attorneys fees.

The facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Respondents Spouses Leonard and Corazon Pitcock are the registered

owners of a parcel of land containing an area of 81,351 square meters, situated in
Barangay Talisay, Lipa City. The said parcel of land is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 69503[3] of the Register of Deeds for Lipa City. They
constructed thereon perimeter fences and buildings, consisting of a farm house,
employees quarters, and the barn/stable for their racehorses. They employed
Manuel A. Lumayog, Sr. as groom or sota for their horses, but he was subsequently
replaced by his son, Manuel A. Lumayog, Jr.

On September 22, 2000, respondents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City a
complaint[4] for unlawful detainer against petitioner, his wife and their nine (9)
children in view of their refusal to vacate, despite demand, a portion of the
barn/stable that they used as their temporary quarters, alleging that petitioners
employment as groom or sota was terminated for just cause in March 2000; that
only petitioner was allowed by them, at his request, to use a portion of the
barn/stable as his temporary quarters, subject to the condition that he would vacate
the same when the space would be needed by respondents and upon the
termination of petitioners employment; and that in October 1999, they found out
that petitioner allowed his wife and children to stay with him in his temporary
quarters and petitioner promised to relocate his wife and children outside the farm.

In their Answer,[5] petitioner, his wife and children alleged that four of the
children (Randy, Lina, Jeffrey and Veronica) were not residing on respondents
property; that Randy, Gerbel and Manuel, Jr. worked for respondents for many

years, but only Manuel, Jr. received compensation; that Lina, Snooky and Wendy
worked as housemaids for respondents, but they were not fully compensated; that
petitioner ceased to be a paid laborer of respondents in 1992, but he was made to
work as a tenant and he and the immediate members of his family planted different
fruit-bearing trees; and that in view of the tenancy relationship between the parties,
the court had no jurisdiction over the case.

On December 21, 2001, the MTCC rendered a Decision [6] in favor or

respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding sufficient evidence to support the complaint for

unlawful detainer, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against all defendants Manuel Lumayog, Sr., Estrella Lumayog, Randy Lumayog,
Manuel Lumayog, Jr., Gerbel Lumayog, Marlon Lumayog, Veronica Lumayog,
Jeffrey Lumayog, Snooky Lumayog and Wendy Lumayog as follows:

1. Ordering all the aforementioned defendants to vacate the

barn/stable and to return possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
2. Directing the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the
amount of P1,000.00 per month as reasonable rent for the use
and occupancy of said premises computed from September 22,
2000 until the same is vacated and possession is returned to the
plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the
amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus an
allowance of P2,000.00 per attendance in court hearing or trial;
4. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the cost
of suit.[7]

The MTCC stated that defendants, petitioner herein and his wife and
children, were not being evicted from the land they claim to be tilling as alleged in
their Answer, but the premises in question was the barn/stable of the racehorses of
plaintiffs, respondents herein, allegedly being occupied, illegally, by the defendants.

Nevertheless, the MTCC stated that it was inclined to believe that

defendants were not tenants based on the following:
In their special and affirmative defenses, defendants alleged that
defendants Randy, Lina, Jeffrey and Veronica are not residing and staying at the
subject premises but elsewhere in Bulacan and Cardona, Rizal, so they could not
be considered tenants. The other women defendants worked as
housemaids. Likewise, Randy and Gerbel worked but no evidence was presented
to show that they worked as tenants. Manuel Lumayog, Jr. could not be
considered a tenant because he was substituted as the groom or sota in place of
his father and was being paid a salary.

Alex Mayor, a witness for the defendants, states in paragraph 7 of his

sinumpaang salaysay (Exhibit 3) na ito ay personal kong nalalaman dahil ako pa
ang pinakiusapan ni Ka Maning na magtabas sa farm na iyon at magtanim ayon
sa kagustuhan ni G. Pitcock.[8]

The main issue that the MTCC resolved was whether or not the plaintiffs,
respondents herein, have the right to eject the defendants petitioner and his
family from a portion of the barn/stable of the plaintiffs which defendants are
presently occupying.

The MTCC found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
occupancy of the barn/stable was by mere tolerance of respondents. It held that
even if there was tacit consent to petitioner and his familys occupancy thereof, the
same may be lawfully terminated as provided under Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court.

The decision of the MTCC was affirmed, on appeal, by the RTC

of Lipa City, Branch 12 in its Decision [9] dated December 1, 2002.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the decision of the RTC
before the Court of Appeals. On March 30, 2005, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision,[10] denying the petition for lack of
merit.
The Court of Appeals stated that as pointed out by petitioner
himself, citing Sintos v. Court of Appeals,[11] the essential
elements of tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.
However, the Court of Appeals noted that petitioner failed to
present any evidence to support the existence of their alleged
tenancy relationship with respondents.
The appellate court drew attention to the Pre-Trial Order
dated October 8, 2001 issued by the MTCC, which Order stated
that the parties stipulated that respondents constructed on their
property perimeter fences and buildings, consisting of a farm
house,
employees
quarters
and
barn/stable
for
their
racehorses. The Court of Appeals held that such admission by
petitioner supported respondents claim that the subject property
was purely devoted to commercial livestock, including the
breeding and raising of horses used in polo games. It also noted
that the tax declaration[12] for the subject property for the year
2000 made no mention of plants or fruit-bearing trees thereon and
only indicated building and fence as the improvements thereon.
Thus, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution [13] datedSeptember
6, 2005.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.

II
WHETHER THE SUPERVENING EVENT WHICH WAS THE
SUBSEQUENT GRANT OF THE CERTIFICATE OF LAND OWNERSHIP
AWARD (CLOA) TO HEREIN PETITIONER WOULD EXEMPT THE
LATTER FROM THE COVERAGE OF RULE 70 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT.[14]

Petitioner contends that in its Decision dated March 30, 2005, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the subject property was purely devoted to commercial livestock,
including the breeding and raising of horses used in polo games, and dismissed
petitioners petition for review.

Petitioner informs the Court that respondent Leonard Pitcock filed an

application for the exclusion of his property covered by TCT No. 69598 from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), pursuant to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1993.

Petitioner submits that in an Order[15] dated June 15, 2004, the DAR, after
evaluation and inspection of the said property, denied respondent Leonard Pitcocks
application for exclusion of the property from CARP coverage, and ordered thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Application for Exclusion

from CARP coverage pursuant to Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1993
involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 69598 located at Brgy.
Talisay, Lipa City, Batangas with an area of 7.9052 hectares is hereby DENIED.
The MARO/PARO is hereby directed to immediately proceed with the acquisition
and distribution of subject property to qualified program beneficiaries.[16]

Petitioner contends that pursuant to the DAR Order dated June 15, 2004, he
(petitioner) was granted TCT No. T-422[17] under Certificate of Land Ownership
Award No. 00751620 by the Land Registration Authority on November 26, 2004,
covering a parcel of land (Lot 14394-B) containing an area of 29,054 square meters
of the subdivision plan, Psd-04-003794 (AR) being a portion of Lot14394, Cad.
218, Lipa Cadastre, situated in Barrio Talisay, Lipa City, Batangas Province. Tax
Declaration of Real Property for the year 2005[18] was subsequently issued under
petitioners name.

Petitioner argues that by virtue of the pronouncement of the DAR which

discussed petitioners right as a tenant dating back to the time of the filing of the
complaint for unlawful detainer, it is but just that he be exempt from the coverage
of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner contends that if the Court finds that this ejectment case was
properly filed, his subsequent ownership of the land he had been tilling should be
considered in determining the issue of possession. He states that in an action for

ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto, but when the issue of
possession cannot be decided without resolving the issue of ownership, the court
may receive evidence upon the question of title to the property for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, providing for
appeals by certiorari before the Supreme Court, it is clearly
enunciated that only questions of law may be set forth. [19] The
question regarding respondents tenancy status is factual in
nature, which is not proper in a petition for review, where only
questions of law may be entertained. [20] The Court may resolve
questions of fact only in exceptional cases, [21] which is not present
here. The Court upholds the finding of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner failed to present any evidence to show that a tenancy
relationship existed between petitioner and respondents Spouses
Pitcock.Jeremias
v.
Estate
of
the
late
Irene
P.
[22]
Mariano
held:

Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to

security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order
to entitle the claimant to a security of tenure.

A tenant has been defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No.
1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines, as a person, who, himself, and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latters consent for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder, under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
system.
This Court had once ruled that self-serving statements regarding
tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact
alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a presumption
of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence entails not
only the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of
sharing can be established; there must also be concrete evidence on
record that is adequate to prove the element of sharing. In fact, this

Court likewise ruled that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any

other evidence must be presented; self-serving statements are deemed
inadequate.[23]

In respondents Supplemental Memorandum with Prayer for the Dismissal of

the Petition[24] filed on October 20, 2009, respondents brought to the attention of the
Court that respondent Leonard Pitcock filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
forcertiorari,[25] contending that public respondent DAR committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his application for
exclusion of their landholding from the coverage of the CARP, and seeking the
reversal and nullity of the DAR Orders dated June 15, 2004 and January 11, 2007.
The said case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97763 and entitled Spouses
Leonard and Corazon Pitcock v. Manuel Lumayog, Kilusang Mamamayan ng
Batangas.

Respondents contend that the issues presented for resolution by petitioner are
now moot and academic in view of the Court of Appeals decision dated September
24, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97763, ruling that the subject landholding is exempt
from the coverage of the CARP, not being an agricultural land. The Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 97763, held:

The evidence on record shows that the subject landholding has been
exclusively developed and devoted for livestock raising by the petitioners from
the date of their acquisition on July 6, 1988. Based on the Report of the MARO,
PARO and the CLUPPI-2, it is clear that a greater portion of the landholding
utilized for grazing and breeding horses while only the eastern portion has been
planted with coffee, cassava, bananas and other seasonal crops. There is nothing
in the evidence presented that the subject landholding was ever utilized for
agricultural purposes.

Even the tax declarations in the name of the petitioners where the subject
landholding was classified as cocoland and riceland are not sufficient evidence to
prove that the subject landholding was utilized for agricultural purposes. There is
no law or jurisprudence that holds that the classification embodied in the tax
declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further
inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the
classification of a land. Thus, we give more faith and credence to the findings of
the MARO, PARO and CLUPPI-2 that the land has been utilized for livestock
farming in the absence of any apparent irregularity in the ocular inspections made
on the subject property.

Moreover, the affidavits of petitioner Leonard Pitcock, Cong. Espina and

Alejandro Espiritu constitute substantial evidence of the utilization of the subject
land prior to the acquisition thereof by the petitioners. These affidavits are
acceptable form of evidence and are considered as the affiants direct testimonies
which private respondent Lumayog failed to refute especially when, in the
affidavit of the petitioner Leonard Pitcock, it was stated that private respondent
Lumayog was working as groom at the Manila Polo Club when he was hired by
the petitioners as a groom for their race horses.

All told, the DAR Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he issued the assailed orders
including the subject landholding within the coverage of CARP on the basis of the
guidelines provided for in DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993,
which had been duly declared by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. The
ruling in the cases of Luz Farms and Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR was emphatic
on the exemption from CARP of land devoted to residential, commercial and
industrial purposes without any qualifications.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for

certiorari filed in this case is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated June
15, 2004 and January 11, 2007 of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform are hereby SET ASIDE.[26]

Lumayogs motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated September 24,

2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97763 was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution[27] dated February 25, 2009.

Lumayog appealed the Court of Appeals Decision dated September 24,

2008 and its Resolution dated February 25, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97763 before
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
186986. On July 13, 2009, the First Division of this Court issued a Minute
Resolution in G.R. No. 186986, resolving, thus:

Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the petition

for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution dated 24 September 2008
and 25 February 2009, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
97763, the Court further resolves to DENY the petition for failure of petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the
challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of this Courts
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.[28]

No motion for reconsideration of the Minute Resolution was filed by Manuel

Lumayog. The said Minute Resolution datedJuly 13, 2009 in G.R. No. 186986
became final and executory on September 4, 2009.

The Courts denial of the petition in G.R. No. 186986 renders the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97763 final and executory. Petitioner
cannot find support in the DAR Order dated June 15, 2004 to establish his tenancy
relationship with respondents Spouses Pitcock, since the issue resolved therein was
not the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents, but
whether or not the subject property of respondents may be excluded from the

coverage of the CARP pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of

1993. Contrary to petitioners allegation, the DAR Order dated June 15, 2004 did not
discuss petitioners right as a tenant dating back to the time of the filing of the
complaint for unlawful detainer.

More importantly, the Court notes that in the Complaint, the premises from
which petitioner and his family were sought to be ejected was the barn/stable of
respondents. Thus, the MTCC stated:

x x x The allegations in the complaint clearly show that [the] instant

case is for unlawful detainer xxx. The premises in question in this case
is the barn/stable of the racehorses of the plaintiffs allegedly being
occupied, illegally, by the defendants.

Defendants are not being evicted from the land they claim to be
tilling as alleged in their Answer x x x.

xxxx

x x x [T]he court is inclined to believe that defendants are not tenants

as defined under Republic Act No. 3844 nonetheless the court must
resolve only the issues pertinent to this case. After a perusal
of the case, the court finds that there is sufficient evidence to
prove that the occupancy of the barn/stable by the defendants
is by mere tolerance of the plaintiffs. Even if there was tacit
consent to defendants occupancy, the same may be lawfully
terminated as provided under Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. x x x[29](Emphasis supplied.)

It must be pointed out that the Pre-trial Order [30] dated October 8, 2001 of the
MTCC stated that both parties agreed to stipulate, among others, that (1)
respondents, in 1988, bought a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 69598, situated
in Barangay Talisay, Lipa City, for commercial livestock, including the breeding
and raising of horses used in polo games; and (2) respondents caused to be

constructed perimeter fences and built buildings consisting of a farm house,

employees quarters and barn/stable for their racehorses. Therefore, petitioner and
his family admitted the existence of the barn/stable in the subject property, which
property they also admitted was owned by respondents. The MTCC ruled that the
occupancy of the barn/stable by petitioner was by mere tolerance of respondents;
hence, it ordered petitioner and his family to vacate the same and to pay monthly
rent in the amount of P1,000.00 from September 22, 2000 until the premises is
vacated. The decision of the MTCC was affirmed, on appeal, by the RTC of Lipa
City, Branch 12 in its Decision[31] dated December 1, 2002 and by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated March 30, 2005.

To reiterate, the issue on whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between

petitioner and respondents, which is raised before this Court, is factual in nature.
This Court is not a trier of facts. The factual finding of the lower courts and the
Court of Appeals that no tenancy relationship existed between petitioner and
respondents is conclusive upon this Court.

Further, the supervening event which was the grant of the

Certificate of Land Ownership Award to petitioner does not exempt
petitioner from the coverage of Rule 70 (Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer) of the Rules of Court, as the premises
involved in this case is the barn/stable of the racehorses of
the respondents being occupied, illegally, by the
petitioner,
which
premises
are
located
at
the western portion of the property, while the area
allegedly planted with crops and occupied by petitioner is
located at the northeastern and eastern portions of the
property.[32]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74482 dated March 30, 2005, and its
Resolution dated September 6, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

ZOSIMO OCTAVIO and JESUS

ALBONA (substituted by his
wife, VIOLETA ALBONA),

G.R. No. 172400

Present:

Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,and

ENRICO R. PEROVANO,

BRION, JJ.

Respondent.
Promulgated:

June 23, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is the appeal of petitioners Zosimo Octavio and
Jesus Albona (deceased and substituted by his wife Violeta
Albona) from the Decision[1] dated January 18, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals, Cebu City, Eighteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No.
78843.The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision [2] dated April
14, 2003 and Resolution[3] dated July 3, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. 01-11392
which affirmed in toto the Decision[4] of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) of Talisay City, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No.
671 ordering petitioners to vacate a parcel of land registered in
the name of respondent Enrico Perovano.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On March 9, 1999, respondent Enrico Perovano (Enrico) filed
a Complaint[5] for Forcible Entry with Damages and Prayer for
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against Zosimo Octavio (Zosimo), Jesus
Albona (Jesus), and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
Dolores Gulmatico (Dolores) before the MTCC. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 671.
In his complaint, Enrico alleged he is the lawful and
registered owner of Lot No. 412 situated at the City of Talisay,
Negros Occidental, comprising an area of 48,693 square meters,
more or less, and covered by TCT No. T-179767. [6] He averred that
on or before the first week of January 1999, Zosimo and Jesus,
upon the instruction and direction, and in connivance and
conspiracy with Dolores, by threat, intimidation, strategy and
stealth, entered the land, plowed it and started planting
sugarcane plants inspite of the efforts of Myrna Ayudante, Enricos
Attorney-in-Fact, to prohibit them from trespassing on the
property.

In their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Motion to

Dismiss,[7] Zosimo, Jesus and Dolores denied Enricos allegations
and argued that the land was voluntarily offered for sale by
Estefania Perovano, Enricos mother, to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) in 1992. By reason of the Voluntary Offer
to Sell (VOS), the landowner (Estefania) placed the land under the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, [8] otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998. They further
alleged that immediately thereafter, the processing of the VOS
Claim Folder was initiated by the DAR Municipal Office of Talisay,
Negros Occidental; identification and registration of qualified
farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to Section 22[9] of Rep. Act No. 6657
was conducted by the DAR Municipal Office of Talisay; and Zosimo
and Jesus were among those identified and qualified as farmerbeneficiaries of the land. The VOS Claim Folder was elevated to
the DAR Municipal Office for review and evaluation and when the
processing of the Claim Folder was completed, the latter was
forwarded
to
the
Land
Bank
of
the Philippines for
valuation.Afterwards,
payment
to
the
landowner
was
made. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were then
generated in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries. Accordingly,
petitioners argue that Estefania ceased to be the owner of the
land and it is not true that Enrico is still the lawful and registered
owner of the landholding. [10] Petitioners add that a Memorandum
of Agreement[11] was executed between Estefania Perovano and
the farmer-beneficiaries wherein they agreed that the farmerbeneficiaries are free to take possession and cultivate the
landholding after payment was made to the landowner by the
Land Bank of the Philippines.[12] They posit that there is no iota of
doubt that the landholding is within the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and it is only the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board which has original
and exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any action as per Section
50,[13] Rep. Act No. 6657.[14] They argue that regular courts were
already divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform
matters,[15] and the filing of the case is pure and simple
harassment with the purpose of preventing or obstructing the
implementation of the CARP.[16]

On December 29, 2000, the MTCC of Talisay City rendered a

Decision in favor of Enrico and ordered petitioners Zosimo and
Jesus to vacate the premises. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants herein are ordered:
1. To vacate Lot 412, Talisay Cadastre, subject of the instant
case, remove all improvements introduced thereon and stop further
cultivation of the land and to return possession of the same to the
plaintiff;
2. Defendants Zosimo Octavio and Jesus Alb[o]na are ordered
to pay solidarily herein plaintiff Enrico Perovano the amount of thirty
two thousand pesos (P32,000.00) as yearly rental of the land from the
time of the filing of the complaint until plaintiff is restored to the
possession of the lot subject of this case.
3. Defendants herein Zosimo Octavio, Jesus Alb[o]na and
Dolores Gulmatico are ordered to pay or reimburse solidarily plaintiff
the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees as
well as P500.00 per court appearance.
To pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[17]

Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Negros Occidental, Branch

46, which, in a Decision dated April 14, 2003, affirmed the MTCC
Decision in toto. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court
finds the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Talisay City,
Negros Occidental, dated December 29, 2000 to be supported by law
and evidence, and finding no cogent reason to disturb, modify, revise
or reverse the same, said Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With
costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[18]

The Court of Appeals, in a Decision promulgated on January

18, 2006, affirmed the RTC Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition
is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 14, 2003 and the
Resolution dated July 3, 2003 of the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[19]

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners raise the following issues for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING LOT 412 IS COVERED
BY THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM, THUS THE
CONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT LOT 412 BY ESTEFANIA [PEROVANO] TO
HER SON [ENRICO R. PEROVANO]; THE EXECUTION OF A LEASE
CONTRACT BY ENRICO [PEROVANO] IN FAVOR OF CARMELA VALLEY
CORPORATION; AND OTHER SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS ARE VOID.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FILED BY THE RESPONDENT AGAINST THE
HEREIN
PETITIONERS
IS
TANTAMOUNT
TO
A
CASE
OF
DISQUALIFICATION OF THE LATTER AS DULY INSTALLED FARMER
BENEFICIARIES OF THE SUBJECT LOT 412, HENCE AGRARIAN IN
CHARACTER.

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY
GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION DATED APRIL 14, 2003 AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED JULY 3, 2003 OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 46, BACOLOD CITY FOR THE INSTANT CASE INVOLVES
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM
PROGRAM (CARP), WHICH IS AN AGRARIAN MATTER, THEREBY
DIVESTING THE REGULAR COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION.[20]

The issue boils down to whether or not the case is an

ejectment suit within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court or
an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.
Petitioners in their Memorandum[21] argue that the subject
Lot No. 412 of the Talisay Cadastre was subjected to a voluntary
offer to sell by no other than the previous owner, Estefania
Perovano, on June 18, 1992; that on September 8, 1992, a
Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Estefania and
the farmer-beneficiaries which included Zosimo and Jesus; the
DAR generated a CLOA and the previous title in the name of the
previous owner was canceled and thereafter the farmerbeneficiaries took possession of the same; the former landowner
had already received payment for the land from the Republic of
the
Philippines
through
the
Land
Bank
of
the
Philippines. Petitioners clarified that since farmer-beneficiaries
Arsenio Bene, Ricardo Orocio and Myrna Ayudante who were CLOA
holders of the subject Lot No. 412 abandoned the subject property
after selling their rights to the landowner, which acts are gross
violations of Rep. Act No. 6657, they were recommended for
disqualification. In their stead, Zosimo and Jesus were installed as
farmer-beneficiaries. They point out that Regional Director Elmo A.
Baares of DAR Region VI, in an Order [22] datedMarch 11, 1997,
denied the protest filed by Enrico Perovano against coverage of
Lot No. 412. On January 19, 1998, Regional Director Dominador
Andres, DAR, Iloilo City, issued an order granting the exemption of
the subject Lot No. 412 from coverage of Rep. Act No. 6657, but
said order was reversed on February 3, 2006, by DAR Secretary
Nasser C. Pangandaman.
On the other hand, respondent, in his Memorandum,
argue that the existence or absence of an agrarian dispute is a
question of fact which is not proper for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Respondent likewise maintains that petitioners
herein are not CLOA holders and hence, they have no basis to
state that they are farmer-beneficiaries. Further, no tenancy
relationship exists between petitioners and respondent. Being an
ejectment case, only the issue of possession is involved.
[23]

At the outset, let us be clear that jurisdiction over the

subject matter of an action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action is
commenced, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or upon a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. [24]
A scrutiny of the material allegations in respondents
complaint before the MTCC shows that it involves possession de
facto, the only issue involved in ejectment proceedings. Enrico
alleged he is the lawful and registered owner of Lot No. 412 and
that on or before the first week of January 1999, petitioners
Zosimo and Jesus, by threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth,
entered the premises of the land, plowed it and started planting
sugarcane.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[25] as amended by Rep. Act
No. 7691,[26] the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure[27] governs the remedial aspects of such
suits.[28]
Under Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657, the DAR is vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. [29]An
agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia,
tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. [30] Under Section 3(d)
of Rep. Act No. 6657, an agrarian dispute refers to any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture,
including
disputes
concerning
farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform

beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate

relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant,
or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy relating
to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. [31]
Petitioners argue that the subject landholding is covered by
the CARP and thus the conveyance of the lot by Estefania to her
son Enrico after she voluntarily offered to sell her property to the
DAR is void. There is no question that the land is covered by the
CARP. Records
show
that
DAR
Secretary
Nasser
C.
Pangandaman issued an Order on February 3, 2006 reversing the
order of DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres granting
Enricos petition for exemption of the land.
However, whether or not petitioners are duly installed
farmer-beneficiaries is a finding of fact. It is well-settled that in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised. We have time and
again ruled that the factual findings of fact by administrative
agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by
the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative departments over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.[32] As held by this Court in Sta. Rosa Realty v. Court of
Appeals, et al.,[33] the identification of farmer-beneficiaries is best
left to the discretion of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, through
its authorized offices, as this is a matter involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP, and unless the Court
finds that there was grave abuse of discretion committed by the
agency involved, which the Court finds absent in this case, it will
not substitute its judgment to that of the agencys. [34]
Records show that the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) promulgated on June 3, 2005 a
Decision ruling that Zosimo and Jesus are not recognized farmerbeneficiaries. The DARAB ruled:
It appears that complainants-appellants (which included Zosimo
and Jesus) were not among those three (3) non-CLOA holders
occupying portions of Lot Nos. 412 and 04 who were given one-hectare
land each as disturbance compensation. Otherwise, they would have

not filed this case on 23 February 1999. It must be remembered the 19

January 1998 Order was declared final on 19 October 1998 and the
original complaint was filed on 23 February 1999.
Thus, this Board is of the opinion that complainantsappellants were not recognized as farmer-beneficiaries of the
subject landholding. Their continued possession thereof was
through stealth. Even if they were not identified as farmerbeneficiaries and not awarded any CLOA, they arrogated unto
themselves the portions of the subject landholding. As admitted
by them in the hearing, they came into the land on the premise that
they are farmer-beneficiaries. Without waiting for an award of any
CLOA, complainants-appellants occupied the landholding. In the
process, expropriating the property of the landowner without due
process of law, prejudicing the rights of the landowner and the
legitimate farmer-beneficiaries who were duly awarded with CLOA.
The acts of the complainants-appellants are similar to that of
land grabbing. The agrarian reform law is not enacted to give license to
anybody to grab somebody elses land. Neither [is it] enacted to protect
the land grabbers or the squatters. [35] (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners argument that the case involves an agrarian

matter divesting the regular courts of jurisdiction therefore has no
merit. They are not farmer-beneficiaries but mere usurpers of the
land.
The MTCC properly ruled that:
x x x Defendants [petitioners herein] claim of ownership [as]
farmer-beneficiaries is not evidenced [by] any Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) for nothing is shown that they are CLOA
holders. Likewise, it is clearly established that defendants herein
Zosimo Octavio and Jesus Alb[o]na remained at plaintiffs [L]ot 414 and
did not reside on Lot 412 for they were residents of Lot 414 for more
than 20 years to date as declared by them in their Joint Affidavits
executed on November 20, 2000 at Iloilo City. [36]

Clearly, therefore, the action is one for ejectment and the

MTCC has jurisdiction over it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City,

Eighteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78843 is AFFIRMED. No

pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and
EMER FAJARDO,

G.R. No. 167891

Petitioners,

Present:

CORONA, J.,
Chairperson,

- versus -

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
ANITA R. FLORES, assisted by
her husband, BIENVENIDO
FLORES,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

January 15, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision [1] of the

Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 28, 2004 and its Resolution
dated April 19, 2005, denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.

The facts are as follows:

Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land, denominated

as Lot No. 2351 (Cad. 320-D), with an area of 25,513 square
meters (sq m), located in Barangay Sumandig in Hacienda
Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner
Jesus Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided
equally between the two until 1975 when the relationship was
converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order [2] from the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III, San
Fernando, Pampanga, rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans
per year, which Jesus Fajardo religiously complied with. From the
time petitioner cultivated the land, he was allowed by Leopoldo
delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on the stony part of
the land, which is the subject of controversy.

On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His

daughter and sole heir, herein respondent Anita Flores, inherited
the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo
executed an agreement, denominated as KASUNDUAN NG
PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA

MAGKABILANG PANIG.[3] This was followed by another agreement,

KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA, executed on July 10, 1991,
wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area
of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there
was
a
conflict
of
claims
in
the
interpretation
of
theKasunduan between Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was
referred to the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag,
Bulacan.[4] In the Report and Recommendation dated May 3, 2000,
the Legal Officer advised the parties to ventilate their claims and
counterclaims with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan. [5]

On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed

by herein respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her husband
Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the complaint, she alleged
that, as the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes, she
inherited a parcel of land consisting of stony land, not devoted to
agriculture, and land suitable and devoted to agriculture located
in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; that, sometime in
the 1960s, during the lifetime of Leopoldo delos Reyes, Jesus
Fajardo requested the former to allow him to work and cultivate
that portion of land devoted to agriculture; that Jesus Fajardo was
then allowed to erect a house on the stony part of the land, and
that the use and occupation of the stony part of the land was by
mere tolerance only; and that the land, which was divided equally
between the two parties, excluded the stony portion. In February
1999, respondent approached petitioners and verbally informed
them of her intention to repossess the stony portion, but
petitioners refused to heed the request.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot No.

2351, with an area of 25,513 sq m, was agricultural land; that

they had been continuously, uninterruptedly, and personally

cultivating the same since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC
had no jurisdiction over the case, considering that the dispute
between the parties, regarding the Kasunduan, was referred to
the DARAB; and that the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction
over the controversy involving the lot in question therefore
precluded the MTC from exercising jurisdiction over the case.

Resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the MTC ruled that, while at first
glance, the court did not have jurisdiction over the case,
considering that it was admitted that petitioner was allowed to
cultivate the land, a closer look at the Kasunduan, however,
revealed that what was divided was only the portion being
tilled. By contrast, the subject matter of the complaint was the
stony portion where petitioners house was erected. Thus, the
court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter. [6]

On April 25, 2001, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of

respondent. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of plaintiff (respondent), ORDERING
defendants (petitioners)

1)

and all persons claiming rights under

them to VACATE the subject premises where
they have erected their house, which is a
portion of Lot No. 2351, Cad-320-D situated
[in] Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan;

2)

to DEMOLISH their house on the subject

premises;

3)

to PAY plaintiff the sum of P400.00 a

month by way of reasonable compensation
for their use and occupation of the subject
premises starting [in] June 2000 and every
month thereafter until they finally vacate
the same; and

4)

to PAY attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and

the cost of suit.[7]

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Third

Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC Decisionin
toto upon a finding that no reversible error was committed by the
court a quo in its Decision[8] dated August 29, 2002.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued an
Order on December 10, 2002, reversing its decision dated August
29, 2002. The RTC found that the issue involved appeared to be
an agrarian dispute, which fell within the contemplation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, and thus ordered
the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.

A petition for review was then filed by respondents with the

CA to annul the Order of the RTC dated December 10, 2002.

On October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed decision,

which reinstated the MTC decision. It disagreed with the findings
of the RTC and ruled that the part of Lot No. 2351 where
petitioners house stood was stony and residential in nature, one
that may not be made to fall within the ambit of the operation of
Philippine agrarian laws, owing to its non-agriculture character.
The CA explained that, on the strength of the two instruments, the
parties made a partition and divided the agricultural portion of Lot
No. 2351 equally among themselves. By virtue of said division, the
parties effectively severed and terminated the agricultural
leasehold/tenancy relationship between them; thus, there was no
longer any agrarian dispute to speak of. Fajardo had already
acquired the benefits under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law when one-half of the agricultural portion of Lot No. 2351 was
allotted to him. Petitioners cannot, therefore, be allowed to
continue possession of a part of the stony portion, which was not
included in the land he was cultivating. [9] The dispositive portion of
the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding that the

court a quo seriously erred when it reversed itself, its
Order dated December 10, 2002 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 25,
2001 of the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan is
hereby REINSTATED.[10]

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied;

hence, this petition.
The issue in this case is whether it is MTC or the DARAB
which has jurisdiction over the case.

There is no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the parties

executed an agreement, denominated as KASUNDUAN NG
PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA
MAGKABILANG PANIG. Therein, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo
was the tiller of the land. This Kasunduan was subsequently
followed by another agreement, KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA,
whereby an area of 10,923 sq m of Lot No. 2351 was given to
petitioners. The portion of the land where petitioners house is
erected is the subject of the instant case for unlawful detainer.
Respondent argues that this portion is not included in the deed of
partition, while petitioners insist that it is.

We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its Order
dated December 10, 2002 that the resolution of this case hinges
on the correct interpretation of the contracts executed by the
parties. The issue of who has a better right of possession over the
subject land cannot be determined without resolving first the
matter as to whom the subject property was allotted. Thus, this is
not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the
MTC.[11]

More importantly, the controversy involves an agricultural

land, which petitioners have continuously and personally
cultivated since the 1960s. In the Kasunduan, it was admitted that
Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural lessees,
petitioners have a right to a home lot and a right to exclusive
possession thereof by virtue of Section 24, R.A. No. 3844 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code.[12] Logically, therefore, the case
involves an agrarian dispute, which falls within the contemplation
of R.A. No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

An agrarian dispute[13] refers to any controversy relating to

tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship,
or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer
of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy
relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. [14]
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy
regarding
tenurial
arrangements.
The
contention
that
the Kasunduans,which
allegedly
terminated
the
tenancy
relationship between the parties and, therefore, removed the case
from the ambit of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an
agrarian dispute because the controversy involves the home lot of
petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant
relationship.

.Amurao v. Villalobos is quite instructive:

The instant case undeniably involves a

controversy involving tenurial arrangements because
the Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay, terminate
the same. Even assuming that the tenancy
relationship between the parties had ceased due to
the Kasulatan,there still exists an agrarian dispute
because the action involves an incident arising from
the landlord and tenant relationship.

In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that:

[I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of

prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true,
will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the
previous
juridical
tie
compels
the
characterization of the controversy as an
agrarian dispute. x x x Even if the tenurial
arrangement has been severed, the action still
involves an incident arising from the landlord
and tenant relationship. Where the case
involves the dispossession by a former
landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed
to have been given as compensation in
consideration of the renunciation of the
tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian
dispute. On this point the Court has already
ruled:

Indeed, section 21 of the

Republic Act No. 1199, provides
that all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the
landlord or by a third party and/or
the settlement and disposition of
disputes
arising
from
the
relationship of landlord and
tenant . . . shall be under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction
of
the
Court
of
Agrarian
Relations. This jurisdiction does
not require the continuance of

the relationship of landlord and

tenantat
the
time
of
the
dispute. The same may have
arisen, and often times arises,
precisely from the previous
termination
of
such
relationship. If the same existed
immediately, or shortly, before
the controversy and the subjectmatter thereof is whether or not
said
relationship
has
been
lawfully terminated, or if the
dispute springs or originates
from the relationship of landlord
and tenant, the litigation is (then)
cognizable by the Court of
Agrarian Relations . . .

In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the tenancy

relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of
no moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute
is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if
the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is
cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The
severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the
action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.[15]

Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between

the parties, regarding the interpretation of the Kasunduan, was, in
fact, raised and referred to the DAR, which in turn referred the
case to the DARAB.[16] In view of the foregoing, we reiterateHilario
v. Prudente,[17] that:

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts

from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has
initially been lodged with an administrative body of
special
competence. For
agrarian
reform
cases,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the Court

of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court dated December 10, 2002 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
AMANDO G. SUMAWANG, G.R. No. 150106
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
ENGR. ERIC D. DE GUZMAN,
Respondent. September 8, 2004
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

On June 8, 1999, Engineer Eric de Guzman, as plaintiff, filed a

complaint in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, against Amando G. Sumawang, for unlawful detainer with
damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3778. The
plaintiff alleged therein that the President of the Philippines
issued, on August 19, 1988, Emancipation Patent No. 288843 in
his favor, over a parcel of agricultural land, designated as Lot 33,
with an area of 9,970 square meters, located in Macatcatuit,
Guimba, Nueva Ecija; on December 12, 1988, the Register of
Deeds
issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) EP No. 31683 over the
landholding; thereafter, he leased a portion of the property to the
defendant where the latter constructed a small hut, and remitted
the rentals therefor; in the early part of 1999, the defendant failed
to pay the agreed rentals for the landholding based on said

patent; despite his demand on March 10, 1999, the defendant

failed to vacate the property; and no amicable settlement of the
matter was arrived at by the parties in the Office of the Barangay
Captain.

The plaintiff prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the

defendant to vacate the property and to pay damages and
attorneys fees. In his answer to the complaint, the defendant
alleged that Gloria Zulueta Rominquit was the owner of a large
tract of agricultural land, designated as Lot 1402, which was
placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; he
cultivated a portion of the property and was one of the farmersbeneficiaries of the landholding, as listed in the Office of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform; sometime in 1965, he swapped the
portion of the property he was cultivating with Lot 33 which was
cultivated by Antonio Ferrer and, thenceforth, he had been
cultivating the same lot; in 1994, he built a house of strong
materials in the property where he and his family resided; he
sought the assistance of his first cousin, Judge Felix de Guzman,
the father of the plaintiff, to secure a patent and title over the
property in his name but the plaintiff, who was the son of Judge
De Guzman and an engineer by profession and a non-resident of
Guimba, secured through fraud an emancipation patent and title
over the property in his name.

The defendant interposed the defense of lack of jurisdiction

of the trial court over the action and the subject matter thereof,

and prayed that the complaint be dismissed on those grounds;

and that he be awarded damages and attorneys fees.
The plaintiff adduced evidence that per Parcellary Mapping Survey
(PMS) No. 067, the subject property owned by Rominquit was
designated Lot 12011, with an area of 9,100 square meters,
covered by Certificate of Land Title (CLT) No. 0114427 issued to
Antonio Ferrer, the farmer-beneficiary thereof; but per final
survey, the property was designated as Lot 33, with an area of
9,970 square meters; he was granted Emancipation Patent No.
288843 over Lot 33 and on the basis of said patent, TCT EP No.
31683 was issued by the Register of Deeds. He declared the
property under his name under Tax Declaration No. 94-1003200515, free of any encumbrance, after paying the amortizations
due to the Land Bank of the Philippines; and that, during the
period from 1991 to 1997, he employed the plaintiff as farmerworker to whom he remitted sums of money for the expenses for
the cultivation of the property such as soil, fertilizer, seedlings,
rentals for a rotorator, etc. The defendant, for his part, presented
certifications from the formerbarangay captains that, since 1969,
he had been the tenant on the farmland covered by CLT No.
0114427 under the name of Antonio Ferrer, the beneficiary of the
property; and that, in 1987, he built a house of strong materials
thereon; in 1991, the plaintiff, through his father, Judge Felix de
Guzman, suggested a sharing system between the plaintiff and
the defendant, whereby the plaintiff will provide monetary
assistance for the expenses for the cultivation of the property by
the defendant and would share in the produce thereof and net of
expenses.

On June 27, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor

of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to:

1. Vacate the property and to remove his hut/house erected thereon;

2. Pay plaintiff reasonable rental for the use of the property at the rate
of P500.00 per month from March 12, 1999 until he finally vacates the
same;

3. Reimburse plaintiff P170.00 representing the amount spent for filing

fees; and

4. Pay the costs of suit.[1]

The trial court ruled that the defendant was not the legitimate
tenant-beneficiary over the property, as certified by the Office of
the Municipal Agrarian Reform, but Antonio Ferrer, who
transferred the property to the plaintiff; and that there was no
landlord-tenant relationship over the property between the
plaintiff and the defendant; hence, it had jurisdiction over the
action.

The defendant appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) which rendered judgment on October 9, 2000, reversing the

decision of the MTC. The RTC ruled that, based on the facts on
record, the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant
was an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB).

The plaintiff, then the petitioner, filed a petition for review of the
decision with the Court of Appeals (CA), which rendered judgment
on September 25, 2001, reversing the decision of the RTC and
reinstating the decision of the MTC. The appellate court held that
it was not prepared, based on the record, to hold that the
petitioner was the agricultural tenant of the respondent therein.

The respondent therein, now the petitioner, filed a petition for

review on certiorari with this Court contending that:

1. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion,

that it is not prepared to declare petitioner-appellant not (sic) a tenant
(p. 128, Records), concluding that petitioners occupation of subject
land is by mere tolerance of private respondent and without any
contract between them, petitioner-appellant is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand (p. 129, Records)
(italics, ours);

2. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not

taking cognizance of the doctrine of estoppel, as against the private
respondent-appellee (pp. 7-8, Comments to Petition for Review);

3. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not

applying the provisions of R.A. 6657 (New CARP Law), as applied by the
court ad quem, considering that the petitioner-appellant has met the
six (6) requirements that concur to make a tenancy relationship (pp. 68, Comments to Petition for Review).[2]

The petitioner asserts that he had been a farmer-beneficiary of

the land since 1965 and even after the respondent fraudulently
secured title over the property, the latter allowed him to cultivate
the property and supplied him with farm inputs and implements;
the respondent also shared with him the harvests therefrom on a
50-50 basis, net of costs of production. The petitioner asserts
that, under the factual milieu, he was the agricultural tenant
of the respondent and not merely his farm worker. Hence, the
dispute between them is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB as held by the RTC, and not the MTC, as ruled by the CA.

The threshold issue is whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction

over the action of the respondent. The resolution of the issue is
anchored on our resolution of the issue of whether or not the
petitioner was the agricultural tenant of the respondent or merely
the latters farm worker.

The petition has no merit.

The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court

over the subject matter on the existence of the action is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the
law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.
[3]
In Basco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing
Corporation,[4] we had ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over
the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a

motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would

depend almost entirely on the defendant. [5] Once jurisdiction is
vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. [6] The
Municipal Trial Court does not lose its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a
defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties.[7] But it is the duty of the court to receive
evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. [8] If, after
hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the
court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. [9]

In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of

Appeals,[10] we held that:

Indeed, a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be

evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in determining
whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely
factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land. It is also a legal relationship. As we ruled in Chico v. Court of
Appeals:

Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential

to create a de jure leasehold or tenancy relationship
between the parties. This de jure relationship, in turn, is
the terra firma for a security of tenure between the
landlord and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not
brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a
legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial.

Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

The requisites of a tenancy relationship are as follows: (1) the parties

are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make
the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled
to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws. The security of tenure
guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de
jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. [11]

In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his claim that he had
been installed by the respondent as agricultural tenant on the
landholding. He relied solely on his bare claim that he and the
respondent, through the latters father, Judge Felix de Guzman,
had agreed for the petitioner to be the agricultural tenant of the
respondent, sharing the produce therefrom on a 50-50 basis, net
of costs of production. There is no evidence on record that,
indeed, the respondent had authorized his father to enter into
such an agreement with the petitioner. In Valencia v. Court of
Appeals,[12] we held that the right to hire a tenant is basically a
personal right of a landowner. For Judge de Guzman to be able to
install the petitioner as agricultural tenant, he must be specifically
authorized by the respondent. The petitioner failed to adduce a
morsel of evidence that he received a share of the produce of the
property from the respondent.

The petitioners reliance on the lists of expenses, incurred by the

respondent for the cultivation of the property, is misplaced. In VHJ

Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,

[13]
citing Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[14] we emphasized that:
The respondents self-serving statements regarding tenancy relations
could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working
on anothers landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence
of agricultural tenancy. There must be substantial evidence on record
adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. Thus:

Nor is there any basis for petitioners claim that he is an

agricultural tenant. One of the essential requisites for the
existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing, by the
landowner and tenant, of the produce and no proof of this
fact has been shown in this case. As we have held:

All these requisites are necessary in order to

create tenancy relationship between the
parties and the absence of one or more
requisites does not make the alleged tenant
a de jure tenant as contra-distinguished from
a de facto tenant.

To prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence

must be presented. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate;
competent proof must be adduced.[15]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for

lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.