Korina Marawis

Philo 111 Y: Report Essay

1. Discuss Maimonidess three theories of creation (Moses, Aristotle, and Plato) and arguments for
and against them. Show why Maimonides favors Mosess theory.
Like Thomas Aquinas, Maimonides believes it is impossible to show by logical considerations alone
either that the universe was created or that it is eternal. Though Maimonides says he believes in creation,
he admits one can do no more than tip the scales in this direction. In his work, Guide for the Perplexed,
he limits his discussion to the theories of Moses, Plato, and Aristotle. His treatment of these theories is
mainly thematic; hence, his characterizations of these alternatives are neither precise nor historically
accurate.
Moses: That the world was brought into existence out of nothing in the first instant of time (creation
ex nihilo).
Aristotle: That the world is eternal and that it proceeds from God by necessity.
Plato: That the world was created in the first instant of time of pre-existent matter.
Based on his explicit remarks, Maimonides prefers the theory of Moses but allows one to hold that of
Plato as a reasonable alternative. But there has always been a school of thought that maintains that he is
secretly committed to the view of Aristotle. Aristotle argued that the world is eternal and that whatever is
eternal is necessary. His medieval followers took this to mean that while the world is ontologically
dependent on God, there is no moment when it first comes to be and therefore does not owe its existence
to a decision to create. It exists not because of anything God does but simply because of what God is.
Because God's nature does not change, according to this position, neither does the existence or
fundamental structure of the world. The most important consequence of this view is that God does not
exercise free choice, which is to say that according to the Aristotelian alternative, the world is governed
by necessity.
The standard contentions in favor of Aristotles position take the form of counter-arguments
against Mosess theorythat world is created ex nihilo. These contentions takes two forms of
approaches: by showing that there is something inherent in the nature of the world that makes creation
impossible or by showing that there is something inherent in the nature of God that does. The first
approach uses change as a starting point. Change always proceeds from something to something else, as
when a chicken springs from an egg or an acorn develops into a full grown oak tree. If this is true, it is
impossible for something to come to be from nothing (ex nihilo). The second approach speculates that if
God is perfect, it makes no sense to suppose that God could ever do anything new such as bring the
world into being. Nothing necessitates Him to create the world as it is.
Maimonidess response to the first argument begins by him conceding that change does proceed
from something to something else, however, why should one assume that the creation of the world has to
follow the same pattern? An account of creation is a theory of origin, how a thing comes to be initially.
By contrast, an account of change is a theory of development or alteration, how one existing thing
emerges into another. For all we know, the origin of a thing may be completely different from its
development later on. Thus it is presumptuous to suppose that we can deduce from our experience of the
world as it is at present the moment of its creation. It follows that the first argument against creation is
not decisive, which means that creation remains a possibility.

Maimonides attacks the second argument by stating that willing something new, by a perfect
being, need not imply change. If a person decided to take a trip tomorrow but events spoiled his plans,
he will have to change his mind. Change occurred in this instance but this is not the case for God. For
example, a person decided to solve math problem tomorrow and he did it exactly as planned, it would be
misleading to say he underwent a change. He did undertake something new, to the degree that he had
intended it all along independent of external circumstances. Maimonides takes this to mean that it is
possible for a being not affected by external circumstances to will something new as long as it is part of
his original intention. This is sometimes expressed by saying that changing one's will is not the same as
willing change. So once again, the argument against creation is not decisive.
Maimonides contentions for creation are logically correct but what he truly established is the
possibility of creation, not its actuality.
2. Review God as an efficient cause via Ockhams Razor, then, discuss the universals and
nominalism. Define the nominalist influence on the modern thought.
Ockhams Razor is frequently expressed in the statement Beings are not to be multiplied beyond
necessity. It operates on the basis of the principle of parsimonythe simpler theory is more likely to be
true. Ockham's Razor never allows us to deny presumed entities; at best it allows us to refrain from
positing them in the absence of known compelling reasons for doing so. In part, this is because human
beings can never be sure they know what is and what is not beyond necessitythe necessities are not
always clear to us. But even if we did know them, Ockham would still not posit that his Razor allows us
to deny entities that are unnecessary. For Ockham, the only truly necessary entity is God; everything
else, the whole of creation, is radically contingent through and through1. In short, Ockham does not
accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason2.
In the case of universal entities, Ockham's nominalism is not based on his Razor, his principle of
parsimony. Ockham does not hold merely that there is no good reason for affirming universals, so that
we should refrain from doing so in the absence of further evidence. He also holds that theories of
universals, or at least the theories he considers, are outright incoherent; they either are self-contradictory
or at least violate certain other things we know are true in virtue of the three sources just cited. For
Ockham, the only universal entities it makes sense to talk about are universal concepts, and derivative
on them, universal terms in spoken and written language. Metaphysically, these universal concepts are
singular entities like all others; they are universal only in the sense of being predicable of many.
Based on the statements above, Ockhams nominalism is seen as:
A denial of metaphysical universals.
An emphasis on reducing one's ontology to a bare minimum, on paring down the supply of
fundamental ontological categories.

1 God is a necessary entity but he is not the first efficient cause of the world and
everything in it.
2 Everything must have a reason or a cause.

A denial of abstract entities3. Ockham was or was not a nominalist in this sense. He
believed in abstractions such as whiteness and humanity, for instance, although he did not
believe they were universals.)He certainly believed in immaterial entities such as God and
angels. He did not believe in mathematical (quantitative) entities of any kind.
The defense of nominalism undertaken by William of Ockham prepared the way for various
modern nominalistic theories such as those of instrumentalism, pragmatism, semantics, and logical
positivism. Well-known nominalists include Francis Bacon, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Herbert
Spencer, and Nelson Goodman. Also, according to the philosopher of science Ian Hacking, much of
what is called social constructionism of science in contemporary times is actually motivated by an
unstated nominalist metaphysical view.

3 Ockham was or was not a nominalist in this sense. He believed in abstractions such as
whiteness and humanity, for instance, although he did not believe they were
universals.)He certainly believed in immaterial entities such as God and angels. He did not
believe in mathematical (quantitative) entities of any kind.