Asian Affairs

ISSN: 0306-8374 (Print) 1477-1500 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raaf20

A democratic paradox: The communalisation of

politics in Ceylon, 1911-1948
Harshan Kumarasingham
To cite this article: Harshan Kumarasingham (2006) A democratic paradox: The
communalisation of politics in Ceylon, 1911-1948, Asian Affairs, 37:3, 342-352, DOI:
10.1080/03068370600906507
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068370600906507

Published online: 21 Nov 2006.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 62

View related articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=raaf20
Download by: [Quaid-i-azam University]

Date: 16 May 2016, At: 00:38

Asian Affairs, vol. XXXVII, no. III, November 2006

A DEMOCRATIC PARADOX:
THE COMMUNALISATION OF POLITICS
IN CEYLON, 1911-1948

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

HARSHAN KUMARASINGHAM
Harshan Kumarasingham is studying for a Doctorate in Political History at
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. His research is focused on
comparative historic commonwealth experiences with the Westminster system
with particular regard to South Asia and Australasia.

The situation in todays Sri Lanka graphically illustrates the wisdom of the
following judgement made over half a century ago:
So long as an alien power governs a Southeast Asian country, the situation
is relatively simple a very small minority controls larger minorities, as
well as the dominant indigenous people. But when this foreign imperialism comes to an end, or when it genuinely begins to share its power with
the nationalists of the country, readjustment in relationships between the
various ethnic groups becomes imperative.1
The Sinhalese majority and the Ceylon Tamil minority, with their many
similarities and differences, lived together on the island for centuries under
colonial rule. It is the differences that have come to the forefront since independence. Yet, as Ceylon2 moved towards self-government, it seemed headed for a
peaceful and democratic future, in contrast to India where communal troubles
were all too visible. And it is worth noting that, in contrast to the active and
armed hostility that has characterised Sri Lankan politics since the 1950s,
there was no orchestrated violence on the island between these two dominant
communities during 150 years of British rule. But the departure of the British
catalysed communal rivalry between the Sinhalese and the Ceylon Tamils.
The Sinhalese comprise about 70 percent of the population and are mainly
Buddhist, living in the south and centre of the island, while the Ceylon
Tamils (11 percent) are mainly Hindu, living in the north and east. The
Ceylon Tamils are distinct from the Indian Tamils, brought in by the British
to work on the tea plantations. Other smaller groups include the Muslims and
the Burghers, descendents of Portuguese, Dutch and British marriages with
the Ceylonese.
Between 1911 and independence in February 1948, an intercommunal elite
struggled for, and achieved, gradual but significant reforms. But this process led
to a rethinking of their separate interests and objectives, thus sowing the
seed for future conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils. This conflict manifested
ISSN 0306-8374 print/ISSN 1477-1500 online/06/030342-11 # 2006 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/03068370600906507

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

POLITICS IN CEYLON

343

itself potently with the communally charged and controversial period surrounding the 1956 election of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, which prominently advanced
to the electoral stage the communal identity politics of ethno-nationalism as
never before. This article focuses on the period before then to try to understand
the historical context in which such politics could thrive.
The new oligarchy that succeeded the colonial power, euphoric at gaining
independence, did not acknowledge the changing sensitivities of the society it
now administered. It had striven for independence for all the country so
that all could be equal with no need to pay allegiance to any foreign power
swapping the durbar for democracy. Exhilarated by the heady ideals of
western democracy and its veneration of individual liberty, its leaders rejected
the stagnant, divisive and archaic structure of the old native society. Independence, to their minds, would enable their society to enter a new Elysian era.
But the modernisation of native political power generated its own tensions.
The process of forming the new state stimulated parochialism, communalism
and ethnic rivalry as groups competed for their share of the prize of sovereignty.
The new secular governments of independence were attracted to what Mark
Juergensmeyer has termed the myth of equality which denies that a
problem exists and holds to the illusion propounded by democratic theory:
that all people are equal, and for that reason discrimination should not occur
among groups.3 In Ceylon it was the intercommunal elite that held to this
illusion.
The elite of early 20th century Sri Lanka were western-educated, high-caste,
wealthy urbanites of both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. They held an
almost complete monopoly over position and influence in the path to greater
political autonomy. This minority was a product of colonial rule. Since the
British had arrived in Ceylon in 1796, when they forcibly displaced the
Dutch, they had enlisted the native elite to help administer the island. After
the eventual fall of the Kandyan Kingdom this meant that by 1833, for the
first time in centuries, the whole island was effectively administered by one
government. The native elite quickly impressed the British, and impressed
themselves, by their ability to become thoroughly imbued with the values,
styles and expectations of their new colonial masters.
A colonial governor, Sir Henry McCallum, recorded at the beginning of the
20th century that this elite had assimilated an education of a purely Western, as
opposed to Oriental type, and who are to be regarded, not as representative
Ceylonese, but as the product of the European administration of Ceylon on
lines approved by British tradition.4 Initially therefore this group provided
the colonial government with native leaders who were loyal Anglophiles,
with conservative leanings, sometimes referred to as Brown Sahibs. With
their education often at Oxford and Cambridge, they brought back with them
to Ceylon the English principles of government, justice, and liberty and
founded reforming rather than radical movements. Through their compliance
this group helped ensure that British rule in Ceylon was largely peaceful.
Their reward was to be regarded as the natural group to supply members of
the advisory body to the Colonial Governor after 1833.5

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

344

POLITICS IN CEYLON

The bond of the English language allowed the elites of the two communities
to work together in schools, the public service, commercial establishments and
law courts. It also distanced them from those in their own communities who did
not speak English. The westernised elite, from a class constituting only four
percent of the population, believed they could control the divisive potential
of religious, racial and social differences and impart new values to a new
nation. They accepted modernity and rejected communalism as barbarous
and atavistic. Their disposition was pragmatic and secular . . . suspicious of primordial attachments of any kind, and sufficiently flexible and worldly-wise to
cope with the complicated demands of modern democracy, as David Little
notes.6 They held to the belief that through a western-style liberal democracy
and a vested interest in the governance of the colony the diverse communities
would unite towards the objective of reform and self-government.
Though accused by the British of having less right than British civil servants
to speak for the peasants of Ceylon, they were successful in securing the first
steps towards electoral representation. Though the reform gained by such moderates did not arouse the emotions of the masses, nonetheless, in the words of
R.N. Kearney, the expectation existed that the struggle for Ceylonese selfgovernment would unify the Sinhalese and Tamils in a common cause even
if for some quarters it was behind a facade of cosmopolitanism.7
After some initial small and incremental concessions, the elite then set their
sights on more than mere representation: they wanted an effective share in
managing the affairs of the country. In the face of petitions and movements
further reform of the colonial government in 1911 allowed election through
limited franchise of a minority of members of the Legislative Council that had
been set up in 1833 as an advisory body. The criterion for the franchise
English education made only 4 percent of the people eligible, and the
majority of members were still chosen by appointment.
The election of the Tamil Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan to represent the
educated Ceylonese seat over his Sinhalese rival Sir Marcus Fernando was
an event that showed that he had support from all the communities as the
personification of the westernised Colombo elite. It also showed caste rather
than racial bias since Fernando had a Sinhalese trading caste heritage as
opposed to the goyigama caste from which most of the contemporary Sinhalese
leadership and elite were drawn.8 The vellala (roughly the Tamil equivalent of
goyigama) Sir Ponnambalam concentrated on island-wide issues rather than
those facing the Tamil community alone. The Sarasavi Sandarasa, a local
Buddhist journal, asserted in September 1899, after he had helped Buddhist
interests, that Sir Ponnambalam, a Hindu like most Tamils, not only looks
after the welfare of his own constituents, but also all matters connected with
various interests on the island . . . It might well be said, judging from the
active part he has taken, and the amount of time and labour he has devoted to
questions in Council affecting the Sinhalese alone, that he was their representative looked upon as an all island leader.9
With the international fervour created by World War I the elite were
influenced by nationalist agitation to demand greater constitutional reform,

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

POLITICS IN CEYLON

345

and in 1917 they established the Ceylon Reform League, later known as the
Ceylon National Congress, under the leadership of Sir Ponnambalams
brother Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam. It was blithely assumed that the
efforts for political autonomy would unite the Sinhalese and Tamil who,
although influencing each others culture for centuries, had tensions between
them owing to language, territorial, cultural and religious differences. The Congress believed they were recognising the wisdom of communal unity for their
nationalist demands.10 This sentiment was reflected by the Oxford-educated
Sinhalese Sir James Peiris, who later succeeded the Tamil aristocrat Sir
P. Arunachalam as President of the Ceylon National Congress in 1919. He
said: The past few years have shown us that the Sinhalese and the Tamils
are one people. The struggle we are entering today will cement that union
stronger and stronger.11 Their ideas and beliefs prevailed, since the Ceylonese
intercommunal elite formed almost the sole channel of negotiation for reform
with Westminster.
The Congresss constitutionalist and conservative leaders were adamant in
their desire to secure responsible self-government for Ceylon as part of the
British Empire, and to avoid the agitation and radicalism they saw infecting
India and the Indian National Congress.12 Indeed the Congress after its inception was able through innumerable petitions and deputations to Westminster to
gain further reform of the Legislative Council. From 11 members elected by territorial constituencies and eight by communal electorates, representation had
increased by 1924 to 23 and 11 seats respectively.13 But with more electoral territorial and communal seats, ethnicity began to manifest itself as a decisive
element for rivalry in the struggle for representation.
Communal representation had influenced the shaping of British policy
during the 19th century; the British believed that all communities should be
part of the political process. Yet the paradox of such a policy was that while
all citizens were treated equally and were subject to the same laws, the administration and political structure maintained heterogeneity and formalised differences as the basis for political representation. For example many areas were
administered on the strength of ethnic concentrations: areas with a majority
of Sinhala speakers were administered in Sinhala, and Tamil areas likewise,
rather than as multi-communal districts. This distinction can be seen in the
almost exact replication of the administrative boundaries of the ancient Tamil
Eelam14 by those of the colonial era.15 This contradiction hit at the very
heart of the Congress and moved Sri Lanka irretrievably towards communal
politics.
The Tamils, who had been well represented in the previous arrangement,
now pondered the dominance the new democratic system would accord the
Sinhalese vis-a`-vis the minorities by virtue of the territorial and communal
seats allocated to the majority race. In December 1918 two prominent Sinhalese
elite leaders in the Congress promised the creation of a separate Western
Province for Tamils (in urban Colombo, with a majority Sinhalese population,
where most of the elite resided) as an assurance against domination by one
community.16 By 1920 however the Sinhalese leadership had changed its

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

346

POLITICS IN CEYLON

position, arguing that elections on communal lines were an impediment to

national unity and democracy raising the suspicion that the Sinhalese in Congress were willing to sacrifice Tamil interests.17
As the reforms expanded and more power was devolved, the demands for
greater communal autonomy increased. Communal representation had
allowed the communities to work together as a combined indigenous protest
movement. Now the Congress was pressing for the Legislative Council to be
elected on a territorial basis and for the granting of executive powers to the
elected representatives.
The other communities viewed this with dismay since the result would
be Sinhalese domination of both Council and Executive. Such a change in
direction towards a territorially elected system was viewed as a betrayal of
the agreement to maintain balanced representation.18
The result was a walk-out from the Congress by the Tamil leaders, led by the
brothers Arunachalam and Ramanathan. This left the Congress as a body with a
predominantly Sinhalese character. Many Tamils and other communities such
as the Muslims left the Congress to formulate their own communally orientated
prescriptions for reform. As C.A. Woodward points out, this action ended the
operation of the Ceylon National Congress as a comprehensive and inclusive
nationalist organisation.19 Politics and the objective of a western liberal
democratic style model for Ceylon had therefore drawn apart the Sinhalese
and Tamil communities that only years before had superficially appeared so
fused. The sources and fears of communal rivalry worked against the formation
of a united nationalist organisation.
The Donoughmore Commission of 1928 and 1929 is remembered for its
bold proposal of introducing universal suffrage to the island in 1931, allowing
the franchise to be extended from 200,000 male citizens based on literacy, property and income, to all male and female citizens over the age of 21 (the first
colony in the British Empire to broaden the franchise to this extent).20 As
well as allowing for greater devolution of power and Ceylonisation of
Government services, it signified movement towards electoral representation,
abolishing the communal electorates and replacing them with eight members
nominated by the Governor to speak for interests otherwise unrepresented
in answer to the fears of minorities, in a council of 58 members.21 The Commission rejected the pleas of the Tamils and other groups to maintain communal
seats. The Commission saw communal representation as a cancer on the
body politic . . . poisoning the new growth of political consciousness and
effectively preventing the development of a national or corporate spirit; it reaffirmed that there could be no hope of binding together the diverse elements
of the population in a realisation of their common kinship and an acknowledgment of common obligations to the country of which they are all citizens as long
as there is communal representation.22
This noble attempt to achieve national unity by means of constitutional
reform that entailed the abolition of communal representation stirred growing
distrust and resentment amongst the communities. Interestingly, the Simon
Commission and the Round Table Conference were formulating schemes for

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

POLITICS IN CEYLON

347

electoral and constitutional safeguards for minorities in India at the same period
as the Donoughmore Commissioners were rejecting such a system of communal
representation in Ceylon and pressing for national integration and territorial
representation.23 Significantly all minorities voted in the Legislative Council
against the abolition of the electorates.24
New organisations such as the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress were founded to
argue against the territorial electoral principle connoting majority Sinhalese
rule. G.G. Ponnambalam, a new leader in Tamil politics, stated that communal
electorates would assure balanced representation, with half the seats going to
the minority communities and the rest to the Sinhalese. Ponnambalam feared
that the country run by a majority elected on a territorial basis would equate
to the growth of a racialist party system and Sinhalese oppression of the minorities.25 Ignoring petitions from the smaller communities, the Commissioners
implemented their proposal for the abolition of communal seats. The immediate
reaction was the boycott in Tamil areas, by the new Tamil parties, of the new
elections to the State Council. This meant that there were no seats filled for
the four northern electorates in Tamil areas and only three Tamil voices (they
were from Congress) from 1931 to 1934 during the first crucial years of the
newly created State Council with its 50 constituencies. For the first time the Sinhalese obtained an absolute legislative majority over all other communities
combined.26
At all levels of Ceylonese society there seemed to be serious misgivings.
Broad sections of the island did not acquiesce to the new political establishment
since they believed it had not devolved enough power to the new Ceylonese
executive. Yet the main disgruntlement was over the future and structure of representation for the various communities. The Muslims sent a delegation to
Whitehall, as did Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan for the Tamils, stating that
the new structure with its democratisation of the electorates would mean a
permanent Sinhalese domination of politics. There were divisions amongst
the Sinhalese themselves, especially the Kandyans from the central part of
the island who wanted more seats allocated to their region. (The Kandyan
local body was the first, in 1925, to advocate federalism as a solution, unlike
the Ceylon Tamil elite who either hesitated or lacked cohesion over any
ideas on federalism until after 1948.27) The Sinhalese and Tamils still in Congress were forthright in urging the Commission not to extend the franchise to
include the Indian plantation workers for fear of being swamped, and in
doing so confirmed its image as a landowning, conservative oligarchic
organisation.28
Yet the Congress was fortunate that the structure favoured the rural seats
and accordingly, despite small working class encroachments in the urban
centres,29 the elite was able to continue its dominance under universal suffrage
introduced for Ceylonese citizens Indian plantation workers were not
citizens. The elite of the Ceylon National Congress also dominated the newly
created Board of Ministers and, with few changes, it was this leadership that
would take Ceylon on the path to independence. Though this was a moderate
leadership under the wise D.S. Senanayake, who wanted the Tamils to return

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

348

POLITICS IN CEYLON

to the Congress, it was unable to gain island-wide support because the new franchise and electoral structure could not prevent the Tamils from seeing themselves reduced from a major force on par with the Sinhalese in national
politics to a peripheral minority community.30
The new democratic structure thus extensively reduced the influence and
numbers of Tamils in the Congress elite and in politics as a whole, removing
them from the centre of political leadership. With all positions on the Board
of Ministers in the first State Council 1931 36 occupied entirely by Sinhalese,
the fears of the Tamil community seemed to be realised. Until this point
the Tamil communities had placed their faith in the constitutionalist and elite
Tamils Arunachalam and Ramanathan to maintain their position by working
in concert with their friends in the Sinhalese elite. The failure of their
mission to secure territorial representation on a communal formula meant the
beginning of the decline of Tamil elite dominance.31
The ideals of the unitary British liberal state with its emphasis on electoral
rather than communal voters was transposed to Sri Lanka in the belief that the
struggle for greater autonomy from Britain would encourage political unity
amongst the diverse communities. The British contended that communalism
would damage democratic ideals and foster animosity and division. They promoted individual values over communitarian ones Western conceptions over
Eastern realities. David Brown has noted that a society defines itself by its perception of the common good for all interest groups.32 Both the British and the
Sinhalese community that dominated the Congress believed it was in the
common good of the future unitary state to keep communalism out of its politics. The Sinhalese elite shared with the British an attitude that communalism
was primitive.33 Nevertheless, the new structure had been imposed, and the
Congress elite supported the ideal that communalism would be an obstruction
to self-government, retarding the development of Sri Lanka as a modern
multi-ethnic society. Indeed, in relation to the objective of national unity, the
Tamil boycott in 1931 over the loss of communal seats confirmed in Sinhalese
eyes their willingness to impede the political advance of Ceylon by placing their
minority privileges before the national interest.34
D.S. Senanayake as a member of the Sinhalese elite represented a new generation of leaders emerging in the Ceylon National Congress, who dominated
the State Council. Senanayake realised the need to regain the confidence of
the minorities both as a means to secure further administrative concessions
from the Colonial regime and to safeguard future national unity. A wealthy
and politically adroit Sinhalese Buddhist with a comforting bucolic image,
Senanayake had been instrumental in restraining religious and indigenous linguistic zeal in the State Council, which he had headed since 1942.35 He was
a firm advocate of a secular and unitary state where all the communities
could play an essential part in the politics of the island. In reaction to the
widespread dissatisfaction over the Donoughmore Constitution, the British
Government agreed to a new commission with a vague post-war pledge for
responsible government. So, in the last years of the war, the Soulbury
Commission was duly despatched to establish the necessary constitutional

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

POLITICS IN CEYLON

349

mechanics for Dominion status and decolonisation. The avuncular and shrewd
Senanayake pushed for a united front to achieve the maximum results. As the
undoubted leader for the Ceylonese in the negotiations with the British he
understood the implications of Sri Lankas plural society and knew concessions
to the minorities would be needed to achieve independence. The imperative in
Senanayakes belief was a joint programme for all, with no special privileges
for any single ethnic group, in the cause of secular nationalism.36
Through skilful appointment of Congress elite Tamils to posts on the Board
of Ministers, Senanayake demonstrated to Whitehall and the minority
communities his belief in unity. The Tamil and other minority elites were
appeased and persuaded by Senanayakes argument in 1945: Do you want
to be governed from London or do you want, as Ceylonese, to help govern
Ceylon?37 Only on constitutional questions with implications for government
were sharp communal lines formed within the elites in the State Council. Indeed
two recognised Sri Lankan scholars, one Sinhalese and the other Tamil,
concluded that voting on most other issues in the 1921 46 period seldom produced clear communal divisions within the State Council and relatively weak
communal tension.38
The new constitution with minor amendments was passed, enshrining the
principles of unitary government and majoritarian rule. The Soulbury Constitution rejected the need for communal representation on grounds that it
would be an impediment to national unity. With Senanayakes encouragement
it redrew electoral boundaries for greater minority weighting and created an
upper chamber for other interests. But as a whole it assumed the possibility
of communal harmony without supportive institutional procedures such as a
bill of rights, which it rejected as unnecessary.39 The Congress elite headed
by D.S. Senanayake were able to convince the British and the minorities in
the Council not only that the latter would have a valued place after independence but that their interests would be protected. Tamil leaders like G.G. Ponnambalam were unable to convince the Commission or the majority of Tamil
and elite Councillors that any drastic checks were necessary against Sinhalese
dominance.40 In fact there were sections of Tamils and other groups that actually favoured the retention of British rule over independence as a counter to Sinhalese dominance.41 The British believed that far from being a communal
colossus the Sinhalese majority with their own caste, religious and regional divisions were not a complete ethnic unit.42
Unfortunately this proved an oversimplification of the problems that faced
modern Sri Lanka. Its democratic and constitutional structures were illequipped to adapt to the divisive consequences of a multi-ethnic society with
its pressures of regionalism, religion and especially language. The elite of
Senanayakes ilk would only be able to stem the tide of ethnic nationalism
for so long, even though they believed they had secured independence for all
and presided over the first years of prosperity and peace. The elites brand of
secular nationalism proved incapable of gaining widespread support and reaching the lower strata of society. Here the real loyalty lay with kith and kin an
ethnic rather than national identity. Secular nationalism was elitist in

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

350

POLITICS IN CEYLON

conception. The elite and the British were unable to create a new political
culture to acquaint average citizens with the demands and responsibilities of
a pluralist democracy.43
The 1947 elections that would determine the government for independence
a year later were not generally fought on communal issues. With few exceptions
all seats returned the candidate from the same community as the majority of
their constituents.44 Of the parties that contested the 1947 election only the
Marxist parties and the United National Party (UNP, formed from the Congress)
were based on an intercommunal foundation. Yet the communal electoral
crucible that would characterise future elections was in place from the beginning. Sir Arunachalam Mahadeva (son of Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam),
Vice President and stalwart of the UNP, and a representative of the moderate
Tamil elite, was defeated in Jaffna by a more communal-thinking rival, and
the pattern was repeated in most of the Tamil provinces.45 The UNP itself
did not gain the majority it had hoped for and needed the support of smaller
parties and independents to form a government.46
The cracks in unity were widening and those elitists in executive power
showed complacency, insensitivity, or even ignorance of the growing tensions
in their young democracy. The system of democracy transplanted to Sri
Lanka activated these stresses. Nina Samarasinghe demonstrates that as independence dawned few of the elite in power had perceived or were willing to
perceive the complex nature of the Ceylonese polity . . . The minorities
would, it was thought, accommodate to a measured Sinhalese majority domination over the country. British officials shared the same delusion.47 The
country had already through its electoral results shown communal lines of
voting and loyalties to ethnicity and religion. The implementation of democratic politics, the atrophy of the power of the elites and the sidelining of
their moderating influence in the following years accelerated the new
Ceylon into the harsh realities of a multi-ethnic democracy lacking the constitutional, institutional and social infrastructure to deal effectively with such
political forces.
The Westminster-style electoral system of single member plurality gave a
natural psephological weight to the majority population, ending guaranteed
communal representation for minorities, whose interests were now jeopardised.
The moderate conservatism of the powerful Congress elite had afforded an
assurance to the minorities and gained their acceptance, but the elite could
not guarantee that all subsequent governments would share their view.
Despite the consternation of many of the elite, politics in the new democratic
arena began openly to function on communal rather than national lines.
Ceylonese democracy seemed unable to halt the demise of intercommunal
partnership and prevent the communal politics its promoters had hoped to
avoid. At independence the elite seemed ignorant of the problems that would
face their multi-ethnic society, as more populist ideals gained strength in the
years that followed. The Ceylonese form of a British-style democracy stimulated but did not accommodate ethnic politics and loyalties. Sri Lanka is still
dealing with this democratic inheritance.

POLITICS IN CEYLON

351

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

NOTES
1. V. Thompson & R. Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1955, p. 217.
2. Ceylon was the name of the country until it changed to Sri Lanka in 1972. Sinhalese should not
be confused with Ceylonese.
3. Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 180.
4. R.N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967, p. 26.
5. W.H. Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1960, p. 82.
6. David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity. Washington: US Institute of Peace Press,
1994, p. 52.
7. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon, p. 27.
8. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism Its Origins and Development in the
19th and 20th Centuries. London: Hurst, 2000, p. 48.
9. K.M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, London: Hurst, 1981, p. 367.
10. M.R. Singer, The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1964, p. 38.
11. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon, p. 28.
12. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, pp. 385 386.
13. E.F.C. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966,
pp. 146147.
14. Roughly meaning areas inhabited by the Tamils and of the ancient Tamil Kingdom in Sri
Lanka the goal of certain secessionist Tamil groups.
15. Elizabeth Nissan & R.L. Stirrat, The Generation of Communal Identities, in Jonathan Spencer
(ed.), Sri Lanka History and the Roots of the Conflict. London; Routledge, 1990, p. 29.
16. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, pp. 392 393.
17. R. Ganguly & R. Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict The International Dimension.
London: Longman, 1998, p. 196.
18. C.A. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon. Providence, RI: Brown University
Press, 1969, p. 31.
19. Ibid., p. 32.
20. T.J. Barron, The Donoughmore Commission and Ceylons National Identity. Journal of
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 26, 2 (July 1988) 147 157.
21. Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, p. 85.
22. Ibid.
23. S. Arasaratnam, Nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Tamils, in Michael Roberts (ed.), Sri
Lanka Collective Identities Revisited, Vol. II. Colombo: Marga Institute, 1998, p. 297.
24. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon, p. 35.
25. Ibid.
26. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon, p. 33.
27. Michael Roberts, Problems of Collective Identity in a Multi Ethnic Society: Sectional Nationalism vs. Ceylonese Nationalism, 19001940, in Michael Roberts (ed.), Sri Lanka Collective Identities Revisited, Vol. I. Colombo: Marga Institute, 1997, pp. 453454.
28. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, pp. 420 423.
29. Ibid., p. 425.
30. Dagmar Hellman-Rajanayagam, The Politics of the Tamil Past, in Spencer (ed.), Sri Lanka
History and the Roots of the Conflict, p. 111.
31. Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, p. 67.
32. David Brown, Democratisation and the Renegotiation of Ethnicity, in Daniel Bell et al. (eds),
Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia. New York: St Martins Press, 1995, p. 141.
33. Michael Roberts, Stimulants and Ingredients in the Awakening of Latter-Day Nationalism,
in Roberts (ed.), Sri Lanka Collective Identities Revisited, Vol. I, pp. 271 272.

Downloaded by [Quaid-i-azam University] at 00:38 16 May 2016

352

POLITICS IN CEYLON

34. S.J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka, Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 109.
35. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, pp. 446452.
36. Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity, p. 52.
37. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon, p. 38.
38. S. Namasivayam, The Legislatures of Ceylon, 19281948. London: Faber & Faber, 1951, pp.
6067, and I.D.S. Weerawardana, Government and Politics in Ceylon. Colombo: Ceylon
Economic Research Association, 1951, p. 139.
39. R. Coomaraswamy, Sri Lanka: The Crisis of the Anglo-American Constitutional Traditions in
a Developing Society. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1984, pp. 1415.
40. Arasaratnam, Nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Tamils, p. 299.
41. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon, p. 35.
42. Arasaratnam, Nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Tamils.
43. K.M. De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880 1983.
Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1986, p. 156.
44. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon, p. 39.
45. Ibid.
46. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon, p. 71.
47. Nina Samarasinghe, Colonial Policy, Ethnic Politics and the Minorities in Ceylon 1927 1947.
London: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 341 342.

This article has been peer-reviewed.