On Categorization and Metaphorical Structuring. Some Remarks On Egyptian Art and Language (P.J. Frandsen, Cambridge Archaeologycal Journal, 7-1, 1997)

Cambridge Archaeological Journal 7:1 (1997), pp.
71-104
On Categorization and Metaphorical Structuring:

Some Remarks on Egyptian Art and Language1
Paul J. Frandsen
This article discusses some aspects of the way the ancient Egyptians classified their world.
The Egyptian method of representation aimed at showing things as they existed in the
imagination of the artist who accordingly rendered them as they 'really were', and not as
they were seen, that is, without having recourse to foreshortening, shadow, perspective.
What is stored is a mental image of the prototype or 'genus' of the object. Linguistic and
pictorial material provide evidence of the existence of inalienable properties of a given
mental picture. Another set of components is the interactional properties. Both are
grounded in the basic experience of the perceptual, motor and intellectual apparatus of the
body. Their distribution is overlapping, because the factual inalienability of its own
members is one of the first experiences of a child. While some aspects of the conceptual
system and categorization grow out of this immediate experience, others can only be
understood in terms of other types of experience, such as metaphors in the sense ofLakoff
and Johnson. Hieroglyphs and art are discussed in terms of the notion of metaphorical
structuring.
The aim of this article is to discuss the relationship

between verbal and visual representation, or at a
more abstract level, the possible relationship between
language and conceptual structure in ancient Egypt:
in short, categorization. The content is admittedly
somewhat speculative, but since description rather
than interpretation seems to be at the heart of the
research of most Egyptologists a few wild shots
should do no harm.
Categorization is a matter of paramount importance. People cannot think about the world, let alone
act within it, unless they divide it into classes. Whenever we see something as a kind of thing we are
categorizing. Ever since Psammetichus (according
to Herodotus (11,2)) found out that the first universal
language was not likely to have been that of the
Egyptians, the preoccupation with classification has
mostly gone hand in hand with the search for a
possible link with language and writing. In the seventeenth century, England was the scene of some of
the most ambitious attempts ever made to work out
a perfect, universal language based on perfect universal categories attempts by the Scotsman George
Dalgarno (c. 1626-1687) and the Englishman John
Wilkins (1614-1672). In An Essay Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language, Wilkins introduces
his extremely comprehensive scientific taxonomy,

together with the language as well as the written
form in which the real characters were to find expression, with a few succinct formulations of the
problem:
there have been some other proposals and attempts
about a Real universal Character, that should not
signifie words, but things and notions, and consequently might be legible by any Nation in their
own tongue; which is the principal design of this
Treatise
It cannot be denied, but that the variety
of Letters is an appendix to the Curse of Babel,
namely the multitude and variety of Languages.
(Wilkins 1668,13)
If I echo these futile essays by asserting that many
human concepts are almost universal, simply because
71
Paul J. Frandsen
the characteristics of Egyptian art (Schafer 1974, 20

& 47 [1963, 21 & 50]).2 But what is interesting is that
the Egyptian artist seems capable of creating this
'look' by means that are anything but natural, in
particular by avoiding the use of that which we find
as natural as the air we breathe: perspective, linear
as well as aerial.3 Admittedly, it takes some effort for
modern westerners to think of something as not natural. The coexistence for almost one and a half centuries of photography and representational art has
occasionally brought about a complete disintegration of art's relation to nature. In our daily dealings
with the world we have internalized the application
of perspective and angles to the extent that we are
always ready to put the subjective above the objective. The subjective angle or point of view is so deeply
rooted in European art that meticulous observers of
non-perspective art, even before the advent of the
photograph, fell into the trap of imparting perspective where none was to be found.
A notorious instance of this procedure is to be
seen in Figure 1, where the lower copy was made by
a member of the epoch-making German team that
produced the monumental Denkmaler of Lepsius.4
The accuracy of the renderings found in this work is
justly considered to be a milestone in our subject. It
is therefore even more striking that the draughtsman who copied the scene '"corrected" it according
to the standard of his 'own time. In the original, the
feet overlap wrongly from a modern point of view',
and the line, which in the original is nothing but the
'rounded neckline of the dress lying on the unforeshortened shoulders', becomes in the incorrect copy
simply a part of the shoulder profile (Schafer 1974,
264 [1963, 267]).
Egyptian art is anything but 'natural', as a quick
glance at some representations will immediately
show (Figs. 2-4). Not only did the ancient artists not
try to convey the illusion of depth in a picture (although the use of horizontal registers, overlapping,
and scale in composite scenes might be interpreted
as devices indicating depth). Their very ideas of before vs behind or left vs right would in many cases
seem to be utterly confused that is, from the Westerner's point of view. From our perspective the artist
puts right hands on left arms; the feet on right-facing
figures seem to be two left feet, while left-facing
figures are shown with two right feet; limbs and
bodies overlap in a totally 'unnatural' manner, and
thus it is obvious that the principles by which the
Egyptian craftsmen worked must have been rather
different from those with which we are familiar. For
reasons that will become clear below, we shall here
they are fundamental, there might be those who

would think that this is not so. For many years it has
been thought to be 'politically correct' to deny the
existence of universals. But even though I am not
going to take issue with that standpoint here, it is
important for the present purpose to stress that
it does indeed depend on what kinds of concept we
are talking about. Many concepts are so fundamental that we do not think of them as special categories.
They have simply been embodied or coded into the
grammatical structure and rules of our language.
And so, if it be conceded that the notion 'up' (vs 'down')
is an important element in categorization, it might
possibly be agreed that some categories could be
universal.
Egyptian representational art holds much appeal. If one looks for the reasons for this fascination
one will often be told that the pictures are strange
and familiar at the same time. We can see what they
represent frequently in colour and yet they
have an air of mystery, of something exotic. The
seemingly enchanting blend of nature and geometry
in two-dimensional representation has for a long
time exercised a seductive influence on cartoon buffs
because the style would appear so easy to emulate.
For all its stylization, Egyptian art is life-like.
Such experiences undoubtedly touch on something important. They are, moreover, in keeping
with many scholars' attempts at comprehending
Figure 1. Servants waiting on a lady; from a banquet

scene in the tomb ofRekhmire (Theban Tomb no. 100);
18th Dynasty, (a) Davies 1943, II, pi. 64; (b) Lepsius III,
41. (Both after Schafer 1974, fig. 284a+b.)
72
Egyptian Art and Language
Figure 2. Married couples, (a) Lepsius II, 21;

(b) Lepsius II, 20; both Old Kingdom. (After Schdfer
1974, figs. 166 & 167.)
only be discussing representations in two dimensions, that is, reliefs, paintings, and drawings. Before
we begin to take_a closer look at this art, however, it
should be emphasized that its characteristic appearance is to be attributed to a Sitz im Leben radically
different from our own attitude to art, and not to any
technical shortcomings on the part of the ancient
draughtsman.
There have been many attempts to find the key
to a proper understanding of Egyptian art and to
account for its lack of perspective, foreshortening
and oblique views. From what I have said so far it
will probably come as no surprise that this article
relies on the work of the late German scholar Heinrich
Schafer; but it will nevertheless be necessary to make
brief mention of two rival approaches.5 The first has
been developed by Erik Iversen. He sees Egyptian
two-dimensional art as the rational outcome of rational considerations as to the best way of rendering
an observable three-dimensional reality in two dimensions (Fig. 5). In his opinion
The at first sight confusing appearance of the parts
on the two-dimensional plane can in fact, be shown
to conform to the simple technical rule, that in their
Figure 3. Married couples on benches; (a) Lepsius II,

10a; Old Kingdom; (b) Davies & Gardiner 1915, pi. 18;
18th Dynasty. (After Schafer 1974, fig. 168.)
two-dimensional projection, parts protruding from the

three-dimensional plane must be seen in profile, and
parts extending on the plane en face. (Iversen 1975,
35)6
No cogent criticism of Iversen's theory of the relationship between three- and two-dimensional art has
yet emerged. One obvious weakness, however, is
that he never considered representations of two-dimensional objects other than those of human beings
and, occasionally, animals, and therefore may never
have realized that the notion of a 'three-dimensional
Figure 4. A man with his two dogs; detail from a Middle

Kingdom Stele, Berlin 22820 = Anthes 1930, pi. 7.
(After Schafer 1974, fig. 15.)
plane' is by no means as clear as he seems to think.

As far as I can see he would indeed have had a hard
73
Paul J. Frandsen
SSÊGE
j*^
/TIS=JI
f
G
Figure 5. Deceased and his wife receive bearers of offerings. In the upper left scene the original grid pattern has been
preserved. Concerning the principal and similar representations Iversen (1975, 35) argues the 'the body . . . in its twodimensional appearance did not form a coherent unity, but a complex whole of independently projected parts,
connected by their mutual relation to the vertical line through the ear (MM). (Blackman 1915, pi. 11; Middle
Kingdom; after Iversen 1975, pi. 8.)
CURVED SURFACES
SOLID
DERIVED SECTION
-b
time accounting for many other two-dimensional representations. But the most important argument
against his 'rule' is in my view that it simply does
not fit into the conceptual system of the ancient Egyptians.
The American Whitney Davis has returned to
an old approach, according to which two-dimensional art is section drawing. A three-dimensional
object is seen as being made up of several components for instance the head, shoulder, breast of a
figure of a human being (Fig. 6). Such a complex
'three-dimensional sighting' cannot be transferred
in its entirety, and the artists must therefore settle
for less. They must single out a number of significant components, render them, and put them together in a way that makes it possible to present the
characteristics of the three-dimensional object in a
TWO-DIMENSIONAL
SECTION-CONTOUR
FLAT SURFACES
where angle x =
90 (I).
but nutc:
where angle x is
less than 90
(II).
Figure 6. 'Principles of the Section-Contour Drafting of

Solids with Curved and with Flat Surfaces.' (Davis
1989, fig. 2.5.)
74
what belongs to it' (Schafer 1974, 89 [1963, 97-8]).

As will be seen, Schafer puts a heavy emphasis
on conceptual factors relative to both input and output. In the artist's head there is stored an objectcentred depiction that does not include information
about the viewer's position, and it is that vision that
is being articulated through the artistic process. If
the object is made up of several components he will
produce mental images of these. In the inevitable
choice between which more or less essential components should be stored in the artists' brain, Schafer
conceded that
Where one surface of an object is significantly larger
than the other it will mostly become the basis of
the image in a draughtsman's mind, as it is almost
always the most characteristic. So an egg always
appears in its longest aspect Q, and not, as it might,
as a circle. (Schafer 1974, 96 [1963,104-5])8
plane parallel to the picture plane. This could not be

achieved by rendering all the components either full
face or in profile. A combination of both, supplied
with foreshortenings, might do the trick, but this
would result in a representation that would be in
conflict with the demand for an image that observes
the true, 'objective' properties of the object to be
depicted. In order to reduce the complex three-dimensional mass the artist must therefore make a
reductive analysis, and here, it is suggested, the guiding principle is the wish to display as much of that
particular part of the whole as possible.
More precisely, (1) the component is cut by an
intersecting plane between the most distant opposite surfaces of the component, in real measure; (2)
a view of this plane as perpendicular to the line of
sight and at optical infinity is taken; (3) its outermost closed contours are drawn. (Davis 1989, 14,
cf. 20)
The point is thus that the picture we see is not a picture
of a bounded surface, but a picture of a section.
Schafer's account of the nature of Egyptian art
is rather different. In his view Egyptian art is
geradvorstellig, a term which John Baines has rendered as 'based on frontal images'.7 In Schafer's own
words the artist
does not feel his way over the drawing surface in
accordance with his foreshortened visual images,
but he follows his images of the unforeshortened
objective reality. Therefore the surfaces of the originals are always treated as though the viewer were
looking straight at them, although they are placed
obliquely to him. . . . An Egyptian two-dimensional artist constructs his 'vision' of an object, that
is a three-dimensional original, by reproducing the
individual frontal images that seem important to
him and composing them into a picture. In the
process he changes his mental standpoint with almost every part but it is a mental standpoint: in
his role of two-dimensional artist he is fixed to the
spot in front of his work surface. He cannot physically walk round his picture and work at it from
different sides. (Schafer 1974, 314 [1963, 322])
Thus, the starting point of the Egyptian artists is not
visual observation. What they are aiming at is to
'show things objectively as they are, or as they live
in [their] imagination', the outcome being a product
of their skill and knowledge as it was rooted in the
tradition of his epoch. 'Any draughtsman's senses
give him a host of perceptions of different objects,
and of one and the same object'. From these he rejects 'the ones with a perspective character, because
of his experience that the "foreshortened" view deprives the original of its rights, cheats it of part of
75
Schafer's very comprehensive and detailed analysis

of the enormous material led him, however, to the
conclusion that there were no absolutely strict
rules:
If we take an object that is to be drawn according to
the strict laws of perspective, for example a chair,
we can predict precisely how the drawing will look
if made from a given point of view. And anybody
who later draws it from the same point will always
produce a picture that is in principle identical. This
would be impossible with Egyptian methods. Even
if every artist placed himself in precisely the same
position in relation to the model as his predecessor
had done, and attempted to draw it as faithfully as
possible, the most various pictures could result,
according to his degree of interest in single parts
and attributes of the chair, whether visible or invisible; and certain of these would for whatever reasons become fixed or lasting forms. (Schafer 1974,
137-8 [1963,143]).
Thus, what Davis would regard as a configuration of
sections is held by Schafer to be a composition of
different visions or mental images. In fact, the section hypothesis is far from new, and Schafer has
already tried to counter it with the argument that
there are several kinds of representation which the
section hypothesis is unable to account for as will
be seen in what follows.9
One might further object that the hypothesis
does not say very much about the possible ways in
which the sections are composed into comprehensive pictures. Here it is only fair to add that even
Schafer could not entirely escape such criticism. But,
as already indicated, the most serious weakness is
that there are many examples which this hypothesis
cannot explain, such as, for example, Figure 7, where
Paul J. Frandsen
palace. In Figure 10 the compound is seen from the

side, i.e. from right to left. But a closer look at the
pictures reveals that the lines serve several purposes.
Obviously the surrounding line is meant to give us
the contour of the ground-plan, as may be seen from
the position of the doors and gates. But the tall columns in the third section of the palace and the little
servant sweeping the floor between their bases show
that the lower and upper lines also represent the
floor and ceiling of the building, in which case the
outer lines to right and left must be the walls. Furthermore, above the bedroom in the palace, the one
with the head-rests, the outline or the roof 'is
raised to indicate a ventilation scoop' (Schafer 1974,
132-3 [1963,138-9]). In one and the same representation, the building is thus seen from the side, that is
upwards, and in plan.11
We shall finally consider a 'very noteworthy
representation', as Schafer puts it, of a sunboat (Fig.
12), included among many other 'pictures of the sky
on the ceiling of the tomb of Ramesses VI'. In the
middle of the deck we have a chapel with a god.
Two pairs of human feet are seen, one in front of and
behind the shrine. In the place where the heels should
be we have regular ovals, and behind each pair of
feet there is a line. Schafer suggests, 'without conviction, that it may represent the back pillar' ('there can
be no doubt', he adds, 'that these strange drawings
are meant to stand for statues'). At first sight one
might be inclined to interpret these feet with their
ovals as 'sections taken a little above the ankle-joint',
but this, indeed, would not be a very characteristic
place for making a section, if the picture were to
represent a standing figure or a statue of a figure.
Schafer has another solution (Fig. 13):
Figure 7. Slit stern of a boat enclosing a rudder, from a

scene in the tomb ofi}uy (Theban Tomb no. 40); 18th
Dynasty. Davies & Gardiner 1926, pi. 18 (cf. pis. 10 &
33). (After Schafer 1974, fig. 47.)
Figure 8. Standard with image of a jackal god, from a

Sed-festival scene; 5th Dynasty. Bissing & Kees 1923,
pi. 16. (After Schafer 1974, fig. 48.)
As far as the rendering of nature is concerned the

very common pictures of feet cut into temple roofs
in the Late Period belong to the same class; these
are meant to record that a devotee once stood praying there. As can be seen from the figure, these
drawings are of several different types. In general
it may be said that they are n o t . . . the soles of the
feet, but represent with their sandal straps and toe
nails what a man sees when he looks down at his
feet.
[The ovals must therefore] simply indicate the
calves, [and] on this analogy the indications of statues [in the boat picture] can be removed from their
misleading proximity to modern working drawings and placed in the correct context of the imagebased ancient Egyptian mode of thinking and
depicting' (Schafer 1974,128-9 [1963,135]).
the slit-stern of a boat enclosing a rudder is shown

without any transition between a side view of the
stern and the oar, and a view of the slit from above.
The same goes for the jackal on a standard (Fig. 8).
We would further imagine pictures of buildings10 to be good examples of section drawing, but,
as Figures 9-11 will show, this is simply not the case.
What we see are two different renderings of a palace
at el-Amarna, both from the same room in a tomb.
Figure 9 shows the ground-plan of the palace and
the palace as seen from the front in such a way that
the picture should be read from below and upwards.
The facade, which has one large and two minor gates,
gives access to a courtyard, where the so-called Window of Appearances is seen behind four columns.
Two small doors lead to the next section of the
The hypothesis that the Egyptians' representations
76
Figure 10. Representation of the palace at el-Amarna;

New Kingdom. Davies 1903-1908,I, pis. 26 & 25.
Figure 9. Representation of the palace at el-Amarna;

New Kingdom. Davies 1903-1908,1, pis. 18 & 10.
Figure 12. Sun-boat viewed from above, from the ceiling in the tomb of
Ramesses VI; 20th Dynasty. Piankojf 1954, pi. 173. (After Schafer 1974, fig.
104.)
Figure 11. Ground plan deduced

from Figures 9-10. (After Schafer
1974, fig. 109.)
were based on mental images12 is of the utmost importance, but not as precise as one might wish. The
artists were undoubtedly capable of making a picture of one particular object with its specific, that is,
differentiating characteristics, or with distinctive features appropriate to that object. But it should be
made clear that the level of categorization relative to
Schafer's concept is a more general one, i.e. that of
kind or type or of genus or prototype,13 if we are to
relate it to other systems of classification. Thus at

this level we talk about a dog, as opposed to an animal
77
Figure 13. Worshippers' footprints, from the roof of the

Khonsu temple in Karnak; Late period. Schafer 1939,
150. (After Schafer 1974, fig. 105.)
Paul J. Frandsen
at a higher level or, say, a bulldog at the lower level.

A complete account of the properties of a phenomenon or an object or classes of such items
consists of two things: an analysis and a synthesis.
Ideally, the analysis accounts for the components, or
the building blocks, structure and contents of the
object, while the synthesis discusses its wider context. The analysis inquires into the inherent properties, and the synthesis would seek to define the
so-called interactional properties. I shall try to indicate a path in both directions, but first I wish to
emphasize that the result(s) produced may very well
be independent of the two approaches precisely because they are analytical procedures and no more than
that. Thus, what from the point of view of analysis
can only or may best be comprehended in terms
of 'inalienable properties', may from the synthetic
standpoint come out as 'interactional properties'.
Analysis: inalienable properties
As we have seen, an Egyptian picture is produced
from a 'mental image', i.e. a notion of the category to
which the object belongs in the Egyptian classification of the world. This takes us first to the question
of the inherent characteristics of that class, and to
Schafer's hypothesis I shall now add another, which
is that the properties relevant to the production of a
picture are the inalienable properties of the genus (to
use a more accurate taxonomy) that is the features
or properties which cannot be acquired or disposed
of, and without which the object would cease to be
what it is. The term 'inalienable' and its non-linguistic implications derive from a paper from 1916 by
the French philosopher and anthropologist, LevyBruhl, 'L'expression de la possession dans les langues
melanesiennes'.u Since a discussion of such problems

would seem to be a far cry from mental images, let
me get straight to the point by asking if one can own
one's head in the same way as one can own one's
house?15 The answer depends on categorization and
grammar and on how we look at the relationship
between language and conceptual structure. From a
linguistic point of view both phrases contain a genitive, but since this term, as applied inter alia to IndoEuropean languages, is used to account for two very
different renderings of the same linguistic phenomenon (syntagm), it is often differentiated. We talk
about an objective vs a subjective genitive. The classic
example is amor dei (nostri) 'God's love (for us)' [dews
amat nos] and amor (noster) dei '(our) love of God'
[amamus deum]. The first is an instance of the subjective genitive, the second of the objective genitive.
78
In the Egyptian texts it is frequently said of

Pharaoh that his snd (fearsomeness) or his sjsjt/s'fyt
(awesomeness or impressiveness) or, fear of him
and awe of him is throughout the world or penetrates the world, or something similar; there is a
host of cognate idioms and phrases. Twenty-eight
years ago Siegfried Morenz (1969) suggested that
the genitive in such syntagms should be taken as a
subjective genitive, and that consequently we should
consider snd, sjsjt/sfyt, and suchlike to be properties
belonging to and emanating from the king.16 It is literally the king's snd that destroys his enemies. We should
no longer use translations such as 'fear of him' or
'the fear that he inspires'. As a corollary the personality of the king as holder of a high office17
should be regarded as being composed of or endowed with snd and sfsjt/sfyt in the same way as it
has several so-called 'souls', a shadow, a name, etc..
If, conversely, the genitive is taken as an objective
one, then we have a rather different situation. In
other words, this might be a case where the interpretation of linguistic data could be of importance for
our view of the nature of theocracy or divine kingship in ancient Egypt.
Morenz did not really try to substantiate this
idea, and it would indeed seem at first to be a pretty
hopeless task, in that the language in which all such
phrases were couched, Middle Egyptian, used one
and the same set of pronouns to express both 'functions' of the genitive.18 The situation is not completely without hope, however, beca_use during the
second millennium BC the language already rich
in pronouns evolved a new set of possessive pronouns that would seem to be used in those cases
where we would talk about a subjective genitive,
while retaining the old set for use in connection with
a certain category of nouns, the so-called inalienable
nouns.19 The two most important linguistic features
characteristic of this class very special rules of determination, and use of the old set of pronouns have
been known for a long time, but to my knowledge
no empirical study has ever been made to determine
which words were admitted into this class. What the
grammars say about this is certainly not very accurate.20 However, there can be little doubt that the
core of the group is the words denoting parts of the
body, and in order to express a phrase like 'his head'
the Egyptians would therefore still use the old pronouns. In the scholarly literature these words are
also known under the label 'non-acquirable nouns',
but in fact it is not entirely immaterial what terminology we adopt in order to grasp a phenomenon.21
In a number of malayo-polynesian languages, for
instance, there are very clear distinctions between

the two types of genitive. When in these languages
they talk about 'the man's horse' they use a morphologically distinct, subjective, or as the terminology
goes, a dominating genitive, because the man dominates the horse and can get rid of it. But in a phrase
like 'the man's arm' the speaker would employ an
objective or dominated genitive 'the arm on the man',
as it were, because the arm cannot be got rid of and
therefore dominates the man (Egerod 1984).
The situation in Egyptian is fundamentally the
same, and accounts for the presence of words for
parts of the body in this category.22 This is not the
place to attempt a detailed review of the evidence
for membership of this particular class,23 but I should
like to mention that the one example of the word s'fyt
that I know of in a Late Egyptian text does use the
new possessive pronoun,24 that is, a 'subjective or
dominating genitive', and it would therefore seem
that Morenz was on the right track the more so
since there is clear evidence from autobiographical
inscriptions of the nomarchs of the Middle Kingdom, as well as from the Coffin Texts dealing with
'transformations', that things like sni, and sfsft/sfyt
are acquirable in that they are given to the nomarchs
and the dead respectively (Bickel 1988). It should
also be pointed out that in spite of the fact that the
ancient Egyptians had a lot and a fate, they also had
free will.25 The use of the new set of pronouns would
appear to be in keeping with this fact, in that the
appropriate forms of this set are used in all the known
examples of the word s'3y 'destiny' combined with
an expression of possession in Late Egyptian. By his
own deeds man could bring about some changes in
what would seem at first to be an inevitable fate, an
expression of the divine will.26
The point made so far is that the conceptual
system of the Egyptians had a category of inalienable 'things', first and foremost parts of the human
body. These had a special status in their language
which in turn and that goes, of course, for language in general may be considered as being one
of the most important human cognitive activities.
Subsequently I have suggested that the mental image from which the Egyptian artist would produce a
picture was based on the inalienable properties of
the kind of object (genus, prototype) which in the
Egyptian 'universe' would exclude information about
angles of view, etc.. It should be stressed, however,
that there is nothing in the human mind which would
prevent the point of view from which a picture is
presented from being part of the mental image of the
type of object, because this 'viewpoint-component'
79
falls within the concept of 'interactional properties'

to be discussed in the following paragraph.
Synthesis: interactional properties
Having made the claim that the components of the
mental picture are the inalienable properties of the
genus, it may well be asked what this means in
practical terms, and how one could substantiate such
a hypothesis. As always, such questions are more
easily posed than answered. Let us take the category
of 'table' and ask the question, What would be the
minimal components necessary for us or the Egyptians to think of it (or, talk about it) as a table? A
top, I suppose, maybe a leg, or, possibly two?27 The
simple answer is that we do not know for sure what
would be the minimal requirements in this case, but
if we want to be on solid empirical ground we must
make an inventory of, if not all, then at least a representative sample of material. I suspect that for most
objects28 it would 'suffice' to draw up an inventory
of all the components found in two-dimensional art
from the Old Kingdom, because by that time the
cultural patterns of what any given object or person
looked like would have been so well established that
all its conventions would have been inculcated in
the mind of every potential draughtsman.
But even if by undertaking such a painstaking
job we were to succeed in establishing a canon of
components, we might still not be in a position to
claim that these components were the properties
without which the object would no longer be what it
is, without which it would forfeit its right, as it were,
to membership of a given representational category.
And we would certainly not be able to establish
anything more about the nature of the category of
inalienable things.
In the hope of getting further insight into the
problems raised we shall approach the problem of
categorization from another angle, that of cognitive
science, as represented in particular by the works of
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson
1980; Lakoff 1987). If the basic propositions of these
scholars gain widespread acceptance we shall in fact
have a new scientific paradigm even though its
pedigree can be traced back to Wittgenstein and to
the eminent scholars Edward Sapir (1884-1939) and
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941)29 or for that matter to Dalgarno and Wilkins. There is not space here
to do justice to the radical ideas of this school, so I must
confine myself to a few basic points. On their view,
classes of objects and phenomena are not in the first
place made up of features they have in common.
Paul J. Frandsen
the category of an object, let alone of an object per se.

Instead, the properties relevant to the question of
category are the interactional properties, that is, characteristic features deriving from the classifier's interaction with the category. An extremely interesting
case in point is the classificatory approach to plants
and animals of the Swedish naturalist Linne, or
Linnaeus. It might be thought that his taxonomy
would have been worked out according to the conventional view of classification, based on the principle that 'the categories of mind fit the categories of
the world' (Lakoff 1987, 32 passim). But it was not:
'Scientific classification in biology grew out of folk
classification. And when Linnaeus classified the living things of the world, he specifically made use of
psychological criteria in establishing the level of genus' (Lakoff 1987, 34). Linne's chief concern was to
avoid taking species for genera, and he therefore
used such delimiting features as would be easy to
perceive and to recognize, and easy to describe in
words such as, e.g. the shape of the fruit of a plant
rather than stem, calyx, or petals.32 The genus provides the general characteristics and the species the
distinguishing features. However, the general features of the genus also serve to
The prevalent western definition of a class sometimes called 'monothetic' assumes that all its
members share at least one common property. Categorization may, however, also be based on the socalled 'polythetic' principle, according to which the
members of a category have no single property in
common. They are united by what Wittgenstein
called 'family resemblances'. The members of a class
may even have a majority of defining properties in
common, and yet no single property need be common to all of them, and the missing property may be
different for each object.30 The critique of the cognitive scientists goes even further:
The traditional view is tied to the classical theory
that categories are defined in terms of common
properties of their members. . . . The traditional
view is a philosophical one. . .. We will be calling
the traditional view objectivism for the following
reason: Modern attempts to make it work assume
that rational thought consists of the manipulation
of abstract symbols and that these symbols get their
meaning via a correspondence with the world objectively construed, that is, independent of the understanding of any organism. A collection of
symbols placed in correspondence with an objectively structured world is viewed as a representation of reality. On the objectivist view, all rational
thought involves the manipulation of abstract symbols which are given meaning only via conventional correspondences with things in the external
world. . . . In its place there is a new view of
categories, what Eleanor Rosch has termed the
'distinguish it from all others in the natural order.'

This is a psychologically defined notion of an 'essential character'; which characteristics can be instantly distinguished depends on the perceptual
systems of the beings doing the distinguishing....
In short, the genus was established as that level of
biological discontinuity at which human beings
could most easily perceive, agree on, learn, remember, and name the discontinuities. The genus, as a
scientific level of classification, was set up because
it was the most psychologically basic level for the
purposes of the study of taxonomic biology by human beings. It was assumed that this would also fit
certain real discontinuities in nature.33
theory of prototypes and basic-level categories. (Lakoff
1987, xii.)
She focused on two implications of the classical
theory: First, if categories are defined only by properties that all members share, then no members
should be better examples of the category than any
other members. Second, if categories are defined
only by properties inherent in the members, then
categories should be independent of the peculiarities of any beings doing the categorizing; that is,
they should not involve such matters as human
neurophysiology, human body movement, and specific human capacities to perceive, to form mental
images, to learn and remember, to organize the
things learned, and to communicate efficiently.
(Lakoff 1987, 7)
Thus, cognitive research argues that basic-level or

prototype categories (= genus) are basic in terms of
perception, function, organization of knowledge and
communication. This is the highest level at which
the members of a class are perceived as having similar overall shape; at which mental images of the
category are formed; 'the first level to enter the lexicon of a language', etc. (Lakoff 1987,46).34
Moreover, according to this view and this is
where the change of paradigm comes in categorization and reason are not abstract and disembodied.
On the contrary, they are very much embodied, in
that the basis of our classificatory systems is our
own discovery and experience of the perceptual and
In other words, contrary to the traditional view, a

category need not be and ordinarily is not defined
by virtue of one or two points of resemblance,31 and
at the level of synthesis, therefore, the question to be
asked is not what are the minimal components/distinguishing features/differentiating characteristics of
80
of animals (Meeks 1986). Thus the 'personality' of

the Egyptian king was conceived of as a falcon and
that of the queen as a vulture, presumably in accordance with a metaphor that RULERS ARE BIRDS
(of prey) (Buchberger 1986). Likewise the writing
(meaning) of many words might be structured by
hieroglyphs depicting animals, such as the giraffe }
in the word fX& 'to foretell': PTiSl* (see further
below).
'Metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and
action and only derivatively a matter of language'
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980,153).37 In short according
to this argument the world is metaphorically structured. Metaphors are far from being the kind of embellishment, or expression of poetic license that we
usually associate with this word. That the perceived
world is metaphorically structured means that metaphor is the principle and means by which we categorize. Metaphors induce similarities, but they also
create new kinds of similarities (Lakoff & Johnson
1980,148ff.) thus enabling us to understand one phenomenon or field of experience in terms of another
or several others. This imaginative capacity is also
embodied although in a more indirect manner.
motor apparatus of our body, as well as its mental

and emotional capacity. Likewise, our interaction
with our physical, social and cultural environment is
of paramount importance. Our first categories are
grounded in such experiences and the structures of
our conceptual system grow out of them and make
sense in terms of them (Lakoff 1987, 14).35 Not all
categories, however, emerge solely from our direct
experience. Many aspects of human activities such
as the use of abstract categories, thought, emotions,
sense of time, social practices, and all the phenomena that do not have inherent boundaries and
orientations can certainly be experienced, but not
'fully comprehended on their own terms. Instead we
must understand them in terms of other entities and
experiences, typically other kinds of entities and experiences' (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 177).36 These are
metaphors, metonymy and mental imagery. More
specifically, Lakoff & Johnson distinguish between
orientational, ontological and structural metaphors.
The structural metaphors are the less strange in that
they represent cases where one phenomenon or concept is 'structured in terms of another'. The orientational metaphors organize
a whole system of concepts with respect to one
another. [They] have to do with spatial orientation:
up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow,
central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise
from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we
have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a
concept a spatial orientation; for example, HAPPY
IS UP. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980,14)
Metaphorical structuring
The studies of basic-level categorization suggest
that our experience is preconceptually structured
at that level. We have general capacities for dealing with part-whole structure in real world objects
via gestalt perception, motor movement, and the
formation of rich mental images. These impose a
preconceptual structure on our experience. Our basic-level concepts correspond to that preconceptual
structure and are understood directly in terms of
it. (Lakoff 1987, 269-70)
The sequence of the spatial directions is equally important; we refer to UP-DOWN in that order.
Ontological metaphors do something else. They
enable us to
In domains where there is no clearly discernible

preconceptual structure to our experience, we import such structure via metaphor. Metaphor provides us with a means for comprehending domains
of experience that do not have a preconceptual
structure of their own. A great many of our domains of experience are like this. Comprehending
experience via metaphor is one of the great imaginative triumphs of the human mind. Much of rational thought involves the use of metaphoric
models. Any adequate account of rationality must
account for the use of imagination and much of
imagination consists of metaphorical reasoning.
(Lakoff 1987, 303)
identify our experiences as entities or substances,

we can refer to them, categorize them, group them,
and quantify them and, by this means, reason
about them. When things are not clearly discrete or
bounded, we still categorize them as such, e.g.,
mountains, street corners, hedges, etc. (Lakoff &
Johnson 1980, 25)
A very obvious type of ontological metaphor is those

that allow us 'to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human
motivations, characteristics, and activities' (Lakoff &
Johnson 1980, 33). This is the phenomenon normally
referred to as personification which attributes human qualities to things. To the same category belongs also the capacity of the Egyptians, so 'wondrous
strange' to the people of antiquity, to think in terms
It will be seen that this approach to how a given

culture comes to have the categories it has highlights
the crucial and fundamental importance of bodily
81
Paul J. Frandsen
experience. Since, on this view, the language too is

metaphorically structured and not something separate from the rest of our experience, the same grand
hypothesis should also account for the privileged
position that is given to the category of inalienables
in language as well as art. The ontological and orientational metaphors are, of course, crucial for whatever we 'do', and consequently the notions of 'entity'
and 'up-down', are as indispensable to categorization as are those inalienables that we have been discussing hitherto. Inalienability is no more important
for conceptualization than those types of metaphor.
In the case of ancient Egypt, where for all we know
the conceptual organization of basic notions such as
the concept of space was rather different from the
one that speakers of the Indo-European languages
have, it may even have been a more salient feature
for the production of certain forms of representation
(art) and expressions of possession in language.38
The properties that can be neither acquired nor
got rid of were earlier posited as being of crucial
importance for the production of a mental picture of
a given 'genus'. To these should now be 'added', as
it were, the interactional properties, i.e. the characteristics resulting from the physical-historical and
socio-historical interaction of the Egyptian polity with
its environment in the widest possible sense of the
word. This interaction in its historical dimension
resulted from and shaped the language as well as
the representations that embody cognitive matters
in material but non-linguistic form. However, at the
rather 'elementary' (abstract, 'low') level at which
the basic structuring is believed to work, the two
sets of features, inalienable and interactional, resulting (if from nothing else) from the two separate ways
of organizing conceptualization ('description') adopted above, may very well prove to have at least a
highly overlapping distribution. What happens is
that body parts are projected metaphorically onto
objects and other phenomena that can be understood in terms of them. It should be stressed once
again that we are not talking about the inalienable
properties of a given object as such. In that case a
table would most certainly need at least one leg, a
human being two nipples and not 'just' one. Rather
we are talking of the properties of, or relevant to, the
'mental image', of or for the 'genus', 'type', 'basic-level
category', 'prototype', etc.. In the case of a dead civilization it is impossible to do many of the things that
cognitive scientists do to their 'material' in contemporary society: design experiments, reason about the
'use of language', where it is always tacitly assumed
that one can have recourse to a 'competent speaker'.
But we can use the grammatical approach to show

that there is evidence for the existence of such a
phenomenon in ancient Egypt, which, like the notions of 'up' and 'down', might otherwise be deduced only from the Lakoffian hypothesis and its
insistence on the importance of 'basic' experiences.
A detailed study might possibly lead to a modification of the view here taken, and it is not inconceivable that the notion of inalienability might turn
out to be less adequate that hitherto thought.39 In
any case, while the prominence of words for parts of
the human body within the category of 'inalienables'
is demonstrated by the special linguistic status of the
words for body-parts, an explanation for this phenomenon may now be found in the theories or hypotheses of Lakoff et al. concerning the interactional
properties. This is because according to their argument it is to be expected that the factual inalienability
of his or her own limbs or body parts should be
among the first experiences of a child.
We have already discussed the special status in
the grammar of the language of those inalienables
that relate to the parts of the body. Everyone familiar with the language of the Egyptians will be able to
come up with scores of examples of the way this
category is used to organize and structure perception and thinking about the world. Thus, the body as
a whole served as an important metaphor for conceptualizing the cosmos, that is, the 'world' of the
Egyptians and their gods, for which the language
had no 'word', or the land of Egypt or the temple.40
The person of the king was 'seen' as a body of which
his subjects were the members.41 There are not many
linguistic studies of the Egyptian concept of time and
space42, but there are many indications that the Egyptians had a conceptual system for understanding
spatial as well as temporal locations which was different from, say, speakers of English.43 For example,
as is reported for the Otomanguean language, Mixtec,
of Western Mexico (Lakoff 1987, 313-17) the Egyptians very probably did not put something on something. The word on renders the Egyptian word "^ hr,
which conventionally is said to be either a substantive with the meaning face or a preposition with the
meaning on. Since 'we' cannot accept a translation
which would go like 'put something/ace something',
we assume that the meaning of the word ^ lyr has
been extended to include also the notion on. We
further translate '(he is) in the process of doing' or
'on doing' where the Egyptian has ^ \yr + doing
as if the 'meaning' of the 'thing meant' (judging
from the grapheme and our knowledge of the lexeme)
had been lost. Likewise, the Egyptians probably did
82
not live on earth, as the conventional rendering of

the word head tp (substantive/preposition) goes,
but (on) the head (? tp) of the 'earth'. In like manner,
they would speak before the face (J^T hft-hr) of someone, and they might eat 'head (in) arm (?T tp-c) of
lying down' (i.e. 'before going to bed').44 In that the
word for mouth (=> r) and the preposition meaning
related to, about or to (=> r) were (at least) graphically
identical, it is not entirely improbable that the Egyptians spoke (to) the mouth (= r) of someone. But
what about the metaphorical structuring of art? Two
very different examples will suffice.
The first one comes from the medium that
unites, as it were, language and art, the writing.
Hieroglyphs differ from 'pictures' in that, in addition to being pictorial representations of prototypes
of what they depict, they are at the same time graphic
representations of the sound pattern of objects and
of linguistic 'messages'. In the structure of their representation, however, they are hardly different from
any other two-dimensional representation.45 An
Egyptian picture is often said to be 'alive'. This is a
not a very precise description, but for the present
argument it will do. For example, once the ritual of
Opening the Mouth (Otto 1960; Finnestad 1978) had
been performed on a statue, this latter could serve as
an abode for the ba, the manifestation of the invisible
power of gods, and the manifestation of the essential
properties or forces of the king and deceased persons. If the image was manipulated, damaged or
destroyed, that of which it was a representation
would likewise have been damaged or mutilated,
because damaging means manipulation of its vital,
that is, inalienable properties. The hundreds of
hieroglyphs are in themselves expressive of a system of classifying the
world, in that the signs
represent men, animals,
and all kinds of objects.
When used as terminal
ideograms the so-called
determinatives they
perform a metaphorical
structuring or serve in
Lakoff's senseas a metonymic model (see below)
of the immediately preceding 'word'.46 In certain
periods, and in contexts
involving magical behaviour, the potency of the
Li7o-
representations gives rise to an interesting feature

(Fig. 14). Thus for instance, in the oldest large corpus
of texts, the so-called Pyramid Texts, written on the
walls of some of the rooms and corridors in the
pyramids of the later third millennium BC, the use of
hieroglyphic signs for living beings was apparently
considered to be dangerous and detrimental to the
deceased. Signs for men and animals were therefore
sometimes replaced by other signs, or they were left
out entirely or even truncated and mutilated in spite
of the fact that this would most certainly reduce the
legibility of the text. Thus we find the full phonetic
writing 1 ^ , ^ 'elder' for the sign f*i, which in turn is
but a mutilated form of the ideographic writing ft
Likewise we find = 'human beings' in place of ^ $
The practise of mutilating signs does not quite follow the taxonomy known from other sources; it is
directed primarily against the head and the trunk.
Thus they write t 'to fall' instead of if*"/ 1 ^
'adoration' instead of 1 ^ ^ and <=,5^W 'terrifyingness'
instead of H ! 3 ^ . The head is left out only in contexts where the Egyptians would depict the world of
the monstrous, but the body torso and legs is
frequently avoided. Thus we find = ^ ) 'human
beings' or 'Egyptians' for ÎiM, and &J(^ 'pure'
for ifi (Lacau 1914; Edel 1955/1964,31ff.; cf. e.g. Barb
1971, 155, fig. 3; Vernus 1982, 101-2; Kammerzell
1986; Janosi 1994, 97-8 with nn. 20-24)47
Now, at first this might be thought of as a typical case of what is usually labelled metonymy, that is,
allowing one entity to stand for another, say, a part
standing for the whole. Thus we talk about the
'White House' instead of the President and his
ft
^3
Figure 14. Mutilated hieroglyphs. (After Barb 1971,156.)

83
Paul J. Frandsen
administration; of 'Brussels having decided', and so

on. Both metaphor and metonymy are means of understanding, but while the principal function of the
latter is referential e.g. to a PLACE FOR AN INSTITUTION or PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT ('give
me a Carlsberg') or PLACE FOR AN EVENT
('Watergate, and now Irangate!') the former is
basically a way of understanding and structuring
one phenomenon in terms of another. Therefore when
the Egyptians depict one or more limbs in place of
the entire figure, whether human or animal as in
the case of hieroglyphs depicting body-parts this
may in some cases be a 'simple' instance of metonymy, of a subcategory standing for the whole
category. But it obviously depends on whether the
intended semantic configuration of a given category
is intact or not.48 The best discussion of what this is
all about is in Lakoff, according to whom the basic
logic of this schema is as follows:
The schema is asymmetric: If A is a part of B, then
B is not a part of A. It is irreflexive: A is not a part of
A. Moreover, it cannot be the case that the WHOLE
exists, while no PARTS of it exist. However, all the
PARTS can exist, but still not constitute a WHOLE.
If the PARTS exist in the CONFIGURATION, then
and only then does the WHOLE exist. It follows
that, if the PARTS are destroyed, then the WHOLE
is destroyed. (Lakoff 1987, 273)
Now, in their written form the Egyptian words may
be represented in various ways, ideally by a sign or
combination of signs of which the actual pictorial
value is less significant than their phonetic value,
followed by one or more signs (terminal ideogram
or determinative) which, as already said, serves as a
metonymic reference to or perform(s) a metaphorical structuring of the preceding grapho-phonetic representation of the word. Any graphic representation
of a word may therefore be said (ideally) to be a
composite of two 'wholes', each with its proper
configuration of parts. Therefore, in the examples
from the Pyramid Texts quoted above, those signs
(different or mutilated forms) that substitute for other
signs were clearly intended to do something to the
whole, i.e. to the configuration of which they were a
part, while leaving the composite intact. At the level
of sound pattern (phonemes) nothing changed, and
the words were still structured metaphorically by
the terminal ending in the form of a configuration of
body-elements.49 But the body was no longer intact,
and there can be little doubt that it is the component
[ALIVE] which had been removed. And thus we are
in a position to see why the concept of metonymy
does not apply to these cases. The image of a striking
man without a body is quite harmless [NOT ALIVE]

and is thus a rather unlikely substitute for a dangerous whole [ALIVE]. The mutilation has deprived it/
him of one or more of its/his inalienable properties,
that is, parts of vital importance for the whole, and
it/he does not, therefore, stand for the dangerous
whole, hi fact, the new sign or the 0-sign is not even
a subcategory of a known whole. Conversely, in spite
of the absence or suppression of some of the elements in the metaphorical complex (or semantic components of a semantic whole) the metaphorical
correspondence between the two wholes remains
intact. And so probably did the mental picture producing the overall visual (grapho-phonetic) representation. In the choice of signs, moreover, neither
visual nor semantic considerations were likely to
have been given precedence over one another, because they both form part of a 'reality' in which the
two components are inseparable.
The last example is of a different kind. This is
the central scene of the so-called 'Birth Legend', a
cycle of pictures and texts dealing with the hieros
gamos, the union between Amun and the queen of the
reigning king (Figs. 15,16 & 17).50 In the text we are
told how the god Amun takes on the appearance of
the king, the husband of the queen. He then enters her
'bedroom', the n/ny-chamber,51 in order to beget the
next king. The queen, however, is fully aware of his
true identity and of what is expected of her, and the
text describes in no uncertain terms what is going on.
He found her resting in the M/rw-chamber of her
palace. At the scent of the god she awoke, laughing
before His Person. He went to her at once, and had
an erection towards her. He gave his heart towards
her. He caused her to see him in his true form as
god after he had come close to her, she rejoicing at
seeing his radiant vitality, while his love flowed
through her body, the palace being flooded with
the scent of the god, all his smells being those of
Punt (Sethe 1906, 219,12-220, 6)52
The translation of such a passage is no easy
matter, because the risk of overinterpretation and
vulgar simplification is always present. Thus, the
two most recent English translations of the phrase
here rendered 'had an erection towards her' (h3d)
render the phrase as 'he lusted after her', and if the
connotations of Tust' imply that which the word
undoubtedly means, one might prefer the latter more
decent term.53 However, while the meaning of \}id in
other contexts as well is always very concrete, the
present text contains other words of which the semantic field is much more complex. This goes for the
word mrwt, here rendered as 'love,' and above all for
84
Figure 15. 'Birth-legend' in the version from the Deir el-Bahri temple; 18th Dynasty. (Drawn by Ase Fosdal Ghasemi,
after Naville 1897, pi. 47.)
85
Paul J. Frandsen
would seem to tell a rather different story. Although

pictures of sexual intercourse are extremely rare in
contexts circumscribed 'by a system of decorum',55
the act could be depicted in a non-pornographic,
high culture context, as seen in Figures 18,19 and 20.
Here the picture is, in fact, a hieroglyph from an
inscription in a Middle Kingdom tomb, known for
its many unusual hieroglyphs and sportive writings.
The hieroglyph in question is part of a vertical band
of inscription of which the only complete copy is
that of Champollion 1844,11,347 (Fig. 19), which
should be used together with Lepsius II,143b (Fig.
20) (for the wider context set Newberry 1893, pi.
XIV). In spite of its highly unusual appearance, the
content of the inscription is nothing but a common
list of titles and epithets according to which the deceased was mry niwtyw=f hsy sptyw=f 'one loved by
his townsmen and favoured (hsy = man playing harp,
Fig. 19) by the people of his nome'. But what triggered off this way of representing the epithet was
doubtless 'des imaginations que le mot aime de son
texte lui suggerait' (imaginings that the word loved
in this text suggested to the scribe), as it was put by
Drioton (1933,205). Following a clue from Newberry
(1893,59),56 Drioton suggested that the sign showing
a man caressing the chin of a woman is to be 'read'
mr, while the couple in the bed supplies the consonants ntf. Drioton takes ntf to be the verb 'besprinkle'
which should indicate 'la possession de cette femme'.
While, however, I fully subscribe to the 'reading' ntf
the referent must surely be the so-called independent pronoun ntf which would yield the sense 'she
belongs to him' or something very similar.57 Whether
it be characterized as a further instance of sportive
writings or seen as a more 'serious' attempt at making a sort of double entendre, the important point
for our purpose is the connection between the word
mri 'love' and the sexual intercourse depicted by the
hieroglyph of the copulating couple. The hieroglyph
does not 'mean' love, but the word 'love' structures
the graphic form of the inscription metaphorically.
And this is also the case with the scene of the
hieros gamos, which is structured by at least two metaphors: LOVE IS A GIFT and LIFE IS A GIFT. The
first may sound slightly more modern than is warranted, but, as I have briefly indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the basis for this formulation rests
on the general 'use' of the word mri, mrwt 'love' in
this and a variety of other contexts58 and, in this
particular cotext, on the meaning of the phrase 'give
heart towards' rdi ib r, which likewise occurs in the
text accompanying the picture.59 Among the many
metaphors that structure the Egyptian concept of
Figure 16. 'Birth-legend' in the version from the Luxor

temple; 18th Dynasty. (After Brunner 1964, pi. 4.)
the phrase 'give heart towards' rdi ib r. It would fall

outside the scope of this article to enter into a discussion concerning the degree to which the relevant
passages blend the concrete and the figurative, but
concrete descriptions of sexual matters are by no
means unusual in Egyptian texts, and there can be
little doubt that 'give heart towards' is one of the
ways in which this text refers to the actual intercourse.54
We shall now take a look at the image, which
86
Figure 17. 'Birth-legend' in the version from theMedinet Habu temple; 19th Dynasty. (After Brunner 1986, pi. 16.)
life, the gift-metaphor is one of the more frequently
encountered. Life is normally given in unequal exchange, that is, from god to king, or from king to
subjects, and in the scene of the hieros gamos we are
seeing an exchange in which it is life that is being
exchanged. But here the god has to give life in order
to get life from the queen, for the further purpose of
getting life, at a later date, from the offspring (as it
were) from this exchange. The essence of the transaction may also be seen in Figure 21 which inter alia
is structured by the same metaphor. This scene, which
is quite common from the 19th Dynasty, shows the
sky goddess Nut bending over the earth god Geb,
her consort. The two are kept apart by the air in the
form of the god Shu. Every night Nut swallows the
sun and the bas of the gods, i.e. the stars to whom she
subsequently gives birth in the morning. As shown
in this particular representation where Shu carries
two signs of life f in his hands, she receives life in
the evening in Egyptian sunset is called htpm cnh,
a complex 'term' with the connotations 'to go to rest
in life', 'be satisfied with (have had one's fill of) life',
etc. and gives life in the morning.60 On this reading of the scene of the hieros gamos the difference
between the messages of the text and the picture
87
Figure 18. Hieroglyph, from tomb no. 17 at Beni Hasan;

early 12th Dynasty. Lepsius 11,143b (the hieroglyph was
'mutilated' when Newberry copied the scene, cf. Newberry
1893, 59&pl. XIV). (After Manniche 1987, fig. 21.)
Paul J. Frandsen
Jfr.
*--*tXX)'Lb\JLsm*- iXe^xL&fcL
"Woe
"U. ai^JU
c*.
WeUihjv*-- (c)
CLeAVf olci/vn l(a_

VVn
>voyrvm*-
Figure 19. Figure 18 complete and in its context. (After Champollion 1844, II, 347.)
88
would be this: the text the narrative brings the

circumstances of the meeting of the god and the
queen into focus in a way that highlights the intercourse. This is a story about, e.g. Tuthmosis I and
Queen Ahmose, a myth that is being recounted. The
picture, on the other hand, deals with the deep-structures, that is, focuses on the real issue, namely, that
the union of man and woman is merely a means to
an end: procreation and concern about descent.61
The Egyptians do not show a picture of a sexual
intercourse, not because it is taboo, but because, as a
picture of what is incidental, it is inappropriate in a
temple context, where the specific, if present at all,
would be hidden behind or embedded in symbolic
or ritual representations.62 This should not be taken
to mean that it was immaterial to the person who
commissioned the scene whether the name of the
king was Tuthmosis I or IV, or the name of the
mother Ahmose or Mutemwia or, similarly,
whether the name of the pharaoh clubbing the enemies was left out in any of the almost countless
scenes of that type. These and many similar representations formed part of the scheme of decoration
that was applied to the temples. In order for a given
representation whatever its specific nature to
be efficacious or to work hie et nunc, the divine and
the mundane levels of cosmos, or, in a different wording, myth and cult, must be brought together. The
basic principle: that the human and the divine have
to be brought together, has been accounted for in
two different ways. According to the first, basic patterns or circumstances of life prototypes, or in the
terminology of Assmann to whom we owe this hypothesis, constellations are transposed to the level
of myth through the process of sacramental interpretation ('Sakramentale Ausdeutung') (Assmann
1995, 3&tL).a According to the second account, the
direction of the process aims at bringing 'divinity'
'down to earth':
Ritual texts or ritual expression in general
aim at conveying to the present situation its primeval, universal, real significance, which alone will
subject it to ritual handling. . . . ritual logic . . .
reduces the situation to its cosmological significance in order to subject it to ritual control. Ritual
communication is a closed circuit; it derives its
efficaciousness not from the impression it makes
on any of the persons it addresses, but only through
conformity with cosmology' (Sorensen 1984,17).
This is not the place to discuss which of the two

views offers the better explanation of the phenomenon. Both of them highlight the all important fact
that ritual and/or symbolic actuality consists in
Figure 20. Figure 18 complete and in its context.

(Drawn by Ase Fosdal Ghasemi, after Lepsius II, 143b.)
89
Paul J. Frandsen
Figure 21. The sky goddess Nut bending over her consort, the earth god Geb. The air god Shu, who keeps them apart,
gives life to the mouth of the goddess and receives it from her vulva. This process of regeneration is matched by the
depiction of the daily course of the solar bark. (After Lanzone 1883, Tav. CLV.)
(Fig. 16), things are more complex at Deir el-Bahri

(Fig. 15), in that it is virtually impossible to identify
the support of the couple with any known reality in
terms of furniture. The interpretation of all these objects has been the subject of a very full discussion by
Brunner (1964, 38-42), who argues that what we see
in Figures 15 and 16 is a later misunderstanding of
an earlier mode of representation which would give
us a side view of the object, over which is placed a
view of the object seen from above. According to Schafer
(1974, 110 [1963, 119]), 'This method of representation is only found in the Early Dynastic Period and
the early Old Kingdom; it was abandoned later on.
But in New Kingdom religious art there are still beds
with figures squatting on them shown in the same
way', as may be seen in Figure 22, which is nothing
but a later scene in the 'Birth Legend'. There are
other beds in the 'Birth Legend', rendered in accordance with the archaic way of representing beds, but
there also seem to be two deviations from the simple
view from above placed on top of a side view.
establishing this bond that cannot be grasped between the mundane and divine spheres and this
is important for our understanding of the representation of the hieros gamos. The design of the scene
articulates an attempt at translating a non-visual concept into a visual one, and since the union takes
place in a realm beyond history64 it is possible that
the mental image producing the representation
would reflect this 'fact'.
The union takes place in a space that already by
its name the n/hy-chamber is marked as something apart from the ordinary, mundane sphere, and
the way it is furnished would seem to support this
view. In all three scenes the chief protagonists are
sitting on something. In the 19th Dynasty version
from Medinet Habu (Fig. 17), they sit on a bed, while
the piece of furniture on which the two supporting
goddesses were resting has been lost. In the two 18th
Dynasty versions the supporting goddesses sit on a
bed, but while in the Luxor version Amun and the
queen sit on something which is depicted as the sky
90
Figure 22. The queen sitting on a bed after the birth of the king and his so-called ka. Above the figures is an image of
the sky. At Luxor. (After Brunner 1964, pi. 12. Reproduced in Schafer 1974, fig. 66.)
First, in two scenes we find two beds placed

one on top of the other, a picture that Schafer (1974,
110 n. 55 [1963, 380 n. 154]), unlike Brunner, takes to
be 'a result of an early reinterpretation (of) the single
bed', rather than a misunderstanding (Fig. 23). The
second deviation is the one found in Figures 15 and
16. Both scenes have been recarved and reworked in
the 19th Dynasty, after having been partly destroyed
during the Amarna period at the end of the preceding dynasty, but there is nothing to indicate that
what we see is the result of incompetent and ignorant restoration, as suggested by Brunner (1964, 3842). The fact that the 19th Dynasty representation
(Fig. 17) lets the coupling take place on a bed shows
that the earlier representations are unlikely to have
been the outcome of any form of misunderstanding.
The scenes in Deir el-Bahri and Luxor should rather
be seen as evidence of an interpretation of an event
which is above history in its mundane sense. The
hieros gantos is set in a place of regeneration, above the
'earth'. In the earlier version, at Deir el Bahri, this
has been given a shape of which the most significant
91
feature is that it is 'above'. The interpretation has

been carried further in the Luxor version, where the
couple seem to be seated on/in the sky without any
other support for their feet than the hands of the two
goddesses. In principle, the same line of reasoning
should account for the equally extraordinary scenes
with the two beds on top of each other. If we must
find an explanation for the fact that the setting ('furniture') is easier to identify, it might, perhaps, be
argued that in spite of the participation of several
deities in the scenes related to the birth and breastfeeding of the future king, this event may have more
'historical' substance and may therefore be set in a
space which is easier to identify.
In any case, what is shown is a representation
of something for which there is a mental picture, but
no real, physical, objective reality.65 The inalienable
elements of the image are those elements required to
give shape to the metaphorical structuring and to
establish the cosmological rapport between the two
levels of action, the prototypical or mythical and the
hie et nunc. The various productions of the scene
Figure 23. Deir el-Bahri version of the same scene as Figure 22. Three depictions of the starry sky provide the setting for this scene. The beds rest on the
sky. (Drawn by Ase Fosdal Ghasemi, after Naville n.d. [1897], pi. 53.)
'-a
fully demonstrate the near 'identity' or overlapping

distribution of the properties that can be neither acquired nor got rid of, and of the interactional properties, i.e. the characteristics resulting from the
physical-historical and socio-historical interaction of
the Egyptians with their environment. Neither the
n/ny-chamber nor the 'bed' are just a chamber and a
bed, and the mental image resulting in the production of the scene must therefore have reflected this
situation. If the mental picture had required a bed, a
bed would have been drawn according to the paradigm for interactive properties of the period (style)
and the interactive properties of the scheme of decoration, constellation, etc. something which might
very well have resulted in the representation of an
archaic bed of the type shown in Figure 22. In the
present scene, however, the situation is different.
Over and above the presence of gods, the cosmological setting is indicated by elements such as the
lifting up of the couple, the drawing of a set of horizontal parallel lines creating an 'up and down', and
by the presence either of the sky (probably as hrt
'mat which is above', rather than pt) or of two signs
of life ^, as in Figure 21. This might explain why the
god holds two life signs in Figures 15 and 17, where
no sky is indicated, and only one life sign in Luxor
(Fig. 16) where the couple are placed on the sky.
Moreover, in this reading, based on the analogy with
Figure 21, the queen would participate in the act as
the mother-sky-goddess. The act of procreation
would be indicated by the presence of one or more
beds in the entire scene, the giving of life, the close
overlapping of the principal figures as opposed to
the supporting goddesses, and possibly other elements that elude me. The point is that since it is
the study of metaphors that guide us in our analysis
of images these images are less likely to reveal the
metaphorical content than language. Further progress
in the understanding of a scene like this must therefore be based on a more intensive study of the Egyptian metaphors.
rather enjoy the wonderful privilege of making material available in a systematic manner. Secondly,
the questions addressed are not easy to come to
grips with in any culture, and especially if we choose
to rely solely on so-called 'facts'. What is needed are
theories that can help us to ask the right questions
and structure second-order research. Some of the
questions relate to seemingly universal phenomena,
based on certain forms of fundamental experience
which may be so widespread as to claim almost
universal status. There is little doubt, I think, that
many orientational and ontological metaphors structure and permeate our experience in a way that is
hardly specifically cultural. Yet, even though the conceptualizing capacity of mankind may be the same,
the conceptual systems need not be the same, because not all basic experiences are likely to be the
same, equally forceful and dominant, and because
the basic experience is in any case insufficient to
determine the conceptual systems. And thus a major
part of the codes, conventions, images and ideas
in short, categories that we meet in a given culture can only be understood in terms of that culture.
And by way of underscoring this point I should like
to conclude by recounting a legend found in a novel
by the Danish Nobel Prize winning writer Johannes
V. Jensen (1873-1950). The novel takes place at the
time of the Reformation, and the character who relates it is sitting at the deathbed of a wounded friend:
Zacharias recounted a legend. It was about a monk
who was taking a short-cut to Jerusalem. First he
came by two sparkling lakes, then over a little hill,
and then around a hollow. After a long journey up
hill and down dale, he came to two great white
mountains, and there he rested. Then he travelled
for miles over a domed plateau, up one side and
down the other. From the top he had glimpsed the
Garden of Gethsemane. Then he came to Jerusalem. (Jensen 1992,174)
What is going on in this text? A closer look at it will

no doubt quickly make the reader suspect the truth
of what is being recounted. It is a legend, and as such
it belongs to a realm where things are not what they
appear to be. Further clues are to be found in the
vocabulary (especially the Danish word 'bede', meaning to 'pray' and, in archaic style, 'to eat', here translated as 'rest'), the purpose and goal of the journey
('short-cut', and that to 'Jerusalem'), and, of course,
the wider context of the legend in the novel. Yet I
know from previous experience that very few modern Scandinavians are in a position to decode the
message of this text, and since I have no intention of
ending this article with a cliff-hanger, I had better
Concluding remarks
Coming now to the end, I should like to return to my
starting-point, the somewhat speculative character
of this article, in which I have touched on a few
questions that ought obviously to be dealt with more
fully. They are of a kind that is still fairly novel in
our field, and for good reason. In the first place Egyptology is still in a phase where predominantly descriptive research is much in demand, and it is therefore
only to be expected that most Egyptologists should
93
Paul J. Frandsen
between some of the many approaches (especially Erman and Iversen) see Mysliwiec (1970,
72) who argues that the side view and the front
view are complementary:
L'imagination de l'artiste semble 'tourner' dans
l'espace la silhouette humaine et 'fixer' sur la
surface seulement ses aspects les plus caracteristiques, typiques: ils correspondent a l'aspect
de l'etre humain de face et de cote. Compris
ainsi Tobjectivite' du dessin sur la surface serait
done un denominateur commun entre deux
divers domaines de la plastique: la statuaire et
le relief.
Cf. Pirenne (1963,165) where it is argued that
in pre-Greek art
la representation picturale n'a jamais tenu
compte de la perspective lineaire au sens
complet du terme . . . Cette ancienne methode
de representation est cependant basee avec
precision sur certaines lois optiques. Mais
celles-ci se reduisent presque uniquement a un
seul theoreme de la perspective lineaire. La
projection centrale d'une figure situee dans une
surface plane, sur une seconde surface plane
parallele a la premiere, est une figure qui est
geometriquement semblable a la figure
originale'.
The citation continues:
Thus considered, the translation of a figure
from one plane to another becomes a purely
technical process dependent on no laws of optics or perspective, for the natural reason that
disclose that the landscape the text describes is that

of a naked woman's body. The point should be clear
enough: no linguistic model, no theory of pragmatics, in short, no formal approach can help us in understanding what kind of landscape is being depicted.
It can be understood only by those who are fully
familiar with the Christian, European concept of the
Forbidden Fruit.
Notes
1. I thank John Baines for a very constructive reading of this article, and I am deeply grateful to
John R. Harris for his many penetrating comments, useful additions and references, and for
having corrected my English text. An earlier version was published as Frandsen 1993; another
version was given in Cambridge as the Glanville
Lecture for 1994.
2. For other recent attempts at coming to grips with
the aesthetic organization of the ancient Egyptians, see Junge 1983 and 1990; Baines 1985a and
1994.
3. This should not be taken to mean that the Egyptians were unaware of the fact 'that objects appear smaller the more distant they are'. See
Schafer 1974, 82 [1963, 88], to which should be
added the new translation of the 'Etana poem'
given on pp. 347-8. According to Baines (1985a,
18-19), it is not the absence but the presence of
perspective which needs to be accounted for:
The suggestion that perspective is the goal of a
unilinear development implies that methods
of representation are subject to an 'evolutionary' universal. Reduced to its simplest form,
such a universal might run: (I) Schematic; (II)
'Realistic'; (III) Incorporation of foreshortening and use of oblique projective systems; (IV)
Perspective. The four stages also map the complete transition from object-centred to viewercentred representation. It is clear from some
paleolithic art that the shift (I)-(II) is possible
in any context, but (II)(III) might depend on
extra factors, such as the extent of the representational system: . . . (Ill) and (IV) must be
separated because of the gulf between full perspective and the many representational systems in which foreshortening is incorporated
or oblique projections are used but there is no
perspective system. Linear perspective is characteristic of a few centuries of western art and
quite exceptional in the more general history
of representation.
4. Lepsius, n.d., Ill, 42.
5. For an attempt to work out a sort of compromise
in their two-dimensional form of appearance, the

artistic reproductions of three-dimensional objects
were not perspective reflections of their prototypes,
but technical projections of them. (Cf. Iversen 1990)
7. For a critical discussion of Schafer see Baines
1985a.
8. He adds that 'it is not an invariable rule that the
largest surface must be shown, and it is quite

conceivable that the smaller one should be chosen'. In Schafer (1986, xx), John Baines points
out, that in the 'Old Kingdom eggs are circular.
As is the tendency with the human torso, the
later shift to an oval aspect creates a more informative and distinctive image; it may also relate to the common use of the form as a
hieroglyph'.
9. Schafer 1974,127 ff. and 124 [1963,131] where he
writes:
In Egyptian art the most instructive cases of
ostensible sections, many of which could naturally be interpreted just as well as 'false transparencies', seem to me to be representations of
holes in the ground and similar phenomena.
One of the hieroglyphs for a pond or a hollow
94
filled with water is an open semicircle filled

with water lines O , and similar forms also
occur in New Kingdom landscapes next to pictures of <ponds [German Teichen]> {pots}
whose images are based on views from above.
10. For such material see Roik 1988.

11. Cf. the similar ambiguity in the drawing of seats
of chairs (Schafer 1974,140).
12. For a discussion of mental images see Lakoff
1987,444ff., notably the following quotations:
It is important at the outset to distinguish mental images from perceptions. A perception of a
scene is rich in detail;... Mental images have a
different character. . . . Not all of the field of
mental vision is filled. And although in daydreaming we form mental images without noticeable effort, constructing an image and
keeping it in mind is an effortful activity. Moreover, we can form images of things we can't
see. Imagine a basketball. Imagine a trunk. Imagine the basketball inside the trunk. Our real
eyes cannot see through the trunk to the basketball, but our mind's eye can' (pp. 444-5)
13. Genus being the level between family and species, the latter being defined biologically as the
level of interbreeding possibilities. For prototype
see further below.
14. 'Leur [certain Melanesian languages] division des
noms en deux classes a done un interet sociologique, et une analyse attentive de ce fait
linguistique peut contribuer a l'interpretation
exacte de certaines institutions des societes
inferieures' (Levy-Bruhl 1916,104).
15. For a rather more technical, Egyptological, discussion of what follows see Frandsen 1994.
16. John R. Harris has pointed out to me that
there is a serious problem of English usage in a
discussion of the subjective/objective genitive,
in that the words for 'fear', 'awe' (etc.) can
only be used of emotions experienced, not of
the force that gives rise to them: there is no
easy alternative as in Latin. Thus, 'fear of him'
would be acceptable as a translation of a supposed objective genitive, whereas 'his fear' will
not do if the genitive is the subjective, since it
cannot mean anything other than that he is the
one afraid.
At his suggestion I have therefore chosen to retain the Egyptian words in the text.
17. Morenz writes (1969,147):
Wir werden in Betracht ziehen miissen, dass
sich die 'Amtsperson Konig' aus einer Fiille
von Elementen aufbaut, die unter gegebenen
Umstanden im Leben wie im Tode selbstandig
in Erscheinung treten konnen. Neben den
95
(schliesslich allgemeinen anthropologischen)

Hauptbestandteilen k3, b3, 3bund b.3t, neben
Name, Schatten und anderen Elementen sind
beim Pharao Potenzen in Rechnung zu setzen,
die immer auf ihn beschrankt bleiben und
deren eine 'sein Schrecken' ist.
In a footnote (n. 34) he adds: 'Meine Definitionen

lassen es nicht geraten erscheinen, Begriffe wie
"Hypostase" oder "Personifikation" auf den
"Schrecken Pharaos" anzuwenden'.
18. Compare, however, this passage from the main
record of the 'First Hittite Marriage' where it is
said of the king as the manifestation of the sungod: 'Omniscient like Sia, one who searches the
bellies like Re, Lord of Heaven (si3 ib mi si3 dcr
hwt mi r nb pi), it is his terrifyingness who has
made people great, his impressiveness which
pacifies the evil (?) of this land' (in nrw-f sc3 rmt
Sft=fHr ship dww [,??<^] 13 pn) (Kitchen 1979,
240,14-241,1). Incidentally, the first part of this
quotation is probably more than an echo of the
famous "The Loyalist Teaching', cf. Posener 1976,
62-3.
19. Thus, in the classical stage of the Egyptian language the third person singular pronoun =/was
used to say 'his house' (pr=f) and 'his head' (tp=f).
In the later stages the Egyptians would say p3y=f
pr instead of pr-f for 'his house', while for 'his
head' they would still say tp-f.
20. For some basic observations see Stern 1880, ch.XI,
195; Erman 1933, 163-9; Gilula 1976,170-71;
Cerny & Groll 1984,59-66 (= 4.2.9). In Shenoutean Coptic MMO= is used 'to predicate so-called
"inalienable" possession . . . and is selected by a
special sub-paradigm of noun lexemes' (ShishaHalevy 1986,37); cf. Shisha-Halevy 1986,21; 237;
24 supra P 2; 32; 33,3-4; 34 with pp. 161 n. 36 and
162 n. 37; 130ff.. Cf. also Stern 1880, 317; Till
1955, 324; Till 1961, 208 and 296; Westendorf
1965-1977, 272 n. 5; Quack 1994, 35-6. The use of
the so-called weak plural article, attested in three
syntagms, was discussed in Polotsky 1968. According to him the presence of this otherwise 'nonexistent' article is due to the fact that the three
phrases all begin with 'an unstressed vowel (i.e.
vocalized zero consonant) with which the article
forms one syllable, as shown by the constant
absence of a point over the vowel' (Polotsky 1968,
245). This observation is not to be denied, but the
explanation for the occurrence of the article is
more likely to be that the core of each of the three
syntagms would seem to be made up of a word
belonging to the category of inalienable nouns.
Paul J. Frandsen
21. I fully subscribe, however, to the splendid remark of Sottas (1923, 78), who, on the subject of
the nomenclature applied to a certain grammatical form, said that 'a tout prendre, un non-sens
prete moins aux confusions qu'un contresens'.
22. John R. Harris has suggested that mention be
made of
the observed distinction between congenital
defects, which (as 'inalienable') are not infrequently represented, and, on the other hand,
accidental/acquired defects, which normally
are suppressed. This extends to embalming,
where accidents may be repaired but, to my
knowledge, deformities never are.
23. It should be mentioned, though, that similar phenomena are known from a large number of very
different languages, including some Indo-European ones, cf. the important paper by Rosen 1959.
24. iw t3y=f Sfyt hr %m-p3 wr lit. 'his impressiveness
entered into the prince' Doomed Prince 7,1-7,2 =
Gardiner 1932,6,3-4.
25. Cf. Quaegebeur 1975,123 ff..
26. Cf. Gardiner 1932, 72,15-73,2 (= Wenamun 2,5658; the intended Classical Egyptian encountered
in the cotext of this particular example makes it
even more valuable); Kitchen 1989, 257-8 (= O.
Letellier); Edwards 1960, I, 63 and II, pi. XXII (=
T.2 = P. Turin 1984, rt.18-20); id. I, 86 and II, pi.
XXXIII (= P.3 = P. Louvre E.25354, rt.55-8); id. I,
115 og II, pi. XLV (= B. = P. Berlin 10462 rt.40-42);
Kitchen 1979, 227, 8-10 (= Hittite Treaty 10-11);
Quack 1994, 310 (Ani B 20,12 = P. Boulaq 4, VII,
11-12); Gardiner 1932, 7,2; 8,5 and 8,15-16 (=
Doomed Prince 7,10; 8,5 and 8,11); Gardiner 1931,
pi. XVII (= P. Chester Beatty I, rt.17,7-9). Cf. also
Hubai 1992.
27. John Baines has suggested to me that since 'Egyptian art hardly ever shows more than 2 legs, even
though 2 is a bad number for standing, other
considerations must enter into the choice. Presumably the point of a table is that it stands up,
so that what is inalienable is space between the
top and the ground.' And John R. Harris has
remarked that 'in the matter of legs it may
be of some importance that the three-legged
"workmen's"stool is (?mostly) shown with three
legs.'
28. See, however, the remarks on, e.g. isolated objects in Schafer 1974,137 ff..
29. The 'hypothesis' of Sapir and Whorf, who were
among the more prominent precursors of what
is now usually referred to as 'socio-linguistics',
has for many years been discredited. In the last
96
analysis they believed that language exercised

command over culture to the extent that it could
influence non-linguistic behaviour. Language
was held to determine our perception and conceptualizing of the world. One of the most interesting critiques of this position was given by
Claude Levi-Strauss in his famous paper 'Linguistics and Anthropology' (1967), in which he
agrees that language is at one and the same time
a reflection of and a part of culture. But it can
also be 'a condition of culture' in the double
sense that 'it is mostly through the language that
we learn about our own culture', and that 'the
material out of which language is built is of the
same type as the material out of which the whole
culture is built: logical relations, oppositions, correlations, and the like. Language, from this point
of view, may appear as laying a kind of foundation for the more complex structures which correspond to the different aspects of culture' (p.
67). Language and culture, further, are both products of the human mind, but when we wish to
enquire into the nature of the connection between the two or to establish correlations, it is
important to bear in mind 'the level at which to
seek the correlations between language and culture' and what it is that 'we are trying to correlate'. One cannot correlate, e.g. 'the use of two
different prefixes for womankind among the
Oneida' with the social attitude vis a vis the same
group, because the 'level of behavior' cannot be
correlated with 'categories of thought'. Yet, LeviStrauss finds it hard to believe that it should be
'a pure coincidence that this strange dichotomy
of womankind should appear precisely in a culture where the maternal principle has been developed in such an extreme way as among the
Iroquois'. He suggests a different interpretation
of the phenomenon and maintains that 'when I
suggest this interpretation, I am not trying to
correlate language and behavior, but two parallel ways of categorizing the same data' (p. 71).
What went wrong for Whorf was that 'he [was]
trying to correlate' 'a crude, superficial, empirical view of the culture itself with the 'linguistic
structure'. 'So he is really trying to correlate things
which belong to entirely different levels' (pp.
72-3). For a review of the history of the hypothesis, and 'a discussion of the Whorfian formulation and the critical and empirical work to which
this formulation has been subjected', see Currie
1966.
Today there is a renewed interest in the ideas
of Whorf, and several experiments seem to confirm some of his more radical views, cf. Lakoff
1987, 269-337, esp. chapter 18 'Whorf and Relativism' which contains, inter alia, an account of
the famous experiment of Kay & Kempton (1984),
whose test of the interplay of cognition and naming was seen to confirm Whorf's contention that
the structure of language influences perceptual,
non-linguistic cognition, and thus that naming is
part of cognition.
30. See Needham 1979, 65:
A simple example is that of five objects defined by five features. It is possible for each of
the objects to have four out of the five defining features, and thus to resemble one another overall, yet for no single feature to be
common to all of the objects: e.g. (1) A B C D,
(2) ABC E, (3)ABD
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
E, (4) A C D E, (5) BCD
E. The five objects can thus be classed together

by having each a preponderance of the defining features, but there is no single feature that
is common to all, and the missing feature is
different'for each object.
For other applications of this principle see Lakoff
1987,16-21 et passim.
For an extremely stimulating survey of research
in different fields leading to the construction of
the modern cognitive model, see Lakoff 1987,
chapter 2, 'From Wittgenstein to Rosch'.
Mnemonic considerations played an important
part already in the universal system of classification worked out by Wilkins, see Eco 1994,251^4.
Lakoff 1987, 34-5, and Cain 1958, 144-63, as
quoted in Lakoff 1987.
At this level, people function most efficiently
and successfully in dealing with discontinuities
in the natural environment. It is at this level of
physical experience that we accurately distinguish tigers from elephants, chairs from tables, roses from daffodils, asparagus from
broccoli, copper from lead, etc.. One level
down, things are much more difficult. It is
much harder to distinguish one species of giraffe from another than to distinguish a giraffe
from an elephant. Our capacity for basic-level
gestalt perception is not tuned to make easy,
clear-cut distinctions at such lower levels.
(Lakoff 1987, 269)
This view, incidentally, is in certain important
respects almost the very opposite of that of the
French school of sociology, which argued that
the first classes were social classes since 'the human mind lack[ed] the innate capacity to construct complex systems of classification' (Needham
1963, xi). As Durkheim & Mauss say
We have seen, indeed, how these classifications were modelled on the closest and most
fundamental form of social organization. This,
however, is not going far enough. Society was
not simply a model which classificatory
thought followed; it was its own divisions
which served as divisions for the system of
classification. The first logical categories were
social categories; the first classes of things were
classes of men, into which these things were
integrated. It was because men were grouped,
and thought of themselves in the form of
groups, that in their ideas they grouped other
things, and in the beginning the two modes of
grouping were merged to the point of being
indistinct' (Durkheim & Mauss 1963, 82-3).
'Men, by organizing themselves, created groups
and divisions that taught them to classify.'
(Needham 1979, 27). And compare this with yet
another quotation from Lakoff:
What gives human beings the power of abstract reason? Our answer is that human beings have what we will call a conceptualizing
capacity. That capacity consist in: [a] the ability
to form symbolic structures that correlate with
preconceptual structures in our everyday experience. Such symbolic structures are basic-level
and image-schematic concepts, [b] The ability
to project metaphorically from structures in
the physical domain to structures in abstract
domains, constrained by other structural correlations between the physical and abstract
domains. (Lakoff 1987, 280-81)
36. See also Lakoff (1987, 6):
But a large proportion of our categories are not
categories of things; they are categories of abstract entities. We categorize events, actions,
emotions, spatial relationships, social relationships, and abstract entities of an enormous
range: governments, illnesses, and entities in
scientific and folk theories, like electrons and
colds. Any adequate account of human thought
must provide an accurate theory for all our
categories, both concrete and abstract.
Furthermore:
Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not clearly
delineated in our experience (the emotions,
ideas, time, etc.), we need to get a grasp on
them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial orientations,
objects, etc.). The need leads to metaphorical
definition in our conceptual system. (Lakoff &
Johnson 1980,115)
37. Cf. also pp. 151ff. and" Lakoff 1987, xiv:
Thought is imaginative, in that those concepts which
are not directly grounded in experience employ metaphor, metonymy, and mental im97
Paul J. Frandsen
agery all of which go beyond the literal

mirroring, or representation, of external reality.
It is this imaginative capacity that allows for
'abstract' thought and takes the mind beyond
what we can see and feel. The imaginative
capacity is also embodied indirectly since
the metaphors, metonymies and images are
based on experience, often bodily experience.
38. It should be noted here that there are languages
where chains of genitives are used to express
what in the Indo-European languages is expressed by means of verbal patterns (Egerod 1984,
17-18, cf. 6), and that Egyptian, in the opinion of
some scholars, might seem to have had a similar
structure. See, conveniently, Polotsky 1964,1313; Schenkel 1990,115-21.
39. As mentioned above, other terms such as 'nonacquirable nouns' have been used in more specifically grammatical discussions.
40. See the very penetrating discussion in Finnestad
1985,121ff..
41. In English, too, body metaphors are quite widespread. Just as we would talk about somebody
as being 'the right hand' of the 'head' of an organization, the subjects of Pharaoh could be his
'ears', 'eyes', 'mouth', etc.. For material on and
related to the use of body metaphors see Grapow
1924,106-29; Strieker 1963; 1968; 1975; 1982; and
1989; Lefebvre 1952; Lacau 1970; Piankoff 1930.
Reference should also be made to Dhorme 1923.
It should be noted that the use of body metaphors is not restricted to animate things. Inanimate objects like, for example, obelisks can have
a 'body' (dt) (Sethe 1906, 367,9), and in what
might possibly be a jocular context, its length is
given in terms of the length of its 'nasal bone'
(iwn n fnd) (P. Anastasi 1,15,3). According to
Grapow (1954, 37), this expression 'kann hier bei
einem Obelisken, einer vierzeitigen Spitzsaule
mit quadratischem Querschnitt, nur die Kante
bezeichnen sollen, iiber welche die Lange des
Obelisken gemessen wurde'. For the use of the
mouth to designate the entrance to buildings,
valleys, etc., see the references given above, and
Frandsen 1992.
42. See Leclant 1969; and, conveniently, Kakosy 1986.
There are also several important observations to
be found in the literature on Egyptological subjects, such as e.g. Cerny 1943, 344: '. . . we may
assume that for Egyptians there was a strong
similarity, if not identity, in the conception of
space in place and space in time'.
43. It is important to distinguish
98
between conceptual systems and conceptualizing capacities. The same capacities can give
rise to different systems in the following ways:
First, highly structured preconceptual experiences may be different. For example, for the
Cora, who live in the mountains of Mexico,
basic hill shape (top, slope, bottom) is a highly
structured and fundamental aspect of their constant experience. It is not only conceptualized,
but it has been conventionalized and has become part of the grammar of Cora. Cora speakers may have the same conceptualizing capacity
as we do, but they have a different system,
which appears to arise from a different kind of
fundamental experience with space. Second,
since experience does not determine conceptual
systems, but only motivates them, the same experiences may provide equally good motivation for two somewhat different conceptual
systems.... Third, the same basic experiences
and the same conceptualizing capacity may
still result in a situation where one system lacks
a significant concept that another system has ...
It should be borne in mind that the systemcapacity distinction cannot, in many cases, be
clearly drawn. (Lakoff 1987, 310)
44. All of this should not be taken to mean that the
meaning of a 'word' cannot be extended, modified, applied to other 'things meant', etc.. What
is at issue is, inter alia, the scientific credo that in
the process of signification the relationship,
whether direct or indirect, between the sign and
the significatum is arbitrary, so that there is no
inherent link between a sign and-what it stands
for. Expressed in terms of the triadic relation
current in semiotics, it is the arbitrariness of the
AB relationship (signifiant/signifie), which is called
in question. For an interesting, though rather
different, attempt at going beyond what grammars and dictionaries say, see Mysliwiec 1972.
See in general Lyons 1987, 95-119.
45.
L'unite de l'ecriture et de l'art 6gyptiens est
primordial; tous les deux sortent de la meme
genese, au meme moment, qui est le commencement de la premiere dynastie; tous les deux
etaient complementaires, des ce moment, ou
se relayaient. C'est pourquoi on peut affirmer
que l'art egyptien est tout entier 'hieroglyphique';
mais si je le fais, pour appuyer sur cet aspect
de la question, il faut ajouter que les hieroglyphes eux-memes font partie de l'art e'gyptien
et que la paleographie et l'iconographie ont
beaucoup de traits communs . . . A mon avis,
c'est evident qu'il [the fact that the writing
system does not note the vowels] ressort d'une
tendance qui nous est bien connue de l'art
egyptien, et qui depend elle-meme du but de
cet art: un besoin de permanence, l'annulation

de tout ce qui n'est que provisoire.' (Fischer
1986, 25 and 26; cf. also pp. 24-9).
Cf. also Vernus 1981 and 1995; Fischer 1963. For
the working of the writing system see Schenkel
1984; and most recently Depuydt 1994. And for
'the hypothesis that the hieroglyphic system is
based on the extreme application of the human
faculty of metaphorizing' see Goldwasser 1992.
46. Although there are no real difficulties in reading
a hieroglyphic text, the 'mechanics' of the writing system are still far from being fully understood. See, for example, Scharff 1942; Fischer 1977;
Hornung 1983,458 and 460; Te Velde 1985/1986;
Ray 1986; Goldwasser & Laor 1991; Goldwasser
1992; and Kahl 1994,105ff.. For metonymic models see Lakoff 1987, chap. 5 et passim.
47. Mutilated hieroglyphs could also be used in sportive writings such as in Lepsius 1904,103 (a better copy of Newberry 1893, pi. XVI and Lepsius
II,143d [= Beni Hasan, tomb no.17, for which see
further below]), where according to Sethe (1924,
62), %.ê$ is to be read ck hr-h3t prr hr-phwy
'who enters first and goes out last'. In the original the tail of the bird is written under, i.e.far,the
paws of the forepart of the lion, while the legs
are written under, i.e. hr, the hindpart of a lion!
48. In view of the varied and divergent definitions
in contemporary literary and post-modern linguistic theory of tropes such as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, it should be stressed that
for the purpose of the present argument the terms
used and the sense ascribed to them derive from
the writings of Lakoff and Johnson. For a good
survey of the problems, see Levinson 1983,14762.
49. In those cases where the sign has been deleted,
as in !>&}> (Sethe 1908, 560b; T.- as opposed to
k*i in M. and N.) the absence of the determinative
may be interpreted as 0 . The 'meaning' of the
word was 'compensated for' by the full phonetic
writing of the word.
50. This particular scene has been preserved in three
versions, two from the 18th and one from the
19th Dynasty. The standard study of the texts is
still Brunner (1964, 35-58).
51. The /ra;-chamber is the innermost part of certain buildings such as tombs, temples and palaces,
and the term connotes 'creation', 'rejuvenation',
'regeneration', 'end and beginning', 'perfection',
'beauty', 'goodness', etc. (cf. Frandsen 1992,53-4
et passim).
52. The version rendered here is the earliest of the
99
three, that of the birth of queen Hatshepsut in

the temple at Deir el-Bahri, which differs from
the Luxor version in having the phrase 'he gave
his heart towards her' or even better 'that of
hers'. For the Luxor version see Helck 1957,
1714,8-16.
53. See Murnane 1995, 22-3 and Davies 1992,28.
54. For a very important discussion of the passage in
question see Miiller 1966. However, like Brunner
1977, 1159 n. 3,1 do not agree that rdi ib r is an
accurate reflection of the Egyptians' anatomical
knowledge of the process of procreation (Miiller
1966, 273). Cf. also Piankoff 1930,44.
55. For the concept of decorum see the fundamental
study Baines 1985b, 277-86 et passim. For representations of sexual motifs in general see
Manniche 1987.
56. Drioton does not make any reference to Newberry!
57. For 'ejaculate', which is probably what Drioton
had in mind, the Egyptians used the word sti
'shoot', 'pour'.
58. See Brunner-Traut 1980; and Erman & Grapow
1928, 103,1 where the examples could easily be
multiplied. Love is also a property that may be
given rdi mrwt (Erman & Grapow 1928, 102,1921 and, for example, Brunner 1964, 56), and the
'love of someone' is far from being always an
'objective genitive' as is usually assumed; cf.
Morenz 1969, discussed above; Simpson 1977;
Assmann 1990,108; and Frandsen 1994.
59. The LOVE IS A GIFT metaphor as such is independent of the existence of the phrase rdi ib r,
and in light of the context of the scene it is therefore hardly significant that the phrase has been
left out in the Luxor version. At Medinet Habu
too little has been preserved to indicate what
was there; cf. Brunner 1986, pi. XVI.
60. The signs of life held in two arms have other
connotations as well, compare, for example, their
use in scenes of weighing the heart (Seeber 1976,
70; and Figs. 18 & 20).
61. Cf. in general Vernus 1985, 45-6 and Assmann
1987, 36^2.
62. I share the view of those who believe that most
Egyptian 'scenes' of an allegedly historical nature are, in fact, almost entirely devoid of specific historical content. Only thus can we
understand how, for instance, one and the same
representation of a 'historical event' could be
transmitted time and again throughout two millennia as an instance of one of the (ritual) deeds
of the incumbent pharaoh. Examples are legion:
Paul J. Frandsen
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On Categorization and Metaphorical Structuring. Some Remarks On Egyptian Art and Language (P.J. Frandsen, Cambridge Archaeologycal Journal, 7-1, 1997)

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Cambridge Archaeological Journal 7:1 (1997), pp.

On Categorization and Metaphorical Structuring:

The aim of this article is to discuss the relationship

his extremely comprehensive scientific taxonomy,

the characteristics of Egyptian art (Schafer 1974, 20

they are fundamental, there might be those who

Figure 1. Servants waiting on a lady; from a banquet

Egyptian Art and Language

Figure 2. Married couples, (a) Lepsius II, 21;

Figure 3. Married couples on benches; (a) Lepsius II,

two-dimensional projection, parts protruding from the

Figure 4. A man with his two dogs; detail from a Middle

plane' is by no means as clear as he seems to think.

Figure 6. 'Principles of the Section-Contour Drafting of

Egyptian Art and Language

what belongs to it' (Schafer 1974, 89 [1963, 97-8]).

plane parallel to the picture plane. This could not be

Schafer's very comprehensive and detailed analysis

palace. In Figure 10 the compound is seen from the

Figure 7. Slit stern of a boat enclosing a rudder, from a

Figure 8. Standard with image of a jackal god, from a

As far as the rendering of nature is concerned the

the slit-stern of a boat enclosing a rudder is shown

The hypothesis that the Egyptians' representations

Egyptian Art and Language

Figure 10. Representation of the palace at el-Amarna;

Figure 9. Representation of the palace at el-Amarna;

Figure 11. Ground plan deduced

relate it to other systems of classification. Thus at

Figure 13. Worshippers' footprints, from the roof of the

at a higher level or, say, a bulldog at the lower level.

melanesiennes'.u Since a discussion of such problems

In the Egyptian texts it is frequently said of

Egyptian Art and Language

instance, there are very clear distinctions between

falls within the concept of 'interactional properties'

the category of an object, let alone of an object per se.

'distinguish it from all others in the natural order.'

theory of prototypes and basic-level categories. (Lakoff

Thus, cognitive research argues that basic-level or

In other words, contrary to the traditional view, a

Egyptian Art and Language

of animals (Meeks 1986). Thus the 'personality' of

motor apparatus of our body, as well as its mental

In domains where there is no clearly discernible

identify our experiences as entities or substances,

A very obvious type of ontological metaphor is those

It will be seen that this approach to how a given

experience. Since, on this view, the language too is

But we can use the grammatical approach to show

Egyptian Art and Language

not live on earth, as the conventional rendering of

representations gives rise to an interesting feature

Figure 14. Mutilated hieroglyphs. (After Barb 1971,156.)

administration; of 'Brussels having decided', and so

man without a body is quite harmless [NOT ALIVE]

Egyptian Art and Language

would seem to tell a rather different story. Although

Figure 16. 'Birth-legend' in the version from the Luxor

the phrase 'give heart towards' rdi ib r. It would fall

Egyptian Art and Language

Figure 18. Hieroglyph, from tomb no. 17 at Beni Hasan;

CLeAVf olci/vn l(a_