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For Friday, August 15:

1. Digest the following cases: Ernesto v. CA, GR 52178, Sep 28, 1982 & Amadora v.
CA, GR L-47745, Apr 15, 1988 [compare/distinguish facts]; Escribano v. Avila, GR L30375, Sep 12, 1978; Pendon v. Diasnes, GR L-5606, Aug 28, 1952; Centeno v.
Villalon-Pornillos, GR 113092, Sep 1, 1994; Quibuyen v. CA, GR L-16854, Dec 26,
1963; Ferrer v. Pecson, GR L-5221, Oct 27, 1952.
2. Prepare for seat work on above cases (in lieu of recitation).
3. Prepare for 3rd Quiz
REVIEWER FOR THIRD QUIZ
This reviewer only consists of basic principles. Prepare also to apply these principles in
specific situations, based on the assigned cases.
Application of Principles on Legislative Intent (Spirit of the Law):

When the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases (cessante ratione
legis, cessat et ipsa lex): E.g., prohibition of share tenancy in new law impliedly
repeals all provisions of old law which is connected to share tenancy (such as prethreshing of harvest) although the repeal is not expressed (Pp v. Almuete, 1976
where the Court held that under the leasehold system, the prohibition against
pre-threshing has no more raison d'etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a
fixed rental ...)
Re Legislative omissions and clerical errors: Whatever omission may be
apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied
by an adherence to its avowed objective because what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of it as what is written.
Avoiding absurdity: The power of a court to supply or omit words from a statute
in order to prevent an absurd result which the legislature will not be supposed to
have intended, is well established. Statutes must be construed in such a way as to
give effect to the intention of the legislative authority, and so as to give a sensible
meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd
results, departing to the extent unavoidable from the literal language of the
statute.
Avoiding injustice: In instances where a literal application of a provision of law
would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of
logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code
admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt
the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justicia ruat coelum. Stated
differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a
solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
Surplasage and superfluity: Where there is a clear case of a failure to express a
meaning, a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming

and, consequently, from supplying any meaning. "If there is no meaning in it," said
the King in Alice in Wonderland, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we
needn't try to find any." (That is, if the meaning of the statute or provision itself
can be understood and interpreted but a phrase in it cannot, the phrase that fails
to express a meaning should just be ignored as a surplasage and superfluity.)
Law does not require the impossible: The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other
words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla
obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance
with what it prescribes [which] cannot, at the time, be legally accomplished.
Doctrine of Necessary Implication: What is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may
be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.
Interpretation of words and phrases
Words and phrases (W&P) may have ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal,
commercial or trade meaning depending on legislative intent.
Thus, in interpreting meaning and scope of such words & phrases, the whole
statute must be considered, as a whole, to determine the real intent.
General rule: W&P must be interpreted in accordance with well-accepted meaning;
they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
Exception: (1) When the law itself defines them; in which case they should be
understood according to the definition given by the statute itself, throughout the
statute; or (2) when the context in which the word or phrase is employed dictates a
different sense (Maxim: A word is to be understood in the context in which it is
used Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam).
Qualification to exception: Statutory definition does not apply where application
will create obvious incongruities in the language of the statute, will destroy one of
its major purposes, or will become illogical as a result of change in its factual basis.
General or restricted meaning
Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda A general statement is understood
in a general sense, meaning that, where a word used in a statute has both a
restricted and general meaning, the general meaning prevails over the restricted
meaning unless the nature of the subject matter or the context in which it is
employed clearly indicates that the restricted (or limited) sense is intended.
Progressive construction : Generic terms include things that arise therefrom This
interpretation extends application of statute to all subjects and conditions within its
general purpose or scope, including future subjects. This prevents statutes from
becoming ephemeral and transitory.
Where the laws does not distinguish...

we should not distinguish (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus)
because it is assumed that the legislature made no qualifications.
However, when there are facts or circumstances that show that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification, the courts may give effect to legislative
intent..
Associated words
Nosciter a sociis where a word is obscure or ambiguous (susceptible of various
meanings), it may be interpreted by considering the company of words in which it
is found or with which it is associated. Unless the law defines it differently, it will be
presumed to have a meaning similar to that of words associated with it.
Ejusdem generis (same kind or specie) Where a statute enumerates things of a
particular class or kind, accompanied by words of a generic or general character,
the generic words will be limited to things of a kindred nature with those
particularly enumerated.
o For ejusdem generis to apply, the ff must concur: (1) enumeration of
particular and specific words, followed by a general word or phrase; (2)
particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind; (3)
the enumeration is not exhaustive, or is not merely by examples; and (4)
there is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a
broader meaning.
o Enumeration is exhaustive if it embraces all persons or objects of the class.
o Caution: Ejusdem generis is not a universal principle it should be applied to
carry out, not to defeat, the intent or purpose of the law.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius what is not included is excluded
o Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matter, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters;
o A general expression followed by exceptions therefrom implies that those
which do not fall under the exceptions come within the scope of the general
expression; and
o The expression of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all
not expressed, even if all would have been implied had none been
expressed
o Not applicable if enumeration is by way of examples only.
o Like ejusdem generis, expressio unius is also not of universal application. It is
merely an auxiliary rule of interpretation that must give way to
circumstances indicating that the enumeration was not intended to be
exclusive.
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This applies
only if omission has been clearly established, but not where the legislature had not
intended to exclude. If the latter case is clearly indicated, the court may supply the
omission.
Doctrine of last antecedent Generally, qualifying words restrict or modify only
words or phrases to which they are immediately associated. In the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and qualifying words and phrases

must be applied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not to other
remote or preceding words or association of words, unless the context otherwise
requires.
o Here, punctuation marks, particularly the comma, is important.
o Redendo singula singulis a variation of last antecedent doctrine; means
referring each to each each word is applied to the subject to which it
appears, by context, most appropriately related.
Provisos, exceptions, saving clauses
Provisos:
o Common function is to restrain or qualify the generality of a clause or section
to which it refers. The primary purpose is to limit or restrict the general
language or operation of the statute. Usually starts with Provided, That...
However, a proviso can also enlarge instead of restrict or limit General rule is
that proviso qualifies only the phrase immediately preceding it (unless
legislature clearly intended it to have a wider scope).
o In case of conflict between a proviso and the main provision of a statute, that
which is located in a later portion of the statute prevails (subject to usual
exception of legislative intent). In general, in fact, in case of irreconcilable
conflict between provisions of a statute, the later provision prevails because
it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislature.
Exceptions
o Clause which expressly exempts something from the operation of the statute
and generally expressed in such words as except, unless otherwise,
shall not apply, but, but need not be introduced by such words (see
Pendon v. Diasnes, G.R. No. L-5606. August 28, 1952 example of exceptions
not preceded by except or unless)
o When there are exceptions, what is not in the enumeration of exceptions is
deemed included in the general rule.
o As a general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed
Saving Clause - Usually saves something (e.g., vested rights) from the effect of
repeal of a law

Strict or liberal construction

Kind of construction will depend on nature of statute, purpose to be served and
mischief to be remedied.
Purpose is to give interpretation that will best accomplish the end desired.
Construction/interpretation may either be strict or liberal depending on purpose
of legislation and rights affected. However these are also subject to exceptions.
In all cases, the test is legislative intent.
Strict construction
Cf Verba legis
Construction according to the letter of the statute; interpretation that does
not extend or enlarge the statute either by implication, intendment, or
equitable considerations beyond the literal meaning of its terms.
Examples of types of statutes that are generally strictly construed:

Penal statutes: Generally strictly construed against the State and liberally
in favour of accused;
o Means the court may not include or exclude matters or cases not
included or excluded in the provisions of the law.
o Means that only those persons, offenses, and penalties clearly
included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the
operation of the statute. They must come clearly within both the spirit
and the letter of the statute, and where there is reasonable doubt, it
must be resolved in favour of the person accused of violating the
statute (People v. Garcia, 1950, in Agpalo, p.398).
o Does not mean narrow construction that can defeat legislative intent.
Only means that courts must carefully safeguard the rights of
defendants and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the
legislature in enacting the law.
o Thus, if statute is ambiguous and admits two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which is in favour of the accused
should be preferred.
Statutes in derogation of rights
o Generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within
their scope or purpose.
Statutes granting privileges
o Granting advantages to private persons or entities may create special
privileges or monopolies that can violate equal protection clause of the
constitution (e.g., franchise).
o Strict construction requires that those who have been granted
privileges must comply strictly with its provisions, because privileges
are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of the one who grants
them (Barreto v. Tuason, 1926)
Naturalization Laws
o Strictly construed against the applicant because the right of an alien to
become a citizen is a statutory and not a natural right.
Statutes concerning the sovereign (the State)
o Restrictive statutes that impose burdens on the public treasury or
which diminish rights and interests of the State are strictly construed
o Statutes authorizing suits against the government. Constitution
provides that the State may not be sued without its consent. This is
based on the universal principle that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Moreover, without this principle, the State will be subjected to a lot of
inconvenience which can restrict government efficiency. However, it
has been held in a long line of cases that when government enters into
a contract with private persons, it is deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit.
Statutes prescribing formalities of execution of a last will

o The courts cannot dispense with statutory formalities in execution of a

last will and testament since these formalities have been imposed in
order to ensure that the testators intention is not defeated.
Liberal construction
Means such equitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a statute to
accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or promote justice.
Means construction that expands the meaning of a statute to meet cases
which are clearly within its spirit, intent and purpose.
However, a statute may not be liberally construed as to read into it
something which its clear and plain language rejects.
Statutes that are generally liberally construed:
o Social, general welfare legislations: Statutes that promote social
justice, general welfare, or growth of civilization. Included here are
labor laws, agrarian reform laws, pension laws, etc. which are liberally
construed in favour of intended beneficiaries.
o Procedural rules (e.g., Rules of Court) are also liberally construed under
the principle that technical rules should not be allowed to override
substantial justice.

Mandatory and directory statutes

Mandatory statutes
o Commands either positively that something be done or performed in a
particular way, or negatively that something not be done.
o Where the statute is mandatory, the court has no power to distinguish
between material and immaterial breach of, or omission to, compliance. Law
must be obeyed under pain of sanction or declaration of nullity of what has
been done.
Directory statutes
o A statute which is permissive or discretionary in nature
o Non-performance of what is prescribed, though constituting in some
instances an irregularity, will not vitiate the proceedings taken.
Classification important in resolving question of what effect should be given to a
statute (validity, liability, etc.)
Test to determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory is to ascertain the
consequences that will follow in case what the law prescribes is not done or what it
forbids is done.
Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory depends on its effect.
E.g., do substantial rights depend on it? Can injury result from ignoring it? Can the
intention of the legislature be accomplished in some other manner than that
prescribed?
Mandatory statutes usually use words of command: shall, ought, must, should,
should not, shall not, cannot. Directory statutes usually use permissive words: e.g.,
may. However, in some cases, it is necessary to discern legislative intent (e.g., if it
makes performance subject to availability of funds it is not mandatory even if the
word used is shall.)

Prospective and Retroactive Statutes

A prospective statute is one which operates upon facts or transactions that occur
after the statute takes effect (applies to the future); a retroactive law is one which
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in
respect to transactions already past.
Generally, laws operate prospectively unless a retroactive effect is expressly
declared or necessarily implied from the language of the law.
Art. 4 of the Civil Code provides: Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided. This implies that laws with retroactive application may be
passed but they must not impair constitutional rights: e.g., they may not impair
obligations of contract, deprive persons of property without due process of law, or
divest rights that have become vested. Ex post facto laws are also prohibited by
the Constitution (laws that make criminal an act done before its passage).
The following laws or rules are generally given retroactive application:
o Penal laws that are favourable to the accused. Exceptions: where accused is
a habitual delinquent; where the statute itself expressly provides that it shall
not apply to existing actions or pending cases; or, as held in Ferrer v. Pecson,
G.R. No. L-5221. October 27, 1952, where the accused disregards the later
law and invokes the prior statute under which he was prosecuted.
o Procedural laws new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumptively applicable to all actions (even pending actions), except, where
law itself excludes application to pending actions, when to apply it
retroactively would lead to injustice (as when vested rights are prejudiced), if
to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the courts.
o Curative statutes curative statutes are remedial by curing defects in earlier
laws and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. Thus, they
may be given retroactive application, subject to the usual exceptions: if they
impair obligations of contract or disturb vested rights. Exception to the
exceptions are police power legislations because autonomy of contracts as
well as vested rights must yield to the legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to prescribe regulations to promote health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.